The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 27.3

JOURNAL Issue 27.3 | Fall 2023

THE

of Conventional Weapons Destruction

3D MODELING ♦ COUNTER-IED ♦ DIGITAL EORE IN SOMALIA MINE ACTION IN LEBANON ♦ QUICK REACTION FORCE

ACCESSIBLE SEEDED FIELD

for mine action research

FIREARM DEACTIVATION

in Bosnia and Herzegovina

AMMUNITION ID GUIDE for Ukraine

Issue 27.3, Fall 2023

*CISR website: https://jmu.edu/cisr/journal/current-issue.shtml *JMU Scholarly Commons: https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal *ISSUU.com: https://issuu.com/cisr-journal *accessible html or pdf available

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Center for International Stabilization & Recovery (CISR) James Madison University - MSC 4902 Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA Email: cisr-journal@jmu.edu https://www.jmu.edu/cisr

TOPICS FOR VOLUME 28 (2024)

28.1 WINTER 2024 | 28.2 SUMMER 2024 | 28.3 FALL 2024

• Accessibility, Diversity, and Gender • Clearance & Technology • Countries/Regions

ISSN: 2469-7575

• The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction • Issue 20.1 ongoing: (print) ISSN 2469-7575; (online) ISSN 2469-7605 • For previous ISSN numbers visit www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/about.shtml

The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction is a professional trade journal for the humanitarian mine action/conventional weapons destruction community, including but not limited to mine action, physical security and stockpile management, small arms and light weapons, and other conventional weapons destruction related topics.

The editorial board reviews all submissions for content and accuracy, as well as suitability for The Journal. The editorial board reserves the right to reject articles.

Authors who submit articles to The Journal are expected to do so in good faith and are solely responsible for the content therein, including the accuracy of all information and correct attribution for quotations and citations.

Please note that all rights to content, including images, published in The Journal are reserved. Notification and written approval are required before another source or publication may use the content.

For more details please visit our website or contact the managing editor.

This publication is funded by grants from the US Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author[s] and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Department of State, the US Department of Defense, James Madison University, or the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.

• Environmental Mitigation • Funding & Sustainability • Health and Safety • Physical Security and Stockpile Management • Risk Education & Victim Assistance See page 65 and the CISR website for detailed descriptions of volume 28 (2024) topics

www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/cfps.shtml CISR Staff

SUZANNE FIEDERLEIN, PhD, Director NICOLE NEITZEY, Assistant Director

Publications Staff

SABRYN HEBERT, Assistant Editor

HEATHER HOLSINGER, Communications & Publications Manager JENNIFER RISSER, Managing Editor

BLAKE WILLIAMSON, Communications & Publications Specialist

Programs and Support Staff

AMY CZAJKOWSKI, Senior Project Manager/Program Coordinator

CAROLYN FIRKIN, Office Operations Manager LETITIA TURNER, Program/Financial Assistant

CHARLIE EICHELMAN, Graduate Assistant

Editorial Board

MICHAEL BUTERA

JENNIFER RISSER

STEPHANIE PICO

JABIN VAHORA

SUZANNE FIEDERLEIN, PhD

KRISTIN SKELTON

ON THE COVER:

A UAV captures imagery on the second floor of a structure in Old Mosul.

Mahmoud Dilaan Hussein, a local artist and stone mason, painted the mural (See article page 53). Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

Center for International Stabilizational and Recovery

Join the LinkedIn Group: https://linkedin.com/groups/4815644/ Like us on FACEBOOK: https://www.facebook.com/cisrjmu Follow on INSTAGRAM: https://www.instagram.com/cisr.jmu Follow on TWITTER: @cisrjmu

A MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR As I write, there is so much happening in the world of mine action, both encouraging and disheartening news. Just this week, reports claim that clearing Ukraine’s contamination will take decades; Lebanon announced it is free of ISIS-cleared IEDs; and we learned of three HALO bomb technicians injured in the Kherson region of Ukraine. Increasingly we read about floods displacing UXO, and extreme heat and fires causing ERW to explode. Given these unfolding events, it is of vital importance that we continue to share information, reporting on the issues, challenges, and successes we face in our programs around the world.

In this issue of The Journal: • Robin Toal delves into MAG’s emergency digital explosive

• Lieutenant Colonel Geir P. Novik (Norwegian Defence

ordnance risk education (DEORE) in response to a tragic

Research Establishment) discusses the training pro-

accident that occurred on 9 June 2023 in the Lower

gram for the deactivation of firearms, implemented by

Shabelle region of Somalia that killed twenty-seven people,

the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has

including twenty-two children. MAG’s rapid-response

encouraged capacity building, ensured that firearm deac-

DEORE materials on Facebook and Instagram illustrate

tivation is accomplished through international standards,

the effectiveness and lessons learned from this response.

and weapons are “rendered inoperable,” curbing illicit fire-

• Golden West’s Charlie Holloway reflects on the history

arm trafficking and criminal activity.

and present-day activities of the US State Department’s

• Lynna Banach (American Public University), Commodore

Quick Reaction Force (QRF), tasked with responding

Roy Vincent T. Trinidad, and Captain Julian B. Dolor (Armed

rapidly to landmine, battle area clearance, and physical

Forces of the Philippines) report on Golden West’s ordnance

security and stockpile emergencies. In partnership

recycling technology, and how its application could be

with State since 2013, Golden West highlights two QRF

employed in the Philippines to counter the prevalence of

deployments: a WWII aerial bomb in the Federated

ERW while also supporting its counterinsurgency battle.

States of Micronesia (2017) and a series of explosions in

• Mark Wilkinson, PhD, highlights the work of DanChurchAid

Equatorial Guinea (2021).

under the auspices of the Lebanese Mine Action Centre,

• Jasper Baur, Gabriel Steinberg, John Frucci, PhD, and Anthony

Brinkley

(Demining

Research

noting the country’s many successes in clearing decades

Committee/

worth of cluster bombs, mines, and ERW while also

Oklahoma State University/Columbia University) address

underscoring the challenges it faces in “completing the

the gap between mine action and academic research,

job.” Wilkinson notes that while Lebanon has demonstrated

planting a field with 143 diverse items including mines,

excellence in mine action, it continues to need international

IEDS, submunitions, and UXO to assess methods and test equipment for detection and mapping of ERW.

support to realize its opportunity of “complete clearance.”

• In partnership with the Iraq Directorate of Mine Action,

• Lieutenant Perederii (National Police of Ukraine), Tony

Iraqi State Bureau of Antiquities and Heritage, and the

Salvo (Bomb Techs Without Borders), and Drew Prater

US State Department, Erin Atkinson, Marc Dennehy, and

(Relyant Global) introduce the fourth edition of the free and

Craig Locke explore Tetra Tech’s clearance initiatives in

downloadable guide, “Basic Identification of Ammunition in

Old Mosul. Their work includes survey, clearance, and

Ukraine,” available in Ukrainian and English, which contains

debris removal at both the Al-Masfi Mosque and Al Tahera

entries for more than 500 munitions for the military and

Church. Through the use of a 3D model generated using

NGOs working to clear contamination in Ukraine.

photogrammetry and drones, they are able to accurately assess the scope and scale of the project.

As we look ahead, CISR is excited to announce the 28th volume of The Journal publishing in winter 2024. We are eager to share our new calls for papers on a diverse array of topics. These range from regional focuses on Myanmar, South Sudan, Yemen, and Ukraine to thematic issues including environmental mitigation, liability and land release, first-aid training and trauma care, broadening victim assistance, and how we are addressing bias through our use of language and imagery. Please note that in addition to the full list of topics, we encourage submissions encompassing all areas of mine action and welcome enquiries on potential articles and the review process. We look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Suzanne Fiederlein, PhD ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

3

contents 6

AN ACCESSIBLE SEEDED FIELD FOR HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION RESEARCH

By Jasper Baur, i,iii Gabriel Steinberg, i John Frucci, PhD ii and Anthony Brinkley ii [ Demining Research Community, i Oklahoma State University, ii Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University iii ]

19

EMPOWERING HOST NATION COUNTER-IED AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY EFFORTS: Innovative Application of Ordnance Recycling

By Lynna Banach [ American Public University ], Commodore Roy Vincent T. Trinidad [ Armed Forces of the Philippines ], and Captain Julien B. Dolor [ Armed Forces of the Philippines ]

24

INTEGRATED COOPERATION IN IMPLEMENTING FIREARM DEACTIVATION CAPABILITIES: Bosnia and Herzegovina

By Lieutenant Colonel Geir P. Novik [ Norwegian Defence Research Establishment ]

30

AMMUNITION IDENTIFICATION GUIDE FOR UKRAINE: A Collaborative Project Amidst War

By Lieutenant Perederii, i Tony Salvo, ii and Drew Prater iii [ National Police of Ukraine, i Bomb Techs Without Borders, ii and Relyant Global iii ]

4

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

35

MINE ACTION IN LEBANON: Innovation, Learning, and Finishing the Job

By Mark Wilkinson, PhD [ DanChurchAid ]

42

MAG EMERGENCY RESPONSE: Digital Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in Somalia

By Robin Toal [ Mines Advisory Group ]

49

DEPARTMENT OF STATE’S QUICK REACTION FORCE: Twenty-three Years of Service

By Charlie Holloway [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]

53

REVIVING OLD MOSUL: 3D Modeling Aids Safe Clearance in Iraq

By Erin Atkinson, Marc Dennehy, and Craig Locke [ Tetra Tech ]

65

ENDNOTES

69

CALLS FOR PAPERS

Special thanks to our contributing organizations:

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

5

AN ACCESSIBLE SEEDED FIELD for Humanitarian Mine Action Research

By Jasper Baur,i,iii Gabriel Steinberg,i John Frucci, PhD ii and Anthony Brinkleyi [ Demining Research Community,i Oklahoma State University,ii Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia Universityiii ]

MOTIVATION The detection of buried and surface explosive remnants of war (ERW) is a critical task in the land release process.1 The goal of this project is to create a long-term study site and benchmark to accelerate humanitarian mine action (HMA) research for the detection of buried ERW, including

unexploded

landmines,

and

ordnance

(UXO),

improvised

explo-

sive devices (IEDs). A crucial step in transitioning experimental detection techniques from the lab to the field is conducting rigorous field testing in a realistic and safe environment. 2,3,4 With

most

academic

institutions

lacking access to stockpiles of inert ERW to conduct testing and prioritizing scientific publications over realworld field applicability, this step is too often neglected. The result is that most HMA studies lack sufficient benchmarking among detection variables such as depth of burial, size and diversity of ERW, and environmental context, making it nearly impossible to objectively compare the effectiveness of different instruments and sensors. Consequently, the humanitarian demining community is less willing to accept novel methods and

6

instead relies largely on traditional

FIGURE 1. Orthomosaic of the initial field on 7 March 2023 (1) next to the same field on 13 June 2023 (2) processed in Pix4DMapper.

approaches.

All graphics courtesy of the authors.

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Military munitions response (MMR), an industry focused

the results of the benchmark tests are rarely released

on clearing UXO from formerly used defense sites, differs

to the scientific community. Additionally, MMR focuses

from HMA in that it has strict industry standards and

almost exclusively on larger, buried metal UXO, while HMA

protocols for testing and evaluating new instruments

deals with clearance of landmines, UXO, and IEDs which

and methods on ground-truthed seeded fields with

can include plastic or low-metal content objects that are

known geophysical signatures and depths of burial.

present on the surface and at depth.6

5

Unfortunately, access to these fields are restricted and

OVERVIEW To

address

this

issue,

the

Demining

Research

located at OSU’s Center for Fire and Explosives, Forensic

Community, (a US-based nonprofit organization whose

Investigation, Training and Research (CENFEX) range

mission is to advance the field of HMA though bridging

in Pawnee, Oklahoma. This field was initially seeded in

7

academic research in accordance with demining organi-

March 2023 and was reseeded at a permanent location in

zations), in partnership with the Global Consortium for

June 2023. The permanent site will be open to the broader

Explosive Hazard Mitigation at Oklahoma State University

mine action community to test equipment and methods

(OSU), have seeded a comprehensive field with 143 diverse

for detecting and mapping ERW.

items including landmines, submunitions, UXO, and IEDs

INITIAL TEST SITE Environment. The topsoil of the burial site is a silt

Burial grid. We buried 143 items in total (including con-

loam for the A horizon 0–18 cm and a silty-clay loam

trol holes) in a grid pattern that covered 10 x 40 m for an

18–30 cm for the Bt1 horizon. It is categorized domi-

area of 400 m2. The grid consists of six columns (labeled

nantly as a RenC2-Renfrow silt loam by the Web Soil

A–F) spaced 2 m apart, each with 25 rows (labeled 1–25)

Survey (WSS) from the US Department of Agriculture.

8

spaced 1.5 m apart (Figure 2). We placed six ground control

The field is oriented approximately north-south in the long

points (GCPs), one at each corner and two inside of the

TABLE 1. Class and quantity of buried items.

direction. It is located on

CLASS

and is therefore littered

QUANTITY

an explosive test range with small metal frag-

Control Hole

8

Clutter

11

Projectile

25

AP landmine

27

were

AT landmine

2

ent. There was no veg-

Grenade

18

etation at the time of

40mm grenade

13

burial 7 March 2023,

Submunition

9

but after three months,

IED

7

knee-height weeds in

3D printed ERW

10

TNT stick

1

Shells & casing

10

Empty

9

Total

150

mentation. The field is relatively flat with no strong gradients that visually

appar-

Initial field, seeded 7 March 2023.

the northern end of the field grew (Figure 1). We can expect vegetation growth as time passes depending on the time of year.

FIGURE 2. Top panel shows an oblique angle of the initial field oriented from south (bottom) to north (top) showing columns A–F. Bottom panel shows an oblique angle of the permanent field oriented from east (bottom) to west (top) showing columns A–F.

Permanent field, seeded 15 June 2023.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

7

grid. The Northwest corner of the grid is A1 with the south-

between objects during data acquisition. Column B

east corner being F25. The buried items are a diverse set

contains eighteen hand grenades, one landmine, and six

of ERW. We categorize each item into broad classes con-

projectiles. Column C contains thirteen 40mm grenades,

sisting of Control hole, Clutter, Projectile, Anti-personnel (AP)

three projectiles, and nine submunitions. Column D

mine, Anti-tank (AT) mine, Hand grenade, 40mm grenade,

contains only AP mines. Column E contains thirteen

Submunition, Improvised Explosive Device (IED), 3D printed

projectiles, one landmine, ten shells or casings, and two

ERW, Shells & Casings, and Empty (nothing buried in this

IEDs. Column F contains two munition cases, one filled

location). The quantity of each class is shown in Table 1

with fuzes and the other with shrapnel, one plastic AT

and the specific type of ERW along with its weight, size,

mine, and ten pieces of clutter that include cell phones, a

ferrous or nonferrous metal content, and related notes are

copper pipe, aluminum cans, and metal shrapnel.

available in Table 4. The items were buried organized into columns by class and in some cases physical properties and appearance.

Figure 3 shows all the items in a condensed grid for visualization purposes. Column A contained six larger metal projectiles, one AT mine, and six IEDs, with smaller 3D-printed ERW and empty spaces placed between the larger metal items to minimize magnetic interference

FIGURE 3. Condensed grid for visualization of placement of each item, produced from structurefrom-motion photogrammetry. Columns A–E are accurate in terms of placement and order in the buried grid, and F is accurate in order of items, but there is offset of item placement. The exact placement and corresponding names of the items are available in Table 2 and 4.

EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN

8

The diversity of ERW and the structure of the field was

intervals to explore how different geophysical signatures

designed to allow scientists and researchers to tackle

of the ERW attenuate with depth. The depth for each

numerous questions related to ERW detection. This

item was carefully determined based on the likely field

involves deciphering which sensors are most useful for

deployment and depth of penetration for the specific

detection of which types of ERW.9 Each grouping of items

ERW. Larger projectiles are prone to penetrate deeper

as described previously were buried at different depth

into the ground, whereas submunitions and scatterable

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

TABLE 2. Placement and depth of each item in the grid.

Depth (cm) B

A Pressure cooker1 Plastic projectile2

1

Depth (cm)

Depth (cm)

C

Depth (cm)

D

Depth (cm)

E

8

M228 5

0

M3857

0

PFM-16

0

M693

2

M228 5

2

M385E47

0

PFM-16

0

M693

3

M6A1

3

20

M228

5

4

M385

7

0

PFM-1

6

0

60mm mortar

4

Plastic projectile2

2

M228

5

6

M385

7

0

PFM-1

6

0

Inert warhead

2

PFM-16

0

2

10 10

Depth (cm)

F Shrapnel cache10 Control hole11

12 14

8

Fuze cache

14

8

Control hole11

15

M49A33

6

VS-1.6 4

12

3

3

10

5

M6A13

16

M18 5

8

Undesignated dril7l

6

Plastic projectile2

4

M228 frag 5

0

M9187

2

PFM-16

0

M81A13

6

7

M833

12

Mk15

2

Drill round7

2

PFM-16

0

M2A3 6

4

8

Plastic projectile2

4

M228 frag 5

4

40mm 203 shrapnel7

4

PFM-16

0

Projectile3

4

9

AI pipe Bomb1

8

M228 frag 5

6

M385

4

PFM-16

0

M55A3

2

10 Plastic OZM2

2

M228 frag 5

8

40mm dummy7

4

PFM-16

0

M7153

2

11 AI pipe bomb1

6

M213 5

0

M7157

6

PFM-16

2

Drill round3

0

Shrapnel10

0 17 2

Control hole11 Aluminum can10 Control hole11 Aluminum can10 Control hole11

12 Plastic OZM2

4

M213 5

2

M427 7

6

PFM-16

2

20mm3

0

Control hole11

13 M63

4

M228 frag 5

4

M9187

6

PFM-16

4

KSF-cap 8

0

Shrapnel10

14 15 M65AI3

2

16 17 M65AI3

0

18 19 PVC pipe1

8

20 21 Propane tank1

16

22 23 PVC pipe

1

8

24 25 M124

12

M228 frag 5

6

Drill round3

8

PFM-16

4

KSF-casing 8

0

M228 frag 5

8

Drill round3

8

PFM-16

6

KSF-casing 8

0

Riot grenade 5

0

Drill round3

8

PFM-16

6

KSF-cap 8

2

M18 5

2

M42 6

0

PFM-16

8

KSF-casing 8

6

6

2

Hand grenade 343d

4

M46

2

PFM-1

10

KSF-casing

POMZ2M 6

6

M42 6

4

VPMA 2

0

TNT9

12

PGU-243

0

M42 6

6

VPMA 2

2

Tipman tank1

20

M7933

2

M38 6

0

VPMA6

4

MK 2/2 8

16

M7933

4

BLU-26 (D-1)/B 6

2

PMN 6

6

40 mm shell 8

M220

3

0

BLU-42/B

6

4

PMN

M2203

2

BLU-42/B 6

6

M2203

4

BLU-42/B (D-1)/B 6

2 17 4 20

20 4 30

Shrapnel10

6

Shrapnel10

8

Huawei phone10

2

HTC phone10

4

2

8

2

8

40 mm shell x2

8

2

TS-50 6

0

40 mm shell x3 8

2

8

TS-502

2

40 mm shell x47

2

2

Control hole11 Copper pipe10 Control hole11

15

LEGEND 1.

IEDs

6.

Scatterable and AP mines

2.

3D printed ERW

7.

40 mm grenades

3.

Projectiles

8.

Shells, fuze, or casing

4.

AT mine

9. TNT

5.

Grenade

10. Metal clutter 11. Control hole

landmines are placed on the surface and may become

The burial depths ranged from the surface to 20 cm.

