The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 28.2
THEJOURNAL
of Conventional Weapons Destruction
Navigating the Unintended
Consequences
of Language, Imagery, Meaning
Food Security and Mine Action
Preliminary findings from Lebanon
Preventing Arms Diversion
Ukraine’s counter-diversion efforts
Effects of Aging on Under Water Ammunition
Impact of the environment on munitions
Analyzing Localization in HMA
The case for equitable partnerships and inclusion
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Center for International Stabilization & Recovery (CISR)
James Madison University - MSC 4902 Harrisonburg, VA 22807 / USA
Email: cisr-journal@jmu.edu
https://www.jmu.edu/cisr
ISSN: 2469-7575
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction Issue 20.1 ongoing: (print) ISSN 2469-7575; (online) ISSN 2469-7605For previous ISSN numbers visit: https://www.jmu.edu/cisr/journal/about.shtml
The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction is a professional trade journal for the humanitarian mine action/conventional weapons destruction community, including but not limited to mine action, physical security and stockpile management, small arms and light weapons, and other conventional weapons destruction related topics.
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Authors who submit articles to The Journal are expected to do so in good faith and are solely responsible for the content therein, including the accuracy of all information and correct attribution for quotations and citations.
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This publication is funded by grants from the US Department of State. The opinions, findings, and conclusions stated herein are those of the author[s] and do not necessarily reflect those of the US Department of State, the US Department of Defense, James Madison University, or the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery.
ON THE COVER:
Sanaria, 31, a Kurdish deminer. Sanaria is a former laboratory technician who is a climber and hiker in her spare time. Courtesy of Sane Seven/MAG. (See article page 6).
JABIN VAHORA Center for International Stabilizational and Recovery
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A MESSAGE FROM THE DIRECTOR
As ever, it's been a pleasure for CISR staff to connect with mine action colleagues at the 27th National Directors Meeting in Geneva in early May; the Third International Conference on Mine Action in Azerbaijan in late May, where the focus was on mitigating the environmental impact of landmines; and in June, at the Explosives Ordnance Seminar Europe in Serbia.
In this issue of The Journal, we discuss a variety of topics, including how the mine action sector uses words and imagery to share the stories of those we serve, preventing arms diversion in Ukraine, studying the effects of aging on underwater munitions, and localization efforts in mine action, amongst many others.
• Our first editorial by Jon Brown (Mines Advisory Group) discusses the power of imagery and language, and the importance of ethical storytelling. “Words matter. The imagery we use matters. When we tell the wrong story (or the right story in the wrong way), it damages us as organizations … as a sector … and causes distant but lasting harm to the very communities we exist to serve … “
• In his editorial, “What Can Artificial Intelligence Offer to Humanitarian Mine Action?”, Russell Gasser, PhD, argues that the mine action sector must set forth a clear path forward, understanding what AI can and cannot realistically provide to mine action operations while standardizing AI training data and defining success criteria.
• In her article, “Preventing Arms Diversion in Wartime Ukraine,” Olena Kryzhanivska, PhD, (Forum on the Arms Trade) presents an overview of Ukraine’s and its partners’ counter-diversion efforts, addressing the current challenges of monitoring international military aid in the face of active conflict.
• Anda Riza and Andro Mathewson (The HALO Trust) evaluate the role of open-source research in mine action, from mapping conflicts and their effects to informing survey and clearance operations in current conflicts, such as in Ukraine and Yemen.
• Nicole Neitzey (Center for International Stabilization and Recovery) and Colin King (Fenix Insight) present their study analyzing the effects and implications of the underwater environment on munitions, and the importance of removing munitions that may have been buried for decades.
• Riccardo Labianco, PhD, and Myriam Rabbath (Mines Advisory Group) present their study on the effects of humanitarian mine action on food security, drawing on community interviews in Lebanon with local farmers, consumers, and agricultural workers.
• Mark Wilkinson, PhD (DanChurchAid), Lisa Mueller-Dormann, Camilla Roberti (Danish Refugee Council), and Lene Rasmussen (DanChurchAid) discuss the principles and challenges of localization in mine action, examining the tenets the authors believe should guide the development and design of future projects.
• In his latest photo essay, Sean Sutton, traveling with Norwegian People’s Aid, takes us to Lucala-2 in Angola, where he met with local citizens who portrayed the impact landmine contamination has had on their community since the Angolan Civil War ended in 2002.
We hope you find this issue of The Journal as insightful as we have. While recognizing the significant challenges the mine action community faces—such as explosives contamination, tech innovation, environmental concerns, as well as how we ethically share the stories of those we exist to serve—the authors in this issue offer paths forward, representing the dedication and service our community contributes on a daily basis to make this earth a safer place.
Sincerely,
Suzanne Fiederlein, PhD
IN THIS ISSUE
A Message from the Director
Navigating the Unintended Consequences of Language, Imagery, and Meaning Has Never Been More Difficult or More Important
By Jon Brown [ Mines Advisory Group ]
What Can Artificial Intelligence Offer Humanitarian Mine Action?
By Russell Gasser, PhD [ Independent Consultant ]
Preventing Arms Diversion in Wartime Ukraine: A Brief Overview
By Olena
Kryzhanivska, PhD [ Forum on the Arms Trade ]
The Prioritization of Survey Through Open-Source Research in Ukraine
By Anda Riza and Andro Mathewson [ The HALO Trust ]
Studying the Effects of Aging on Ammunition Under Water
By Nicole Neitzey [ Center for International Stabilization and Recovery ] and Colin King [ Fenix Insight ]
Securing Land to Contribute to Food Systems: Preliminary Findings on Humanitarian Mine Action’s Cumulative Effects on Food Security in Lebanon
By Riccardo Labianco, PhD, and Myriam Rabbath [ Mines Advisory Group ]
Local is Possible: An Analysis of HMA Localization Efforts and a Proposed Pathway for Future Projects
By Mark Wilkinson, PhD [ DanChurchAid ], Lisa Mueller-Dormann, Camilla Roberti [ Danish Refugee Council ], and Lene Rasmussen [ DanChurchAid ]
Angola: Hidden Danger
By Sean Sutton
EDITORIAL
Navigating the Unintended Consequences of Language, Imagery, and Meaning Has Never Been More Difficult Or More Important
By Jon Brown [ Mines Advisory Group ]
Words matter. The imagery we use matters. When we tell the wrong story (or the right story in the wrong way), it damages us as organizations, damages us as a sector, and, most importantly of all, causes distant but lasting harm to the very communities we exist to serve and of which we are members. Let’s be clear: we at Mines Advisory Group (MAG) are certainly as guilty as the rest of the sector in getting things wrong, but we are putting steps in place to try to get it right.
The world has moved on from the days when international development organizations sought out extreme representations of poverty and misery for the sake of a few bucks in donations. Not long ago, almost every narrative pivoted on a one-dimensional and fundamentally inaccurate storyline: here is a group of wealthy, privileged, expert people (saviors) rendering assistance and aiding another group of people (victims).
(Above) Sanaria, 31, a Kurdish deminer. Sanaria is a former laboratory technician who is a climber and hiker in her spare time. All images courtesy of Sane Seven/MAG.
The people at the very heart of these storylines were, in large part, depicted as both voice-less and choice-less. Hapless and helpless beneficiaries—a term that starkly exemplifies the problematic language often used in our narratives.
What’s noteworthy about humanitarian mine action (HMA), of course, is the vast majority of people at the tough and important end of the job— the deminers, community liaison officers, administrators, and managers in our programs—are from communities affected by explosive contamination. Their work entails delivering benefits
to their own communities, neighbors, and families. So, when we slip into us and them narratives, the kind of language that depicts us (those from the privileged and powerful side of the tracks) doing good or rendering assistance to them (those in less privileged communities affected by landmines or unexploded ordnance (UXO)), then we are guilty of not only bias, and arguably, colonial thinking, but we are also guilty of downright inaccuracy. And the truth is that HMA has a demonstrative track record of ensuring communities are at the center of decision-making. MAG’s innovative
work developing community liaison and conflict-sensitive approaches, refined and improved over many years, is explicitly designed to ensure people in affected communities have agency and influence. Other HMA organizations equally place communities at the center of their thinking. Our external representation of our work must catch up with this important operational principle.
An area in which we can all improve is not just in the way we describe our work and the attention we pay to the dynamics that complicate storytelling (in an important, and I would argue,
Fahima, a 28-year-old Yazidi deminer from Sinjar, Iraq. Fahima is a team leader, overseeing a mixed male and female demining team, and has worked for MAG for eight years.
positive way) but also in the efforts we take to ensure our impact is understood by both the general public and also by non-experts working in adjacent development enterprises.
We as a sector are too often guilty of speaking of visibility as if it’s just a box we tick for donor requirements, rather than the rocket fuel that can accelerate our impact. And we talk of government funding when it should more accurately be framed as citizen funding, paid for by ordinary tax-payers who live in donor states. Put simply, the sector as a whole hasn’t done enough to tell its story or, more importantly,
the story of the communities afflicted by the reverberating impacts that arise from conflict.
Telling that story has never been more crucial. If we are to advocate for policy change, or government (citizen) funding, then we must influence the policy-makers. And to do that, we must start by ensuring there is widespread understanding of what we do and why we do it amongst the most important audience of all: the people who put the policy-makers in their positions of power in the first place. The very people, in fact, who we need to also engage with in order to substantially
increase our un-restricted income so that we can meet need not funded by institutional donors.
Telling that story has also never been more challenging given the proliferation of digital channels and fragmentation of the traditional big beasts of global media. However, with that challenge comes opportunity, as our stories can travel further and faster thanks to those same digital channels.
Other factors also mean we must as a sector sharpen our focus, and arguably, find ways to ramp up the investment we make in communications. A rapidly changing conflict and insecurity
We as a sector are too often guilty of speaking of visibility as if it’s just a box we tick for donor requirements, rather than the rocket fuel that can accelerate our impact.
Halala, a Kurdish deminer, is a former child psychologist now working on demining tasks near Sulaymaniyah, close to the border with Iran.
context, leading to increased and complex needs, has led to an attention deficit for legacy conflict settings and other regions not at the forefront of the constantly-shifting global news agenda. There is also increased competition for global funding, as well as increased competition for human resources and talent.
Together, these factors mean communicating our purpose and impact is not only more essential than ever but must be done in an increasingly noisy and crowded world where awareness of the importance of mine action will diminish without concerted effort. We must be more creative in approaches when it comes
to raising awareness of the continued impact of landmines in places such as Angola or South Sudan, to name but two, while rigorously maintaining an ethical and equitable approach to storytelling.
To that point, communicating the importance and impact of HMA must be done in the right way—not by mining the murky depths of misery and undermining the dignity of our fellow human beings, or by appealing to unpalatable savior instincts. And not by framing our narratives with archetypal heroes and victims: the saviors and the saved. Doing it the right way might mean being creative, for sure, but never manipulative and
never by crafting bogus storylines for dramatic effect. Authenticity and creativity can walk hand-in-hand. Notably, by helping those from affected communities tell their stories their way, we increase the representation of those communities not just externally, but also within our organization. In doing so, our staff and external audiences will see themselves, their stories, and the stories of their communities represented, not in a hierarchical way, but as a true reflection of what we are and what we aim to achieve. So too will those with their background in affected communities who are thinking of working for or supporting us. This sense of representation helps us
Kurdish deminers close to a minefield in northern Iraq. From left: Avan, Houras, Halala, and Sanaria.
to build our global culture as one that is inclusive, which ultimately helps us increase our impact.
The starting point has to be ensuring everyone has ownership of their own story. In MAG’s new Ethical Storytelling policy, the concept of ownership is our guiding and core principle, both the North Star and the red line that defines our approach. This means upholding the dignity of our staff and people in the communities where we work by honoring their wishes on what and how a story is told. We will not tell their story—despite the resources invested—if it cannot be told with the right level of integrity or without the full agency of those concerned.
Ownership is also the first of the ten principles identified in Dignified Storytelling,1 a platform for global advocacy and outreach that shares connections and learning for those working toward the kind of storytelling that upholds and celebrates the dignity of everyone.
Its other principles—of equal importance—include an emphasis on the biases that we all carry within us; the acknowledgement that we are all multi-dimensional, rather than archetypes; and that truth, not headlines, is what we should seek. Alongside the concept of ownership, the other most important principle (in my view) is the one that bookends Dignified Storytelling’s ten principles: A Story Can Change the World
In practical terms and execution, what does all of this mean?
Such an approach is resource hungry. It means you cannot rock-up in a village and spend half an hour getting consent forms signed and then snap away with a camera and scribble a few
notes on an iPad. It means relying on community liaison staff—who are most often from the affected communities— and their deep relationships in those communities to lay the groundwork and to have meaningful conversations with people about their stories and about how and where they want those stories to be told.
Siham, an Arab deminer from Mosul.
We also intend to deliberately diversify the range of professional storytellers we work with, including seeking out and employing writers and photographers from affected communities, and next year will be seeking to equip citizen storytellers to work alongside us and tell stories from their communities.
This all takes time (and money) and we all must accept that we will inevitably end up with failed investments along the way—those occasions when planned external engagement initiatives or opportunities cannot be fulfilled, despite the effort and cost incurred, because we are unable to abide by the principles we have committed to.
Ethical storytelling in a highly competitive communications context also requires taking a very detailed, considered approach to particular contexts. Landmine removal is not a fast-moving story, so identifying particular lines of interest or angles
against this largely static backdrop is critical. Otherwise, journalists, for instance, simply shrug and say “what’s new?” The good news is that there is a growing cohort of media organizations, journalists, and influencers who share our values and are equally committed to ethical storytelling, unafraid of messy and complex narratives, and determined to frame our work and the communities and individuals that define us in a multi-dimensional and nuanced way.
The next step for MAG, having articulated a new Ethical Storytelling policy, is to ensure our staff and partners are sensitized to it. Sharing it
with relevant staff, in tandem with the roll-out of our new communications strategy, will require systematic engagement across the thirty-plus countries where we work during the remainder of 2024 and, we acknowledge, a degree of testing and learning along the way. We know we won’t get everything right, but we are determined to keep trying.
We also intend to deliberately diversify the range of professional storytellers we work with, including seeking out and employing writers and photographers from affected communities, and next year will be seeking to equip citizen storytellers to
Rawa and Siham.
work alongside us and tell stories from their communities. There is nothing radical about this, but it nevertheless represents a new approach for MAG as we try to create space for those who might have been traditionally marginalized or stereotyped in telling their stories.
Earlier this year, MAG also launched The Female Lens, 2 a long-
term collaboration with female photographers, some of whom are from conflict-affected states but none of whom had worked in mine action before. We asked these photographers to document the experience of women in communities recovering from conflict because we recognize that the role of women in conflict recovery is often under-acknowledged. Our
brief was simple and deliberately non-prescriptive: spend time with our female staff in our programs and collaborate with them to help them tell their stories, in all their multidimensional messiness and nuance. We aren’t dictating the angle or the approach from either our Manchester, UK hub, or from the offices in the countries where we work.
Avan, a MAG deminer, juxtaposed with inert munitions at the Chamchamal training base, highlighting the transition from conflict to safety.
A high-profile feminist Lithuanian photographer, Sane Seven, who is more accustomed to photographing A-list celebrities for glossy magazines, spent time with our deminers in northern Iraq and emerged from the trip with a series of arresting images: the Arab deminer from Mosul who wanted to remove her hijab and wear modern, Western clothing; the Yazidi who wanted to wear traditional dress but instantly went into playful TikTok mode; the Kurdish deminer who shared photographs of herself summiting one of Iraq’s biggest peaks and said she wanted to be pictured in traditional dress in the mountains. Together, we hope such images challenge the stereotypes and biases that we all hold.
Later this year will also see us commence the creation of a new guide for language use so that we are not exacerbating or perpetuating existing
prejudices. Its purpose will be to encourage our staff and partners who use English (our primary organizational language, which is arguably an issue in itself) to deploy language that is respectful of everyone. This won’t be the work of a few weeks but will, I hope, benefit from the brilliant work already done by others on this issue and will also play a key role in our internal journey to eliminate, so far as we can, all and any forms of discrimination.
JON BROWN Director of Engagement
Mines Advisory Group www.maginternational.org
And it’s important to acknowledge that neither our Ethical Storytelling policy nor the emergent language guide will be definitive gospels. They will require review and evolution in the coming years as we get things wrong (and right) and as we respond to the ever-changing world. But the truth at the heart of our approach will, I believe, be a stubborn and immutable one. Everyone owns their own story and it’s theirs to tell, not ours.
See endnotes page 64
Jon Brown oversees Mines Advisory Group's (MAG) external and internal global communications. He is a former newspaper journalist who, prior to joining MAG, advised corporates, government bodies, and not-for-profits on strategic communications and public engagement campaigns.
Yazidi deminers pictured near the MAG base in Dohuk.
WHAT CAN Artificial Intelligence OFFER HUMANITARIAN MINE ACTION?
Would you walk on land declared safe by an unproven technology, developed by enthusiastic proponents who do not have long experience in the world of mine action? What if the system for locating hazards will be tested in only one or two trials, even though the type of machine learning system they are using is known to sometimes give false but completely plausible results (so-called hallucinations 1)? Furthermore, in the proposed machine-learning system there will be no audit trail for analysis if a serious error occurs, and no way of knowing for sure how to prevent its repetition.
