Human development Report 2013 on Citizen Security in Latin America by Programa de las Naciones Unidas para el Desarrollo en América Latina y el Caribe

Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014 Citizen Security with a human face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America

Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014 CITIZEN SECURITY WITH A HUMAN FACE: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America Copyright © 2013 By the United Nations Development Programme One UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017, USA All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be produced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise without prior permission. ISBN 978-9962-688-22-8 Website: www.latinamerica.undp.org November 2013 EDITORIAL PRODUCTION Regional Service Centre for Latin America and the Caribbean Regional Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Revision and edition Fernando Muñoz Cover Design Francesca Starr Jessup Helen Clare Dixon English Translation Alfa Omega Impresores Maisa Ferro, Corotú Estudio de Diseño Design and Layout Printed in Panama For a list of any errors or omissions found subsequent to printing, please visit our website at www. latinamerica.undp.org The analysis and recommendations of this report do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), its Executive Board, or the United Nations Member States. The views presented in this report are the sole responsibility of its authors.

Prologue The Latin American region has established itself firmly on the international stage, and is making progress on poverty and inequality reduction and on economic growth and financial stability. There are, however, still challenges: taken as a whole the region carries a heavy burden of violence, registering more than 100,000 homicides per year. Most countries in the region have homicide rates which are much higher than for other regions and which are considered to be at epidemic levels by the World Health Organization. The human and social costs of this violence are high. This reality led UNDP to dedicate its Regional Human Development Report 2013-14 for Latin America to the challenge of providing citizen security. Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and proposals for Latin America maps the problems of crime and violence in the region, and offers important recommendations for improving public policies on citizen security. The report builds on UNDPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Central America Human Development Report, Opening Spaces to Citizen Security and Human Development launched in 2009, and its Caribbean Human Development Report, Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security, of 2012. Around the world, rule of law and citizen security are key elements of UNDPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s programming. We work on justice and law enforcement, and on preventive measures like generating employment opportunities and promoting social inclusion and a culture of peace and stability. Citizen security, as defined in this UNDP Report, is a sensitive issue which preoccupies many political decision-makers, and reverberates in the heat of electoral campaigns. It is not surprising that the issue has escalated in Latin America to become the number one public concern in many countries. The level of insecurity many experience impedes human development. This report analyzes the phenomenon of citizen security in-depth, studying successful experiences, and proposing concrete recommendations for improvements. UNDPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean has involved both experts and high-level political leaders in the discussion and preparation of the report, and has collected a wealth of data and analyses on which it plans to improve continuously in both scope and quality.

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UNDP is actively working on citizen security in most of the countries of Latin America. In some cases, we have supported the development of comprehensive national policies on citizen security and coexistence, implemented observatories of violence, and engaged in legal reforms to achieve arms control or to design local security plans. The results are promising in many countries. With this new report launched, we are ready to help turn its proposals into actions, and to enlarge our partnerships with the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean to improve citizen security and life human development.

Helen Clark Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

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Presentation Latin America today shows stronger and more integrated economies, less poverty, more consolidated democracies, as well as States that have taken on greater responsibilities in terms of social protection. However, the weak link in the region is crime and insecurity. Throughout the last decade the region has suffered an epidemic of violence, accompanied by the growth and dissemination of crime, as well as an increase in fear among citizens. Between 2000 and 2010, the murder rate in the region grew by 11 percent, whereas it fell or stabilized in most other regions in the world. In the last decade, more than one million people have died in Latin America and the Caribbean as a result of criminal violence. Moreover, considering the countries for which data is available, robberies have almost tripled over the last 25 years. On a typical day in Latin America, 460 people suffer the consequences of sexual violence, most of them women. Violence and crime directly harm the rights that are at the core of human development: life itself and the physical and material integrity of people. The deterioration of security has not been a uniform phenomenon.. In some countries, lethal violence is what most affects the population, whereas in others murder levels are relatively low but the sharp increase in crimes against property has triggered a public perception of insecurity. Meanwhile, within these countries the situation varies greatly, with some municipalities, states or departments showing indicators comparable to those of European nations, and others where lethal violence is even greater than in countries at war. Countries in the region show large deficits in capacities concerning justice and security, which are reflected in alarming levels of impunity, the crises in their prison systems and the feeling of mistrust citizens harbor regarding the institutions of justice and the police. In light of these deficits, privatization of security has gained momentum, which deepens inequality in access to security and leaves unsolved the challenges the State faces as the main guarantor of citizen security. Simultaneously, community bonds such as the family, schools and the community itself have weakened in some contexts as social tensors which would enable cooperation and positive coexistence, leading to distorted forms of organization driven by fear and distrust such as “vigilantism” (taking justice in one’s own hands), as well as support for “iron fist” policies.

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In order to examine what is behind this phenomenon of insecurity and offer recommendations to improve government policies in this matter, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) decided to produce the present Report on Human Development for Latin America. The report offers a regional view of citizen security for the 18 countries in continental Latin America, from Mexico to Argentina, and the Dominican Republic. The report excludes English-speaking Caribbean countries because their situation was analyzed in depth in the UNDP Human Development Report Human Development and the shift to better citizen security (2012). While preparing this report, the UNDP Bureau for Latin America and the Caribbean brought together a distinguished team of specialists coordinated by political scientist Rafael FernĂĄndez de Castro, with the support of high-ranking public representatives and civil society. This investigative and propositional effort to shape better and more effective public policies was made possible by the determined commitment of the Spanish Government through the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation which established the Spain-UNDP Fund for Latin America. This is another demonstration of the Spanish cooperation solidarity with the region and the bonds that tie it to Latin America. This report is also an example of collaboration between different regional agencies and organizations, as well as within the United Nations System itself. The economic costs of crime addressed in this report were researched along with the InterAmerican Development Bank (IADB); the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) supported some of the prison surveys, the results of which help to better understand the complexities of crime. The participation in the reportâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Advisory Council of the top managers from the IADB, the CAF, the Organization of American States (OAS), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), the IberoAmerican General Secretariat (SEGIB) and the World Bank made it possible to bring together a valuable diversity of visions and data to our study. In the United Nations system, we received the support and active participation of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), and the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. In the UNDP, the Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) and the Human Development Report Office (HDRO) were fundamental partners in the process of preparing this study. There is no single magic formula to solve the problem, but insecurity can be remedied. Latin America has experiences and lessons learned that are analyzed in the report. These experiences range from the improvement of police work derived from their deployment by blocks and neighborhoods and their close work with communities, through to the collection of statistical data and the adoption of new technologies to locate hot spots of criminal activity and focus efforts on prevention at those risk areas, as well as the creation of specialized units within the justice and security systems to provide support to vulnerable groups, such as young people and women who have been victims of crime. The different threats to citizen security must be addressed with differentiated responses that take into consideration the level of criminal organization and the places in which they occur: the home, schools or the public environment. Lastly, security policies need to be evaluated periodically in terms of their effectiveness and impact, ensuring that they do not result in even greater levels of violence and that they fully respect human rights. VI

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The Regional Human Development Report calls on governments in Latin America and the Caribbean to shift from reflection to action, with creative and innovative responses, learning from successes and failures. Progress in citizen security does not stem from a single isolated policy or action, but from a multi-sector approach and a series of policies including preventive measures, institutional reforms, sufficient public investment, changes in the relationship between the State and communities, broad and sustained political will, and the adoption of more modern and effective systems of information and intervention. Thus, rather than thinking of a one-size-fits-all model, decision makers must design a series of policies and reforms with clear goals to address needs in the short, medium and long term. To accomplish this, each countryâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s social and political forces are advised to arrive at a National Agreement for Citizen Security so as to align public and private efforts towards the reduction of crime and violence as a State policy. Among other recommendations, we propose the creation of a Regional Forum on Citizen Security in Latin America and the Caribbean, open to the participation of nongovernmental stakeholders, with the aim of identifying common challenges, sharing successful experiences and identifying mechanisms of cooperation. This report urges us all to act at the local, national, regional and global level to build a vision of citizen security that prioritizes human development. Citizen security with a human face is an attainable objective.

Heraldo MuĂąoz Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

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Introduction This report analyses citizen insecurity, which is one of the critical challenges to human development in Latin America. Despite the fact that over the course of the last 12 years the Human Development Index has grown at an annual rate of 0.94% (i) due to improvements in health, education and life expectancy, human development in the region continues to be affected by inequality, lack of social mobility and insecurity. The report draws on the conceptual and analytical improvements highlighted by other United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) reports on citizen security, including the Central American report “Opening Spaces to Citizen Security and Human Development 20092010” and the Caribbean report entitled “Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security” (2012). The report is structured in three sections: evidence, responses and guidelines for action.

The evidence Chapter One places people at the centre of the definition of citizen security. UNDP considers citizen security as a necessary condition for human development, a public good whose provision is the primary responsibility of the State. The chapter argues that strengthening citizen security goes hand in hand with the construction of democratic institutions and ways of living that provide effective protection to people’s physical and material integrity in accordance with human rights. “Behind crime and violence” (Chapter Two) responds to a Latin American paradox: Why, despite advances in indicators of regional growth and development in the last decade, have both objective and perceived insecurity increased? Four sets of variables explain Latin America’s vulnerabilities to crime and violence: (a) economic structures that conditioned a poor-quality economic growth focused on consumption, with insufficient social mobility and the generation of “aspirational crime”; (b) changes in social institutions such as the increase in single parent households, high dropout levels in education and urban growth; (c) the drivers firearms, alcohol and drugs; and (d) the lack of institutional capacity of Latin American states, particularly in the provision of justice. “The insecurity map” (Chapter Three) provides a snapshot of regional crime and violence on the basis of three indicators: homicide, robbery and fear, the latter built on data from perception and victimization surveys. The map highlights the differences between and within countries, and also illustrates how insecurity is a regional challenge. In each country, the

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perception of security has deteriorated, and robbery is viewed as one of the greatest threats by citizens. While the homicide rate has stabilized and even declined in some countries, it remains high in 11 of the 18 countries analysed, the rate being higher than 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants, a level considered epidemic. Chapter Four “The major threats to citizen security” looks at the main expressions of crime and violence affecting Latin America - street crime, organized crime, violence by and against youth, gender violence, illegal violence by state actors, and corruption. Not everything that happens in the region may be attributed to transnational organized crime, which operates in a complex context of local crime and violence that occurs both in private settings and the public sphere. The interwoven nature of these threats explains the deterioration of security in the region and the emergence of a spiral of violence in some cities and regions of Latin America. Chapter Five “The costs of insecurity” explores how insecurity impacts at least three dimensions of human development -individuals, the social fabric and democratic institutions-. It also includes three studies on the cost of violence and crime. The first is a study in five countries on the anticipated costs of preventing violence, the costs that occur as a result of crime and the costs incurred by the State to punish those responsible. The second estimates how homicides affect life expectancy and how this in turn impacts upon the decline of gross domestic product. Finally, the third one analyses the efficiency of government spending in maintaining order and security.

The response of the actors Chapter Six “The response of the State” analyses the major reforms to the basic institutions in the chain of justice: police, judges, prosecutors and prisons. It includes a special section dedicated to prevention efforts, indicating the need to redouble efforts towards inter sector coordination of prevention, an integral component of citizen security policy. Each section highlights lessons learned and critical aspects of the State’s capacity in order to ensure that public provision of citizen security is effective, legitimate and respectful of human rights. Chapter Seven explores the counterpart of a responsible State “The responses of non-State actors” through their response strategies: functional, non-functional and those that fall within an unregulated grey area. The chapter shows the richness of experiences in Latin America driven by civil society organizations and social movements. Active and functional citizen participation has allowed actions to democratize, supplement and monitor public provision of citizen security. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPOR T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

“International cooperation” is discussed in Chapter Eight through three sections: advances and challenges of sub regional cooperation, cooperation with the United States and cooperation with international organizations. The chapter shows that Latin America is emerging as a new player in global cooperation on security. It underlines the need to align and coordinate the various cooperation efforts, including South-South cooperation, to strengthen local capacities in the recipient countries.

Guidelines for Action Security can be improved, as shown in Chapter Nine “Interventions: Lessons Learned” which features five lessons from regional initiatives to reduce homicide and crime levels in areas of high violence and insecurity: Fica Vivo (Brazil), Plan Cuadrante (Colombia), Barrio Seguro (Dominican Republic), gang truces (El Salvador) and Todos Somos Juarez (Mexico). The chapter shows that hard-line policies have failed in the region, and presents a range of responses that empirical evidence indicates are optimal to address the various threats to citizen security. Finally, Chapter Ten “Ten recommendations for a secure Latin America” presents strategic priorities with specific recommendations for Latin American decision makers and citizens to achieve citizen security. It includes actions to address and manage threats to citizen security, both in the short term and through reforms and transformations that require sustained efforts over time. It presents specific recommendations for three groups that are essential to the inclusive construction of citizen security: youth, women and victims of violence and crime. The report makes a systematic effort to identify the specific needs and demands of youth and women in the field of citizen security. Young people, particularly young men in conditions of exclusion and low social mobility, have become the group most affected by the high levels of lethal violence that characterize the region. Women, for their part, whether girls or adults, are facing threats to their physical, emotional and material integrity; these threats are often invisible and require urgent action by the State to establish effective prevention and punishment. Latin America is currently at a crucial point in strengthening the citizen security of its inhabitants. This report “Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America” aims at being a tool to promote this process.

[i] This figure was calculated based on the average change observed in the 18 countries of the Report, excluding the Caribbean.

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Regional Human Development Report 2013-2014 Citizen Security with a Human Face: Evidence and Proposals for Latin America Helen Clark Administrator United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Rebeca Grynspan Under-Secretary General of the United Nations and Associate Administrator United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Heraldo Muñoz Assistant Secretary General of the United Nations and Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Jessica Faieta Deputy Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Freddy Justiniano Director ai Regional Center for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Igor Garafulic Senior Policy Adviser of Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Pablo Ruiz Practice Leader Crisis, Prevention and Recuperation For Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

Rafael Fernández de Castro Medina Report Coordinator Gema Santamaría Balmaceda Senior Report Advisor INFORME REGIONAL DE DES ARROLLO H UMA NO 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Advisory Council

Michelle Bachelet Former President - Chile Former Executive Director of UN Women Alicia Bárcena Executive Secretary of the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (CEPAL) Jolita Butkeviciene Director Latin America and Caribbean, DG Development and Cooperation EuropeAid Daniel Chávez Morán Founder of Vidanta Group Álvaro Colom Former President The Republic of Guatemala Gino Costa Former Minister of Defense - Peru President of Ciudad Nuestra Juan Ramón de la Fuente Former Secretary of Health - Mexico Former Dean of the Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM) Jorge Domínguez Vice Provost for International Affairs, Special Advisor for International Studies to the Dean of the Faculty of Arts and Sciences, and Chairman of the Harvard Academy for International and Area Studies Patricia Espinosa Former Secretary of Foreign Affairs - Mexico Yury Fedotov Executive Director United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime General Director The United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV)

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Leonel Fernández Former President the Dominican Republic Oscar Fernández-Taranco Assistant Secretary-General for Political Affairs United Nations Igor Garafulic Secretary of Advisory Council Senior Policy Adviser of Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Enrique García Executive President of the Development Bank of Latin America (CAF) Enrique Iglesias Secretary General of the Ibero-American General Secretariat (SEGIB) José Miguel Insulza Secretary General of the Organization of American States Nelson Jobim Former Minister of Defense - Brazil Former Minister of Justice - Brazil Anders Kompass Director of the Field Operations and Technical Cooperation Division Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights Ricardo Lagos Former President - Chile President of the Democracy and Development Foundation María Emma Mejía Former Secretary General of UNASUR Former Minister of Foreign Affairs - Colombia

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Carlos Menocal Former Minister of the Interior - Guatemala Antanas Mockus Former Presidential Candidate Colombia Former Mayor of Bogota

Carlos Romero Minister of Government Plurinational State of Bolivia Norman Quijano Former Mayor - San Salvador El Salvador

Luis Alberto Moreno President of the Inter-American Development Bank

Alvaro Saieh President Corp Group Interhold

Heraldo Muñoz Assistant Secretary General Regional Director for Latin America and the Caribbean United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

José Ignacio Salafranca PP Eurodeputy President of the Euro – Latin American Parlamentary Assembly Spokesperson for the European Foreign Commission EPP Group

Oscar Naranjo Former General Director of the Colombian National Police Force Executive Director of the Monterrey Latin American Institute for Technology System

Gregory Treverton Director of the RAND Center for Global Risk and Security

Ana Palacio Former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Spain Elected Counselor of the Spanish State Council Beatriz Paredes Ambassador of Mexico to Brazil Former Mexican Senator Renate Rennie President of the Tinker Foundation Inc. Gonzalo Robles General Secretary of International Cooperation for Development of Spain and Minister of Foreign Affair and Cooperarion Development of Spain Roberto Russell President of Vidanta Group

Hasan Tuluy World Bank Regional Vice President of RVP for Latin America & the Caribbean Arturo Valenzuela Former Assitant Secretary of State for Nestern Hemisohere Affairs, United States of America Founding Director of the Centre for Latin American Studies at the University of Georgia Tabaré Vázquez Former President of the Oriental Republic Uruguay Joaquín Villalobos Security Advisor Researcher at the Development Research Centre (CIDAC) - Mexico Ernesto Zedillo Former President - Mexico Director of the Yale Center for the Study of Globalization

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Authors Enrique Desmond Arias (Estados Unidos) Nadjeli Babinet (Mexico) Marcelo Bergman (Argentina) Jose Miguel Cruz (El Salvador) Hugo Frühling (Chile)

Juan Carlos Garzón (Colombia) Hernando Gómez Buendía (Colombia) Eduardo Moncada (Estados Unidos) Gema Santamaria (Mexico) Arlene Tickner (Estados Unidos)

Consultants Carlos Basombrío (Peru) Adriana Beltrán (Colombia) Raul Benítez Manaut (Mexico) Armando Carballido (España) Lucía Dammert (Peru)

Cristina Eguizabal (El Salvador) Adam Isacson (Estados Unidos) Michael Layton (Estados Unidos) Robert Muggah (Canada) Jorge Restrepo (Colombia) Ilona Szabó (Brasil)

Report Drafting Team Nadjeli Babinet Patricia Bordier Rafael Fernandez de Castro Medina Juan Carlos Garzon

María Isabel López Santibáñez Paul Moch Gema Santamaria Balmaceda Iván Sierra

Peer Reviewers Claudio Beato (Brasil) Jenny Pearce (Reino Unido) Michael Shifter (Estados Unidos)

Statistics Héctor Duarte Paul Moch

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Oscar Ortega Leticia Ramírez Ernesto Ulloa

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United Nations Development Programme Alejandro Álvarez Gustavo Arriola Carolina Azevedo Pablo Basz Neus Bernabeu Anyarlene Berges Gerardo Berthin María Valeria Cabrera Elia Carrasco Carmen De la Cruz Gabriela Catterberg Gabriela Dutra Eveline Debrujin Rafael Espinosa

Alan Fuchs Claudia Gazol Juan Pablo Gordillo Alfredo González George Gray Molina Estefanía Grijalva Maribel Gutierrez Maurice Kugler Tania Guzman Daniel Luz Jose Machillanda Fernando Masaya Arturo Mautte

Gerardo Noto Marta Ortega Baldonedo Eduardo Ortíz-Juárez Fernando Pachano Rebeca Pérez Stefano Pettinato Gonzalo Pizarro José Pineda Marta Ruedas Claudia de Saravia Manuel Sessa Marcela Smutt Rodolfo De la Torre María Loreto Torres

Agradecimientos

We recognize the generous support of the Spanish Agency of International Development Cooperation (AECID) through the UNDP/Spain Fiduciary Fund. We also recognize the collaboration and contribution of the Latin American Development Bank (CAF), the InterAmerican Development Bank (BID), the World Bank, the Mexican National Institute of Technology (ITAM), the International Development Research Center (IDRC), Vanderbilt University-Latin America Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), and the Woodroe Wilson Center (WWC). We would like to thank contributions: Nathalie Alvarado, Cynthia J. Arnson, John Bayley, Hugo Beteta, John de Bôer, Pedro Cote, Lauri Garcia de Dueñas, Henriette Geiger, Markus Gottsbacher, Maria Isabel Gutierrez, Eduardo Lopez-Moreno, Beatriz Magaloni, Natalia Ordaz, Zulia Orozco, Marta Pedrajas, Carlos Mario Perea, Victor Rico, Cristian Riego, Ernesto Rodriguez, Ana Maria San Juan, Elkin Velasquez and Jose Antonio Zabalgoitia. We would especially like to thank Carlor Vergara of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, and Sandeep Chawla, Angela Me and Salomé Flores of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).

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Contents

CHAPTER 1. CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT Human development: a perspective on Latin America Citizen Security: a key focus for people The dimensions of insecurity and principle threats Three key ideas

3 3 5 5 7

CHAPTER 2. BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Socio-economic factors: aspirational crime 15 23 Social factors: social fabric and social control Drivers of Crime and Violence 30 Institutional Vulnerabilities 33 Recommendations 36 CHAPTER 3. THE INSECURITY MAP

Analytical and methodological framework 41 Homicides: magnitude and particularities of the challenge 46 Robbery 55 Victimisation by social strata and age 64 Recommendations 69 CHAPTER 4. THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Street Crime 75 Organized Crime 76 Violence and Crime committed by and against youth 81 Gender violence 82 Illegal Violence by state actors 85 Corruption 86 Recommendations 86 CHAPTER 5. THE COSTS OF INSECURITY Victimisation and the Fear of Violence and Crime Impacts of Insecurity on the Social Fabric, Urban Spaces and Communities Insecurity as an Obstacle for the Expansion of Capacities and Individual Freedoms The Impact of Insecurity on Democratic Governance The Costs of Insecurity for Latin America Recommendations

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93 95 97 99 101 107

CHAPTER 6. THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

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The State’s capacities: its organization and operation 111 The police 113 The justice system 117 The prisons 122 Crime Prevention Policies 129 Recommendations 133 CHAPTER 7. THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

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140 Functional responses for building security Dysfunctional responses for building security 145 “Grey area” responses: the importance of their regulation 147 Media response: a key role for security 151 Recommendations 154 CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

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International Cooperation: an intersecting constellation 159 United States: Traditional cooperation and opening to new alternatives 166 New areas of cooperation with the United States 167 International Organisations: Local level strengthening, global level alignment 168 Recommendations 172 CHAPTER 9. INTERVENTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

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Responses to Threats to Citizen Security 178 Hard-line Responses and their Negative Effects 181 Interventions: Lessons Learned, Challenges and Replication 184 Recommendations 195 CHAPTER 10. TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SECURE LATIN AMERICA 199 NOTES

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

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CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

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Arre, Belkis RamÃrez, 2003

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CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Latin America stands today at a key juncture to forge a future in which its citizens can enhance their capacities and take full advantage of its greater opportunities. Over the last few years, the region has made significant improvements in its levels of economic growth, health, and education, as well as in the reduction of poverty (UNDP 2013). After years of political and economic instability, the region’s citizens and communities also seek to strengthen their democracies in order to make them more just, pluralist, and inclusive (UNDPOEA 2010). In spite of these advances, human development in the region faces major challenges: Latin America as a region has the greatest levels of inequality in the world. When adjusting the Human Development Index (HDI)1 to measure levels of inequality, the real picture emerges of a region that has been unable to ensure economic and social rights for the great majority of its population. Inequality, low levels of social mobility, and the inter-generational transmission of poverty are crucial obstacles (UNDP 2010a), and much remains to be done in terms of education, health, and gender equality (UNDP 2013, 29-31, 64). On another plane, there are deficits in the scope, efficiency, and legitimacy of Latin American States that must be overcome to guarantee the exercise of full and active citizenship in conditions of equality. In this context, crime and violence are serious obstacles for full human development in Latin America. Its population points to these problems as key priorities, both through public opinion surveys and constant demands on public decision-making institutions, because of the way they negatively affect people’s daily lives, communities, and institutions. This report focuses on citizen security in Latin America. It analyses its dimensions and impacts while identifying the responses that can be adopted by Latin American countries to confront crime and violence as a means to achieve higher levels of human development.