For example, in B1–B5, five

Tables 2 and 4 have all the depth information per item.

nearly identical hand grenades were placed at different

Additionally, control holes were dug at various depths and

depths: one placed on the surface, one at 2 cm, 4 cm,

filled with the goal of decoupling a signature resulting from

6 cm, and 8 cm respectively. Grenades are likely to be

soil displacement or disturbance from one resulting from the

found on or close to the surface, so they were buried at

items themselves. This may be especially relevant for LiDAR

shallow depths in increments of 2 cm up to a final depth

and depth sensors that look at soil subsidence.11 Similarly,

of 8 cm. This will allow researchers to examine the signal

the clutter items will help determine if the signatures of the

attenuation with depth for future thermal, magnetic, and

ERW are unique and if they can be distinguished from metal

ground penetrating radar (GPR) surveys.

and electronic clutter. The non-unique signature problem

shallowly buried with time.

10

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

9

FIGURE 4. Permanent seeded field map displayed as an orthomosaic on a satellite map. The blue square shows the location of the IVS relative to the field. There is a pavilion for field operation logistics and gravel road access to the site. is particularly difficult for certain sensor modalities, and

Over time (months to years), natural environmental

we hope that the presence of clutter in our seeded field

emplacement and equilibriums will be reached, providing us

will help researchers identify ways to reduce false positive

with a realistic field that is usually only found in confirmed

detections.12,13

hazardous areas. This time-since-seeded variable is often

There are plastic, low metal, and metal (ferrous and

unaccounted for in other HMA geophysical studies and

non-ferrous) ERW buried in the seeded field. This will allow

is especially relevant for datasets that rely on realistic

researchers to compare the viability of different sensor

resettling of the ground or a thermal equilibrium to be

modalities for different material properties. For example,

reached.14,15,16,17 Lastly, while weeds and light vegetation are

we have the metal American M-12A1 anti-vehicle (AV)

present, there are no large trees or bushes in the field site

landmine and the plastic Italian VS-1.6 AV landmine both

to prevent testing of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and

buried at 12 cm depth.

ground-based methods.

LIMITATIONS Given one test location, studies using this field cannot

ERW detectability in all regions of the world.18 Despite this,

address the effect of differing environmental factors such

it is necessary to constrain environmental variables to

as soil type and vegetation biodiversity on detectability

allow for a clear, objective comparison of detection rates

of ERW. Landmines and UXO are found in sixty countries

for different geophysical sensors. Other environmental

and territories around the world in diverse environments

parameters such as soil moisture, temperature, and

ranging from the tropical rainforests of Southeast Asia

humidity, which affect GPR and thermal imagery, change

to the deserts of the Sahara, thus not all the geophysical

daily and must be considered and recorded.19,20

tests on this field will provide transferable knowledge for 10

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

FIGURE 5. Instrument verification strip, ISO buried at recorded depths of 6 inches (15.2 cm), 13 inches (33.0 cm), and 20 inches (50.8 cm) respectively.

BENCHMARK SURVEYS From

12–16

Research

Among the datasets collected were thermal, visual,

Community with affiliate researchers from OSU, the

magnetic, GPR, stereoscopic, and LiDAR surveys with both

Department

Binghamton

UAV- and ground-based platforms (cart and handheld) over

University and University of Maryland, and Lamont-

the field site. Once processed, these datasets and the

Doherty Earth Observatory at Columbia University

subsequent analysis will be made freely available to the

collected the first major datasets on the seeded field.

HMA community, providing the first comparative dataset

of

June

2023,

Geological

the

Demining

Sciences

at

on this seeded field for future studies.

PERMANENT SITE On 15 June 2023, after the benchmark surveys on the

is that the twenty-five rows are spaced 1 m apart instead

initial field were conducted, the items were unburied and

of 1.5 m in the previous field due to a space constraint.

reseeded in a new permanent site. The ongoing burial

The dimensions of this field are 10 m x 25 m with a total

is meant to simulate real-world conditions where UXO

area of 250 m2 (Figure 4). This field is about 150 m from

and mines need to be detected months to years after a

the initial site and oriented approximately east-west

conflict has ended.

lengthwise. The soil layers vary slightly from the initial field

The permanent site has the same seeding pattern and

with the first 6–8 cm consisting of silty loam and 8–30 cm

burial depths as the original field. The primary difference

depth consisting of a dense silty-clay that is difficult to dig

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

11

FIGURE 6. Scaled pictures of A) 20mm projectile, B) TS-50 AP mine, C) M12 AT mine, D) M213 grenade. through. Wooden popsicle sticks were placed to mark the

columns B and C and rows 16 and 17 and the SE-center

locations of the buried items so as not to interfere with

GCP is located between columns D and E and rows 8 and

future magnetic surveys. There is a minimal amount of

9. The placement of each ISO and GCP was recorded

small metal fragmentation in this site compared to the

using a handheld Trimble Geo7x with accuracy of ±5

initial site.

cm. Coordinates of the GCPs and ISOs are provided in

An instrument verification strip (IVS) was installed near

Table 3.

the permanent site. The IVS has items with known shapes, sizes, and magnetic signatures that serve to calibrate instruments, especially magnetometers. The IVS contains four industry standard objects (ISO) 3 m apart as shown in Figure 4 to include two small, one medium, and one large

GCP/ISO

LATITUDE

LONGITUDE

GCP NE

36.3531001

-96.856893

inches, and the large ISO was buried horizontally at 20

GCP NW

36.3531111

-96.857171

inches. Each ISO was made from black steel pipe nipples,

GCP SE

36.3530033

-96.8569

with the exception of one small ISO. The first small ISO is

GCP SW

36.3530164

-96.857078

GCP NW-center

36.3530772

-96.857078

long. The medium ISO is Schedule 40, 2 inch straight pipe

GCP SE-center

36.3530375

-96.856996

nipple and is 8 inches long. The large ISO is a Schedule 40,

ISO 20mm

36.3531296

-96.857243

4 inch straight pipe nipple and is 12 inches long.

ISO small

36.3531282

-96.857263

ISO medium

36.3531299

-96.857285

ISO large

36.3531283

-96.857306

ISO (Figure 5). The two small ISOs were buried horizontally at 6 inches, the medium ISO was buried horizontally at 13

a heavy hex head bolt, 2 inches long. The second small ISO is Schedule 40, 1 inch straight pipe nipple and is 4 inches

Six ground control points (GCPs) were placed at the permanent site: one at each corner of the grid and two in the center. The NW-center GCP is located between 12

TABLE 3. Locations of GCPs and ISOs as measured from the Trimble Geo7x.

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

FIGURE 7. The left image shows the technique used to measure burial depth. The right image shows the digging process.

METHODS Pre-burial data collection. Prior to burial, each item was

Burial techniques. After each item went through

weighed, measured (length and diameter), photographed

several measurements, we transported them to their

with and without a scale, and underwent a ferrous metal

designated burial location. After all the items were placed,

test. The workflow for taking these measurements

we conducted a thermal and visual light drone survey

followed a systematic process. First, we organized the

over the field. The processed visual surveys are shown in

ERW into a condensed grid in the arrangement in which

Figures 1 and 4. Next, we dug burial holes for each item

they would be buried (Figure 3). Next, each item was

and placed the item into its hole. We tried to dig holes

weighed on a small food scale accurate to 1 g. A small

to the proper depth to mitigate soil disturbance. In some

portion of the larger items (such as the pressure-cooker

instances, the hole was deeper than intended and we had

and metal AT mine) were too heavy for the small scale

to remove the item, infill it, and then replace the item. In

and were weighed using a digital luggage scale accurate

other instances, we needed to continue digging to make

to 100 g. Next, we used a ruler to measure the length

the hole the intended depth. After the item was placed

and diameter of each item in place. Then we conducted

into the hole, two rulers were placed, one horizontal on

a ferrous metal test, placing a magnet on each item and

the soil surface and one vertical resting on the uppermost

recording if the item was composed of a ferrous or non-

surface of the item. We then recorded the depth to the

ferrous material. Finally, we placed the items next to a

center of mass of the object based on the intersection of

water bottle and a ruler for scale and took bird’s eye view

these rulers (Figure 7). For this method, we estimate an

pictures. Figure 6 shows examples of the scaled pictures.

error of ±1 cm. Once an item was buried, the hole would

The collected data for each item can be found in Table 4.

be filled until level with the surface and the soil was not

These measurements were collected prior to seeding the

manually compacted.

initial test site.

CONCLUSION We seeded a well-documented test field consisting of 143

methods and instruments they develop with transparency

diverse inert ERW in a grid pattern at depths ranging from

and uniformity. The first iteration of this field was seeded

0 to 20 cm equipped with an instrument verification strip.

on 7 March 2023 and remained in place for three months.

This field is intended to serve as a benchmark to the HMA

Before the initial site was unburied, our team along with

community, allowing researchers to thoroughly test the

university and industry partners, collected the first aerial ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

13

TABLE 4. The specific type of ERW buried along with its weight, size, ferrous or nonferrous metal content, and related notes.

ID

Item

Class

Depth

Weight (g)

Length (cm)

Diameter (cm)

Ferrous (1) or NF (0)

Country

A1

Pressure Cooker

IED

8

3800

20

23

0

Afghanistan, India, and Pakistan

A2

Plastic Projectile

3D Printed

2

90

16.8

4

0

A3

M6A1

Rocket

20

1500

54

6.8

1

A4

Plastic Projectile

3D Printed

2

90

16.8

4

0

A5

M6A1

Rocket

16

1500

54

6.6

1

A6

Plastic Projectile

3D Printed

4

90

16.8

4

0

A7

M83

Projectile

12

1108

36.6

6.4

1

A8

Plastic Projectile

3D Printed

4

90

16.8

4

0

A9

Aluminum Pipe Bomb

IED

8

1318

35.2

5

1

A10

Plastic OZM

3D Printed

2

200

12

7.2

0

A11

Aluminum Pipe Bomb

IED

6

1019

25.4

5

1

A12

Plastic OZM

3D Printed

4

200

12

7.7

0

A13

M6

Rocket

4

1400

55

6

1

M65AI

Projectile

2

922

21.2

6

White projectile that’s dented in

M65AI

Projectile

0

922

21.2

8.4

White projectile

PVC Pipe

IED

8

870

37

8.8

0

Wide PVC pipe

Propane Tank

IED

16

1290

29.4

13

1

Empty black propane tank

PVC Pipe

IED

8

760

45.6

5.4

0

Longer PVC, mostly nonferrous, with ferrous handle

M12AI

Anti-tank mine

12

4200

12.8

33

1

Reference

Notes Empty at burial, mostly non ferrous, handles ferrous

US

OP 1664

2.36 inch bazooka

US

OP 1664

2.36 inch bazooka

US

OP 1664

60mm Illum

US

OP 1664

2.36 inch bazooka

A14 A15 A16 A17 A18 A19 A20 A21 A22 A23 A24 A25 B1

M228

Grenade

0

482

11

6

1

B2

M228

Grenade

2

499

11

6

1 1

B3

M228

Grenade

4

492

11

6

B4

M228

Grenade

6

401

11

6

1

B5

M18

Grenade

8

294

11

6

1

B6

M228 Frag

Grenade

0

621

11.2

5.8

1

B7

Mk1

Grenade

2

501

11.2

5.8

1

B8

M228 Frag

Grenade

4

483

11.2

5.8

1

B9

M228 Frag

Grenade

6

474

11.2

5.8

1

B10

M228 Frag

Grenade

8

452

9

5.8

1

B11

M213

Grenade

0

397

8.8

6.5

1

B12

M213

Grenade

2

456

8.8

6.5

1

B13

M228 Frag

Grenade

4

490

11.2

5.8

1

B14

M228 Frag

Grenade

6

525

11.2

5.8

1

B15

M228 Frag

Grenade

8

584

11

5.8

1

B16

"Rusty" Aluminium

Grenade

0

303

12

6

0

14

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

US

OP 1664

Practice M12 landmine

US

60E-2-2-27

Israeli version

US

OP 1664

Rusty aluminium

ID

Item

Class

Depth

Weight (g)

Length (cm)

Diameter (cm)

Ferrous (1) or NF (0)

Country

Reference

B17

M18

Grenade

2

157

12

6

1

US

60E-2-2-94

Purple smoke German concussion grenade

Notes

B18

Handgranate 343d

Grenade

4

147

12

6

1

Germany

60E-6-2-4

B19

POMZ-2M

Anti-personnel frag

6

1198

10.5

6

1

Russia

60H-1-1-1

B20

PGU-24

Projectile

0

490

22

4

1

US

60D-2-2-293

20mm projo

B21

M793

Projectile

2

243

22

4

1

US

60D-2-5-16

25mm TP-T

B22

M793

Projectile

4

243

22

4

1

US

60D-2-5-16

25mm TP-T

B23

M220

Projectile

0

227

18.2

3

1

US

60D-2-2-28

20mm TP

B24

M220

Projectile

2

227

18.2

3

1

US

60D-2-2-28

20mm TP

B25

M220

Projectile

4

225

18.2

3

1

US

60D-2-2-28

20mm TP

C1

M385

40mm

0

246

7.5

4

0

US

60D-2-2-303

Practice 203mm grenade

C2

M385E4

40mm

0

251

7.5

4

0

US

60D-2-2-303

Practice 203mm grenade

C3

M385

40mm

0

245

7.5

4

0

US

60D-2-2-303

Practice 203mm grenade

C4

M385

40mm

0

245

7.5

4

0

US

60D-2-2-303

Practice 203mm grenade

C5

Undesignated drill

40mm

2

165

10

4

0

US

UNKN

Rubber 40mm 203 round

C6

M918

40mm

2

190

10.4

4

1

US

60D-2-2-23-11

40mm prac with spotting charge

C7

Drill Round

40mm

2

103

11

4

0

US

C8

40mm 203 shrapnel

40mm

4

116

6.2

4

1

C9

M385

40mm

4

304

10.4

4

0

US

C10

Undesignated 40mm dummy

40mm

4

105

10

4

0

US

C11

M715

40mm

6

92

7.6

4

0

US

60D-2-5-28

Green smoke 40mm 203

C12

M427

Fuze

6

203

9.8

4

0

US

60F-2-3-32

2.75 inch rocket fuze

C13

M918

40mm

6

238

8.5

4

1

US

60D-2-2-23-11

40mm prac with spotting charge

C14

Drill Round

Projectile

8

384

11.2

4

0

US

C15

Drill Round

Projectile

8

319

11.2

4

0

US

40mm drill 203 40mm drill 203, ferrous casing, body NF

40mm drill 203 Projectile 60D-2-2-303

40mm prac solid 40mm dummy 203

40mm frill 203, ferrous casing, body NF

C16

Drill Round

Projectile

8

335

11.2

4

0

US

C17

M42

Scatterable

0

211

7.4

4

1

US

60T-2-2-12

HEAT submunition

C18

M46

Scatterable

2

209

7.4

4

1

US

60T-2-2-12

HEPD submunition

C19

M42

Scatterable

4

213

7.4

4

1

US

60T-2-2-12

HEAT submunition

C20

M42

Scatterable

6

214

7.4

4

1

US

60T-2-2-12

HEPD submunition

C21

M38

Scatterable

0

130

4

0

US

60C-2-1-2

Golf ball

60C-2-1-2

Prac baseball submunition

C22

BLU-26 (D-1)/B

Scatterable

2

413

6

1

US

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

15

ID

Item

Class

Depth

Weight (g)

C23

BLU-42/B

Scatterable

4

C24

BLU-42/B

Scatterable

C25

BLU-26 (D-1)/B

D1

Length (cm)

Diameter (cm)

Ferrous (1) or NF (0)

Country

Reference

Notes

314

6

1

US

60B-2-2-36

Baseball submunition Halfshell X2

6

304

6

1

US

60B-2-2-36

Baseball submunition Halfshell X2

Scatterable

8

406

6

1

US

60C-2-1-2

Prac baseball submunition

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D2

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D3

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D4

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D5

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D6

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D7

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D8

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D9

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D10

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

0

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D11

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

2

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, Missing wing

D12

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

2

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D13

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

4

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D14

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

4

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D15

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

6

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D16

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

6

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D17

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

8

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D18

PFM-1

Scatterable Anti-personnel

10

72

11.8

6.2

1

Russia

Training, fuze is ferrous, body is not

D19

VPMA

3D Printed

0

87

3.2

10.5

0

D20

VPMA

3D Printed

2

87

3.2

10.5

0

D21

VPMA

Anti-personnel Blast

4

126

3.5

10.5

0

D22

PMN

Anti-personnel Blast

6

248

5

8

1

D23

PMN

3D Printed

8

167

6.5

11

0

D24

TS-50

Anti-personnel

0

135

4.5

9

1

D25

TS-50

3D Printed

2

88

4.5

9

0

E1

M69

Projectile

10

1850

19.4

6

1

US

OP 1664

Practice 60mm mortar/ no fuze well

E2

M69

Projectile

10

1900

19.4

6

1

US

OP 1664

Practice 60mm mortar

E3

60mm Mortar

Projectile

8

1260

21

5.5

1

E4

Inert Warhead

Rocket

8

1148

21

7

1

US

E5

M49A3

Projectile

6

1000

23

7

1

US

60D-2-2-262

E6

M81A1

Projectile

6

881

17

3.5

1

US

OP 1664

E7

M2A3

Landmine

4

840

15.4

6.4

1

US

60A-2-1-12

E8

Unknown

Projectile

4

558

18.8

8.6

1

16

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Rusted 60mm Mortar 2.75 inch factory inert warhead, 60mm 60mm mortar Bounding frag

ID

Item

Class

Depth

Weight (g)

Length (cm)

Diameter (cm)

Ferrous (1) or NF (0)

Country

Reference

E9

M55A

Projectile

2

217

17

3

1

US

60D-2-1-12

20mm TP

60D-2-5-28

Green smoke 40mm 203

E10

M715

Projectile

2

860

12.2

3.8

1

US

E11

Drill Round

Projectile

0

865

16.4

3.8

1

US

E12

20mm

Projectile

0

275

13.8

3.4

1

Notes

20mm projo with rounded base

E13

KSF-cap

Casing

0

61

6.6

5.8

1

Russia

E14

KSF-casing

Casing

0

154

20.5

6.2

1

Russia

E15

KSF-casing

Casing

0

105

23

5

1

Russia

E16

KSF-cap

Casing

2

82

6.8

6

0

Russia

E17

KSF-casing

Casing

2

153

20.5

6.2

1

Russia

E18

KSF-casing

Casing

2

106

23

5

1

Russia

E19

TNT

TNT

12

482

18

4.6

0

E20

Tipman Tank

IED

20

1376

28

9

0

E21

MK 2/2

Projectile

16

216

22

5

0

E22

40mm Shell

Shell

2

49

4.5

4

0

E23

40mm Shell x2

Shell

2

98

4.5

4

0

x2

E24

40mm Shell x3

Shell

2

146

4.5

4

0

x3

4.5

4

0

x4

E25

40mm Shell x4

Shell

2

241

F1

Shrapnel Cache

Clutter

12

5100

1

14 9200

1

F2

Hole

Control Hole

F3

Fuze Cache

Clutter

14

F4

Hole

Control Hole

15

Anti-tank mine

12 15

F5 F6

Hole 12cm

Control Hole

F7

Aluminum Can

Clutter

2

F8

Hole 13cm

Control Hole

17

Small ferrous component British

60D-2-3-36

2 inch Illum mortar

2698

10.5

22

0

14

12.5

6

0

Partially filled with dirt

14

12.5

6

0

Partially filled with dirt

457

12

8

1

493

12

9

1

107

24

2.5

0

F9

Aluminum Can

Clutter

4

F10

Hole 18cm

Control Hole

20

F11

Shrapnel

Clutter

0

F12

Hole 15cm

Control Hole

17

F13

Shrapnel

Clutter

2

F14

Hole 20cm

Control Hole

20

F15

Copper Pipe

Clutter

4

F16

Hole 30cm

Control Hole

30

F17

Shrapnel

Clutter

6

418

9

4.1

1

Shrapnel

Clutter

8

393

10

4

1

Huawei Phone

Clutter

2

136

12

5.6

0, 1

Has some ferrous components

HTC Phone

Clutter

4

129

11.2

5.5

0, 1

Has some ferrous components

F18 F19 F20 F21 F22 F23 F24 F25

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

17

and ground-based magnetic, GPR, thermal, visual, and

inert munitions seeded for HMA testing purposes. This

LiDAR surveys that will serve as the baseline datasets

resource will help bridge the gap between academia and

for this field. The same field of 143 items was reseeded

HMA by offering researchers a realistic field to assess

at a nearby location on 15 June 2023 at a permanent

ERW detection methods and HMA operators a framework

site. To our knowledge, this is the most diverse field of

through which to compare them.