There is dangerously uncritical promotion on social media of unproven artificial intelligence (AI) technology that is potentially hazardous, insufficiently tested, and unlikely to provide practical solutions in the field. Over twenty years ago, airborne sensors (airship or drone), multi-sensor data fusion, thermal imaging, and many more technologies were promoted as practical solutions for mine clearance, but uptake has been near zero. A drone with sensors linked to an AI system
can currently detect a few mine types that are visible on the surface of the ground, over 95 percent of the time. To get from this to near-perfect detection, for unknown mine types including improvised devices, with buried mines and a wide range of different backgrounds, is a monumental task. Separating the different causes of failure such as: sensor limitations, incorrect AI algorithms, or inadequate training data, is a pre-requisite for progress. Standardized AI training data, and defined success criteria agreed by researchers and mine action organizations, are essential if initial trials are to be more than an opportunity to publicize different approaches in carefully prepared scenarios. The use of AI also presents novel legal and liability issues in the event of failure.
INTRODUCTION
AI systems are developing at a breathtaking pace, especially the "Large Language Models" (LLM), like ChatGPT. One of the few certainties is that by the time this article is published, today’s best systems will be overtaken by new developments. AI can now write computer code, translate languages, improve weather forecasting, analyze proteins to find new ways to treat diseases, and far more. AI is set to transform the world in coming years. Correctly applied, it could also bring huge benefits to mine action, which makes the current hyped-up misuse even more disappointing.
But what is AI? And, specifically, what can it contribute to humanitarian mine action (HMA)? This article uses the name AI in the popular sense, not the precise technical meaning—machine learning and generative AI are often confused. The journal New Scientist defines AI as "software used by computers to mimic aspects of human intelligence.”2 The history of computer AI goes back nearly seventy years, 3 but three key developments have led to
The negative consequences of the misuse of machine learning and AI go further than the danger from overlooked hazards. Inappropriate use of AI on safetycritical tasks—especially tasks that humans can already perform to a very high standard—may well prevent AI from being accepted for other uses in mine action where it can make an important difference to the effectiveness and efficiency of operations, and as a result, save lives and prevent injuries. Mine action needs to set out a clear path forward based on understanding of what AI can and cannot provide.
the current extremely powerful LLMs. Firstly, the massive improvement in computer speed, power, and memory over the last five decades coupled with decreased costs. Secondly, the development of the internet and World Wide Web, which give access to the vast amount of information required to train a large general-purpose LLM. And finally, the successful implementation of "multi-layered neural networks" in 2012.4
In practical applications, AI is currently evolving in two different directions. These are not formal categories and they overlap to some degree. The first group is Utility AI, based on specific machine learning to produce assistive tools to help complete tasks. Common examples are digital assistants and language translation programs. In the second group are Generative systems , which use a vast knowledge base to generate new answers in response to carefully crafted questions called prompts . ChatGPT is the best-known example of about fifty large systems currently online in early 2024.
UTILITY AI BASED ON MACHINE LEARNING
Human users often know the type of result they want from these systems, whether it is converting handwriting to computer text, getting an answer to a spoken question (e.g., using Alexa or Siri), managing complex coordination or logistics, or any one of literally millions of other tasks. The system is expected to deliver a result, not to describe what a range of results might possibly look like. This could help with many organizational tasks within mine action. Current AI could be used to take daily clearance and land release records and return performance and cost analyses,
update planning, and generate written reports in different formats, translating them into almost any language and dialect. AI is already used in many industries to support recruitment and training needs, and in mine action, it could deliver the repetitive part of planning and proposal writing, as well as improve coordination. Self-checking by AI, together with human supervision, will still be essential, but nonetheless there are many very useful applications for AI in mine action.
GENERATIVE LARGE LANGUAGE MODELS
The second broad category of AI uses general purpose LLMs to provide answers in response to a question or prompt. Writing good prompts, known as prompt engineering, is a new profession that pays very high salaries, even by the standards of the computer industry. The job is lucrative because it requires understanding of neural networks and practical experience of how different LLMs function. It is an illusion to think that anyone from any background can produce ground-breaking results after only a few hours using a public-access LLM. A comparison can be made with chess grand-masters—a new player can learn the rules quickly, but many hours of practice coupled with deep understanding are needed to get the best from the big LLMs.
An artificial neural network learns and builds neural pathways based on training in a way that is analogous to the human brain. The largest LLMs currently ingest thousands of gigabytes of information from the internet during training, but even this has its limits. An LLM trained on the sum of human knowledge at earlier stages in human history might insist unequivocally that the sun rotates around the earth, that human sacrifices are necessary to ensure a good harvest, or that slavery is normal and acceptable. Training models cannot escape capturing and potentially exaggerating some systematic errors.
POTENTIAL IMPACT
One key area where AI is already having a positive impact globally is in supporting learning and training. Commercial systems are now available (in 2024) to develop training curricula, generate lesson plans, improve testing of learned information and skills, and provide one-to-one support and mentoring to both learners and teachers. Learning experts currently regard the best machinegenerated teaching materials as indistinguishable from those prepared by skilled and experienced humans.7 This has obvious application in mine action—especially when linked to machine translation for local languages. The goal is not to ask AI what should be learned, but for humans to define the required knowledge and skills and then get AI to support with the lesson and materials preparation, mentoring for both trainers and trainees, and skills testing methods for certification and quality management. AI-supported learning could be transformative for explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). A wide range of teaching materials can be generated to deliver the
The training sets for large LLMs also rely on human decisions; many hours of human effort are needed to identify, verify, and label information to support training data sets (e.g., manually identifying what can be seen in a photograph by adding tags). This tagging may be outsourced as a low-paid job for people in locations remote from users, maybe in a different cultural context. Time magazine reported that some tagging to identify text snippets was done for ChatGPT by a subcontractor in Kenya and paid less than USD$2 per hour. 5,6
existing, standard, pre-defined messages of EORE in ways that reflect local culture, context, and language, and are compatible with the relevant International Mine Action Standards/National Mine Action Standards and defined national policies. Materials can be updated and adapted quickly, and designed for delivery through different media, in ways that reflect local sensitivities. There is perhaps nothing here that cannot be done by a very large team of skilled and experienced humans, but AI can save a lot of drudge work, and make EORE accessible to a wider audience and to small local organizations who are in touch with hard-to-reach populations. There is no need to wait; this technology is available now in AI learning support systems. It is not specific for mine action and is already being used in workplace training. These systems can also include support for quality management methods such as ISO9001.
The potential application to EORE goes even further. For the first time, AI opens the door to realistic direct checking
Courtesy of AdobeStock.
of likely behavior changes, whether EORE is delivered traditionally or with AI support. An example is the use of apps on cheap smartphones to simulate daily activities (e.g., children on their way to school) and generate behavior prompts from AI-simulated "friends and acquaintances" who encourage either safe or unsafe behavior. The user’s decision can then be used to measure lessons learned. AI can provide a different, unique, and relevant scenario for every child each time it is used, and actively reinforce safe behavior as well as measure success.8
CAN WE TRUST AI SYSTEMS?
A drone with sensors linked to an AI system can currently detect a few mine types that are visible on the surface of the ground, over 95 percent of the time. Courtesy of AdobeStock.
CONCLUSIONS
The first conclusion is positive: machine learning or Utility AI offers significant opportunities for improving effectiveness and efficiency when used in a supporting role in HMA. AI for many applications, including language translation, improving reporting and planning, managing recruitment, and quality management, is now readily available. In particular, current AI already provides the tools to improve all types of training and learning and could transform EORE.
The extremely high cost of developing AI systems means that mine action will be dependent on using and adapting available systems. Any future work should find ways to leverage existing systems to benefit mine action. Collaboration with specialists who have a depth of understanding of and experience in applying AI will be essential.
The training data set is the dominant issue for trustworthy neural networks. LLMs give plausible but completely false answers (hallucination) at low percentage rates, but not zero rates.
Generative AI is unsuitable for safety-critical tasks (e.g., for stand-alone detection and recognition of explosive hazards). Machine learning may well have future application, but any proposed safety-related use should be subjected to rigorous trials scrutinized by independent specialists with expertise in both mine action/EOD and AI systems. The same rigorous safety criteria used for other demining systems (including manual clearance) must be applied.
The ethical implications of AI, including liability in the event of failure, must be considered in parallel with technical and implementation issues. Overall, mine action should seize the opportunity to be more effective and efficient through the use of supportive utility AI. At the same time, bold decision making is needed to categorically reject the wildly popular misapplication of AI technology in safety-related tasks like individual mine detection, until extensive research results demonstrate effectiveness and reliability beyond reasonable doubt.
See endnotes page 64
The author wishes to thank Dr. Robert Keeley for valuable comments on the draft of this article.
RUSSELL GASSER, Ph D Independent Consultant
Russell Gasser, PhD, has worked on new technologies for mine action, results-based and quality management, and evaluation for the European Commission, the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD), the Small Arms Survey, and as an independent consultant. In the late 1990s, he investigated the failure of large-scale research funding to provide matching breakthroughs with new technologies for landmine clearance—the total research funding up to 1998 was nearly US$1 billion. He sees exactly the same exaggerated claims and fundamental errors now being repeated twenty-five years later for drones and AI and hopes that the large-scale allocation of resources to inappropriate techniques will not be repeated.
PREVENTING ARMS DIVERSION IN WARTIME UKRAINE: A Brief Overview
By Olena Kryzhanivska, PhD [ Forum on the Arms Trade ]
Ukraine has entered its third year defending against Russia’s full-scale invasion, and despite emerging as one of the largest importers of weapons, it manages to prevent their major diversion. Experts evaluate the current arms control and weapons and ammunition management efforts by Ukraine and its allies with cautious optimism. Although obtaining detailed information about the intricacies of weaponry management in Ukraine is challenging, open sources allow us to glimpse some of the current measures taken during wartime. This article presents a brief overview of Ukraine's counter-diversion efforts and those of its partners, encompassing monitoring and control of international military aid, as well as border control measures. It also addresses the current challenges and opportunities for improving the situation.
INTRODUCTION
The reality of the Russian war in Ukraine has necessitated adjustments to normal arms control routines. The pace of decision-making regarding arms transfers, licensing procedures, shipment of weapons, as well as their distribution, use, and destruction, surpasses standard procedures. The strain of increased demands on these systems raises reasonable concerns about the potential spread of transferred weapons from Ukraine to other regions due to factors such as corruption, the challenging nature of physical security and stockpile management (PSSM) in times of war, Russia’s seizures on the battlefield, as well Ukraine’s reputation as “a hub of the illicit arms trade.”1
This piece provides a concise overview of the measures implemented by Ukraine and its partner countries aimed at mitigating the risk of the diversion of heavy weapons, as well as small arms and light weapons (SALW). It specifically addresses aspects such as record-keeping and control of international military aid transferred to Ukraine and border management practices. The article also discusses diversion resulting from battlefield capture by the Russian side. While not widespread, those instances of weapons diversion have been utilized by Russia for various purposes within the context of hybrid warfare.
BACKGROUND
Institutional weakness, inadequacy of the national legal framework, widespread proliferation of weapons in society, and the enduring problem of corruption defined the initial decade of Ukraine’s existence as an independent state.
Following the acquisition of substantial stocks of conventional arms and ammunition from the Soviet Union, Ukraine, as a newly independent state, engaged in arms transfers to many countries. These countries included, but were not limited to, South Sudan, Syria, Chad, Kenya, and Libya. 2 A Ukrainian parliamentary commission in 1998 revealed that, between 1992 and 1996, military stocks valued at US$32 billion had gone missing from inventories and were illegally sold abroad. 3
Beginning in the 2000s, Ukraine adopted a more responsible approach to conventional arms control.4 In addition to those arms control treaties that Ukraine joined in the 1990s (e.g., the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe), the country also became a party to various international instruments in the 2000s, including the Firearms Protocol, the Programme of Action on Small Arms (PoA), and its International Tracing Instrument (ITI). Furthermore, Ukraine commenced the regular submission of reports on military spending (UN MilEx) and arms transfers (UNROCA).
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in 2018 aims to prevent and combat illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition, and explosives in all its aspects.7 Additionally, Ukraine collaborated actively with NATO in the destruction of obsolete conventional munitions, SALW accumulated since the Second World War. 8
... despite the accumulation of arms in Ukraine, there have been no major cases of illicit arms trafficking abroad.
While the progress made by Ukraine in implementing the best PSSM practices is undeniable, the unprecedented influx of weapons and ammunition following the Russian invasion in February 2022—including heavy conventional weapons such as battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, combat aircraft, helicopters, large-caliber artillery systems, missile systems, uncrewed combat aerial vehicles, as well as remotely operated munitions, SALW, and their ammunition—has raised concerns about Ukraine’s ability to control and utilize such extensive weaponry properly. Fears regarding the possibility of large battlefield captures of transferred weaponry by the Russian side, along with existing disinformation campaigns aimed at discrediting Ukraine’s reliability, have added to the negative forecasts of the diversion of western weapons to unauthorized parties.9
The most feared scenarios of weapons diversion in Ukraine include:
The battle against corruption in Ukraine has persisted for decades and gained additional attention following the start of the full-scale Russian invasion. According to Transparency International, in 2023, Ukraine was ranked 108th out of 180 countries in the Corruption Perception Index, reflecting a slight improvement of eight points compared to 2022.5 A surge in law enforcement activities, particularly in investigating corruption cases within the military, along with high-level resignations occurring in 2022–2023, 6 is intended to demonstrate to Ukrainian society, as well as allies, that Ukraine is becoming a more trustworthy and reliable partner.
Before the start of the full-scale invasion, Ukraine participated in several international projects aimed at modernizing its PSSM practices. The multi-year project launched by the Organization for Security and
• Diversion of weapons to terrorists and criminal groups due to inadequate control of storage and use.
• Diversion of weapons by the Russian side due to battlefield capture.
• State-sponsored diversion of weapons based on Ukraine’s high corruption rates and a previous record of diversion in the 1990s.
• Diversion of SALW and their proliferation within the country and adjacent regions due to increase of stocks in civilian custody.
The potential outcomes of these scenarios could contribute to armed conflicts in various regions of the world, as well as an increase in armed violence in Ukraine and neighboring countries. However, despite the accumulation of arms in Ukraine, there have been no major cases of illicit arms trafficking abroad.10
MONITORING AND CONTROL OVER THE USE OF INTERNATIONAL MILITARY AID
In response to the swift escalation of weaponry inflows and concerns regarding their potential misuse,11 the Ukrainian Parliament (Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine) took action in July 2022 by establishing a special temporary commission to monitor the use of weapons provided to Ukraine by international partners during martial law.12 The primary objectives of this commission were to prepare and submit legislative initiatives outlining a model for parliamentary control over the receipt and utilization of international material and technical assistance. To date, the commission has compiled and released two reports detailing its activities.
In collaboration with its partners and allies, even before the beginning of the Russian full-scale invasion, Ukraine dedicated significant efforts to integrate a modern system of control over arms transfers. As outlined in the Preliminary Report on the work performed by the temporary commission as of January 2024, the information systems employed for accounting and monitoring include: the information and analytical system SOTA, Logistic Functional Area Services (LOGFAS), KOROVAI, and System Analysis Program Development (SAP) (Systemanalyse Programmentwicklung).13
The information and analytical system SOTA, implemented in 2022, operates within the apparatus of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine transmits daily updates
The Ministry of Defense has completed the first stage of implementation of the automated defense resource management system based on System Analysis Program Development in the Armed Forces, January 2024. Courtesy of Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
to this system, providing information about received weapons and military equipment, as well as plans for their future acquisition.
LOGFAS is an integrated set of software systems developed to support NATO's logistics operations, facilitating coordination between NATO member states. It was officially introduced for use by the Armed Forces
Inspection of American military aid in Ukraine, January 2024. Courtesy of Ministry of Defense of Ukraine.
of Ukraine on 15 October 2022, although Ukraine has had limited access to LOGFAS since 2019. Since the summer of 2022, the Ukrainian military received a full license for usage. In 2022, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defense commented in an interview that the full-scale implementation of this service may take several years.14
KOROVAI is specialized software developed through collaboration between the United States, the United Kingdom, and Ukraine. It has been utilized by the Armed Forces of Ukraine since 1 September 2022. The Ministry of Digital Transformation of Ukraine oversees the monitoring of this system, while the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine manages the data input. The International Donor Coordination Center (IDCC) is responsible for overseeing international partners. This program enables the sending country to record the quantity and form of packaging of military aid, with its movement tracked until delivery to the Command of the Logistics Forces of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The software allows for all participating users to be involved in planning needs and monitoring the movement of material resources to connect to the unified center of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.
SAP is a system specifically designed to automate logistics planning processes. Currently utilized for accounting spare parts, planning repairs, maintenance of military equipment, and automation of physical support, it plays a crucial role in enhancing efficiency.
Additionally, a barcode system is employed to track weapons arriving from the United States. Introduced in December 2022, this technology mandates that each weapon arriving from the United States is affixed with a barcode. Ukrainian military personnel then scan the barcode, instantly transmitting information about the weapon's serial numbers to a centralized database located in the United States. This streamlined process enhances traceability and ensures accurate record-keeping of the weapons received.15
In February 2024, the government of Ukraine endorsed the procedure for monitoring and controlling the use of international military aid.16 As outlined in the resolution,17 a series of logistics points will be established outside the country. These entities are meant to serve as the Ukrainian divisions of the international hub, consolidating the logistics network of partners from Ukraine.