The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) has been addressing this issue for more than two decades. It has pioneered an understanding of citizen security from a human development perspective. In different national, regional, and global reports, the UNDP has called for reflection and action to curb the growing problems of insecurity and violence affecting Latin American countries, and the impact they have on people’s quality of life and development.2 This chapter seeks to enrich the analytical framework promoted by UNDP based on a regional vision that highlights common vulnerabilities and opportunities, and thus enables learning and joint actions above and beyond the particular characteristics of each country. The chapter contains four sections. The first describes the human development focus and then presents an overview of the region’s performance in human development. The second section defines what is understood by citizen security in this report. The third presents the dimensions of insecurity and the main threats to the security of Latin American citizens. The fourth and last section proposes three key ideas about citizen security in Latin America.

Human development: a perspective on Latin America The concept of human development was a milestone in how countries and the international community understand and measure development. This concept recognises that the true wealth of a nation resides in its people, and that the aim of development should be the “creation of conditions that enable people to enjoy a long, healthy, and creative life” (UNDP 1990, 10). Human development should be understood as the process of expanding people’s choices, freedoms, and capacities in order to enjoy health and wellbeing, and to have access to knowledge and resources necessary to lead life with dignity. Human development should be present in all aspects of social processes, such as democratic governance, environmental sustainability, the construction of more just and inclusive societies, and the prevention and resolution of conflicts. This requires the REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPOR T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

establishment of certain founding principles, namely:

1 CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

• Equity: the idea of fairness between women and men, social groups, ethnic groups, generational groups, and present and future generations. • Productivity: the full participation of people in the process of income generation. • Participation: the capacity of communities and social groups to influence decision-making that affects their lives. • Sustainability: the freedom to earn a living consistently and to receive a fair share of the wealth. An examination of Latin America’s achievements in terms of the HDI and other associated indicators (inequality and gender, for example) provides a relatively positive impression of the region. All countries in the region have experienced sustained improvements in their human development indexes since 1990 (UNDP 2013, 151). The region registers comparatively high HDI levels3, and its HDI components are closer to the “high” level than the “middle” level of human development (UNDP 2013, 23). The inequality-adjusted human development index (IHDI) shows that Latin America has advanced in the reduction of inequality in development opportunities, particularly in education. Between 1990 and 2010, the region advanced in the reduction of inequality in education—enrolment and expected years of schooling— and this has contributed to closing the educational opportunities gap for human development (UNDP 2013, 29-30). With regard to gender inequality, Latin America shows important levels of improvement. For example, the percentage of women holding parliamentary seats is 22.38% in Latin America, which places the region above the average observed in other regions of the world (UNDP 2013, 159). The satisfaction surveys measuring people’s perception about their own human development indicate that Latin America in general, has a positive level of wellbeing. For example in the category concerning the “general satisfaction with life” —valued on a scale of 0 to 10—, the Latin American region has an average rate of satisfaction of 6.306, which places it at the highest level of satisfaction worldwide (UNDP 2013, 177). Nevertheless, key regional challenges persist. Inequality has diminished, but it continues to run deep and its effects are pronounced due to the strength with which inequalities are transmitted from generation to generation and to the low levels of social mobility that prevail in Latin America (UNDP 2010a, 25). In terms of gender equality, in spite of notable improvements in women’s participation in political life and in the labour market, the region continues to fall behind in access to education 4

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for girls and women. An example of this is the percentage of women who have completed at least secondary school, which continues to be less than 50% in 10 out of the 18 countries analysed in this report, including some countries considered to have “high human development” (UNDP 2013, 157-158).4 Moreover, the adolescent fertility rate is one of the highest in the world and continues to relate to socio-economic and educational factors, having a greater effect on women with lower levels of education and income (ECLAC 2011, 93-96). In addition to these challenges, citizen insecurity in its diverse manifestations is a fundamental obstacle to human development for all countries in the region. Without a doubt the protection of life and of people’s physical and material integrity is a fundamental pre-requisite for them to be able to attain greater capacities and effectively exercise basic freedoms. In the majority of Latin American countries, there are high levels of lethal violence with a tendency to increase that is greater compared to other regions of the world (UNODC 2011). The homicide rate for 11 of the 18 countries analysed in this report is more than 10 homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants,5 a rate considered by the World Health Organisation (WHO) as epidemic. According to the joint UNDP-Latin American Public Opinion Project survey (LAPOP-UNDP 2012) the percentage of Latin Americans who answered “yes” to the question “Have you been the victim of any criminal act in the last 12 months?” ranges from 6.9% (Panama)6 to 28.1% (Ecuador). When asked specifically about what type of criminal act they had experienced, armed robbery ranged from 8.1% (Chile) to 50.5% (Honduras). This means that in only a year, across all countries, the percentage of Latin Americans that say they have been victims of crime involving the use of violence is considerable (the regional average is 30.35%). Another issue is the perception of security, which has a real effect on the way in which people develop and relate to their surroundings. This figure is very low in the region. According to Gallup World Poll, published by the World Human Development Report (2013, 177), only 43.44% Latin Americans feel safe walking alone at night in the city or area where they live. When this statistic is compared with other regions, Latin America clearly has the lowest perception of security worldwide (in Sub Saharan Africa the percentage is 55.3%; in Europe and Central Asia 53%; in the Arab States 62.9%, and in Southern Asia 66.9%). The LAPOP-UNDP survey (2012) confirms this tendency. For example, when respondents were asked if they had restricted their places of recreation due to fears of becoming a crime victim, the percentage of people answering “yes” ranged from 20.6% in Chile to 59.1% in the Dominican Republic.

Over the last three decades, the traditional definition of security, centred on the defence of crucial State interests such as sovereignty and autonomy, has undergone important changes. At least three aspects of this definition have been questioned internationally: the idea that security is synonymous with national security or State security when facing possible external aggression; the belief that threats to security are mainly military; and the belief that such threats have an objective nature that allows them to be identified independently from prevailing political considerations (Lipschutz 1995, 6). These changes are linked to transformations that, in practical terms, have affected the realities of countries around the world, particularly due to the processes associated with globalisation. The “border” that divided the internal from the external has become diffuse, reflecting the inter-relation that exists between the national and international arenas. While some security threats can be contained on a local level, many internal dynamics —such as institutional weakness or the lack of governance— can become regional or even global threats. In the same way, transnational or global threats —such as trafficking of arms, people, and drugs— can exacerbate local conditions of insecurity (World Bank 2011; UNODC 2012; Small Arms Survey 2013). Security can be defined from multiple perspectives and grouped according to: the level of analysis adopted (individual, community, state, region, and world); the threats that are emphasised (common crimes, organised crime, war, hunger, poverty); or the public policy that are implicitly or explicitly being privileged (prevention versus repression, for example) (Baldwin 1997; Tickner and Mason 2003; Abello and Pearce 2007).7 From the point of view of this report, the definition of security is centred on the concept of citizen security and its relationship to concepts of human security and human development. Human security is defined as the condition of living free from fear and want. This is a broad concept that takes into account a wide range of threats that can put life and people’s wellbeing at risk: environmental disasters, wars, community conflicts, food insecurity, political violence, threats to health, and crime (UNDP 1994, 27-28). These threats can affect people and limit their opportunities for human development above and beyond the differences in economic development of each country (Gasper 2005, 223). In comparison with the diversity of threats included in human security, citizen security is a much more limited concept. In fact,

citizen security can be understood as a specific mode of human security, related to personal security and more specifically with threats such as crime and violence (UNDP 2005, 35; UNDP 2010b, 31).

1 CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Citizen Security: a key focus for people

Citizen security is one of the main concerns of citizens in Latin America. Crime, violence and the fear they generate, albeit with difference levels of intensity, are challenges shared by all countries across the region. For this reason, the report centres its attention on this specific aspect of human security, without rejecting a broader concept of security —involving aspects such as health, education, and food security— that provides the foundation for citizen security and human development. Citizen security encompasses a basic nucleus of rights including the right to life, the respect for a person’s physical and material integrity, and the individual’s right to lead life with dignity (Caribbean Report UNDP 2013, 7; Central American Report UNDP 2010b, 31). As with previous UNDP reports,8 this concept is centred here on the wellbeing of each person and the provision of citizen security as an indispensible requisite for human development. Equally, this report emphasises the central role and guardianship of a series of human rights that can be demanded of the State (UNDP 2010b, 38; UNDP 2013, 7). Thus, the lack of employment, poverty, inequality or the lack of freedoms, to mention just some examples, are direct obstacles for citizen co-existence and security (UNDP 2005, 32). This report considers that strengthening citizen security depends on building institutions and democratic forms of coexistence that ensure, effectively and sustainably, the physical and material integrity of each person in strict compliance with human rights. In this sense, citizen security must not be understood exclusively as a simple reduction of the rates of crime and violence. It must be the result of policy aimed at devising a comprehensive strategy that includes: improvements to the quality of life of the population; community action to prevent crimes and violence; an accessible, agile, and effective justice system; and education based on values for peaceful co-existence, respect for the law, tolerance, and building social cohesion.

The dimensions of insecurity and principle threats

Crime and violence are threats to people’s lives, to their physical integrity, and to their property. However, these must be underREGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPOR T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

stood as distinct analytical categories, given that not all crime is violent and not all acts of violence are defined as crimes under the law. Corruption and fraud, for example, are not associated with violence generally, and theft is defined as the “obtaining without violence another person’s property without the owner’s consent” (UNDP 2010b, 34). On the other hand, not all violent acts constitute crimes. For example, the legitimate exercise of violence by the State does not constitute a crime.9

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Moreover, violence is an analytic category that underlines clearly a whole gamut of motivations that tend to be ignored when referring to crime. While crime is commonly associated with economic motives, violence is recognised as a form of behaviour that can be motivated as much by political and institutional interests as by diverse forms of exclusion and social discrimination (Moser and Winton 2002). For example, gender based violence cannot be understood without taking into account the whole body of norms and social behaviour that lead to this kind of violence and that contribute to its invisibilisation and normalisation. Along these same lines, the category of violence allows us to recognise that insecurity can be motivated by norms and behaviour that are not resolved merely by applying more severe laws, but by the deep transformation of social and cultural templates and the promotion of a culture of peace, democratic coexistence, and gender equality. (Pearce 2006).

In addition to defining crime and violence as threats to citizen security, this report focuses on six principle threats that have a generalised presence in the region with a negative impact for the human development of Latin Americans: street crime, violence and crime exercised against and by young people, gender violence, corruption, illegal violence carried out by agents of the State, and organised crime. While some threats —such as organised crime, and especially drug trafficking— often tend to be singled out to explain why Latin America is one of the most insecure regions in the world, the truth is that the regional, national, and local dynamics of insecurity are much more diverse. In fact, many of these threats, such as corruption, gender violence (in particular domestic violence), and street crime are not necessarily embedded in transnational criminal networks, but have their origins and practical manifestations in local environments. In other words, it is in this whole gamut of threats, along with their interaction and reproduction on a local level, where we find the explanation of the growing rates of crime and violence affecting the region’s citizens on a daily basis. Although they take shape in different spaces of social interaction —from the home and the community to the

Box 1.1. Crime and violence The category of “crime” refers to the group of behaviours classified as illegal or contrary to the laws and judicial norms prevailing in a given State. As such, these forms of behaviour are subject to punishment or sanction by the competent authorities (Tilly 2003, 19). “Violence” as a category, has different meanings. The World Health Organisation’s definition considers violence to be “the intentional use of physical force or power, threatened or actual against oneself, another person or a group or community, that either results in or has a high likelihood of resulting in injury, death, psychological harm, maldevelopment or deprivation” (OPS 2002, 5). Other sociological definitions go beyond the physical dimension of violence and refer, for example, to symbolic violence—understood as a type of domination or violence that has been internalised by the victim to such an extent that it is not perceived as violence— (Bourdieu 6

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2004, 339) or to structural violence — understood as the result of a “political and economic organisation of society that imposes adverse emotional and physical conditions on people, from high mortality rates to poverty and the exploitation of labour” (Bourgois 2001, 8)—. In this report, violence is understood as the intentional use and imposition of physical force by a person or group of people against another person or other people. Nevertheless, psychological and emotional violence is recognised as an unavoidable dimension of physical violence, as well as an important result or impact of it. In addition, vulnerabilities of a structural nature, such as poverty, economic inequality, unemployment and marginalisation, constitute manifestations of so-called structural violence that limit severely the choices that people have.

Crime and violence can produce feeling of fear and mistrust, as much for those who directly experience these acts (direct victims) as for those know indirectly about these acts (through the testimony of victims, close social circles or through the mass media). That is to say, crime and violence can increase a person’s perception of insecurity and make them feel more vulnerable faced with the possibility of having their physical or material integrity threatened. This is where it is important to distinguish between the objective and subjective dimensions of citizen security.10 The objective dimension of citizen security is related to crime and violence. The subjective dimension depends on the perception of insecurity that is manifested in feelings of fear and vulnerability. Moreover, the perception of insecurity or the “subjective dimension” of citizen security is important because fear, intimidation, or mistrust can have real consequences on people’s human development. It is probable that a person who has been a victim of an act of physical violence will limit his or her freedom of movement and will experience health problems such as anxiety, depression, or suicidal behaviour (OPS 2002, 9).

Other repercussions of citizens’ perceptions of fear can be observed in changes to social cohesion, in the level of trust people have in State institutions, and in the generation of dynamics of urban segregation that undermine public spaces (UNDP 2010b, 36; Rotker 2000; Dammert 2004). In some Latin American countries the proliferation of communities that are closed or surrounded by walls, is due to their members’ perception of being threatened (Rodgers 2004; Caldeira 1996; Coy and Pöhler 2002). Without examining whether or not this perception is proportional to the “objective dimension” of insecurity, the subjective dimension has very real consequences in the dynamics and norms of social co-existence that arise in the region.

1 CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

public sphere—, these threats are related to each other, and as such can reproduce each other and generate greater cycles of violence (Pearce 2006). Some studies have demonstrated, for example, that a person who has suffered or witnessed domestic violence during childhood has a greater risk of becoming a victim or perpetrator of this form of violence as an adult (Bott et al. 2012, vii). Equally, qualitative studies on youth violence have consistently demonstrated the presence of domestic violence precedents among young people who participate in gangs (see Portillo 2003).

Three key ideas 1. Citizen security and human development have a mutually reinforcing relationship Citizen security is a necessary condition for human development; and vice versa, human development conditions citizen security. In effect without citizen security, which protects a basic core of rights, people cannot fully develop their capacities nor can they contribute with all their potential to improving the conditions of their families, communities, and institutions. Threats to citizen security may also have an impact on people not directly affected, even future generations. Moreover, some forms of violence are not isolated acts, but occur repeatedly in the life of individuals, which has a sustained effect in undermining freedoms and capacities.

Box 1.2. The six principle threats - Street crime: refers to theft and robbery on a small scale that tend to occur in public places and that involve, in some cases, threats of violence, beatings, or injuries inflicted on victims. - Violence and street crime exercised against and by young people: youth constitute the group most affected by criminality and violence, and at the same time are those most commonly responsible for intentional violence and for committing crimes. - Gender violence: are all those forms of violence committed against a person or groups of people because of their gender, which tends to be expressed more intensely and predominantly against women and girls.

- Corruption: in its broadest sense, this means the undue appropriation of public resources, the distribution of which is the responsibility of the State. - Illegal violence by agents of the State: includes a wide range of activities, ranging from police abuse of citizens and actions that constitute clear human rights violations, to the direct participation of agents of the State in activities linked to organised crime. - Organised crime: all organised and long-term criminal activity whose capacity to obtain and provide goods and services implies corruption, coercion and, in some cases, violence.

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Domestic violence, for example, constitutes a threat to citizen security as it limits and undermines the possibilities for human development of those people who suffer because of it. A child who undergoes violence at home will have fewer opportunities to expand freely their learning and enjoyment capacities. Equally, a woman who is a victim of violence from her partner or another family member will have her choices for development severely affected along with her ability to decide over what she wants “to do” and “to be” (Bott et al. 2012).

CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

The impact of insecurity can be analysed based on three dimensions linked to human development: the individual dimension, the social dimension, and the institutional dimension. As Figure 1 illustrates, the impact that occurs in one dimension can affect other individual and collective arenas. In other words, criminal and violent acts that affect people’s freedoms and guarantees on an individual level can have repercussions in interpersonal trust, in the social fabric, and in the perception of people about the capacity of democratic institutions to ensure citizen security. While threats to citizen security have a negative impact on all people, they do not have an equal impact on all. This impact varies according to gender, ethnicity, sexual identity, age, race, social class, and place of residence. This is also related to the different capacities and real opportunities that people have, and their different degrees of vulnerability and risk.

Figure 1.1

Under a gender perspective, in particular, women and men experience, exercise, and perceive violence and insecurity in different ways, and their impact on one or the other gender is distinct. This is because gender inequalities persist in society, expose women and men to different threats, and create specific risks for women (De la Cruz 2007). This gender difference in terms of insecurity also arises from the social construction of masculinities permeated by violence. In Latin America as in the rest of the world, young men are the main victims and perpetrators of violence (Briceño 2005, 1640-1641; UNODC 2011). The concentration of violence in this group has to do with the prevalence of social and cultural patterns and forms of socialisation that have associated values such as respect, dignity, and peer recognition with a willingness in practice to adopt violent behaviour and violent forms of co-existence (Hume 2007; Pearce 2006). Socioeconomic factors combine with this, such as exclusion, low social mobility, and scarce or precarious employment, to place young men in situations of risk (Rodgers 2006; Moro 2006). Hence, any attempt to construct different masculinities free from violence, must involve the promotion of positive socialisation mechanisms (Baird 2012) along with real opportunities that enable young men to become agents and protagonists of their own development.

Impacts

Capacities and freedoms Rights and guarantees Social fabric Sense of belonging to a community and existence of spaces for cooperation Impacts

Democratic governance The attitudes of citizens towards the Rule of Law and their support for democracy

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2. Citizen security constitutes a public good, and as such, its provision is the responsibility of the State Citizen security is a public good,11 that is to say, a good to which all people must have access without distinction based on social class, political preference, race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual identity. In reference to the State’s role in providing citizen security, this report proposes the notion of the Responsive State. Based on this notion, it is understood that the State is the principle dutybearer in charge of providing citizen security, inasmuch as this constitutes a public good to which all people have a right. Equally, we would emphasise that although many agents intervene in providing security, the State is the only agent with the mandate to ensure that this provision does not serve limited private interests or protect only a few, but rather serves all citizens based on the “common interest”. In democratic contexts, the State must be the embodiment of the compact endorsed by the members of a political community (UNDP-OEA 2010). In other words, its laws and institutions must represent and guarantee the common good or the public good. The role of citizens is to define and update the meaning of “the public” through elections, social movements, civil society organizations and /or by raising their voices in the media. When referring to citizen security, other characteristics of the State stand out. According to the definition of the “ideal type” of State proposed by the sociologist Max Weber (1994), the State is the only agent that can claim the exclusive and legitimate use of violence. In characterising the State’s monopoly or “exclusive use” of violence, Weber argues that the State constitutes the highest level of authority or sovereignty within a given territory. In characterising its use as “legitimate”, he refers to a use of violence by the State that must be based on upholding the validity of law.

Box 1.3. Responsive State

CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Threats to citizen security do not arise from a vacuum, but in an environment that limits the participation and the equal and fair access of all citizens to the social, cultural, institutional, and material resources that make their human development possible (UNDP 2013, 29-31; UNDP 2010b). In building citizen security through democratic mechanisms and inclusive and sustainable institutions, an environment must be established in which people can aspire to widening their capacities and freedoms.

The State is the only agent with the mandate of providing citizen security, inasmuch as this constitutes a public good. In order to fulfil its responsibility, the State must act in strict compliance with the law and respect for human rights.

This definition of an “ideal type” of State does not necessarily reflect reality. In practice, in both developed and developing countries the State is not the only agent that claims the use of force for itself. Others make use of force, even when this is not always legitimate or coherent with a regulatory framework. Examples of this are: armed groups that operate with criminal aims or when taking justice “into their own hands”, private security companies that operate outside the law or in a grey area, and groups of people who act —more or less spontaneously— to publicly punish presumed criminals. These groups, among others, are responding to a reality in which the provision of security is “hybrid” (Luckham and Kirk 2012). That is to say, not only the State, but also other multiple agents seek to exercise violence and provide security, even though many of these agents do so for private ends and, depending on the circumstances, on the margins or outside the law. Even so, Weber’s concept of the State is relevant in emphasising that the responsibility for the provision of citizen security should fall on the State and that the use of force should be “legitimate”. That is to say, the State must respect the rule of law and comply with the principles of respect for human rights established by international law (Universal Declaration of Human rights, ResoBox 1.4. Democracy and citizen security Democracy is the only political system in which the freedoms and rights of people impose unmistakeable limits on the exercise of power and as such, it is the only system capable of guaranteeing the freedoms necessary for people to develop their capacities: for example, the freedom to participate in public life, to organise, and to decide over their own lives. Nevertheless, in order for the State to provide citizen security as a public good, democracy must not be restricted merely to its electoral dimension. Democracy must be a system that guarantees the validity of the Rule of Law, the peaceful resolution of conflicts, accountability and the empowerment of people in a context of respect for fundamental freedoms. (O’Donnell 1993, 305; Ungar 2011). REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPOR T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

lution 217 A (III), United Nations, 1948). This report considers that the provision of citizen security must aspire to confront crime and violence through prevention, without reproducing or increasing the use of violence, while opening spaces for citizen participation and strengthening the Stateâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s institutional and democratic capacities.

CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

From a human development perspective, citizen security must be understood as the planning, organising, and execution of holistic and participatory policies of different kinds. These policies should not only aim to lower crime rates, but also contribute to the creation and strengthening of more effective and sustainable institutions for human development. Thus, the ways in which citizen security is provided should be analysed in order to determine whether or not the policies that have been adopted by the State effectively enable citizens to enjoy their freedoms.

3. Citizen security requires engaged citizens who guarantee the democratic, inclusive, and public character of security services If it is to be compatible with a human development perspective, citizen security must be built based on institutions and demo-

Box 1.5. The three dimensions of citizenship Civil citizenship is made up of the rights that guarantee individual freedoms: freedom of expression, thought, and religion, and the rights to justice, property, and binding contracts. Political citizenship consists of the right to participate in the exercise of political power as a member of a body invested with political authority or in electing its members. Social citizenship covers a whole spectrum including the right to a minimum level of economic wellbeing, to share social inheritance to the full, and to live according to the standards predominant in society. Source: UNDP-OEA (2010, 32).

Box 1.6. Active citizenship Active citizenship refers to the participation of citizens in building citizen security, through inclusive democratic processes that are respectful of the law. 10

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cratic forms of co-existence that allow for the active participation of citizens (women and men) in defining their life choices and perspectives, and in broadening their capacities for participating in political decision-making. Citizenship is the condition of belonging as individuals to a political community â&#x20AC;&#x201D;embodied by the State and by a set of laws, institutions, and practices linked to theseâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; through which rights and duties are established (Posas 2007, 7). Thomas H. Marshall (1992) identifies three dimensions of citizenship: civil, political, and social. These dimensions refer to different rights and freedoms ranging from the rights to express oneself and to have access to justice, to the right to participate as a member of a political community, and to achieve a minimum level of economic wellbeing. These rights, nevertheless, are tied to duties: citizenship is, in sum, a pact between people and the State. That is, citizenship is understood as the social and political pact between members of a political community called the State, from which a set of rights and duties is derived and shared equally by all citizens. The respect for the rights of all is the most solid road towards citizen security. That is to say, safeguarding the physical and material integrity of others and respecting the laws that protect core fundamental freedoms are elementary steps in building citizen security. The full respect for the rights of all people is yet to be achieved in the region. This reflects an insufficient degree of legitimacy and trust in State institutions and laws. In addition, in scenarios with high levels of objective and subjective insecurity, some behaviour becomes more acceptable or permissible within certain communities: the violent reconfiguration of social cohesion is a serious consequence of the insecurity that, in turn, generates greater levels of violence. Citizen security is not just a question that involves citizens who break the law or the direct victims of criminal violence or fear. This task requires participation and commitment from business people, academics, politicians, civil society leaders, social movements, and community organisations. In short, citizen security concerns all citizens, because it is a fundamental condition for human development. An engaged citizenry is indispensable in guaranteeing the effective provision of citizen security in a democratic and inclusive framework. Citizen participation, in general, and that of civil society organisations in particular, is crucial in overseeing the actions of the State, in defining policies based on the needs and

demands of communities, and in ensuring that the public provision of security is considered preferable to any other option.

CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

Society’s citizens and organisations can have a positive influence on the provision of citizen security as a public good, through programmes and initiatives that —together with State institutions— enable citizens to have more equal access to the mechanisms that effectively protect people from crime and violence. Citizen security is not only a challenge but also a key to strengthen human development in Latin America. The region is very close to building a more prosperous future, in which its citizens and communities can achieve a meaningful way of life, preserving their integrity, their heritage, and their autonomy. Understanding citizen security as a challenge shared across the region and for which concrete lessons have already been learned means recognising that its strengthening is essential in order to achieve that “Ascent of the South” that promises decisively to improve the lives and wellbeing of Latin Americans.

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BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

CHAPTER

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

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BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

MambrÃº, Jorge Pineda, 2007

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CHAPTER

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Over the last decade, Latin America has experienced strong growth in two areas: economic and criminal. The region as a whole has undergone significant economic growth as well as a reduction in the levels of inequality, poverty, and unemployment. Despite this, crime and violence have increased. What are some of the main factors that have led to the high levels of criminality so visible in the majority of countries in Latin America? Why is the frequency of crime greater in some countries, cities, and sub-regions than in others? In response to these questions, this chapter presents four arguments: • The region’s economic improvement is a necessary, though not a sufficient condition to contain crime. Variables such as poverty, inequality, and unemployment cannot explain the extent of crime or its dynamics by themselves. The combination of these variables, along with the rise in consumer expectations and a lack of social mobility in specific contexts, increase the risk factors and provide incentives for aspirational crime, above all. • The changes in communities due to rapid and uncontrolled urban growth, as well as structural changes in families and deficiencies in educational systems, have created conditions that influence criminality. • The drivers of crime, such as firearms, alcohol consumption, and drug trafficking, without being causal factors, have fuelled the phenomenon. • States in Latin America lack the capacity to address the challenge of insecurity: corruption and impunity, as well as sanctions that are disproportionate to the crime, have reduced their effectiveness and legitimacy. This chapter is divided into four sections. The first analyses socioeconomic factors, which refer to conditions such as growth, poverty, inequality, and unemployment. The second, on social factors, analyses the role of the family, school, and the community. The third section, on drivers of crime, refers to the impact that alcohol, drugs, and firearms have on the increase in crime. The fourth, institutional factors, refers to dysfunctional aspects of the State.

Socio-economic factors: aspirational crime Latin America has had sustained aggregate economic growth over the last ten years with an annual average rate of 4.2 %. Poverty levels have decreased: 70 million people have emerged from poverty (Ferreira et al.2013). Unemployment has declined at a sustained pace since 2002, and in 2012 reached its lowest level at 6.4% (OIT y CEPAL 2013). Based on these changes, various criminological theories (Merton 1938; Cloward y Ohlin 1960; Agnew 1992) predicted a decrease in crime and violence indicators in Latin America, with an improvement of the socioeconomic factors associated with it —economic growth and reductions in poverty and unemployment. However, the opposite occurred: crime and homicides increased. This section argues that neither economic growth nor the reduction of poverty and unemployment can explain the increase in violence. Insecurity in the region has a multi-dimensional explanation, which includes the precariousness of employment, persistent inequality, and insufficient social mobility. Different combinations of these socio-economic factors in specific contexts create vulnerable environments, which block legitimate possibilities for social mobility. In these circumstances and in a context of consumer-driven economic growth, individuals or groups appear that are willing to challenge the established order and choose crime as a way of life. This is called aspirational crime.

Progress in Economic Development In recent years, Latin America has achieved greater growth than the United States and the principal European economies (CEPAL 2012, 9): in 2011, the growth rate of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the region was 4.3%, and in 2012, 3.1%; moreover, the number of Latin Americans who joined the middle class approached 50 million — growing from 103 million people in 2003 to 152 million in 2009 — (Ferreira et al. 2013, 1); inflation has remained low in the majority of countries, and unemployment has diminished at a sustained rate since 2002, with only a single interruption during the crisis of 2009 (CEPAL 2012; PNUD 2013). REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Box 2.1. Youth Age Groups

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

It is difficult to establish the exact age group that best defines youth, given that “youth” as a condition is experienced in different ways, depending on the economic, social, or cultural group to which one belongs. While a young indigenous person living in poverty takes on adult roles early – before the age of twenty – for urban middle or upper-class youth, juvenile status lasts longer and can continue until the age of thirty. The majority of experts agree that one’s condition as a young person is “constructed” in a specific space and time, which is why one cannot establish a valid age group for all youth. For statistical purposes, the United Nations considers youth to be persons between 15 and 24 years old. This age range overlaps with what the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) calls “children”, those persons under 18 years old. At the same time, this

definition differs from that used by the Pan-American Health Organization (PAHO), which defines adolescents as those between the ages of 10 and 19. In the Latin American region, there is great diversity in the age range used to define youth12. This has practical implications for the analysis of the relationship between citizen security and youth. In this report, in general, the age group refers to 15 to 24 year-olds. In some cases, for statistical purposes, this age group has been expanded to age 29, justified by demographic, social, and cultural changes, particularly in urban areas. In other instances, it uses information from official national and international institutions that adopt other age groups.

Source: CEPAL (2008); CEPAL and the Ibero-American Youth Organization (IYO, 2004); ILO (2004 and 2012).

The Evolution of Poverty and Indigence, Latin America, 1980-2012

50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

250 200 Millions of people

Percentage of population

Figure 2.1.

150 100 50 0

1980 1990 1999 2002 2009 2010 2011 2012

Non-indigent poor

1980 1990 1999 2002 2009 2010 2011 2012

Indigents

Sources: ECLAC, based on special tabulations of data from household surveys conducted in given countries. a Estimates are for 18 countries in the region, plus Haiti. The data for 2012 are a projection.

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Table 2.1.

Country

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Rep. Uruguay Venezuela Average

significant improvement in the HDI between 1990 y 2012 (UNDP 2013, 63-64). Table 2.1 shows that the HDI has improved in all the countries in the region.

Latin America, human development index (HDI), 2005-2012 value and rate of change Rank according to HDI in 2012

45 108 85 40 91 62 89 107 133 120 61 129 59 111 77 96 51 71

Rate of change 2005-2012

HDI Value 2005

2012

0.771 0.647 0.699 0.789 0.681 0.732 0.682 0.655 0.551 0.582 0.745 0.572 0.746 0.641 0.699 0.669 0.744 0.694 0.683

0.811 0.675 0.73 0.819 0.719 0.773 0,724 0,68 0.581 0.632 0.775 0.599 0.78 0.669 0.741 0.702 0.792 0.748 0.719

5.19 4.33 4.43 3.80 5.58 5.60 6,16 3,82 5.44 8.59 4.03 4.72 4.56 4.37 6.01 4.93 6.45 7.78 5.29

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

According to the 2013 Human Development Report, eight economies in Latin America are among the 25 developing countries with the highest rates of growth in their per capita income, as well as being among the fifteen countries which show the most

Table 2.3 Country

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dom. Rep.

Source: Global Human Development Report 2013, UNDP.

Uruguay

Socio-economic factors and insecurity: a complex relationship

In other words, the percentage of countries with high rates of homicide is slightly greater in countries with higher incomes (estimates based on UNODC 2011, 336-337 and 344-345).

Venezuela Promedio a

Source: Official administ Note: N/A refers to data a The average was calcu

Despite progress in economic growth and human development In the case of variables like poverty, one can see in Table 2.2 in comparative indicators in the Latin American countries, homicide and rob- that their relationship to high levels of homicide 13 terms doesn’t appear to follow any pattern. Even if the two bery continue at alarming levels. The evidence under analysis serves to qualify a hypothesis of causality between the econom- countries that have the highest homicide rates —Honduras ic variables (poverty, inequality, and unemployment) and crimi- and El Salvador— also show pronounced poverty levels, other nal activity, and suggests that the relationship between the countries with significant poverty, like Bolivia or Paraguay, are two is more complex than it seems initially. For example, on the among those with the lowest homicide rates in the region. Furwhile povertythe diminished between in mechanisms the maVulnerabilities weaken social fabric and2004-2010 its control TableDevelopment 2.5. basis of data from the 2013 Human Report, one ther,that does not find a close relationship between income and homi- jority of countries in Latin America, homicide rose in more than underCollage study, including in those countries The City Family cide: among countries that have averageThe incomes of between half of the countriesThe with lower levels of poverty. where US$5,000 and US$10,000, one finds that 25in % of these have - The increase single-parent - The levels of schoolLikewise, dropout,in those countries - The rapid and chaotic growth of been reduced considerably—Peru, Panama, high rates of homicide (more than 10 per inhabitants). families with100,000 scarce resources and poverty has especially at the secondary level. cities and and the breakdown of the Republic— there wasquality. no concomitant decline in However, in the group of countries that have average the persistence of a highincomes rate of of the Dominican - Deficiencies in educational social fabric. Table 2.2). less than US$5,000, only 13% adolescent of them have high homicide rates. robbery (See fertility without effective - Problems of employability. -The continuing marginalization of support and protection of the State. broad sectors of the urban - Migration processes. population. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4 1 7

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

34,9 62,4 36,4 13,7 45,2 21,1 48,3 48,9 54,8 71,5 35,5 61,9 31 56,9 48,7 47,5 17,7 37,1

1.031,5 75,3 361,3 847,6 95,1 71 499 397 44,2 156 251,4 -

Theft 6,2 7,1 20,6 2 44 6 46 36 37 9,1 8,1 9,6 15 5 25 5,7 -

Homicide 54 25,8 42,2 16,4 42,7 47,9 30 68,9 34,8 27,7 37,9 36,2 44,3 13,7 27,6

973,3 96,8 457,9 895,6 102,5 65 28,3 615 591 48,7 28,9 149 104,4 319,9 -

Theft 5,8 8 20,6 2 33 11 51,9 46 57,9 13,1 9,1 18 12,3 11 24 6,6 -

Homicide

Circa (2008) Type of criminal act (rate per 100,000 inhabitants)

8,6 42,4 24,9 11,5 37,3 18,5 39,1 46,6 30 67,4 36,3 58,3 25,8 34,7 31,3 41,4 8,4 27,8

87,6 409,4 397,6 86,8 62 266,7 680 489 56,9 18,2 192 266 410,5 224

Theft

10,1 15,5 2 34 11 64,5 41 77,5 23,8 9,1 21,2 10,7 9 25 6,1 -

Homicide

Circa (2010) Type of criminal act Population living (rate per 100,000 in poverty (%) inhabitants)

See Statistical-Methodological Annex. Population in poverty data used from ECLAC2013; for Paraguay, data was used from the General Directorate of Surveys and for Guatemala, UNDP-Guatemala (2011-2012). a. In the case of Mexico, there was a change in methodology in 2010 which explains the growth in poverty.

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay Venezuela

Country

Population living in poverty (%)

Percentage of the Population in Poverty and Rate of Criminality per 100,000 inhabitants, Latin America, 2004, 2008, and 2010

Circa (2004) Type of criminal act Population living (rate per 100,000 in poverty (%) inhabitants)

Table 2.2.

-12,56 -5,34 -5,27 -2,68 -2,91 -2,05 -3,17 -0,78 -0,96 0,38 -0,97 -2,80 -6,50 -5,95 -2,14 -8,76 -4,18

Poverty

-1,41 2,72 2,21 -8,48 -1,45 -2,11 6,05 8,06 4,79 3,85 12,7 -

Theft

7,04 -4,13 0 -3,79 13,89 6,7 2,31 18,24 26,92 2,06 20,14 3,56 13,33 0 1,17 -

Homicide

Annualized average rate of change (2004-2010)

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

investment by the State, (CEPAL 2011a), this improvement in income distribution — measured by the Gini coefficient15— did Rate of change HDI Value not translate necessarily2005-2012 into a reduction in crime and violence16. Table 2.32012 indicates that inequality in Costa Rica is the same as in 2005 Paraguay (Gini 0.51), but the robbery rate in Costa Rica is signifi0.771 5.19 0.811 cantly higher than that of Paraguay (975 per 100,000 inhabit0.647 4.33 0.675 per 100,000 inhabitants, respectively). 0.699 ants and 180.73 4.43 0.789 0.681 0.732 0.682 0.655 0.551 0.582 0.745 0.572 0.746 0.641 0.699 0.669 0.744 0.694 0.683

3.80 0.819 0.719 Regarding unemployment,5.58 some criminological theories posit 0.773 hypothesis: 5.60 the following lower levels of unemployment — especially0,724 in the youngest6,16 population — will correlate with 3,82 0,68 low levels of crime (Fagan y Freeman 1999; Bergman 2013). A 5.44 0.581 comparison of the rates of8.59 robbery and youth unemployment 0.632 in 18 countries in Latin America 4.03 reveals a very low correlation 0.775 between 0.599 these two variables. 4.72Further, there is a very weak cor4.56 of the youth population that 0.78 the percentage relation between 4.37the rate of robbery in 2010 (0.03) 0.669 neither studies nor works and 17 0.741 (CEPAL 2006a y 2007). 6.01 4.93 0.702 6.45 0.792 Surveys of0.748 the prison population 7.78 offer a revealing fact with respect to the complexity of the unemployment-crime relation5.29 0.719

ship: the majority of the inmates (60% in Chile, 70% in Brazil and Argentina, and 84% or more in the other countries) worked at the same time that they were involved in criminal activity. The evidence indicates that the great majority of inmates had begun work at a very early age (on average, before age 15), but had unstable and low-paying jobs. As such, it is possible that for many, robbery functioned as a supplement to income from precarious employment. Table 2.4.

Robbery rate 2009

Gini Coefficient 2009

Robbery rate 2010

Gini Coefficient 2010

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

490,2

575,1

Chile

1.040

992

Colombia

Costa Rica

990,1

397,6

Ecuador

El Salvador

102

Guatemala

339,1

266,7

Mexico

632

680

Nicaragua

565

489

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

167

192

Dom. Rep.

282

266

Uruguay

Venezuela

254

224

Promedio a

360.4

50.8

302.2

48.5

Country

Honduras

Source: Official administrative records compiled by the UNDP and the World Bank. Note: N/A refers to data unavailable a The average was calculated only taking into consideration the countries with observations.

Characteristics of Prison Inmate Work Trajectory, selected countries, 2013

Average age for starting work

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

14.8

14.3

14.2

13.9

15.7

12.6

9.6

8.5

56.5

52.9

54.8

46.4

88.7

84.6

70.2

26.2

30.5

25.4

60.3 Never knew father or m 36.6 Left home before age

24.9

11.6

6.0

bilities that weaken the social fabric who andstarted its control mechanisms Percentage of inmates 4.2 9.8 work before age 9 Percentage of inmates who started The Collage The City 49.4 48.3 work before age 15 - The levels of school dropout, - The rapid and chaotic growth of Percentage of inmates who worked and especially at the secondary level. cities and the the 69.7breakdown of85.9 one month before detention

ctive ate.

Robbery Rates and Gini Coefficients, Latin America, 2009-2010

Table 2.3.

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

In a similar vein, despite the fact that there was a reduction in in-

erica, human development index (HDI), equality in the majority of countries in the region, fuelled by robust 2 14 rate of change economic growth, conditional transfers programmes , and social

- Deficiencies in educational quality. Percentage of inmates who worked - Problems of employability.

social fabric. -The continuing 22.5 marginalization 30.8 of and reported other non-wage income broad sectors of the urban population. Percentage of inmates who were members 6.0 10.1 of the police or the armed forces

Source: Comparative study of the prison population, UNDP (2013). See Statistical-Methodological Annex.

9.7 Table 2.6.

Fam perc

Grew up without moth 6.1 or father (until age 12

Source: Comparative Study of Prison REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Box 2.2. On the relationship between insecurity and poverty at the municipal level

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

If one analyses, on one hand, the rate of homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants as a rough indicator of insecurity, and on the other, the distinct components of the HDI in the 176 countries including all those in Latin America and the Caribbean between 2007 and 2010, one finds only a very weak correlation between a higher average rate of homicide and a lower level of development18. Figure Figure 2.2A. 2.2A.

However, examination at a more disaggregated level with more complex well-being indicators shows that there is indeed a relationship between the two phenomena, but that it takes very different forms in each case, and that it can even radically change over time in the same country.

19 Total TotalHomicides Homicidesand andIncome IncomePoverty, Poverty,by bymunicipality, municipality,Brazil, Brazil,2011 2011 19

a rica, rica,1980-2012 1980-2012

Homiciderate rateperper100,000 100,000inhabitants, inhabitants,2011 2011 Homicide

3030 2020 1010 00 -10 -10 -20 -20

9 2010 09 20102011 20112012 2012

0,2 0,2

0,4 0,4 Incidence Incidenceofofpoverty povertybybyincome, income,2010 2010

0,6 0,6

0,8 0,8

Figure Figure2.2B. 2.2B.

a Total TotalHomicides Homicidesand andMultidimensional MultidimensionalPoverty, Poverty, by bymunicipality, municipality, 20 20 Colombia Colombia2009 2009

tants, bitants,

riminal criminalact act r 100,000 er 100,000 bitants) abitants) Homicide Homicide -10,1 10,1 15,5 15,5 22 3434 1111 -64,5 64,5 4141 77,5 77,5 23,8 23,8 9,1 9,1 21,2 21,2 10,7 10,7 99 2525 6,1 6,1 --

Annualized Annualizedaverage averagerate rate ofofchange change(2004-2010) (2004-2010) Poverty Poverty Theft Theft Homicide Homicide -12,56 -12,56 -5,34 -5,34 -5,27 -5,27 -2,68 -2,68 -2,91 -2,91 -2,05 -2,05 -3,17 -3,17 -0,78 -0,78 --0,96 -0,96 0,38 0,38 -0,97 -0,97 -2,80 -2,80 -6,50 -6,50 -5,95 -5,95 -2,14 -2,14 -8,76 -8,76 -4,18 -4,18

-1,41 -1,41 2,72 2,72 -2,21 2,21 --8,48 -8,48 --1,45 -1,45 -2,11 -2,11 -6,05 6,05 8,06 8,06 4,79 4,79 -3,85 3,85 -12,7 12,7 --

-7,04 7,04 -4,13 -4,13 00 -3,79 -3,79 13,89 13,89 -6,7 6,7 2,31 2,31 18,24 18,24 26,92 26,92 2,06 2,06 20,14 20,14 3,56 3,56 13,33 13,33 00 1,17 1,17 --

Homiciderate rateperper100,000 100,000inhabitants, inhabitants,2009 2009 Homicide

1500 1500

1000 1000

500 500

-500 -500 0,2 0,2

0,4 0,6 0,4 0,6 Incidence Incidenceofofmultidimensional multidimensionalpoverty, poverty,2005 2005

At the municipal level, the highest rates of homicide in Brazil —in general— are found among the municipalities with less income poverty. This data corresponds to the population with per capita incomes below the total poverty line for the country.

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

0,8 0,8

The graph on Colombia, which incorporates a multidimensional poverty measurement, shows a completely opposite pattern from that of Brazil. In this case, the highest homicide rates correspond to those municipalities with greater multidimensional poverty— a measurement that includes indicators of well being at the local level in the area of education, the labour market, social security and household conditions —.

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

number of homicides had begun to occur in those municipalities with less income poverty 22.

The case of Mexico shows a completely opposite pattern to that of Colombia, because in Mexico the highest homicide rates can be observed in those municipalities with less multidimensional poverty — a measurement which, in the case of Mexico, includes dimensions analogous to those of Colombia, but also includes access to food —.

This evidence suggests that, in Latin America, the relationship between well-being and insecurity is far from linear and clear-cut: there is a need to go beyond structural factors and examine the diversity of elements which exert influence in different contexts. In addition, the behaviour of these elements over time is an important consideration. A strategy for the rigorous and systematic accumulation of quantitative and qualitative information is crucial to continue identifying the common elements and data that are increasingly more effective for public policymaking in this area, as well as to foster effective information exchange between countries.

An additional element to consider in this complex panorama is that the relationship between well-being and insecurity can change radically over time. An exercise carried out in Mexico shows that between 1990 and 2000 the greatest incidence of homicides was recorded in those municipalities with greater income poverty; in 2005 and 2007, this relationship began to change, and by 2010, had changed drastically: by then, a higher

1 19

Figure 2.4.

Total Homicides and Multidimensional Poverty, b by municipality, Mexico 2010 21

Figure 2.2C.

Afr

Central Amer

Latin America a the Caribbe

North Amer

South Amer

Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 2010

Euro

0,8

0 0

100

Source: Population Division (

Incidence of multidimensional poverty, 2010

Figure 2.5. Percentage of children between 0 and 14 years old who live in female-headed households in urban areas, Latin America, 1994-2005

100 90

Percentage

Sources: Compilation based on official data from the following organizations: Brazilian Centre for Latin American Studies and FLACSO Brazil 2013; UNDP, Fundacao Joao Pinheiro, and IPEA 2013; National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, Sub37.8 40 Department of Colombia; Government Secretariat of the34.7 Directorate for Social Promotion and Quality of Life of the National Planning United States of Mexico and the National Council for the Social Development Policy Evaluation; World Bank. 33 32.1 35 26.3 29 28.4 28 28.3 26.6 achievement, literacy, 26.4areas: educational 30 indicator a Refers to the population that is disadvantaged in five of the following attendance, school underachievement, access to services for early childhood care, child labour, long-term unemployment, formal 25.8 school25.9 26.5 27.3 26.5 23.2 22.8 24 22.5 25 access to improved employment, health insurance, access to health services based on need, wall materials, and severe overcrowding. More recent information on multidimensional poverty is 21.1 sources, excreta disposal, flooring 20.8 drinking-water 21.4 materials, exterior 19.8 19.4 19.6 19.3 17.8 not available and it is understood that this indicator, as with the structure municipalities, doesn’t18.4 change significantly with detail, consult www.dnp.gob.co 17.6 20 of 18.3 16.4 time. For greater 15.5 12.5educational lagging behind, access to health services, access to social security, housing quality and space, b Refers to the population with a per capita income below the well-being 15 line and facing at least one form of social deprivation from the six following areas: access to basic services for housing, and access to food. For greater detail, 10 consult www.coneval.gob.mx

60 50 40 30 20

Circa 2005 Source: CEPAL (2011) 26 .

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Brazil

Bolivia

0 Argentina

Uruguay

Venezuela

Peru

Panama

Paraguay

Nicaragua

Mexico

Honduras

Guatemala

Ecuador

Source: ECLAC, Gender Statistics, Online Data base CEPALSTAT (CEPAL 2011b).

El Salvador

Costa Rica

Chile

Colombia

Brazil

Bolivia

Circa 1994

Argentina

5 0

Rate

Figure 2.3.

In sum, when taken separately and at least at the national level, poverty, inequality of income, and unemployment do not appear to adequately explain the levels of insecurity in the region. On the contrary, crime has increased in a regional context of dynamic growth and significant improvement in social indicators. Understanding this particular phenomenon means that there is a need to recognize that violence and crime do not have simple explanations. As suggested by the empirical evidence in Box 2.2 and by reviewing selective data in this section, there is no single cause or factor that has enough explanatory power, and the national level of analysis appears to be insufficient. The analysis of different groups of variables — among them basic social and economic conditions — makes it possible to identify a relationship with the growth of insecurity, which, at the same time, is more pronounced in specific areas and populations (Sen y Kliksberg 2007, 247).