See endnotes page 65

Acknowledgements A big thank you to Billy Magalasi and Greg Powers who manage the CENFEX range and greatly facilitated operations for this project. We want to thank Alex Nikulin and Tim de Smet for donating the PFM-1s to this field. We also thank Heidi Meyers, Cole Petrich, Gabriel Chen, Ved Lekic, Meyer Taffel, and Alex Pick-Aluas who assisted in the unburial and reburial process for this fieldwork.

JASPER BAUR President, Demining Research Community Lead Scientist, Safe Pro AI Jasper Baur is the co-founder and President of the non-profit organization Demining Research Community and the Lead Scientist at Safe Pro AI. Baur is a PhD candidate at Columbia University studying remote sensing applied to explosive hazard mitigation ranging from detecting small anti-personnel landmines to monitoring Alaskan volcanoes. He graduated from Binghamton University in 2020 with a Bachelor of Science in Geological Sciences, and a master’s from Columbia University in 2022 in physical volcanology. He has received numerous awards for his work in landmine detection and is always striving to innovate in the humanitarian mine action space. He is an FAA 107 certified UAS remote pilot and has months of fieldwork experience in remote environments.

GABRIEL STEINBERG Vice President, Demining Research Community Lead Software & AI Engineer, Safe Pro AI Gabriel Steinberg is the co-founder, Lead Software, and AI Engineer at Safe Pro AI and co-founder and Vice President of the nonprofit organization Demining Research Community. Steinberg completed his Bachelor of Science in Computer Science at Binghamton University and studied toward his Master of Science in Computer Science at Karlsruhe Institute for Technology with a concentration in artificial intelligence. His main research interest is in computer vision with the goal of detecting scatterable landmines and unexploded ordnance from unmanned aerial vehicles. He has published and presented his research in several journals and at conferences, and worked in state-of-the-art AI research teams focusing on data science and machine learning applications in bioinformatics, passive bioacoustic monitoring, and largescale software agent simulations.

18

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

JOHN FRUCCI, PhD Director, Center for Fire & Explosives, Forensic Investigation Training & Research Director, OSU Global Consortium for Explosive Hazard Mitigation John Frucci has been at OSU in the School of Forensic Sciences for eleven years. He is the Program Director of the Arson, Explosive, Firearms and Tool Marks Investigation, and the Forensic Investigative Sciences graduate programs. Frucci is the Director of the Center for Fire & Explosives, Forensic Investigations Training & Research and the OSU Global Consortium for Explosive Hazard Mitigation.

Frucci was a career law enforcement officer for the Essex County Sheriff’s Office in Newark, New Jersey, serving in several units including as an FBI Certified Bomb Technician and Commander of the Bomb Squad. He retired in 2013. He earned his bachelor’s degree in 1997 from Rutgers University, his master’s degree in 2000, and his education specialist degree in education administration and supervision in 2006 from Seton Hall University. He earned his PhD in May 2018 at OSU and completed an additional master’s degree from the Missouri University of Science and Technology in Explosives Engineering and Technology in 2020.

ANTHONY BRINKLEY Oklahoma State University, School of Forensic Sciences Vice President, Pacific Rim Services For the past three years, Anthony Brinkley has been associated with Oklahoma State University, School of Forensic Sciences.

Having earned his Master of Science in Forensic Sciences from OSU in spring of 2023, he is currently pursuing a PhD in the same field. Brinkley has over thirty-five years of experience with UXO beginning in the US Navy, where he served for twenty-five years in roles such as Salvage Diver, Salvage Diving Officer, and Special Operations/EOD Officer. Since retiring from the US Navy in 2013, Brinkley has remained committed to the EOD community overseeing and conducting numerous munitions and explosives removal projects. Currently, he serves as Vice President of Pacific Rim Services, Guam LLC, where he plays a crucial role in supporting the US Marine Corps buildup in the Pacific region. In addition, he provides UXO support for Ukraine.

Empowering Host Nation Counter-IED and CounterInsurgency Efforts:

Innovative Application of Ordnance Recycling

A

By Lynna Banach [ American Public University ], Commodore Roy Vincent T. Trinidad [ Armed Forces of the Philippines ], and Captain Julien B. Dolor [ Armed Forces of the Philippines ]

s the United States works to grow its defense partnership with the Philippines, the country continues to fight instability and insecurity amidst a lengthy battle against insurgent and terrorist groups.1,2,3 As the overlap between urban areas and conflict zones increases, and with violent groups’ use of improvised explosive devices (IEDs) against government forces, the danger to civilians escalates.4 This paper provides a deeper understanding of how the prevalence of unexploded ordnance (UXO) and the use of IEDs in the Philippines fuel the realities of insurgency and humanitarian danger in the country. Furthermore, using Golden West Humanitarian Foundation’s (Golden West) program in Cambodia as a framework, this paper examines how the innovative application of Golden West’s ordnance recycling technology in the Philippines would impact the host nation’s ability to counter the enduring challenges posed by insurgency groups use of UXO and IEDs. Employing Golden West’s technology in a way that uses deteriorating ordnance stockpiles, surplus ordnance, and explosive remnants of war (ERW) to produce water disruptors for use as a successful, efficient, and affordable method of handling explosive hazards offers a unique approach to supporting the Philippines in its counterinsurgency battle.

INTRODUCTION In the Philippines, the conflict zones overlap with urban

of the humanitarian mine action (HMA) community on

areas, meaning civilians are increasingly in danger as

a global scale. 8 In Cambodia, Golden West successfully

violent groups use IEDs against government forces. 5

produces high-quality main charge explosives for use in

While explosive ordnance (EO), munitions and ammunition

HMA operations via its Explosive Harvesting Program

depot explosions, and other UXO-related events pose

(EHP). 9 Using their program in Cambodia as a framework,

serious risks to the civilian population in the Philippines,

the employing of explosives recycling technology in the

insurgents and terrorists benefit from the acquisition of

Philippines would empower the host nation to decrease

explosive material from aging, poorly maintained, and

its aging and surplus UXO stockpiles and ERW in a

poorly secured ordnance stockpiles, which also wind up in

sustainable way that saves lives while simultaneously

conflict zones or surrounding areas.6,7

decreasing the amount of explosives material available

Golden West is a nonprofit organization based in the United States that works to create cutting-edge tools,

to insurgent groups, supporting host nation counter-IED efforts, and building defense partnerships.

programs, and methods to improve the effectiveness ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

19

BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM SET In the Philippines, UXO from the Second World War, Vietnam War, Indochina Wars, and the Cold War continues to pose a threat.10,11 In the decades following the end of these hostilities, there has been significant economic growth and population expansion into previously uninhabited areas, exposing UXO that pose a serious threat to safety and impede local economic development.12 Moreover, ordnance stockpile management is a concept that is critical to ordnance security, functionality, and safety. However, in practice, ordnance stockpile management efforts vary greatly globally, often based on knowledge of best practices and the availability of resources to implement such practices. In the Philippines, for example, the root causes of incidents of unplanned explosions at munitions sites between 1979 and 2013 included lack of surveillance leading to ammunition deterioration, inappropriate storage systems and infrastructure, and failure to consider external environmental influences and events.13 While the Philippines works to secure and liquidate old, expired,

FIGURE 1. Terrorist group IED components recovered in Maguindanao Province, Philippines, after military operations pushed Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters from Maguindanao Province in November 2019.

Courtesy of 6ID.

and unstable UXO stockpiles, the country is also battling

that the explosives often impact unintended and collateral

violent insurgent and terrorist groups.

targets in a wide area. 22 Furthermore, the availability of

As the Philippines government contends with insurgent

unsecure and unstable ordnance for nefarious insurgent

and terrorist group activity, non-state actors use IEDs as

and terrorist use contributes to the prevalence of the

a main weapon in their battles against the government,

intersection of civilian life with UXO and IEDs. Through

endangering both government forces and civilians.14,15,16,17,18

a deeper understanding of the prevalence of UXO and

IEDs can have a main charge made of military explosives,

the use of IEDs in the Philippines, how these dynamics

ordinary ammunition, or home-made explosives, and are

fuel the realities of insurgency and humanitarian danger

employed in attacks that purposefully target government

in the country become clearer. Although the Philippines

forces and the civilian population.19,20,21 Even if these

government is working to manage aging ordnance

explosive weapons target a specific population, the

stockpiles, counterinsurgency, and the use of IEDs, the

overlap of civilian populations with conflict zones means

danger these three issues pose to civilians remains.

ORDNANCE RECYCLING AND WATER DISRUPTORS AS A SOLUTION Through its EHP, Golden West employs its ordnance

charges for use by nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

recycling technology across Cambodia. The initial goals

in demining operations. 25 Additionally, after the removal

of the program included providing a deployable, affordable

of the main charge and any remaining explosive residue,

method to defuse explosives from weapons like aircraft

the program is able to recycle any scrap metal from

bombs, anti-tank mines, and artillery, and establishing a

ERW casings. Golden West now maintains its Applied

method to transform the recovered explosives into tools

Technology Training Center (ATTC) located in Kampong

for demining and explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)

Chhnang, Cambodia, where the program supports the

teams. 23 Over the last fifteen years, working closely with

production of donor charges for humanitarian demining

the Cambodian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and the

organizations in Cambodia and year-round EOD training

Cambodian Mine Action Centre (CMAC), the program has

and logistical support. 26 In addition to having a proven

In Cambodia, the EHP breaks

framework to use as a model, an innovative program in

down discovered ERW and surplus ammunition stores

the Philippines will have the advantage of building upon the

using a cutting and steaming process before using the

development and progress made by the EHP in Cambodia.

exceeded these goals. 24

components to generate small 100g and 300g donor 20

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

INNOVATIVE ORDNANCE RECYCLING IN THE PHILIPPINES While the explosives recycling program in Cambodia

water disruptors use water as a projectile to separate

recycles ERW to create donor charges for use in demining

IED components rapidly and in such a way that inhibits

operations, a parallel program in the Philippines would

the IED explosion from occurring. 28 Water disruptors are

break down UXO and ERW, recycling the components

sustainable and easily implemented and managed by

into water disruptors. A simple tool commonly used by

host nations.

police forces and armies in counter-IED operations,

BENEFITS OF GENERATING WATER DISRUPTORS FOR COUNTER-IED USE Although water disruptors and their use as a counter-

procedure. 33,34 These disruptors are ideal for deployment

IED tool continue to evolve, the basic design and concept

in situations where it is possible to specifically target

is rather simple. Water bottle disruptors typically consist

the IED power source, and they offer many advantages,

of a plastic bottle filled with water and a tiny amount of

including a secure, reliable, effective, and consistent means

high explosives that creates a non-aggressive charge.

29

of defusing IEDs and reducing contact with the IED and

Upon detonating the explosives, the water is ejected at a

time inside the explosives threat zone. 35,36 Furthermore,

high speed, separating the IED circuitry before the bridge

water disruptors may be reusable if necessary, offering

wire in the detonator has a chance to react, attempting

unique value for the price-point in addition to not requiring

The semi-

the same types of permits required for the acquisition,

remote use of water disruptors involves the operator

transportation, and storage of high explosives. 37 Ultimately,

manually positioning the disruptors close to IEDs without

in the Philippines, using water disruptors to counter IEDs

disturbing them, with the main purpose of the IED

is an approach that the host nation can use as part of a

disrupter being to neutralize IEDs as part of a render safe

greater counterinsurgency strategy.

to defuse rather than detonate the device.

30,31,32

Golden West’s EHP components and donor charges in Cambodia.27 Courtesy of Golden West Humanitarian Foundation.

Choosing to create water disruptors from recycled ordnance

in

the

Philippines

comes

with

multiple

advantages. Given the makeup of water disruptors and how they disarm IEDs, the resulting small, non-aggressive charges are generally not usable for nefarious purposes and unable to hurt people. These safety characteristics of water disruptors are especially pertinent to ensuring that the products of the ordnance recycling program are not able to negatively contribute to the situational dynamics in the country. Additionally, any water disruptors created via an ordnance recycling program using Golden West’s ordnance cutting technology will be officially serialized, similar to the donor charges created via the ordnance recycling program in Cambodia and distributed as IED disruption tools.

A final important aspect of the program is the low cost of creating the disruptors. Each disruptor will consist of a recycled charge contained in a water bottle-like container with a straw, resulting in a locally manufactured and maintained product costing less than USD25. This costpoint is important with respect to long-term program affordability. Overall, using ordnance recycling technology to create water disruptors is a safe, affordable, and sustainable means to generate counter-IED tools for use in the Philippines.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

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FIGURE 2. Ordnance recycling and water disruptors as a solution for the Philippines, which conceptually illustrates how an EHP program would break down UXO and ERW into recyclable scrap metal and components used to generate water disruptors—a simple tool commonly used by police forces and armies in counter-IED operations.38 Courtesy of Golden West and Eodpromartin, 39 Bottler,40 CC BY-SA 3.0.41

STRATEGIC BENEFITS OF ORDNANCE RECYCLING AND WATER DISRUPTORS AS A SOLUTION Aside from the various tactical benefits of implementing an

ordnance-recycling

program,

are

counter-IED and counterinsurgency mission, a program

several

in the Philippines would mirror these achievements. By

strategic-level benefits as well. As with the explosives

reducing the local and regional risks and hazards created

recycling program in Cambodia, the primary objective of

by deteriorating and unsecured conventional ordnance,

implementing the proposed program in the Philippines is

decreasing the amount of ordnance available for IED

to save lives. With “at least ninety percent of the casualties

production, and increasing the tools available to counter-

caused by the use of explosive weapons in populated areas

IED use in the country, the ordnance recycling program

likely to be civilians,” the scope of the problem is massive.42

will help to save lives in the Philippines.

Aside from the trauma and fear of IED use in civilian areas,

Another projected benefit of the program is recycling

in more rural areas, land contamination from explosive war

of the steel typically used to encase UXO. While the

relics puts residents at risk for generations and frequently

steel casing of UXO may be corroded due to exposure

prevents local inhabitants from returning or using the

to harsh conditions, most thick steel casings will only

Through building strong

experience superficial corrosion with a majority of the

and cooperative relationships with the Royal Cambodian

casing remaining intact.46 Steel and copper are potential

Armed Forces (RCAF) who now turn over their surplus

byproducts of the old ordnance recycling process, and

ammunition for processing, the EHP in Cambodia has

after treating the empty munitions casing to ensure

identified a reliable internal source of disposal explosives

elimination of any residual explosives residue, Golden

to support long-term clearance operations, lowered public

West’s EHP in Cambodia has reclaimed tons of metal.47,48

safety hazards associated with ammunition storage,

The steel byproduct of the ordnance recycling process

and diminished environmental harm brought on by bulk

is a substantial benefit given that the Philippines is “the

Though slightly modified for the

world’s 17th-largest steel importer,” and the demand

land for livelihood purposes.

ordnance destruction.

22

there

45

43,44

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

for steel in the Philippines continues to grow.49,50 The

Final overarching benefits of the program are the building

recycling of steel byproducts can generate revenue for

and strengthening of relationships with the host nation

use in continuing to fund the program via paying for water

and counter-IED capacity building within the Philippines.

disruptor materials or program training, increasing the

The proposed ordnance recycling program represents

sustainability and benefits of the program for the host

a lower cost, sustainable way to support defense and

country. 51

security partnerships with limited resources, while helping to fight insurgency in the Philippines.

CONCLUSION Employing Golden West’s technology in an innovative way that uses deteriorating ordnance stockpiles, surplus ordnance, and ERW to produce water disruptors for use in handling explosive hazards offers a unique approach to supporting the Philippines in its counterinsurgency battle. Not only will the proposed solution impact the host nation’s ability to counter the enduring challenges posed by explosive hazards and insurgency groups, it will also save lives and strengthen international partnerships.

Ultimately, when considering the implementation of the EHP technology to sustainably produce a safe counter-IED tool for host nation use, Golden West believes the benefits greatly outweigh the initial investment and has a signed partnership with the Philippine Navy NAVSOCOM to pursue the program. Dependent on funding, the program will commence in 2024.

See endnotes page 65.

Lynna Banach is a Doctoral student at American Public University. The views and analysis expressed in this article are those of the author, purely expressed for academic reasons, and in no way represent an official position of American Public University or any federal agency.

LYNNA BANACH Doctoral student, American Public University Lynna Banach is a professional in the analysis field and is currently pursuing a Doctorate of Strategic Intelligence at American Public University. She has an extensive background in force protection and holds a Bachelor of Science degree in Psychology and a Master of Science degree in Terrorism and Counterterrorism Studies. In expanding her research experience, Banach has been working with Golden West Humanitarian Foundation and international partners to explore innovative applications of ordnance recycling technology.

COMMODORE ROY VINCENT T. TRINIDAD Armed Forces of the Philippines Commodore Roy Vincent T. Trinidad PN is a career naval officer who has specialized in surface warfare, special warfare, and naval intelligence. He is a member of the PMA “Sambisig” class of 1991. He has spent more than half of his thirty-two years commissioned service in operations as a Navy SEAL, assigned aboard commissioned vessels of the Navy or with intelligence units of the AFP, mostly in Mindanao and the West Philippine Sea. He has extensive experience working with foreign armed services, most notably as the Incident Commander at Tacloban Airport after Typhoon Yolanda (international code name: Haiyan).

As the ICS Commander of the affected area of the super typhoon, he was on the first plane that landed in the city and organized naval units, joint and combined forces, and the domestic and international NGOs/INGOs. He has a master’s degree in public administration specializing in development and security and is completing his doctoral dissertation in peace and security administration. He has numerous combat and administrative awards at the tactical, operational, and strategic levels.

Commodore Trinidad often presents internationally and is a leader in counter-IED protocols.

CAPTAIN JULIEN B. DOLOR Armed Forces of the Philippines Philippine Navy Captain Julien B. Dolor holds a Bachelor of Science in Management from the Philippine Military Academy and a master’s degree in public management and major in development and security from the Development Academy of the Philippines. His master’s thesis focused on “The Philippine Navy Disposal Management of Explosive Remnants of War, Unserviceable Ammunitions, and Improvised Explosive Device.” In his twenty-eight years of experience, Captain Dolor has worked in naval special warfare/special operations, intelligence, and protective security. He is currently the Chief of the Research Division at the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), while pursuing a Strategic Intelligence Course in one of the AFP’s Special Intelligence School.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

23

INTEGRATED COOPERATION IN IMPLEMENTING FIREARM DEACTIVATION CAPABILITIES: Bosnia and Herzegovina

By Lieutenant Colonel Geir P. Novik [ Norwegian Defence Research Establishment ]

M

any of the illegal firearms used for terrorist and criminal activities throughout Europe originate from the Balkan region and have previously been legally exported and sold as deactivated firearms. However, due to variations in the quality of deactivation standards and verification processes, many deactivated firearms can easily be reactivated into fully functional military weapons. To prevent the illegal reactivation of additional weapons, new guidelines regarding deactivation standards and techniques have been introduced, thus ensuring that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable. Within the framework of the European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR), a training program regarding the deactivation of firearms has been developed and implemented by the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina (AFBiH).

Photo caption: Various decommissioned military firearms designated for deactivation.

Courtesy of Geir P. Novik.