Exporting countries bear a significant responsibility for overseeing the transfers of weapons and ammunition. In fulfilling this role, the United States, being the largest donor of military aid, maintains a military presence in Ukraine tasked with conducting on-site visits and inspections of arms stockpiles.18 Commencing in June
NATO Rapid Deployable Corps – Greece hosted the LOGFAS Fundamentals Course and LOGFAS Sustainment Planning Module / Supply Distribution Model Course, September 2022.
Courtesy of NRDC-GR.
2022, personnel overseeing these operations from various US agencies initiated regular coordination meetings to streamline Ukraine's oversight activities. By the close of 2022, the working group comprised seventeen oversight organizations.19 In January 2023, the United States published a Joint Strategic Oversight Plan (JSOP) for Ukraine Response. 20
The Ministry of Defense of Ukraine consistently communicates updates on inspections of international military aid carried out by US personnel. These inspections encompass the verification of key parameters, compliance with serial numbers, assessment of technical conditions, and evaluation of conditions for the proper storage of weapons, focusing on safety and security, directly at the weapon storage locations.
On-site inspections are vital tools for controlling PSSM under ordinary circumstances. However, given the dynamic nature of war, where weaponry is sometimes transferred directly to the battlefield or stored in close proximity to the frontline, authorities are not always able to conduct physical inspections. The incapacity of specialists to execute comprehensive oversight over transferred weaponry due to evident limitations creates an opportunity for adversaries to disseminate vocal reports and engage in disinformation campaigns. In this situation, a preference should be given to alternative methods of weaponry monitoring and control, and new practices in end-use monitoring involving modern technologies. 22
BORDER CONTROL MEASURES
Maintaining an effective border control system is crucial for preventing the proliferation of weapons and ammunition to other countries and regions. Reports indicate that the disruption of existing illicit trade routes and organized criminal relationships may be contributing factors. 23 For instance, the naval blockade of the port of Odesa deprived arms traffickers of their primary channel for selling arms on a large scale. Enhanced security measures across Ukraine, in the form of checkpoints and stops, make the transportation of weapons more challenging. 24
For several years, Ukraine has collaborated with the OSCE to enhance its border protection mechanisms. 25 Recognizing the heightened risks of illicit cross-border trafficking of weapons, the European Union (EU) initiated the Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management in Moldova to address potential security threats arising from the Russian invasion. 26 The EU Home Affairs Commissioner stated that the hub aims to prevent a situation akin to the post-Balkan war era, during which crime gangs in Europe exploited opportunities to build up their arsenal. 27
The State Border Service of Ukraine utilizes the available technologies (SOTA, LOGFAS, and KOROVAI) to coordinate international military assistance, manage the logistics support of NATO, and communicate daily information on received weapons and military equipment to the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine. 28
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
The overview of modern software employed in Ukraine for recording and controlling military assistance provides insight into the new digitalized approach adopted by Ukraine and its allies. While the concept sounds promising in theory, its practical implementation poses significant challenges. Assessing the current stage of software implementation and the proportion of national weaponry recorded in the databases is challenging. Transitioning from traditional data-keeping methods, which involved hand-written journals, to modern technologies will require a considerable amount of time.
The oversight of the transfers, distribution, and use of military assistance in Ukraine is a crucial measure to prevent its diversion. However, the feasibility of fully controlling all weaponry during the ongoing full-fledged war in Ukraine raises significant challenges. The volume
Ukraine’s border guards receive equipment from the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe to better combat smuggling of weapons, ammunition, and explosives, May 2024.
Courtesy of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine.
In addition to these measures, a robust international police and prosecutorial cooperation framework between Ukraine and the European Union has played a positive role in uncovering cross-border organized crime activities. 29
of military assistance is so vast that exporting countries would need to substantially increase their financial and human resources to conduct the required number of inspections. In situations where physical onsite inspections become impractical, technology and artificial intelligence offer viable alternatives for achieving these objectives.
While the counter-diversion measures are in progress, it’s important to remember that Ukraine is perhaps the first country in history that attempts to fully modernize its weapons and ammunition management (WAM) system during wartime.
Unlike many countries that have experienced conflicts, Ukraine is under the scrutiny of the international disarmament community, held accountable for any lapses in weapons control while actively defending itself against invaders. Maintaining the highest level of military
partnerships and cooperation, essential for its survival as an independent state, Ukraine is highly motivated to prevent arms diversion.
However, preventing the capture of weapons by Russians on the battlefield is a challenging task. Ukrainian soldiers, at great personal risk, often return to collect weapons and die as a result. 30 Yehor Cherniev, M ember of Parliament and temporary commission, explained that in the event of lost weapons, their serial numbers are immediately communicated to the embassies of the countries that provided them. This practice is aimed at transparently demonstrating that Ukraine no longer possesses these weapons, although it is acknowledged that some may end up in unintended hands. 31
Unlike many countries that have experienced conflicts, Ukraine is under the scrutiny of the international disarmament community, held accountable for any lapses in weapons control while actively defending itself against invaders. Maintaining the highest level of military partnerships and cooperation, essential for its survival as an independent state, Ukraine is highly motivated to prevent arms diversion.
Reports reveal that Russians have obtained trophy weapons, particularly firearms, which are subsequently transferred to other regions of the world and used for disinformation purposes against Ukraine. This underscores the multifaceted challenges Ukraine faces in preventing arms diversion in the complex dynamics of war.
32
While we do not see massive proliferation right now, this may change once the fighting stops. 33 There are concerns that Ukraine might experience a situation similar to that of the Western Balkans. In the aftermath of the Balkan wars
in the 1990s, the proliferation of SALW occurred due to inadequate PSSM practices. This led to the diversion of these weapons from official police and military inventories for unauthorized use, both within Europe and beyond. 34 However, we already see significant differences, particularly in the more responsible attitude of Ukraine’s authorities and partner states. During active warfare, it is challenging to monitor and fully control the diversion of weapons. However, after this conflict ends, Ukraine and its allies need to be prepared for entirely new challenges in arms control and WAM. While the outcome of the war is difficult to predict, the future of arms control mechanisms will depend on Ukraine's ability to exercise full control over its weapons stockpiles and national borders. Ukraine's defeat would represent a dramatic development, with a large arsenal of imported weapons falling directly into the hands of the stateaggressor and potentially appearing in various regions where Russia’s military and its proxy forces operate. The possibility of a frozen conflict, existence of grey areas, and porous borders would open new routes for the illegal flow of weapons. The full restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity appears to be the only viable path for implementing comprehensive arms control measures in line with international best practices.
See endnotes page 64
Emerging Expert Forum on the Arms Trade
Olena Kryzhanivska, PhD, is an independent Ukrainian researcher with a PhD degree in Political and Social Sciences from Gazi University, Turkey. She has previously worked for the Norwegian Embassy in Ankara and interned for the UNODA Conventional Weapons Branch in New York. Currently, Kryzhanivska is an Emerging Expert 2023–2024 with the Forum on the Arms Trade and contributes to its regular monitoring on the arms transfers to Ukraine.
OLENA KRYZHANIVSKA, Ph D
The Prioritization of Survey Through Open-Source Research in Ukraine
By Anda Riza and Andro Mathewson [ The HALO Trust ]
With the increasing quantity of available and relevant open-source information online, the mine action sector is well poised to take advantage of its accessibility for conducting research, analysis, and investigations. In current conflicts, such as in Ukraine and Yemen, online sources are a rich repository of information which can be leveraged for survey and clearance operations. Humanitarian mine clearance actors can harness this vast quantity of information to map conflicts and their effects, including the location of landmines and other explosive remnants of war (ERW). In turn, this can be used to help prioritize survey efforts, especially in contexts where resources are limited and the need is great. The HALO Trust (HALO) has successfully applied this methodology in Ukraine and is expanding it to other locations as well.
INTRODUCTION
Open-source research (OSR), defined as “the process of collecting and analyzing legally gathered information from publicly available sources,”1 is a relatively new tool within the mine action sector but has a long-standing history of use by law enforcement and national security organizations. 2 Within mine action, OSR is a growth area with the promising potential to improve non-technical survey (NTS) directly and land release in general.
Examples of OSR include the following: monitoring social media to map explosive ordnance (EO) contamination in a conflict zone, archival research to understand minelaying patterns in past conflicts, and the analysis of current and/or historical satellite imagery to map craters, roads, and trenches. All of these are used to assist with the process of NTS, traditionally acting as part of the deskbased assessment prior to the deployment of NTS teams which help inform further survey priorities. 3 Prior to the deployment of teams on the ground, however, information gathered online or in archives can be used to prioritize the survey process.
HALO has leveraged open-source information online since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 to help prioritize survey areas. This has improved the efficiency and effectiveness of HALO to deploy survey teams and conduct rapid assessment of settlements that leads to the identification of suspected hazardous areas (SHA) and confirmed hazardous areas (CHA).
A building damaged by shrapnel and bullets in Ukraine. All graphics courtesy of The HALO Trust.
OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH IN MINE ACTION AND
THE HALO TRUST
At HALO, OSR has become an integral part of the planning process for both new country operations and the expansion of efforts in existing locations. In Ukraine, HALO has been continuously conducting OSR since the start of the conflict in 2014, monitoring social media posts and intelligence assessments to ensure the safety and security of our staff, as well as to have an in-depth understanding of the conflict and the resultant EO contamination across the nation.
HALO’s research team has created a map by collating, categorizing, geolocating, and analyzing over 100,000 data, which point to or directly identify locations that are likely contaminated by EO.4 Figure 1 includes movement of the frontlines, and HALO’s safety buffer from the frontline areas. This data has been used for various strategic decisions, including security assessments and survey prioritization.
30 km Buffer Zone from Front Lines
30 km Buffer Zone from Front Borders
Front Lines (Source ISW)
Areas not under Ukrainian government control on 24 February 2022
Air/Missile Strike
Attack/Explosion/Shelling
Damaged Infrastructure
Damaged Military Vehicle
Landmines and IED
Unexploded Ordnance
Unplanned Explosions at Munitions Sites
Civilian Accident
Demining Accident
Military Accident
Police Accident
Other
Air/Missile Strike
Attack/Explosion/Shelling
Cluster Munitions
Damaged Infrastructure
Damaged Military Vehicle
Explosion at Ammunitions Sites
IED
Civilian Accident
Identifiable EO
Identifiable Military Vehicle
Landmine-AP
Landmine-AT
Landmine-Unknown
Not Relevant
UXO
Demining Accident
300mm 9M55 rocket, Ukraine.
Figure 1. HALO's conflict and contamination map.
Figure 1 . HALO Verified Events Entered into PowerApps
SURVEY PRIORITIZATION THROUGH OPEN-SOURCE RESEARCH
Scope and unit of analysis. The scope of HALO’s prioritization efforts aligns geographically with its current area of operations (AO). At the regional level, HALO holds permission to operate in specific areas, including parts of Kyiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Donetsk, and Kherson Oblasts, as permitted by the Ukrainian authorities. A narrower and more local focus occurs at the district and territorial community (hromada). Characterized as larger than a settlement, a hromada encompasses numerous settlements. It is by focusing on this unit that HALO distinguishes itself geographically from other mine action operators’ AO. This approach has been beneficial due to the size of Ukraine and the nature of the conflict, where the majority of minelaying has occurred in agricultural areas or in the vicinity of smaller settlements. By prioritizing at
the hromada level, HALO ensures that this unique aspect of the conflict is taken into consideration throughout the survey process.
At this level, HALO has established prioritization criteria for hromadas falling within HALO’s AO. The prioritization is visually represented through a color-coding system, where darker colors signify higher priority areas (Figure 2). This approach ensures a systematic and strategic deployment of resources in areas requiring more attention and intervention over others with a lower priority.
Methodology. OSR reports within HALO’s AO are systematically gathered, starting with various aspects related to landmines, encompassing both reported accidents and reported sightings. The analysis extends to areas under occupation since February 2022, which
includes liberated areas and a surrounding 10-kilometer zone. This comprehensive approach allows insight into the evolving dynamics and mitigates any potential issues stemming from any data incompleteness.
Infrastructure damage is meticulously cataloged, with each category assigned a cumulative score based on the impact to local communities and the importance of the infrastructure. The classifications include transportation facilities such as roads, railways, bridges, and airports; social infrastructure facilities such as theaters, stadiums, libraries, government offices, banks, and other financial institutions; sanitary systems such as drinking water, waste management, and dams; telecommunication facilities such as television, mobile, and internet; and other infrastructure as seen in Table 1.
The analysis further encompasses the quantitative assessment of conflict events reported through ORS, excluding points categorized as "other," "not sure," and "not relevant." This enables HALO to quantify and
understand the magnitude of events directly related to the conflict.
An additional parameter is the population density for every hromada within HALO's AO. This information, publicly available from the Ukrainian authorities, contributes to a more nuanced understanding of the demographic landscape in the areas under consideration. It also highlights areas where human activity is more likely to overlap with EO contamination, potentially resulting in an increased likelihood of accidents.
Considerations. The outlined considerations form an essential framework designed to provide strategic guidance to senior management in determining the priority areas for survey deployment. This pre-survey assessment aims to streamline the allocation of limited resources effectively before survey teams physically visit identified areas. Several key points define the structure of this prioritization process.
Firstly, the prioritization criteria extend to each specific region in HALO’s AO. This regional focus allows for a nuanced approach, recognizing the unique characteristics and challenges in each area—such as highlighting differences in tactics used during the conflict. 5 The analysis is limited to hromadas within HALO's AO, with regular updates incorporated over time to ensure accuracy and relevance. By confining the assessment to HALO AO hromadas, the prioritization efforts are adjusted to each specific operational context.
A priority color scale is employed to distinguish the urgency and significance of each area. This scale classifies priority into four categories: low, medium, high, and very high (specific scores depending on region). This systematic grading system facilitates a clear and intuitive understanding of the relative importance of surveyed areas.
The system aims to target and plan interventions in higher-priority areas, thereby optimizing resource allocation. However, in specific instances, such as in Kharkiv Oblast, survey teams extend their assessments to include the closest villages in the surrounding areas, demonstrating the ability for a flexible and contextspecific approach. In other areas, such as Mykolaiv Oblast, the unique operational context necessitates a more constricted strategy due to security and access considerations.
Outcomes. The prioritization matrix assigns each hromada a specific score accompanied by a corresponding color scale indicative of its priority score. The web map interface facilitates access to detailed information related
A TM-62 anti-vehicle mine in Mykolaiv Oblast.
to each criterion within the matrix by simply clicking on the respective hromada, thereby providing a comprehensive overview of its prioritization factors. This is accessible both on laptops and mobile devices.
Drawing from cumulative results thus far, a significant trend emerges. Within one-third of the hromadas located within HALO’s AO, evidence of landmines is apparent.
Notably, 90 percent of these hromadas were occupied, approximately half have incurred infrastructural damage, and more than half have been affected by some form of conflict event. These findings underscore the multifaceted impact of conflict and provide a foundation for prioritizing ongoing and future survey and clearance efforts.
EVALUATION THROUGH RAPID ASSESSMENT
Evaluation. The accuracy of HALO’s survey prioritization based on open-source data and the priority matrix has been confirmed by the rapid assessment of communities by HALO’s NTS teams. Rapid assessment does not fall under the definition of NTS in the International Mine Action Standards but is used by HALO as a precursor to NTS to assist a program in prioritizing areas most affected by EO for deployment of NTS teams. During the process of rapid
assessment, NTS teams will visit all settlements in a defined area and collect information about the presence of direct or indirect evidence of EO without defining a polygon. This is completed through interviews with a small number of informants to determine if there is any evidence of explosive contamination in the village or not. This is not a comprehensive approach but provides a rapid picture of the contamination in an area, as well as a starting point for future
Table 1. Criteria for hromada.
NTS activity. When all localities are visited by teams, those which show direct and indirect evidence of contamination will then be prioritized on the NTS work plan, during which CHA and SHA polygons are created.
HALO has conducted rapid assessment of communities in Ukraine since 2016. After 24 February 2022, this has been used to both confirm the prioritization based on open-source data and to further help prioritize NTS across Ukraine given the scale of the conflict and the size of the country.
The color-coded map excerpt (Figure 3) shows the prioritization of the communities (the highlighted areas) and the results of HALO’s rapid assessments. The location of rapid assessments, which confirm the presence of
EO (in red) match, on average, HALO’s high priority communities. The green points, which show no presence of EO, match HALO’s low priority communities. Possible issues. Some of the major potential problems when conducting survey prioritization based on opensource data are the accuracy and availability of the data, the construction of the matrix, and context-specific issues. While some of these issues are surmountable, others may have insoluble negative effects, which must be mitigated during the strategic decision-making process.
Data availability and accuracy are vital to the correct prioritization of survey areas. The Russian invasion of Ukraine has been described as “the world’s first TikTok war,” resulting in effectively endless imagery and footage
Figure 3. The prioritization of Sumy and Kharkiv regions with rapid assessment results.
of the conflict. 6 While the availability of data is not an issue, the largest problem stems from capturing and analyzing the information given limited resources. Thus, certain types of data need to be prioritized. HALO’s research team in Ukraine focuses on any footage that highlights the presence of landmines and ERW, such as reports of civilian accidents, footage of tanks being hit by landmines, or videos of cluster munition strikes. However, even with the added prioritization of this data, lapses in the most pertinent data are still possible due to the size of both the conflict and Ukraine.
