CPR Spring 2023 (XXI,1)

SPRING 2023

VOLUME XXI NO. 1

COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW inside:

adapting to the information environment: why u.s. internet freedom policy should promote the use of telegram in russia [Pg. 19]

IMRAN KHAN'S REVOLUTION: PAKISTAN'S GREATEST HOPE OR BLEAKEST DANGER? [PG. 38]

THE ROUGH ROAD AHEAD FOR THE REPUBLICAN HOUSE [pg. 13]

MASTHEAD

EDITORIAL BOARD

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

Kaitlyn Saldanha

PUBLISHER

Katerina Kaganovich

CHIEF-OF-STAFF

Reece Brown

MANAGING EDITORS

Jesse Levine

Carmen Vintro

Nicolas Lama

Evelyn Yu

POLICY 360 EDITOR

Michelle Brucker

Columnist EDITOR

Collin Woldt

PITCH MANAGER

Alan Chen

PUBLICITY EDITOR

Amelie De Leon

STAFF

POLICY 360 CHIEF SENIOR EDITOR

Marla Rinck

COLUMNIST CHIEF SENIOR EDITOR

Avery Lambert

SENIOR EDITORS

Alan Chen | Deepa Irakam | Robert Gao | Charlie Wallace | Benji Waltman | Sebastian Preising | Lochlan Liyuan Zhang | Rachel Krul | John David

Cobb | Carina Layfield | Melissa Yu | Rohil Sabherwal |

Makennan McBryde | Avanti Tulpule | Natalie Goldberg | Max Hermosillo | Layne Donovan | Isabel Randall | Gabriella Chioffi | Aileen Hernandez |

Julia Nash | Andrea So | Roshan Setlur | Carsten Barnes | Ariana Eftimiu |

Tatiana Gnuva | Anna Bartoux | Ryan Safiry

JUNIOR EDITORS

Maryam Abbasi | Daniel Kim | Saniya Gaitonde | Changu Chiimbwe | Joseph Karaganis | Emily Gao | Laila Cruz | Lara Geiger | Lily Sones |

Karun R Parek | Kaitlin Strong | Catherine Li | Isaiah Colmenero | Abby

Sim | Iliana Rios | Martina Daniel | Marla Rinck | Emily Debs |

Giulio Maria Bianco | Monica Vazquez | Devon Hunter | Amelie Ortiz De Leon | Gabriella Frants | Claire Schnatterbeck | Elizabeth Yee

STAFF WRITERS

Ann Mizrahi | Joy Botros | David Eckl | Kira Ratan | Heather Chen |

Makram Bekdache | Adam Kinder | Irene Jang | Kristy Wang | Theodore

Zaritsky | Jackson Weinberger | Nicholas Brown | Rebecca Kopelman |

Emily Swan | Francine Diaz | Alexia Vayeos | Evanna Hasan |

Kyra Chassaing | Eva Atkins | Luis Enrique Monroy | Lokaa Krishna |

Henry Wager | Victoria Gallacher | Max Edelstein | Elise Wilson | Alexia

Pérez | Christian DeMeire Gist | Amelia Fay | Elisha Baker | Carol Davis |

Shiva Yeshlur | Renuka Balakrishnan | Traolach O'Sullivan |

Nia Tomalin | Ada Baser | Fiza Rizvi | Lili Samii | Garrett Spirnock | Alannis

Jaquez | Julianna Lozada | Jack Lobel | Faiza Chowdhury | Andrew Fahey

| Jack Holmgren | Farhan Mahin | Genesis Vanegas Calvo | Moya Linsey |

Luc Hillion | Soenke Pietsch | Lena Barday | Steven Long |

Jonathan Waldmann | Zachary Troher | Adam Rowan | Aleka Gomez-Sotomayor-Roel

DISCLAIMER: The views and opinions expressed in this magazine belong to the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Columbia Political Review, of CIRCA, or of Columbia University. Front cover photo credit: Erica Vega. Back cover photo credit: Scarlet Sappho.

EDITOR’S NOTE

Looking back on the year since our last print edition and looking forward to the year to come, we are faced with continued economic reverberations of the pandemic. We now find ourselves confronting the repercussions of a series of calculated response tradeoffs, witnessing a painful market correction in real-time. But in spells of economic anguish, journalism and free press emerge as more crucial than ever: not just for uncovering truth, but for holding accountable those in power.

At a time of great economic uncertainty, I am empowered by the community of engaged young minds that this publication brings together. It is with this sense of empowerment that I am honored to introduce the Spring 2023 Issue of the Columbia Political Review, our return to print publication after a year of digital content.

The cover piece of this issue draws on perhaps the most poignant political theme of the digital age; that is, the politics of information. In her piece, Amelia Fay proposes U.S. backing of the encrypted messaging platform Telegram as a powerful facilitator of civil discourse in Russia. Carmen Vintro analyzes a new SEC proposal with potential to revolutionize climate accountability on Wall St.. Traolach O’Sullivan explicates the history of racial injustice in U.S. affordable housing policy. David Eckl responds to Kevin McCarthy’s election as Speaker of the House, and Max Edelstein highlights the implications of the L.A. City Council scandal for Latino representation in municipal government.

This issue’s edition of Policy 360 examines the leftist governmental surge, or “Pink Tide,” in Latin America. Led by Managing Editor Michelle Brucker and Chief Senior Editor Marla Rinck, this roundtable brings together the perspective of four writers – and four countries – to assess the implications of Latin America’s harkening back to 2000s-era socialism.

Looking abroad, Eva Atkins assesses the shortcomings of Frontex – the European Border and Coast Guard Agency – in responding to the ever-increasing flow of northern migration guaranteed by the climate crisis. Adam Kinder calls for the abolition of the kafala legal system of the Middle East. Turning to North America, Victoria Gallacher decries the negligence of the Canadian government towards First Nations communities, and Shiva Yeshlur unpacks the international response to Sudan’s post-coup crisis. Finally, Fiza Rizvi takes on the controversial tenure and reformist agenda of Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan.

Collectively, these pieces demonstrate how trying times are survived by the persistence of those who choose to demand accountability. Indeed, in the aftermath of crisis, it is that insistence on discourse – inquiry, prose, the pursuit of knowledge – that brings recovery.

At this moment of intense scarcity, it brings me great joy and immense hope that the Columbia Political Review remains a community dedicated to these values.

DOMESTIC POLITICS

THE SEC'S FIGHT TO STANDARDIZE ESG REPORTING IN THE U.S.

Carmen Vintro BC '23

THE NEED FOR RACIAL JUSTICE IN NATIONAL HOUSING POLICY

Traolach O'Sullivan GS '24

THE ROUGH ROAD AHEAD FOR THE REPUBLICAN HOUSE

David Eckl CC '23

EXCLUSIONARY POLITICS VERSUS MULTIRACIAL COALITION-BUILDING: INSIDE THE L.A. CITY COUNCIL RECORDINGS

SCANDAL

Max Edelstein SEAS '25

ADAPTING TO THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: WHY THE U.S. INTERNET FREEDOM POLICY SHOULD PROMOTE THE USE OF TELEGRAM IN RUSSIA

Amelia Fay CC '23

FRONTEX: THE LOOKING GLASS OF EU IMMIGRATION POLICY

Eva Atkins CC '26

KILLING KAFALA: MODERN SLAVERY AND ABOLITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Adam Kinder CC '26

THE WATER CRISIS: CANADA'S FAILURE TO FIRST NATIONS COMMUNITIES

Victoria Gallacher BC '24

IMRAN KHAN'S REVOLUTION: PAKISTAN'S GREATEST HOPE OR BLEAKEST DANGER?

Fiza Rizvi CC '24

SHUTDODWNS AND BLACKOUTS: AN INTERNATIONAL FAILURE TO POST-COUP SUDAN

Shiva Yeshlur CC '26

POLICY 360: THE NEW PINK TIDE IN LATIN AMERICA

HOW TO STEER THE TIDE: COLOMBIA'S NEW VISION OF LEFTISM

Steven Long CC ' 24

brazil's dramatic return to a bygone era

Soenke Pietsch CC '23

ARGENTINA'S BALANCING ACT AMIDST A LASTING INFLATION CRISIS

Lena Barday CC '25

LEFT-WING DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO: FUEL FOR CARTEL VIOLENCE?

Luc Hillion GS '24

THE SEC'S FIGHT TO STANDARDIZE ESG REPORTING IN THE U.S.

Carmen Vintro // Barnard College ’23

January 17, 2023

Over the past few years, a “tectonic shift” to sustainable investing has defined the financial sector. Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) metrics, such as carbon emissions, that evaluate company performance based on factors outside of traditional financial accounts are at the core of what it means to invest sustainably in the 21st century. Today, 92% of companies listed on the S&P 500 publish a sustainability report and investors are rushing to integrate ESG considerations into their portfolios, driving the 12-fold increase of money that flowed into sustainable funds from 2016 to 2020. But a lack of reporting standards in the U.S. has let some companies and investors mischaracterize their assets as “green” and caused havoc for investors trying to make decisions using inconsistent and incomparable information.

In March 2022, following in the footsteps of the EU—which already requires robust corporate sustainability reporting—the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a proposal designed to usher the U.S. public sector into a

new era of climate-oriented disclosures. The proposed rule, expected to come into effect early next year, would require public companies to report climate-related information, such as carbon emissions and material climate-related risks, in their annual financial statements. Though many in the business, political, and nonprofit sectors have voiced support for the proposal, it is far from perfect and will require heavy revision ahead of implementation if it is to survive imminent litigation and succeed in

this proposal, rather than congressional legislation, will be a key factor to achieving the Biden Administration's climate goals.

However, in light of the Supreme Court’s recent ruling that the EPA exceeded its power by regulating carbon emissions, the SEC is concerned that the rule might be struck down by the judiciary. Opponents of the proposal in the corporate world and the Republican party have already threatened litigation, and

its mission to provide consistent climate-risk information to the market. The proposal is a key part of the Biden Administration’s plan to achieve net zero emissions by 2050, and has been praised by investors, companies, NGOs, and academics for formalizing and centralizing the “E” in ESG reporting standards. In the face of a Republican-controlled Congress in the House, executive regulation like

the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a powerful trade group, wrote that the proposed rules “are vast and unprecedented in their scope, complexity, rigidity and prescriptive particularity.”

Others disagree with the entire principle of the government regulation of ESG metrics, arguing that the complexity of ESG means that a one-sizefits-all model will not work on considerations that inherently vary from

company to company.

One of the most substantial objections to the proposal center on the definition of materiality and the legal purview of the SEC, whose regulatory mandate to maintain fair and efficient markets hinges on the requirement that businesses disclose material information. Materiality is a legal concept that serves to determine what information companies are required to make to the public so that they can make an risk-informed investment decision. Drawing from relevant case law, the SEC states its definition of materiality to be information for “which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would attach importance.” This definition is maintained in the language of the proposal, which points to the impact of California wildfires on farmers and wineries as an example of a material climate-related impact. However, the interpretations of who the “reasonable investor” is and what it is they care about are still up

for debate among legal scholars.

A current commissioner dissented from the proposal, saying that the disclosure requirements were made “without regard for materiality.” Five former commissioners concurred, writing in a dissenting comment that the SEC would be exceeding their legal authority by mandating politically-charged disclosures that are an “unprecedented and unjustified effort beyond financial materiality.” Their arguments imply that a company’s impact on the environment—its carbon emissions—has no bearing on a company’s financial performance and, therefore, are not important to the “reasonable investor” seeking a financial profit. Another group of former commissioners, however, argue that the SEC has used its “authority to require environmental and climate-related disclosures” for decades, and therefore is well within their legal right to propose the new mandates.

Voicing another potential reason why the SEC’s proposal could be in violation of materiality constraints, J.W. Verret, a professor at the Antonin Scalia Associate Law School, suggests that the disclosures are not based on the “reasonable investor,” but rather to appease powerful, vocal, and special-interest investors such as pension and union funds. Thus, he claims, the SEC has exceeded its legal purview because the proposed disclosures are immaterial.

Yet the question as to who counts as a “reasonable investor” is still contentious. A group of law professors commented that disclosure requirements must evolve with a changing market. In a press release, SEC Chairman Gary Gensler illustrated how the market landscape, and thus the “reasonable investor,” have changed with the growing understanding of impending environmental impacts. Gensler said that because investors who represent “literally tens

A protest against banks' investment into fossil fuels. Photo by Visible Hand.

of trillions of dollars” are “recogniz[ing] that climate risks can pose significant financial risks to companies,” they have a burgeoning need for climate disclosures. Furthermore, it could be argued that the “reasonable investor” is beginning to care more about the environmental and social impacts of their investments beyond financial implications. A recent study by Stanford Business School found that younger investors claim they are willing to sacrifice 6-10% of their retirement savings to “support ESG causes,” hinting at a potential shift in the mindset of the new reasonable investor that broadens the concept of company performance beyond financial profit.