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Aspirational crime Between 2008 and 2010, 8 of the 10 countries in the world with the highest indices of income inequality were in Latin America, where an enormous proportion of income is controlled by a small fraction of the population: 32% of income accrues to 10% of the population, while the poorest 40% receive only 15% (CEPAL 2012, 20). Growth has not benefitted all equally and has left behind – in conditions of vulnerability – broad sectors of the population. According to the Human Development Report (PNUD 2013, 38), Latin America suffers an average loss of 25.7% with respect to the HDI adjusted for inequality, whereas the world average is 23.3%. In the region, the loss due to inequality in the income components is greater (38.5%), followed by education (23%) (PNUD 2013, 155). Even though available estimates indicate that at least 40% of households in the region shifted to a higher socioeconomic class between 1995 and 2010, the majority of people in poverty whose situation improved were not integrated directly into the middle class, but rather formed part of a group located between the lower class and the middle class. The World Bank calls this segment of the population “vulnerable groups”, constituting the most numerous “class” in Latin America: 38% of the population (Ferreira et al. 2013). This sector can be characterized by its vulnerability to informal sector employment, educational stagnation, and scant social coverage. (Birdsall et al. 2013). In the social mobility process in the region, 73% of the expansion of the middle class is attributed to economic growth, especially 22

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

as a result of its impact on employment creation. The remaining 26% of mobility is explained by the reduction of inequality (Banco Mundial 2013a). Even if the majority of those who managed to change their class status through increased income have not fallen back, the mobility potential is limited. It should be noted that the so-called Latin American middle class cannot be equated with the middle class in the advanced economies in terms of levels of education, job security, and social welfare provisions (OCDE 2011). Intergenerational mobility also continues to be limited. Parental economic and social origins and environment at birth continue to determine one’s future. (Yon Kim, 2013). As noted in the 2013 Human Development Report, in Brazil, at least a fourth of income inequality is associated with family circumstances — such as the educational level of the parents, race, ethnicity, or place of birth. This persistence in transgenerational income patterns can also be found in countries such as Chile and Mexico (PNUD 2013). Even in the face of such limitations, the process of social mobility in the region has increased demand for consumer goods such as electric and electronic products, cell phones, Internet, and automobiles, among others (OCDE 2011; Franco et al., 2013). Possessing such items is often seen as the principal avenue for social integration, while those who lack them see it as a form of social exclusion. The very capacity to consume has become a key factor in the perceptions of one’s social condition, especially in a context in which broad sectors of the population lack the means to satisfy their consumer aspirations. (Franco et al. 2013). Finally, problems in the quality of work persist in the region. According to the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), an atmosphere of uncertainty prevails, a result of the expansion of informal or precarious employment, which increases the situation of risk for low-income populations with no access to social security (CEPAL 2011a and 2012). This explains why employment cannot be equated with overcoming poverty or vulnerability. For example, 92% of the indigent poor and 94% of the non-indigent poor are employed, but this hasn’t allowed them to overcome their vulnerable situation, due to the low quality of their work (CEPAL 2012, 21). While low-quality employment doesn’t allow people to fulfil their aspirations, crime continues to represent an option to achieve them. As was shown in this section, the great majority of those incarcerated for robbery held jobs before being arrested, but these jobs were largely unstable, low paid, and in the informal sector. Access to quality employment to overcome situations of vulnerability continues to be a challenge for the economic structure

Vulnerabilities that weaken the social fabric and its control mechanisms

The Family

- The increase in single-parent families with scarce resources and the persistence of a high rate of adolescent fertility without effective support and protection of the State. - Migration processes.

The Collage

- The levels of school dropout, especially at the secondary level. - Deficiencies in educational quality. - Problems of employability.

of the region. The significance of this is particularly important in light of some sociological approaches that argue that people in poverty are not necessarily those who commit crimes, but rather those with aspirations for achieving socially established goals (obtaining brand-name items or the latest generation cell phones) but who have comparative disadvantages for attaining them, such as bad jobs and low salaries (Merton 1938; Cloward y Ohlin 1960; Agnew 1992). In conclusion, expectations of rising consumption together with stagnation in social mobility and the lack of inclusive growth, are all among the factors that can help explain the increase in crime in Latin America. Further, in a context of persistent inequalities, precarious employment and the expansion of consumer expectations, what is called aspirational crime constitutes a plausible hypothesis for the region and requires further study. The regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s robust economic performance requires a strong upward thrust in social mobility to move from the expansion of consumption expectations to the widening of real opportunities for peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development. This is of particular importance for socially excluded groups and those who suffer discrimination, including children, youth, and women in the region.

Social factors: social fabric and social control From the human development perspective, the institutions or spaces for socialization that can contribute to the expansion of peopleâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s capacities, the strengthening of the social fabric, and to the prevention of violence and crime, are the family, the school, and the city. Through these institutions, community is built. They are foci for interaction and learning. In sociological crime theories, these are key spaces for social control that allow people to take decisions in accordance with established norms; in others words, they function as crime inhibitors.23

The City

- The rapid and chaotic growth of cities and the breakdown of the social fabric. -The continuing marginalization of broad sectors of the urban population.

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Table 2.5.

The argument in this section maintains that, in recent years, the changes that have taken place in family structure, in the school, and in the city as areas of social interaction, have weakened as mechanisms for control and as spaces for protection and mobility. Based on hypotheses posited by some sociological theories of crime, Box 2.5 shows the challenges faced by diverse social actors. These vulnerabilities, without being causal, contribute to creating an environment propitious for crime and violence. Table 2.5 also suggests the importance of designing and implementing public policies to strengthen both spaces for interaction and social safety nets, key elements for crime prevention.

The Family In Latin America, the family structure has undergone profound changes in the last decades. These changes have diminished its capacity to respond to changes in society and still remain a fundamental support and catalyst for the development of the individual (Arriagada 2002; Sunkel 2006). The family does not only fulfil a basic function of social support and physical, material, and emotional protection, but it also has a fundamental role in the socialization of norms and their learning. This makes it both a mechanism of social control and an ideal space for the expansion of opportunities. The changes and transformations in the family structure, as well as the persistence of factors which jeopardize its functioning, are elements to consider in the context of the insecurity that the region faces. Three important changes in Latin American families can be identified: the increase in single-parent families, the persistence of high rates of adolescent fertility, and migration processes.

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

The available data indicate that, in recent years, the number of mother must assume responsibility for a household with scarce single parent, female-headed households in Latin America has resources (Cerruti y Binstock 2009). increased significantly. The percentage of births in single parent, female-headed households doubled in 30 years, from 7.3% in Two parent households have also been subject to important 1970 to 15% in 2000 (Castro et al. 2011). The demographic pro- changes. For example, there has been a reduction in the perfile of single mothers continues to show a concentration in the centage of households in which the father or mother doesn’t youngest sectors, the least educated, and those with the least work, and therefore could take care of the child raising: it has economic resources (Castro et al. 2011, 52-3). This phenomenon diminished from 47% in 1990 b to 34% in 2004. No information Total Homicides and Multidimensional Poverty, b by poses importantFigure challenges for the parenting and development is available21about who has assumed responsibility for childcare 2.2C. municipality, Mexico 2010 of children, particularly if they lack the support from social ser- in these households, and as such it remains an open question vices (Navarro 2009; Jelin 2005). It points to a serious problem regarding the rearing and raising of a large number of children in the region regarding the absence of a paternal figure, which (Briceño-León 2013). has real consequences 40 for women who have to confront child According to studies —such as that of the World Bank rearing alone. (2011a)—, those children who feel close to their families have a In the case of urban30areas, the number of single parent, female- 10% lower probability of adopting risky behaviours such as vioheaded households also shows a significant increase. During the lence, smoking, and abuse of drugs and alcohol, as well as risky period 1994-2005, the percentage of children between 0-14 sexual activity. Surveys conducted in prisons point to a signifiyears old that live 20 in single parent, female-headed households cant problem of family abandonment and rupture. For example, grew, with the exception of Guatemala, in all the countries in more than a third of inmates had left home before the age of 15 and, on average, 21.2% said that they had never known their the region (CEPAL 2009). mother or father (see Table 2.6). 10 The relationship between the growth of single parent, femaleheaded households and the deterioration of security in the Figure 2.4 shows that Latin America and the Caribbean is the region is, of course,0 not a simple one nor is there a mechanical region with the second highest levels of adolescent fertility causal relationship. The connection needs to be approached (between 15-19 years old) in the world after Africa. While the 0 20 into considera40 80 fertility rate60for every 1,000 adolescent females100 dropped 26% from a comprehensive perspective which takes Incidenceofofhigh multidimensional 2010 on a globalpoverty, level for the period under study (1970-1975 to 2005tion the differences between single parent households and medium strata, where the woman has economic independ- 2010), in the region, the reduction was 5 percent, and in South ence and social autonomy, and the poorest sectors, where the America the rate rose by 10%. This tendency, with differing degrees and rates in the Latin American countries, is tightly linked Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants, 2010

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Percentage of children between 0 and 14 years old who live in female-headed households in urban areas, Latin America, 1994-2005

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

19.8

15.5

26.5

22.5 17.8

26.5 19.6

Circa 2005

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Paraguay

Nicaragua

Mexico

12.5

Honduras

El Salvador

Ecuador

Costa Rica

16.4

22.8

26.3

28.4

28.3

21.4

19.4

Source: ECLAC, Gender Statistics, Online Data base CEPALSTAT (CEPAL 2011b).

27.3

Panama

25.9

25.8 24

18.4

Colombia

19.3

23.2 21.1

Chile

17.6

Brazil

20.8

32.1

Guatemala

26.6

26.4 18.3

Circa 1994

37.8

34.7

Bolivia

40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

Argentina

Percentage

Figure 2.3.

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

Never knew father or mother

13.1

16.6

19.4

26.7

23.2

28.2

Left home before age 15

38,4

32,5

36.1

37.4

27.8

56.0

Grew up without mother or father (until age 12)

14.5

14.0

15.6

18.2

11.7

14.9

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Family past of inmates, selected countries, 2013 percentage

Table 2.6.

Source: Comparative Study of Prison Population, PNUD (2013).

to the socioeconomic levels of households: adolescent fertility rates are higher in the poorest sectors (Di Cesare 2007; CEPAL 2011a).

Just as in the case of the single-parent, female-headed households, the relationship between adolescent fertility and criminality shouldnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t be casually assumed, and much less lead to the stigmatization of an already vulnerable group. On the contrary, this data should highlight the need to develop prevention and protection mechanisms aimed at alleviating the conditions of poverty and exclusion affecting this group, including sexual and reproductive education and educational opportunities for the prevention of adolescent pregnancy (Naslund-Hadley y Binstock 2011).

Adolescent fertility reflects and reproduces the socioeconomic vulnerabilities faced by an important sector of young women in the region. Due to these vulnerabilities, it is probable that the high rate of adolescent fertility translates into broken homes, with child-rearing and child supervision dynamics that can increase the risk factors for children and youth with respect to criminality.24 In Latin America, the countries with homicide rates higher than 20 for every 100,000 inhabitants (official administrative records compiled by the UNDP 2013) have high levels of adolescent fertility (CEPAL 2012).25

Finally, it is relevant to consider the stress that migration places on the family unit. The emigration of Latin Americans has increased significantly, principally towards the countries of the Or-

Regions of the World, rate of adolescent fertility, 1970-1975 and 2005-2010

Figure 2.4. Africa Asia Central America Europe Latin America and the Caribbean World North America

South America 0

50 2005-2010

100

Rate

150

1970-1975

Source: Population Division (ONU, 2009).

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Figure 2.5.

Net enrolment rate by school level, Latin America, last year available

ganisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), above all between 1990 and 2005. Mexico and Colombia are the countries with the most emigrants in the region, although as a percentage of total population, various Caribbean countries have more than 20% of their population abroad (SICREMI 2011). According to data from the Latin American and Caribbean Demographic Centre (CELADE), the number of Latin American and Caribbean emigrants increased between 2000 and 2005, from an estimated total of 21 million people to 25 million (CEPAL, 2006b). In the second half of the decade, this number rose to almost 30 million, although recently data show a slowing of the flow —especially in the context of the world economic crisis of 2009 (CELADE 2011). In particular, the emigration towards Spain diminished by 38% in the period between 2005-2007 and 20082010, and the flows — duly authorized— towards the United States diminished by 4% (SICREMI 2012).

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

The search for employment and opportunities in other countries has repercussions on households, in breaking up the family unit and affecting its cohesion, membership, and stability (Petit 2003, 6). On this issue, the process of the feminization of migration should be highlighted, and which has increased in recent years, as well as so-called “long distance” motherhood. This phenomenon deserves further study, especially in the case of the Central American countries. In conclusion, there is a combination of changes that have had an impact on family structure in Latin America with the potential to undermine its strength as a mechanism of social control and as a space that provides protection and allows for social mobility. Public policies for the prevention of violence and crime need to address these changes in order to strengthen the resiliency factors for the inhabitants of the region.

From this perspective, educational systems in the region face three challenges to strengthen youth resiliency in the face of insecurity: high dropout levels, especially in secondary school; deficiencies in the quality of education; and the lack of job opportunities. In Latin America, 51% of young males and 45% of young females do not finish secondary school. Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala show the highest dropout rates (CEPAL 2010). This differs according to different social strata: the poorest sectors are the most affected. Of the richest 20% of the population, almost all finish high school, 86 % of females and 81% of males, while for the poorest 20%, only 26% of females and 23% of males finish secondary school (Kliksberg 2011). Without a doubt, dropping out of school continues to be a challenge for schools in the region, with serious consequences for the transmission of intergenerational poverty (Banco Mundial 2007). Dropping out of school is linked, among other things, to socioeconomic factors. Specifically, the need to work forces children and youth in economically precarious circumstances to leave school to support their families (Organización Internacional del Trabajo OIT 2004). Dropping out of school is principally attributable to the need to work at an early age (SITEAL 2013). This variable grows in importance as adolescence approaches. According to the ILO (2004), 70 percent of male youth point to the need to work as the reason for dropping out, while 97% of female youth give domestic obligations, maternity, and housework as reasons for dropping out.

Latin America has made significant progress in education, in improving literacy levels and children’s access to primary schools, with high coverage levels in all countries (CEPAL 2010). The illiteracy rates of the adult population are around 11%, while for the new generation, the illiteracy rate is 2% at the regional level (CEPAL 2010).

Insufficient remedial programs to help overcome academic difficulties exacerbate the challenges for young people to stay in school. Experts also point out that, in addition to problems of educational quality, schools are insufficiently flexible and responsive to children with learning disabilities, which also prompts them to leave school. UNICEF (2011) has identified a link between the high number of school dropouts in the age group from 12 to 14 and levels of insecurity in Central America. This reflects the limited capacity of the educational systems in the region to provide real incentives and opportunities for young people to continue their education.

At present, education levels are higher than two decades ago, in contrast with the scenario of deteriorating citizen security. If one of the hypotheses about how to respond to the high levels of crime and insecurity is education, it is clear that by itself, the school has not been a deterrent to violence. Some studies show that when youth-at-risk remain in school during adolescence,

A recent study shows that in Mexico, young people with lower levels of education are more vulnerable to being victims of violence: the rate of homicide of males between 18 and 40 without a primary school education is much higher than the national average, with 300 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants. In contrast, men between the ages of 26 and 40, who managed to finish

The School

their participation in criminal activities is reduced significantly (Heller et al. 2010).

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Source: Population Division (ONU, 2009).

Figure 2.5.

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Net enrolment rate by school level, Latin America, last year available

100 90 80 70

Rate

60 50 40 30 20

Secondary

Elementary

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Paraguay

Panama

Nicaragua

Mexico

Honduras

Guatemala

El Salvador

Ecuador

Costa Rica

Colombia

Chile

Brazil

Bolivia

Argentina

Dominican Republic

High school

Source: CEPAL (2011) 26 .

university, had a homicide rate of 26 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2011. In the case of women, the only group that had a higher homicide rate than the national average were those between ages 18 to 25 who hadnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t finished primary school (Merino et al. 2013).

pleted 9 years of schooling; in Brazil and Chile, 60%; in Peru, 62.9%; and in El Salvador, 68.6%. In all countries, more than 80% of inmates had not completed 12 years of school. In other words, there is a higher level of school dropouts among those who commit crimes (See Table 2.7).

Surveys conducted among prison populations (PNUD 2013) show that the great majority of inmates had left school very early. In Mexico, 51.1% of the surveyed inmates had not com-

Evaluating the quality of education is a complex challenge. International tests provide an approximation. The results of the 2009 PISA test, which provides an estimate of the quality of

Table 2.7.

Educational level achieved by inmates, selected countries, 2013 percentage

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

23,8

15,2

24,8

38,1

40,2

51,1

62,9

68,6

60,6

60,4

84,7

85,9

87,1

87,3

83,6

84,4

Did not complete primary school Did not complete 9 years of schoolinga Did not complete 12 years of schooling Level at which the majority dropped out

Table

Arge

2rio.

1rio.

Boliv

Source: Comparative Study of the inmate population, UNDP (2013). Note: DU refers to Data Unavailable a. Does not apply to Argentina

Braz

Chile REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Colo

Costa

Country

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Table 2.8.

Percentage of Urban and Rural Victimisation 30, Latin America 2012

Country

Urban Victimisation

Rural Victimisation

Urban

ment in the educational environment results in an improvement Argentina a of performance that ranges from 20 to 50 points in qualifying tests, depending on the subject (UNESCO 2009). In this sense, an Bolivia b improvement in access to education is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition. Economic and social conditions play a crucial Brazilc role in the educational process. From this perspective, the deficiencies and gaps in education can be seen as vulnerabilities in Chiled the face of crime, and at the same time, insecurity in educational environments affects the performancee and retention of students Colombia in school.

Argentina

Bolivia

Brazil

Chile

Colombia

Costa Rica

Ecuador

El Salvador

Guatemala

Honduras

Costa Rica Among the existing vulnerabilities, one must also consider the low levels of insertion by young people into the labour market, El Salvador frequently linked to their educational level (Weller 2006): an incomplete secondary school educationf reduces their employGuatemala ability in the formal market (Kliksberg 2011). According to the ILO, this reality is reflected in the high levels of youth unemHonduras g ployment —between 2.3 and 5.5 times higher than that of adults— as well as unstable and low-income jobs (OIT 2012). Mexico Among youth of the poorest quintile, almost 25 percent —especially women— are neither economically active nor enrolled Nicaragua in school. The consequences of weak labour market insertion are multiple: from present and future low-incomes to social disintePanama gration (CEPAL 2011a).

Mexico

Paraguay h

Nicaragua

Panama

Paraguay

Peru

Dominican Republic

The Cities and the Community Peru

i Republic Latin America is the mostDominican urbanized region in the world, with almost 80 % of its population living in cities, a higher proporj Uruguay tion in fact than in the most developed countries (ONU-Habitat 2012). This is an important factor if one considers that cities are where crime is concentrated. As is seen in Table 2.8, the counthe Statistical-Methodological tries in the region have higher rates of Annex. victimisation in urban than in rural areas. a. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2000-2009. b. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. c. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2004-2010. d. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. e. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2002-2010 f. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2001-2011 g. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. h. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. i. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. j. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010.

A study by the International Centre for Development and Research of Canada (IDRC) on the link between cities, urbanization Venezuela 19 20 processes, and crime, identified a number of different analytical frameworks (Muggah 2012, 6). Two of these were used for this Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012). study: first, the theory of social disorganization, which argues that economic disadvantages, heterogeneity among inhabitants, and instability contribute to disorder within communities, education among 15 year olds from 65 countries—eight Latin and hence to violence. Second, the social capital-cohesion apPercentageshows of inmates admit to having consumed or other drugs least 6 hours before that thewho region continues to rank among alcohol proach, which argues thatatinterpersonal trust and social relaTable 2.12. American— committing a crime, selected countries, 2013 those with the weakest performance. tions are key to understanding criminality. Uruguay

Argentina

Mexico

According to UNESCO’s Second Regional Comparative and Explanatorydrugs Study (SERCE), the educational environment is the Admit to having consumed 30.8 36.0 before the commission of a that crimebest explains27 student performance. Improvevariable

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

The nature of the changes in Latin American cities, especially in urban growth, helps explain the deterioration in security. The 30.2 15.2 38.3 48.8 active processes of urban growth and their relationship with

Type of drug consumed 28

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT Alcohol

Cocaine or “crack”

2 0 1 3 62.9 -2014

33.3

77.3

88.7

79.5

59.4

55.6

18.5

15.7

1.7

50.0

41.5

Average rates of change in the population and of homicides, selected countries, 2000-2010 32

Country

Urban Population

Homicides

Argentina a

1.21

-2.43

Bolivia b

2.84

8.45

Brazilc

1.61

-4.13

Chiled

1.49

0.00

Colombia e

2.12

-6.06

Costa Rica

2.92

7.5

El Salvador

1.38

6.37

Guatemalaf

3.57

Honduras g

3.87

21.89

Mexico

1.82

11.64

Nicaragua

1.93

5.96

Panama

3.49

13,56

3.4

-5.73

Peru

1.84

8.00

Dominican Republic i

2.93

0.00

Uruguay j

0.29

1.40

Paraguay h

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Table 2.9.

the Statistical-Methodological Annex. a. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2000-2009. b. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. c. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2004-2010. d. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. e. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2002-2010 f. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2001-2011 g. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. h. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. i. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. j. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010.

alcohol or other drugs at least 6 hours before

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

the deterioration in security merit particular attention. There are two principal challenges: urban sprawl of intermediate cities and accelerated growth of urbanisation in some countries —especially in Central America.

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Over the last 20 years, even if the proportion of the urban population who lived in slum conditions30 diminished in percentage terms — from 33% to 24%—, the absolute number of persons in these conditions rose from 106 to 111 million in Latin America and the Caribbean (ONU-Habitat 2012). In general terms, demographic growth and the urbanisation process have slowed in the region (ONU-Habitat 2012). The turning points for urbanization in South America were in 1960, and in 1965 in Central America (ONU- Habitat 2010-2011), with a massive push of internal migration towards the urban areas. For example, in 1950, there were 320 cities in the region with at least 20,000 inhabitants; half a century later, this number rose to almost 2,000 cities (Rodríguez 2011). As such, urbanisation advanced much more rapidly than the capacity to respond of institutions and communities themselves, which meant that wide sectors of the population remained outside networks of social protection and state coverage. Even though crime levels were not high for these first generations of internal migrants, in time the number of persons involved in crime rose, among the second and third generations living in relatively marginalized communities. The growth of crime in large urban centres like Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, Mexico City, and Buenos Aires in the 1980s, is a reflection of these new generations of youth that grew up in the disadvantaged outskirts (Bergman 2009; Beato y Couto 2009). Various studies have shown how these socially and physically disorganized, lowincome, and disadvantaged neighbourhoods, have higher crime rates (Geneva Declaration Secretariat 2011; Alda 2012; Escobar 2012). A strong correlation between urban growth and crime has been established. As one can see in Table 2.9, the majority of those countries that experienced an urban population growth rate of more than 2% annually—the natural demographic growth rate — also had increases in the homicide rate —with the exception of Colombia and Paraguay—. The problem doesn’t appear to be the size of the city, but rather the institutional capacity to integrate those sectors found in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and barrios. In a study carried out in 50 cities in the world, the World Bank found no evidence linking the size of cities and crime, but did find a compelling relationship between urbanisation trends and rates of homicide. The rhythm of urbanization in cities is a key factor to keep in 30

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

mind regarding Latin American vulnerability to violence (Banco Mundial 2011a).

Drivers of Crime and Violence Drivers of crime are those factors that influence crime, rather than structural causes. The presence of firearms, drug-trafficking, and alcohol consumption all fuel insecurity.

Firearms There is an ongoing debate about the relationship between crime rates, levels of violence, and the possession of firearms. The discussion hinges on two perspectives: firearms as an instrument of dissuasion, and firearms as a driver of violence and crime (UNODC 2006). According to the second view, easy access to firearms can transform criminal acts and conflicts into lethal episodes. According to LAPOP-PNUD 2012, between a third and half of all robberies in Latin America were perpetrated with firearms. With respect to homicides, the figures are even more dramatic. In countries with data for multiple years, such as Argentina, Honduras, and Mexico, the proportion of homicides with firearms is on the increase. The arms market seems to have grown significantly in the Latin American region, if one considers the increase in the numbers of factories, especially in Brazil. At the core of the arms increase in the region are the sequelae of the civil wars in Central America, the armed movements in Colombia and Peru, the diversion by corrupt officials in various countries of arms meant for exclusive use by the Armed Forces, and finally, arms trafficking, a result of the ease of weapons sales in the United States. (Szabó et al. 2013). In response to this, a number of initiatives have been taken to restrict the carrying of arms in public areas. One such programme has been implemented in El Salvador with the support of UNDP, which seeks to strengthen the registration and control of firearms in the hands of civilians, to reduce demand through communications campaigns, and to restrict the carrying of arms, particularly in those municipalities with higher levels of violence (National Civilian Police). The lethal violence produced by firearms in the region far surpasses the world average of 43% of the total of homicides. According to the 2012 Report on Citizen Security of the Or-

Ecuador El Salvador

Percentage of homicides Countries

Guatemala

percentages and totals Percentage of

UNODC

OEA Start of period

Total of homicides from

Total of legal arms c

Nicaragua Panama

52 (2004)

1113

1.240.000 (2010)

28.7

16.9

Brazil

70.8 (2008)

68 (2000)

37.003

3.155.691 (2003)

39.8

Chile

37.3 (2005)

695.968 (2005)

8.1

Colombia

81.1 (2010)

77 (2004)

14.063

41.3

Costa Rica

57.3 (2006)

52 (2001)

201

148.000 (2006)

30.7

Ecuador

68.7 (2008)

62 (2004)

1.752

117.000 (2006)

33.3

Bolivia

Mexico

End of period

52.0 (2008)

Argentina

Honduras

Percentage of victims of robbery with armsd

Paraguay Peru

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Table 2.10.