24

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

CHALLENGES OF INHARMONIOUS DEACTIVATION STANDARDS Numerous European countries have witnessed an

reactivated and used in shootings throughout Europe.6,7

increase in lethal gun violence during the last decade,

To address this escalating problem involving the reacti-

precipitating concerns that an arms race among drug

vation of formerly deactivated firearms, the European

criminals and the increased availability of illegal firearms

Commission has established a set of common guide-

could generate even more crime and gun violence.1

lines regarding deactivation standards and techniques to

According to Project TARGET, an EU-funded research

ensure that deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly

project that aims to determine the impact of gun trafficking

inoperable (e.g., Regulation ((EU)) 2018/337). 8 It is antici-

on gun violence in the European Union (EU), some higher-

pated that the implementation of such EU regulations has

level criminals appear to have unlimited access to firearms,

tackled the source of the problem of deactivated firearms

including military-grade firearms, through the smuggling of

that could easily be reactivated.

conflict legacy weapons and the trafficking of reactivated

However, in practice, many countries still apply different

firearms. According to the European Union Agency for

deactivation criteria depending on the extent of the

Law Enforcement Cooperation, 3 these illegal weapons

deactivation process to which such firearms have been

primarily originate from the Western Balkans and the

subjected. Nations have varying deactivation standards

former Soviet Union; one of the primary sources of such

and specifications; some countries have more rigorous

weapons is the circulation of previously decommissioned

standards while others have older or outdated deactivation

and deactivated weapons that are reactivated.

specifications, enabling a later restoration of the weapons

2

Such reactivation involves illegally restating a deac-

to full working order.9

tivated firearm (i.e., a firearm that has been rendered

To ensure that deactivated firearms are rendered

inoperable) to an operable condition. This is generally

irreversibly inoperable, thereby guaranteeing that they

made possible through inadequate national deactivation

are not subsequently used in illicit firearms trafficking and

standards (i.e., insufficiently invasive or permanent) or

criminal or terrorist activities, it is necessary to implement

through sub-standard deactivation processes.4,5 Firearms

appropriate firearm deactivation standards.

that were improperly deactivated have been known to be

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

25

SURPLUS WEAPONS IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA When the Yugoslav Wars in the Balkans ended in

training sequences in ammunition and weapons stockpile

2001, large quantities of weapons were left in poorly

management since 2011. Through this joint venture, the

managed stockpiles and in the hands of the military and

AFBiH and the EUFOR MTT are currently in the process

police, as well as militias and civilians. Subsequently, the

of establishing a highly competent training cell, namely

Balkans became an acknowledged source of guns that

the Ammunition Weapon Explosive Training Cell (AWE TC).

had been diverted from official stockpiles for illicit use in

This cell is subordinate to the AFBiH Training Doctrine

Europe and elsewhere.10 Even in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

Command (TRADOC).

challenges related to unregistered small arms and light

As a result of this cooperation, the AFBiH has identified

weapons (SALW) persist nearly three decades after the

tens of thousands of weapons of different calibers; these

end of the war. Some of these weapons are located at

weapons have been declared non-prospective, meaning

identified depots under military control, while others are

that they serve as surplus for the AFBiH.12 The AFBiH

at locations that remain unknown, and many continue to

now aims to reduce the surplus in a transparent and

evade identification and registration.11

controlled manner and to establish a sustainable life cycle defense

for the fixed stockpile.13 By deliberating about alternative

cooperation and with assistance from the international

methodologies for stock reduction, and in light of the

community, the AFBiH has made immense inroads

global challenges posed by illicit firearms trafficking and

toward identifying, marking, storing, safeguarding, and

the usage of reactivated deactivated firearms, the special

maintaining

However,

through

bilateral

and

regional

to

ammunition and weapons advisor (SAWAD) to COM

international standards. A vital part of this assistance has

EUFOR and the EUFOR MTT identified a need to develop

involved the cooperation and joint training of AFBiH and

the AFBiH’s capability to deactivate firearms according to

European Union Force Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUFOR)

international standards. As a result, such firearms can be

units, as well as case-specific training for the AFBiH,

rendered irreversibly inoperable, thus virtually eliminating

such as that organized by EUFOR Mobile Training Teams

the risk that they may be illegally reactivated and used for

(MTT). Within the framework of such an MTT, the Swiss

criminal activity.

their

weapon

inventories

according

military has supported AFBiH with time-limited, specific

COLLABORATING TO DEVELOP AN EU STANDARDS-BASED TRAINING PROGRAM The

Multinational

Small

Arms

and

Ammunition Group (MSAG) is an apolitical, informal, multinational assembly of like-minded states that undertakes, at the discretion of the member states, the development of any SALW/ Conventional Ammunition (CA) related standard operative procedures and training programs deemed necessary to improve the quality of the efforts made in the field of SALW/CA. Its aim is to enhance the development of a capacity on physical security and stockpile management (PSSM), exchange best practices with regards to SALW/CA, and orchestrate destruction and disposal in order to reduce accidents and the number of SALW in circulation.

Through the framework of the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG), the Swiss MSAG representative presented the status of the current SALW operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and highlighted the necessity to build the capability of the AFBiH in relation to SALW deactivation according to the current EU regulations. As an MSAG member state, Norway offered its assistance in developing and implementing a suitable course program; through a bilateral agreement between the Norwegian Defence Staff and EUFOR MTT, the formalities for a cooperation were established.

At a workshop led by the EUFOR MTT in 2019, the final details for the course were agreed upon, and it was determined that the course program would be

Description of the MSAG.

in accordance with the 3M principle, encompassing

Courtesy of the Multinational Small Arms and Ammunition Group (MSAG, 2023).

moderating (train the trainer), mentoring (coach the trainer), and monitoring (observe the trainer), thereby enabling the AFBiH to both deactivate firearms according to EU regulations and to maintain a sustainable work

26

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Step 1

Step 2

Moderating

Instructor

Trainer candidate

Mentoring

Students

Step 3 Monitoring

Illustration of the 3M train-the-trainer principle.

Courtesy of Geir P. Novik.

pool by independently overseeing the future training of

since 2017 to mark and register the state military stockpile.

instructors and deactivation specialists. It was also decided

Through support and funding from several entities, including

to invite SALW specialists from the Swiss Armed Forces

the German Federal Foreign Office, the United Kingdom,

Logistics Organisation (LBA) to support the implementation

and the Norwegian Ministries of Defense, as well as the

of the course, which later proved to be a major asset to the

United Nations Trust Facility Supporting Cooperation on

Norwegian instructors.

Arms Regulation (UNSCAR), HALO had successfully marked

Since marking and registration (M&R) is an integral part of the deactivation process, it was pragmatic to include

and registered over 60,000 assorted SALW of over 280 different types.14

the HALO Trust (HALO) in both the lecture regarding the

By early 2020, much of the preparation work was about

M&R and the physical marking of unregistered weapons

to be finalized and was on track for the first deactivation

that enter the deactivation process and the final marking

course that was scheduled to take place later that year.

of the deactivated weapons according to EU requirements.

However, this would not occur for another two years due to

At the time, HALO had collaborated with EUFOR and AFBiH

the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic.

IMPLEMENTING THE TRAINING PROGRAM After two years of continuous postponements, the first

that included theoretical and practical instruction regarding

train-the-trainer course for the AFBiH was conducted in June

how to conduct lectures, in addition to advanced deactivation

2022 at the AWE TC at the Travnik barracks in central Bosnia

specialist training. This included further teaching and

and Herzegovina. In this week-long course, twelve highly

practical exercises in specialized craftsmanship, as well as

motivated and skilled members of the AFBiH participated in

a comprehensive theoretical introduction to the specifics

the training. Out of the twelve, nine participants successfully

of the foundational regulations. This would help to ensure

completed the training and were certified as deactivation

that the deactivation process was not only compliant with

qualified specialists. Of these nine participants, six potential trainers were also identified to be selected for the second part of the 3M program, which was to be conducted as an integrated part of the second deactivation course.

In September 2022, the six trainers selected in the June training received an additional one-week course package

Challenges encountered: A lack of conformity to traditional definitions of firearm types required comprehensive technical knowledge and a thorough understanding of the applicable regulations.

Courtesy of Geir P. Novik.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

27

A deactivation team from the program deliberating on the deactivation procedures with support from the Swiss SALW expert.

Courtesy of Geir P. Novik.

AFBiH. Due to the diligent work and preparation of the selected AFBiH trainers who conducted most of the lectures and the practical exercises, a further seven students were certified as deactivation

qualified

specialists.

Moreover,

an additional six new potential trainers were identified and designated to take part in the course planned for November 2022. However, despite the concerted efforts of the EUFOR MTT and the Norwegian instructors, the Swiss technical experts, and the students and trainers from AFBiH, both the November course and the following course planned for June 2023 had to be postponed due to AFBiH’s internal affairs.

the applicable regulations, but also that the quality of the workmanship denotes that the physical appearance of the deactivated firearms was preserved. For aesthetic and commercial purposes, retaining the appealing physical appearance of the deactivated firearms will understandably increase the value of a weapon designated for museums, the film industry, or private collectors. All the personnel selected for this training performed outstandingly, and all six were certified as deactivation trainers.

By this time, HALO had terminated their involvement in M&R, and Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA) assumed the responsibilities for M&R in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Supported by Norway, NPA initiated their work as early as 1996, marking their presence as the first civilian organization working in Bosnia and Herzegovina after the end of the war.15

Thankfully,

collaboration

continued

with

NPA

introducing the students to the practical M&R process while providing them with new insights into the importance of

consisted of a one-week program (identical to the first

One of the course participants, a member of the AFBiH, in the process of deactivating an MG 34 general-purpose machine gun, in accordance with Regulation (EU) 2018/337.

deactivation course) involving eleven participants from

Courtesy of Geir P. Novik.

marking and recordkeeping.

The next part of this second deactivation course

28

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

SA(LW)-Deactivation & Verification - Process

4.

5.

1.

2.

3.

Intermediate Verificaiton

Final Verificaiton

6.

Knowledge

Identification

Procedure

Deactivation

Verification

Finalization

• Legislation • Regulations • General Principles • Certificates & Paperwork

Positively determining applicable procedure for identified firearms according to “specific operations per type of firearms” (Table III) of Regulations (EU) 2018/337.

• Positively identify firearms and essential parts thereof according to the “List of types of firearms” (Table I) of Regulation (EU) 2018/337.

• Verify the Basic Making of the weapon.

Positively verifying the deactivation of firearms and essential parts thereof according “Technical Specifications for the deactivation of firearms” (Annex 1) of Regulations (EU) 2018/337.

Deactivate weapons according to the “specific operations per type of firearms” (Table II) of Regulation (EU) 2018/337.

• Finalize Paperwork • Generate Weapons Certificate

Illustration of the deactivation process.

Courtesy of EUFOR MTT.

The next course is scheduled to take place in November

standards in the future through a sustainable pool of

2023 and an additional three courses will likely be conducted

certified deactivation qualified specialists and trainers as

in 2024, thus ensuring that AFBiH is independently able

well as personnel certified to verify regulatory deactivation

to deactivate firearms in accordance with international

procedures.

CONCLUSION Through common goals and particularly advantageous

that future firearm deactivation is executed according to

intergovernmental and organizational cooperation, it has been

international standards and regulations, it ensures that

possible to utilize available resources regardless of national

deactivated firearms are rendered irreversibly inoperable,

or organizational affiliations. This cooperation has included

thus preventing them from being used as illegal weapons in

both bilateral agreements (Norway–Switzerland) within

illicit firearms trafficking and criminal or terrorist activities.

the framework of an apolitical, informal, and multinational

Furthermore, this course program can easily be replicated

assembly of like-minded states (MSAG) and nongovernmental

in other countries across the region to provide a sustainable

organizations (NGOs) (e.g., HALO and NPA), conducted under

solution to the problem of illicit weapons proliferation and

the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP)

the diversion of reactivated firearms through cooperation,

mission; EUFOR’s Operation ALTHEA.

capability building, and national ownership.

The course program has proven to be a success in terms

See endnotes page 67

of capability building in relation to AFBiH. By confirming

GEIR P. NOVIK Lieutenant Colonel Norwegian Defence Research Establishment Geir-Petter.Novik@ffi.no Lieutenant Colonel Geir Petter Novik is a Senior Staff Officer at the Norwegian Ministry of Defence, currently assigned to the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment. His assignments include duty as the MoDs senior representative for defence exports and material management within the Norwegian defence sector, and as a SALW-CA project manager for the Norwegian Arms Control Office. LTC Novik holds a PhD in Science and Technology from the University of Stavanger with a specialization in risk management and societal safety particularly related to unexploded ordnance and explosive remnants of war.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

29

AMMUNITION IDENTIFICATION GUIDE FOR

UKRAINE

A Collaborative Project Amidst War

By Lieutenant Perederii, i Tony Salvo, ii and Drew Prateriii

D

[ National Police of Ukraine, i Bomb Techs Without Borders, ii and Relyant Globaliii ]

uring explosive hazard clearance operations, identification of munitions is of the utmost importance. Once the munition is positively identified and its filler and safeties are known, it can be dealt with in a safe and controlled manner. While clearing Fallujah, Mosul, and surrounding areas in Iraq, abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO) and explosive remnants of war (ERW) from twentythree different countries was encountered, challenging even the most ardent explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician. To this end, an ordnance identification document based on the munitions encountered was compiled, the latest version containing more than 340 different munitions.1 Those working diligently to clear explosive ordnance (EO) in Ukraine, as well as first responders, are facing a similar problem, encountering munitions from twenty-six different countries, some of which are newly identified munitions.

An informal group of experienced, international EOD technicians help with identification including former military personnel. Identification is also done through manufacturer websites and publications as well as open source.

Destroyed buildings on the edge of Kharkiv.

All images courtesy of the authors.

30

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

UKRAINE According to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), in the first year of the conflict alone, more than 305,000 explosive munitions were located, recorded, and removed in Ukraine, yet approximately one-third of the country remains affected by EO, endangering millions of Ukrainian citizens as they attempt to go about their daily lives. 2 One US government official stated that the current dud rate among Russian munitions is approximately 40 percent, which only exacerbates this deadly issue. 3

FIGURE 1. ID Guide v.4.0 Ukrainian (left) and English (right).

AMMUNITION GUIDE To deal with such a large number of diverse munitions, the

US-based

nongovernmental

organization

Users are able to place entries side-by-side in order

(NGO)

to mitigate the language barrier. The guide is free and is

Bomb Techs Without Borders (BTWOB), 4 has co-published

published as a .pdf document for maximum compatibility

the Basic Identification of Ammunition in Ukraine 5

with electronic devices. The target audience is Ukrainian

(https://ukr.bulletpicker.com/id-guides.html),

is

EOD, sappers, deminers, and first responders who, by the

in its fourth version and is available in Ukrainian and

which

very nature of their work, are exposed to these explosive

English. Initially, the guide was exclusively available in

hazards (EH) on a daily basis. The level of detail contained

Ukrainian to cater to the target audience—Ukrainian

in the guide is deliberately limited to allow for maximum

security services, sappers, and EOD personnel. However,

distribution without compromising operational security.

an English version of the 3.0 edition was subsequently

The guide is known to be in widespread use with Ukrainian

published on 22 March 2023.

forces, as well as local NGOs and INGOs. The authors are

The English version directly mirrors the Ukrainian edition and is mainly intended to assist international partners and

aware of foreign militaries using the guide to identify and track explosive munitions found in Ukraine.

international NGOs (INGOs) working with Ukrainians.

FIGURE 2. Ukrainian (left) to English (right) comparison.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

31

BTWOB started with a base document of munitions they knew to be found in Ukraine in the summer of 2022, then initially partnered with

FIGURE 4. Table of contents for the ordnance identification document.

the National Police of Ukraine EOD. Since then, 8th SOF Regiment EOD and State Emergency Services of Ukraine EOD have joined as major contributing partners. Contact information is provided in the guides, and numerous other agencies, units, and departments contribute in an ad hoc unofficial capacity, as well as individual sappers and EOD operators. The major contributing partners are readily identified on the guide’s front cover. These partners provide credible, first-hand information directly from the frontlines with information, pictures, and measurements as time and situations permit.

Version 4.0 contains more than 500 different munitions and is divided into twenty headings with numerous sub-headings and hyperlinks, enabling the user to navigate quickly through the 914-page document.

Basic dimensions and related munitions accompany pictures to assist the user in positive identification of the explosive hazards.

To highlight munitions with additional safety concerns, simple color coding warns users of particular hazards such as incendiary fillers or magnetic fuzing. There are five different color/style lines, which are placed around munition pictures to ensure the user is aware of additional hazards. Additionally, a clock icon is added to those munitions with a time delay hazard.

A solid red line around an image indicates that an item is sensitive to movement. Familiarize yourself with the technical details of the item before conducting any actions!

A dotted red line around the image indicates that the item is sensitive to magnetic field changes, acoustic disturbances, infrared radiation (IR), etc. Do not approach these items!

A solid yellow line around the image indicates that the item is a cluster munition or submunition. Assume that more items like it may be in the areas. Use a clear and proven exit route from the area.

A solid orange line around the image indicates the item contains an incendiary filler (magnesium, white phosphorus, thermite mixture, etc.).

A dotted orange line around the image indicates the presence of toxic materials (poisonous chemicals, depleted uranium, etc.).

Pictures with a clock indicate that the munition has a timer or is designed to self-destruct after a long delay. Consider that these munitions can detonate at any time without warning.

FIGURE 3. Color-coded warnings indicate specific hazards, like incendiary fillers or magnetic fuzing. The clock icon denotes munitions with a time delay hazard.

32

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Table of Contents (Page 1) Projectiles • 12.7–20mm • 23mm • 30mm Grenades • 35mm • Antipersonnel • 37mm • Antitank • 40mm • Smoke • 43mm • Misc • 57mm • 73mm Land Mines • 76–82mm • Antipersonnel • 85mm • Antitank • 100mm • Boobytrap Devices • 105mm • 115mm Sea/River Mines • Anti-landing Mines • 120mm • 122mm Special Mines • 125mm • Limpet Mines • 130mm • 152mm Mortar (Projectiles) • 155mm • 60mm • 20mm • 203mm • 82mm • 240mm • Aerial Bombs • Cluster Bombs • Submunitions

Table of Contents (Page 2) Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS) • 122mm MLRS 9K51 “Grad” • 220mm MLRS 9K57 “Hurricane” • 300mm MLRS 9K58 “Smerch” Rockets and Launchers • 57mm • 127–150mm • 80mm • 266mm • 82mm • 220mm • 122mm • 300mm RPG • RPG-7 Series • Carl Gustav • 40mm • 60–68mm • 70–75mm

• 80–85.1mm • 90–95mm • 105mm • 106–125mm

Table of Contents (Page 3) Fuzes • Base Detonating (BD) • Bomb • Guided MIssile • Drone • Submunition • Grenade • Mine • Point Detonating Drones PD) and Point • Kamikaze Drones Initiating Base • Armed Drones Detonating (PIBD) • Proximity Modified/Homemade • Time Ammunition Propellant Mine Clearance Pyrotechnics Systems Miscellaneous

Guided Missiles • Air-to-Air • Air-to-Surface • Surface-to-Air • Antitank • Surface-toSurface • Cruise Missiles • Ballistic Missiles

The editing and publishing of the identification guide is a massive undertaking, involving the collation of incoming information and meticulous verification of its accuracy. The authors understand the vital importance of ensuring the information is correct and go to great lengths to ensure its accuracy and legitimacy.

The

primary

sources

used by the authors to check the accuracy of information are field reports, manufacturer websites, brochures, and publications, as well as military manuals (of varying languages) and texts.

Secondary sources of information are intelligence publications, press/media, an informal network of subject matter experts, and open

sources

(Twitter,

Telegram,

Facebook, etc.). This information is collated and analyzed for accuracy before being entered into the guide to ensure the highest possible standards.