Going even further to expand materiality to include a non-financial dimension, the EU introduced a new concept called double materiality, which looks at materiality from

two perspectives: 1) financial and 2) environmental and social. While the internally-facing financial component is what materiality traditionally considers to be important information, double materiality adds another viewpoint that includes a company’s “external impacts” in its appraisal of company value.

Within this conception of double materiality, London School of Economics PhD student Mattias Täger identified a divide between what he terms “weak” and “strong” double materiality with regard to climate information. With the weak interpretation, non-financial information, such as compliance with strengthening regulation or ability to attract talent, is considered important because of its direct impact to a firm’s bottom line. This weak interpretation finds the environmental and social materiality components to be mate-

rial because they pose financial risk to the firm’s performance. With the strong interpretation, however, the environmental and social components are considered important by the “reasonable investor” for reasons beyond purely financial performance. It is unclear whether the SEC will follow the EU’s lead and adopt this new definition of materiality, let alone if it is legal to do so. Current SEC commissioner Hester Pierce— the only commissioner to disapprove of the proposal—argued that double materiality “has no analogue in our regulatory scheme.” Once the proposal is in its revised form, it will surely face litigation that will determine the future of materiality in U.S. law, and the extent to which the financial sector can participate in the global fight against climate change.

Graphic by Official Journal of the European Union.

Chicago’s Cabrini Green, the quintessential example of disaster in public housing. Photo by John White.

Who deserves protection under the umbrella of the welfare state? Exclusively the destitute? Or does everyone deserve assistance in attaining certain basic entitlements? The relationship of the United States government with housing centers around its response to this question. To that end, American housing policy has been defined by two approaches, each flawed, progressing upon one another historically. First, from 1949 to 1993, the government committed itself to supporting only the most destitute. The approach did not yield positive outcomes, instead being widely characterized by segregation, concentrated poverty, and neglect. When it became apparent that this was a massive failure, Congress attempted to reimagine those fundamental questions about the role of a welfare state in a new policy approach. It launched a new system in 1992; instead of taking on the burden of providing housing itself, it opted to cede as much control as possible to private developers through a grant system. This attempted to fix previous errors that created communities of concentrated poverty by dictating that grants integrate affordable housing into middle class communities. The reforms have been controversial; the problem of creating these new model communities is that it drastically decreases the proportion of affordable housing produced by each dollar of government funding. While it has been said that residents who lived in the neglected communities created by the old government-run model are much better off in new mixed income communities, with access to better employment, education, and quality housing, the prob-

lem is they rarely make it there. The new approach has ultimately proven damaging to most of the low-income residents whom these policies initially claimed to serve.

There is another critical issue to examine with contemporary housing policy, aside from the national government’s decision to step back and attempt to meet the demand for affordable housing through models of privatization; to date, American housing policies have not taken adequate account of race and racism. Whether by deliberately promoting segregation or failing to positively redress long-standing discrimination, national policies have prevented millions of minorities who are statistically most in need of housing from attaining those stable housing outcomes as well as broader economic prosperity.

Early public housing in America: a welfare policy for the impoverished

To understand problems in contemporary housing policy, one must return to decisions made nearly 100 years ago when the national government first became engaged in housing. In the midst of the Great Depression, mass poverty and class-conflict created a unique opportunity for reorganizing society and unprecedented attention was paid to social welfare. However, in response to real estate lobbies fearing competition, government funded housing took on a particular character; Congress committed to serve an exclusively low-income population, plans that optimistically envisioned a “compassionate stopover for the working poor.” The negative consequence of this choice would emerge over time.

In the wake of WWII, as the United States prepared for unprecedented economic boom, the character of public housing was fundamentally altered. Public housing was no longer intended for the downtrodden middle class, as during Depression years. Instead, it was reserved for the most destitute, which–due to a longstanding history of institutional and social discrimination–were predominantly Black Americans. Official policy per the Housing Act of 1949 was to provide “a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family.” But importantly, this was accomplished in different ways for white people than it was for minorities. As Columbia University historian Ira Katznelson explains in his book When Affirmative Action Was White, the G.I. bill propelled white families into middle class homeownership through subsidized loans without requirement for down payments. These opportunities were not extended across racial lines. Subsidized housing was provided for families of color almost exclusively through the sprawling system of public housing, which was far from a path to middle class life. This stratification exerted a natural pressure towards the economic segregation of public housing, though it was also facilitated through an explicit process: the Housing Act of 1949 set a limit on incomes for applicants and accepted only those who “lived in unsafe, insanitary, or overcrowded dwellings, or displaced by public slum-clearance or redevelopment project.” The combination of these shortcomings resulted in a concentration of destitute residents in public housing, isolated from social and economic integration.

A classic example of the practical consequences of the Housing Act of 1949 can be seen in Chicago’s Cabrini-Green, where housing policies created a community marked by racial segregation and concentrated poverty. Cabrini-Green, constructed in 1942, was originally a predominantly white community. But it was transformed over a period of two decades, in no small part by the Housing Act of 1949, into an impoverished and overwhelmingly nonwhite population. Recognizing this shift in the racial diversity is critical to understanding why it failed. It is imprudent and unjust for governments to attempt to concentrate residents it views as undesirable in communities that are out of sight and out of mind. The strategy was not unique to Cabrini-Green or Chicago: it reflects a national mood of developing white communities at the expense of people of color. Underfunding and neglecting “undesirable” communities allowed social crises to blossom, creating challenges that local and national governments continue to grapple with to this day.

It is no exaggeration to say that Cabrini Green was set up to fail. As public housing funds dried up, and Chicago’s overall tax base eroded, in part due to white flight, the City Hall used its available funds to prioritize white neighborhoods. Basic services were withheld from Cabrini-Green such as police, transit, maintenance, and building upkeep. As Cabrini Green grew increasingly isolated from economic opportunities, employment rates plummeted and residents who had previously been responsible for paying a maintenance fee were no longer able to do so. Instead of addressing this, City

Hall and the Chicago Housing Authority simply allowed the community to fall into disrepair. Lawns were paved over to save on maintenance. Broken lights were left powerless for months. The final 1,000 units that were added to Cabrini Green in 1962 were constructed on budgets so thin that their low-quality infrastructure was prone to frequent issues. When those units incurred damages, they were simply left vacant to save money instead of rehabbed and allocated to another resident. Severe economization resulted in a policy of decay and neglect, and a pleasant neighborhood of garden apartments soon became a deteriorating concrete jungle of deep poverty and boarded windows. Crime, gangs, and drugs thrived in a community deprived of economic and educational opportunities. It was textbook structural pov-

Paradigm shift in nationwide approaches

While these problems were particularly prevalent in Cabrini-Green, American public housing at-large was increasingly identified with decaying infrastructure, crime epidemics, and social isolation throughout the later 20th century. Troubled by this, Congress established a national commission in 1989 to investigate and respond to the dire circumstances. It noted critical conditions in which residents were “paralyzed by fear of widespread neigh-

erty, sanctioned by the United States government. Cabrini-Green became infamous as the neighborhood that “represented everything wrong with public housing in America.”

Teardown of Chicago’s Cabrini Green. Photo by Señor Codo.

borhood crime, incapable of securing meaningful employment, confined to safe and unsanitary units, and unable to access much needed self-sufficiency programs.” To combat these problems it launched a new policy objective in 1992, HOPE VI, to fundamentally redefine its public housing approach. HOPE VI would no longer prioritize housing the extremely poor. Instead, it aimed to revitalize public housing

were successful in some cases, with a number of neighborhoods experiencing growth in per capita income as well as significant decreases in unemployment rates, dependence on government aid, and crime. But there are also undesirable side effects to making mixed-income housing a policy prerogative in order to reduce concentrated poverty: as influxes of higher income residents pour into

pursued: 50% of units were listed at market price, 20% subsidized moderately for the working poor, and 30% designated as public housing. The influx of middle-class families transformed Cabrini from a predominantly Black community to increasingly white. Displacement was a central issue. A small fraction of former residents were granted access to the new townhomes, while most were pushed

through public-private partnerships that would provide homes integrated into surrounding communities where both market-rate renters and public housing beneficiaries would reside. Integration was intended to provide welfare recipients access to pillars of social mobility, including quality education and employment opportunities. Segregated, impoverished, and ill-maintained high-rise projects would be demolished. Importantly, there were no measures to redress the racial inequality that had been nourished through previous housing policies. Reforms treated the housing crisis as a purely economic issue: a decision at the root of its continued ineptitude.

Mixed-income communities

these communities, they gentrify it and resegregate it with a population of upper income, predominantly white residents. The government is then needed to provide deeper and deeper subsidies to keep rent within the bounds of incomes for beneficiaries, and fewer and fewer people are able to be assisted and afford housing.

This was precisely the case with HOPE VI reforms in Cabrini-Green. Owing to its existence atop the national consciousness of disastrous public housing projects, it was one of the first to receive a HOPE VI development grant in 1993. Over the course of 16 years, neat rows of townhomes replaced the old and dilapidated high-rise buildings. A mixed-income resident profile was aggressively

to substandard housing on Chicago’s periphery and denied the opportunity to return.

When “revitalization” becomes equivalent to gentrification, these communities remain segregated: the pendulum merely swings in the opposite direction. Federal audits determined that just 11.4% of former residents return to revitalized HOPE developments, while the majority are displaced to peripheral areas that are equivalently racially segregated and socially isolated.

Thus, the mixed-income approaches only ameliorate problems of concentrated poverty, leaving segregation largely untouched.

”

“

Economic disparities are a symptom of the underlying disease that has pervaded American society: systemic racism. Its ills have been embedded within housing systems across the nation: through redlining, urban renewal, restrictive covenants, disinvestment, and white flight.

Lessons for equitable housing

Failures in both the specifc case of Cabrini-Green as well as national housing policy at-large are a reminder of America’s persistent racial divisions. Inequalities extend far beyond segregated, substandard public housing, they are apparent in education, employment, healthcare and life expectancy, legal access, law enforcement relations, and prison populations.

Problems rooted in racial inequality cannot be eradicated by solutions designed to curb economic inequality. Eliminating poverty and racial inequality is a much more extensive undertaking than bulldozing dilapidated infrastructure and forcing the residents elsewhere, as if welfare beneficiaries are pieces of dust being swept around a room. Sustainable communities depend on open spaces, reliable public transit, quality schools, robust employment opportunities, community centers, and equitable city services. The aforementioned 11.4% relocation rate of former residents to redeveloped communities is insufficient, and why scholars as-

sert, “the racial pendulum has swung too far from Black to white in many HOPE VI developments.”

Policies that facilitate mixed-income communities provide quality housing resources to wealthy residents at the expense of the displacement of an ever increasing proportion of working class people most in need of housing. While the initial integration of higher income residents into the community may appear to successfully create diverse communities, Northwestern Professor and expert on HOPE VI reforms Thomas Kost proclaims it “inevitably succumbs to the homogenizing force of officially sanctioned gentrification.” Even though the stated goal of these policies is racial integration, the constant pressure of gentrification undermines any kind of long term attainment. Once segregated communities of Black Americans living in concentrated poverty then become gentrified and predominantly white communities. Meanwhile, the root causes of the housing crisis, as well as the widespread need for immediate aid, remain unaddressed.

To tackle today’s salient housing problems, local and national authorities must recognize the strong link between race and class within American society; racial minorities are the most affected by poverty, which is an outcome that came about by deliberate historical processes. Racial segregation and concentrated poverty in public housing did not happen by accident. Economic disparities are a symptom of the underlying disease that has pervaded American society: systemic racism. Its ills have been embedded within housing systems across the nation: through redlining, urban

renewal, restrictive covenants, disinvestment, and white flight. Katherine Gonsalves, who writes on the historical progression and legacies of discrimination in national housing policy, proclaims “the ghetto is not just a place but a structural process.” Racial discrimination in public housing was the source of the ensuing issues of concentrated poverty that Congress faced when it undertook the HOPE VI reforms: but in treating it as purely an economic problem and ignoring the underlying root, policies are utterly incapable of a lasting remedy. Thus, when shaping policy that addresses the combined problems of racial and economic disparities in housing, policies must be oriented around racial justice and integration. Income deconcentration will be addressed as a byproduct, but importantly, whenever there is a policy conflict the race-conscious prerogatives must take precedence. This is the best way to aid those stakeholders to which national housing policy actually is intended to serve, and more broadly remedy root causes of poverty and urban decay. Professor Ulf Torgensen famously declared housing as the “wobbly pillar of the welfare state.” But housing is integral to effective and equitable policies and societies–it cannot be that wobbly pillar. It also must be integrated into a broader welfare strategy, as sustainable housing policy is intimately connected with good employment and educational opportunities. Forging an egalitarian and democratic society depends on ensuring all people have quality access to all these pillars of social mobility: housing, employment, and education.