Dominican Republic Uruguay Venezuela Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012).

Perce comm

Table 2.12.

El Salvador

76.9 (2008)

81 (2000)

2.957

149.719 (2006)

29.3

Guatemala

84.0 (2010)

73 (2000)

5.403

235.514 (2006)

40.7

Honduras

83.4 (2010)

76 (2005)

4.063

151.003 (2006)

50.4

Mexico

54.9 (2010)

26 (2000)

8.627

2.824.231 (2006)

24.9

Nicaragua

42.1 (2009)

56 (2007)

338

90.113 (2006)

31.8

Panama

75.0 (2010)

59 (2005)

667

65.436 (2006)

34.7

Paraguay

56.1 (2009)

66 (2000)

467

361.093 (2004)

27.1

Peru

50.8 (2009)

270.041 (2005)

17.0

Dominican Republic 65.5 (2010)

49 (2000)

1.678

178.193 (2005)

31.8

Uruguay

46.5 (2004)

39 (2000)

107

450.000 (2010)

10.1

Venezuela

79.5 (2009)

50.0

Admit to having consumed before the commission of a

Type of drug consumed

Alcohol Cocaine or “crack” Marijuana Pills Inhalants Other drugs

Source: Comparative study of the prison p

Source: Compilation based on OEA-Alertamérica (2012, 26 y 28) and LAPOP-PNUD (2012). Note: N/A refers to Data not available a For last year available. All cases refer to 2010, with the exception of Costa Rica (2006), Argentina and Ecuador (2008), El Salvador and Uruguay (2009). b Same years c Civil arms legally registered, most recent data. Source: UNODC and UNDP Guatemala for Guatemala. d Refers to the percentage of persons who report having been the victim of an armed robbery divided by the total of individuals who report having been the victim of any crime in the last 12 months. The answer

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Table 2.11.

Percentage of inmates who admitted to having used a weapon in the commission of a crime, selected countries, 2013

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

59.9

33.3

26.0

25.1

36.2

36.6

37.0

18.7

20.4

18.0

26.0

22.4

37.9

57.6

47.4

56.1

41.8

40.3

65.4

49.3

41.7

57.9

63.5

67.5

Carried a weapon at the time of the commission of a crime Said they used a weapon (of those that carried one) Given weapon by friend or police a Had a weapon before age 18 Source: Comparative study of the prison population, UNDP (2013).

ganization of American States (OAS), in Central America 78% of homicides are committed with firearms, and in South America, 83%. Following the global trend, those countries with high homicide rates are those with high rates of firearms possession. As noted in Box 2.10, Guatemala, Honduras, Colombia, and Venezuela have percentages higher than 75% (OEA Alertamérica 2012). According to the study on homicide carried out by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), in 2011, the probability of being killed by firearms is six times higher than by knives (UNODC 2011). The first three columns in Table 2.10 show that the percentages of homicides perpetrated with firearms are very high. Without a doubt, the growth in the rates of homicide from 1980 and 1990 coincides with the growth in the circulations of arms. In Latin America, at least 80,000 homicides every year are committed with firearms. In 2011, available information on eight countries31 in the region showed a combined figure of 72,992 homicides commited with arms. The extensive use of arms also reflects their availability. The fourth column of Table 2.10 presents data on legally registered arms; however, the number of unregistered arms is thought to exceed the number of registered ones. Surveys of prison inmates also demonstrate how arms are a factor that facilitates crime. A significant number of those interviewed said that they were armed when committing a crime, especially robberies (See Box 2.11). Of those, less than half fired the weapon, and the rest used it for deterrence. In almost all the cases, the inmates confirmed that they had access to a weapon before age 18, and many said that they had received them from the police itself.

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Drugs Drugs have an impact on citizen security in three areas: first, in the violence and crime directly related to their consumption; second, in activities related to their cultivation, production, and sale (Goldstein 1985; MacCoun et.al. 2003); and finally, the violence linked to the unanticipated effects of the repressive measures of the State. Due to its illicit nature, the production and trafficking of drugs fuels violence and crime in the region, as it provides resources for criminal organizations, worsens impunity and corruption, distorts the economy through money-laundering, and adversely affect human development in specific ways (Global Commission on Drug Policy 2011; Transform Drug Policy Foundation 2012; OEA 2013). The resources from this illicit business not only generate large profits for those that control it, but also serve as an incentive for the recruitment of young persons, largely from disadvantaged areas with scarce jobs, who are willing to join these organizations with the hope of higher incomes (Villalobos 2010; Garzón 2012; Banco Mundial 2011b). However, the impact of production and trafficking of drugs on violence is mediated by contextual variables. Among these variables are the rivalries among criminal organizations, (Briscoe 2013; Coscia y Ríos 2012; Snyder y Durán-Martínez 2009), the relationship between criminal groups and communities, and the presence of the authorities and their possible links with criminal organizations. For example, countries like Bolivia and Peru, which are involved in the production of illicit drugs, haven’t reached critical levels of lethal violence (Muggah y McDermott 2013). Even some countries with high levels of homicide associated with organized crime, have areas where high numbers of lethal crimes do not occur (Ríos 2013).

In addition, the unanticipated impact of State-directed repressive strategies has had negative effects on community security and development (Global Commission on Drug Policy 2011; Transform Drug Policy Foundation 2012; Felbab-Brown 2012; Guerrero 2011). In particular, offensives by the State can generate an aggressive reaction from criminal organizations and bring about their division and geographical dispersion (Coscia y Ríos 2012; Guerrero 2012; Felbab-Brown 2013). Drug consumption by addicts is a public health matter. People who are addicted to such substances should not be criminalized. On the contrary, they should be seen under comprehensive public policies, which should include treatment, harm reduction, and social integration (Organización Panamericana de la Salud OPS 2010; Comisión Global de Políticas de Drogas 2011; OEA 2013). Data show that the violence and crime directly associated with drug use is minimal (OEA 2013). According to the OAS report (2013), consumption tends to be high among those who have committed crimes, but it cannot be said that the commission of crimes is high among those who use drugs. For example, despite the fact that drug use among the prison inmate population is higher than in the general population (CICAD 2010), it can be influenced by other factors, such as the marginalization and exclusion that prisoners frequently face (Bennett et al. 2008). Some studies show that harder drugs correlate more strongly with the commission of crimes. A recent meta-analysis32 which includes more than thirty studies at a global level, concludes that the probability of committing a crime is between 2.8 and 3.8 times greater among those who have used drugs; the probabilities of repeat offending are 6 times higher in the case of crack, 3 times higher in the case heroin, and 2.5 times higher in the case of cocaine (Stevens et al. 2005). In addition, the correlation between the commission of crimes and drugs is associated with periods of intense addiction, and diminishes during periods of less dependency (Chaiken y Chaiken 1990). However,

this kind of analysis fails to take into consideration the following elements: the risky environment that characterises this kind of illegal market, the particular vulnerabilities of this population, and the lack of State assistance and protection mechanisms available for the drug-using population.

Alcohol Alcohol abuse is associated with high-risk behaviours, among them the recourse to violence. Surveys conducted in prisons highlight the association between alcohol consumption and the commission of crimes. Table 2.12 shows that alcohol represents more than 60% of the drugs consumed before the commission of a crime, significantly higher than for other legal and illegal psychoactive substances.

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

In the case of Central America, there is a correlation between the key areas for drug trafficking and high rates of homicide, especially in Guatemala and Honduras (UNODC 2013, 48). In Colombia, some data show that drug production activities claim between 4,600 and 7,000 lives every year, which would be equivalent in their highest estimate to 40% of the 17,700 homicides reported in 2010 (Mejía y Restrepo 2010). In Mexico, the federal government estimated that between December 2006 and January 2012 almost 60,000 persons died as a result of executions, confrontations between rival gangs, and attacks on authorities by criminal organizations linked to drug-trafficking (OEA 2013).

In addition, alcohol is a factor associated with gender violence. Surveys conducted in 12 countries in the region show that women victims of violence committed by male partners relate these assaults with alcohol consumption — from 29% in Guatemala to 53% in Ecuador— (Bott et al. 2012, 51-53). This association between alcohol and violence, above all in the home, is evident in different countries such as Russia, Iceland, and the United Kingdom, where more than half of violence, rape, and homicide among couples is related to alcohol consumption (OMS 2006). In conclusion, alcohol consumption is associated with a range of different kinds of violence, above all common crime and gender violence. While not a structural cause, the reduction of alcohol abuse could be a proactive action to reduce actual violence.

Institutional Vulnerabilities According to the criminological theory of dissuasion, a person has fewer incentives to commit a crime if he or she knows that the probability of being sanctioned is high (Paternoster 1989). Further, citizens have more incentives to respect the existing laws if their application is considered just, proportional to the crime, and respectful of human rights and rule of law. This section provides a brief overview of the deficiencies of the state in providing citizen security, and shows three shared weaknesses in the region: corruption, impunity, and lack of proportionality in punishments. An analysis of these vulnerabilities will be addressed in detail in Chapter 4 (both corruption and abuses of authority) and in Chapter 6 (which shows how the States’ institutional weaknesses undermine their capacity to fully guarantee citizen security). REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Venezuela

g. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. h. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. i. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010. j. Average annual rate of change for homicides 2005-2010.

Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012).

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

2 Percentage of inmates who admit to having consumed alcohol or other drugs at least 6 hours before committing a crime, selected countries, 2013

Table 2.12.

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

30.8

36.0

30.2

15.2

38.3

48.8

Alcohol

62.9

77.3

88.7

79.5

59.4

55.6

Cocaine or “crack”

33.3

18.5

15.7

1.7

50.0

41.5

Marijuana

32.7

13.4

10.5

15.3

22.6

35.4

Pills

30.8

8.1

0.8

0.6

0.7

9.5

Inhalants

0.6

12.1

0.6

2.3

0.3

2.0

Other drugs

0.6

1.7

0.3

1.7

0.7

1.5

Admit to having consumed drugs before the commission of a crime Type of drug consumed

Source: Comparative study of the prison population, PNUD (2013).

Corruption Data from the LAPOP-PNUD survey (2013), which is examined in Box 2.13, shows the percentage of citizens from whom the police or a public official has requested a bribe, as well as the perception of the citizens regarding the legitimacy or justification of the use of bribery. To varying degrees, there were citizens in all of the countries who responded in the affirmative to the questions in Box 2.13. In all cases, they responded that they had been victims of corrupt practices more frequently by the police than by public officials. Given that the police are the State institution that maintains the most direct and frequent relationship with the citizenry in security issues, it is clear that this practice has negative consequences for citizen confidence. The results of the LAPOP survey and the official administrative records compiled by the UNDP reflect a correlation in countries with relatively low crime rates and low rates of corruption — Chile, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Panama—. In those countries with high levels of crime and violence, bribery rates are relatively high —Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, Venezuela and Colombia—. Of course, there are exceptions, like El Salvador, with high levels of violence and low levels of corruption.

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Regarding the question as to whether the payment of a bribe is justified, more than 20 percent of those surveyed answered “yes” in Colombia and Mexico, countries which share high rates of homicide. In other countries, with higher levels of violence — like El Salvador or Guatemala—, this percentage was less than 10% (see Box 2.13).

Impunity When a high percentage of violent and criminal acts against the citizenry are not investigated, processed, and when justified, punished, it creates a sensation of vulnerability. While no country solves all its crimes and punishes all offenders, a minimal threshold is required to avoid generalized distrust, fear, and even contempt for the law among citizens. In general, the more serious the crime, the probability of its punishment should be higher. In the OECD countries, the sanction rate for homicide is more than 65%. However, there is a serious deficiency in Latin America in this regard. According to some studies, until 2007, in Mexico only one of every seven homicides was punished (Zepeda 2013). In Brazil, less than one in every four homicides is solved (Beato 2012).

Table 2.13.

Country

Latin America, 2012

Table 2.14.

Bribery requests from public Police

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

2 How do things work ¿Is paying a

Country

Brazil

Public Employees b

Chile

R s

9.5

5.2

8.6

Costa Rica

Bolivia

20.0

10.5

15.3

El Salvador

Brazil

4.3

2.3

9.1

Mexico

Chile

1.9

1.6

7.1

Source: OAS-Alertamérica, Citize

Colombia

9.5

5.2

21.1

Costa Rica

4.9

3.4

12.6

15.3

9.3

19.5

El Salvador

5.6

2.3

9.4

Guatemala

18.0

4.5

4.8

Honduras

15.9

7.0

11.7

Mexico

20.5

9.8

21.8

Nicaragua

5.4

1.5

13.0

Panama

3.5

1.7

8.2

Paraguay

13.6

7.4

14.4

Had a weapon befor

Peru

16.4

7.8

13.7

Source: Comparative study of t

Dominican Republic

14.6

6.6

17.2

Uruguay

3.6

2.2

8.3

Venezuela

7.8

3.6

8.4

Argentina

Ecuador

Table 2.11.

Carried a weapon at commission of a crim Said they used a wea carried one) Given weapon by fri

Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012). a “Has any police agent requested a bribe from you in the last 12 months?”

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

An indirect method that allows one to ascertain the levels of impunity in a country is the hidden figure for crime. The hidden figure is the unreported complaint rate, which is reflected in victimisation surveys. Even though few countries report it, the OAS Observatory notes that in some countries the reporting of crime is very low: for example, in Mexico and in Costa Rica, less than one in every four crimes is reported (see Box 2.14).

BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

Lack of Proportionality in Punishment All punishment should be proportional to the severity of the offense. In general, penal codes reflect this principle. However, in practice, the proportionality of the sanction leaves much to be desired. Prisons in the region are overcrowded, as a result of a problem of the disproportionality of sentences relative to minor crimes. A fundamental problem in this regard is that police, prosecutors, and judges tend to concentrate on the arrest and punishment of the easily detained, instead of the pursuit of organized crime which requires greater intelligence work and interinstitutional coordination (Azaola y Bergman 2002). As a result, the sanction proportionality tends to disappear.

Recommendations 1. Address the multiple socioeconomic factors associated with crime and violence in Latin America in a comprehensive manner. Mitigation of the factors underlying crime and violence requires policies, programmes, and projects that address their vulnerabilities. This demands multi-sector responses and a coordinated

Table 2.14. Country

Rate of complaints to the police (all crimes), selected countries, various years

Rate of complaints to the police

Year of measurement

Brazil

2002

Chile

35.7

2010

Costa Rica

23.1

2010

El Salvador

9.8

2009

Mexico

2009

Source: OAS-AlertamĂŠrica, Citizen Security Observatory

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effort from State institutions, integrating ministries of security, health, economy, social development, and public health, among others. Government programmes that promote more equitable development and foster social mobility are a key element to respond to the challenge of insecurity, especially in a context of significant disparities between countries and gender. Wider coverage by state services, as well as the social commitment of the private sector, will promote and foster more equitable growth. In practice, governments should implement specific programmes addressing those risk factors that emerge in particular areas, and which affect people and their communities. Likewise, universal coverage policies are needed to increase access and quality of education, expand work opportunities, and substantively improve the living conditions of the poorest population. 2. Contain and mitigate the drivers of crime: arms, drugs and alcohol. There is an urgent need to control the flow of arms and munitions, as well as to regulate and control their use by civilians. Campaigns to discourage the citizen use and ownership of arms are useful to complement regulation. In the international sphere, cooperation between states is crucial, especially in the case of the co-responsibility of countries that are arms manufacturers. The consumption of alcohol and other drugs, both legal and illegal, requires a social and public health approach. In the case of alcohol, restrictions on hours and areas of consumption could have a positive impact on the occurrence of violence, especially when these measures are accompanied by campaigns for prevention, consumer risk, and damage reduction, and greater police presence. This requires that particular attention be paid to the relationship between alcohol and domestic violence, starting with early warning and complaint mechanisms, to prevent incidents from taking place. Regarding illicit drugs, it is important to differentiate between the different substances and their effects. The prevention of consumption, as well as attention and rehabilitation, should be based on scientific evidence and respect for human rights. It should be noted that consumption is not a security issue, but rather a public health issue. Regarding the criminal dimension of drugs, closely linked to their prohibition and the competition for markets, institutional responses should be oriented toward the reduction of violence associated with organized crime activity, and toward the pro-

3. Risk factors for youth must be addressed, and environments for opportunity and protection need to be created. Prevention programmes directed at youth in vulnerable conditions should focus on expanding their capacities and opportunities to achieve their goals through legal means. These kinds of measures can also have positive effects on the strengthening of community bonds and creating protective factors in the face of child and youth participation in crimes or their recruitment by organized crime. Secondary school coverage should be expanded. Support programmes for families have shown promise in this respect, particularly for single parent and low-income families. The formation of public-private alliances is central to generate incentives to avoid school drop-out and to promote real employment opportunities for youth. At the same time, educational quality must be improved and technical training should be complemented with programmes of civic training, in accordance with the particular characteristics of each social context. Special attention should be placed on the prevention of school and domestic violence. The development of a secure environment for youth upbringing requires creating a context of care and protection, with the strengthening of family bonds and the active participation of the community and civil society organizations. A key element in these programmes is the participation of youth during the process of formulation, implementation, and evaluation of such efforts. 4. Strengthen the social fabric as an area for protection and social mobility There is a need to formulate public policies to strengthen spaces for interaction and social safety nets, as key elements in crime prevention. A social and political policy is required to address the challenges and vulnerabilities that single parents and female-headed households face in child rearing. For example, public day-care facilities, the lengthening of the school-day, and after-school educational and social programmes, are necessary in the case of single-family households that cannot depend on an extended family to help with the supervision of children.

In addition, better sexual and reproductive education for the adolescent population is urgent —especially in the disadvantaged sectors—in order to reduce fertility rates at young ages. Guaranteeing access to relevant information on sexual and reproductive rights can help achieve this. It is essential to strengthen the social safety nets in communities with high rates of migration, especially in those cases where the nuclear family is affected by the physical absence of a mother or father. Coordinated work by civil society organizations that work with migrants and State social safety networks can help reduce the vulnerable situation of this population.

2 BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

tection of citizens. Within this framework, actions carried out by authorities must insure the criteria of no reproduction of violence and respect for human rights.

Regarding cities, it will be important to increase public and private investment in low-income neighbourhoods, accompanied by an expansion of basic services, an institutional presence and its integration in city development. Better communication and accessibility, a greater effort to widen the coverage of basic services, and the building of cultural and recreational areas will improve the quality of life in these communities and reduce their marginalization. It is also necessary to develop social and urban policies to try to reclaim public areas in the city and create common spaces that promote social cohesiveness. Inclusive urban planning constitutes a tool that can contribute to reducing disparities and avoiding the breakdown of the social fabric, thus contributing to the prevention of crime and violence. 5. Combat corruption and reduce impunity It is crucial to establish control mechanisms and citizen oversight, and effective accountability that would serve to re-establish the legitimacy of state institutions. This requires measures for prevention, control, and investigation that operate effectively in the face of corruption and the abuse of power. There is a need to establish procedures for internal supervision, citizen oversight, effective channels for complaint, and the administration of sanctions for acts of corruption and human rights violations. Given the lack of proportionality in punishments, it is necessary to review the criminal law framework to balance the severity of crimes and the corresponding sanctions. In this context, the use of “iron fist” policies should be dispensed with, and priority should be given to the application of alternative sanctions and measures, such as social reintegration.

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BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

THE INSECURITY MAP

CHAPTER

THE INSECURITY MAP

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

THE INSECURITY MAP

Guitar, Pedro Reyes, 2003

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

CHAPTER

THE INSECURITY MAP

Latin America is the only region in the world where homicides increased between 2000 and 2010, representing the lives of one million people who were victims of lethal violence (UNODC 2012). Although this upward tendency has stabilised and even reversed in some countries, the levels of lethal violence in the region continue to be high. In 11 of the 18 countries analysed, the rate is greater than 10 homicides for every 100,000 inhabitants, a level considered to be epidemic by the WHO. In all countries of the region, even those with relatively low homicide rates, the fear of becoming a victim of violence and crime, including robbery, has become commonplace (LAPOP-UNDP 2012).

Analytical and methodological framework

This chapter analyses the available data on the objective and subjective dimensions of citizen security. To this end, use has been made of administrative registries of homicide and robbery, surveys on victimisation and perception, and research carried out in prisons.

The use of these analytical categories contributes to understanding the dimension of insecurity as well as its patterns of behaviour. In particular, it allows for an explanation of why, even in countries with relatively low crime rates, people’s sense of insecurity and fear has risen. The data over time show that both objective and subjective insecurity is on the increase in the region. That is, from a historical perspective its tendency is to rise. Even in countries with a low intensity of crime, such as Chile or Uruguay, due to a tendency of abrupt growth in robbery and other crimes since the beginning of the 21st century, insecurity has become the issue of greatest citizen concern (Dammert and Lunecke 2007; Núñez, Tocornal and Henríquez 2012).

Five main points are made in this chapter: • While the rate of homicides has stabilised and even diminished in some countries of the region -thus reversing the tendencies of the last two decades- the levels of lethal violence continue to be a major concern. • Available statistics indicate that robbery is the crime that most frequently affects Latin Americans and there is a marked rise in the number of robberies committed with violence. • In spite of the differences between countries in the intensity of objective insecurity, Latin America has a shared challenge in terms of the perception of violence: the whole region suffers from high indices of fear. • Homicide is concentrated to an alarming extent among youthful populations, in particular young men. • It is necessary to strengthen efforts aimed at improving the collection and organization of trustworthy, homogeneous, and verifiable data. The chapter has four sections: the analytical and methodological framework, the homicide map, the robbery map, and the perception of insecurity. It ends with a section on recommendations.

This report systematises the best quality information available from the last 10 to 20 years for the 18 countries analysed.34 In order to analyse the evolution of crime and the levels of violence in the region, a distinction needs to be made between two analytical variables: tendency and intensity. Tendency refers to the trajectory, high or low, that can be observed over time. Intensity refers to the levels of violence and crime that occur at any given time.

The data used in this chapter comes from three main sources: (a) each country’s administrative records made by the relevant authorities (police, criminal justice system, and statistics centres), (b) surveys on victimisation and perception, mainly based on LAPOP surveys carried out since 2000 in all countries of the region, as well as a battery of special questions for this report carried out by LAPOP and the UNDP in 2012 (LAPOP-UNDP 2012), and (c) as yet unpublished surveys of prison inmates in five countries of the region —Argentina, Brazil, Chile, El Salvador, and Peru— by the UNDP, and in Mexico by the Centre for Economic Research and Teaching (Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económica -CIDE). In addition, through its Country Offices, the UNDP gathered official information from government administration records on 12 categories of crime (see statistical-methodological appendix).35 REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

As a way of dealing with these deficiencies in information, as well as the problems in making comparisons between countries (cross-cutting comparisons) this chapter compares each country with itself over several years (longitudinal measurement). Longitudinal measurement offers a greater degree of confidence for the following reasons: • Data collection in each country is generally done with the same method over the years. In the case of errors, these methods are generally “systematic”. This means that even when an error exists in the measurement, it is not reproduced in the calculation of crime tendencies.36

• Each country has its own definitions of different crimes and its own system for data gathering. Because of this, a comparison between countries doesn’t always reflect a genuine contrast for the same type of crime. This problem is mitigated by comparing specific crime tendencies in each country. • The majority of crimes committed are not reported to the authorities. Paradoxically, in places where the authorities are competent, there may be more reports (and in this way they seem to have a higher crime rate) than in places where the authorities are less effective. Efficient authorities produce greater trust for the population in making a formal report.

3 THE INSECURITY MAP

The definitions of robbery vary from country to country. In some countries, the same category covers violent or armed robbery and theft, but not in others. Because of this, comparing theft and robbery between countries is not recommended. Even homicide, in some cases, cannot be compared, since some countries specifically report on intentional homicide while in others, the category of homicide also includes negligent homicide (manslaughter).