Feedback from the field has been positive

and

the

identification

guide

is known to be used by the different agencies which provide input, as well as local commercial companies, local NGOs, and INGOs. The identification guide has quickly become the “go-to guide” for personnel clearing unexploded ordnance (UXO), those needing to identify the discovered items for accurate reporting to the proper authorities, and for training teams. Continually updated with new additions, corrections, and images added to existing content, the guides maintain their relevance and utility. Updates are announced on BTWOB.org and Facebook.

Even animals are not safe from the ravages of war, as evidenced by the EO contamination and destruction at the Feldman Ecopark on the east side of Kharkiv. These images show the Ecopark enclosure with rocket penetration.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

33

CONCLUSION This guide is possible due to the many people who have shared and contributed information about EO found in Ukraine, and we are pleased it is helping to protect the men and women clearing their homes, cities, and fields, as well as helping to keep Ukrainian citizens safe from the indiscriminate hazards of EO. See endnotes page 67.

LIEUTENANT PEREDERII National Police of Ukraine Lieutenant Perederii currently serves in the National Police of Ukraine (NPU) and has been the primary NPU representative for the ammunition ID guide’s development since the first edition. He has been in law enforcement for over eight years and an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer for four years. He graduated from the EOD school in Merefa, Ukraine, in 2020, and has also attended numerous training courses overseas throughout his career.

TONY SALVO Bomb Techs Without Borders, Ukraine Branch Director, Senior Technical Advisor Tony Salvo is a former US Army enlisted EOD technician (eight years) with extensive combat experience in the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts. Previously, he has worked in the humanitarian sector in Iraq and Syria clearing explosive hazards left from the ISIS conflict. Currently he serves as the Branch Director and Senior Technical Advisor for Bomb Techs Without Borders in Ukraine.

DREW A. PRATER Relyant Global International C-IED SME Drew A. Prater is a former US Army EOD Technician (nineteen years) who has worked internationally for the past eighteen years conducting humanitarian and commercial clearance and training operations throughout Afghanistan, Burkina Faso, Cambodia, Iraq, Jordan, Mali, Nigeria, Pakistan, Thailand, Ukraine, and Vietnam. He has also authored and co-authored numerous articles for professional journals and publications. He is currently the International C-IED SME for Relyant Global and a volunteer with Bomb Techs Without Borders.

34

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

MINE ACTION IN LEBANON: Innovation, Learning, and Finishing the Job

By Mark Wilkinson, PhD [ DanChurchAid ]

L

ebanon is a country that has been severely affected by landmines, cluster bombs, and other explosive remnants of war (ERW) through decades of war and civil war.

In many cases these legacies of war remain today, intertwined with the complex geopolitics of the region. Yet Lebanon is also a country that exemplifies excellence in mine action—from strategic to operational levels.

DanChurchAid (DCA) has conducted mine

action activities in Lebanon since 2006 and the end of the conflict between Hezbollah and Israel, which caused massive destruction of infrastructure throughout the country. DCA also delivers broader humanitarian work with the Palestinian and Syrian refugee communities and the Lebanese host community. This article considers DCA’s mine action experiences in Lebanon, providing examples of how innovation in its work, delivered under the

Example of the activities of a DCA clearance team in a complex urban environment. This site is contaminated with cluster munitions. Note the close proximity of housing to the contaminated area.

Courtesy of DCA (Lebanon).

auspices of the Lebanese Mine Action Centre (LMAC), has contributed to best practice in the field. Additionally, the

both internal and external challenges which threaten the

article examines how, despite excellent progress toward

ability of LMAC to achieve compliance with treaty com-

fully clearing its explosive contamination and “completing

mitments as well as complete clearance of its explosive

the job,” Lebanon has proven to be extremely sensitive to

hazards. Without sustainable funding from the international community in 2023 and beyond, continued progress is likely to be restricted with profound consequences for LMAC and the Lebanese people.

$17.2

2018

$19.7

$17.2 $14.7

2019

2020

2021

$11.2

2022

FIGURE 1. Funding (in millions of USD) of the LMAP from 2018 to 2022. Funding cuts from international donors in 2023 are likely to threaten the delivery of the LMAC mine action strategy as well as the timeline for completion and exit.

Courtesy of LMAC.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

35

THE LEBANESE NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITY: THE FOUNDATION FOR SUCCESS Aley

Since 2006 Chouf

Békaa Ouest

Rachaiya

Jezzine Saida Nabatiyé

Hasbaiya

Marjayoun Sour Bent Jbail

As of December 2022

FIGURE 2. A comparison of explosive hazards clearance in South Lebanon in 2006 (left) and 2022 (right).

Courtesy of LMAC.

Mine action activities in Lebanon are conducted under

military engineering regiment, staffed with dedicated,

the auspices of the LMAC. While LMAC was established

knowledgeable, and experienced personnel. The determi-

in 2007, the National Demining Office (NDO) was opened

nation of LMAC to deliver high quality, effective, and effi-

in 1998 while the Mine Action Coordination Centre (MACC)

cient mine action activities is enshrined in their mission

was established in 2000 with the United Nations Mine

statement “the Lebanon Mine Action Programme will, in

Action

operational

close partnership with relevant stakeholders, continue to

management of mine action.1 By 2002, the Lebanese

Service

(UNMAS)

leading

the

use best and emerging practices to ensure an efficient,

government had signed an agreement with the United

effective and relevant programme.”2 The fostering of rela-

Arab Emirates (UAE) to clear the former Israeli-occupied

tionships with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)

areas of South Lebanon and as a result, this expanded

delivering mine action activities is testament not only to

the MACC into a tripartite structure comprising the

LMAC’s commitment to its mission, but also its desire to

United Nations (UN), Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF), and

address the full range of challenges

the UAE. By 2009, LMAC had full strategic and operational

posed by its explosive hazard

control of mine action activities in the country. LMAC is

contamination. LMAC rep-

part of the Lebanese armed forces and has overall

resents an outstanding

responsibility for the management and implementation of

example

mine action policy and strategy, including the coordination

national mine action

of explosive ordnance risk education (EORE) and victim

center

assistance (VA).

excellence and effi-

of can

how drive

While strong national ownership is a defining character-

ciency across the

istic of mine action in Lebanon, other important factors

five pillars of mine

have played a significant role in the efficiency and effec-

action.

tiveness of LMAC. Any interaction with LMAC reveals an organization built upon a professional and well-trained

FIGURE 3. The RSHDL was established in 2017 in Hammana and delivers international mine action standards (IMAS) compliant training to LAF and civilian personnel.

Courtesy of LMAC. 36

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

a

GENERATING NATIONAL MINE ACTION CAPACITY It would be remiss to discuss the commitment of Lebanon to its mine action program without briefly considering the Regional School for Humanitarian Demining (RSHDL), established in 2017 in Hammana. The very existence of the school recognizes the important role that LAF (and indeed other military forces) can play in demining, but it also acknowledges the specific requirements of humanitarian demining. As has been well discussed, humanitarian demining differs significantly from military demining for the following reasons:

1. It aims for complete mine clearance to make an area safe for civilians; 2. It does not accept deminer casualties as an operational reality and therefore must adhere to strict safety standards at all times; 3. It must have a distinctly humanitarian, that is, non-military purpose. 3 Through the RSHDL, LMAC not only generates high-quality capacity for conducting mine action activities across Lebanon, it also plays a role as a regional actor and center of excellence where it can use the experience and knowledge of its staff to share best practice internationally.

INNOVATION AND EXCELLENCE IN IMPLEMENTATION ​O F MINE ACTION ACTIVITIES The following sections will examine elements of DCA mine action activities in Lebanon, linking strategic and operational aims and objectives to specific activities that have demonstrated innovation and learning.

LOCALIZATION DCA operates within an LMAC strategy that is designed

Lebanon.”4 Through shared understanding of partnership,

to drive efficiency. A key element of this is the use of

including joint values, DCA is able to develop sustainable

local actors to deliver operations. For DCA, this also

national capacity across its Lebanese mine action program

aligns with its own global strategy where the promotion

while achieving compliance with and being supported by

of locally led solutions to a range of humanitarian

the LMAC strategy.

concerns via partnerships with local civil society actors

The DCA Lebanon country strategy is committed to

is a defined objective. Within the Lebanese context,

working with national and local partners, supported by

this sits comfortably, and is indeed facilitated with the

the four pillars of localization: ownership, empowerment,

commitment of LMAC to partnerships.

collaboration, and sustainability. 5 In the realm of mine

DCA has actively pursued a localization agenda in its

action, all DCA operational teams—including those in

mine action activities in Lebanon and other countries.

technical management roles—are now Lebanese, a

Its commitment to Lebanese partners is balanced via

culmination of over fifteen years of collaboration with

“a healthy mix of larger, established NGOs, small NGOs

local partners to build and develop essential capacity.

with a specific geographical or programmatical reach and

This allows mine action operations to be delivered in the

NGO ‘start-ups’ who are supported by DCA to establish

most cost-effective and efficient manner for international

their structure and systems in a way that allows them

donors,

to operate independently within the legal context of

ownership and developing national capacity.

OWNERSHIP

EMPOWERMENT

while

simultaneously

COLLABORATION

promoting

national

SUSTAINABILITY

FIGURE 4. The four pillars of localization.6 Courtesy of DCA.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

37

MINE ACTION AS AN ENABLER OF BROADER DEVELOPMENT

BEFORE» DCA

has

begun

to

develop

innovative approaches in response to the reduction in available funding for clearance activities in Lebanon.

As in other countries, recognition of mine action as an enabler of broader humanitarian activities in Lebanon has seen the linking of clearance outputs

to

broader

agricultural

development activities with affected communities.

One

current

project

aims

to

empower marginalized and vulnerable communities in South and Mount Lebanon by supporting the agricultural sector. The use of DCA teams to conduct clearance facilitates the release of land which is linked to follow-on agricultural

part of this project: the restoration

The project is ambitious, aiming to

restoration activity. This encour-

of agricultural lands and the agri-

gather practical evidence that illus-

ages the adoption of sustainable

culture system; rebuilding farmers’

trates how mine action activities can

agroecological approaches to agri-

livelihoods, including access to local

directly bolster food security and

culture, improving the livelihoods

markets; and building the capac-

elevate the local agricultural sector,

of farmers and growers while also

ity of local and national authorities

such as by enhancing employment

promoting social cohesion and posi-

while linking operational-level mine

opportunities and incomes. It may

tive environmental impact. DCA has

action

also offer a more detailed under-

focused on three major activities as

development.

activities

to

sustainable

standing of the relationship between mine action and its wider impact in restoring local environments and livelihoods, supporting peacebuilding, as well as facilitating recovery and development.

FIGURE 5. An example of the impact of clearance in the Mount Lebanon area.

Pre- (above) and post- (left) impact data collection clearly shows the increase in productive land use, most notably in the expansion of access, following clearance.

Courtesy of DCA (Lebanon).

«AFTER 38

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

REDUCING ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT DCA activities in Lebanon have recently focused on reducing the environmental impact of its mine action activities at both strategic and operational levels. An assessment of operational activities evaluated how DCA teams deploy to clearance sites, sustain themselves while on those sites, conduct clearance, and destroy explosive items.

Assessment results are currently being analyzed but will be used to drive the development of mitigation measures.

Additionally, DCA is creating a self-assessment toolkit that will be used by their global mine action programs in an effort to better understand and mitigate the environmental consequences of mine action activities.

At a strategic level, the DCA country management team has actively implemented energy efficiency measures. The use of solar panels to provide domestic electricity supplies to office buildings is one example of how genuine efforts are being

An example of a Lebanese domestic solar installation as used by the DCA office in Mount Lebanon.

made to reduce the environmental footprint of the impact of management activities in Lebanon.

Where possible, “green” alternatives are considered, limiting the impact of DCA operations on the environment.

Courtesy of DCA.

CLEARANCE IN DIFFICULT ENVIRONMENTS The recent Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) paper on clearance conducted in difficult terrain contains a section titled “high elevation, steep slopes and cliffs.”7 The document describes how “work in areas of high elevation, on slopes and on mountains … is a challenge in Lebanon, impeding access to some of the remaining sites of cluster munition strikes and thus

environments that could easily have been considered too complex and dangerous to operate in.

DCA teams conduct clearance under extremely difficult conditions in Mount Lebanon. Note the use of safety ropes to protect personnel on very steep ground whilst conducting clearance.

Courtesy of DCA (Lebanon).

hindering the country’s progress towards meeting its clearance obligations under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. In some parts of Lebanon, cluster munitions have been found in areas that are accessible only by using mountain climbing techniques and equipment, requiring operators to invest in specialist training and equipment.” 8 The work of DCA teams in the Mount Lebanon area provided valuable learning relating to clearance in mountainous environments in support of this paper.

In partnership with LMAC, methods were developed to allow clearance personnel to utilize rope access techniques, allowing for the clearance of cliffs and other steep areas of contaminated land. These methods were both cost-effective and safe for conducting clearance as well as quality control/quality assurance activities in ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

39

IMPACT ASSESSMENT AND COMMUNITY LIAISON DCA teams have utilized pre- and post-clearance impact

hopes and aspirations of local people is met through

assessment toolsets that are applied to all clearance tasks

the types of clearance activities delivered. The LMAC

in Lebanon. Through the collection of data from residents

task prioritization system is also responsive to this

in clearance task areas, a detailed understanding of the

data, ensuring that clearance assets are allocated to

type and extent of contamination, as well as the way

the areas of most need, as well as aligned with the

land was previously used, is obtained. This not only helps

donor requirements of the organizations conducting

to prioritize the work effort, but also ensures that the

clearance.

CLEARANCE IN COMPLEX URBAN ENVIRONMENTS One characteristic of the clearance environment in

as low as possible. The role of LMAC in facilitating liaison

Lebanon is the abundance of urban sites contaminated

with communities, as well as supporting timely explosive

with cluster munitions. It has been widely reported that

disposal of located items, has been a key element in the

following the 2006 war, residential areas were heavily

safety record of these clearance tasks. It is not uncommon

contaminated in the fighting, and the legacy of unexploded

for construction of new residential housing projects to

cluster bombs remains to this day. The clearance of these

commence immediately on completion of these types of

urban areas routinely sees DCA clearance teams working

clearance tasks reflecting both the importance of their

in close proximity to local populations in residential areas.

completion for the safety of the local communities as well

This has required the development of stringent safety

as their support to broader development such as housing

protocols to ensure that the risk to local people is kept

projects.

9

Example of the activities of a DCA clearance team in a complex urban environment. This site is contaminated with cluster munitions. Note the close proximity of housing to the contaminated area.

Courtesy of DCA.

COMPLETING THE TASK: CHALLENGES AND PROGRESS Lebanon is currently suffering from what has been

downward trend in the global funding of mine action is

described as “one of the worst economic crises in mod-

also a serious threat to the ability of Lebanon to meet its

ern times.” Nearly 80 percent of the population lives

treaty commitments as well as to continue routine clear-

beneath the poverty line and electricity blackouts can last

ance activities (see chart on page 31).12

Border tensions with

The practical realities of this situation are profound.

Israel continue to escalate and the possibility of increas-

Of significant concern is the increase in casualties due

The current

to landmines and cluster munitions. This trend arises

up to twenty-two hours per day.

10

ingly serious military conflict is growing.11 40

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

from economic hardship, which encourages high-risk behaviors. For instance, people often resort to collecting scrap metal to supplement their diminishing incomes.13,14 A lack of food security as well as the need for alternative means of heating and cooking has also led people to enter and utilize areas of land known to be contaminated with explosive hazards.

For the international community, the current situation demands careful attention. Lebanon is clearly demonstrating that conflict-affected states with explosive contamination and clearance needs remain susceptible to external influences, regardless of the progress made toward achieving complete clearance of explosive hazards. The short-term nature of mine action funding cycles by international donors does not allow for the longer-term, sustained planning of complete clearance, regardless of the effectiveness and efficiency of the National Mine Action Centre (NMAC). Where a state is unable to fully fund its own clearance needs, Lebanon provides a graphic example of how progress made toward treaty compliance and completed clearance is severely impacted. It also provides a sobering illustration of how that stalling progress leads to increased victims of landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive ordnance.

DCA personnel search for cluster munitions in the Mount Lebanon area.

Courtesy of DCA.

THE LEGACY Lebanon provides numerous textbook examples of excellence in mine action for the international community.

Moreover, it presents a tangible opportunity for the complete clearance of landmines, cluster munitions, and other explosive hazards within a relatively short timeframe. However, to achieve this, Lebanon requires continued funding from the international community.

To complete clearance in Lebanon would not only rid

the Lebanese people of the fear of explosive hazards, it would also offer hope to other countries that achieving the end state and goal of completed clearance is possible.

The lessons learned by DCA, as well as LMAC, provide the opportunity for a “start to finish” assessment of “how to do” mine action. This could prove an invaluable legacy from a completed mine action program.

See endnotes page 67.

MARK WILKINSON, PhD Chief Technical Advisor ​DanChurchAid Mark Wilkinson, PhD, is the Chief Technical Advisor for DCA. He has over twenty years of professional experience in the military and humanitarian mine action (HMA). As a former British Army Ammunition Technical Officer, he worked as a High Threat IEDD Operator in multiple operational environments before transitioning to HMA. In his previous post as the Chief of Operations for United Nations Mine Action Service in Iraq, he gained extensive experience in developing localization projects for HMA. Dr. Wilkinson has an active research agenda focused around IED clearance in HMA environments as well as localization in HMA.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

41

MAG Emergency Response: Digital Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in Somalia

By Robin Toal [ Mines Advisory Group ]

ACCIDENT BACKGROUND On 9 June 2023, a tragic accident involving unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Qoryoley town in the Lower Shabelle

in an open playing field that they started to play with and consequently exploded.

region of Somalia claimed the lives of twenty-seven

Children are particularly vulnerable to UXO as they

civilians, including twenty-two children, and left fifty-three

can be attracted to them for their colorful, shiny, or

others injured. The tragedy was caused when several

unusual appearance and are often unaware of how

young children discovered a mortar round on the ground

dangerous they are.

“This tragic incident underlines the importance of all parties to the conflict in Somalia to handle ordnance with care, to clear existing mines and unexploded devices, and scale up mine risk education among children and communities.” ~ Wafaa Saeed Abdelatef, UNICEF Representative in Somalia

1

SOMALIA CONTEXT Starting with the Ogaden War in 1977 and continuing

Within internally displaced persons (IDP) camps and

with ongoing internal conflicts, Somalia has been left with

in rural areas, women are particularly at risk due to

a grim legacy of remnants of war. The presence of mines

their movements to collect water and firewood, herd

and explosive remnants of war (ERW) pose an immediate

livestock, and children are at risk as they play. Girls and

threat to lives and limit development. Due to numerous

boys represent 91 percent of the victims of explosive

conflicts with Ethiopia, the Somali-Ethiopian border

incidents in Somalia, and in 2019, 74 percent of victims

remains one of the most impacted areas in the country.

were boys.4

Legacy minefields from border conflicts are responsible

The explosive hazard situation in Somalia endangers

for most of the conventional landmine contamination in

communities living in and moving through contaminated

Somalia. In addition to contamination in rural settings,

areas, restricts access to productive land, and reduces

urban areas and main roads are increasingly impacted

access to humanitarian assistance, hindering recovery and

by non-state armed groups using improvised explosive

development. Whilst the total number of landmines/ERW

devices (IEDs) and taking advantage of poorly managed

related accidents and casualties is unknown, the Landmine

stockpiles of weapons and ammunition. 2

& Cluster Munition Monitor recorded 3,313 landmine/ERW

Between

2019–2021,

fifty-seven

incidents

related

related casualties in Somalia between 1999–2019. Of

to landmines and ERW were reported, affecting 136

these casualties, 1,296 people were killed, 1,664 people

victims. This number is likely to be underreported as

were injured, and 353 people have an unknown survival

there is no centralized reporting system in Somalia. 3

status. 5

“UNMAS expresses its sincere condolences to the families affected by this devastating event and shares in their grief and pain during this incredibly difficult time.