Photo by BluEyedA73.

THE ROUGH ROAD AHEAD FOR THE REPUBLICAN HOUSE

Legislating–and democracy as a whole–is a collective action problem. In order to create laws and policies that tackle the issues that the United States faces and guide the nation into the future, the 535 members of Congress must cooperate to pass the bills that become law. Under any circumstances, this is a great challenge. Senators and representatives from across the country have their own constituencies, ideologies, and interests, and managing those competing factors makes any success in Congress a huge accomplishment. Add on the existence of two starkly divided political parties who rarely agree with each other, and a management challenge becomes the nation’s hardest juggling act. The leadership teams of each party in the two chambers of Congress exist to take on this challenge, working to corral the members of their caucuses into working together and creating policies that fulfill the party’s priorities. This theory meets reality on Capitol Hill, and as the 118th Congress begins, it is clear that the reality of congressional politics for the next two years will be one where the thin Republican majority in the

House of Representatives makes the collective action problem of legislating all but impossible to solve. Due to Republicans’ poor performance in the 2022 midterm elections, Republican House leadership under the newly elected Speaker Kevin McCarthy will likely struggle to pass mean-

ingful legislation and will be greatly weakened by concessions made to members of the right-wing Freedom Caucus.

To understand the difficulties that await McCarthy and the House Republican caucus in the next two years, it is useful to compare their situation with what Democrats faced over the last four years. The Democratic Party gained a majority in the House in the 2018 midterms, but a large contingent of its members

opposed Nancy Pelosi’s bid for the speakership, seeking a new cohort of younger leaders and changes to how the House operated. After intense negotiations within the caucus, Pelosi was able to secure the speakership through a series of deals on committee memberships and lawmaking priorities that loosened the speaker’s control over the legislative agenda. She also agreed to a limit on how long she would be able to hold the speakership before stepping aside for a younger generation. However, she also set up large obstacles to any efforts to remove her from the position in the meantime by making it more difficult for members to bring up a vote on a motion to vacate: a mechanism by which the Speaker of the House can be forced out of the position.

After making these deals that appeased her opponents within the party’s caucus while eliminating potential avenues to oppose her leadership, Pelosi proceeded to lead House Democrats for four years, including the first two years of the Biden administration, which saw the passage of major legislative initiatives such as the American Rescue Plan, the bipartisan Infrastructure Investment

David Eckl // Columbia College ’23 March 28, 2023

Donald Trump meets with House Freedom Caucus. Official White House Photo by Benjamin Applebaum.

and Jobs Act, the CHIPS and Science Act, and the Inflation Reduction Act, all while managing a slim majority since Democrats lost House seats in the 2020 election. These victories came despite seemingly insurmountable obstacles in Congress that threatened to derail Democrats’ entire agenda. For instance, the Build Back Better Act, an enormous climate and social policy bill that President Biden campaigned on, was derailed by opposition from Senator Joe Manchin. Following this defeat, though, the bill’s provisions were scaled back and repackaged into the Inflation Reduction Act, a push that Democratic leadership forged in cooperation with Manchin. The example set by Speaker Pelosi over the past few years is one of authoritative leadership in the House, where large pieces of legislation passed despite narrow margins, competing interests, and near-uniform Republican opposition.

Led by Speaker Kevin McCarthy, the Republican House majority of the 118th Congress will struggle to replicate such success. Just like House Democrats after the 2020 election, Republicans now hold a slim majority in the House and can only afford to lose four votes when passing legislation along party lines. This gives each individual member of the Republican House caucus significant leverage over legislation and the ability to influence matters by threatening to withhold their vote. House Democrats under Pelosi were able to walk this tightrope thanks to the deals made between her and her Democratic opposition. McCarthy’s dealmaking has so far failed to effectively manage the disarray within the Republican caucus, with the party

having been gripped by infighting before the new Congress even began.

In November, after the 2022 midterms, when House Republicans elected their leaders, dozens of members of the far-right Freedom Caucus opposed McCarthy’s leadership, seeking fundamental changes to the House’s functioning that would further strengthen the party’s rank-andfile membership. In the weeks lead-

ing up to the speaker election at the opening of the new Congress, McCarthy and his allies failed to reach a compromise with these members of the Freedom Caucus. That failure was brought to the fore in the chaotic, historic, days-long speakership election fight that only saw McCarthy elected as speaker after fifteen ballots and large concessions made to rightwing holdouts. These concessions greatly reduce McCarthy’s power as speaker and all but guarantee that the next two years in the House will be characterized by legislative gridlock and Republican infighting.

The rules under which the House operates can be arcane and

convoluted, but they intimately shape how the chamber and its members behave. In order to gain the support of many members of the Freedom Caucus, McCarthy has had to agree to change the House’s rules in ways that will obstruct swift lawmaking. One cause of Republicans’ discontent with the House’s rules is the recently passed omnibus spending package that Democrats pushed through Congress in December. Individual members had little say in how the package was assembled, and unhappy Republicans saw it as a wasteful abuse of the powers of House leaders. In response, they have pushed McCarthy to institute a waiting period between a bill’s proposal and vote, as well as allow more opportunities for representatives to propose amendments to spending bills when they come up for a vote. This gives individual members a greater say in the legislative process–weakening leaders such as McCarthy who usually have outsized influence over large omnibus packages–but also threatens to hamper lawmaking as each amendment proposed would need time to be debated and voted on. The potential consequences of this shift were summed up by former House Democratic leader Steny Hoyer, who referred to the change as “filibuster by amendment,” since the processing of amendments could dramatically impede legislative action.

In addition, Republicans are moving to restrict earmarks, which are specific provisions in spending bills that route money to representatives’ home states and districts. Earmarks are often criticized as wasteful “pork barrel” spending, but they help accelerate legislation by entic-

Speaker Kevin McCarthy.

Photo by Lingjing Bao.

ing representatives to support bills that they otherwise might not care to vote for. These changes to earmarks and amendments are two of the most prominent rules changes, but there are others with similar effects that will limit the number of scope of the omnibus bills that leadership often use to push through large amounts of legislation all at once. With Republicans advocating for major changes in government spending and the need to raise the nation’s debt ceiling looming within the year, these changes to amendment, earmark, and omnibus rules will all have major obstructive consequences for the legislative process.

These rule changes give more power to individual members and slow down spending bills, weakening the speaker and House leadership in a time when they tend to dominate fiscal policy in Congress. Some other concessions that McCarthy made to his opponents more directly limit his power. During her speakership, Nancy Pelosi made it very difficult to bring up a motion to vacate and attempt to force her out of office. In negotiations with the Freedom Caucus during the recent speaker election, though, McCarthy agreed to change the rules around the motion, enabling any single member of the House to initiate the vote. This means that if McCarthy’s actions as speaker ever run afoul with those who opposed his speakership bid and tensions boil over, his detractors could easily force the chamber back into the chaos of electing a speaker. With this, McCarthy will be on a very tight rope when attempting to push his party through tough issues: it was exactly this single-member motion to vacate rule that ousted

John Boehner from the speakership in 2015. Aside from the motion to vacate, McCarthy’s powers as Speaker are also eroded by his promise to put three members of the Freedom Caucus on the Rules Committee. The Rules Committee decides which bills get a vote on the House floor, and under what procedures, such as whether and how amendments can be made. The committee is therefore very powerful, and it usually operates under significant influence from the Speaker of the House. The inclusion of three of McCarthy’s harshest critics among Republicans will reduce his control of the legislative agenda and ensure that the Freedom Caucus’ approach to legislation is influential, meaning more conservative legislation comes to a vote, and more time-consuming amendments are allowed.

As the 118th Congress engages in more legislative business in the months ahead, the full implications of these rule changes and concessions will become clear. The divisions within the Republican House caucus have already curtailed Republicans’ early legislative initiatives. Coming into power, Republican leaders planned to quickly vote on a set of resolutions that they described as “ready-to-go.” When the time came, however, opposition within the party–from moderate Republicans on some measures and from hard-right members on others–has prevented some resolutions from being voted on. The biggest substantive matter that Congress has had to deal with so far is the fiscal policy fight caused by the looming debt limit. Republicans are united in their desire to reign in government spending in exchange for raising the debt ceiling, but dif-

ferent factions have different plans for doing so. These divisions have prevented the party from providing a cohesive plan to bring to the negotiating table with President Biden. These examples show that divisions within Republicans’ small House majority are already impeding legislative progress, and as Congress engages in more business in the coming months, the House’s rule changes will likely make the whole process even harder.

The changes made to the functioning of the House with Kevin McCarthy’s election as Speaker will greatly change how the chamber functions. The changes are motivated by a desire among some members of the Republican caucus to empower individuals, weaken leaders, and slow down and open up the legislative process. The ideals that these changes derive from are laudable, but they run up against the political realities of how hard it is to tackle the collective action problem of lawmaking. The weakening of the Speaker, demise of earmarks, proliferation of amendments, and other changes under the McCarthy speakership will all make the work of Congress much slower and more difficult. Add on the facts that the Republican majority is extremely slim, its caucus is divided, and Democrats control the Senate and White House and are united in opposition to the Republican platform, and it is all but certain that the 118th Congress will bring little in the way of major legislation. What it will bring is the spectacle of protracted legislative conflict, with the ordeal of the election of McCarthy as speaker as merely the opening act.

EXCLUSIONARY POLITICS VERSUS MULTIRACIAL COALITION BUILDING INSIDE THE L.A. CITY COUNCIL RECORDINGS SCANDAL

Max Edelstein // SEAS ’25

February

21, 2023

What does it mean to hold on to political power? And what does it take to get it? What is the value of representation, and how should a marginalized community react when its leaders start to embody the same racist power structure they were elected to challenge?

These are some of the questions being asked in the wake of the appalling anti-Black, anti-indigenous recording that rocked the Los Angeles City Council this past October. In the leaked tape of a secret meeting at the Los Angeles Federation of Labor, three Hispanic councilmembers and the head of a prominent labor group made racist remarks about a white councilman’s 3-year-old Black son, discussed how best to draw districts in order to maximize their political power at the expense of other minority communities, and disparaged Oaxacan Mexicans. The leaked recording led to the resignations of the now ex-City Council President Nury Martinez and ex-LA County Federation of Labor head Ron Herrera, put a nail in the coffin of now disgraced ex-Councilmember Gil Cedillo, and destroyed the once-promising political career of Kevin De Leon. The recording is forcing Angelenos to take a hard look at the corruption

embedded within halls of power and is sparking discussions on reforming power structures in local government.

All but one of the officials involved in the recording have left their positions, and politicians across the political spectrum from local councilmembers to President Joe Biden have denounced the remarks, but one outstanding issue that Latino Angelenos must continue to grapple with is the future of Hispanic political representation in a city where almost half of its residents are Latino, but less than a third of the councilmembers are. This is the issue that Martinez, Cedillo, Herrera, and De Leon were purportedly attempting to solve when they met for their fateful meeting in October of 2021. Between calling a white councilmember’s Black son a “little monkey,” and saying of Cuban-American District Attorney George Gascon, “fuck that guy… he’s with the Blacks,” the solution they came up with was to draw district boundaries in a way that disenfranchised Black councilmembers

in order to increase their own political foothold.

They planned to do this by shifting powerful assets into districts of Hispanic councilmembers, including

the University of Southern California, large public parks, and dowtown Los Angeles, at the expense of Black councilmembers. Having these large assets in a Latino councilmember’s district would allow them to court campaign donations from powerful landowners and allow these politicians to grow their political network to include more influential connections—increasing their political clout and fundraising capabilities. They also attempted to undermine the political stability of more leftwing councilmembers who represent pro-tenant policies. Through gerrymandering, they proposed cutting renter-heavy neighborhoods such as Koreatown out of progressive city councilmember Nithya Raman’s dis-

“the recording is forcing Angelenos to take a hard look at the corruption embedded within halls of power.”

trict, further undermining the voices of poorer Angelenos who are disproportionately Black and Latino by diluting their votes in landlord-heavy districts.

Not only are these shortsighted, racist solutions to a severe problem in Angeleno politics a stain on the Latino political establishment, but these solutions are also the cause of the very problem they are trying to solve. In these councilmembers' minds, anyone who isn’t solely concerned with helping Latino communities in the specific manner in which they think Latino communities ought to be helped is anti-Latino and pro-Black. They mistakenly believe that the interests of Black and Hispanic communities are at odds with each other, and so people like George Gascon, who has lent his support to criminal justice reform, must be “with the Blacks” and therefore anti-Latino. They fail to see that

by viewing other racial groups as foes to be excluded from their assets and separated from their constituents, the Latino political establishment misses out on the ability to form powerful alliances that would increase their clout in city politics.