Another potential issue can occur during the construction of the prioritization matrix. If, for example, the population data is inaccurate or outdated, this may create a wrong output. Similarly, if the scoring steps for the same criteria are not selected properly, taking regional deviations into consideration, such as the presence of large cities
LOOKING FORWARD
HALO is beginning to augment existing desk-based analysis and previous processes of the prioritization of survey through initial OSR scoping and thorough analysis of conflict history in other regions, such as Southeast Asia and across the Middle East. The lessons learned from Ukraine described in this article have been instrumental in streamlining the process dependent on the country and conflict context. As scraping technologies, such as machine learning algorithms and artificial intelligence improve, OSR’s significance within mine action will only continue to expand.
in otherwise sparsely populated areas, this might also contribute to a less effective prioritization. Lastly, considering the characteristics of the conflict is vital to an effective prioritization. While the Russian invasion of Ukraine has resulted in the largest war in Europe since World War II, it remains a conventional war and highly attritional in nature. While trenches, artillery, tanks, and landmines are ubiquitous across the frontlines in Ukraine, these elements are less likely to be present in other war zones, where conflicts might materialize more as insurgencies or occur mostly in urban areas. In these cases, improvised explosive devices might be more common than landmines and determining occupied areas and frontlines may be more challenging or complex. If survey prioritization is conducted via the previously mentioned methods, a unique matrix must be created for each conflict accounting for demographic, regional, and geographic differences.
See endnotes page 65 An F1 grenade in Eastern Ukraine.
ANDA RIZA Operations Officer
The HALO Trust Ukraine
Anda Riza is an Operations Officer at The HALO Trust Ukraine (HALO), supporting clearance operations and overseeing non-technical survey. Riza completed her Field Officer training in Sri Lanka, prior to which she served as a Non-Technical Survey Coordinator for HALO Ukraine. She is currently working on her master's degree in international management from the International Business College Mitrovica in Kosovo. Riza has worked with HALO for six years.
ANDRO MATHEWSON Global Research Officer
The HALO Trust
Andro Mathewson is a Global Research Officer at The HALO Trust (HALO), leading HALO’s open-source research project mapping the Russian invasion of Ukraine. He received his master's degree in international relations from the University of Edinburgh and bachelor of arts in politics, philosophy, and economics from the University of Pennsylvania, and is currently working on his PhD in war studies at King's College London.
resource. Much of the ammunition in areas from the Baltic Sea to the rivers of Cambodia to the Gulf of Mexico has been immersed for decades, subject to a variety of underwater influences. Many studies have examined the impacts of degrading explosives on the surrounding environment, but few look at what effect the environment has on the munition. The study seeks to analyze those effects and their varied implications.
BACKGROUND
Worldwide, oceans and waterways are contaminated with untold amounts of munitions, many having been dumped when deemed no longer useful, and some having been fired during active conflict or live training exercises. Munitions under water pose a potential threat to commercial operations, civilians engaging in recreational activities, and the health of various underwater ecosystems. Clearance of these hazards is complicated by the realities of operating in difficult circumstances requiring special equipment and training and by the assortment of clutter found in different underwater environments. Yet the recognition that the world’s oceans, rivers, and lakes have great resources to offer and the realization that the sometimes-forgotten munitions that lie in their depths are standing in the way of harnessing the full benefit of these resources while also affecting the health of these ecosystems, means that the time is coming when their clearance will be imperative. Much of the ammunition in these areas has been immersed for decades, subject not only to the effects of water, but also to a variety of other influences present in the underwater environment, such as temperature, pressure, biological content, and even human interaction. Another category of factors that can impact munition aging under water is something referred to in the study as “predisposition to aging,” which is a series of internal and external characteristics related to the munition that may either promote or inhibit the aging process. The combination of these “predisposition influences” explains why similar types of ammunition, in comparable environments, can exhibit varied behaviors during aging. These factors include the materials and design of the munition as well as the circumstances of its storage, maintenance, and deployment (See Figure 1 for a
sampling of the various factors at play in munition aging.)
When these munitions enter the water after being fired, their condition is already uncertain due to the unknown reasons for failure during deployment; this is further complicated by the effects of aging in these conditions. Environmental impacts on munitions have been anecdotally observed for a number of years, yet the measurable effects of ammunition aging have not been fully quantified; as a 2019 report from the Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) indicates, “most information on ageing is anecdotal, rather than systematically compiled.”1 In a 2008 article, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) consultant Colin King wrote “it has long been understood that time and environment take a toll on munitions.”2 Six years earlier, two studies for the US Army Environmental Center attempted to describe corrosion of landmines/ unexploded ordnance (UXO) and the factors influencing it to better understand how these effects might apply in particular to UXO on sites in the United States and their potential environmental impacts. 3,4 Numerous studies, in fact, have tried to quantify the impacts of degrading explosives on the surrounding environment 5,6,7 but few look at the issue from the opposite perspective of what effect the environment has on the munition.
Data on the underwater effects of aging on these systems is limited, leading to polarized views among EOD personnel and risk managers. Changes due to aging lead to greater uncertainty, which implies increased risk; this in turn requires greater caution, with knock-on implications for resources, time, and cost. In a keynote at Kiel Munition Clearance Week 2021, Chief of the German Navy, Vice
Admiral Kay-Achim Schönbach, reported that some of the legacy munitions they are finding are no longer safe to handle due to the aging process.9 However, landbased research has established that munitions generally become safer as they degrade. In Denmark, for example, it was found that World War II-era mines being cleared sixty years after emplacement had been nonfunctional for some time if they were in contact with salt water, “due
THE STUDY—PURPOSE AND METHODS
In 2022, the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) at James Madison University (JMU) joined with explosives experts from Fenix Insight to observe and characterize the visual, structural, and functional changes that occur when munitions are submerged for long periods. The purpose of the study was to provide a broad overview of impacts that aging in underwater settings can have on submerged munitions, serving as a means to identify the residual risk these munitions pose.
JMU faculty with scientific backgrounds in chemistry, physics, geology, biology, and environmental and materials sciences lent their expertise to the project in the form of a
to the alteration of explosives in the detonators from their interaction with salt water and the degradation and corrosion of fuzes.”10 The reality, however, is that different mechanisms, materials, and explosives will react to longterm immersion in different ways, requiring further study to determine how different munitions are impacted by different environments and what the implications are for safety and efficacy of clearance efforts.
research advisory board to help the team better understand the scientific explanations behind the physical and chemical effects being observed, as well as their potential implications. The US Department of Defense’s Strategic Environmental Research and Development Program (SERDP) has funded this work and thus it is focused on the implications for cleanup of US military testing and training facilities, but its findings can also inform the work of the humanitarian sector involved in explosives remediation. The full report is expected to be published by mid-2024 and will be available on the CISR website.11
Figure 1. A representation of the relationships between some of the typical influences involved in the aging of simple munitions. In reality, there are often many more influences and relationships, creating a huge number of permutations. 8 All graphics courtesy of Fenix Insight.
This study predominantly focused on ammunition used during testing or training that failed to function as designed, which is categorized as UXO. Other explosive ordnance (EO), whether derived from stockpiles, sunken cargo vessels, or historic disposal programs like sea dumping, is classified as abandoned explosive ordnance (AXO). This distinction is important in that UXO and AXO exhibit critical differences in their conditions and associated risks (see Figure 2). UXO, typically being fully fuzed, frequently armed, and often subjected to impact, usually brings a high level of uncertainty due to the unknown reasons for its failure and the type and degree of damage sustained. In contrast, AXO, mostly being unfuzed, unarmed, and not subjected to impact, has much less uncertainty associated with it.
FINDINGS
This study has reached the following key conclusions:
The team consolidated and reviewed existing data on the aging of land-based ammunition to make logical predictions for their application to the underwater environment. Patterns of deterioration in casing materials, mechanisms, and explosive compositions were investigated to make educated predictions for future comparisons. The team also relied on its own prior work studying the effects of time and environment on land-based ordnance.12 Some of those previous studies involved the complete disassembly and analysis of live ammunition,13 along with preliminary studies and risk assessment. The ability to visualize, examine, and test internal structures proved invaluable, with some of the observed effects being undoubtedly transferrable to the underwater environment. Thus, imagery and data from those studies have informed this investigation.
» Limited information. Relatively little is known about the effects of aging on munitions spending prolonged periods under water, largely due to policies of either leaving these munitions undisturbed in place or destroying in situ.
» Predictability. The many influences in the underwater environment, with their potential interactions creating a vast number of permutations, make it extremely difficult to predict effects and outcomes with any accuracy (see Figure 1).
» Problematic research. One reason so little information exists is that practical research in this area is potentially hazardous. This is true but, ironically, is a self-reinforcing barrier to gaining greater clarity.
» AXO and UXO. AXO is usually unfuzed, unarmed, and undamaged when it is abandoned. It therefore involves far less uncertainty than UXO, which is often armed, damaged, and may have been subjected to extreme forces during deployment and impact.
» Trend toward failure. Munitions inevitably progress from fully functional to being incapable of functioning as designed, starting with the failure of one or more key components until they eventually become fully inert.
» Non-functional does not equal safe. The fact that a munition may be incapable of functioning as designed does not necessarily make it safe. So long as explosive material is present, it continues to pose potential risk.
» External impetus. In most cases, the net effect of fuze failure is to increase the energy threshold for initiation. While this threshold may no longer be available from, or exceeded by, the fuzing system, it could be provided by an external source, such as violent impact or intense heat.
» Unintended mechanisms . Deterioration can lead to unintended initiation mechanisms through chemical reactions, physical changes, or both, temporarily increasing the risk of accidental or spontaneous detonation.
» Climate change. Changing environmental factors, such as the acidification of seawater, increased water temperature, and increases in storm intensity, may become significant. In particular, the chances of ammunition suddenly becoming exposed to air appear to be increasing.
» Exposure to air. When ammunition is washed up on land or otherwise exposed to air, the substantial change of environment could exacerbate the creation of unintended mechanisms. This includes the possible reversal of effects that had resulted in non-functionality.
IMPLICATIONS AND OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Aging effects may significantly alter the appearance and physical characteristics of munitions, which could have important implications for their visual recognition (see Figure 3), as well as for emerging detection and identification technologies. In many cases, the deterioration of ammunition will degrade these
long periods). This buildup can significantly alter the ordnance’s appearance, which hinders visual detection and recognition, and may also degrade the performance of sensor-based detection technology trained to look for particular signatures. Additionally, it may provide a layer of insulation from the surrounding environment that—
Figure 2: AXO (left) often remains intact for long periods of underwater exposure, while much more uncertainty surrounds UXO (right), which have typically been fully fuzed, frequently armed, and often subjected to impact.
This is an illustration of underwater munitions created by CISR, not an actual photo.
RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has confirmed that there is relatively little awareness or understanding surrounding the effects of aging on ammunition underwater. To address this lack of knowledge, the community should focus greater attention on the subject, which can be done through communication of these issues to key stakeholders (such as funders, clearance operators, affected populations, researchers, and equipment developers), as well as their coordination and cooperation on these issues, plus further targeted research, including detection trials using aging inert ammunition. The study team also encourages the community to engage in more systematic data collection when encountering underwater ordnance, so long as it is
safe to do so. Capturing images and observations about the environment and the munitions themselves can greatly increase the body of knowledge surrounding this subject and enhance our understanding of issues relating to prioritization, identification, detection, disposal, safety, and cost efficiency in underwater clearance operations. Sharing reports on remediation efforts in underwater environments, as well as information on accidents or incidents involving underwater munitions, is also welcome. Any data collection on the topic should of course be conducted in accordance with the guidance in IMAS 07.11.14 If you have information to share, please contact the research team at cisr@jmu.edu.
See endnotes page 66
NICOLE NEITZEY
Assistant Director
Center for International Stabilization and Recovery
James Madison University https:// jmu.edu/cisr
Nicole Neitzey is the Assistant Director at the Center for International Stabilization and Recovery (CISR) and acts as program manager/grants officer. She graduated from James Madison University (JMU) in 2002 with a bachelor of arts in technical and scientific communication, and a specialization in online publications and earned a master of public administration (MPA) from JMU in 2015 with a concentration in nonprofit management. She has worked for CISR since 2001, and since 2016, has taught an MPA course on Proposal Writing and Project Management.
Colin King served in the British Army as an explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) officer, instructor, and intelligence analyst, with numerous operational tours. He also wrote EOD reference works for Janes for seventeen years. Now Chief Intelligence Officer for Fenix Insight, his work includes the disassembly and analysis of unexploded and abandoned ordnance around the world.
Figure 4. (Left) A munition experiencing the effects of concretion before cleaning. (Right) The same munition after cleaning.
Securing Land to Contribute to Food Systems: Preliminary Findings on Humanitarian Mine Action’s Cumulative Effects on Food Security in Lebanon
By Riccardo Labianco, PhD, and Myriam Rabbath [ Mines Advisory Group ]
In a country or region affected by explosive ordnance (EO), the related contamination and, when present, humanitarian mine action (HMA), should be considered as part of the country’s food systems. Accordingly, understanding the cumulative effects of HMA on food security can be better appreciated by considering the whole food system and how local citizens view the impact of contamination. Through a preliminary series of community-level interviews in southern and northeast Lebanon from August to September 2023, Mines Advisory Group (MAG) started a research project on the impact of EO contamination on people’s ability to produce and procure adequate food and the beneficial effects of HMA on people’s food security.
INTRODUCTION
When agricultural land is released as a result of HMA activities, it is very intuitive to think that HMA contributes to landowners’ food security. However, HMA’s beneficial impact can extend beyond that, producing positive effects on the whole food system of an area or country. Through an initial series of twenty-six community-level interviews and adopting a qualitative research approach, the first phase of a research project led by MAG and supported by the United States’ Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (PM/WRA)1 and the Lebanon Mine Action Center (LMAC)2 aimed to explore the link between HMA and food security more closely through the words of the people and communities in southern and northeast Lebanon whose food security was affected by the presence of EO. 3
The ongoing broader research project evaluating the link between HMA and food security aims to contribute to the debate regarding HMA’s relationship with human rights and the sustainable development goals in a qualitative way by learning more about people’s views on the impact of contamination and HMA, while challenging conceptions and approaches that could prevent an organic integration of HMA with the broader set of humanitarian and development activities.
The first part of this research confirmed that both EO contamination and HMA not only affect the lives and livelihoods of the communities living within or near contaminated areas, but they also have differing impacts on food security, including agricultural activities and techniques as well as impacts on cultures and people’s psyche. Such effects appear intrinsically linked, making EO contamination and HMA part of the food systems themselves.
Looking through the lens of the two interrelated concepts of food security and food systems broadens the understanding of the impacts of EO contamination and HMA on the ways in which people produce and procure food. Indeed, food security—considered as existing “when all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life,”4 can be considered as the outcome of an efficient food system, which has been defined as the set of all elements, including “environment, people, inputs, processes, infrastructures, and institutions” and “activities that relate to the production, processing, distribution, preparation and consumption of food, and the outputs of these activities, including socio-economic and environmental outcomes.”5
In this sense, EO contamination factually disrupts the food system and alters the level of food security. Similarly, HMA not only indirectly impacts the food system, it also may develop it further while (re)creating new levels of food security. Without a perspective that jointly considers people’s views and the effects of both EO contamination and HMA on food security, HMA’s documented outcomes, as well as food security interventions, miss important elements. In fact, the broad and qualitative focus adopted in this research allowed us to appreciate how far within a food system contamination harm and HMA benefits can effectively extend, including market dynamics, divisions between urban and rural areas, community resilience, effects of economic crises, and phenomena caused by climate change.
THE PERCEIVED CONNECTION
The impact of EO contamination on various aspects of human security and human rights, including food security and the right to food, 6 is generally acknowledged,7 unlike HMA’s contribution to food security. In fact, HMA is generally assumed to be aimed at simply re-creating pre-contamination levels of food security. Such a return could be the most desirable option but the socioeconomic dynamics that occurred during post-contamination and HMA should not be overlooked, as they might have changed the way in which people can and want to create their food security (see Figure 1). For this reason, this preliminary set of interviews aimed to collect the views of the people residing in currently or formerly contaminated areas on both the impact of EO and HMA on food security.
Socio-Economic Dynamics
Changing the Pre-Contamination Situation
Figure 1. The contamination-HMA timeline and two assumptions on HMA outcomes: returning to the pre-contamination situation and using the land release considering relevant post-contamination socio-economic dynamics.
All figures courtesy of the authors.
and the realization of the right to adequate standards of living. Similarly, by contributing to food security, HMA contributes to the realization of the right to food.
Whether considering the recreation of the pre-contamination situation or in looking forward, HMA needs to break silos and create new synergies and cross-cutting collaborations with humanitarian and development programs based on comprehensive concepts such as food security. In fact, HMA protects and contributes to the realization of a series of human rights. For example, by preventing death and serious injuries, HMA protects the right to life: by guaranteeing freedom of safe movement and access to healthcare and educational facilities,
THE CASE OF LEBANON
Since 1975, Lebanon has faced a series of overlapping and successive conflicts: a long civil war (1975–1990); foreign occupation of the south (1982–2000); and the 2006 war, which resulted in four million cluster munitions dropped over the south;8 battling ISIL in the northeast, and the spillover of the Syria war, to name but a few. These crises have brought about mass civilian casualties and decades-long displacements, critical infrastructure incapacitation, hindered development and basic
THE CENTRALITY OF PEOPLE
Since 2019,10 a series of compounded events, including the Beirut Port explosion, COVID -19 pandemic, complex financial crisis, and global economic deterioration, significantly impacted Lebanon’s food system, aggravating earlier vulnerabilities and deteriorating existing systems.11 Lebanese civilians had to reimagine ways to produce or procure food in such challenging times, with many living in EO-contaminated areas. In fact, it is exactly people’s and communities’ resilience to these socioeconomic dynamics, along with other unpredictable events
Although efforts in the HMA sector to better understand and document clearance impact assessments have grown exponentially over the past few years, these have generally focused on linear and immediate connections between HMA and the respective impact. This has been the case, for example, of land use for returning displaced persons, safe movement, safe access to basic services, and enablement of localized development plans. However, it is important to highlight HMA’s deeper and broader impact. In this way, exploring the link between HMA and food security allows us to appreciate how, and to what extent, HMA tasks and other humanitarian and development activities can be coordinated in producing benefits for people and communities in a more effective way.
services, and impeded access to land and natural resources, all exacerbated by widespread EO contamination.9
MAG has worked in Lebanon since 2001, surveying and clearing contamination and delivering explosive ordnance risk education (EORE). Great progress had been collectively achieved by the LMAC and HMA actors to remove EO threats and alleviate the ensuing blockages, including the return of agricultural activities and resuming safe access to fertile lands for food production.
such as climate-change-induced phenomena, the HMA sector should consider when examining its impact on food security and sustainable development more broadly.