The loss of innocent lives, especially children, is an immense tragedy that underscores the urgent need for heightened efforts to address the dangers posed by explosive ordnance in Somalia.” ~ Mr. Justin Smith, Chief UN Mine Action Service in Somalia 42

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

MAG SOMALIA DEORE BACKGROUND In response to the accident, Mines Advisory Group

MAG Somalia established a Facebook page and built

(MAG) mobilized both headquarters and Somalia based

an online following of approximately 11,000 users across

staff to develop a rapid response digital explosive

the country in 2021 as part of a wider DEORE strategy.

ordnance risk education campaign (DEORE) using paid

MAG Somalia created several digital graphics and videos

adverts targeting Meta (Facebook and Instagram) users

covering a range of key messages.6 In 2021, MAG Somalia’s

in the Lower Shabelle administrative region. The ads

DEORE campaign reached 1.7 million people across the

displayed messages reminding civilians of the threat of

country (excluding Somaliland due to donor restrictions).

UXO and how to stay safe.

“The residents benefit from the ads a lot. I’ve learned many things including how to behave properly when encountering an explosive item and how to recognize dangerous areas through warning signs. My behavior has changed a lot because of the ads. I became more careful.” ~ Daud Mohamed Hussein Jamac, 28

MAG SOMALIA DEORE EMERGENCY RESPONSE MAG Somalia’s response to the tragic accident was to

A short video previously co-developed by MAG and

distribute two ads using previously developed materials in

Clowns Without Borders International was shared with

the form of a simple graphic and a short video.

the target population. This engaging material conveys the

While short video is typically the most effective medium

critical message of “Stay on the Path” by featuring a cast

to engage users with explosive ordnance risk education

of entertaining characters who adhere to this guideline.

(EORE) information, many users have limited bandwidth

The engaging, distinct key message coupled with playful

or use Facebook’s data free service that excludes videos,

music primarily aims to attract children and young people

meaning simple graphics are more effective and accessible

and is designed to be easily understood and emulated by

for certain audiences. The content was delivered through

the younger audience.

Facebook and Instagram, the two most popular social media platforms in the country.

The bright red graphic attracts attention and features simplified headings that read “Explosive Remnants of

Due to Facebook requiring users to be thirteen yearsold to use the platform, the ad includes a request in the supporting text for parents and older siblings to share the content with their children or younger siblings.

War” and “Danger!” The graphic also features a range of

Each ad used the introductory text to highlight the recent

the most common types of mortar devices found in

tragedy near Qoryoley town with the specific location

Somalia to enable citizens to better identify ERW in

provided to make the incident tangible and of greater

their community.

relevance to the audience. The text also used emojis to try to attract greater user attention in a competitive and congested social media environment.

MAG

launched

June

2023,

six

event

occurred.

the

two

ads

on

days

after

the

tragic

Should

future

16

DEORE

interventions be required in Somalia or other contexts, there is potential for decreasing this response time. As MAG’s capability to deliver emergency DEORE responses via social media improves, MAG is working to upgrade its ability to effectively identify

FIGURE 1. Graphic used in an ad campaign.

ERW incidents that would benefit from

All graphics courtesy of MAG. ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

43

FIGURE 2. Still from video used in ad campaign. a digital-led intervention through increased internal

month but due to the relatively small audience size, the

coordination as well as enhanced cooperation with

ad reached the majority of the target audience within two

national mine action authorities. The two ads ran for one

weeks.

TARGETING AGE: Thirteen to sixty-five or older (max range) GENDER: Men and Women GEOGRAPHIC LOCATIONS: Lower Shabelle Administrative Region ESTIMATED AUDIENCE: Between 37,000 and 43,000 Somalia

Include

The target area for the ads

Audience definition

Lower Shebelle

was the administrative state of

Your audience selection is fairly broad.

Lower Shabelle that includes

Browse

Search locations

Specific

Broad

Estimated audience size: 44,300 - 52,100

Estimates may vary significantly over time based on your targeting selections and available data.

Qoryooley

the town of Qoryoley where the deadly incident cost the lives of

twenty-two

children.

Both

men and women were targeted Drop Pin Add locations in bulk

Age

13 - 65+ Gender

All genders

FIGURE 3. Geographic targeting of Meta ads.

44

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Estimated daily results

while the age range was set as

Estimated daily results aren’t available for this campaign because it has a budget that is optimised across ad sets.

broadly as possible to reach as many people as possible, ranging from thirteen years-old to over sixty-five years-old.

BUDGET The initial budget to deliver the ads was $200 based on a cost estimate to reach the target audience of between 37,000 and 43,000 users. At the close of the campaign, the total expenditure was $200 with the average cost to reach 1,000 users priced at $2.23.

AD CAMPAIGN DURATION Scheduled ads ran for one month from 16 June 2023 to 16 July 2023. Campaigns should typically run between four to six weeks to maximize chances of reaching as much of the targeted audience as possible.

RESULTS The

campaign

delivered

Performance overview

Customise metrics

DEORE materials to 89,589 unique Facebook users within the Lower Shabelle administrative

region,

more

than

significantly

the

Reach i

Cost per result i

Amount spent i

––

––

––

estimated

Reach

audience of up to 43,000.

20000

Audiences are estimated by

15000

Meta when building the cam-

10000

paign based on the past three months of activity in the area

$190.88

5000 0

but can vary, especially in volatile environments.

$2.19

87,009

16 Jun

19 Jun

22 Jun

25 Jun

28 Jun

1 Jul

4 Jul

7 Jul

10 Jul

13 Jul

FIGURE 4. Reach performance over time.

The cost to reach 1,000 unique users in Lower Shabelle was $2.23, which was a

($1.51); Iraq ($2.82); Lebanon ($5.67); Vietnam ($9.27); and

little higher than the costs incurred during MAG’s DEORE

Palestine ($11.52).

campaign in 2021 at $1.98. For reference, campaigns in

The audience demographic is in line with previous

other countries have incurred the following costs: Ukraine

campaigns and social media usage in Somalia, with

Demographics

Platform

Age and gender distribution

Results

All

30K 25K 20K 15K 10K 5K 0

13-17

18-24

25-34

35-44

45-54

Men

Women

65% (56,164) Cost per result: $2.22

35% (30,813) Cost per result: $2.14

55-64

65+

FIGURE 5. Demographic breakdown.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

45

Demographics

Platform

Placement per platform

Results

Reach

80K

80K

60K

60K

40K

40K

20K

20K

0

Audience Netw...

Facebook

Instagram

Messenger

0

Oculus

Results

Reach

FIGURE 6. Platform breakdown. notably more men than women using the platforms across

This frequency amplified opportunities for recall and user

all age groups, while the two most common age profiles

engagement.

were eighteen to twenty-four years-old and twenty-five to thirty-four years-old.

There were a total of 45,983 page engagements, representing the total number of actions that users took

The two ads were delivered across Facebook and

in response to the ads. This demonstrates that more than

Instagram. Facebook’s larger user base compared to

half of the users took an action in response to viewing the

Instagram was evident in the results of the campaign. The

messages, signifying a high level of community interest in the

ads amassed a total of 230,000 impressions, indicating

content and that the materials resonated well. Other metrics

that on average, each user encountered the ads 2.57 times.

captured in the tables are explained by a glossary of terms.

Page engagement

Ad

Post reactions

Post saves

Post comments

Post shares

Link clicks

Graphic - Lower Shabelle Emergency Respo...

1,290

189

6

3

30

16

Video - Lower Shabelle Emergency Respons...

44,693

193

3

1

25

1

Results from 2 ads i

45,983

382

9

Total

Total

Total

Total

4

55

17

Total

Total

Total

FIGURE 7. Reach and performance breakdown.

Ad

Delivery

Page engagement

Post reactions

Post saves

Post comments

Page likes or followers

Link clicks

Post shares

CPC (cost per link click)

Graphic - Lower Shabelle Emergency Respo...

Completed

1,290

189

6

3

30

16

$5.71

Video - Lower Shabelle Emergency Respons...

Completed

44,693

193

3

1

25

1

$108.72

Results from 2 ads i

45,983

382

9

4

55

17

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

Total

$11.76 Total

Per Action

FIGURE 8. Engagement breakdown.

Ad

Delivery

Cost per ThruPlay

ThruPlays

Graphic - Lower Shabelle Emergency Respo...

Completed

106,652

–

–

–

–

Video - Lower Shabelle Emergency Respons...

Completed

123,703

44,470

$0.002

15,608

$0.01

230,355

44,470

$0.002

15,608

$0.01

Results from 2 ads i

Total

FIGURE 9. Video engagement breakdown.

46

Cost per 3second video plays

3-second video plays

Impressions

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Total

Total

Total

Total

DIGITAL EORE GLOSSARY Facebook and Instagram metrics and terms

FACEBOOK CLICKS

This metric includes link clicks as well as all clicks on other parts of your ad.

COMMENTS

A facebook post comment is when someone submits a comment on a piece of content on Facebook.

COMMUNITY BUILDING

The process of building an online following of users to a Facebook page.

CPC (COST PER CLICK)

CPC stands for cost per click. This is the price you pay for each click on your Facebook ad.

CTR (CLICK THROUGH RATE)

CTR stands for click-through rate. This is the percentage of people who clicked on the ad after being shown it.

FREQUENCY

The average number of times each person saw your ad.

IMPRESSIONS

Impressions are the number of times any content from your Page or about your Page entered a person’s screen.

LINK CLICKS

This metric measures the number of clicks on links within an ad that users clicked on.

NEW PAGE LIKES

The number of likes of your Facebook Page attributed to your ads.

PAGE LIKES

The total number of likes on a Facebook page.

POST REACTIONS

The number of reactions to your ads. The reactions button on an ad allows people to share different reactions to its content: like, love, care, haha, wow, sad, or angry.

REACH

The number of people who saw your ads at least once during the campaign’s lifetime.

RETARGETING

Retargeting means delivering ads to an audience based on their previous interaction with your ads.

VIDEO THRUPLAYS

The number of times your video was played to completion, or for at least 15 seconds.

FIGURE 10. MAG Digital EORE glossary.

RESPONSE EVALUATION The Emergency Response mechanism worked effec-

generated a significant level of interest. Without a pre-

tively in delivering DEORE content to Meta users in the

and post-campaign study or other forms of monitor-

Lower Shabelle administrative region within a reason-

ing and evaluation, it is difficult to measure changes in

able time of the accident occurring near Qoryoley town.

community knowledge and behavior. However, the digital

Facebook was able to reach more than double the ini-

results demonstrate the potential for temporarily rais-

tial number of targeted users in just two weeks and

ing awareness about the risks of explosive ordnance (EO)

with more than half of respondents engaging with the

within a targeted population.

messages or related page in some way, the response

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

47

LESSONS LEARNED The effectiveness of the project could be improved in the following ways: • Response time: MAG’s established presence in-country, close working relationships with the Somali Explosives Management Authority and United Nations Mine Action Service, and existing DEORE materials facilitated a quick response that would have been slowed without existing networks and capacity. However, with the development of guidelines for more effective monitoring and sharing of EO accidents, response times can be improved further. For emergency campaigns utilizing social media, it is important to be aware that there is typically an automated review period for ads, which can take between four and eight hours. Additionally, ads can occasionally be rejected for reasons that might not be immediately clear.

• Materials: Due to a need to respond quickly, existing DEORE materials were used that were suitable but not specifically adapted to the circumstances of the accident. To maximize effectiveness on a digital medium, it is important that materials and surrounding content adds value to users’ experiences by providing relevant and tangible information with practical utility.

• Engagement: To strengthen recall and better influence behavior change, DEORE practitioners should work to encourage engagement through calls-to-action, such as asking users to share the video or tag their friends to help keep their community safe.

• Monitoring & Evaluation: Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) is limited in an emergency response scenario due to the urgent need to provide risk education to communities as quickly as possible. If time allows, pre- and post-campaign surveys can demonstrate the difference in knowledge, attitudes, and practices but were not possible in this event due to limited capacity on the ground in country and the need to respond quickly to prevent further incidents.

A digital survey conducted during and after the campaign could provide more insights into the initiative’s impact. This approach can be particularly effective when using retargeting to deliver surveys to users who have engaged with the messages.

See endnotes page 68.

“Together, we must intensify our collective efforts to eliminate the risks posed by explosive ordnance and safeguard the lives of vulnerable individuals, particularly children.”

- Mr. Justin Smith, Chief UN Mine Action Service in Somalia

ROBIN TOAL Digital EORE Manager MAG (Mines Advisory Group) Robin Toal is Digital EORE Manager at MAG. He has sixteen years’ experience working in the humanitarian sector in project management, innovation, and behavior change, including the past ten years in humanitarian mine action with MAG and APOPO.

48

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Department of State’s Quick Reaction Force:

Twenty-three Years of Service

F

By Charlie Holloway [ Golden West Humanitarian Foundation ]

or the past twenty-three years, the United States has provided rapid responses to landmine and munitions/explosives related emergencies in some of the most vulnerable populations around the world. Initiated with a group from Mozambique, the Quick Reaction Demining Force (QRDF) was designed by the US Department of State to rapidly respond to landmine emergencies. Presently, its response capacity has expanded to include experts in battle area clearance and physical security and stockpile management (PSSM). These professionals volunteer for deployments on short notice to address emergencies globally. The Department of State Quick Reaction Force (QRF), managed by the Political/Military Bureau Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA), provides an effective capability to respond in forty-eight hours to any type of request for assistance.

Photo caption: QRF Senior Technical Advisor inspecting a US 500lb. WWII aerial bomb discovered during excavation at a windfarm project in Yap in 2017.

All images courtesy of US DOS WRA.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

49

QUICK REACTION FORCE This article focuses on two different deployments in

Golden West has access to a global list of experts in

response to very different challenges. The US Department

a variety of disciplines who can be deployed on very

of State’s QRF team managed to focus subject-matter

short notice. In addition to full- and part-time Golden

expertise and unique technologies and skills to safely

West employees, the QRF Task Manager maintains a list

resolve the immediate problems.

of experts in explosive ordnance disposal (EOD)/PSSM

Today’s QRF evolved from the QRDF created by PM/WRA in 2000 as a humanitarian mine action (HMA) response

who have volunteered to join a QRF deployment with minimal notice.

for emergencies related to landmine contamination.

A typical mission is initiated with reports of an explosive

The QRDF, operated by RONCO Consulting Corporation,

accident or hazard, and an offer of support by the United

consisted of teams of experienced deminers from

States. When accepted, PM/WRA sends a warning order

Mozambique, organized and equipped to respond to urgent

to Golden West’s full-time QRF managers in Washington,

needs worldwide. The QRDF conducted WRA-directed

DC. Ideally the QRF will deploy a planning team within

demining operations in Mozambique, Sri Lanka, Sudan, and

forty-eight hours of notification or sooner when diplomatic

Iraq between 2000 and 2007. In 2008, PM/WRA created

details and transportation are available.

the QRF with an expanded mission beyond landmines to

This QRF planning team assesses the situation on

encompass urgent and emergent unexploded ordnance

the ground and recommends follow-on actions to WRA.

(UXO) and ammunition stockpile emergencies. The new

Golden West’s global footprint often makes additional

QRF contract was awarded to DynCorp International who

EOD or PSSM experts available internally, but the QRF

oversaw the program from 2008 through 2013.

also maintains lists of qualified technical personnel who

Since 2013, execution of the Department of State’s

volunteer to deploy as part of the QRF on short notice.

QRF has been provided by Golden West Humanitarian

The QRF is prepared to add additional resources within

Foundation. A US-based non-profit, nongovernmental

fourteen days, equipped to stay in the field for an extended

organization, Golden West maintains a full-time dedicated

period when directed by the Department of State.

QRF planning cell to deploy within forty-eight hours.

On the ground, QRF managers interact with US

Additional tailored resources can be on the ground within

Embassy and Department of State officials, foreign

fourteen days, prepared to sustain operations for three

and US military officials, and the host nation’s

months or as long as required. Goals of the program are

leadership. The result is often provision of technical

the rapid provision of expert assistance to any type of

information and advice, but also when requested,

explosives-related accident or incident and access to a

involves hands-on mitigation of threats and on-site

variety of skills tailored to the requirements of the task.

training of response forces.

FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA In June 2017, the Department of State deployed the QRF to Yap in the Federated States of Micronesia at the request of the US Embassy.

While constructing a wind farm to generate electricity for the island, crews encountered a US 500lb. WWII aerial bomb located near the base of a windmill tower site. The QRF team assessed the bomb as fuzed, potentially dangerous, and recommended it be destroyed, but no demolition materials were available on Yap. The bomb was temporarily secured in a deep pit dug on the site pending resolution. Subsequent QRF efforts to obtain explosives to dispose of the bomb were frustrated by a lack of commercial air or surface vessels that would transport explosives to Yap. Golden West was prepared to deploy nitromethane based binary explosives, but

Explosive-free bomb casing following successful burning of explosive filler.

50

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Successful cutting of a US 500 lb WWII aerial bomb utilizing Golden West remotely operated MCS in Yap, 2017. could not obtain the blasting caps needed to initiate the

cut the Yap bomb and a Golden West cutting expert was

main charges nor find a vendor willing to ship primary

deployed as part of the QRF team. The 500lb. M-64 US

explosives to Yap, short of a cost-prohibitive dedicated

bomb was remotely cut in the pit, the fuzes removed, and

flight or vessel. Every conceivable solution was tested and

the bomb filler was successfully burned. The empty bomb

found to be untenable. The inability to obtain explosives

casing was turned over to local authorities as a souvenir

prompted Golden West to use their proprietary mobile

of a successful mission. With the bomb destroyed and the

cutting system (MCS) to accomplish the mission.

hazard removed, the wind farm construction continued,

By September 2017, the QRF returned to Yap with a Golden West MCS. The MCS had the capacity to safely

providing critical infrastructure and electrical power to local citizens.

Devastation following unplanned explosions at the Nkoa Ntoma military ammunition depot in Bata, Equatorial Guinea, 2021.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

51

EQUATORIAL GUINEA the military base; for the next two weeks the QRF team assisted the Qatari EOD team in search and rescue UXO sweep operations in the surrounding civilian community.

Following departure of the Qatar EOD contingent, the QRF focused on assisting the French EOD team working the armory perimeter. The team collected UXO and searched a heavily damaged building being constructed to serve as a hospital across from the Armory main gate. After completing a sweep of area surrounding the damaged hospital, the QRF was approached by a local civilian who reported a UXO had landed next to his church. A single Chinese 107 mm Rocket warhead was recovered at 1.6 km from the blast site.

These and dozens of other QRF deployments over the past twentythree years validate the need for a rapidly

deployable

team

of

experts

representing the United States and addressing

explosives

or

munitions

related emergencies. Golden West is

QRF Senior Technical Advisor and Qatari EOD conducting UXO sweep operations in civilian communities, Equatorial Guinea, 2021.

proud to apply our skills and unique technologies to support the Department of State PM/WRA’s QRF program. We continue to work with our technical partners and the academic community

In March 2021, the Nkoa Ntoma military ammunition

to innovate and develop new tools and techniques that

depot and military barracks in Bata, Equatorial Guinea,

will support the QRF mission and the HMA community.

suffered a series of devastating explosions, causing 107 deaths and more than 700 injuries. Damage extended beyond the military compound and involved residential communities in the area. The Government of Equatorial Guinea immediately requested international assistance for what they termed a catastrophe. Two days later, the Department of State offered assistance and directed the QRF to prepare to deploy an advance team of EOD experts.

The QRF deployed an advance team to Equitorial Guinea on 12 March 2021, joining an international response that included contingents from France, Qatar, Cameroon, and a team of PSSM specialists from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining.