The alliance these councilmembers are missing out on is built around common priorities. Black and Latino communities have fought together to increase the minimum wage, strengthen labor laws, establish gang intervention programs, improve public transit, and fight discrimination by law enforcement. Black political leaders’ ability to appeal to these shared interests has allowed them to gain power in the three city council districts represented by Black members, all of which have Latino pluralities. In Councilmember Curren Price’s district, for example, the community is 78% Latino and 13% Black, reflecting his ability to appeal

across demographic lines. The same goes for Marqueece Harris Dawson, another Black city councilmember. Martinez, De Leon, and Cedillo miss out on opportunities to further their communities’ interests by attempting to disenfranchise the Black community instead of allying ourselves with them.

Powerful coalitions between minority communities have a long history of success in the city of Los Angeles and California as a whole. After a century of WASP (White-Anglo-Saxon-Protestant) control of the mayor’s office, Black and Jewish communities united in the early 1970s to bring the city’s first Black mayor Tom Bradley into power. This election redefined the city’s political landscape and ushered in a two-decade long restructuring of political power in the city. At the same time, activist groups formed multiracial coalitions, such as the alliance between Cesar

Los Angeles City Hall. Photo by Ken Lund.

Chavez’s United Farm Workers (UFW) and the Black Panther Party. The Panthers joined the UFW’s boycott against California-grown grapes and the Safeway grocery stores for selling them, and as the Black Panthers were targeted by the FBI, the UFW came to their aid. Together their political power grew, and as the Black Panther Party declined due to the meddling of the FBI, the UFW weakened due to the lack of such a powerful partnership. Coalition building gave them strength in numbers that wouldn’t have been possible otherwise, and the fact that the groups couldn’t survive without each other emphasizes the importance of such alliances.

Of course, coalition building will look different today than it did in the 60s and 70s, and strategies will look different for smaller Black communities and councilmembers than they will for relatively larger Latino ones. But there is still much Latinos must learn from the past and from our fellow Angelenos if we want to evolve past this ugly moment and develop truly sustainable and inclusive political power.

The most recent local elections in Los Angeles seem to reflect this new strategy for increasing the political representation of Latinos in Los Angeles. The progressive former head of the congressional black caucus, Karen Bass, was sworn into the mayor’s office on December 11th, and a new wave of progressive, Hispanic councilmembers joined her in city hall to push the city council to the left. Bass began her political advocacy by founding the now influential Black-Latino advocacy organization Community Coalition. In the

wake of the leaked tape scandal, she positioned herself as the candidate with the decades of experience needed to repair community relations. This strategy apparently paid off, as she was elected by a larger margin than polls anticipated, suggesting Hispanic voters voted for her in larger margins than polls predicted they would.

Hugo Soto-Martinez defeated incumbent councilmember Mitch O’Farrell, supported by the labor movement and the increasingly influential L.A. chapter of the Democratic Socialists of America, whose strategy for electoral success relies on looking past racial demographics to unite around the shared challenges that minority communities face. Soto-Martinez said himself that he thinks the scandal will push the city towards a “multicultured, multi-gendered, multigenerational, movement built on shared interests and the uplift of working-class people.”

Last June, self-proclaimed police abolitionist Eunisses Hernandez handily defeated the very same Gil Cedillo caught on the racist tapes several months later. She did this by uniting historically Latino communities with white ones, running on a platform of rejecting the interests of developers and strongly supporting tenants' rights. Before she ran for city council, she co-founded La Defensa, which focuses on uniting Black and Brown people to fight mass incarceration. By creating a multiracial coalition between different communities, Hernandez and Soto-Martinez are able to gain the number of votes necessary to give Latinos another vote on the city council while still representing the interests of other minorities.

This strategy is proving effective outside of City Hall as well; in the California state senate, social worker, veteran, and LGBTQ activist Caroline Menjivar defeated the local Hertzberg political dynasty, a moderate, pro-business, white centrist political lineage. Menjivar’s election brings progressive, working-class Hispanic representation to a heavily Latino district that used to be represented by people who do not share the community’s interests.

These political victories could represent a temporary backlash to a

racist audio clip before a reset into old habits of the Nury Martinezes and Kevin De Leons of our community that continues Latinos' long streak of political underrepresentation and isolation. Or they could signal a new era for Latino political power in Los Angeles, an era defined by multiracial, working-class solidarity that views Black Angelenos as allies in the fight for equity and social justice instead of adversaries. These victories could demonstrate the promise of a future that embraces empathy for those different than us and an understanding that we are stronger united than we are divided.

“we are stronger united than we are divided.”

ADAPTING TO THE INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT: WHY THE U.S. INTERNET FREEDOM POLICY SHOULD PROMOTE THE USE OF TELEGRAM IN RUSSIA

In 2010, then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton remarked that “the spread of information networks [was] forming a new nervous system for our planet.” These technological advances, she reminded her audience, were not an “unmitigated blessing,” but a tool that could be misappropriated to “undermine human progress and political rights.” Clinton’s proposed solution to these issues was internet freedom: the extension of the free web to citizens living under oppressive governments.

Although Clinton’s State Department tenure concluded in 2013, her goal of global internet freedom guides U.S. foreign policy to this day. In May 2022, the State Department announced a new fund for the international dissemination of anti-censorship technology, as well as an initiative to prevent the misuse of technology by authoritarian governments. Unfortunately, these policies represent a well-intentioned yet misguided attempt at democratic

progress and a fundamental misunderstanding of the information environment in many adversarial states.

Traditionally, U.S. internet freedom policy has focused on information access and public media production (in other words, one’s right to

freely consume and share information online). On several occasions, “information access” has meant throwing diplomatic weight behind American companies under pressure from foreign governments to compromise users’ information or to cen-

Amelia Fay // Columbia College ’23 February 4, 2023

Photo by Wonderlane.

sor dialogue. For example, in 2010 Secretary Clinton supported Google’s refusal to censor Chinese users’ search results after Chinese hackers compromised the Gmail accounts of numerous activists and U.S. officials. In addition, the State Department has made a consistent effort to identify and to denounce foreign propaganda. Although these policies bring significant international attention to the issues of disinformation and information access, they overstate the importance of traditional news sources and neglect the critical role of secure messaging platforms.

The issue of internet freedom is especially pertinent to the current situation in Russia for multiple reasons. Most obviously, the Russia-Ukraine war demonstrates the potential of fake news to incite violence. In February 2022, Putin justified his invasion of Ukraine with accusations of a genocide against ethnic Russians in Ukraine, claiming

Russian troops were on a mission to "denazify" Ukraine. It goes without saying that these claims were false, but a series of draconian internet regulations made it difficult for Russian citizens to access alternative sources of information.

The second reason why internet freedom is of critical importance in Russia is because it provides an opportunity to shake the foundation of Putin’s power. Since becoming president in 2000, Putin has presented himself as a guarantor of order; yield to him and he provides security, comfort, and stability. The most significant uprisings during Putin’s time in power have occurred when his regime failed to uphold its end of the unofficial social contract (that is, the government curtailed citizens’ rights without providing the necessary stability). Given the ongoing situation in Russia, internet freedom will help citizens come to terms with the disconnect between the Kremlin’s mes-

saging and the reality on the ground. Even if a wide-scale reckoning occurs but does not result in concrete political change, it has the potential to divert significant government resources from the war effort.

To effectively support civil resistance within Russia, the State Department must focus on facilitating private dialogue amongst citizens, rather than on information access. Firstly, most Russians get their news via state television channels (in recent years, independent news outlets attracted a sizable readership, but these outlets’ official sites have been blocked since March 2022). This means the state exercises near total control over traditional media, and that directly accessing international news sources is impossible—not to mention dangerous—for most citizens. In addition, the State Department should be careful not to promote certain sources too passionately, as it risks “tainting” them. As

The Kremlin. Photo by Larry Koester.

seen in the Post-Soviet Color Revolutions, the Kremlin has a habit of denouncing legitimate organizations as U.S. agents on a mission to undermine Russian sovereignty. To refrain from playing into Putin’s threat narrative, the State Department should actually maintain a certain distance between itself and any news outlets it seeks to support.

Second, the State Department should prioritize the promotion of secure messaging platforms because doing so is a long-term investment in Russia’s democratic health. Yes, information access is an area of concern, but more important is citizens’ ability to speak freely amongst themselves, to work through conflicting understandings of current events, and to organize on a local level. Enabling these earnest conversations will eventually make the government’s failure a “public fact,” causing the system to crumble organically (the collapse of the Soviet Union is an apt example of this phenomenon). In other words, the State Department should focus not on the immediate gratification

Russian citizens. The app offers users multiple levels of security, including end-to-end encryption, self-destructing messages, and the option to hide one’s phone number. In addition, Telegram can sync messages across devices and allows users to send large files, such as documents or video (this is especially important for reporting human rights abuses). The app is organized via groups and channels, making it easy to share content with large audiences. However, there are four main factors differentiating Telegram from other instant messaging platforms.

First, Telegram offers end-toend encryption, meaning messages cannot be read except on the devices involved. Second, Telegram has a history of denying the Kremlin access to users’ private information. Third, many opposition and international news outlets have an official presence on Telegram; this is currently one of the only ways for citizens to access accurate information. And finally, Telegram became Russia’s top messaging app in March 2022 and

as terrorism and drug trafficking. The reality, though, is that it is impossible to prevent the app’s misuse without monitoring conversations between users, thus compromising the overall privacy of the platform (it is important to note that Telegram has removed public posts inciting violence). Other common concerns include the app’s end-to-end encryption, which is optional but not automatic. This issue, however, could be addressed via a simple educational campaign or clearer messaging by Telegram itself. Telegram is far from perfect, but its status as Russia’s top messaging app shows it has earned citizens’ trust during its years as a platform for human rights activism. Now, Telegram is supporting the dissemination of media from the war in Ukraine, enabling difficult conversations within Russia, and helping Ukrainian and Russian emmigrants communicate with loved ones.

of small internet access victories, but on the long-term strategic benefits of secure civil discourse.

Telegram, a messaging app founded in 2013 “with a focus on speed and security,” is the platform best suited to the challenges faced by

has been downloaded over 4 million times since the invasion of Ukraine. In short, the app is secure and offers users access to countless online communities and topical channels.

Critics have cited the use of Telegram for illicit activities such

In conclusion, Telegram is uniquely suited to support civil discourse in Russia’s closed media environment. Instead of focusing on free access to the traditional internet, the State Department should throw its weight behind Telegram and other secure messaging platforms on which Russians can read independent news and speak freely amongst themselves. To be specific, there is a need for clearer messaging regarding how users can further protect their personal information. Supporting Telegram— in addition to other forms of secure communication—will enable Russian citizens to have the difficult conversations necessary to come to terms with the atrocities in Ukraine, and to process the state media’s misrepresentation of the conflict.

“information access is an area of concern, but more important is citizens' ability to speak freely amongst themselves.”

POLICY 360 THE NEW PINK TIDE IN LATIN AMERICA

Intheearly2000s,awaveofleftistgovernmentscametopoweracrossLatinAmerica.The‘PinkTide’promisedsocial andeconomicdevelopmentandrejectedtheneoliberalpoliciesinvogueontherightofthepoliticalspectrumatthe time.ItwasfueledbyaboomincommoditypricesasgovernmentsacrossLatinAmericabrokewiththeirpastand enactedambitiouspolicies.However,despiteprogressinreducingpovertyinmanyofthesecountries,thecombinationofincumbencyfatigueandcommoditypricecrashesbroughtaresurgenceofright-winggovernmentstopower intheearly2010s.Now,inthewakeoftheCOVID-19pandemic,thepoliticalpendulumhasagainshiftedtothe leftintheregion,andnewlyelectedleftistgovernmentshaveanopportunitytoapplylessonslearnedfromthe2000s toimprovetheirpolicies.However,theywillalsohavetocontendwithamuchmoreuncertainglobaleconomicand geopoliticalsituationthanduringthefirstPinkTide.

ThisroundtablelooksatfourimportantcountriesinLatinAmericawhereleftistgovernmentsarecurrentlyinpower: Colombia,Brazil,Argentina,andMexico.Ineach,ourwritersexplorelinksbetweenpastandpresentleftistgovernments,andevaluateopportunitiesandchallengesthesegovernmentswillfacebothnowandinthefuture.Willthe newPinkTidebuildonlessonslearnedanddeliverincreasedprosperityforthepeopleofLatinAmerica? Alternatively,willitbeunabletoovercomethedifficultsocial,geopolitical,andeconomiccontextintheregionand theworld?

The South China Sea. Photo by U.S. Pacific Fleet.

Gabriel Boric gives victory speech at 2021 Chile Presidential Election.

Photo by Fotografoencampana.