People and communities are central to this research as they lived through these various conflicts and crises, experiencing first-hand the socio-economic consequences, and it is their experiences that contextualize the impact of EO contamination, HMA benefits, and its relationship to food security.
Figure 2. Interviewees by gender.
The community-level, semistructured interviews were held with thirty-three interviewees of different gender and ages, representing a variety of roles within the Lebanese food system including farmers, agricultural workers, shepherds, landowners, entrepreneurs, traders, mayors, mukhtars, and consumers. The interviewees were from the governorates of Nabatiyeh, South Lebanon, Mount Lebanon, the Beqaa, and Baalbek Hermel, all with different types and levels of EO contamination. Some of the governorates were known to be highly productive agriculturally.
Each interview commenced with questions on how EO affected the interviewees’ lives and livelihoods, then probed into a range of issues and observations, from fear, insecurity, and limited access to land, to discussion of productivity, employment, and tree care, planting techniques, and environmental considerations.
Shepherd (3)
(2)
(5)
(5)
(1)
(6)
Fear and Insecurity. Fear of death and serious injury was one of the first topics mentioned by interviewees who often described how they knew of relatives or acquaintances who died or were seriously injured from EO while grazing livestock or carrying out ordinary agricultural activities. Often this fear was reported to have limited the interviewees’ access to land and ability to cultivate crops or graze livestock.12 This appeared to have immediate effects, such as preventing them from producing food as well as longer-term consequences. For example, a number of interviewees explained how the impossibility of taking care of crops, trees, soil, and livestock due to the presence of EO could have a serious impact on their productivity once the land was released.13 In fact, it was not uncommon for interviewees to report the lengthy time and significant investment required to
address the effects of the abandonment of trees, such as olive and fruit trees, or the soil.14
Fear and insecurity were also reported to have a certain psychological impact on the interviewees. Aside from being concerned for their lives and their loved ones,15 some interviewees mentioned not being able to fully enjoy their relationship with the land and the impossibility of living off the successes produced by their work, such as that experienced by their parents and ancestors, which was reportedly perceived as part of their identity.16
Generally, fear and insecurity related to the actual or possible presence of EO also affected food production and procurement, with some interviewees reporting their reluctance to access land to collect herbs for the preparation of food preserves, such as in the case of the production of preserved aubergines.17 Other interviewees mentioned their inability to access tools and equipment that remained in dangerous and contaminated areas or to graze livestock in an extended area in a safe way, resulting in decreased milk production and other products.18
Effects on Crops, Soil, and Farmers’ Work. EO contamination was reported to affect how farmers and other interviewees contribute to the food system. EO also reportedly affected the production of certain food products. In some cases, the impossibility of accessing large quantities of water prevented the cultivation of food products considered highly profitable, such as certain fruits and vegetables. In other cases, EO limited the production and quality of olives and olive oil, chickpeas, walnuts, and milk, which were considered central to the diet of those interviewed and, more generally, staple food for the region and the country. In fact, EO not only prevented access to land, it also limited irrigation or the access to electricity, which affected farmers’ work.
In several interviews, the lack or decrease in soil productivity was connected to the actual or suspected presence of chemicals in the soil. Although at a very anecdotal level, the interviews suggest that further research on this type of pollution could be useful. In other cases, interviewees mentioned the undesired effects of clearance, notably tree cutting, which reinforced the idea that it is necessary to understand HMA’s environmental footprint. This is especially timely considering climate-changeinduced events, including those reported in the interviews, such as extreme heat, drought, and disturbed seasonal patterns. In both direct and indirect ways, participants described how EO contamination affects communities’ resilience to climate change; for instance, limiting the possibility of constructing efficient
Figure 3 . Interviewees by profession.
irrigation systems, which can also impact how people choose to use the land once released.
In some instances, EO contamination was linked to drastic decisions to leave rural areas and relocate to cities in search of better opportunities.19 Indeed, EO contamination not only affects the capacity of landowners to produce food, thereby decreasing the local capacity without relying on imports from other regions or abroad, but it also leads to a gradual weakening and loss of the expertise necessary to produce food.
Decreases in productivity reportedly equated to a loss in employment opportunities, especially for seasonal and daily workers who were often from marginalized communities. In the case of Lebanon, this includes Syrian refugees, whose food security relies on these forms of employment.20 In fact, more generally, it was observed that EO contamination has an important impact on the informal economy sector, which is larger than expected in Lebanon and includes marginalized groups.21
Effects on Personal Habits, Traditions, and Socio-Economic Dynamics. The preliminary round of interviews confirmed another assumption regarding the human, social, and economic impact of EO contamination, which affected civilians at personal and socio-economic levels, especially downstream of the supply chain or in areas of the food system that are normally not directly linked to EO-contaminated land.
At a personal level, it appeared that EO contamination conditioned people’s food habits and preferences. For example, lack of sufficient water and the related limitation on the types of crops that could be cultivated reportedly obstructed the fulfillment of people’s need or desire to procure locally-sourced food products, which was often a necessity due to the disruptions in the food system.22
The cultural importance of cultivating certain crops also surfaced in interviews, especially in those cases where farmers, shepherds, and mukhtars referred to long-established traditions passed down through generations.23 One interviewee, for example, stressed his family’s attachment to olive trees and his desire to access the trees and care for them.24
Several interviews conducted in Saida at the region’s vegetable and fruit wholesale market, as well as at other medium-sized markets, preliminarily confirmed that EO contamination has an impact on market dynamics and the food system. It became clear that local farmers were unable to meet the demand for certain
products sold at local markets, leading to heavy reliance on goods imported from other regions of the country or abroad. 25 Similarly, EO contamination appeared to cause cases of excessive surplus: either because the products’ low-quality did not meet market demand or because EO contamination forced farmers to overfocus on certain crops, such as olives, pears, and apples, to name just a few. In all cases, EO contamination had the final effect of producing economic losses and food waste.
Interestingly, EO contamination appeared to affect the market in some unexpected ways. During interviews, for example, a certain stigma attached to products coming from current or formerly contaminated areas surfaced. 26 Such stigma appeared to influence traders’ attitudes toward buying products from previously contaminated areas, instead preferring to purchase products from non-contaminated areas. Although not conclusive, this was certainly a preliminary finding that will be further explored in the next phase of our research.
More generally, almost all the interviewees mentioned that the compounded economic crisis, including the post-2019 hyperinflation, caused significant food system disruptions and affected their purchasing power.27 Interviewees appeared to react in different ways to the difficult situation. On the one hand, they explained how a decrease in income from agricultural activities pushed them to farm more land, re-purpose their own gardens for cultivations that would fulfil their families’ food sufficiency, or forced them to make hard decisions, including renouncing certain food products, such as meat.28 In other cases, some landowners reported how the compounded economic crisis significantly undermined their ability to act on new developments and initiatives involving cleared land, including new cultivations, use of certain technologies, and the expansion of cultivated zones. With tools, feed, fuel, other inputs (i.e., seeds, fertilizers, and equipment) and other items soaring in price, farming became more expensive, resulting in higher prices of products—unaffordable for final consumers—and in some instances, staff had to be let go.
Whilst the compounded economic crisis was not linked to EO contamination, interviews preliminarily confirmed that the direct and indirect effects of EO threats and HMA benefits on lives and livelihoods included coping mechanisms and strategies to face the compounded economic crisis.
CUMULATIVE BENEFITS AND LESSONS LEARNED
Although this was only the first part of a broader research project—the second phase of which is currently ongoing—a series of preliminary lessons learned about the contribution of HMA to food security could be drawn. By looking at the broader impact of EO contamination on the food system, it was possible to appreciate the broader set of cumulative benefits
of HMA activities—especially land release and EORE—on people’s food security. Furthermore, potential opportunities for synergy between HMA and food security action—such as ensuring that cleared land is effectively and efficiently used as soon as released—also emerged from the interviews.
ADAPTING TO CONTAMINATION AND SAFE ACCESS TO LAND
Having had to withstand long periods of land contamination, many interviewees displayed an understanding of EO threats and prioritized their safety over risking the utilization of contaminated land, thereby modifying how they produced and procured food. The marking and fencing carried out by LMAC and MAG reportedly increased the sense of safety among the population, 29 even in the case of cluster munition contamination and the possibility of finding unexploded submunitions above ground, including in trees. 30 In fact, some interviewees said that the work by LMAC and MAG spurred them or their acquaintances to move back to rural areas from the cities and urban areas where they had migrated. 31 Additionally, increased opportunities in rural areas appeared to allow families to support their family members living in urban areas. 32
More generally, almost all interviewees indicated safe access to land as one of the most important benefits of HMA. In particular, some persons appreciated the strategy of releasing land gradually, instead of at completion of the entire hazardous area, allowing farmers to cultivate portions of their land earlier or at least proceed with necessary preparatory work, 33 including monitoring and taking care of crops and trees. 34 Psychologically, safe access to land also had an important impact on several people, with the fear of death and serious injury decreasing as the possibility of assuming traditional family activities such as farming increased. 35
PRODUCTIVITY, EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC OPPORTUNITIES
Land released and safe passage provided by HMA activities clearly increased productivity and enabled economic opportunities. The interviewees confirmed that more available land led to an increase in food production and procurement. This was particularly relevant for those families who relied on the products of their land or livestock and for those who relied on employment in the sector, such as seasonal or daily workers. 36 Strengthening this reliance was especially important for those who used the land as a mechanism to cope with the compounded economic crisis that began in 2019. 37
As mentioned previously, creating conditions to increase employment in agriculture means creating opportunities for seasonal and daily workers, who can in turn strengthen their food security, as well as for other people who rely on the informal economy sector, including small entrepreneurs in the food processing phase. 38 Direct and indirect HMA outcomes also appeared to help farmers’ and other interviewees’ ability to meet market demands, as more cleared land equated to an increase in product quality as well as investment in technology which allowed for cultivation of new crops. For example—an irrigation system built in a previously contaminated valley allowed for the cultivation of vegetables, which had been imported from other areas of the country, 39 or from abroad.
In a situation of compounded crisis, HMA can clearly contribute to people’s ability to develop and implement coping mechanisms, such as the possibility of using their own land to produce food instead of purchasing it. However, the interviews highlighted other issues (such as the price of fuel and the lack of or high price of agricultural inputs, such as seeds, fertilizers, and equipment) prevented people from fully utilizing the opportunities created by HMA. Such missed opportunities could be addressed through coordination with food security and development actors to minimize those
issues, maximizing the potential of HMA outputs and better supporting landowners, food producers, and traders following land release. For instance, an interviewee whose land was previously contaminated was able to enjoy support in the form of agricultural inputs and water pumping mechanisms, developing his agricultural activities and benefitting his community as a whole with improved water access.40
The coordination between HMA and food security appears to bridge a series of challenges that emerged during the interviews. On the one hand, food security action, especially regarding agricultural activities, minimizes the use of trial-anderror approaches adopted by farmers who aim to re-enter the food system and use the released land in the absence of governmental support mechanisms. On the other hand, by enabling the use of resources and increasing productivity, HMA helps to provide the conditions for the development of farmers’, shepherds’, and other people’s resilience to economic crises caused by domestic or international events, such as conflicts or phenomena caused by climate change.
Interview at Saida Wholesale Market. Courtesy of MAG Lebanon.
CONCLUSION
This preliminary series of interviews and the related analysis illustrates critical observations regarding HMA’s contributions to food security. Firstly, in countries previously or currently experiencing EO contamination, EO threats and HMA affect the dynamics of a food system and the way in which food security is generated. In this sense, EO contamination and HMA interact with the food system and its components, including market dynamics, supply chain mechanisms, the environment, and in livelihoods.
Secondly, people’s views on what constitutes food security and how they achieve it should be central. While HMA focuses on the needs and views of people and communities, it is important that the sector be mindful of what they should ask communities, 41 especially within community liaison activities and non-technical surveys, and not overlook the members and stakeholders of the food system and those entities that support the development of food security, such as international and local nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society. This approach should also include often overlooked aspects, including the psychological benefits produced by HMA, such as the decrease of fear and insecurity, and reconnection with ancestral land and traditions, social cohesion, and inclusion of marginalized communities, including refugees and internally displaced persons.
Thirdly, HMA’s impact should be assessed in relation to the whole food system of a region or country, moving beyond the traditional and intuitive assumptions that can be easily observed when EORE is provided or land is released. As a sector, HMA needs to zoom out and assess both direct and indirect effects of contamination and the benefits of HMA itself. This preliminary phase identified impacts in settings that are not necessarily familiar to the HMA sector, such as wholesale markets, or among food processing actors. This is not only relevant to donors, NGOs, and HMA supporting states, but it should also be pertinent for other stakeholders, including different ministries or state agencies working in HMA and food security.
RICCARDO LABIANCO, Ph D
International Policy Manager
Mines Advisory Group
Riccardo Labianco, PhD, is Mines Advisory Group's (MAG) International Policy Manager and is based in the United Kingdom. He coordinates MAG’s engagement with international fora. He is a lawyer specializing in international law relevant to armed conflicts and post-conflict situations, and has worked on the link between disarmament and human rights. Labianco has a PhD in international law from SOAS, University of London, where he is also a post-doc research associate.
Finally, the set of preliminary findings confirmed that socio-economic dynamics and contextual changes occurring between the start of EO contamination and the release of land need to be taken into account when EO contamination and HMA impacts are assessed, as they in fact are a part of the very food system. In this sense, socio-economic dynamics, as well as other factors, such as climate and environmental changes occurring between contamination and land release need to be considered to improve the effectiveness of HMA contribution to food security. A more in-depth assessment of people’s and communities’ perceptions and experiences, and the consideration for the whole food system, should allow for a better reflection of changes that occurred while HMA was implemented and a better understanding of land use enablers and barriers, ensuring that HMA outcomes effectively contribute to people’s food security and, more generally, benefit their lives and livelihoods. The second phase of the research project is currently ongoing and is aimed at validating the first round of qualitative data through an interdisciplinary team with an interdisciplinary approach.
See endnotes page 66
MYRIAM RABBATH
Senior Community Liaison Advisor
Mines Advisory Group
Myriam Rabbath is MAG's Acting Senior Community Liaison Advisor, providing strategic and technical support on explosive ordnance risk education, non-technical survey, and other community liaison aspects to MAG programs globally. She has extensive field experience in mine action, as well as a multi-sectoral humanitarian and development background including shelter, WASH (water, sanitation, and hygiene), livelihoods, social cohesion, education, and women empowerment projects.
MAG deminers working among olive trees in Lebanon. Courtesy of Sean Sutton/MAG.
Local is Possible: An Analysis of HMA Localization Efforts and a Proposed Pathway for Future Projects
By Mark Wilkinson, PhD [ DanChurchAid ], Lisa Mueller-Dormann, Camilla Roberti [ Danish Refugee Council ], and Lene Rasmussen [ DanChurchAid ]
This paper aims to address the relevance of localization in humanitarian mine action (HMA), delineating principles, challenges, and advocating for increased attention. Drawing upon evidence from localization initiatives from DanChurchAid (DCA) and Danish Refugee Council (DRC) programming, we discuss tenets we believe should guide future project design and development. Contrary to the perception that localization offers limited value in mine action, this paper argues that applying it to HMA projects is both urgent and highly beneficial. As discussions on localization in the humanitarian sphere progress, so too should the implementation of localized approaches in HMA, driven by the evolving landscape and good practices within the sector. The goal for this article is to drive further discussion and research as well as encourage the implementation of localized mine action projects more widely.
INTRODUCTION
Whilst there has been some appetite for discussion on localization in mine action, this initiative has been more broadly applied across the wider humanitarian sector. Of particular note is the Grand Bargain, an agreement that was launched during the 2016 World Humanitarian Summit in Istanbul.1 This agreement recognized the ever-growing need for, and evolving nature of, humanitarian needs. It also acknowledged that a key element of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of humanitarian action was in developing mechanisms to “get more means into the hands of people in need.”2 Through successive reviews, by 2021, the Grand Bargain had sixty-seven signatories (including twenty-five member states, twenty-six nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), 3 and twelve UN agencies). Central to the concept of localization is increased support and space for local responders, acknowledging they are better placed to understand and address contextual challenges. But why is localization widely recognized in the humanitarian sector, yet so limited in its application in HMA?