Existing defense agreements put the French EOD team in charge of supporting Equitorial Guinea forces inside

52

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

CHARLIE HOLLOWAY US Department of State QRF Task Manager Golden West Humanitarian Foundation Charlie Holloway has been a key member of the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) since 2008 and joined the Golden West Humanitarian Foundation in 2013 as the QRF Task Manager. He is responsible for managing, planning, and deploying teams of fully trained and certified explosive remnants of war technical specialists. He and his teams mobilize within forty-eight hours and rapidly implement short-term conventional weapons destruction and mitigation solutions designed to reduce or eliminate threats posed by explosive hazards to civilian populations.

REVIVING OLD MOSUL:

3D Modeling Aids Safe Clearance in Iraq

By Erin Atkinson, Marc Dennehy and Craig Locke [ Tetra Tech ]

A UAV captures imagery on the second floor of a structure in Old Mosul. Mahmoud Dilaan Hussein, a local artist and stone mason, painted the mural.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

U

nder the 2014–2017 Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) occupation, the Old City of Mosul, Iraq, served as a headquarters for the self-proclaimed caliphate. ISIS produced, stored, and transited money, modern munitions, weapons, and improvised explosive devices (IEDs) through the city’s ancient stone streets. Since 2019, the US Department of State has contracted Tetra Tech to survey and clear IEDs and unexploded ordnance (UXO) in Ninewa, Anbar, and Kirkuk Governorates.

In 2022, with the cooperation of the Iraq Directorate of Mine Action (DMA), the Iraqi State Bureau of Antiquities and Heritage (SBAH), and the International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in Conflict Areas (ALIPH), main clearance and rehabilitation efforts in Mosul shifted focus to the Old City. Old Mosul was divided into two large hazardous areas for systematic clearance.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

53

To approach the immense and technically challenging

This article presents a case study of how Tetra Tech

task of clearing the Old City efficiently, effectively, and

leveraged 3D modeling to create a phased, data-driven

safely—without compromising the city’s rich cultural

site clearance plan for the Old City of Mosul, including two

history—Tetra Tech created a 3D model using aerial

historic and culturally significant properties, the Al-Masfi

photogrammetry to quantify and visualize the scope and

Mosque and Al Tahera Church.

scale of the project. This technique allowed the team to

Lessons from this approach can expedite clearance

precisely calculate volumes of debris, strategically plan

planning and operations in urban and emerging conflict

operations and safe displacement areas, and methodically

zones by quantifying project scale and granting foresight

document the current state of archeological and culturally

into suspected and confirmed hazardous areas. Further

significant properties within the Old City. The model

analysis is needed to evaluate the efficacy of this

permitted Tetra Tech to remotely characterize damaged

approach in comparison to traditional international mine

buildings, measure street widths with precision, identify

action standards (IMAS) clearance practices.

structures reoccupied by internally displaced persons (IDPs), and establish visibility into areas beyond the safe reach of cleared pathways—only wide enough for a pair of feet.

THE OLD CITY OF MOSUL The Old City of Mosul, situated on the banks of the Tigris River in Nineveh Governorate, has remained a center for culture and commerce throughout the millennia.1 Since the Neolithic Age (6,000 BCE), civilizations have risen and fallen, each leaving their physical record along the ancient city’s warren of narrow streets. 2 The life-giving Tigris-Euphrates River system brings water from Turkey and Iran into Iraq, creating a rich agricultural and economic development environment aptly named the “Fertile Crescent.” 3

Aerial view of modern Mosul and the Tigris-Euphrates River.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

54

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

ISIS BATTLE FOR MOSUL In June 2014, after waging war across the Nineveh Plains, ISIS entered Mosul, declared a caliphate from the top of the Al Nuri Mosque, and occupied the city for three years. The militants used the ancient stone buildings of the Old City as courts, banks, jails, stores, and factories for creating explosives and weapons. They also persecuted and massacred religious and ethnic minorities—forcing thousands of families to flee—and vandalized significant religious and cultural sites throughout the city.4 On 1 November 2016, the battle for the liberation of Mosul began.

In preparation for close guerilla warfare, ISIS militants cut tunnels through walls of ancient stone buildings, carried and detonated suicide belts, and laid explosive booby traps in homes and basements.

Iraqi and Coalition airstrikes and artillery bombardments pummeled Old Mosul until June 2017. 5 The eight months of war in the Old City left behind a deadly legacy of UXO and IEDs in a heavily damaged, dense urban environment. To this day, these explosive hazards remain buried under piles of rubble left from the airstrikes, sometimes as deep as 10–12 meters.

Tetra Tech technicians conduct building clearance and battle area clearance of rubble in Old Mosul, February 2023.

Courtesy of Khalid al-Mousily, Tetra Tech.

SIX YEARS LATER During the conflict and occupation, from 2014–2017, more than one million people fled Mosul and the western Nineveh Governorate.6 In 2022, government-run IDP camps began closing nationwide. Families returned to Old Mosul to find their community filled with millions of metric tons of rubble and thousands of explosive remnants of war (ERW) piled atop, inside, and under their homes.

Despite the risk, families began reoccupying corners of the Old City and clearing passageways for foot and motorcycle traffic through the narrow ancient streets.

With civilians eager to return to their community and the presence of many ancient and religious properties among the rubble, the DMA required a systematic, controlled clearance approach that respected the sanctity of the Old Mosul neighborhood and honored its deep history. Previous efforts at clearance in the Old City were limited to UXO spot clearance tasks.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

55

CLEARANCE IN THE OLD CITY Since

2019,

Tetra

Tech

has

performed

humanitarian mine action (HMA) and munitions response services in Iraq. Tetra Tech clears explosive

hazards

from

critical

infrastructure,

vital economic centers, and areas of cultural and historical importance. Tetra Tech also trains and mentors local national demining capacity to

The initial clearance polygon was assessed as 281,000 square meters along the western bank of the Tigris River, from Old Bridge in the south to Fifth Bridge in the north.

facilitate Iraqis in gaining agency and longevity in the explosive hazard removal and HMA sphere.

In 2022, the Iraq DMA tasked Tetra Tech with beginning clearance of the Old City. The initial clearance polygon was assessed as 281,000 square meters along the western bank of the Tigris River, from Old Bridge in the south to Fifth Bridge in the north. However, this square meter figure only represented a simple, two-dimensional footprint in a dense, urban area full of multistory structures, most of which included basements below street level. Tetra Tech needed to find a way to quantify the realistic three-dimensional (3D) size and scope of the clearance task to provide an accurate level of effort, estimate resource needs, and optimize schedule efficiency.

Tetra Tech provides EORE in Old Mosul, April 2023.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

Another unique facet of clearance in the Old City is the presence of culturally important and historically significant properties, such as mosques, churches, ancient bathhouses, and archaeological sites. The Old City itself is on the United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization’s (UNESCO) tentative list of World Heritage sites.7 The conservation of these important structures is paramount to preserving the historic character of the Old City. Our team liaises closely with the SBAH to facilitate documentation of historic structures and items of historical or cultural significance found during clearance. All Tetra Tech staff working in Old Mosul have received SBAH training to identify and report culturally sensitive items, and SBAH staff are on-site daily during clearance operations.

56

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

AERIAL PHOTOGRAMMETRY, 3D MODELING, AND MINE ACTION On average, manual mine clearance activities can clear between 10–12 square meters daily, depending on the conditions and operator. 8,9 The

CLEARANCE OPERATIONS

clearance of Old Mosul requires highly technical clearance of complex explosive devices in a very dense urban landscape—streets full of destroyed buildings, immense piles of rubble, and a population actively returning to their community. According to the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), real-time drone technology surveillance can aid security operations and disaster management,10 save human lives, and improve operational efficiencies in demining.11 Nonetheless, flying unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) is often restricted due to their association with military operations, dated legislation, and privacy concerns.12 In

the

past,

photogrammetry

and

multispectral

imaging

have

1.

Identify access points and strategic staging areas 2. Establish a strategic phased clearance plan 3. Calculate equipment requirements to maintain an efficient schedule 4. Remove identification of surface laid explosive hazards

successfully bolstered survey and mapping in agriculture, food science, healthcare, and emergency and resource management.13 Combining spectral imagery with spatial information has been shown to outperform spectral imagery alone, and models can be validated with confidence using pixel-to-pixel comparison.

14

In the past, photogrammetry and multispectral imaging have successfully bolstered survey and mapping in agriculture, food science, healthcare, and emergency and resource management.13 Tetra Tech clears rubble in Old Mosul, April 2023.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

IMAGERY AND DATA MANAGEMENT 1.

Measure reliably the width of streets and alleyways to determine best-fit equipment 2. Estimate rubble volume 3. Codify remaining historical assets and perform preliminary condition assessment post-conflict

EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION (EORE) 1.

Prioritize locations for EORE based on areas reoccupied by families 2. Customize lessons to reflect site-specific hazards FIGURE 1. Operational efficiencies improved by the 3D model.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

57

Screenshot of interactive 3D model of Old Mosul.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

3D MODEL OF OLD MOSUL In need of a simple way to quantify the immensity of clearing Old Mosul, Tetra Tech adapted their routine

ensuring maximum usability.

processes for employing remote-controlled UAVs as a

Relevant images were uploaded and stitched together

non-technical survey (NTS) and reconnaissance tool to

using Pix4Dmapper, a software that identifies key tie points

capture and pair imagery with geospatial information in a

between photos to create a 3D point cloud of the urban

3D model. This model improved efficiencies in clearance

landscape. The information and database manager then

operations,

explosive

migrated the point cloud into ArcGIS to create a spatially

ordnance risk ordnance education (EORE), as seen in

accurate, photorealistic, and interactive 3D model of the

Figure 1.

entire clearance area, accurate to within 20 centimeters.

information

management,

and

First, Tetra Tech UAV operators systematically employed UAVs and photogrammetry to capture more than 15,000

58

the collected data, removing extraneous photos while

Data processing of the images took approximately one hundred hours.

orthorectified high-resolution images of the Old City. Local

The locations of identified explosive hazards and

government officials required Iraqi intelligence officers

other important items were entered into the 3D model,

to be present during all wide-area UAV data collection;

including georeferenced photos, size, and attribute data.

therefore, close schedule coordination was essential.

These data enhance the spatially accurate, interactive

Multiple operators captured images in forty hours of

environment for analyzing distribution patterns of UXO

flight time spread over two weeks, requiring strict data

and IEDs, allowing the routine reassessment of explosive

management processes to coordinate and align image

threats. This unique dataset may also be useful to military

capture efforts. After capturing and uploading the imagery,

historians who want to study the tactics and outcomes of

Tetra Tech’s information and database manager reviewed

the Battle for Mosul.

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Tetra Tech used the resultant model to: • Revise the scale of the problem. By leveraging the

• Characterize

damaged

buildings. The model’s

model, Tetra Tech reassessed the initial estimate

photorealistic representation allows Tetra Tech to

of

Our

gain insight into areas that are typically inaccessible,

analysis determined that the actual clearance effort

such as the tops and undersides of roof overhangs or

encompassed more than 985,000 square meters, in

the interiors of unstable structures that are unsafe to

addition to clearing over one million cubic meters of

enter physically. Moreover, Tetra Tech will continually

rubble. This refined scope takes into consideration

refresh the model with new imagery as clearance

the three-dimensional characteristics of the urban

progresses, turning it into a dynamic dataset that

landscape, enabling more informed decisions regarding

evolves over time.

281,000

square

meters

for

clearance.

• Customize EORE and community outreach. The

resource allocation, scheduling, and budgeting. was

model allows our community liaison officers to

employed to compute the volumes of extensive

prioritize areas for targeted EORE by identifying

rubble piles, gauge street widths, determine building

houses and buildings that appear to be reoccupied.

heights, and establish boundaries within the Old City.

The clearest indication of reoccupation was the

Leveraging these data, our operations can develop a

appearance of rugs and laundry on rooftop terraces,

well-structured, data-driven, and efficient clearance

items visible from the air. Furthermore, the model

strategy. The model aids in optimizing mechanical

assists in tailoring the content of EORE to concentrate

asset utilization, pinpointing access points for tight

on the specific types of explosive hazards present in

spaces, coordinating the movement of substantial

the immediate area.

• Measure

the

environment.

The

model

quantities of cleared rubble, positioning flexible staging areas, and identifying priority sites for clearance.

Armored excavator pulls back rubble in Old Mosul.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

59

Key specifications of the model for each phase of the workflow include planning for clearance, flying the UAVs, building the model, and clearing explosive hazards (see Figure 2). As demonstrated in Figure 2, the model enables Tetra Tech to reassess the scope of the clearance effort, redistribute current resources, and shorten the projected timeline for project completion. Additionally, Tetra Tech will collect ongoing imagery updates as the clearance progresses. This approach will continuously refine and adapt our clearance strategy to address emerging priorities.

Planning for Clearance

Flying the UAVs

Building the Model

Clearing Explosive Hazards

Initial Clearance Estimate: 281,000 m2 (polygon as assigned by the DMA)

Total Area Flown: 77 acres, 15,000 images

Total structures modeled: Over 500

Resource Investment: Two UAV operators

Resource Investment: One data processor

Revised Clearance Estimate: 985,000 m2 plus 1M m3 rubble for clearance and removal

Initial Resource Estimate: Three demining teams four large armored mechanical assets

Duration: 10 hours training, 40 hours flight time

Duration: 100 hours data processing

Initial Duration Estimate: 5–6 years

Revised Resource Estimate: Five demining teams, five large armored mechanical assets, five small soft skin loaders Revised Total Duration Estimate: 4–5 years Reoccupied homes Located: 50

FIGURE 2. Model specifications corresponding to the clearance workflow.

A Tetra Tech technician conduct building clearance and battle area clearance of rubble in Old Mosul, February 2023.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

Courtesy of Khalid al-Mousily, Tetra Tech.

REVITALIZING HISTORIC PROPERTIES When the DMA issued the Old City clearance task in 2022, they identified two historic, culturally significant properties as top priorities for clearance within the larger polygon: the Al Tahera Catholic Church and the Al Masfi Mosque. Both properties received funding for rehabilitation work that could commence as soon as clearance of explosive hazards was complete. Using the 3D model, Tetra Tech quickly created a workable strategy for assessing rubble and resource needs for optimized clearance operations at these two properties.

Operations in and around these historic buildings require constant liaison with local religious leaders and government agencies. The 3D model serves as a digital benchmark for the current condition of these important structures and facilitates local stakeholder engagements with UNESCO and the ALIPH Foundation, who are funding the rehabilitation of these sites.

60

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

AL TAHERA CATHOLIC CHURCH UNESCO remarked that the Al Tahera Catholic Church is woven into the history of the Old City as “a symbol of the diversity that has been the story of Mosul for centuries.”15 The church opened in 1862 after three years of construction. The marble stonework is highly carved, including ornate columns, arches, hand-crafted stone tombs, and crosses carved on the walls and in the courtyard.

Marble stonework on the entrance to the Al Tahera Church.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

Post-conflict, vast amounts of rubble filled the area within the church walls, and large pieces of rubble risked the stability of the surrounding structure. The 3D model was used to establish the boundaries of the Al Tahera clearance effort, allowing our team to estimate rubble volumes, prioritize staging areas, and plan a smart, phased approach to clearance.

In just under two months, Tetra Tech cleared over 400 explosives from 2,000 square meters at Al Tahera Catholic Church, including part of the Bishop’s house, the surrounding walls, and parish houses. Explosive hazards removed from the church compound include over sixty IEDs and IED components, air-dropped improvised munitions (ADIMs), improvised projectiles, suicide vests, UXO, and small arms ammunition. Using data from the 3D model, Tetra Tech optimized resource utilization and reduced clearance time by 25 percent compared to initial level of effort (LOE) estimates. As of 2023, the site is fully cleared, and UNESCO is rehabilitating the church’s interior, employing stonemasons to hand carve marble to replace damaged sections of the décor.

Commendation from the Government of Iraq to Tetra Tech recognizing "outstanding efforts."

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

61

AL-MASFI MOSQUE Al-Masfi Mosque is considered by many to be the heartbeat of the Old City. According to the ALIPH Foundation, Al-Masfi “stands on the site of the oldest mosque in Mosul,” first consecrated in 638 CE, and the current building dates to the 19th century.16 Over the entry gate and along the sahn (courtyard) entrance wall are carved and painted inscriptions referring to the ancient origins of the mosque. Inside the prayer hall, the stone mihrab, huge granite columns on large pediments, and original woodwork attest to the age and enduring character of the building.

Our demining teams used the 3D model to plan operations, assess conditions, and formulate a work plan. The high-resolution orthorectified images of the mosque’s roof facilitated building clearance, removing the need to erect scaffolding and place a human

Inscriptions painted over the sahn entrance of the Al-Masfi Mosque.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

deminer in an unsafe work environment. The model also enabled Tetra Tech to brief the ALIPH Foundation,17 the organization funding ongoing archeological excavations and rehabilitation efforts at Al Masfi.18

Tetra Tech cleared over 700 explosive hazards from 1,000 square meters within the mosque compound in just under three weeks, including ADIMs, conventional and improvised UXO, suicide vests, and small arms ammunition.

The high-resolution orthorectified images of the mosque’s roof facilitated building clearance, removing the need to erect scaffolding and place a human deminer in an unsafe work environment.

Columns of the Al-Masfi Mosque prayer hall.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

62

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

UAV captures images in a cleared building with the word “safe” marked on the wall.

Courtesy of Tetra Tech.

3D MODELING AND MINE ACTION LEARNING Although Tetra Tech has currently cleared a total of

These

data

can

inform

long-term

development

324,000 square meters of the Old City (which already

strategies, improve the understanding of resource gaps

exceeds the original polygon issued by the DMA), we

within a returning population, and inform efforts to

estimate that 985,000 square meters remain to be

revitalize culturally significant properties. Modeling can

cleared as of July 2023. An accurate understanding of how

map and codify recently contaminated areas in conflict

much work is left to complete can help inform Tetra Tech

zones with little to no historical or personal accounts

operations and help the DMA plan and schedule future

of the hazards and facilitate stakeholder education

resource allocation.

on cleared areas prior to designing physical and social

This 3D model serves as a digital time capsule of a city

development projects.

in its current post-conflict state and has the potential to

While this type of modeling has not previously been

be used globally to understand broader battle tactics used

employed in large-scale urban clearance efforts, the

in cities; the widespread and lasting effects of war on

benefits of 3D modeling in enhancing data-driven

urban landscapes; how a city rebuilds itself, and the post-

demining clearance operations is clear. Although this

conflict condition of historic properties, such as important

project represents a singular, positive example of

religious centers or archaeological sites.

applying photogrammetry and modeling in the urban

Tetra Tech posits that 3D modeling can expedite

HMA sector, conducting additional comparative research

explosive ordnance detection, clearance, and debris

could provide quantifiable insights into the time-saving

disposal in urban settings by informing safe and effective

advantages of 3D modeling when applied to traditional

UXO clearance planning and operations, optimizing

survey and clearance methods. Tetra Tech intends to

visibility into potentially hazardous areas prior to personnel

continue updating the model to gain further clarity on

movement, and strengthening relevance and strategic

these beneficial practices.

delivery of EORE.

See endnotes page 68.

ISSUE 27.3 | FALL 2023

63

ERIN ATKINSON Project Manager and Geophysicist Tetra Tech Erin Atkinson is a Tetra Tech project manager and geophysicist with fifteen years of experience in munitions response on CONUS and OCONUS projects. Since 2019, she has managed the US Department of State’s Worldwide Weapons Destruction Support Services Task Order in Iraq, providing humanitarian mine action services across the country. She has degrees in archaeology, geography, and environmental science from the University of Texas at Austin and sits on the United Nations’ International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) Review Board.