HOW TO STEER THE TIDE: COLOMBIA'S NEW VISION OF LEFTISM

Steven Long // Columbia College ’24

On November 7, 1985, a militant guerrilla group known as M-19 sent a message to the Colombian government from inside the Palace of Justice in Bogotá: end the Siege, send in the Red Cross, and begin dialogue. The military then sent a tank into the halls of the Palace. In the ensuing 27-hour military operation, more than 100 civilians were killed. It is surprising then, that Colombia’s new president, Gustavo Petro, is a former member of M-19. But despite his connections with M-19, Petro represents a crucial break with the past.

Petro is an unusual candidate based on his past, and in the context of Colombian electoral history his victory is even more unexpected. Throughout the lifetime of the Republic, the people have never elected a leftist president. Yet, Colombia has also been frustrated by a raft of economic woes, mostly due to inequality and poverty. With a 20 percent youth unemployment rate and 40 percent of the population living in poverty, the country was primed for a shift in leadership. These economic realities, combined in a nation tired of fighting with itself for 70 years, formed fertile ground for Petro’s movement. Faced with an opposition that sought to continue the violence, in 2022, Colombia voted for peace, both physically and economically, with a population exhausted after decades of conflicts with guerillas and drug cartels.

Chile, Brazil, and Mexico are all part of a new wave of leftism and progressivism. This new phenomenon frequently elicits comparison to the older Pink Tide of the early 2000s, which brought to power leaders like Evo Morales in Bolivia and Hugo Chavez in Venezuela. Despite this, the older wave quickly fizzled out. Unlike these countries, Colombia did not participate in the previous Pink Tide. This combined with Petro’s mold-breaking election means that Colombia is able to forge a new path, free of the failures of the previous Pink Tide. If the new one seeks greater longevity, perhaps it must also seek an example in Petro.

The surprising thing about Gustav Petro is, for a former guerrilla leader, he’s rather willing to compromise with opposing parties. He appointed a Liberal economist as his minister of finance, a conservative-leaning foreign minister, and another conservative as his minister of education. For Petro, a new leftism is crucial, one which seamlessly blends the revolutionary tendencies of his past with a modern and distinctly democratic form of socialism.

In his first months in office, he has pushed through a sweeping tax reform bill that institutes an inescapable basic corporate tax of 15 percent directed at fossil fuel giants, financial firms, and the wealthy. He has advocated for guaranteed jobs and income for all Colombians, seeking to alleviate the poverty that grips

the country. Petro’s leftism also has a distinct environmental tint: On the campaign trail, he has focused on the conservation of the Amazon, as well as the incursions of oil and gas giants into the rainforest. In fact, against the opinion of foreign economists, he pledged to end new oil exploration in Colombia.

Colombia has shown that it seeks nothing more than to escape the shackles of violence. Gustav Petro has promised “total peace,” forging armistices and ceasefires with cartels and guerillas. He has shown he is able to govern with support across from the opposition, where environmental protection and social progressivism exists simultaneously with economic reform. In a Colombia that now seeks to move past M-19’s siege and the cartels, this is the way forward, at least for now. In the next decade of the left in Latin America, Colombia must serve as an exemplar of this type of Socialism that upholds the ideals of the Pink Tide without bringing the echoes of repression into the future.

“C olombia has shown that it seeks nothing more than to escape the shackles of violence .”

BRAZIL'S DRAMATIC RETURN TO A BYGONE ERA

Soenke Pietsch // Columbia College ’26

Not everyday is a former-president, turned convict, released due to a supreme court ruling. Very few then also return to the highest office to lead South America’s largest democracy. Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva did the former, and continues to do the latter.

With the election of Lula, the “most popular politician on Earth”, in late 2022, Brazil followed its South American peers in joining the new Pink Tide. Lula’s 2022 campaign rooted itself in a Biden-esque approach of frustration. It was exacerbated by 4 years of conservative, eerily Trump-like politics under former-President Bolsonaro, and reminiscence. Lula served as Brazil’s highest public servant from 2002 to 2010, enacting policies that allowed him to maintain his long-standing popularity. During his first terms, Lula lifted over 20 million Brazilians out of poverty. Buoyed by high commodity prices, the discovery of an immense oil field and favorable U.S. interest rates, he – much like his South American neighbors – enacted cash-transfers, aided small farmers, and reformed labor and pensions. He simultaneously cemented Brazil’s role on the world stage, creating the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) alliance of developing nations. These policies propelled his popularity to a dizzying 87

percent approval rating by the end of 2010, even as global economic catastrophe ensued. Yet even with an infamous headman, the New Pink Tide faces an uphill battle in Brazil – embroiled by a divided government, deep national divisions, and unfavorable global socio-economic conditions. Though Lula clenched (presidential) victory, so did his opposition. In fact, no other party has ever wielded such singular congressional power as Bolsonaro’s Social Liberal Party does in 2023 – not even Lula’s. Such unprecedented opposition poses a threat to successful legislation and a potential government paralysis. Though dissent can strengthen policy by deliberation, the extreme polarization of Brazilian ideology will likely hinder the transformative governance Lula promised. Symbolized by a mere 0.9 percent lead – a far cry from his former popularity – the severity of this problem already revealed itself on the January 8th, 2023 insurrection, during which Bolsonaro supporters stormed Brazil’s capital in a fashion eerily similar to the U.S.’s January 6th calamity. By contrast, however, Brazil is a young, fragile democracy, having freed itself from the shackles of autocracy and military rule in 1988, and still lacks the foundational gravitas of its Northern peer.

Mending Brazil’s divides will be one of the quintessential challeng-

es of Lula’s term. Notwithstanding, he promised to reformulate the economy for the 21st century, protect native groups and environmental spaces, and undo the damage Bolsonaro inflicted. If enacted, these policies will translate the new Pink Tide into a lived reality for Brazilians. If not, the new Pink tide will merely remain a pop of color in the history books of tomorrow.

Yet, Lula does not confront these struggles alone. Neighbors, like Argentina, face many of the same obstacles to true leftist politics. Yet, even in such circumstances, Lula’s term should not be predestined for failure. Political analyst Oliver Stuenkel admits as much. “Since everybody says Lula will get nothing done,” Stuenkel said, “that provides him with some space to surprise the skeptics.” Nevertheless, the occasional surprise does not equate with political revolution. Perhaps this dilemma may be the crux of the threat to Brazil's New Pink Tide. Lula promised a return to normalcy — a return to the ideals from a former time. Still, a return to the norm, even one as dramatic as Lula’s personal journey, can, at its root, hardly be a tidal wave of change. Rather, Lula’s election poses as a familiar wave once more washing up on the shores of Brazil’s political system.

ARGENTINA'S BALANCING ACT AMIDST A LASTING INFLATION CRISIS

Lena Barday // Columbia College ’25

In a new emerging Pink Tide in Latin America, Argentina remains anchored by its crippled economy and immense debts. President Alberto Fernandez’s electoral win in 2019 reflected the residual presence of the Peronist mindset in Argentina, reactive to deepened economic and social inequalities, staggering poverty, and high unemployment rates characteristic of former President Mauricio Macri’s right-wing government. Peronism, championed by former

President Juan Perón in 1940, represents a populist political movement grounded in socioeconomic redistribution and worker rights. During Argentina’s first Pink Tide, Néstor and Cristina Fernandéz de Kirchner adopted Peronist policies in resistance against neoliberal hegemony.

Argentina’s first Pink Tide paved the way for Fernandez’s rise to power. The Kirchner years marked an exciting shift for Argentina as leftist socio-economic reforms were cush-

ioned by the mid-2000s commodity boom and reduction in United States interest rates. Between 2003 and 2007, Nestór Kirchner’s expansion of public expenditure led to drastic improvements in Argentine living standards, with unemployment and poverty rates cut in half since 2002. Considerable economic growth concealed the defective mechanisms at work: state subsidies and devaluation of the peso to nationalize major industries and preserve employment

Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken attends the Organization of American States General Assembly Opening Session in Lima, Peru, on October 6, 2022. State Department photo by Ron Przysucha.

POLICY 360 COLUMBIA POLITICAL REVIEW // SPRING 2023

accumulated expansive fiscal debt. By 2015, Argentina’s economy faced extreme inflation.

In light of this economic struggle, Argentina’s political pendulum swung right, in favor of President Macri’s neoliberal promises of “a shower of foreign investment” and “zero poverty.” This counter-tide, regionally prevalent around the same period— notably in Mexico and Brazil— faced growing discontentment from Argentine society, particularly in response to Macri contracting the largest ever debt with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). By 2018, nearly 40 percent of the population lived under the poverty line. In response to Argentina’s heavily polarized society and a nostalgia for the Pink Tide, Alberto Fernandez’s popularity grew. Meanwhile, Macri’s market-oriented economics failed to sustain economic growth and alleviate inflation.

Fernandez’s bottom-up approach parallels the first Pink Tide, in its appeal to the working class and

minority groups in Argentine society. Nonetheless, the geopolitical and macroeconomic backdrop Fernandez must handle is not nearly as auspicious. The current President faces a balancing act between managing a 44 billion dollar debt to the IMF he inherited from his predecessor, coupled with the damaged socio-economic state of the country, and the challenge to uphold his reformist zeal.

Fernandez and his Vice President, Cristina Kirchner, have had to navigate a global pandemic and macroeconomic crisis whilst attempting to bolster economic growth and negotiate payments and economic plans with the IMF – without breaking their promise of income redistribution and high public spending. Today, Argentina has one of the highest inflation rates in the world. This raises doubts on the sustainability of the current government’s capacity to address economic inequality in the long-term. The government walks on a tightrope. Reflecting internal political polarization in Argentina,

Fernandez’s center-right government faces pressure from radical Peronist factions, especially from his own Vice President. Rather than tightening the staggering budget deficit and reconciling Argentina’s debts, the government expanded its money supply to boost subsidies and public spending. This internal push and pull of economic stabilization and prioritizing social welfare parallels the conflicting ideals of Fernandez and Kirchner. Argentina’s leftist wave must prove its resilience as this new Pink Tide settles in. The government must decide whether to cut back on public spending, thus undermining its political platform, or to commit to the leftist agendas, risking an exacerbation of inflation and a probable economic crisis. Today, Argentina must reconcile its bipartisan agendas and implement cohesive strategies to overcome its political instability and economic fragility.

LEFT-WING DEMOCRACY IN MEXICO FUEL FOR CARTEL VIOLENCE?

On January 6, 2023, passengers aboard a plane at Culiacán airport in Mexico threw themselves onto the floor to avoid gunfire that hit the aircraft's fuselage. This commercial flight was caught in a crossfire between the Mexican military and the

Sinaloa cartel, after the arrest of Ovidio Guzmán, son of notorious drug kingpin “El Chapo.” Guzmán’s arrest cost the lives of 10 soldiers and 19 cartel members in gun battles in the Sinaloa Cartel’s stronghold of Culiacán. Such cases of cartel violence have remained unprecedented during

the presidency of Andrés Manuel López Obrador, elected in 2018 from the left-leaning Movimiento Regeneración Nacional (National Regeneration Movement) party.

As Mexico has one of the world’s largest homicide rates, involving the killing of politicians, journalists, and

Luc Hillion // School of General Studies ’24

security forces, Mexican politics has made cartel-related violence a focal point of public discourse. In Obrador’s election campaign, he vowed to prioritize ‘hugs, not bullets’ and tackle violent crime by fighting poverty using social programs. Overall, Obrador promised to radically break away from the confrontational anti-cartel policies first employed under President Felipe Calderón and his War on Drugs declared in 2006. The Mexican government’s open conflict against cartels skyrocketed cartel-related homicides during the 2010s, yielding a murder rate comparable to that of Colombia, another Latin American narco-state.

President Obrador demonstrated his left-wing, conciliatory approach to drug violence in 2019. After Guzmán was arrested, the President ordered his release to prevent civilian deaths as cartel gunmen sieged Culiacán. Nevertheless, the order to release Guzmán in 2019 remains exceptional in Obrador’s wider anti-cartel policy. Until now, his ‘pink’ government has militarized Mexican security forces. In March 2019, Obrador amended the Mexican constitution, legalizing the use

of military units for public security tasks and establishing a National Guard to replace the Federal Police. Since Obrador’s entry into office, he utilized his revamped security forces to capture several cartel leaders, fueling cartel violence. This year, following Guzmán’s definitive arrest, the Mexican military was prepared to handle the Sinaloa cartel’s retaliation, unlike in 2019. Contrary to Colombia's President Gustavo Petro, Obrador's 'pink' counterpart who abandoned the drug kingpin strategy, Obrador has seemingly yet to realize that leaderless cartels often result in fragmentation and internal conflict.

Furthermore, Obrador's militarization of anti-cartel policies has resulted in welfare austerity to finance substantial increases in the military's budget. Shifting priorities, spending for the Army and Navy surpassed the reduced healthcare budget in 2018 for the first time since 2005. In 2021, the Mexican military's financing was 54 percent higher than in 2018 under Obrador's predecessor, President Enrique Peña Nieto.