The greatest challenge faced when looking at crime statistics is the trustworthiness of the data, since in many countries there is no quality control of the information. The most frequent problems are that the central offices for crime statistics do not do periodic audits of the information received; the different administrative units have different standards in each province and municipality to classify information; there is a lack of transparency or clarity in information management, and there are strong political incentives to manipulate sensitive data. These problems

Box 3.1. Advances in information management Key advances have been made in information management in Latin American countries. On a national level, specialised observatories have been established and institutions have been developed with improved technical capabilities. The use of information networks and mobile communication technologies has also been incorporated. On a regional level, there are key initiatives such as the OAS’ Alertamerica Hemispheric Security Observatory, the CISALVA (Health and Violence Research Centre) and IDB’s Standardized Regional System of Indicators for Citizen Security and Violence Prevention (SES), and the national and local security observatory initiatives supported by the UNDP. Experiences with observatories on violence

Country

Observatory

Institution in charge

Years of experience with observatories

Argentina

Citizen Security Observatory for the Municipalities of Buenos Aires Province (ObserBA)

Argentinean Federation of Municipalities (FAM)Ministry of Government for Buenos Aires Province

Bolivia

National Observatory on Citizen Security

Vice-Ministry for Citizen Security

Brazil

DATASUS- Unified Health System

Secretariat for Strategic and Participatory Management, Health Ministry– IT Department

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Box 3.1. Advances in information management

THE INSECURITY MAP

Experiences with observatories on violence

Colombia

Police National Information System SIEDCO: PONAL Observatory

National Police of Colombia

Costa Rica

Observatory on Violence of the Ministry for Justice and Peace

Ministry for Justice and Peace – Vice-Ministry for Peace – General Directorate for the Promotion of Peace and Co-existence

Ecuador

Quito Metropolitan Observatory on Citizen Security

Quito Metropolitan District

Guatemala

Observatory 24-0

Ministry of Governance – Third Vice-Ministry for the Prevention of Violence and Crime37

Haiti

National Observatory on Security and Violence

Haiti National Police

Honduras

IUDPAS- UNAH Observatory on Violence

University Institute on Democracy Peace and Security (IUDPAS) of the National Autonomous Universidad of Honduras

El Salvador

San Salvador Metropolitan Observatory OPAMSS-COAMSS

Planning Office for the San Salvador Metropolitan Area (OPAMSS)

Nicaragua

Observatory on Co-existence and Citizen Security

National Police of Nicaragua

Panama

Integrated Statistics System Observatory (SIEC)

Security Ministry

Peru

Public Ministry’s Observatory on Criminality

Public Ministry of Peru- National Public Prosecutor’s Office

Dominican Republic

Observatory on Citizen Security

Ministry of the Interior and Police (MIP)

Uruguay

National Observatory on Violence and Criminality

Ministry of the Interior – Eastern Republic of Uruguay

Source: Information compiled by UNDP (2013).

Centre for Excellence UNODC-INEGI

The Centre for Excellence in Statistical Information on Government, Public security, Victimisation and Justice is a joint initiative of the Mexican National Institute for Statistics and Geography (INEGI) and the UNODC. The Centre acts as a focal point for knowledge that supports countries in improving their processes for generating, analysing, and dissemination statistical information based on international best practices. Its work centres on three areas: victims’ research, measuring organised crime and emerging crimes, and the international classification of crime.

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3 Homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants by department, Honduras, 2011

THE INSECURITY MAP

Map 3.4.

10 - 20 20 - 30 Higher than 30

Source: Observatory on violence, University Institute on Democracy, Peace, and Security (IUDPAS, 2011).

Box 3.2. Citizen security in Haiti Haiti has one of the lowest rates of violent death in the region. Since 2004, a considerable improvement has been registered in security conditions. The presence and work carried out by the police force belonging to the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (or MINUSTAH, its French acronym) and the UNDP have contributed to a reduction of violence, as well as the reform of the Haitian National Police (PNH). In 2012, the National Observatory on Violence and Criminality registered 1,109 homicides (including suicides and traffic accidents). There was also an increase in Table 3.3.

Costa Rica

The high level of impunity is another of the challenges. This is reflected in low levels of trust among the population with respect to state institutions, and in particular the PNH. During the last few years, there has been a rise in denunciations, in part due to improvements in registry mechanisms. This is a useful tool for the work done by national authorities to improve the provision of security and justice services.

Homicide rate disaggregated by sex per 100,000 inhabitants, selected countries, 2010-2012 2010

Country

Chile

crimes related with drug trafficking, as well as sexual and sexist violence (in both the capital and the interior of the country).

2012

2011

Men

Women

Men

2.0

0.6

3.0

19.5

2.6

17.5

Women

Men

Women

1.0 REPO R T 2 0 10.4 REGIONAL0.9 H UMAN DE VELOPMENT 3 -2 0 1 4 2.8

Georgia 2.091 501 X. Los Lagos 0.7 Germany 61.406 54.512 XI. Aysén del General Carlos Ibáñez del Campo 1.9 Hungary 2.866 3.020 XII. Magallanes and the Chilean Antarctic 1.3 Iceland 49 48 XIV. Los Ríos 0.5 Ireland 2.009 1.898 XV. Arica and Parinacota 0.5 Homicide rate disaggregated by sex Italy per 100,000 inhabitants, selected Table 3.3. 59.191 countries, 2010-2012 40.362

THE INSECURITY MAP

Santiago Metropolitan region

1.5

Source: Ministry of the Interior and Public Security. Sub-secretariat for Crime Prevention.2010 Country

Men

Chile

2.0

Costa Rica

19.5

El Salvador

117.5

Guatemala

75.1

Honduras

147.6

Mexico

43.7

Nicaragua

Lithuania Malta Moldavia Women Men Netherlands 0.6 Rumania 3.0 Russia 2.6 Serbia 17.5 17.7 Slovakia 127.5 Eslovenia 9.4 Spain 58.7 Sweden 9.4 162.8 Switzerland 4.4 Turkey NA Ukraine NA 7.7 United Kingdom

Panama

39.5

3.3

38.9

Dominican Republic

45.8

4.2

45.7

5.177 2011 256 188 Women 12.928 2.813 0.9 28.293 2.8 558 1.723 19.1 460 8.3 86.582 6.831 12.3 2.595 1.343 NA 47.360 0.8 98.198 2.8 4.6

2.701 2012 196 152 Men Women 11.984 1.0 2.197 0.4 19.183 NA 592 NA 76.6 908 9.7 443 24.5 64.157 2.8 6.690 NA NA 3.456 NA 1.221 NA 22.574 NA NA 76.179 27.6

1.2

35.0

4.7

-76.04 -11.23 5.37 -2.04 -5,53 -31.81 -47.83 -23.44 -19.15 -7.30 -21.90 -32.20 6.09 -47.30 -3.70 -25.90 -2.06 33.18 -9.08 -52.34 -22.42

Note: NA indicate no data available.

Table 3.4. Country

Chile Costa Rica El Salvador

increase women’s vulnerability. The specificities of femicide vary according to the social space in which they occur. In the private sphere, the perpetrator tends to be someone known to the vicFemicide in selected countries Table 3.5. tim, including her partner, former partner or a family member. and unreported crimes Table 3.7A.2011 Victimisation 2010 to be called “intimate femicides” and appear toTable 3.7B. occurring overThese the cases year,tend Chile, 2011 be linked to cases of domestic violence. Country Year Women Men Women Men Homicide disaggregated by sex, selected countries, 2010-2011 percentages

18.53 11.57 14.10

Percentage of

43 81.47 Crime19.89 80.11 Argentina In the public sphere, the perpetrators tend to be unknownCrime 2011 non-reporting victims 88.43 13.50 86.50 car part Costa or Rica people who collectively. “Public” femicidesTheft of 2010 Theft 74.8act individually Robbery withou can occur64.5 in the contexts of peace and war, armed conflict, or 85.83 Robbery 14.37 2011 Peru by surprise or85.63 stealth military repression, andDominican can combineRepublic with other forms of genderBurglary2011 46.5 Guatemala 13.20 88.34 Burglary 14.96 74.27 violence 53.2 such as sexual violence (ACUNS 2013, 55-74). Robbery by assault 6.58 93.83 7.77 92.79 Honduras Survey on Citizen Security (2011). Panama 7.51 92.36 Source: National 6.46Institute for Statistics: 92.36 In Guatemala in 2011, the National Police reported that 631 91.50 10.07 90.85 Dominican Republic 9.28 women had been murdered (PNC 2012). According to figures from the National Police of El Salvador, between 2003 and 2012, 4,018 women were murdered. This is an annual average of 402 homicides against women. Rate of robbery per 100,000 Percentage of Table 3.10. inhabitants, Latin America, Table 3.8. victimisation by robbery, Table 3.9. Table 3.5 shows the number of femicides in four countries, acLatin America, 2012 circa 2005-circa 2012 cording to the last available year in administrative records. It is Percentage important to note that few countries have classified and regisCountry Rate Circa Rate Circa Country of victimisation tered this crime. 2005 2010 Average no. of times Argentina 17.93 980.0 Argentina 973.3 22.56 violence, women are also afBolivia In addition to these forms of lethal Average amount sto 75.3 Bolivia 86.3 Brazil 12.14 fected in a particular and disproportionate way by other types of Median Chile NA 572.7 Brazil violence including sexual and10.82 domestic violence and violence by Minimum Colombia 17.66 495.0 Chilenot making formal 361.3 Maximum Victims of crime 5 4 R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4 Costa Rica 15.38 reports to the Public Ministry, No. of prisoner surve 873.1 397.6 Costa Rica Table 3.7C. Non-reporting Mexico, 2010 Ecuador 25.19 victims, Colombia, 2012 150.4 86.8 El Salvador

per 100,000 inhabitants e, 2010

Table 3.6.

Victims of robbery, Eurasia, 2005- 2007 and 2009 -2011

THE INSECURITY MAP

2010 Total first Totals last Country available year available year 2.2 ( 2005 - 2007) (2009 - 2011) 2.8 0.4 Austria 4.877 3.995 0.8 Belarus 1.099 394 1.2 Bulgaria 3.738 2.588 0.9 Canada 32.437 30.405 1.4 Czech Republic 5.082 3.579 Denmark 2.391 2.166 1.3 Finland 1.699 1.718 1.1 micide disaggregated sex per 100,000 inhabitants, countries, 2010-2012 regatedrate by sex per 100,000by inhabitants, selected countries,selected 2010-2012 Georgia 2.091 501 0.7 Germany 61.406 54.512 del Campo 1.9 2010 2012 2011 2010 2012 2011 Hungary 2.866 3.020 ntarctic 1.3 Iceland 49 48 Women Men Women Men Men 0.5 Women Men Women Women Men Women Ireland 2.009 1.898 Italy 0.93.0 40.362 2.0 0.5 0.6 1.0 0.4 0.6 3.0 1.00.959.191 0.4 1.5 Lithuania 5.177 2.701 19.5 2.6 17.5 NA NA 2.6 17.5 NA2.8 256 NA Sub-secretariat for Crime Prevention. Malta 2.8 196 Moldavia 152 117.5 17.7 127.5 19.1 188 76.6 9.7 17.7 127.5 19.1 76.6 9.7 Netherlands 12.928 11.984 75.1 9.4 58.7 24.5 2.8 9.4 58.7 8.3 24.58.3 2.813 2.8 Rumania 2.197 Russia12.3 19.183 147.6 9.4 162.8 12.328.293 NA NA 9.4 162.8 NA NA Serbia 558 592 43.7 4.4 NA NA 4.4 NA NANA 1.723 NA SlovakiaNANA 908 460 443 Eslovenia NA NA NA NA 7.7NA 0.87.7 NA0.8 NA 86.582 64.157 Spain 39.5 3.3 38.9 27.6 1.2 6.690 Sweden2.8 3.3 38.9 27.62.8 6.831 1.2 2.595 3.456 Switzerland 45.8 4.2 45.7 35.0 4.7 4.2 45.7 4.6 35.04.6 4.7 1.343 1.221 Turkey 47.360 22.574 Ukraine 98.198 76.179 United Kingdom

ble 3.7A.

Victimisation and unreported crimes Victimisation crimes Table 3.7A. and unreported occurring over the year, Chile, 2011 occurring over the year, Chile, 2011

omicide disaggregated43by sex, selected Percentage of Percentage of 43 Crime me untries, 2010-2011 non-reporting victims non-reporting victims rcentages

Theft 74.8 ft 74.8 Robbery by surprise or stealth 64.5 bery 2010 by surprise or stealth 64.5 2011 Burglary 46.5 glary 46.5 men Men Women Men Robbery by assault 53.2 bery by assault 53.2 .53 81.47 19.89 80.11 Source: National Institute Statistics: Survey on Citizen Security (2011). e: National Institute for Statistics: Survey on CitizenforSecurity (2011). .57 88.43 13.50 86.50 .10 85.83 14.37 85.63

.20 .58

Table 3.7B.

14.96 7.77

ate of robbery per 100,000 r 100,000

74.27 92.79

-18.08 -64.15 -30.77 -6.26 -29.57 -9.41 1.12 Homicide Homicide disaggregated by -76.04 countries Table 3.4.2010-2011 countries, Table 3.4. percentage percentages -11.23 5.37 20 Country2010 Country -2.04 Women W Women Men -5,53 Chile Chile-31.81 18.53 81.4718.53 Costa 11.57Rica 88.4311.57 Costa-47.83 Rica -23.44 El 14.10 Salvador El Salvador 85.8314.10 -19.15 Guatemala Guatemala 13.20 88.3413.20 -7.30 Honduras 6.58 93.83 6.58 Honduras -21.90 Panama Panama 7.51 92.36 7.51 -32.20 9.28 Republic 91.50 9.28 Dominican 6.09 RepublicDominican -47.30 -3.70 -25.90 -2.06 33.18 -9.08 -52.34 -22.42

Victims of formal crime not making forma Victims of crime not making

reports to the Public Ministry, Table 3.7B. reports to the Public Ministry, Mexico, 2010

Mexico, 2010

Percentage of Percentage of non-reporting vict non-reporting victims Theft of car parts 93.3 Femicide in selected countries, last available Table 3.5. Theft of car parts 93.3 year Crime

Crime

Robbery without violence 89.6 Robbery without violence Burglary 81.0 Burglary

Country

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

88.34 93.83

Percentage change

Argentina Costa Rica Peru Dominican Republic

Percentage of

Year

Femicides

2011 2010 2011 2011

286 29 93 230

89.6 81.0

Averages amounts stolen and Averages of amounts stolen of and number of time of num prev 45

Note: NA indicate no data available.

As Figure 3.3 and Table 3.6 show, the Latin American countries not only register more crimes than a sample of other countries in Eurasia with a smaller population, but they also show an opposite tendency. The vast majority of Eurasian countries such as Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia, show reductions in the figures for robbery, while in Latin America the tendency is upwards. It tims of crime not making formal is worth pointing out, however, that in some countries such as ports to the Public Ministry, Chile, efforts have been made to encourage reporting crimes, xico, 2010 which may explain the increase in the number of robberies.

nce

on the rate93.3 of victimisation, since the “hidden figure” or figure 89.6 crimes related to robbery and theft tends to be of non-reported 81.0 very high (see Tables 3.7 A, B and C and map 3.6).

Table 3.7A.

74.8 Robbery by surprise or stealth 64.5 Percentage of Burglary 46.5 non-reporting victims Robbery by assault 53.2 72.1 76.0 Institute for Statistics: Survey on Citizen Security (2011 Source: National

Burglary of homes Robbery aginst people

Source: Survey on co-existence and citizen security, DANE (2012).

ges of amounts stolen and number of time of previous robberies, selected ries, 2013 45 Victims’ research allows us to observe the dimensions and ges and medians

Table 3.10 allows for the analysis of the phenomenon of robbery based on surveys with prison inmates. These surveys generated information about the motivations and characteristics of those who steal. In four of the countries, most robberies were for relatively small amounts. The value of stolen goods ranges from an average of US$3,000 in El Salvador to US$33,200 in Peru. For a more precise estimate, the median amount was calculated, that is, the mid-point of the value of stolen goods. This would indicate that half of the robberies were for less than US$100 in El Salvador, US$480 in Peru, US$650 in Argentina, and US$800 in Mexico. In Chile and Brazil, in spite of the fact that the median was as high as US$2,400 and US$2,600, respectively, an analysis by quartiles of the amounts stolen demonstrate that a quarter of

Percent non-reporti

Non-reporting victims, Theft Colombia, 2012

Crime

Table 3.8 presents a general panorama of the rates of change in robberies in several countries of the region 44. An increase can be observed in the rate of robberies registered in all countries, with the exception of Costa Rica, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Venezuela.

magnitude of robbery and other crimes, since it is possible to estimate the hidden figures. Map 3.6 illustrates the difference Argentina Mexico Peru Brazil El Salvador between robbery measured by administrative records, and contrasting victims’ surveys. The rates of victimisation by robbery before 14.1 7.9 8.7 9.5 14.6 (the percentages of the population in each country that say they robbed) contrast$33.200 noticeably from$3.000 administrative re$10.800 have been$16.150 $30.200 cords. One of the explanations of this disparity is the lack of trust 650 800 480 100 2.600 institutions to 1,00 respond, and this 2.40 in the capacity 0,80of the national3,70 9,00 an influence in the10low 650.000 may have1.9 MM MMlevels of reported 50.000 crimes.860.000 264 650 400 158 250 As can be observed in Table 3.9, the percentage of the total ulation, UNDP (2013). population that were victims of robbery, both with violence and lars (2013). M refers to millions. without, ranges from 10.82% in Chile to 25.19% in Ecuador. That is, 10 of every 100 Chileans and 25 of every 100 Ecuadoreans were victims of robbery in 2012.

Victimisation and unrep occurring over the year,

Crime 43

Table 3.7C.

EL MAPA DE LA INSEGURIDAD

Percentage of non-reporting It may be more victims precise to analyse the evolution of robbery based

Table 3.8.

Rate of robbery per 100,000 inhabitants, Latin America, circa 2005-circa 2012 Rate Circa 2005

Rate Circa 2010

980.0

973.3

75.3

86.3

572.7

361.3

495.0

873.1

397.6

150.4

86.8

63.0

62.0

33.2

266.7

496.0

680.0

Nicaragua

79.0

84.3

Paraguay

51.0

56.9

Panama

17.0

18.2

163.0

192.0

266.0

251.4

410.5

224.0

Country

Argentina Chile Bolivia

Brazil 58 Chile $27.000 Costa Rica 2.400 El Salvador 2,00 Guatemala 1.1MM 351 Honduras Mexico

Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay Venezuela

Table 3.9. Country

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Re Uruguay Venezuela

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (20

odological appendix. Note: Rates for Argentina correspond to the years 2005 and 2008; for Bolivia 2005 and 2009; for Honduras 2007 and 2011; for Costa Rica and Paraguay 2005 and 2010; for El Salvador and Chile 2005 and 2012. For the rest of the countries, rates correspond to the years 2005 and 2011. The note NA refers to no data available.

INFORME REGIONAL DE DES ARROLLO H UMANO 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

1.0

6.6

4.5

7.6

5.0

bery,

2011

2010

Country

Women

Table 3.5.

Women

the prisoners in Chile stoleofUS$400 or less, a quarter of the Rate robbery perand 100,000 Chile 0.4 prisoners in SĂŁo Paulo, Brazil, stole Latin US$391America, or less. The first18.53 line inhabitants, Table 3.8. 11.57 Ricaprisoner had com2005-circa of Box 3.11 containscirca the number ofCosta times2012 the NA mitted robbery before incarceration, which in all cases is more El Salvador 14.10 Rate Circa Rate Circa than Country 9.7 seven. Guatemala 13.20 2005

2010

6.58 Honduras 2.8 surveys also allow us980.0 Argentina 973.3profile These to analyse the occupational Panama 7.51 orNA profession of the prisoners75.3 sentenced for robbery. When Bolivia 86.3 the 9.28 Dominican prisoners were asked how many robberies they Republic had committed NA 572.7 Brazil during NA the six months before their detention, El Salvador stood 495.0having Chile out with approximately 45%361.3 of the prisoners admitting NARicabefore and having 873.1 robbed committed crimes on two previous 397.6 Costa occasions, while in Peru around 30% of them responded 150.4 86.8 that El Salvador 1.2 they had committed more than 10 crimes (see figure 3.4). The 62.0 Guatemala 4.7 allows us to observe63.0 research that in Brazil 26.8% of those sur33.2 to having robbed 266.7 Honduras veyed, and in Chile 54%, allowed more than 11 times before their arrest496.0 (Comparative study of prison 680.0popuMexico lation, UNDP 2013). 79.0 84.3 Nicaragua

Men

81.47 Table 3.9. 88.43 85.83 Country

Women

Percentage of80.11 19.89 victimisation by robbery, Latin America,86.50 2012 13.50 14.37 Percentage 85.63

Costa Rica Peru Dominican Repu Average no. of times stol

88.34 14.96 of victimisation 74.27 Argentina 17.93 93.83 7.77 92.79 22.56 Bolivia 92.36 6.46 92.36 Average amount stolen Brazil 12.14 91.50 10.07 90.85 Median Chile 10.82 Minimum Colombia 17.66 Maximum Costa Rica 15.38 No. of prisoner surveyed Ecuador 25.19 El Salvador 12.46 Source: Comparative study of prison p Note: Amounts presented are in USD Guatemala 17.26 Honduras 16.11 Mexico 15.33 Nicaragua 10.71 Panama 5.49 Paraguay 12.88 Peru 23.43 Dominican Republic 16.61 Uruguay 19.13 Table 3.7C. Non-reporting vic Venezuela 17.22

51.0 Paraguay In sum, this research demonstrates that more than56.9half of the detainees for robbery would 17.0 have stolen relatively 18.2 small Panama amounts of money or products of little value, and less than half 163.0 Peru Victims of crime not192.0 making formal would Table have done this in a constant manner. is, there seem reports to theThat Public Ministry, 3.7B. NAmany small-scale 266.0 This Dominican Mexico, 2010 robberies. to be a lot ofRepublic people involved in 251.4 410.5 Uruguay reinforces the reportâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s findings from surveys of victims: that rob- of Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). Percentage Crime bery occurs very frequently in NA the region. non-reporting victims 224.0 Venezuela

Pe non-r

Crime

Burglary of homes Robbery aginst people

Theft of car parts 93.3 The victimization surveys violence demonstrate that the great majority Robbery without 89.6 odological appendix. robberies tend to be of personal or objects Note:ofRates forBurglary Argentina correspond to the years 2005items and 2008; for Bolivia of 2005ordinary and 81.0 46 2009;use for Honduras for Costa Rica and Paraguay for El the . One2007 of and the2011; most complete surveys2005 in and the2010; region, Salvador and Chile 2005 and 2012. For the rest of the countries, rates correspond to the Survey on NA Victimisation the Perception of Public yearsNational 2005 and 2011. The note refers to no dataand available. Security (ENVIPE), estimates that in Mexico there were more than 12 million robberies in 2011, including more than 3 mil-

Table 3.10.

Country Ave cou Table Argentina 3.10. aver

Men

THE INSECURITY MAP

Men

percentages 2012

Source: Survey on co-existence and citizen security, DANE (201

Averages of amounts stolen and number of time of previous robberies, selected countries, 2013 45 averages and medians

e on

Average no. of times stole before Average amount stolen Median Minimum Maximum No. of prisoner surveyed

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

14.1

7.9

8.7

9.5

14.6

$10.800 650 2.40 650.000 264

$16.150 800 0,80 1.9 MM 650

$33.200 480 3,70 10 MM 400

$3.000 100 1,00 50.000 158

$30.200 2.600 9,00 860.000 250

$27.000 2.400 2,00 1.1MM 351

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

Source: Comparative study of prison population, UNDP (2013). Note: Amounts presented are in USD dollars (2013). M refers to millions.

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Car theft rates per 100,000 inhabitants and percentage rate of change, 2006-2010

Country

Argentina

Rate circa 2006

Rate circa 2010

44.9 (2007)

49.2 (2008)

9.58

Change 2006-2010

Table 3.1 THE INSECURITY MAP

Table 3.11.