Despite the good practices identified in the Oslo and Lausanne Action Plans, anecdotal evidence suggests the persistence of mine action direct delivery, especially clearance, by international stakeholders. This dominance is attributed to several factors: substantial investments
needed to enhance technical and leadership skills, lengthy knowledge transfer processes that often exceed project timelines, and safety concerns associated with capacity development. It is probably for these reasons that localization has often translated at the operational level into nationalization—in simple terms, the employment of local staff around an international technical leadership core. But nationalization not only prevents the recognition of the potentially significant advantages in terms of efficiency and effectiveness that localization can offer to mine action, but it also falls short of the genuine commitments to the localization agenda made within the Grand Bargain. Put simply, nationalization is not localization.
Lebanese national staff conduct clearance operations in Mt Lebanon area. All graphics courtesy of DCA and DRC.
LOCALIZATION AND THE HUMANITARIAN SECTOR
In 2016, when countries launched the Grand Bargain, a key aspiration was to be as local as possible and as international as necessary. Since then, localizing the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) has been a high priority for many countries and organizations. This includes advocacy and cooperation with municipalities, local and national governments, as well as the private sector, particularly under SDG 174 and 17.9.5 In 2023, the UN Secretary General identified localization as a “key approach […] towards greater inclusion and sustainability” to ensure improved SDGs performance in its 2023 report on SDGs.6
In the same vein, with over 150 organizations as members, the Core Humanitarian Standards (CHS) have set up a system of standards within humanitarian operations aimed at strengthening accountability to affected communities—local capacity building, as well as locally-led efforts, feature strongly to foster resilience and enhance coordination. DCA and DRC are the only HMA operators that are part of the CHS alliance, further underlining the challenges encountered as well as the different approaches to localization outside of the technical realm within the mine action sector: HMA practices in ground operations that go beyond national and international standards vary significantly and localization is no exception.
LOCALIZATION AS A STRATEGY
The mine action community underscored the importance of strengthening local and national capacities at the first review conference of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention in Nairobi in 2004. Attention continued to be focused on the Maputo Action Plan (2014) and the Oslo Action Plan (2019) until full recognition of the importance of national ownership and capacity building to ensure the effectiveness and sustainability of cooperation and assistance and to reduce reliance on external expertise was given to the Lausanne Action Plan (2021). Nonetheless, the sector has not yet agreed on an overarching strategy beyond the consensus that national ownership and capacity are key for sustainable mine action efforts.
The mine action sector has only recently gone beyond its focus in clearance of contaminated square meters, and predominantly quantitative indicators, toward enhanced efforts to measure impact and outcomes. In this process, localization endeavors have taken different shapes. However, the increasingly constrained funding environment, as well as an ongoing push toward localization, too often translated into the nationalization of international positions and national/international staff ratios. This conflation risks underselling localization, neglecting the
A Libyan deminer unpacks ordnance after transport.
additional resources that are needed to implement trainings, and failing to provide any additional information regarding the sustainability of national actors in the long run. Further, if the aim of localization is recognizing the better contextual knowledge of local actors and fostering their independence, nationalizing international nongovernmental organizations' (INGO) staff won’t contribute to the overall localization agenda but rather slow it down, setting up potentially less viable/sustainable structures.
DRC and DCA aim at putting conflict and explosive ordnance (EO)-affected communities at the center of their activities, seeking cooperation with local actors to ensure solutions and responses meet actual needs and capabilities of local communities. By 2030, DRC’s vision is one where it systematically supports, facilitates, and strengthens local actors in their lead role in crisis response and in the advancement of durable solutions for people affected by conflict and displacement. DCA, as one of the founding organizations of Charter for Change and signatory to the Grand Bargain, has an equally strong commitment to the localization agenda enshrined within its strategy and demonstrated across the range of humanitarian activities it is delivering.
FUNDING AND SUSTAINABILITY
Obtaining dedicated funding for mine action projects which seek to pursue a localization agenda has proven extremely challenging. Whilst some donors have supported these activities—the United Nations Mine Action Standards’ (UNMAS) Partnership Project in Iraq being one important example—the construction of pathways to provide money directly to the local actor had, until very recently, been elusive. A central tenet of localization must be the financial independence of the local partner, and a key element of that is the provision of overheads directly to them. A major obstacle here is the procurement rules of many donors which often define a structural relationship between the donor and the international partner leading the localization project. This represents a bilateral relationship that provides little automatic right for the local partner to influence this power balance, nor to interface directly with project donors. It is difficult to see how a project delivery methodology that is anchored within restrictive procurement rules that controls funding transfer so tightly can be reconciled with a true localization agenda.
Funding agreements which place an international organization as the implementer and signatory to a donor agreement might also be seen as excluding the national partner from important donor interactions. Localized mine
DRC-DDG teams organizing re-training and practice for LPO staff in Tripoli, Libya, 2023.
action projects must develop mechanisms to allow the INGO to facilitate international networks that give true visibility and means of engagement to the local partner. This change would be an important step in driving the necessary shift in the established norms for funding mine action to ensure localization stands a real chance of success. To give the local partner a seat at the table would be invaluable in terms of visibility, advocacy, relationship building, and ultimately, credibility and trust.
Sustainability is another element of localization that closely relates to funding. The realities of many mine action project delivery environments can place extreme pressures on international actors and local partners. Central to this issue is that the current system of funding for mine action projects often sees the donor providing funds for operational implementation based upon unpredictable available funding levels year on year. This makes it difficult for all parties to make true, long-term commitments to localization projects. Commitments to
To give the local partner a seat at the table would be invaluable in terms of visibility, advocacy, relationship building, and ultimately, credibility and trust.
National staff conduct clearance operations in Iraq.
funding in the longer term are critical to build confidence and commitment to the true localization of mine action. They are also vital to provide the job security needed by local mine action staff to truly commit, with confidence, to working for local mine action actors on anything other than an ad hoc and short-term basis. Whilst localization offers significant benefits, those benefits do not come for free. Investment in localization projects by donors can pay dividends in the longer term but there must be true commitment to funding for the timescales necessary for capacity development activities to transition to true localized capacities.
The National Mine Action Authorities (NMAAs) and national authorities also have clear responsibilities in the localization agenda—this goes far beyond facilitating an
KEY COMPONENTS OF LOCALIZATION
A conflict-sensitive, inclusive, principled, and rights-based approach should underpin localization efforts in the mine action realm. Conflict sensitivity goes beyond the Do No Harm approach and provides actors the necessary framework and tools to maximize positive impacts on conflict by strengthening local capacities for peace, building on connectors that bring communities together, and reducing the divisions and sources of tensions that can lead to conflict.
Acknowledging power imbalances, particularly in finance and material positions, and the consequent power dynamics is crucial in interactions with national and local actors working in mine action. Local counterparts
environment where local actors can be seen playing a role in operational implementation. In the first instance, the NMAA must commit via its own strategic plans to recognizing the role of local actors and playing its role in helping to secure any national funding for local mine action actors. Even a commitment to managing and developing the prioritization of mine action activities and subsequent land release aligned with the activities of local mine action actors would do much to show the international audience just how seriously localization is taken and how well it can work within specific countries. Whilst for some NMAA this may require considerable attention, support, and influence, it is key in shaping the enabling environment for future localization projects.
are integral to society, and partnerships with INGOs may exacerbate pre-existing imbalances. Neither party, nor the interaction between them is neutral, and conflict analysis should therefore be the starting point, combined with mutual assessment of our mandates and alignment of our strategic objectives, of any localization efforts. Tensions can arise over financial control, miscommunication, legitimacy, and project design. It is likely that these power imbalances may encourage hesitation in donors considering taking localized approaches to demining. Without a clear understanding of these power imbalances, particularly in places experiencing ongoing conflict, donor funding committed to localization may therefore continue to be difficult to secure. Open communication, feedback loops, mutually agreed upon red lines, and avoidance of
exacerbating conflicts in localized mine action projects may be key elements of upholding minimum standards, and encourage donors to overcome possible hesitations in supporting them.
Similarly, the importance of humanitarian principles cannot be over-emphasized. Any partnership should be assessed and pursued only if it is in the best interest of EO-affected populations and not in contradiction with the humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality, humanity, and independence. HMA, and localization efforts within it, must be rights-based, protectionoriented, and sensitive to age, gender, and other diversity factors such as ethnicity, religion, or displacement status.
National staff conduct clearance operations in Iraq.
FRAMEWORKS FOR LOCALIZATION
With the focus often on quantity over quality in HMA, the documentation of good practices, training, and outcomes measurement related to localization has been sparse, and at best, taken place only at an internal organizational level. DRC and DCA teams have adopted different partnership modalities and approaches across countries and regions choosing options depending on their specific conflict/postconflict context, strategic alignments with partners, and programmatic preferences. Despite some variations, there is a shared understanding that partnerships within HMA should revolve around capacity enhancement (technical, programmatic, support, and administrative skills); equitable relationships; visibility; funding; as well as advocacy and external engagement. What is most effective depends on the program, context, partners’ preferences, existing capacities, and experiences, and should be based on a needs assessment
to understand what capacity building is needed, when, why, and for whom.
HMA quality management systems and technical qualifications are areas that deserve significant attention when it comes to partnerships. A frank discussion around risks and safety is urgently needed to transfer risks to local partners in a logical, productive, and sound manner. In our experience, offering on-site and international training opportunities is an essential step early on in localization projects that should go hand in hand with a clear split of responsibilities and accountabilities, standardized information management systems, and medical training. Programmatic and administrative/management training are often neglected and thus under-budgeted. Nonetheless, administrative and programmatic capacities are a core block of the localization architecture, and without them, the structure is not sustainable.
DCA and DRC identified challenges from an analysis of their experiences in localization projects that encompass various aspects:
• Prioritizing safety over efficiency is vital to prevent unacceptable risk transfer to local partners. Balancing efficiency, safety, and localization requires frank discussions on risk-taking and management, focusing on standards like International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) and National Mine Action Standards, as well as a duty of care toward partners.
• Localization efforts can face challenges due to the lack of a formalized supporting financial environment. Overheads are a key element to sustain organizational structures, yet the split of overhead costs poses dilemmas that require clarity to avoid skepticism from INGOs if perceived too low, or donor rejection if perceived too high.
• Partnering with government bodies or local actors affiliated with a political party, or connected to a party to the conflict, may damage an organization’s neutrality and lead to reputational risks, loss of access, and safety risks for deployed staff. Mitigating risks involves thorough conflict analysis and a sensitive approach to conflict, gender, and diversity throughout project implementation, with INGOs retaining the option to refrain from working with local actors if principled action is endangered.
• Limited time can hinder partnership building and localization efforts, leading to rushed agreements or inadequate capacity building. Addressing these challenges requires dedicated staff with appropriate skills, mindsets, and tools, along with clear practical guidance and training opportunities, donors’ flexibility, and multi-year funding.
• Existing monitoring and evaluation indicators are not good enough. Establishing mutually-agreed qualitative and quantitative indicators, comprehensive and tailored monitoring, evaluation, accountability, and learning (MEAL) frameworks, at the partnership's onset are essential to effectively measure joint results and agree on joint measurement for outcomes.
National staff conduct clearance operations in Iraq.
OFFERING A NEW CONSTRUCT:
IDENTIFYING THE KEY INGREDIENTS OF A VIABLE LOCALIZED MODEL FOR HMA
In Iraq, DCA worked for three years in the delivery of a capacity development and localization project funded by UNMAS. This project forged a partnership between DCA and Health and Social Care Organization (IHSCO), a relatively new Iraqi national NGO, with the intention of supporting the localization and development of IHSCO as an Iraqi organization that could effectively engage in HMA clearance activities as an independent actor. This project saw DCA and IHSCO work toward the systematic development of organizational capacities as the same time as IHSCO operational standard operating procedures were created and implemented. IHSCO ultimately achieved operational accreditation early in year two of the project
In Afghanistan, the DRC supported the Mine Action Programme of Afghanistan (MAPA) implementing partners (IPs) and provided training that included Gender Equality Social Inclusion, MEAL, and livelihoods and protection assessment. In addition, DRC organized advocacy and resource mobilization training and capacity-strengthening activities for MAPA implementing partners in HMA leadership, as well as sending candidates on the explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) Level 2/3 course in Lebanon in 2024. In addition to training open to all MAPA IPs, DRC and the Mine Clearance Planning Agency (MCPA)
In Libya , DRC committed to cooperate with a Libyan organization to build HMA capacities from scratch. After the selection of the partner, including undergoing vetting and due diligence procedures, DRC and Libyan Peace Organization (LPO) agreed on a series of trainings to further the localization plan. These included Information Management System for Mine Action (IMSMA) Core, basic life support (BLS), safety, cybersecurity, EOD refreshers, casualty evacuation (CASEVAC), and nontechnical survey (NTS) training held in Libya and Tunisia and organized by DRC, as well as other training delivered by external partners such as those on human resources (HR), finance management, post-clearance monitoring, and governance delivered by the Libya INGO Forum; age, gender, and diversity training delivered by Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining in Tunis; and the IMAS EOD Level 1 & 2 training delivered in Lebanon by the Regional School for Humanitarian Demining in Lebanon. At the time of writing, LPO explosive
and became authorized by the NMAA (Iraqi Directorate of Mine Action) to deliver a range of operational activities. Whilst the project provided ample opportunity for learning and reflection—particularly on the relationship between donors and the international and national partner in localization projects—it also provided considerable success. In its fourth year, IHSCO is now directly funded by UNMAS to continue its mine action activities in Iraq.
Key ingredients: project planning, effective communication and relationships, strong technical leadership when required, careful risk management, and effective MEAL indicators.
engaged in a series of advocacy activities to ensure technical and financial support is guaranteed for mine action in Afghanistan, a country increasingly neglected due to political sensitivities. DRC and MCPA co-published the study “Localization in Humanitarian Mine Action in Afghanistan.”7 DRC and MCPA co-designed and cooperated on these efforts, ensuring active participation and visibility of both parties.
Key ingredients: partners mapping, vetting, due diligence, open communication, joint design of project and activities, joint planning and implementation, and focal point.
ordnance risk education (EORE) teams are deployed and tasked to deliver EORE sessions in Misurata, Tawergha, and Zletin. The LPO and DRC EOD teams are working together to conduct EOD training under the DRC EOD Task Orders in Tripoli and Tawergha. DRC will continue to work with LPO and deliver training in resource mobilization and proposal writing, as well as supporting functions such as equipment and logistics management. In only three years, DRC and LPO moved from exploratory talks to an established partnership through which LPO obtained accreditation to conduct NTS, EORE, and EOD, with teams deployed together or autonomously. Capacity strengthening, funds transfers, secondments, and continuous communication, combined with the support of LIBMAC, were instrumental.
Key ingredients: partners mapping, vetting, due diligence, capacity enhancing and training on technical, programmatic, and administrative skills, joint deployment for EORE and EOD, and focal point.
In Lebanon, DCA partnered with the Lebanese national organization Lebanese Association for Mine and Natural Disaster Action to develop their capabilities as an HMA NGO. Over a period of several years, DCA established a clear baseline of capabilities and went on to develop a comprehensive capacity development plan that focused on operational HMA activities as well as broader organizational-related functions, such as leadership and management. The capacity development
Whilst each of these examples represents a stand-alone localization project within HMA, both DCA and DRC have captured considerable learning from them. Whilst some of this is contained within internal review documentation, others have already been published. 8 The research conducted for this paper aims to further contribute to the body of knowledge relating to localization within HMA via the development of a proposed pathway that can be used as a guide in the development of future localization projects. This pathway draws key findings from the analysis of DCA and DRC localization activities, presenting a model that is intended to be of use in the design and development of future localized HMA projects.
The proposed pathway is built around three tenets: key principles, enabling factors, and key activities. These three tenets might be considered to reflect the necessary project development activities at the inception phase (the key
element of this project resulted in the successful deployment of multiple HMA teams engaged in EORE and clearance activities—indeed, technical capacity development was probably one of the biggest achievements of this project.
Key ingredients: partner mapping, baseline analysis, capacity development planning, effective communications between partners, and strong technical capacity.
National staff conduct clearance operations in Libya.
principles), the development phase (the enabling factors), and the delivery phase (the key activities) of HMA projects. Whilst specific risks might be identified at each phase of project design, implementation, and delivery, analysis of the projects delivered thus far by DCA and DRC suggests that a number of specific barriers might be seen to have significant impacts—these are represented here as errors , i.e., activities that if omitted or done improperly, might have significant effect on the overall project outcome
Key Principles
• Conflict-sensitive approach
• Trilateral stakeholder relationship and commitment (donor, international partner & national organization)
• Humanitarian principles oriented
• Anchored in core humanitarian
• Standards, right-based approach
• Independent national organization
• Gender / diversity
• Environmentally sensitive
• Sustainability
A Proposed Pathway for the Development of Localized HMA Projects
Enabling Factors
• Strategy
• Legitimacy
• Active cooperation to achieve localization
• NMAA buy in / commitment
• Secure multi-year funding
• Access to donor networks
• Advocacy
Barriers Tenets Considerations
Key Activities
• Establish timeline for assumption of national ownership
• Joint planning / design / implementation
• Through needs assessment
• Develop comprehensive plan
• Integrate all elements of capacity building (technical / programmatic / support & administrative)
Figure 1: A Proposed Pathway for the Development of Localized HMA Projects.
It is important to note that this model has been developed in an attempt to suggest at least the basics of a comprehensive framework to support future localization project development. It is not intended as a complete instruction workflow, merely as a model reflecting experiential learning from previous DCA and DRC projects.
CONCLUSIONS
There is clearly a strong case to be made to support the implementation of localization within HMA activities. Strong commitments have already been made to the localization agenda across broader humanitarian activities and the time is right for the HMA community to both recognize the opportunities that localized responses
1. Distinction Between Nationalization and Localization: Clarify that nationalization of workforces does not equate to localization.