If Mexican citizens gave Obrador a landslide victory in 2018, hoping that the Pink Tide could

save Mexico from cartel violence, it seems that the President has done the opposite. At the cost of welfare austerity, Obrador’s militarization of security forces has maintained total yearly homicides at around 30,000 to 35,0000 deaths since 2018. Obrador is struggling to reverse the 76 percent increase in homicides from 2015 to 2021 under Nieto’s presidency. Additionally, human rights organizations have criticized the military for extrajudicial killings and human rights abuses that resulted from its confrontational strategies.

Overall, in a state plagued by corruption and violence, Obrador’s promises to depart from the reactionary cartel policies of his more conservative predecessors have not materialized. If Obrador still cares for the Pink Tide’s progressive identity to manifest within his policies, he should instill his ‘hugs, not bullets’ ethos into his newly reformed security forces. Obrador could learn from his Colombian counterpart by implementing social programs to combat poverty and abandoning the kingpin strategy, thereby protecting citizens and preventing the escalation of cartel violence.

All of the leaders of these Latin American countries seem to believe a shift towards leftism will solve the problems afflictingtheirrespectivecountries,fromeconomicinstabilitytocivilconflict.However,itisclearthatthisnewPink Tidewillnotbearepeatofthelast.

Withinthecountriesaffected,thereislesseconomicstabilitythanduringthefirstPinkTide.Thereisimmensedebt heldbycountrieswithinLatinAmerica,suchasthe44billiondollarsowedbyArgentina.Inaddition,commodity prices are extremely volatile, especially in the face of the COVID-19 disruptions of supply chains and civil unrest. Thecollapseincommoditypricesin2020,succeededbyasynchronizedspikeinprices,followsanexpectedpattern. Previously,LulausedthistrendtoboostBrazilontotheworldstage.However,macroeconomicandsocialinstability withinLatinAmericancountriesleadstogreaterpricevolatility,comparedtothemoreprolonged,structuralboom during the time of the first PinkTide. For example, even though the country did not participate in the first Pink Tide,Colombiahasmanyeconomicissuesthatwillmakeitdifficultforthecountrytoimplementeffectivemeasures against cartels and M-19. Because of these influences, it will prove difficult to confidently make sustainable large, structuralchangesthateachofthecountriesandtheirleadersdesire.

A boat carrying a group of refugees across the Mediterranean to Greece. The European Union has expanded security in the sea to prevent such crossings. Photo by Mstyslav Chernov.

FRONTEX: THE LOOKING GLASS OF EU IMMIGRATION POLICY

Eva Atkins // Columbia College ’26 April 7, 2023

In his speech announcing the renewal of European Union (EU) funding for the Libyan Coast Guard earlier this month, European Commissioner Olivér Várhelyi expressed hope that the five new patrol boats would “highlight what the cooperation between the EU, our Member States and partner countries can collectively deliver.” Though aspirational in tone, the “cooperation” that Vàrhelyi extols would be more aptly described as the “delegation” that has become representative of EU border policy in the Mediterranean. More than willing to recognize the outsourcing of border regulation, Várhelyi left the details of EU collaboration with groups like the Libyan Coast Guard in the margins. The patrol boats will soon become part of the Coast Guard’s growing fleet of vessels used to force refugees in the Mediterranean back to Libyan detention camps. And the European Union will remain complicit in the abuse that these detainees are inevitably subject to.

As the impacts of the climate crisis become increasingly dire for those in the Global South and political violence drives displaced people to Europe’s shores, the European Union, as the quasi-governing body of the majority of countries on the continent, has responded with am-

bivalence. Struggling to reconcile the competing interests of member states divided by sentiments on migration and political leadership, the EU has failed to land on a cohesive policy towards immigration; this indecision and delegation within EU immigration policy is best embodied in the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, commonly known as Frontex.

Frontex was formed in 2004 to provide intergovernmental security along the external borders of member states. Oversight over its operations falls to the European Council and the European Parliament. The roles Frontex purports to fulfill are “the promotion, coordination, and development of European border management.” Up until 2015, however, Frontex was widely regarded by member states as an ineffective and understaffed bureaucratic patch over a growing wound. With less than 400 employees, Frontex is fundamentally unable to fulfill its mandate, and the European Migrant Crisis of 2015 brought this into sharp focus.

In 2015, the confluence of civil war in Syria and famine and political unrest in Northern Africa forced millions from their homes, fleeing across the Mediterranean and through the Balkans towards Europe. Over 1 million people sought

asylum in EU member states that year. Owing to the clunky, uncoordinated response to the crisis, the EU was prompted to initiate a series of reforms to its asylum processing system and border enforcement resources. Frontex’s budget saw an increase of nearly 54%. Since the agency was granted a second wind, it has become an increasingly dominant actor across the Mediterranean, with a standing corps of border guards projected to number 10,000 by 2027. It recently entered into an arms contract with Airbus and an Israeli weapons manufacturer, and it boasts an arsenal of drones, helicopters, and reconnaissance planes.

Through these reforms, strategy to minimize the stream of refugees arriving via the Mediterranean became preemptive, rather than reactive. The EU relied heavily on outsourcing border security to Northern African countries, through which many migrants traveled to reach the sea. Along with the boats, guards, and funds provided to these countries of “origin and transit,” the governing body also surrendered control over processes of reception and standards of accountability for humanitarian charters. Through the process of externalizing border regulation to countries outside of the union—such as Morocco, Libya, and

Turkey—the EU can voice its respect for humanitarian causes, accrediting Frontex’s efforts in the prevention of migrant deaths at sea, while funding the abuse of these migrants beyond its own borders. Nowhere is this hypocrisy better represented than one such contract involving the Libyan Coast Guard.

In 2015, the EU agreed to codify a previously informal relationship with the Libyan Coast Guard. In exchange for providing training and equipment, the Coast Guard would divert or turn back migrants who reached the Libyan coast attempting to reach Italy by boat. Through various sources of funding, the EU has since granted the Libyan Coast Guard upwards of $400 million to “support migration related issues” since the formalization of the partnership.

While the arrival of migrants by sea decreased from 2015 by nearly 40,000 in 2017, it gradually became clear that the benefits of externalization necessitated a cruelty and isolationism at odds with the platform for basic rights espoused by the EU. Not only did the EU subsidize the outsourcing of its border enforcement, but an investigation conducted by four European media organizations documented the use of Frontex surveillance drones and aircraft to identify migrant boats. In twenty separate instances Frontex surveillance craft identified migrants enroute to EU shores, then relayed the boats’ coordinates to the Libyan Coast Guard who intercepted the boat and returned the refugees to Libya. In 2022 alone, nearly 25,000 migrants were returned to Libya. Those who are forced back to Libya face impris-

onment in detention camps, conditions in which are unspeakably horrific.

Libya’s current political state is tenuous as the country emerges from a violent, protracted civil war that came to conclusion in 2021. Militant groups retain power in much of the country and are notorious for running migrant detention camps along the coast. An amalgam of these groups constitute the Libyan Coast Guard. Abuses are rife and conditions are appalling within the walls of the detention camps. Guards run the detention camps as for-profit prisons, requiring fees for exit or use of a phone. An airstrike in 2019 ended in the death of 40 migrants at the Tajoura Detention Center and 5 people were killed by detention camp guards in October 2019 during an attempt to escape the compound. The devolution of political authority to armed groups promotes this type of wanton violence and exploitation. A UN statement on the condition of the detention system cites abuse “on a widespread scale … with a high level of organisation and with the encour-

Frontex, Fabrice Leggeri, claimed the agency had no direct involvement with the Libyan Coast Guard, a classified report leaked in October of 2022 revealed the depth of the EU’s knowledge of Frontex’s cooperation and more crucially the extent of the Union’s hypocrisy. The report examines evidence for allegations of serious abuse and mismanagement that arose in 2020. Along with the documentation of a dearth of communication between the Coast Guard and Frontex agents, the investigation reached the conclusion that the level of misconduct was such that it hindered the agency’s ability to respect “fundamental rights.” This phrase refers to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, a binding agreement of certain political and social rights, much like a bill of rights. Exactly whose fundamental rights were violated was left in the margins of the report. The refugees forced back to hellish detention camps remained casualties of the politics of delegation the EU has come to favor. Not to mention, Frontex’s active participation in the return of migrants to Lib-

agement of the state … suggestive of crimes against humanity.’” Detainees face extortion, physical abuse, sexual exploitation, and unprovoked killings.

While the then director of

ya violates international law against refoulement, or the forced return of migrants to unsafe locations. The confidential report is evidence that the EU is aware of Frontex’s complicity in migrant push-

“strategy to minimize the stream of refugees arriving via the Mediterranean became preemptive, rather than reactive.”

backs. Just this past February, despite the magnitude of maltreatment and illegal action presented to the European Parliament, the Libyan Coast Guard was promised 5 new searchand-rescue vessels, and Frontex faced no significant consequences for its malfeasance.

The relationship between Frontex and the Libyan Coast Guard

allow free travel between their borders. Once migrants pass through these countries along the edge of the Area, border regulation is null.

is made all the more complex through Frontex’s other engagements. Similar allegations of complicity in the illegal pushback of asylum seekers in Greece have been reported. Greek border guards were documented in a leaked report using force to expel migrants on the border and denying them the opportunity to apply for asylum. A chief official in the human rights division of Frontex recommended the agency’s withdrawal from Greece on account of the abuse. The EU opted to maintain Frontex presence and support in Greece. States on the external border of the EU have unique responsibilities in border regulation. Not only do they absorb the majority of immigrants crossing the Mediterranean and the Balkans, but they are the final stop before migrants enter the Schengen area, which comprises 23 EU countries who have agreed to

The EU’s vague directives to Frontex are a result of its own inability to conceptualize an immigration policy that is both humane and prohibitive. While each country shares responsibility for the welfare and protection of the Union, border states shoulder the brunt of the Union’s border policy and therefore find immigration to be an issue of far greater political salience than in countries geographically removed from the crisis. France and Italy clashed last November over Italy’s refusal to assist aid groups in searchand-rescue missions in the Mediterranean. The French government sent 500 new guards to its own border with Italy and withdrew from an agreement to resettle 3,000 migrants who had arrived in Italy in France. This is just one in a series of conflicts over immigration. To add to the complication, it becomes difficult to accept the strain on member states’ infrastructure as justification for extreme regulatory measures given that 4 million Ukrainians were seamlessly enveloped into western Europe following Russia’s invasion.

As a result, the policy that has emerged from the collective body of these varied interests is discombobulated and contradictory. Frontex has been simultaneously tasked with ensuring the “fundamental rights” of asylum seekers and proving itself effective in deterring migrants from reaching the shores of Greece, Italy, and Spain to begin with. At surface level, it does appear that delegation to the countries of “origin and move-

ment” has proven effective in slowing migration flows to European borders. As opposed to the nearly 1 million refugees who entered Europe through the Mediterranean in 2015, only 123,000 attempted the crossing in 2021. However, the agency’s efficacy relies heavily on delegation to governmental authorities uninhibited by humanitarian standards. Try as it might to avoid a conversation about the ethics of border operations, it has become increasingly difficult for the EU to deny complicity in large-scale human rights abuse. In the vacuum of directive created by interstate squabbles and thinly veiled racism, the system that has emerged is ugly and riddled with corruption, dishonesty, and incompetence. A border authority that possesses firearms and search and rescue vehicles, that acts as both a watchdog and boasts a standing corps of thousands of officers under orders to facilitate safe border crossings, and that aims to discourage crossings in the first place was only ever fated to be dysfunctional.

Frontex is a mirror into which the EU finds itself staring. The irreconcilable mandates of its border agency are reflective of a union that is slowly imploding, finding it impossible to juggle the increasingly divided interests of its members. With dissatisfaction and a healthy dose of nationalism, the United Kingdom has already excused itself from the turmoil over immigration. One can only wonder how much longer member states can tolerate the stress of collaboration as the climate crisis drives more migration northward.

Demonstration outside of Frontex HQ in Warsaw. Photo by Noborder Network.

KILLING KAFALA: MODERN SLAVERY AND ABOLITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST

At a dingy airport in Kathmandu, Nepal, twenty-nineyear-old Sajit Lama falls into her mother’s arms, weeping. “I’m sorry, Mama. I wasn’t able to bring you anything,” she cries. “It’s okay. The most important thing is that you’re home,” her mother replies. Sajit has just spent the past ten years of her life confined in Lebanon, working for over a decade on a single year’s salary. During that time, her employers, a wealthy Lebanese family, stole her passport, cut her off from communication with the outside world, and forced her to work in their home as a maid for years without compensation. Unfortunately, Sajit is one among millions of victims of the kafala system, a legal framework through which employers in the Middle East sponsor migrant workers and exploit them for their labor. With no enforcement of international labor standards, sponsors are given almost exclusive dominion over their employees, who are given little recourse in the event of financial, physical, or sexual abuse. By all accounts, the kafala system is a modern form of slavery, yet it continues to prop up entire economies with its profits. Simply put, the internation-

al community has a responsibility to curb this injustice and to make the future development of the region conditional upon its abolition of the system that has robbed so many millions of their own chance at prosperity.