Countr

Argentin

Bolivia

34.1

39.4 (2010)

15.54

80.3

45.4 (2010)b

Bolivia

Brazil

-43.6

Brazil

Chile

33.0

58.0(2010)

75.76

Chile

Colombia

42.0

47.0 (2010)

11.90

Colombia

Costa Ric

Ecuador a

68.1 (2011)

El Salvador

25.9

16.1 (2010)

-37.84

Ecuador

Guatemala

25.0

23.0 (2010)

-11.20

El Salvad

18.0 (2007)

46.0 (2010)

155.56

Guatema

Honduras Mexico

134.8

204.6 (2010)

51.74

Hondura

7.1 (2007)

6.7 (2010)

-5.63

Mexico

0.5

0.5 (2010)

0.0

Paraguay

12.6

20.2 (2010)

17.46

Panama

Peru

36.9

52.2(2010)

41.46

Paraguay

18.6 (2011)

53.3

45.0 (2010)

-15.57

Nicaragua Panama

Dominican Republic Uruguay

Nicaragu

Peru

Dominica

Uruguay

Venezue Note: NA refers to data not available. a For Ecuador, information only exists for these years in UNODC statistics. b The 2006 rate in Brazil does not include Paraná and in 2010 does not include car theft in Paraná, Amapá, and Pernambuco.

Robbery with violence

Bolivia. There is no case where the accumulated percentage for other crimes exceeds 35%, and Mexico is the country with the least victimisation due to robbery.

Source: LAPOP –UN a. The category “Ot vandalism, extorti

The available statistics for some countries corroborate the fact Table 3.13B. robbery victims disaggregated by sex and type of robbery, Latin America, 2012 that, along with the increase Percentage in robbery, thereofwas also marked The surveys of prison inmates confirm the extensive use of arms growth over the last year in the use of violence when these and physical violence in robberies 49. As Box 3.13A shows, there Unarmed robber thievesin the percentage crimes were committed. Violence or threats during robberies isBurglary: Unarmed robbery a sizeable disparity of prisoners who rewithout physica entered País the use of firearmsArmed physical tend to involve or otherrobbery weapons such as ported havingwithout used firearms in robberies.with In Argentina, the use aggression or thre anyoneinpresent aggression threat knives. In some cases, either because the victim resists or be- of firearms robberies is very high, practically 80%,or while in El cause the perpetrator is inexperienced make the Women Salvador and Chile itMen is 36%. It is also noteworthy that half the Women or unable to Men Women Men Women M victim submit to threats, the attacker uses the weapon. Thus, in robberies reported by detainees in Argentina were done with 22.3 14.0 39% in Mexico, 15.4 37% in Chile,16.6 29.3 23 some Argentina cases serious injuries or homicides result from35.2 robberies violence. 30% in Peru and11.7 Brazil, 14.2 19.3 11.412% in El Salvador 8.4(see Table 3.12A). 16.4 19.1 42.1 31 Bolivia (Blumstein 1995, 2000 and 2003). and 35.5 44.3 9.7 13.9 6.5 4.9 20.2 13 Brazil According to the 2012 LAPOP-UNDP survey, close to 80% of Latin The gender-disaggregated data show that, in general, the Chile 7.1 9.2 9.6 16.6 5.4 6.0 53.1 47 Americans who say they have been victims of crime during the greatest proportion of victims of robbery, without firearms or 34.3 47.1 9.1 5.7 12.6 9.8 27.3 21 Colombia last 12 months, experienced some form of robbery, with or with- physical aggression, are women, while men tend to be victims 25,5 34.7in Chile of 7.3 8.2 49.1 36 Costa Rica out violence. As Box 3.12 shows, most of the robberies armed robbery (see7.5Box 3.13B). This 8.2 confirms that insecurity 27,1 violence. The same 38.7 can be has 15.1a differentiated impact 7.7 on men and 17.1women, and that 17.1it is 32.2 24 Ecuadorare committed without and Uruguay observed, although to a lesser 21.1 extent, in Costa Rica,35.9 Peru, and necessary to prevent2.8 and attend to crime 8.8 15.8 taking into account 13.8 23.7 20 Ell Salvador these differences. 33.6 47.8 5.9 3.7 19.1 11.2 27.6 17 Guatemala 50.3 50.7 6.1 2.8 13.8 18.1 15.1 13 Honduras 3 -2 0 1 4 6 1 17.1 30.4 12.5 7.7REGIONAL H UMAN 9.2 DE VELOPMENT 13.0 REPO R T 2 0 125.0 16 México 26.0 36.2 12.5 6.3 14.2 13.6 27.2 23 Nicaragua

Table 3.13B.

Percentage of robbery victims disaggregated by sex and type of robbery, Latin America, 2012

THE INSECURITY MAP

3 País

Unarmed robbery Burglary: thieves Unarmed robbery without physical entered without with physical aggression or threat anyone present aggression or threat Victims of robbery, with and without violence, and other crimes, Latin America, 2012 Men Table 3.12. Women Men Women Men Women Men percentage

Armed robbery

rate of change,

Women

Argentina 22.3 Change 2006-201014.2 Bolivia 35.5 Brazil 9.58 Chile 7.1 15.54 34.3 Colombia -43.6 25,5 Costa Rica 75.76 27,1 Ecuador 11.90 21.1 Ell Salvador NA 33.6 Guatemala -37.84 50.3 Honduras -11.20 155.56 17.1 México 26.0 Nicaragua 51.74 -5.63 27.2 Panamá 0.0 26.5 Paraguay 17.46 8.8 Perú 41.46 34.6 Rep. Dominicana NA 7.6 Uruguay 44.7 Venezuela -15.57

35.2 19.3 44.3 9.2 47.1 34.7 38.7 35.9 47.8 50.7 30.4 36.2 41.0 27.8 24.8 29.7 12.5 53.9

Source: LAPOP - UNDP (2012).

14.0 15.4 16.6 11.7 Robbery Robbery 11.4 8.4 16.4 19.1 with violence without violence 9.7 13.9 6.5 4.9 Argentina 42.95 41.07 9.6 16.6 5.4 6.0 Bolivia 34.72 46.43 9.1 5.7 12.6 9.8 Brazil 45.53 28.46 7.3 7.5 8.2 8.2 Chile 13.77 63.41 15.1 7.7 17.1 17.1 Colombia 52.37 31.55 8.8 2.8 15.849.03 13.8 Costa Rica 38.91 3.7 19.139.9 11.2 Ecuador 5.9 50.36 6.1 2.8 13.827.41 18.1 El Salvador 44.02 12.5 7.7 9.227.16 13.0 Guatemala 55.91 12.5 6.3 14.218.43 13.6 Honduras 66.68 Mexico 8.4 36.21 13.6 8.530.08 10.1 Nicaragua 45.69 23.9 17.6 11.133.86 9.3 Panama14.2 44.19 9.8 17.235.43 22.0 Paraguay 37.33 14.3 12.9 11.347.11 7.1 Peru 17.5 36.60 46.89 14.3 11.7 7.7 Dominican Republic 40.97 46.18 9.8 3.0 15.4 14.4 Country

29.3

18.85 26.02 22.82 16.09 12.06 10.45 28.57 16.93 14.89 33.70 20.45 20.37 15.56 16.51 12.85

Uruguay

19.76

64.31

15.93

Venezuela

64.83

23.79

11.38

Women

23.5 31.7 13.1 47.7 21.8 36.1 24.3 20.7 17.4 13.5 16.9 23.3 15.2 26.9 28.5 35.5 53.0 18.6

Other 42.1 crimesa

15.99

20.2 53.1 27.3 49.1 32.2 23.7 27.6 15.1 25.0 27.2 35.2 25.6 41.7 29.3 43.9 17.1

17.8 Table 15.5 28.2 24.8 16.8 10.0 8.5 Hom 30.7 13.8 14.7 36.2 20.2 20.6 12.8 18.1 10.5 Robb 19.3 13.0

Source: LAPOP –UNDP (2012) .49 a. The category “Other crimes” corresponds to victimisation involving physical assault, sexual assault or rape, kidnapping, vandalism, extortion or others.

and LAPOP-UN Notes: Homicid every 100,000 Robbery: Perce

Table 3.13A.

nd type of robbery, Latin America, 2012 Unarmed robbery with physical aggression or threat Women

16.6 16.4 6.5 5.4 12.6 8.2 17.1 62 15.8 19.1

Men

Percentage of robberies with violence, selected countries, 2013

Unarmed robbery without physical aggression or threat

Robberies with violence Men Women

Argentina

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

47.2

36.1

36.6

39.0 Men

30.1

11.7

30.6

37.0

14.2 18.1

31.8

12.7

Mexico

79.9Other crimes 37.3 50.8 Women

11.7 Cases where 29.3 there have been 23.5injuries 17.8 12.1 19.1 42.1 31.7 15.5 Source: Comparative study of prison populations, UNDP (2013). 4.9 20.2 13.1 28.2 6.0 53.1 47.7 24.8 9.8 27.3 21.8 16.8 8.2 49.1 36.1 10.0 17.1 32.2 24.3 8.5 R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4 13.8 23.7 20.7 30.7 11.2 27.6 17.4 13.8

21.5 23.8 20.5 15.5 13.6 12.2 26.9 19.9

account that 1 relatively low robbed during people have b

Table 24.4 3.15A. Socio-economic strata according to income

ABC1 (high) C2 (middle high) C3 (middle) D (middle low)

Perce

Ro with of f the

Source: LAPOP - UNDP (2012).

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador Ell Salvador Guatemala Honduras México Nicaragua Panamá Paraguay Perú Rep. Dominicana Uruguay Venezuela

País

Table 3.13B.

22.3 14.2 35.5 7.1 34.3 25,5 27,1 21.1 33.6 50.3 17.1 26.0 27.2 26.5 8.8 34.6 7.6 44.7

Women

35.2 19.3 44.3 9.2 47.1 34.7 38.7 35.9 47.8 50.7 30.4 36.2 41.0 27.8 24.8 29.7 12.5 53.9

Men

Armed robbery

14.0 11.4 9.7 9.6 9.1 7.3 15.1 8.8 5.9 6.1 12.5 12.5 8.4 23.9 14.2 14.3 17.5 9.8

Women

15.4 8.4 13.9 16.6 5.7 7.5 7.7 2.8 3.7 2.8 7.7 6.3 13.6 17.6 9.8 12.9 14.3 3.0

Men

Burglary: thieves entered without anyone present

16.6 16.4 6.5 5.4 12.6 8.2 17.1 15.8 19.1 13.8 9.2 14.2 8.5 11.1 17.2 11.3 11.7 15.4

Women

11.7 19.1 4.9 6.0 9.8 8.2 17.1 13.8 11.2 18.1 13.0 13.6 10.1 9.3 22.0 7.1 7.7 14.4

Men

Unarmed robbery with physical aggression or threat

Venezuela

29.3 42.1 20.2 53.1 27.3 49.1 32.2 23.7 27.6 15.1 25.0 27.2 35.2 25.6 41.7 29.3 43.9 17.1

23.5 31.7 13.1 47.7 21.8 36.1 24.3 20.7 17.4 13.5 16.9 23.3 15.2 26.9 28.5 35.5 53.0 18.6

Men

Unarmed robbery without physical aggression or threat Women

64.83

23.79

14.2 21.5 23.8 20.5 15.5 13.6 12.2 26.9 19.9 15.0 31.9 20.6 20.2 18.5 15.0 14.8 12.5 10.2

Men

THE INSECURITY MAP

17.8 15.5 28.2 24.8 16.8 10.0 8.5 30.7 13.8 14.7 36.2 20.2 20.6 12.8 18.1 10.5 19.3 13.0

Women

Other crimes

Source: LAPOP –UNDP (2012) .49 a. The category “Other crimes” corresponds to victimisation involving physical assault, sexual assa vandalism, extortion or others.

Percentage of robbery victims disaggregated by sex and type of robbery, Latin America, 2012

Note: NA refers to data not available. a For Ecuador, information only exists for these years in UNODC statistics. b The 2006 rate in Brazil does not include Paraná and in 2010 does not include car theft in Paraná, Amapá, and Pernambuco.

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

e, Categorisation of countries according to homicide and robbery rates 51 Latin America Crime, violence, and the perception of insecurity are common Categorisation of countries according to 51 homicide and robbery rates but differentiated problems for Latin America countries. Table High Low Latin America 3.14 groups countries in two categories â&#x20AC;&#x201D;high and lowâ&#x20AC;&#x201D; ac-

Table 3.14

3 THE INSECURITY MAP

Table 3.14

Argentinacording to homicide and robbery rates. Bolivia Chile Robbery. Percentage of people victimised due to robbery (LABrazil Costa RicaPOP, 2012) over the last year: the low goes category goes from Colombia Nicaragua0 a 16,7% and high is more than 16,7%. This classification was Homicide Ecuador Peru made taking into account that 16,7% implies that one out of six El Salvador Uruguay persons was a victim of robbery. In other words, a country with Guatemala Homicide Honduras a relatively low robbery rate is when one in every six people or Mexico more (that is, one in seven or eight) was robbed during the last Panama 12 months, and a country with a high rate of robbery is when Paraguay more than one in six people have been robbed in the last 12 Dominican Republic months. Venezuela Argentina Brazil Bolivia Chile Colombia Costa Rica Argentina Brazil Victimisation by social strata and age Ecuador El Salvador Robbery Bolivia Chile Guatemala Honduras Colombia Peru Costa Rica Mexico The IDB and the UNDP joined forces in 2013 to carry out a study Ecuador El Salvador Robbery Uruguay Nicaraguaon the costs of crime and the levels of victimisation in five counGuatemala Honduras Venezuela Panama tries: Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay. The Peru Mexico Paraguaystudy examined robbery, theft, and bodily harm52 by socio-ecoUruguay Nicaragua Dominican Republic nomic strata and by age group. Tables 3.15A, 3.15B, and 3.15C Venezuela Panama Paraguay show victimisation by socio-economic strata in Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic and LAPOP-UNDP (2012) for victimisation by robbery. and Honduras. High

ping,

Brazil Low Colombia Ecuador Argentina El Salvador Bolivia Guatemala Chile Honduras MexicoCosta Rica PanamaNicaragua Peru Paraguay Uruguay Dominican Republic Venezuela

Notes: Homicide: low: less than 10 homicides for every 100,000 people; high: more than 10 homicides for every 100,000 people. Percentage of people victimised due to robbery (LAPOP, 2012) over the last year:Inthethe lowTable goes on Chile, it is clear that the sector with the highest and LAPOP-UNDP (2012) forRobbery: victimisation by robbery. Notes: Homicide: low: less than 10 homicides for every 100,000 people; high: more than 10 homicides for income level of the population suffer less from robberies with account that 16,7% implies that one in six people was a victim of robbery. In other words, a country with a every 100,000 people. relatively low robbery rate is when one2012) in every or more (thatgoes is, one in seven orviolence eight) wasin their homes than the sector with the lowest income Robbery: Percentage of people victimised due to robbery (LAPOP, oversixthepeople last year: the low robbed during the last 12 months, and a country with a high rate of robbery is when morelevel. than one six other hand, the high income sector suffers more Onin the been robbed lastof12robbery. months.In other words, a country with a account that 16,7% implies people that onehave in six people wasina the victim from robbery by surprise or stealth than the sectors with less relatively low robbery rate is when one in every six people or more (that is, one in seven or eight) was income. In addition, robbery with violence affects mostly the robbed during the last 12 months, and a country with a high rate of robbery is when more than one in six people have been robbed in the last 12 months. lower-middle income sectors (see Table 3.15A).

Table 3.15A.

Percentage of victimisation by socio-economic strata, Chile, 2010

Percentage of victimisation socio-economic strata, Chile, 2010 able 3.15A. Socio-economic Robbery by Robbery by Robbery Theft 56

strata according with the use surprise or to income of force in stealth 54 cio-economic Robbery Robbery by53 Robbery the house ata according with the use surprise or with to income of force in stealth 54 violence55 ABC1the (high) 4.26 6.72 house 53

with 55 violence Theft 56 Bodily harm 57

2.98 C2 (middle high) 4.08 5.09 3.40 C3 (middle) 4.34 5.07 4.98 BC1 (high) 4.26 6.72 2.98 11.15 D (middle low) 4.04 4.87 (middle high) 4.08 5.09 3.40 8.495.37 E (low) 4.34 6.76 2.56 (middle) 5.07 4.98 9.044.00 (middle low) Source: Elaborated 4.04with data from ENUSC4.87 8.37 (2013). for the study on the costs5.37 of crime and violence, BID-UNDP low) 6.76 2.56 4.00 6.53

11.15 8.49 0.419.04 1.788.37 1.306.53 2.10 3.43

Bodily harm 57 Robbery of vehicle 58

0.41 1.78 1.30 0.72 2.10 3.51 3.43 2.42 2.19 0.51

Robbery of vehicle 58 Robbery from the vehicle 59

ce: Elaborated with data from ENUSC for the study on the costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013). 64

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Table 3.15B.

Percentage of victimisation by socio-economic strata, Costa Rica, 2010

0.72 3.51 2.42 13.29 2.19 13.79 0.51 13.14 14.24 24.28

Robbery from the vehicle 59

13.29 13.79 13.14 14.24 24.28

Source: Elaborated with data from ENUSC for the study on the costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013).

Percentage of victimisation by socio-economic strata, Costa Rica, 2010

Socio- economic strata

Robbery with the use force in the house

Very high/ high Middle high Middle Middle low low

13.85 14.29 10.37 10.74 11.33

Robbery by surprise or stealth

17.31 13.10 15.16 10.32 7.55

Robbery with violence

25.38 27.38 24.73 22.78 15.65

Robbery of vehicle

Bodily harm

2.31 3.57 3.19 1.93 3.24

3.57 0.00 1.38 2.43 2.37

3 THE INSECURITY MAP

Table 3.15B.

Robbery from the vehicle

18.75 4.86 10.76 9.52 11.69

Source: Compiled with data from DemoscopĂa 2010 for the study Costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013).

Table 3.15C.

Percentage of victimisation by socio-economic strata, Honduras, 2010

Socio-economic strata

Robbery with the use of force in

Very high / high Middle high Middle Middle low Low

11.94 13.47 12.45 11.45 8.13

Robbery by Robbery with surprise or violence

4.48 1.42 1.89 3.03 2.03

Bodily harm

Robbery of vehicle

Robbery from the vehicle

1.49 0.71 0.75 0.67 0.41

1.49 2.84 2.26 1.35 0.41

11.94 7.09 4.15 2.69 2.03

44.78 34.04 29.43 26.60 21.14

Source: Compiled with data from DemoscopĂa 2010 for the study Costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013).

In contrast, in Costa Rica, the highest socio-economic sector is the one that faces the highest quantity of robberies (with the use of force in the house, by surprise and with violence), in comparison with the lowest strata (see Table 3.15B).

Table 3.16A. Age range

15 to 19 years 20 to24 years 25 to 29 years 30 to 39 years 40 to 49 years 50 to 59 years 60 or more

Data from Honduras shows that the highest socio-economic strata is the most affected by robbery with the use of force in the house. Similarly, a very high figure can be observed for the high socio-economic strata as victims of robbery with violence (see Table 3.15C).

Percentage of victimisation by age range, Chile, 2010 Robbery by Robbery with surprise or violence stealth

7.73 7.00 4.63 5.50 5.46 5.87 3.31

7.24 8.74 5.22 5.76 6.46 4.99 3.54

Theft

Bodily harm

9.34 10.89 10.99 9.01 9.43 9.71 5.60

3.61 2.95 1.67 1.85 2.64 1.81 0.77

Robbery of Robbery from vehicle the vehicle

2.75 3.68 1.88 2.59 2.44 2.18 1.96

11.77 13.64 14.76 13.97 16.12 15.16 9.99

Source: Compiled with data from ENUSC for the study Costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013).

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Table 3.16B.

Percentage of victimisation by age range, Costa Rica, 2010

Table 3.16C.

Porcenta

Source: Compiled with data from ENUSC for the study Costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013).

hile, 2010

1 5 7 5 4 1 7

THE INSECURITY MAP

ily m

Table 3.16B.

Robbery of Robbery from vehicle the vehicle Age range

2.75 3.68 1.88 2.59 2.44 2.18 1.96

15 to 19 years 20 to 24 years 25 to 29 years 30 to 39 years 40 to 49 years 50 to 59 years 60 or more

Robbery by surprise or stealth

Robbery with violence

Bodily harm

18,75 13,54 10,71 11,19 11,09 8,56 5,64

28,13 28,13 20,36 23,59 21,13 21,56 14,11

0,00 6,25 2,68 3,02 2,38 2,95 1,61

Robbery of Robbery from vehicle the vehicle

0,00 0,00 20,45 8,33 11,84 9,24 5,23

0,00 11,36 12,90 14,91 16,25 54,58 6,38

Source: Compiled with data from Demoscopía 2010 for the study Costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013).

ta Rica, 2010

ry of Robbery from cle the vehicle

0 0 5 3 4 4 3

11.77 13.64 14.76 13.97 16.12 15.16 9.99

Percentage of victimisation by age range, Costa Rica, 2010

0,00 11,36 12,90 14,91 16,25 54,58 6,38

Table 3.16C.

Table 3

Age rang

15 to 19 ye 20 to 24 ye 25 to 29 ye 30 to 39 ye 40 to 49 ye 50 to 59 ye 60 or more

Source: Compile

Porcentaje de victimización por tramos de edad, Honduras 2010

Robbery by Robbery with Robbery of Robbery from Bodily surprise or violence vehicle the vehicle harm stealth Percentage of crimes reported in relation to crimes committed, Table 3.17. 15 to 19 years 1.08 2010 24.33 0.00 1.08 1.08 selected countries, Age range

Table 3.18.

20 to 24 years 1.69 26.17 1.69 1.12 1.69 25 to 29 years 2.94 26.59 0.58 1.74 Crimes Chile Paraguay Uruguay4.13 Country 30 to 39 years 0.33 23.86 0.33 0.33 3.73 40 to 49 years 2.97 15.87 0. 73 0.37 2.97 50 to 59 years Car theft 923.01 2,75 95 1.36 1.83 0.00 100 0.46 or more 0.42 15.98 0.42 43 0.42 Theft from the60vehicle 27,71 95 1.70 Motorbike theft NA 100 86 Source: Compiled with data from Demoscopía 2010 for the study Costs of crime and violence, BID-UNDP (2013). Bicycle theft NA NA 53 Argentina Burglary with the use of force 54,40 45 60 Bolivia Attempted burglary NA 23 35 Brazil Robbery with violence 44,92 52 47 One ofbythe main conclusions this analysis is that crimes do not In Honduras, Robbery surprise or stealthof(without violence) 30,15 NA the age range suffering 43 more from robberies by Chile stealth is from 40 to 49NAyears, while the group from Theftaffect social strata in a homogeneous way, although there 25,51seem surprise or26 Colombia 25 to 29 suffer to be similarities in the type of crime affecting certain social Bodily harm and threats 43,33 41 more from robberies 38 with violence. The rate of Perception de insecurity and victimisation, Latin America, 2012 Costa Rica mitted, For example, and Costa Rica, robbery 3.18. in Honduras Theftstrata. ofTable animals NA with victimisation 18 for car theft and theft NAfrom inside vehicles is very percentage Ecuador country (see Table 3.16C). violence is the crime that most affects the high-incomeNAsocial low in this 50 NA El Salvador Vandalism NA 16 NA strata. to a vehicle Factor by Perception Victimisation Uruguay Country of Costs the ofmain that can be extracted from these Guatemala Source: Compiled with data from ENUSC Chile, ENV Paraguay, and Ministry of the Interior Uruguay for One the study crime conclusions and violence BID-UNDP (2013). which insecurity Note: NA In refers to dataof notvictimisation available. strata or age Honduras terms by age range, in Chile young people tables is to show that not all crimes affect allinsocial the 95 and study of these dif- Mexico (15 to 24 years old, that is, Insegurity the two first age shown inhasgroups in the same way. The recognition neighbourhood in groupsSecurity 95 is greater deteriorated a powerful tool for analysis and forthan the formula- Nicaragua Table 3.16A), stand outthe as those most affected by robberies by ferences can beDirect neighbourhood 86 direct victimisation should be carried out in surprise or stealth and robberies with violence. The same two tion of public policies. Similar studies Panama 53 the region, to enable analysis age groups also suffer most bodily34.6 harm. In terms of car49.1 theft, more countries of Argentina 21.3 1.97 about the rea- Paraguay 60 son for, and causes the group most affected is between39.8 40 and 49 years old. 53.2 Bolivia 27.8of, this heterogeneous impact 1.67 and allow us Peru 35 to identify patterns where they exist. Brazil 28.2 56.9 16.4 2.59 47 Dominican In Costa Rica, the age groups that undergo more robberies by 43 Chile 28.7 42.8 14 2.56 Republic surprise and with violence are young people from 15 to 24 years NA Colombia 32.5 30.8 21 1.51 Uruguay of age. The age group of 50 to 59 years stands out as that suffer38 29.7 54.8 17.5 2.41 Costa Rica Venezuela ing more theft from inside the vehicle with a victimisation rate NA Ecuador 38.1 41.5 28.1 1.42 of more than 50% (see Table 3.15B). NA Source: LAPOP –PNUD (20 El Salvador 42.5 42.0 17.4 2.43 NA Guatemala 31.7 47.8 20.9 1.90 ce BID-UNDP (2013). Honduras 23.2 40.2 18.9 1.68 6 6 R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4 36.8 55.9 23.1 2.00 Mexico Nicaragua 29.0 21.6 13.5 1.87

Percentage of crimes reported in relation to crimes committed, selected countries, 2010

Crimes

Car theft Theft from the vehicle Motorbike theft Bicycle theft Burglary with the use of force Attempted burglary Robbery with violence Robbery by surprise or stealth (without violence) Theft Bodily harm and threats Theft of animals Vandalism to a vehicle

Table 3.18.