2. Design and Analysis: Use conflict-sensitivity analysis to inform the initial design of localized HMA projects.
3. Funding Regulations: Advocate for donor procurement regulations that enable direct fund allocation to national actors.
THE WAY FORWARD
Promoting the commitments made to the Grand Bargain agenda, DCA and DRC believe that localization and national ownership are vital to the effective and efficient delivery of future HMA activities and that localization efforts must
STATES / DONORS
offer and begin to address the challenges to effective localization that must be addressed. It is evident that there are a number of clear messages that should underpin ongoing discussion and action in furthering the localized HMA agenda:
4. Capacity Building as Investment: Treat capacitybuilding activities as a long-term investment essential for successful localization, despite their impact on initial work outputs.
5. Risk Management in Localization: Emphasize the importance of risk management, including effective risk identification, ownership, and transfer, as a vital component of effective localization.
be further strengthened. To this effect, we call on states, donors, and organizations with HMA commitments to promote localization, equitable partnerships, and inclusion within the mine action sector by the following means:
• Enhance donor coordination and alignment on localization commitments across the sector via harmonized MEAL frameworks, policies, and funding modalities to ensure overhead coverage and training, as well as promote clarity and shared accountability on risk sharing.
STATES / DONORS
(continued)
• Encourage the exchange of good practices among states and implementing partners.
• Incentivize the establishment of long-term and strategic partnerships via the provision of multi-year and flexible funding via humanitarian and development channels.
INGOs
• Develop organization-wide localization strategies and participate in joint learnings and exchanges of good practices.
• Commit to equitable partnerships and transfer a fair share of their project budgets to national partners, ensuring clarity and shared accountability on risk sharing, as well as committing to work on solid quality management structures.
NATIONAL ACTORS
• Demand a seat at the HMA decision making fora.
• Join forces to develop and demand for a fair share of funding, including overhead and training budgets.
NATIONAL MINE ACTION AUTHORITIES
• Facilitate an enabling environment for localization by recognizing the role of local actors in strategic plans and helping to secure any national funding for local mine action actors.
MARK WILKINSON, PHD
Chief Technical Advisor
DanChurchAid
Mark Wilkinson, Ph D, has over twenty years of professional experience in the military and humanitarian mine action (HMA). As a former British Army Ammunition Technical Officer, he worked as a high threat improvised explosive device disposal (IEDD) operator in multiple operational environments before transitioning to HMA. In his previous post as the Chief of Operations for United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS) in Iraq, he gained extensive experience in developing localization projects for HMA. Dr. Wilkinson has an active research agenda focused around IED clearance in HMA environments as well as localization in HMA.
LISA MUELLER-DORMANN
Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Coordinator
Danish Refugee Council
Lisa Mueller-Dor mann manages the DRC's advocacy on mine action and peacebuilding in Geneva and also serves as the Global Mine Action Area of Responsibility Co-Coordinator as part of the Global Protection Cluster. She has worked on disarmament, peacebuilding, and security sector reform at field- and headquarter-level for the past six years, managing project implementation in South Sudan for DRC and Mines Advisory Group (MAG), as well as for the German Federal Foreign Office in Berlin and the German Development Agency (GIZ) in Addis Ababa. Mueller-Dormann holds a dual master’s degree in international relations and human rights from Sciences Po in Paris and the School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Columbia University.
• Establish a standing agenda item at the Mine Action Support Group meetings to discuss localization and national ownership.
• Facilitate the participation and exposure of national staff and national partners at international fora for HMA.
• Engage in active consultations with other NGOs to identify and map training and capacity building needs.
• Agree on joint MEAL frameworks to evidence the causal linkage between capacity building, localization, and increased national ownership.
• Coordinate with INGOs and UN agencies to participate in joint advocacy efforts for localization in mine action vis a vis donors and other international stakeholders.
• Play an active role in supporting localized mine action projects.
See endnotes page 67
CAMILLA ROBERTI
Global Humanitarian Disarmament and Peacebuilding Advisor
Danish Refugee Council
Camilla Roberti advises, coordinates, and works on policy, evidence, and learning with a focus on localization and integrated approaches. Prior to her work with DRC, Roberti worked with the Italian Agency for Development Cooperation in Tunisia and the oPt, and DG NEAR and Humanity & Inclusion in Brussels. Through her professional experience, she gained field and headquarter experience in working with local civil society on governance and migration as well as disarmament, peacebuilding, and protection of civilians.
LENE RASMUSSEN
Team Leader and Global Senior Mine Action Program Advisor
DanChurchAid
Lene Rasmussen leads, advises, coordinates, and supports country programs at DCA with resource mobilization, strategy, program development, and management with a focus on humanitarian interventions within a nexus approach. Rasmussen’s experience and expertise has been gained through multiple years of international service on overseas missions in MENA and Central Asia in roles as diverse as regional manager, program manager, grants and finance manager, and logistic manager with responsibilities covering strategic program development and management, fundraising and representation within the HMA and development aid spheres, as well as in monitoring and evaluation and capacity building of local partners, stakeholders, and staff.
ANGOLA HIDDEN DANGER
By Sean Sutton
INTRODUCTION
Lucala-2 is a small village in northern Angola with 750 residents, situated by a bridge crossing the Lucala River. This bridge gained strategic importance during the Angolan Civil War (1975–2002) as a critical crossing point. Throughout the war, minefields were tactfully laid at all four corners of the bridge, illustrating the extensive use of landmines that has continued to impact Angola. These mines remain a harrowing legacy, contributing to ongoing casualties and significantly hindering development efforts long after the war's conclusion. The community explained how they have been living in fear since the war ended in 2002.
The area's strategic importance during the war was due to the main road from Luanda heading east and northeast, leading to Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte, regions known for their key diamond mines, as well as the hydroelectric plants in Malanje. The bridge, crucial for access and control, was mined and became a focal point of conflict.
A woman heads to the river to collect water for cooking. It is a beautiful area with fertile soil and plenty of water all year round. All images courtesy of Sean Sutton/NPA.
Additionally, the Lucala river, flowing into the Kwanza river, added to the area's significance.
There were seven minefields around this area, forming a defensive layer about 10 kilometers deep. Landmines were integral to defenses and were widely and extensively used. Different militaries were here; in the 1980s Cuban forces were present alongside People’s Armed Forces of Liberation of Angola (FAPLA), later succeeded by Angola Armed Forces (FAA). National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA),1 a key former political and military organization during the Angolan Civil War, took the bridge and most of the province after heavy fighting in 1992. They held it for two years. UNITA was supported by foreign allies and opposed the MPLA-led government, playing a significant role in the conflict until it transformed into a political party after the war ended in 2002.
HIDDEN DANGERS
These images capture the daily life in Lucala-2 during November and December 2023, just as the air begins to cool in the evening. The village is situated just a couple hundred meters from the minefield. Children play near an old tank in the evening light. Norwegian People's Aid (NPA) teams cleared hundreds of explosive munitions from one of the abandoned tanks in the village.
The NPA team found three more landmines during clearance operations in this area. Petroff was visibly moved by the experience as he saw the land being safely used by Eva and her friends. As a Non-Technical Survey (NTS) officer, Petroff is one of NPA Angola’s key members of staff. Before, I lived and worked in Germany, making spare parts for trucks. I came back to Angola in 1991 and worked with MSF in a feeding center in Malanje. It was a very difficult situation during the war, many people were needing help. I started working with NPA in June 1996 as a deminer at first and was promoted to section leader after nine months. Then I became deputy platoon commander and soon after platoon commander, managing forty deminers as NPA’s capacity expanded. After two years I was sent on an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) course and then worked as an EOD officer for two years. I really enjoyed my work as an EOD officer as I was always working closely with the community.
Cuban troops and FAA troops were stationed here and there was a lot of fighting. Then UNITA took over. Soldiers were all around this area and they put landmines around their places. During the first peace agreement in 1991, my father and my brother were both killed. My father took a path to go fishing early in the morning at 9 am and set off a mine and my brother went to help him and he also set off a mine. They were blown apart…
~Village Soba Domingos Francisco Domingos.
Pedro Ngunza (Petroff), NPA NonTechnical Survey officer, standing at the spot where Eva (in the background) had previously found and moved landmines.
Maria Francisco, Margarida Miguel, and Eva Antonio are old friends who have grown up together. The women discussed their village and their farm and described how their families had to flee from fighting when they were children during the war, “This is where my father and his father are from,” explained Margarida. “It is a beautiful place with good soil and plentiful water from the river. When I was seven years old, I fled from here with my family because of the fighting that happened … we fled to Dondo (a major town in the region) 54 kilometers south of here.”
Maria interjected, “We came back five years later when I was twelve when the fighting finished. I remember coming back, well, everything was destroyed, all the houses had been burnt. It took a long time to rebuild. We have been living with the consequences of the war ever since, actually.”
Maria Francisco, Margarida Miguel, and Eva Antonio.
Maria holding Lizundra, one of her daughter’s twins.
When I stood on a mine, I thought my life was over.
~Landmine survivor Carlos Joao Pedro, 54
Then ten years later my wife passed away and life was even more difficult. I had to sustain the children in this condition. I have spent my life farming to survive. I get some support from the government because when I lost my leg on 4 October 1994, I was a soldier. I was on a probing mission against UNITA, and we were going up a riverbank when it happened. I have never had a prosthesis, no one has ever offered to help me get one. I would like to try one, but I have to go over uneven surfaces, up and
down slopes and across rivers to get to my farm—so my prosthetic leg wouldn’t be of much use! I walk two and a half kilometers each way to my farm every day. Sometimes I carry bananas, mangoes, or cassava back as well. I even walk from N’dalatando, which is a long way (nine and a half hours). The kids go to school Monday to Friday but help me on the farm at the weekends. We have always known that the area behind the house is mined because it was a military area. All military areas are mined. The first big fight
here was on 25 March 1990. It went on for two years, UNITA controlled the area for that long and we were all stuck here, no one could leave the area. The government forces retook the area in 1993. We need people to clear the minefields, I am so happy NPA is here. I won’t have to worry about the children, and I can let them play and go up and collect mushrooms. Lots will change when we know it is safe. We always feared that area, anyone that went there was taking a big risk.
Children play close to the minefield.
EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE RISK EDUCATION
Albertina delivers a risk education session with students in Lucala-2 primary school.
In December 2022, 116,265 square meters was cleared, resulting in the destruction of 115 antipersonnel mines and 440 items of explosive ordnance. Following this clearance, NPA staff Albertina Quinhama and Pedro Ngunza (known as Petroff) are now engaging with villagers to conduct an impact assessment on the land that has been made safe.
At Horacio Felix Machado's school, where he is acting school director, education perseveres amidst danger. Serving 510 students aged five to thirty, the institution relies on the dedication of four permanent and five volunteer teachers to navigate this precarious proximity to such a threat.
We have many students, but few teachers. I am the acting director and have to teach classes as well; that’s not normal. We have students from grade 1 to grade 6. We have one kindergarten class with fifty children. There have been accidents here and we are afraid of the dangerous areas. People have parcels of land here and many people have parcels of contaminated land that they can’t use. Some areas we know are mined, others are suspected. Children look around for scrap metal and have gone into the dangerous area. They have come back home with explosive items which is incredibly dangerous. My son was involved in this. I was so worried when I caught him, I even shouted at him. He found a grenade and brought it home.
The students are asked if they know where the nearest minefield is. It is only 100 meters away from the school.
Albertina and NPA staff.
~Horatio Felix Machado, acting school director
Albertina also delivers an explosive ordnance risk education session to pupils at Tunda Sanji primary school.
George raises the radio so that the school children can hear the count down for one of the two demolitions. The first demolition destroyed an unexploded mortar bomb. The students shrieked after the explosion. The second demolition was much closer, and the children could see the explosion—they screamed and then they all pointed excitedly. It was a good lesson!
DEMINING EFFORTS
In December 2023, NPA discovered a high concentration of mines in the Tuna Sanji minefield. They were laid in a row, 1 meter apart and consisted mostly of PPM2s and some GYATA64s placed on top of two rocketpropelled grenades (RPGs). The mines were laid to protect the military position situated on top of the hill and have been reinforced like this to create a bigger explosion, to kill as many as possible. There is a great 360-degree view of the area and it was clearly very strategic. It was used as a position by the Portuguese from the 1950s onward and was fought over in the war. There are trench lines all the way round as well, 30–40 meters before the mine row. UNITA wanted the area in part because it is a good coffee growing area and coffee was very lucrative.
Senior field supervisor, Francisco Cupindama Gregorio, carefully places a specially designed fork to pull the uncovered mine and ordnance from a safe distance. This is to ensure that there are no surprises, to ensure there are no booby traps.
We are finding craters where explosions have occurred. We are told that the mines stopped a number of UNITA attacks, but they did manage to take the position and hold it for a few years. NPA started work here on 9 September 2023, and more than 4,000 m 2 have been cleared so far. It is a challenging task as the mines are so close together. The deminers need to be monitored constantly as it is dangerous. The vegetation is thick here, it is jungle. The angle is steep, and it is wet and slipp[er]y. The community will benefit and want to use the area for housing and agriculture.
The detonator of a former East German PPM2 landmine is carefully removed. The mine is disarmed and placed next to other mines that have been made safe.
National Mine Action Agency, also known as Agência Nacional de Acção Contra Minas, staff visit the minefield and undertake quality assurance activities.
It is important that there is national capacity to manage and coordinate the activities of the mine action sector in Angola. NPA supports Agência Nacional de Acção Contra Minas (ANAM) in developing its capacity to ensure it has the skills and knowledge to regulate, manage, and coordinate mine action activities more effectively with minimal outside technical support. 2 Through capacity development, NPA aims to increase national ownership and help mine-affected states ensure an efficient and effective mine action program executed according to established National Mine Action Standards and International Mine Action Standards. Angola is a state party to the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, which, together with the Oslo Action Plan, calls on states to demonstrate high levels of national ownership and calls for measurable actions that translate to tangible results.
Staff transport unfired rocket-propelled grenades to
for transporting to the demolition site. It’s
NPA vehicles
demolition day.
NPA technicians prepare to safely demolish all the explosive items found during this work period. Two pits for the demolition were prepared the day before. All the items were transported in sand boxes from the minefield in vehicles. The items were carefully placed in the pits and the explosive charges were prepared. Technicians with radios were dispersed all around the area to establish a security cordon to ensure no one was in the danger area.
After the security cordon was checked over the radios, the demolitions were fired simultaneously.
Village leaders and local authority representatives who came to see the demolition pose next to the large hole left by the explosion.
Thirty-seven-year-old Albertina Quinhama assists with an impact assessment for a recently handed-over minefield cleared by NPA teams. She is questioning villagers about the use of the now-safe land.
TOGETHER TOWARD TOMORROW
I have been working with NPA since 2011. For the first five years I worked as a deminer. It was good work. I was scared a bit at the beginning. I remember finding my first mine. Now that really was scary, even though I was trained properly, it was still scary. I called out after I had uncovered it in the ground. The supervisor came and told me it was an MAI-75. This is a common mine in Angola and has killed and maimed so many people in my country. My supervisor disarmed the mine and then helped calm me down. Then I picked up my detector and went back to work, checking the ground little by little, using my trowel to check for landmines when I get a signal. I felt really happy. That mine I found could have saved a life, it guaranteed safety in that place. Very satisfying.
Demining in progress. This area in Tunda Sanji was determined as a dangerous area back in 2002 after NTS at the time. The suspected area was said to be over 1 million m2. When we came here to look at the site, we investigated and did NTS again. Thanks to local information, NPA was able to cancel a lot of the area as it was already being used. The dangerous area was reduced to 57,000 m2 , a huge difference.
Working the land in Lucala-2. This used to be a minefield.
NPA’s work in Angola is funded by the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement in the US State Department's Bureau of Political-Military Affairs; Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Government of Japan; and Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See endnotes page 67
SEAN SUTTON
Independent Documentary Photographer
Sean Sutton is an independent documentary photographer, storyteller, and communications professional, working with international nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and media. His imagery has been published across major media channels worldwide. Along with testimony-based narratives, this has formed the visual and informational content required to communicate the impact and consequences of armed conflict, including human rights, environmental, and developmental issues. The aims are to meet public, institutional donor and policy objectives, to fight injustice, raise funds, and influence change. He has built a strong and active network of media contacts and is represented by Panos Pictures. In order to maximize impact, he combines NGO collaborations with media coverage. Focusing on amplifying the voice of marginalized communities, profiling issues, crisis situations, highlighting injustice, and demonstrating how together we can change things for the better. His work has informed and provided the evidence for advocacy campaigns and actions and his core personal and professional ambition is to influence, through sincere and impactful multimedia journalism. NPA and ANAM female staff pose for a photo.