MARC DENNEHY Task Order Leader Tetra Tech Marc Dennehy is a Tetra Tech Task Order Leader with over ten years of experience in munitions response. Since 2019, he has provided in-country management and technical oversight for the US Department of State’s Worldwide Weapons Destruction Support Services Task Order in Iraq, providing humanitarian mine action services across the country. Dennehy holds degrees in civil law and criminal justice from Ireland’s University College Cork and is a graduate of the British military’s Royal School of Military Engineering, Defence Explosive Ordnance Disposal, Munitions and Search Training Regiment.

CRAIG LOCKE GIS Analyist Tetra Tech With a decade of experience as a Royal Engineer Geographic Technician, Craig Locke deployed globally, including operational duties in Afghanistan. In 2016, he transitioned to the civilian sector, where he contributed to planning 5G, dark fiber, and fiber-to-the-home networks in the United Kingdom. With Tetra Tech, Locke worked as a GIS Analyst on the US Department of State Conventional Weapons Destruction Program in Syria and now manages GIS initiatives in Iraq—combining military precision with cutting-edge technology.

CONTACT INFORMATION Erin Atkinson Tetra Tech 1320 N. Courthouse Rd, Suite 600 Arlington, VA 22201 Erin.atkinson@tetratech.com

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Nikulin, P. D., deSmet, P. D., Puliaiev, A., Zhurakhov, V., Fasullo, S., Chen, G., ... & Cappuccio, K. (2020). Automated UAS aeromagnetic surveys to detect MBRL unexploded ordnance. The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, 24(1), 13.

Shubitidze, F., & White River Technologies, Inc. Newton United States. (2018). Continued Discrimination Demonstration Using Advanced EMI Models at Live UXO Sites: Data Quality Assessment and Residual Risk Mitigation in Real Time. ESTCP MR-201227, Final Report, http://www. serdp. org/ProgramAreas/Munitions-Response/Land/Live-Site-Demonstrations/ MR-201227.

International Campaign to Ban Landmines, Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor 2022 (ICBL-CMC: November 2022), https://bit.ly/3xh9exL. Demining Research Community, https://www.de-mine.com/.

Soil Survey Staff, Natural Resources Conservation Service, United States Department of Agriculture. Web Soil Survey. Available online at http://websoilsurvey.nrcs.usda.gov/ accessed [07/06/2023].

Kasban, H., Zahran, O., Elaraby, S. M., El-Kordy, M., & Abd ElSamie, F. E. (2010). A comparative study of landmine detection techniques. Sensing and Imaging: An International Journal, 11, 89-112.

Simms, J. E., & Berger, R. P. (2010). Demonstration of UXOPenDepth for the estimation of projectile penetration depth.

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16. Nikulin, A., De Smet, T. S., Baur, J., Frazer, W. D., & Abramowitz, J. C. (2018). Detection and identification of remnant PFM-1 ‘Butterfly Mines’ with a UAV-based thermal-imaging protocol.

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Created by Drew Prater and Tony Salvo for Optima Group GICHD, “Ukraine Faces Massive Explosive Contamination One Year into Conflict,” ReliefWeb, 22 February 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4pp8uxuj.

Clark, Joseph, “DOD Announces $800M Security Assistance Package for Ukraine,” U.S. Department of Defense, 7 July 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4fxjtbkk.

Bomb Techs Without Borders, www.BTWOB.org.

“Basic Identification of Ammunition in Ukraine,” BulletPicker, https://ukr.bulletpicker.com/id-guides.html.

Mine Action in Lebanon: Innovation, Learning, and Finishing the Job by Wilkinson [ from page 35 ] 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

Taken from GICHD paper on Transitioning Mine Action Programmes to National Ownership: Lebanon available at: https://tinyurl.com/y9m6jw5w.

LMAC Program Strategy 2025.

Diakonia International Humanitarian Law, Humanitarian Demining as a form of Humanitarian Assistance under International Humanitarian Law June 2020 at: https://tinyurl.com/4b8pvny9.

Taken from: DCA Lebanon Country Strategy.

See: “The Bigger Picture: Considerations Toward the Sustainable Localization of Mine Action”, Mark Wilkinson, Albert Schevey and Ahmed Al Zubaidi, The Journal of Conventional Munitions Destruction, Volume 27, Issue 1, https://tinyurl.com/4n5dwknf.

Wilkinson, Mark; Albert Schevey, and Ahmed Al Zubaidi, “The Bigger Picture: Considerations Toward the Sustainable Localization of Mine Action,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction, Volume 27, Issue 1 (2023). https://tinyurl.com/4n5dwknf.

See: https://tinyurl.com/49a5uaev.

See: https://tinyurl.com/49a5uaev.

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9.

10.

11.

12.

13.

14.

See, for example, Human Rights Watch, ‘The Impact of Israel’s Use of Cluster Munitions in Lebanon in July and August 2006’, available at: https://tinyurl.com/2ppj9bhd.

See: https://tinyurl.com/5cvmxw3w.

See, for example: Bateman, Tom, “Israel-Lebanon border tension raises fears of bloody escalation,” https://tinyurl.com/5yw5ejc3.

See: https://tinyurl.com/bdfh3y3x.

See: OCHA Lebanon Advocacy Note, “Increasing Humanitarian Needs in Lebanon” available at: https://tinyurl.com/bdd6ka2s.

See: LMAC Annual Report 2022, p. 37.

MAG Emergency Response: Digital Explosive Ordnance Risk Education in Somalia by Toal [ from page 42 ] 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

“UNMAS is profoundly saddened and alarmed by the tragic incident involving unexploded ordnance (UXO) in the Lower Shabelle region of Somalia.” United Nations Mine Action Service. 12 June 2023. https://tinyurl.com/4a3dwj7k.

“2022 Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview.” ReliefWeb. OCHA, 24 October 2021. https://tinyurl.com/y2ev4s6u, Abdulle, Dahir. “Somalia Briefing.” Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention Intersessional Meetings, 22-24 June, 2021. PDF file. https://tinyurl.com/2bm8r8m2.

“2022 Somalia Humanitarian Needs Overview.” ReliefWeb. OCHA, 24 October 2021. https://tinyurl.com/y2ev4s6u.

Landmine and Cluster Munition Monitor. “Somalia Impact Report.” 20 April 2021. https://tinyurl.com/4rcepa8a.

MAG Somalia. Facebook, https://www.facebook.com/MAGSomalia.

Reviving Old Mosul: 3D Modeling Aids Safe Clearance in Iraq by Atkinson, Dennehy, and Locke [ from page 53 ] 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

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Yaqub, Lina. 2019. “The Impact of the Baghdad–Berlin Railway on the City of Mosul: Urban Form, Architecture, and Housing.” Doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati, https://tinyurl.com/545d8uwc.

Yaqub, Lina. 2019. “The Impact of the Baghdad–Berlin Railway on the City of Mosul: Urban Form, Architecture, and Housing.”

Doctoral dissertation, University of Cincinnati, https://tinyurl. https://tinyurl.com/545d8uwc.

Government of Iraq. “About Iraq: Geography.” Embassy of the Republic of Iraq., accessed August 15, 2023, https://www.iraqiembassy.us/page/geography.

United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner. “Mosul: UN receives reports of mass killings of fleeing civilians by ISIL.” UN OHCHR. Accessed September 15, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/5avkrje3.

BBC News. “How the battle for Mosul unfolded.” BBC. Accessed August 20, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/6pts69sy.

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA), 2017. “Iraq: Mosul Humanitarian Response Situation Report.” United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. No. 40 (July): 1-8, https://tinyurl.com/4j289k6j.

United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization (UNESCO). Tentative World Heritage list. Old City of Mosul UNESCO World Heritage Centre Marc, Acheroy, and Yvinec Yann. 2008. “Mine-suspected Area

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11.

12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18.

Reduction Using Aerial and Satellite Images.” Humanitarian Demining: Innovative Solutions and the Challenges of Technology. Vienna: I-Tech Education and Publishing.

AVS Mine Action Consultants. 2004.”Comparative trials of manual mine clearance techniques.” GICHD: (Winter): 19-20.

Cruz, Inna, and Daniel Eriksson. 2013. “Miniature Aerial Photography Planes in Mine Action.” Journal of ERW and Mine Action 17, no. 3 (fall): 51-57.

Marc, Acheroy, and Yvinec Yann. 2008. “Mine-suspected Area Reduction Using Aerial and Satellite Images.” Humanitarian Demining: Innovative Solutions and the Challenges of Technology. Vienna: I-Tech Education and Publishing.

Cruz, Inna, and Daniel Eriksson. 2013. “Miniature Aerial Photography Planes in Mine Action.” Journal of ERW and Mine Action 17, no. 3 (fall): 51-57.

Racetin, Ivan and Andija Krtalic. 2021. “Systematic Review of Anomaly Detection in Hyperspectral Remote Sensing Applications.” Appl. Sci. 11, no. 4878 (May): 1-35 https://www.mdpi.com/2076-3417/11/11/4878.

Myint, Soe W., Elizabeth A. Wentz, and Sam J. Purkis. 2007.

“Employing Spatial Metrics in Urban Land-use / Land-cover Mapping: Comparing the Getis and Geary Indices.” Photogrammetric Engineering & Remote Sensing 73, no. 12 (December): 1403-1415. https://doi.org/10.14358/PERS.73.12.1403.

United Nations Education, Science, and Culture Organization (UNESCO). “UNESCO Begin Work at Al-Tahera Church.”, last modified April 20, accessed August 22, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/ykh45na8.

International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in conflict areas (ALIPH) Foundation. “Mosul Mosaic: Restoration of Al Musfa (Al Masfi) Mosque.”, accessed August 22, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/yxx93wuk.

Learn about the ALIPH Foundation’s mission here: https://www.aliph-foundation.org/.

International Alliance for the Protection of Heritage in conflict areas (ALIPH) Foundation. “Mosul Mosaic: Restoration of Al Musfa (Al Masfi) Mosque.”, accessed August 22,

CALLS PAPERS

FOR

VOLUME 28 | 2024

Image courtesy of HALO.

ACCESSIBILITY, DIVERSITY, & GENDER

CLEARANCE & TECHNOLOGY

Digital Accessibility

Area Preparation & Clearance

How accessible are digital explosive ordnance risk education programs and materials? How is the sector innovating and working to make risk education more accessible and inclusive, ensuring it benefits a wider audience?

Gender & Culture

How are mine action organizations supporting female deminers in regions where societal norms do not support women working in such roles? What challenges have female deminers encountered—security threats; discrimination from their families and communities; difficulty in obtaining future employment? What repercussions have women faced for defying cultural, religious, and societal norms and expectations? The Journal invites insights on how mine action organizations are addressing these issues and how they are supporting the women they employ.

Gender and Peace and Security

The inclusion of women in mine action not only fosters diversity but also catalyzes peace and security within communities. As women’s involvement and contributions to this sector increasingly grow, how are they advancing the cause of peace and security more broadly within their communities?

Reshaping the Lens: Language and Imagery in Mine Action

How do we use language and imagery to represent those we support through our clearance operations, risk education, and survivor assistance? As the world sharpens its understanding of bias, ableism, and the role of powerful historical dynamics, the MA sector finds itself at a crossroads, examining its own paradigms. How can we bring global attention to our programs and fundraising initiatives without resorting to exploitation and sensationalism? What role can the individuals and communities portrayed play in helping us to reshape not only our communications, but our relationships with those we work with?

Before landmines and other explosive remnants of war can be found and destroyed, deminers must first clear any thick vegetation blocking access to the area. From using drones for identifying hazardous areas to deploying vegetation cutters for preparing work areas, how is your organization approaching clearance tasks in overgrown areas?

Future of Drones in Mine Action

How are organizations adapting their use of drones and AI to reflect the diverse contamination and environments in which demining operations take place? Discussions around technology and methodology within the context of mine action are encouraged. What is the path forward in these diverse environments, especially with regards to active or recent conflict-affected areas?

Legacy Minefields and Path Toward Completion

Countries including Angola, Cambodia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Laos, and Vietnam continue to face explosive remnants of war contamination. Submissions on current programs operating in these countries are encouraged.

Liability and Land Release

What are the most pressing issues surrounding liability in mine action today? How are stakeholders liable throughout the land release process and how is liability applied to deminers, landowners, communities, etc.? How can such liability be contextualized within certain environments, such as Ukraine?

Mine Action and Clearance of Heritage Sites

Cultural heritage sites bear invaluable historical and cultural significance but often fall victim to the hazardous presence of explosive remnants of war. How can the mine action sector adapt its initiatives to value and protect these vulnerable sites? In contexts like Ukraine, where cultural heritage contends with unexploded ordnance amidst ongoing conflict, what unique challenges arise and how might they be addressed?

Underwater Clearance

of Conventional Weapons Destruction

Unexploded ordnance contamination from wars and recent conflicts disrupts fishing activities, exports, cargo and container ships, water treatment plants, and food security.

The Journal seeks articles on how programs are countering underwater UXO contamination.

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COUNTRIES & REGIONS Myanmar

Syria

Pacific Islands: Solomon Islands and Palau

Yemen

Myanmar’s mine and ERW contamination stems from prolonged armed conflict, with an increase in contamination since conflict erupted in February 2021. With mine casualties on the rise, and the UN reporting a nearly 40 percent increase in civilian casualties (likely higher due to underreporting), The Journal seeks articles on mine action operations in Myanmar.

Remaining WWII ordnance continues to threaten the lives of civilians in the Solomon Islands and Palau. What is being done to combat this deadly legacy in terms of survey, clearance, risk education, training, and capacity building?

South Sudan: Legacy and New Contamination

South Sudan is contaminated with landmines and unexploded ordnance from decades of conflict, affecting farming, infrastructure, and the safe return of displaced civilians. With the June 2023 explosion at a national ammunition depot facility in Bentiu, funding shortages, continued insecurity, and severe flooding, what lies ahead for mine action operations in South Sudan, including survey and clearance, urgent risk education, victim assistance, etc.?

Syria continues to grapple with mine, IED, and cluster munition contamination, with the Landmine & Cluster Munition Monitor reporting that in 2021, one in two people were at risk from explosive ordnance. In the face of ongoing security risks and no national mine action program, what work is being done in Syria in terms of demining, risk education, and survivor assistance?

Contaminated with mines and improvised mines from previous and ongoing conflicts, the organization Save the Children reported that in 2022, a child died from mines roughly every two days. With over half of 2021’s child casualties attributed to mines and internally displaced persons facing hazards in their homes, alongside roads, and in buildings, what is the future of mine action in Yemen and how are mine action organizations carrying out operations in this difficult environment?

Image courtesy of FSD.

Ukraine

Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, how are donors, implementing organizations, and researchers planning for the future of mine action operations in Ukraine? What lessons have already been learned and how are challenges being addressed?

ENVIRONMENTAL MITIGATION Environmental Mitigation in Mine Action

How is the mine action sector developing evidence-based knowledge and resulting guidance around environmental mitigation for mine action operations? What strategies and practices have proven effective or ineffective?

Are mine action authorities and operators conducting systematic follow-up after land release to account for the environmental impacts following clearance?

Extreme Weather and Disaster Mitigation

Innovative Finance in Mine Action

Mine Action, Conservation, and Wildlife

Funding for the Environment

As extreme weather conditions become the new norm, countries including Ukraine, Myanmar, Somalia, and Afghanistan experience the detrimental effects of contamination displacement due to flooding. What implications does this have for future mine action planning and operations?

Unexploded ordnance harms and kills wildlife through human dispersant and habitat loss. Submissions discussing the intricate relationship between wildlife, biodiversity, and mine action, as well as mine action initiatives clearing nature reserves and recent conflict zones, are encouraged.

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FUNDING & SUSTAINABILITY

THE JOURNAL OF CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

The diversification of funding has been a longstanding issue for the mine action sector. How is the community successfully casting its net further amongst potential donors, embracing public-private partnerships, and seeking new avenues to diversify funding to enact real change for affected countries?

Is funding reflecting the need to mainstream environmental considerations into mine action operations? What opportunities are there for mine action operators to seek diversified sources of funding and what can the sector learn from those outside the mine action sector?

Image courtesy of MAG.

RISK EDUCATION & VICTIM ASSISTANCE Emergency Risk Education

In areas such as Ukraine, Ethiopia, Myanmar, and Syria where farmers increasingly take risks to clear their land of explosive hazards, and an ever-growing number of children are exposed to the risks of unexploded ordnance, what is the mine action sector doing to create and disperse urgent risk education to those specific groups most in need?

Broadening Victim Assistance to Enact Lasting Change

HEALTH & SAFETY First-Aid Training in Mine Action

The Journal seeks articles about first-aid training for those working in the mine action sector. How is training being adapted for environments like Ukraine and are organizations providing first-aid training to civilians living in contaminated environments? How has the approach to training evolved, adapting to injuries in remote and challenging environments?

Occupational Safety and Health in Mine Action

Mine action staff, especially those in emergency and conflict/post-conflict environments, may experience anxiety, psychological distress, and post-traumatic stress disorder. How are donors and organizations enacting policies that address their staffs’ occupational safety and health, and what further steps need to be taken?

Victim Assistance (VA) has long been a pillar of mine action. How can the sector enact a more sustainable, inclusive approach to VA, learning from or partnering with organizations that can provide survivors with culturally sensitive, rights-based advocacy in addition to prosthetics and mobility devices? How can the sector counter the stigma around disability and take the opportunity to apply years of experience and lessons learned in contexts such as Ukraine and other recent conflict-affected regions?

Interested in Submitting on Something Else?

We encourage authors to submit content most relevant to their work. If you are interested in submitting on a particular topic but don’t see it listed here, reach out to our editorial team. We are always happy to discuss scope, submission guidelines, and deadlines.

Image courtesy of Geir P. Novik.

PHYSICAL SECURITY & STOCKPILE MANAGEMENT PSSM of State-controlled Stockpiles in Coastal West Africa Coastal West Africa faces increased security challenges including the risk of weapons diversion as a result of the rapid expansion of instability in neighboring countries.

How can internal, regional, and international communities collaborate effectively to mitigate risk of illicit diversion of conventional weapons?

Helping Mitigate Illicit Diversion

In the past, various actors have taken advantage of wartime and post-wartime environments to illicitly traffic weapons and related items. While Ukraine’s partners are supporting Ukraine’s self-defense, how can allies and organizations help Ukraine and its neighbors to strengthen their borders and build their law enforcement capacity to mitigate the risk of illicit diversion of conventional weapons? Can possible partners, funding streams, and best practices be identified and implemented while the war is ongoing? How is such support planned and sequenced?

Image courtesy of Geir Novik.

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CALLS PAPERS FOR

Accessibility, Diversity, and Gender

• Digital Accessibility • Gender & Culture • Gender and Peace and Security • Reshaping the Lens: Language and Imagery in Mine Action

Clearance and Technology

• Area Preparation & Clearance • Future of Drones in Mine Action • Legacy Minefields and Path Toward Completion • Liability and Land Release • Mine Action and Clearance of Heritage Sites • Underwater Clearance

Countries and Regions

Volume 28

JOURNAL

Join the conversation.

Submissions to cisr-journal@jmu.edu (See pages 65-67 for detailed topic descriptions)

• Pacific Islands: Solomon Islands and Palau • South Sudan: Legacy and New Contamination • Myanmar, Syria, Ukraine, & Yemen

Environmental Mitigation

• Environmental Mitigation in Mine Action • Extreme Weather and Disaster Mitigation • Mine Action, Conservation, and Wildlife

Funding and Sustainability

• Innovative Finance in Mine Action • Funding for the Environment

Health and Safety

• First-Aid Training in Mine Action • Occupational Safety and Health in Mine Action

Physical Security and Stockpile Management

• PSSM of State-controlled Stockpiles in Coastal West Africa • Helping Mitigate Illicit Diversion

Risk Education and Victim Assistance • Broadening Victim Assistance to Enact Lasting Change • Emergency Risk Education

Center for International Stabilization and Recovery James Madison University, MSC 4902 Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA

www.jmu.edu/cisr

Image courtesy of Jasper Baur, Gabriel Steinberg, John Frucci, Anthony Brinkley, and the Demining Research Community.