In Islamic jurisprudence, the word “kafala” means something akin to “sponsorship,” and is meant to describe a form of legal guardianship that resembles the caring act of adopting a child. In spite of its history, as massive natural resource reserves were discovered in the Arabian Gulf over the course of the mid-twentieth century, kafala morphed into something much more sinister. Within only a few years, newly oil-rich states like Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) needed a malleable workforce that could be brought in during times of growth and shuttled out amidst economic downturn. The most efficient way to create such a labor market is to legally empower employers to the greatest possible degree and limit the bargaining power of the common laborer, which is exactly what the future member states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) did. The GCC, a regional economic

bloc including Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and the UAE, would later dominate the region’s affairs in the latter half of the century, particularly by encouraging the practice of sponsoring foreign laborers. By the new millennium, most oil refineries, construction sites, and infrastructure projects in the Gulf were staffed by migrant workers from impoverished South Asian and Sub-Saharan African countries. Today, domestic workers account for over 95% of the workforce in Qatar and the UAE for an average of over 70% in the GCC more broadly. In all of these countries, there are no means by which laborers might collectively bargain, much less individually fight against their employer’s abusive behaviors. Domestic laborers are often confined to inhumane working and living conditions, and their whereabouts are strictly policed by their superiors. They leave their homes in the hope of providing for their families, and many, like Sajit, do not see those families for decades. In essence, what originally began as a positive legal concept to establish guardianship over a child has now morphed into a way to infantilize laborers that are the backbone of entire

Adam Kinder // Columbia College ’26 February 4, 2023

economies.

The question for the rest of the world is simultaneously simple and complex: What do we do about this? There is certainly no panacea for such a complicated problem, but relief might be found if international stakeholders are willing to use their financial leverage in the region against its greatest perpetrators. Saudi Arabia and the UAE are without a doubt the most geopolitically consequential nations in the region, and it’s no coincidence that both heavily depend on foreign workers for economic progress. Both nations have built massive fortunes through oil production and private foreign investment respectively, the majority of which has been generated through the sweat of migrants. It stands to reason, then, that if the international

community–particularly the United States, the United Kingdom, and other major regional stakeholders–can sustain pressure on local superpowers, they could allow reformists to take advantage of these nations’ reliance on foreign investment as a functional necessity for their continued growth. In Saudi Arabia, the ambitious Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman has set forth a grand vision to transform the nation by funding lavish infrastructure projects and encouraging the growth of new domestic service industries. The UAE has followed a similar path, investing heavily in sustainability technology and its already vibrant tourism industry. Unsurprisingly, such sprawling advancements can only be realized with the help of massive foreign capital and cheap labor, which

introduces a point of leverage that could be critical in this struggle. At every point where migrant workers are charged with building or maintaining these grand projects, foreign governments should then require that their public and private investment be conditional upon the recipient nations’ treatment of those workers. At the very least, substantial proof of ethical labor practices must be shown. By doing this, the global community exerts leverage to protect against human rights abuses, and in targeting regional power players, can expect cascading benefits.

An alternate solution requires that we look both eastward and westward for reference. In Xinjiang Province, China, there is credible evidence to suggest that local Uyghur Muslims are being forced to live in

Migrant laborers at a construction site in Qatar. Photo courtesy of ILO/Apex Image.

labor camps and manufacture goods for the Chinese state. This fairly obvious violation of human rights garnered much international attention, which eventually manifested itself in the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act (UFLPA): the United States’ effort at legislating the crisis. The act outlaws all imports from the region on the assumption that they were produced using forced labor. While generally expected to be effective, experts note that the UFLPA will be severely limited in its impact if it is not accompanied by the passage of similar laws abroad. Though not entirely analogous in scope, the UFLPA can be considered a template for international legislation tackling the kafala system. Not only would foreign investment become conditional, but manufacturing would become a new arena in which the global community could pressure reform. In just the UAE, the manufacturing industry is valued at over $300 billion, the vast majority of which is generated directly from the sweat of domestic workers. If the United States and others were to establish a similar policy to the UFLPA in tackling the GCC’s embrace of kafala, the pressure of conditional investment would be multiplied, and the chances of abolition greatly increased.

There is no question that these actions would be beneficial for larger reform efforts, but to assume that immediate substantive change will occur is unfortunately unrealistic. No legislation nor diplomatic strategy can be expected to work without genuine progress on the ground; an authentic change in domestic administrative culture is necessary. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other countries that legitimize the

kafala system must realize internally that their current mode of operation

not depend on petrochemicals forever, political change is on the horizon.

is not just morally reprehensible but economically unsustainable. As labor markets become more competitive in a post-pandemic global economy, effectively enslaving over 90% of a domestic workforce is not exactly conducive to attracting new laborers. In fact, low labor mobility is frequently cited as a major factor in the limited growth potential of private sector operations in the Gulf, as workers simply do not want to risk becoming forced laborers themselves. Nations that contribute to the labor force under the kafala system, most notably Uganda and the Philippines, have gone as far as to successfully ban their citizens from working in the GCC until kafala-related abuses are rectified. In the case of the Philippines, the measure was recently lifted after considerable improvements were made to workers’ conditions in Saudi Arabia, demonstrating the efficacy of sustained pressure. Other kafala nations might also find themselves isolated from private business partners, as optical concerns are more relevant to commerce now than ever. Though the GCC has remained tight-lipped on the issue, it must certainly realize that, in the very same way that it can-

At the center of this web of politics and profits stand people like Sajit and her mother–families that have been torn to shreds by the maw of this vicious system, and workers that now have to spend the remainder of their lives picking up the pieces. The international community has a responsibility to act not just because what is occurring is morally unjust, but also because, for millions of people, this is a matter of life and death. Qatar alone saw 6,500 of its migrant workers perish in preparation for the 2022 World Cup. Elsewhere, hundreds of thousands more continue to be abused or cut off from basic contact with the outside world. Regional stakeholders are uniquely positioned to use their financial leverage as a tool of change, and if they did, they would save lives and livelihoods. The kafala system has for nearly a century generated profit off of the bruised and bloodied backs of people daring to pursue opportunity away from home, and in the same way that prior iterations of slavery have been dealt with, justice can only be truly served in its abolition.

"Saudi Arabia, the uae, and other countries that legitimize the kafala system must realize internally that their current mode of operation is not just morally reprehensible but economically unsustainable."

THE WATER CRISIS

CANADA'S FAILURE TO FIRST NATIONS COMMUNITIES

Victoria Gallacher // Barnard College ’24

February 7, 2021

On June 19, 2022, Neskantaga

First Nation, an Ojibwe community located in the heart of Northern Ontario, reached its 10,000th day without clean water. This community is living through the constant nightmare of Canada’s longest consecutive boil water advisory, first put in place in February 1995. Unfortunately, Neskantaga is not alone.

The Canadian government defines a long-term boil advisory as a “public health protection message about real or potential health risks related to drinking water” that persists consecutively over a year. When

Prime Minister Justin Trudeau was first elected in 2015, the number of drinking water advisories in First Nations communities across Canada surpassed one hundred. While this amount has slowly decreased over time as advisories have been lifted, additional advisories sprout annually. As of October 12, 2022, twenty-seven long-term drinking water advisories continue to afflict many families in First Nations communities. Although it is home to 7% of the world’s renewable freshwater resources, Canada suppresses accessibility to the nation’s Indigenous peoples, resulting in severe health

disparities, cultural destruction, and even fatal consequences. Ultimately, the persistence of the water crisis for Canada's First Nations communities highlights an essential point: the Canadian government has neglected their responsibility to support Indigenous communities for far too long. It is time they live up to their responsibilities and take action.

How Canada Arrived at the Curent First Nations Water Crisis

The water crisis is only one component of the long, treacherous relationship between First Nations communities and the Canadian government. Since the country’s birth, the Canadian federal government has legally held jurisdiction over "Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians" as outlined in the Constitution Act of 1867. This jurisdiction is further covered in depth through the Indian Act of 1876, which grants the legal identification of Indian Status, structures local governments, and outlines land management for the reserve. The act also provides First Nations with many supposed protections under law, including tax exemptions and reserve land protection from seizure and interference from provincial demands. Ultimately, however, these protections have proved a double-edged sword.

Twenty-seven long-term drinking water advisories continue to afflict First Nations communities in Canada. Photo by Council of Canadians.

The water crisis that Canadian First Nations are experiencing now results from the regulated rights of other Canadian citizens not being extended to those who live on reservations. This occurrence is possible because the Indian Act limits provincial jurisdiction which governs the standards of water for a majority of Canadians. The remnants of colonialism are apparent when examining the Act. The objective of the legislation was clear as Canada’s first Prime Minister, John A. Macdonald, stated:

authorities to choose who works on their infrastructure. The government does not keep any record regarding the relationships between these companies and the communities they were hired to help. As a result, it is not uncommon for long-term advisories to be lifted and quickly replaced with a short-term advisory label or for projects to go unfinished due to construction companies abandoning the projects.

Historical governmental discrimination towards First Nations communities persists today; the localized government outlined in the Act delegates the responsibility of water management on reserves to First Nations chiefs and councils; however, federal jurisdiction undermined their efforts to govern. Water infrastructure is 20% self-governed, and federal funding covers the remaining cost. This funding is often inadequate, and there is no evaluation of the communities ability to pay the remainder. Thus, when efforts are made to build, operate, maintain, and monitor water and wastewater systems, Canada requires communities to follow a “lowest-bidder” principle, which does not allow local

Accessibility to potable water is essential to adequate health and well-being. A majority of the Canadian population has water that is regulated by provincial and territorial legislation and is accessible at the turn of a tap. In Ontario, where over 70% of the boil water advisories impacting First Nations communities are concentrated, the Clean Water Act of Ontario (Bill 43) guides the province to "ensure that every Ontarian has access to safe drinking water." Contrastingly, the water in many First Nations communities is inaccessible, contaminated, or in insufficient quantities. Infrastructural issues include failures of a single community fountain that accumulates, water trucks that limit supplies and refills, defective home systems subjected to freezing in the winter, or treatment plants that are not sufficiently funded. All of which have led to boil water advisories concentrated disproportionally in these communities. There is a lack of regulation existing across all communities, which presents unique challenges to every reserve.

Small water systems, such as individual wells, which one in five homes on reservations use, do not qualify for government funding which leads to bottled water being

a costly means to an end for many, highlighting a deep infrastructural issue. Families are often left to choose to utilize their limited water for drinking, cooking, or cleaning. The federal government must shift to regularly monitoring the state of systems on reserves and appropriately fund the infrastructure. This is essential to ensure every home has access to clean water instead of relying on band-aid solutions. Trucking in water while restricting the autonomy of First Nations communities is not enough to resolve their infrastructure concerns.

The Indian Act and its complexities have resulted in immense suffering for First Nations communities. The government has the ability to delay and deny progress on certain projects due to the unwarranted jurisdiction over reserve governance the Act permits, restricting self-determination of communities while continuing to allow families on reserves to live without the basic necessity of clean water.

Consequences of the Water Crisis

The government’s neglect has put the lives of individuals on First Nations in jeopardy. Water significantly impacts the development and long-term health of the children growing up in these regions. Many spend their entire childhoods without access to clean drinking water. The unfiltered water is often contaminated, and some communities have been exposed to high levels of E. coli, lead, and uranium, among other contaminants. This has had extreme consequences on health, as residents report symptoms of skin diseases, gastrointestinal problems, and even birth defects. Lack of ac-

“The great aim of our legislation has been to do away with the tribal system and assimilate the Indian people in all respects with the other inhabitants of the Dominion as speedily as they are fit to change.”

cess to clean water presents systemic health problems to First Nations communities, for instance, without water that is clean and accessible, soda is often more reliable and cheaper. The overconsumption of soda contributes to higher reported issues surrounding weight maintenance, type 2 diabetes, and cancers. First Nations communities are also disproportionately diagnosed with kidney disease, high blood pressure, and mental health conditions. These circumstances have led to the life expectancy of First Nations people to be ten years shorter than other Canadians.

Given that water access is so limited, reserves were particularly vulnerable during the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, due to the inability of communities to follow recommended guidelines such as frequent handwashing. While the Canadian government focused efforts to minimize the impacts of COVID-19 and the well-being of people throughout the country, citizens living on reserves were abandoned. Access to clean water has a direct impact on one’s health, and although recent years have shone a spotlight on the importance of public health, the harsh impacts of the water crisis have continued to be ignored.