ENDNOTES
Navigating the Unintended Consequences of Language, Imagery, and Meaning Has Never Been More Difficult or More Important by Brown [ from page 5 ]
1. The Female Lens, Mines Advisory Group, https://www.maginternational.org/thefemalelens/
What Can Artificial Intelligence Offer Humanitarian Mine Action? by Gasser [ from page 13 ]
1. "These researchers are using drones and machine learning to detect land mines--and save lives," Scientific American, September 7, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/bdzewc9s
2. “Artificial Intelligence (AI): Computer software that mimics aspects of human intelligence,” NewScientist , https://tinyurl.com/mrxsujrm
3. Gold, Edem. “The History of Artificial Intelligence from the 1950s to Today,” freeCodeCamp, April 10, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/mrx5am9n
5. Perrigo, Billy. “Exclusive: OpenAI Used Kenyan Workers on Less Than $2 Per Hour to Make ChatGPT Less Toxic,” Time, January 18, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/4ss44tzd
6. Hern, Alex. “TechScape: How cheap, outsourced labour in Africa is shaping AI English,” The Guardian, April 16, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/5n6zm9yp
7. A useful introduction to how AI can be used in learning and behavior change: Rob Hubbard, “LH #95: The Human Moment with Rob Hubbard,” in The Learning Hack podcast, February 26, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/46rmxbne
8. A critical analysis of AI in learning: Egle Vinauskaite, “LH #92: AI: The Product and the Problem with Egle Vinauskaite,” in The Learning Hack podcast, January 15, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/45jjc4ze
9. Hallucination Leaderboard on GitHub available at: https://tinyurl.com/yt57twxh .
10. For many examples, see Kahneman's 2011 book "Thinking, Fast and Slow.”
11. Liang, Weixin, Girmaw Abebe Tadesse, Daniel Ho, L. Fei-Fei, Matei Zaharia, Ce Zhang, and James Zou. “Advances, challenges and opportunities in creating data for trustworthy AI,” Nature Machine Intelligence 4, 669–677 (2022), https://tinyurl.com/3kz9vzhp.
12. Elad, Barry. “Important ChatGPT-4 Statistics Comprehensive Facts and Data for Upcoming Years,” EnterpriseAppsToday, March 29, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/urhb9252
Preventing Arms Diversion in Wartime Ukraine: A Brief Overview by Kryzhanivska [ from page 18 ]
1. Stohl, Rachel, and Elias Yousif. “The Risks of US Military Assistance to Ukraine,” The Stimson Center, July 13, 2023, https://shorturl.at/crtB8 .
2. Picard, Michael, Olena Shumska, and Aaron Karp. “The Global Small Arms Trade and Diversions at Transfer,” in Gun Trafficking and Violence: From the Global Network to the Local Security Challenge, 19–49, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/2w5894jt .
3. Brown, Steve. “Opinion: What Will Happen to the Weapons Provided to Ukraine When Russia Is Defeated?” Kyiv Post , April 10, 2023, https://www.kyivpost.com/opinion/15606
4. Holtom, Paul. “Ukrainian Exports of Small Arms and Light Weapons, 2004–2007,” SIPRI, October 2008, https://shorturl.at/uxFN0 .
5. “Our Work in Ukraine,” Transparency International, 2023, https://www.transparency.org/en/countries/ukraine
6. Minakov, Mykhailo. “Fighting Corruption in Wartime Ukraine,” Wilson Center, February 13, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/2yadr4d7
7. “Briefing to the United Nations Security Council Threats to International Peace and Security,” Office for Disarmament Affairs, statement by Mr. Adedeji Ebo, January 22, 2024, https://shorturl.at/kmsV8
8. Foy, Henry, Sam Fleming, and Roman Olearchyk. “Nato and EU Sound Alarm Over Risk of Ukraine Weapons Smuggling,” Financial Times , July 12 2022, https://tinyurl.com/2hv84tnk
9. “Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy Utvoryla Tymchasovu Spetsialnu Komisiiu Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z Pytan Monitorynhu Otrymannia i Vykorystannia Mizhnarodnoi Materialno-Tekhnichnoi Dopomohy Pid Chas Voiennoho Stanu,” Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, July 2022, https://www.rada.gov.ua/news/razom/225764.html
10. “Proekt Postanovy pro poperednii zvit Tymchasovoi spetsialnoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z pytan monitorynhu otrymannia i vykorystannia mizhnarodnoi materialno-tekhnichnoi dopomohy,” Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, January 2024, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/43489
11. Melnyk, Taisa. “Mist Mizh Armiiamy NATO. Ukraina Perevodyt Viiskovu Lohistyku Na Nativsku IT-Systemu LOGFAS. Naskilky Skladnyi Tsei Shliakh,” Forbes Ukraine, September 8 2022, https://shorturl.at/bmzH1.
Dopomohy Dlia Zadovolennia Potreb SyBezpeky i Syl Oborony u Period Voiennoho Stanu,” Ofitsiinyi vebportal parlamentu Ukrainy, February 13, 2024, https://shorturl.at/mWY58
14. “Procedure for the organization of interaction between the central executive authorities and other state authorities regarding the attraction, receipt, transfer, accounting, monitoring and control of the use of international military aid to meet the needs of the security forces and defense forces during the period of martial law.”
15. Baldor, Lolita C. “US Military Now Doing Onsite Weapons Inspections in Ukraine,” AP News, October 31 2022, https://shorturl.at/pBD19
16. “JSOP-UKRAINE RESPONSE IN BRIEF,” US Agency for International Development, January 2023, https://shorturl.at/adqNV.
17. “FY 2023 Joint Strategic Oversight Olan - Ukraine Response,” Department of Defense Office of Inspector General, January 18, 2023, https://shorturl.at/lyEMZ
18. “Defense Ministry Conducts Two More Inspections of Weapons Transferred by USA,” Interfax-Ukraine, February 28, 2024, https://shorturl.at/gqtzV.
19. Cordle, Dylan, and Jen Spindel. “Grappling with EndUse Monitoring,” Forum on the Arms Trade, January 8, 2024, https://shorturl.at/juzCO
20. Schroeder, Matt, and Olena Shumska. “Making the Rounds: Illicit Ammunition in Ukraine,” Small Arms Survey, January 2021, https://tinyurl.com/yd9mv393 .
21. Galeotti, Mark, and Anna Arutunyan. “Peace and Proliferation: The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Illegal Arms Trade,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 22, 2023, https://tinyurl. com/3f6szyan .
22. “Increased Supply of Weapons to Ukraine since Invasion Adds to Pre-Existing Stockpiles,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: Risk Bulletins, November 2023, https://tinyurl.com/mv7r6thv
23. “Supporting the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in Preventing and Combating Illicit Trafficking in WAE,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, accessed March 2024, https://tinyurl.com/5fuxza92
24. “Informal Home Affairs Council: EU Launches the Support Hub for Internal Security and Border Management in Moldova,” European Commission, July 11, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/3e5vnraf
25. “Parliament Creates Commission to Monitor Movement of Western Weapons in Ukraine,” The Kyiv Independent , July 19, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/yc5833dt
26. “Proekt Postanovy pro poperednii zvit Tymchasovoi spetsialnoi komisii Verkhovnoi Rady Ukrainy z
pytan monitorynhu otrymannia i vykorystannia mizhnarodnoi materialno-tekhnichnoi dopomohy,” Verkhovna Rada Ukrainy, January 2024, https://itd.rada.gov.ua/billInfo/Bills/Card/43489
27. “Ukraine 2023 Report,” European Commission, November 8, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/49z59b4h
28. “How Ukrainians Modify Civilian Drones for Military Use,” The Economist , May 8, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/mrz78vwb
29. “Ukraine’s Drone Production Could Reach 2 Million Units This Year,” Ukrainska Pravda, March 5, 2024, https://tinyurl.com/b8strwvz .
30. Jakes, Lara. “Ukrainian Soldiers Risk Their Lives to Keep Weapons from the Black Market,” The New York Times , May 12, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/bdzf853a .
31. “Ne Tilky Onlain: Yak Zakhid Kontroliuie Svoiu Zbroiu v Ukraini - Rozbir Ekspertiv,” Freedom, October 2023, https://tinyurl.com/yyfrz6bv
32. “Russia Carries out Special Operation Involving Trophy Weapons in Gaza Strip,” , October 2023, https://tinyurl.com/45m8nyry
33. Galeotti, Mark, and Anna Arutunyan. “Peace and Proliferation: The Russo-Ukrainian War and the Illegal Arms Trade,” Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, March 22, 2023, https://tinyurl.com/3f6szyan
34. Newton, Mike. "Weapons Marking and Registration in Bosnia and Herzegovina: A Model for a Regional Approach to SALW Life-Cycle Management in the Western Balkans," The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 24, no. 2 (2020), https://tinyurl.com/y836ve87.
The Prioritization of Survey Through Open-Source Research in Ukraine by Riza and Mathewson [ from page 24 ]
1. Mathewson, Andro. “Open-Source Research and Mapping of Explosive Ordnance Contamination in Ukraine,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 26, no. 1 (2022): 36, https://shorturl.at/ghkIJ
2. Block, Ludo, “The Long History of OSINT,” Journal of Intelligence History, 2022, https://shorturl.at/ACIK7
4. For a detailed overview of HALO’s process, please see Andro Mathewson’s article in The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 26.1, “OpenSource Research and Mapping of Explosive Ordnance Contamination in Ukraine.” The data is sourced by HALO’s research team as well as through data sharing with individual researchers and organisations, such as Brady Africk, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data
Project (ACLED), LiveUAMap, and the Institute for the Study of War.
5. For example, the differences between contamination in Kyiv and in Mykolaiv regions. The contamination in the former is more sporadic in nature, whereas in the latter, it is more organized, exemplified by distinct orderly lines of anti-vehicle mines.
6. Chayka, Kyle. “Watching the World’s ‘First TikTok War,’” The New Yorker, March 3, 2022, https://shorturl.at/qDFM4 . While investigative units, such as Bellingcat estimate “that about 70% of evidence … comes from TikTok content,” ( https://shorturl.at/aCHQT ) The HALO Trust predominantly relies on footage from Telegram channels and Twitter users.
Studying the Effects of Aging on Ammunition Under Water by Neitzey and King [ from page 31 ]
1. “Vietnam Aging Study Management of Explosive Remnants of War (MORE),” GICHD, September 19, Global CWD Repository, https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/ cisr-globalcwd/1235/
2. King, Colin. "As Mines Grow Old." The Journal of Mine Action 11, no. 2 (April 2008): 4–5, https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol11/iss2/2 .
3. Ostazeski, Stan, and Leo F. Saubier. “Corrosion of Buried Mines,” Technical Reports Library, 2002, https://tinyurl.com/2rwv6ukb
4. Ostazeski, Stan. “Corrosion of Unexploded Ordnance,” USAEC Report No. SFIM-AEC-PC-CR-2002041, November 2002.
5. Conder, Jason M., Thomas W. La Point, Jeffrey A. Steevens, and Guilherme R. Lotufo. “Recommendations for the assessment of TNT toxicity in sediment,” Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry 23, no. 1 (January 2004): 141–149, https://doi.org/10.1897/03-137
6. Juhasz, Albert L., and Ravendra Naidu. “Explosives: Fate, Dynamics, and Ecological Impact in Terrestrial and Marine Environments,” Reviews of Environmental Contamination and Toxicology 191 (2007): 163–215, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-69163-3_6
7. Sagi-Ben Moshe, S., Z. Ronen, O. Dahan, N. Weisbrod, L. Groisman, E. Adar, and R. Nativ. “Sequential biodegradation of TNT, RDX and HMX in a mixture,” Environmental Pollution 157, no. 8–9 (August/September 2009): 2231–2238. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.envpol.2009.04.012 .
8. King, Colin. “The Effects of Ageing on Colombian ‘Shoe Polish’ Mines” Fenix Insight (2020): 11. https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-globalcwd/1564/
9. Schönbach, Vice Admiral Kay-Achim (Chief of The German Navy). “Keynote Remarks,” Kiel Munition Clearance Week, December 2, 2021,
https://youtu.be/Lp8VeamWwa8
10. Jebens, Martin. "Environmental Impact on the Functionality of Landmines: Does Aging Matter?"
The Journal of ERW and Mine Action 14, no. 1 (April 2010): 72–81, https://commons.lib.jmu.edu/cisr-journal/vol14/iss1/24/
11. The full report will be available at: https://www.jmu.edu/cisr/programs/aging.shtml
12. See for example: “Scoping Study of the Effects of Aging on Landmines” ( https://tinyurl.com/v4z2adc9), “Study of the Effects of Aging on Landmines” ( https://tinyurl.com/yvdxxmer), and “Guide to the Ageing of Explosive Ordnance in the Environment” ( https://tinyurl.com/3mzbd6cv), Global CWD Repository.
13. A process known as “exploitation.”
14. “07.11 Land Release,” IMAS, https://www.mineactionstandards.org/standards/07-11/.
Securing Land to Contribute to Food Systems: Preliminary Findings on Humanitarian Mine Action’s Cumulative Effects on Food Security in Lebanon by Labianco and Rabbath [ from page 36 ]
1. Learn more about the Office of Weapons Removal and Abatement (WRA): https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/pm/wra .
2. Learn more about the Lebanese Mine Action Center (LMAC): https://tinyurl.com/57dmaksy
3. “The Contribution of Humanitarian Mine Action to Food Security: Preliminary Findings from Lebanon,” Mines Advisory Group, 2023, 4, 8, https://tinyurl.com/2za59ct4
4. See “World Food Summit–Plan of Action 1996,” paragraph 1 ( https://www.fao.org/3/w3613e/w3613e00. htm); “The State of Food Insecurity in the World” FAO, 2001, 49 ( https://www.fao.org/4/y1500e/y1500e00.htm); see also “New Report: Humanitarian Mine Action and Food Security,” Mines Advisory Group, 2024, 11 ( https://tinyurl.com/3kehcfs3) (hereinafter HMA and Food Security Report).
5. “Food Losses and Waste in the Context of Sustainable Food Systems,” HLPE Report 8, June 2014, 12, https://www.fao.org/3/i3901e/i3901e.pdf
6. “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” General Assembly Resolution 2200A, adopted December 16, 1966. See also, “The Right to Adequate Food” Article 11, https://tinyurl.com/374fczej .
7. See Henrique Garbino’s article, “The Impact of Landmines and Explosive Remnants of War on Food Security: The Lebanese Case,” in The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 23, no. 2 (2019), https://tinyurl.com/h4425fj3; see also Greg Crowther’s “Counting the Cost: The Economic Impact of Cluster
Munition Contamination in Lebanon,” Center for International Stabilization and Recovery Global CWD Repository, 2008, https://tinyurl.com/5n9x782b; and, more generally, in GICHD and UNDP’s, “The Sustainable Development Outcomes of Mine Action in South Sudan,” 2023, https://tinyurl.com/bdd8ju25
8. “Convention on Cluster Munitions: Article 4 Lebanon Extension Request,” Lebanon Mine Action Center, 2019, https://tinyurl.com/y4b332rr
9. Ibid.
10. 2019 was the date of publication of the latest specific report on this topic by UNDP. Hamade, Kanj Dr., and Dr. Ilina Srour. “Socio-Economic Benefits of Mine Action in Lebanon–The Case for Sustained Support,” UNDP and LMAC, 2019, https://tinyurl.com/33sdyzmh
11. Lebanon and food insecurity.
12. “The Contribution of Humanitarian Mine Action to Food Security: Preliminary Findings from Lebanon,” Mines Advisory Group, 2023, 12–13, https://tinyurl.com/2za59ct4
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid, 16.
16. Ibid, 14.
17. Ibid, 16.
18. Ibid, 17.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid, 26, 29.
21. Ibid, 16: more generally, see, among others: “Assessing Informality and Vulnerability among Disadvantaged Groups in Lebanon: A Survey of Lebanese, and Syrian and Palestinian Refugees,” ILO, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/28adxh3u
22. “The Contribution of Humanitarian Mine Action to Food Security: Preliminary Findings from Lebanon,” Mines Advisory Group, 2023, 15, https://tinyurl.com/2za59ct4
23. Ibid, 13–14, 26–27.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid, 19.
26. Ibid 19–20.
27. Ibid, 20.
28. For example, see “Integrated Food Security Phase Classification: Lebanon,” ICP, 2022, https://tinyurl.com/tv5xsh9c
29. “The Contribution of Humanitarian Mine Action to Food Security: Preliminary Findings from Lebanon,” Mines Advisory Group, 2023, 21–22, https://tinyurl.com/2za59ct4
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid, 26–27.
32. Ibid.
33. Ibid, 21–22.
34. Ibid, 23–24.
35. Ibid, 26.
36. Ibid, 29.
37. Ibid, 28.
38. Ibid, 25.
39. Ibid, 22–23.
40. Ibid, 24.
41. See, for example, the definition of “mine action” in “04.10 Glossary of Mine Action Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations,” IMAS, https://tinyurl.com/peh5w8wh
Local is Possible: An Analysis of HMA Localization Efforts and a Proposed Pathway for Future Projects by Wilkinson, Mueller-Dormann, Roberti, and Rasmussen [ from page 42 ]
1. Metcalfe-Hough, Victoria, Wendy Fenton, Barnaby Willits-King, and Alexandra Spencer. “The Grand Bargain at five years: an independent review,” ODI, June 8, 2021, https://tinyurl.com/r2353ut2
4. Strengthen the means of implementation and revitalize the Global Partnership for Sustainable Development.
5. Enhance international support for implementing effective and targeted capacity-building in developing countries to support national plans to implement all the sustainable development goals, including through North-South, South-South, and triangular cooperation.
6. Available at: https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/report/2023/
7. Holloway, Hannah Rose, and Shafi Ullah. “Localisation and Humanitarian Mine Action in Afghanistan: Steps Required to Strengthen Locally led Response,” Internal paper, DRC and MCPA, 2023.
8. Wilkinson, Mark, Albert Schevey, and Ahmed Al Zubaidi. “The Bigger Picture: Considerations Toward the Sustainable Localization of Mine Action,” The Journal of Conventional Weapons Destruction 27, no. 1 (2023), https://tinyurl.com/6837wwe2 .