Health is not the only aspect of First Nation life eroded by the water crisis. Water is an integral part of traditional culture. Practices such as fishing, hunting, and customary practices rely on clean water due to a "culturally-understood obligation to protect water." These cultural obligations are entwined with well-being as mercury contaminated source water leads to mutated and poisoned fish.

This interconnectivity of water is immense, and the lack thereof hinders the well-being of those who live on reserves with long-term boil water advisories in terms of physical health, emotional comfort, and traditional ties.

Failed Promises, and A Pathway Forward

Clean water is only one facet of the government's enduring history of inaction, despite its promises of progress. Before coming to office in 2015, Justin Trudeau stated the following:

“We have 93 different communities under 133 different boil-water advisories. A Canadian government led by me will address this as a top priority because it’s not right in a country like Canada. This has gone on for far too long.”

After assuming his position, he claimed that he would lift all longterm advisories within five years. That target came and went in 2021, with slow progress and communities still pleading for access to clean water. Over the years, the government earmarked large amounts of funds towards elevating the crisis over the years. However, efforts remain futile as long-term boil water advisories persist for decades and new ones arise. The endurance of water advisories throughout Canada emphasizes the endless cycle of apologies and retroactive measures, instead of providing adequate attention to sup-

porting First Nations communities.

In December, a multi-million dollar settlement received court approval to compensate communities that have endured a long-term boil water advisory since 1995 with the aim to resolve infrastructure problems and address any damages to individuals. Almost a year has passed since the approval, and little information on the impact the settlement has had in helping First Nations communities has been published.

With murmurs of a snap election approaching, the interests of First Nations communities are once again being committed to as part of the electoral cycle. Trudeau and the Liberal Party have announced advancing reconciliation as one of the five priorities of the government. This commitment is made while the people of Neskantaga First Nation, among many others, continue to live without clean water, bringing into question the credibility of yet another promise.

The Canadian government has taken far too long in addressing these human rights violations. The slow-paced attitude indicates the government’s lack of real commitment to resolving the water crisis it manufactured. It must take swift action to address the promises made at the beginning of Trudeau’s government, because the endurance of the water crisis in a nation with abundant accessible fresh water is inexcusable. Canada is praised for its cultural mosaic and inclusivity, yet it continues to exclude First Nations communities from the need of fresh water. The persistence of this violation exposes Canada's illusive display of equality.

IMRAN KHAN'S REVOLUTION: PAKISTAN'S BRIGHTEST HOPE OR BLEAKEST DANGER?

Fiza Rizvi // Columbia College ’24 March 7, 2023

Although Pakistan gained its independence in 1947, it is still far from free for millions who share the dream of democracy. The road to popular democratic rule has been fickle: no Prime Minister in Pakistan’s history has served an entire term. Prime Ministers have either succumbed to official charges of corruption, military coups, or political in-fighting resulting in forced resignations. Imran Khan was elected Prime Minister in August of 2018, after the former Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, was indicted by the Supreme Court on embezzlement and corruption charges. Khan’s campaign of anticorruption in 2018 mobilized the youth, with the highest ever voter turnout among first-time voters. Yet, a mere three and a half years later, parliament ousted Khan by a vote of no confidence and installed Nawaz Sharif’s brother as Prime Minister. Khan now embarks on inspiring a revolutionary ‘Long March’ to call for early elections. This November, Khan was shot in the leg by an armed civilian, and many members of his party, the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, were injured and/or killed. Since then, sever-

Imran Khan addresses a Jalsa Procession in Karachi. Photo by Wasif Malik.

al conspiracies ensued: Khan alleged the U.S.’s involvement in backing his opponents in their attempts to oust him and accused his military and political opponents of an assassination attempt. Relations between Islamabad and Washington—and between the Pakistani military and Khan—soured. For Pakistan’s youth, Khan embodies a shining alternative to Pakistan’s broken system, but his critics labeled him as a ‘right-wing nationalist.’ Is Khan a visionary reformist cultivating meaningful

change, or a political agitator rattling the cage to no avail?

Khan’s critics claim he is playing a losing game, alienating powerful western allies and worsening Pakistan’s already tense relationship with its military. With issues of inflation and climate disasters, critics question if Khan is acting at the right time. However, it can be argued that the losing game is to surrender the people’s will in moments when authentic politics are needed

most. Crises of environmental destruction, economic downturn, and civil-military dynamics will not be effectively resolved by politicians concerned with how much they can embezzle without raising suspicion. The placement of Shabaz Sharif as Prime Minister is a clear perpetuation of the dynastic politics that Pakistan has long suffered under. Exchanging the people’s will for a passive and unfettered transition works directly against the principle of self-determination that has been revered as the pinnacle of democracy.

Khan was charged with terrorism this summer for threatening to sue a judge and police officers. Magistrate Ali Javed reported Khan criticizing the inspector-general of police forces and a judge at one of Khan’s rallies; the terrorism charge follows the British-colonial sedition laws. Since the Pakistani judicial and military institutions historically upended their theoretical impartiality to instead influence politics, Khan’s threat to their hold on political power makes retaliation expected. When setting aside even the out-dated colonial law meant to subordinate Pakistanis as British subjects, the employment of the sedition laws to uphold terrorism charges against Khan is a mere reflection of the power structure Khan and young people wish to see removed. When criticism is received as sedition and hyperbolized to terrorism, a reformation is critical; Pakistan’s power system is not a livable one to be accepted with passivity by citizens. Khan is not playing a losing game. He has already reinvigorated a historically politically-apathetic demo-

graphic in Pakistan and unveiled the lengths the establishment will go to interrupt opening the political arena.

Alienation from the West is a consequence of the War on Terror for many Pakistanis, including Khan. The lack of foreign cooperation and the United States’ narrow focus on anti-terrorism, rather than key points like economic partnerships, for conducting foreign policy with Pakistan has left a growing resentment among the Pakistani population. Nationalism has already been stoked within Pakistan against the interference of the west in the War on Terror. During the War on Terror, US-led drone strikes killed

nearly 60,000 Pakistanis, including 20,000 civilians, leaving a deeply unpopular opinion of the West. Imran Khan did not rouse anti-west sentiment nor did he invoke ‘rightwing nationalism’. His rhetoric is a product of poor foreign policy coordination between the former Pakistani government and Washington. It is negligent to presume Khan created an anti-western climate in Pakistan when anti-westernism has long inundated the climate of countries from the Middle-East to South Asia harmed by poor collaboration and ineffective targeting from the West.

What remains true, despiteall criticisms of Imran Khan, is that

he has opened the political realm to Pakistanis who feel disenfranchised by the military-judicial power over civilians. The answer for ‘when is the right timing for a political reform in Pakistan’ remains the same: as soon as possible. A nation self-proclaimed as a democracy all while the military and politicized judiciary stand as its core pillars cannot flourish. When reform is a necessity, it is not a matter of when, but by who. Imran Khan embodies the spirit of the revolutionary force that Pakistan needs to actualize its democracy so it is no longer a futile dream of its people.

Imran Khan at the 2012 Annual Meeting of the World Economic Forum. Photo by Remy Steinegger.

SHUTDOWNS AND BLACKOUTS: AN INTERNATIONAL FAILURE TO POST-COUP SUDAN

March 30, 2023

On October 25th of last year, protesters across Sudan were met with an unwelcome greeting by the government: total internet blackout. But on the anniversary of the violent military coup that displaced former Sudanese transition government leader Abdalla Hamdok, the government’s response was all-too familiar.

Today, the international community is holding its breath for the country. Sudan is facing severe food shortages amplified by the climate crisis, and a strain in the wheat market exacerbated by the war in Ukraine—substantially decreasing the nation’s economic activity. And while many grassroots protest movements (predominantly populated by students) have seen marginal progress in mounting strength against the state and the new-found military government, the new government has dismantled most of the resistance. Under the helm of mili-

tary general Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the signal sent by the government remains the same: stand down, or be ready for stun grenades and tear gas. Though the Sudanese people have fought off internet shutdowns and sweeping political repression by the coup government for almost a year and half, they have largely been met with silence and complacency from the international community.

Sudan has been embroiled in

Darfur region of the country. Most notably in October of 2021, the people’s renewed hope for Hamdok, a former Deputy Executive Secretary to the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and women’s political rights advocate, as a democratic beacon was left in shambles after al-Burhan, once a general under Hamdok himself, initiated his own military coup against the leader. Al-Burhan has since committed to a mass-policy of jailing and persecuting political dissidents and human rights advocates across the country.

Though al-Burhan’s military takeover was backed by pro-military civilian groups, many of those groups have since reversed course on their approval of his government and cabinet.

civil conflict ever since the 2019 coup that displaced former dictator Omar al-Bashir, a staunch human rights violator who committed a host of mass atrocities and ethnic cleansings against the Darfuri people across the

Between January and October of 2022 alone, nearly 380 civilians had been killed from interspersed conflict between Arab and non-Arab groups across the country, facilitated by a disorganized and brutal military response. Most alarming is the reigni-

Shiva Yeshlur // Columbia College ’26

"Though the Sudanese people have fought off internet shutdowns and sweeping political repression by the coup government for almost a year and half, they have largely been met with silence and complacency from the international community."

tion of conflict in Darfur, which was already struggling to find peace after al-Bashir’s earlier campaign of violence in the region.

Moreover, the international community’s response to the conflict has been profoundly complicated by a renewed Russia-Saudi-UAE-Egypt bloc emboldening al-Burhan’s autocratic response to the uprisings. Russia in its own right has viewed the larger Sahel region, a segment of North Africa bounded by the Sahara to the north, with an eager eye as a potential site for military influence. It

has continued its pursuit of engaging in a policy of unconditional military aid, in strong contrast to the U.S.’ policy of democratically-conditioned aid.

For Saudi Arabia and its allies, who sent three billion dollars in aid to the government after the 2019 fallout, the coup government is substantially more advantageous than a democratic one.They were particularly important in shaping the aftermath of the 2019 coup, as foreign investment from Saudi Arabia and the UAE provided leeway for the

military-backed government to resist calls for a civilian-led government. The pivot to the Sahel is likely indicative of a larger exploitation of power vacuums in the region – all the while the U.S. and its allies are absorbed in other geopolitical conflicts, perhaps most obviously in Ukraine.

It’s unlikely that a policy of humanitarian aid is likely to compete with either Moscow or Riyadh’s allies, and yet that somehow still remains Washington’s strategy today. That’s why a stronger response to the crisis can’t simply come from aid package

Former Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok and French President Emmanuel Macron. Hamdok’s engagement with the international community during the democratic transition after the 2019 coup earned him widespread recognition for his efforts.

Photo by Laurent Blevennec.

after aid package—rather, it must target the root of the Sudanese government’s stronghold. And central to this stronghold is al-Burhan’s aggressive policy of information blackout.

The government’s rep aed tactic of silencing protestors through internet crackdowns has not only suppressed communication about protests and potential human rights abuses, but has also served to create an opaque curtain preventing the rest of the world from active engagement in the crisis. And for Sudan, the situation is likely not to improve without a substantial rethinking of the broader international community’s response.

While the country is already bearing the brunt of an autocratic

regime and a substantial humanitarian toll, a new frontier for disaster threatens the region even further: a climate catastrophe. A report by the UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) indicates that, unless Sudan is able to develop climate policies to combat food insecurity and natural resource mismanagement, the reality for citizens in the country will likely only be exacerbated by the global climate crisis. Downturns in rainfall patterns and an increasing threat to food distribution will likely have a tremendous impact on food insecurity in the country. Combine that with a larger risk for natural disaster damage and the unique threats posed to women and other marginalized communities in the region, and Sudan is headed

down a difficult path. And in a country where rising sea levels and natural disasters will likely leave the region uninhabitable by 2060, stronger climate strategies must be a part of the humanitarian strategy.

A climate disaster does not just have implications for the environment, but will likely make it substantially more difficult to form a united political resistance. As an aptly named UN Human Rights Watch article demonstrates, “For Sudan, Hope Isn’t a strategy.” Rather, real and tangible progress must be made to fight for what some might argue is some of the last remaining bastions of hope for the country.

As newspapers, foreign jour nalists, and national and international media continue to remain silent as the conflict brews, it is becoming more evident than ever before that a new strategy must be undertaken to successfully challenge the military government and its continued abuses against the Sudanese people. As the Council on Foreign Relations writes, “There is no papering over the chasm between civilians’ vision of the Sudanese state and the model preferred by those currently controlling it.”

Sudan will only be able to combat its growing security and climate risks with the aid of a sweeping international response that does not simply provide a short-term solution, but confronts and pressures al-Burhan’s government in the longterm and re-democratizes the spread of critical information in the country.

Darfur Refugees in Sam Ouandja, Central African Republic. Photo by hdptcar.