Chile

Paraguay

Uruguay

9 2,75 27,71 NA NA 54,40 NA 44,92 30,15 25,51 43,33 NA NA NA

100 43 100 NA 45 23 52 NA 26 41 18 50 16

95 95 86 53 60 35 47 43 NA 38 NA NA NA

Source: Compiled with data from ENUSC Chile, ENV Paraguay, and Ministry of the Interior Uruguay for the study Costs of crime and violence BID-UNDP (2013). Note: NA refers to data not available.

Under-reporting crimes The 2013 IDB-UNDP study also analyses the under-reporting of crimes in Chile, Paraguay, and Uruguay. Table 3.17 shows the percentage of crimes reported with respect to the total number of crimes committed in these countries. The information from this table corroborates that car theft is the most reported crime. On the opposite end of the scale, the least reported crimes are theft, theft from inside a vehicle, and robbery by surprise, in the case of Chile; vandalism of a vehicle, theft of animals, and attempted burglary, in the case of Paraguay; and attempted burglary and bodily harm, in the case of Uruguay. The low level of reporting for these crimes could be due, on the one hand, to the low amounts involved in these losses and, on the other hand, to the high transaction costs of filing a report that might imply dealing with slow and difficult processing with a low probability of success. It also may indicate a lack of trust in the institutions and their effectiveness. For example, in the case of Chile 83.3% of the reasons given for not reporting these crimes were the following: “the loss was not sufficiently serious”, “the police couldn’t have done anything”, “I had no witnesses”, “the process requires a lot of time”, “the justice system (trials) wouldn’t have done anything” and “the police wouldn’t have done anything” (MISP 2011). Similarities can be observed among all three countries in terms of the reasons for under-reporting. This conclusion is relevant

and must be taken into account: the institutions in charge of attending to and preventing crime need to be strengthened, so that citizens feel more trust in reporting crime, and that their complaints will be resolved, given that this also serves as a deterrent to committing crimes.

Perception of insecurity Latin Americans stand out at a global level because of the fear they experience due to the situation of insecurity. Figure 3.5 includes the 26 countries where more than 50% of the inhabitants feel unsafe walking alone at night. According to the sample taken by the Gallup pollsters, 10 of the 18 countries analysed in this report (as well as Haiti) are among the countries with the greatest levels of fear (see figure 3.5.).

THE INSECURITY MAP

Table 3.17.

Country

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay Venezuela Source: LAPOP –PNUD (2012).

The fear of being a victim is a complex social phenomenon that does not necessarily reflect the levels of real victimisation that affects citizens (Casas-Zamora 2012, 47; Dammert and Lagos 2012, 33-39). The perception of fear is related to multiple factors that include the news coverage of crime, citizens’ stories, and the lack of trust on an interpersonal level and in institutions (see Box 3.3). According to the 2012 LAPOP-UNDP survey, 3 of every 10 Latin American citizens say they feel unsafe in their neighbourhoods and 5 of every 10 perceive that security in their country has deteriorated. There are differences between the perception of REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

The communications media. New coverage of crime, with descriptions, images and stories, influence perceptions of insecurity. While what is portrayed in the media generally reflects a specific event, it raises the possibility for this to happen to anyone exposed to similar situations. Media dissemination of a real event can generate alarm that goes beyond the real dangers. During the third meeting of the Advisory Council for this report in Cancún, Mexico, Harvard Professor Jorge I. Dominguez explained that in Latin America crime and violence produce so much noise in the media that it’s as if they are announced by loudspeakers in the street. The TV soap operas that glorify the drug lords contribute to the distortion. Sounding board for the middle class. To the extent that Latin America has grown and new sectors have entered the middle class, this sector of the population tends to be more affected by robberies and with increasing frequently they are victims of “express” kidnappings and other property crimes. The media repercussion are stronger in comparison with crimes committed in marginal areas. The phenomena of kidnapping and robbery of people with high incomes magnifies this phenomenon, with high-profile cases that have a big impact on society as a whole.

Citizens’ stories. This refers to narratives or discourse transmitted by word of mouth based on the experiences of fearful individuals that end up becoming collective fears. These stories can have an incremental influence according to their similarity to the life of whoever hears them. Conditions such as gender, social situation, age, being a neighbour or relative, or the occurrence of crime in places where people congregate, increase the levels of fear significantly.

3 THE INSECURITY MAP

Box 3.3. Factors that influence the perception of fear among citizens

Disordered spaces. Places that are dirty, dark, or abandoned noticeably increase the levels of fear. This type of space increases the sensation of vulnerability, both about becoming a victim and being unable to react and escape if this occurs. This has a greater impact on women and older people. Mistrust in interpersonal relations and in institutions. Although it seems not to generate such immediate effects of alarm compared to the above, this mistrust tends to deepen feelings of fear. The lack of trust is rooted in individuals who perceive low levels of effectiveness in reducing crime and low performance by the institutions in charge of managing crime —police, judicial organisms, or local governments—. At the same time interpersonal mistrust, perceived as low levels of communal belonging and social integration, generate growing feelings of threat and insecurity.

Sources: Briceño (2007); Cisneros and Zubillaga (2001); Dammert (2010); Díaz-Cayeros et al. (2011); UNDP (2005); Rincón and Rey (2009); Vilalta (2012).

Recommendations 1. Improve information systems. It should be a priority for Latin America countries and cities to improve their information about citizen security, especially that which has to do with crime, victimisation, and institutional performance. This report recommends building information systems that include the participation of institutions with responsibilities in the area of citizen security, with defined methodologies and protocols that ensure quality data, as well as an office to centralise information. The aim here is to obtain comparable and compatible information from the different government institutions and the different countries of the region. In order to achieve this, the system must be open to interaction with different users and provide inputs for planning, monitoring, and evaluating public policy. The accessibility and dissemination of data through diverse physical and virtual media will enable monitoring by government institutions, civil society

organisations, and the citizenry on an independent basis. This way, it can become an appropriate platform for transparency and accountability. The geo-referencing of crime variables is a central tool for focusing resources and defining the strategies to be developed. The use of technologies for generating maps enables the analysis of situational and social factors associated with the concentration of problems of insecurity in certain areas. International experience demonstrates that the use of digital mapping is a technique of great value for planning actions to control crime and violence and can become a tool to prevent crime and the fear associated with it. It is important to make efforts to ensure that information is not only available on national and municipal levels, but also in smaller jurisdictions such as census districts. This will make it possible to focus limited government resources more efficiently, in responding to crime and violence, as well as in studying in more detail the social and demographic factors that contribute to their growth. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Perception de insecurity and victimisation, Latin America, 2012 percentage

Table 3.18.

THE INSECURITY MAP

ted,

Uruguay

95 95 86 53 60 35 47 43 NA 38 NA NA NA

Perception

Country

Security has Insegurity in the neighbourhood deteriorated

D-UNDP (2013).

Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Ecuador El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Nicaragua Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay Venezuela

Victimisation

Direct

Factor by which insecurity in the neighbourhood is greater than direct victimisation

34.6 39.8 28.2 28.7 32.5 29.7 38.1 42.5 31.7 23.2 36.8 29.0 19.3 24.5 50.0

49.1 53.2 56.9 42.8 30.8 54.8 41.5 42.0 47.8 40.2 55.9 21.6 29.8 47.5 45.6

21.3 27.8 16.4 14 21 17.5 28.1 17.4 20.9 18.9 23.1 13.5 6.9 15.3 28.1

1.97 1.67 2.59 2.56 1.51 2.41 1.42 2.43 1.90 1.68 2.00 1.87 3.55 2.35 1.70

38.6

64.8

19.1

2.71

32.4 43.7

55.2 58

22.8 19.4

1.92 2.62

Source: LAPOP –PNUD (2012).

2. Strengthen systems for reporting crime and violence with more agile and clear processes and with greater capacity for local responses.

One of the keys in responding to the challenge of insecurity is citizens’ denunciations and their collaboration with the authorities. The development of mechanisms to facilitate trustworthy and effective reporting of crime and violence is of central importance, and these must guarantee the safety of the witnesses and affected citizens, with trained staff to prevent revictimization. This is necessary in order to improve the available information and strengthen judicial processes.

can contribute to strengthening reporting systems, since they inform citizens about their rights and the mechanisms designed to protect them. Similar strategies that contribute to improving the response capacity include: toll free telephone lines with 24 hour access; a local presence of state institutions; protection mechanisms for people who report crime and their immediate family; the presence of staff trained in attending to victims, the use of technologies to inform about the occurrence of crime (internet and social networks), and mechanisms to follow-up on denunciations. In addition, alliances with citizens’ organisations that work in support of victims are a valuable resource for creating closer relationships between citizens and the authorities.

At the core of this recommendation is the recovery of trust in the institutions, which requires transparent professional management that respects human rights, is focused on citizens and is attentive to their needs. Actions such as campaigns for prevention

In this sense, this report recommends caution when analysing tendencies in reporting, since its increase does not necessarily express deterioration in security, but can reflect greater and improved institutional coverage. It is important to monitor the

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

port recommends that the state pay attention to those crimes and actors that are producing the greatest damage, especially on the right to life. Dissuasion is a central element of any strategy that aims to reduce homicide, and this is complemented with the weight of the law against criminal organisations that use violence. It is also important to focus on those groups most exposed to violence —such as young people— and those who are in situations of greater vulnerability to violence—especially women and children.

THE INSECURITY MAP

4. Adopt actions to reduce robbery and containing the expansion of illegal markets. This report recommends intervention by state institutions centred, at least, on four factors to combat robbery and theft: the increase in reports by citizens; the containment of illegal markets —by directing actions against the links in the chain that centralise distribution and receive the largest profits—; intervention in the “red zones” where the greatest number of crimes is concentrated; and strengthening the culture of citizenship. These require complex interventions that address the multiple dimensions of this phenomenon. In the case of car and mobile phone theft, joint efforts with insurance companies and telephone operators are key to identify strategies that contribute to reducing incentives and protecting property owners (with a market logic that enables the purchase of replacements parts —in the case of vehicles— and equipment at attractive prices, among other measures). Rather than directing the action of the state against street delinquents or small-scale distributors, institutional interventions should focus on larger markets. Small-scale robberies require a differentiated response, centred more on prevention. 5. Respond to the perception of insecurity, by addressing the multiple variables that influence fear of crime. The best way to respond to the perception of insecurity is through institutional performance in protecting citizens from violence and crime. However, there is a diverse set of actions that can contribute to improving people’s perceptions and reducing fear. One determining factor is citizens’ trust in the institutions that ensure justice, especially the police. There needs to be a policy for creating closer ties between the police and communities, which would help improve the image of this institution. The police should be respectful and provide a good response to the problems arising from local insecurity. In addition, an opportune and decisive response to police corruption and abuse 72

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is key, together with clear sanctions that give citizens a sense of certainty. Urban development policies aimed at recovering and broadening public spaces can contribute to reduce the levels of fear and vulnerability. Improvements in street lighting in common areas and heavy traffic zones, the prevention and containment of problems such as vandalism, public distribution and consumption of alcohol and other illegal drugs, the sale of pirated goods in the street, as well as prostitution in public places, all positively influence the perception of security. These actions, as well as committing the police, are sustainable when accompanied by social interventions that protect and offer alternatives to vulnerable populations living in marginalized conditions. The participation of civil organisations, business people, and religious groups, among other key actors, add value to these actions. Interventions in this field should avoid the segmentation of communities and the discrimination of certain social sectors and population groups. The communications media have an important role to play in forming citizens’ opinions. Without compromising freedom of expression and the right to information, news coverage should protect the integrity and intimacy of victims and their immediate family. They should also avoid the over-exposure of violence and sensationalism, as well as the proliferation of messages that exaggerated the incidence of crime.

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

CHAPTER

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Untitled, Marcela Alarcรณn, 2005

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CHAPTER

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Citizen security is a complex phenomenon combining a variety of threats: while the analysis of robbery rates and homicides provide a useful overview, it is still an incomplete picture. To understand the threats to citizen security, it is also important to analyse the context in which they emerge and develop, the profile of victims and victimisers, the way in which they interact, and their impact on the citizenry. The objective of this chapter is to analyse, from a qualitative perspective, the six threats identified in this report as most important due to their impact on human development. They are: (a) street crime, (b) organized crime, (c) violence and crime carried out by and against youth, (d) gender violence, (e) corruption, and (f) illegal violence by state actors. This chapter contains four main messages: • Even though organised crime is a threat which seriously affects human development, the insecurity situation that the region faces is the result of a wide range of threats: not everything that happens in Latin America can be explained by drug trafficking. • The relationship between the different threats at the local level explains the high levels of crime and violence in the region. • The limited reporting of violence and crime creates gaps and deficiencies in the information available. This is the case for kidnapping and extortion, for the violence against migrants and the trafficking of persons, for sexual and domestic violence, and for corruption and excessive force employed by state actors. • The interaction of organized crime with the other threats is at the core of the spiralling violence and the exponential growth of homicide in some countries or sub-regions. This chapter is divided into six sections. In each section, one of the six main threats is analysed. Rather than exhaustively describing each threat, the chapter aims to present their principal characteristics, dynamics, and impact on the citizenry.

Street Crime Street crime is understood as profit-seeking activities, such as petty theft, that often happen in public places and that can involve, in some cases, threats of violence, beatings, and injuries against victims. They happen more often in urban contexts and frequently go unreported. Although they seem minor, these crimes constitute the most frequent threat against citizen security. Consequently, when one speaks of a safe city or a safe neighbourhood, it generally refers to the infrequency of street crime. As can be seen in Figure 4.1, in almost all the countries in Latin America, people identify this as the main threat against their security. In aggregate terms, 48% of Latin Americans identify common crime as their principal threat (LAPOP 2012). Despite the lack of systematic studies in Latin America, the global evidence and field experience suggest that street crime is generally associated with conditions of marginality.61 Prison surveys show that repeat offenders among inmates accused of robbery is significant. The literature points out that to the extent that successive offences go unpunished, an ever more vicious circle is set in motion between criminal acts and conditions of marginality (Cloward and Ohlin 1960; Mettifogo and Sepúlveda 2005). There is a significant lack of information and consequently a limited analysis of street crime in the region. It is known that street crime doesn’t only affect the middle and upper classes, but also the poor, who have fewer material resources with which to obtain protection. In the face of the severity and lethal nature of other threats in the region – as is the case of organized crime – authorities tend to focus on high-profile violence. However, street crime is precisely the threat that most affects, in a consistent and daily manner, the average citizen via the principal crime associated with it: robbery. Given that the analysis of the regional tendencies regarding robbery was explored in depth in Chapter 3, this section will not examine this issue further.

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Principal threat to security according to citizens , Latin America, 2012

Figure 4.1.

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

4 80 70

Percentage

60 50 40 30 20

Venezuela

Uruguay

Dominican Republic

Peru

Paraguay

Panama

Nicaragua

Mexico

Honduras

Guatemala

El Salvador

Ecuador

Costa Rica

Colombia

Chile

Brazil

Bolivia

Argentina

Common criminals

Gangs Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012).

Organized Crime

institutions through corruption and impunity (UNODC 2008; Miraglia, Ochoa and Briscoe 2012; Morris 2012).

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 July-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Apr-12

Apr.-09 July-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr.-10 July-10

Jan.-07 Apr.-07 July-07 Oct.-07 Jan-08 Apr.-08 July-08 Oct.-08 Jan-09

Organized crime includes all criminal activity organized and has a significant impact on the spiralling homicidal extended over time, whose capacity to deny or provideexecutions goods This threat Monthly in metropolitan Monterrey, Figure 4.2. violence that some Latin American regions and sub-regions and services depends on the use of corruption, coercion, and in México, 2012 have experienced. The presence of criminal structures that are some cases, violence. A wide range of offenses is connected with 200 at the local level as well as at the national and more or less organized fuels violence and crime as a result of organized crime international180 level. While some are specifically concentrated at disputes among them or their reaction in the face of attacks Violence alert, march-april 2010 the local level – such as extortion or selling drugs on the street by state security forces. This is particularly relevant for those 160 – others go beyond this realm and occur at the national level countries in the region that have a high incidence of homi140 with clear connections to a transnational dimension, as is the cide—especially Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, Colomcase of human, 120 drug, or arms trafficking. The growth and prolif- bia, and Brazil— or those that have experienced a significant Rupture of equilibrium eration of organized crime should be analysed precisely from the increase — as in the case of Mexico— (see Box 4.1). 100 Average interaction between these structures — local and transnational postalert: 77 80 Hope 2011). In every case, the spiral of violence has a profound impact on (UNODC 2012a; citizen security: the homicide rate approaches levels similar 60 Organized crime is a threat that evokes great fear among popu- to countries engaged in wars (Lessing 2012), with the conse40 lations where it takes root (see figure 4.1) and that has a nega- quent displacement of populations and humanitarian emersecurity policies tive effect on20 people and their communities through the use gencies. This indicates that public Average prealert: 7 that seek of violence and 0 coercive measures based on intimidation and to confront organized crime with an “iron fist’, can provoke a duress (Banco Mundial 2011; OCDE-DAC 2012; Foro Económico consequent rise in precisely the violence they seek to contain. Mundial 2012). The following section will briefly analyse four of the main criminal activities of organized crime, which share both low In addition,Source: organized crime has a multiplier effect on insecurity, Guerrero (2012). as it magnifies other threats, exploits and deepens the vulner- levels of reporting and high levels of bodily injury: human abilities of Latin American democracies, and negatively affects trafficking and smuggling (in particular women, minors, and migrants), kidnapping, and extortion.

Principal threat to security according to citizens , Figure 4.1. Box 4.1. The spirals of violence and organised crime Latin America, 2012 80

Gangs

The rupture of the equilibrium can come from the greater capacity and determination of the State to combat criminal structures, from the greater willingness of illegal groups to respond with violence to state action, or to disputes between criminal organisations over control of illicit markets.

Venezuela

Uruguay

Dominican Republic

Peru

Paraguay

Panama

Nicaragua

Mexico

Honduras

The evidence suggests that any of these ruptures can result in spiralling violence. What has happened in the city of Monterrey, Mexico, and in Medellin, Colombia, illustrates how violence intensifies after a rupture of the equilibrium. In both cases, the rupture of the power equilibrium of the criminal structures ignited a cycle of disputes that sharply increased the number of homicides. In Monterrey, at the beginning of 2010, the rupture between two criminal structures — the Gulf Cartel and its armed wing, the Zetas — provoked Common criminals a rapid rise in violence and set in motion a long-running battle (Guerrero 2012).

Guatemala

El Salvador

Ecuador

Costa Rica

Colombia

Chile

Brazil

Bolivia

Argentina

Percentage

The spirals of70 violence can be defined as the sudden and sustained rise of violence in a geographical area, which disrupts 60 or alters the existence of a previous equilibrium. The word “equilibrium”50does not refer necessarily to a previous situation of no violence, rather to a situation in which the levels 40 of violence have remained stable or low. For example, equi30 to the decision of criminal actors to tolerlibrium can refer ate each other20or seek to associate or control their exercise of violence. The rupture of the equilibrium and a surge of spiral10 ling violence reflect the incapacity of legal or illegal actors to 0 prevent it or control it. Its magnitude and duration depend as much on the State’s capacities as it does on the will and capacity of illegal actor to restore the equilibrium or generate a new order.

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012).

Figure 4.2.

Monthly executions in metropolitan Monterrey, México, 2012

200 180

Violence alert, march-april 2010

160 140 120 100

Rupture of equilibrium

Average postalert: 77

60 40 20

Average prealert: 7 Oct-10 Jan-11 Apr-11 July-11 Oct-11 Jan-12 Apr-12

Apr.-09 July-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr.-10 July-10

Jan.-07 Apr.-07 July-07 Oct.-07 Jan-08 Apr.-08 July-08 Oct.-08 Jan-09

Source: Guerrero (2012).

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

4 THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Box 4.1.The spirals of violence and organised crime In Medellin, the spiral was the result of the extradition, in 2008, of 14 paramilitary leaders that were in prison at the time. One of these leaders was in charge of the Cacique Nutibara Bloc, which from 2003 controlled the criminal organiFigure 4.3.

zation in Medellin. Their extradition shattered the power equilibrium and provoked a cycle of disputes and readjustments between criminal structures (Medina, Posso and Tamayo 2011; Llorente and Guarín 2013).

Homicide rate per 100,000 inhabitants in the city of Medellin, Colombia, 2010

100

94,4 86,3

Rupture of equilibrium

80 70 60

57,3

45,6

35,3

34,0

35,9

20 10 0 2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

Source: Government of Medellin Secretariat.

Human Trafficking and Smuggling At a regional level, human trafficking is a particularly serious crime due to its direct impact on life and liberty, defined by the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress, and Punish Trafficking in Persons as “the transfer, harbour or receipt of persons by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of power, or of a situation of vulnerability or of giving or receiving payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person who has authority over another person, for the purpose of exploitation.” Generally, human trafficking is carried out for purposes of prostitution, sexual tourism, and forced labour, and represents a serious human rights violation. In the case of sexual exploitation, the consequences of trafficking frequently include sexually transmitted disease, abortions, drug consumption, and death. The effects of trafficking on child 78

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

victims are often difficult to overcome and cause permanent damage. The victims’ invisibility and stigmatisation worsen the consequences of this crime (Le Goff y Luther 2011; Comisión Interamericana de las Mujeres de la OEA et al. 2006). Table 4.1 contains the available data on human trafficking for some countries in the region. Despite the fact that these rates seem relatively low, the number of victims of this crime is not. For example, during the period from 2007 to 2010, in 14 countries in the American continent —including the United States, Canada, and some countries in the Caribbean— more than 6,000 persons reported being victims of this crime (an annual average of 1,500 individuals). Of these victims, approximately 27% were minors and, in the majority of cases, women (UNODC 2012b, 61). Estimates suggest that for each trafficking victim, there are 30 more that have not been reported (UNODC 2012b, 61). Based on the figure of reported cases, this is the equivalent of 45,000 victims annualy in Latin America. This figure could be much higher, based on the estimates at the national level by

Argentina

2011

0.5

Bolivia

2009

3.1

Chile

2011

0.1

Colombia

2011

0.1

Costa Rica

2010

0.9

the United States and its effect in Mexico have led migrants to adopt ever more dangerous and clandestine routes, which expose them to recruitment, extortion, and death (Santamaría Percentage of persons imprisone 4.2.the National Commisand extortion, selected countries 2013)63. According to specialTable reports from sion of Human Rights (CNDH), between September 2008 and Argentina Mexico Peru El S February 2009, 9,758 migrants in Mexico were deprived of their freedom, while betweenKidnapping April and September 20101.9the number 9.6 1.7 rose to 11,333 (CNDH 2011, 61). It is worth noting that while NA the CNDH estimates thatExtortion each year almost 20,0000.2migrants in NA transit are kidnapped, only 60 filed complaints for this crime in Source: Comparative Study of the inmate population UNDP (2013). See Methodological-Statistical A 2010 (CNDH 2011) 64. Note: The annotation NA refers to Data Unavailable

Guatemala

2011

0.9

Nicaragua

2011

0.6

Kidnapping and extortion

Panama

2011

0.3

Paraguay

2010

0.0

Peru

2011

0.5

Country

Year

Rate

See Statistical-Methodological Annex.

some civil society organizations and institutions that specialise in this area. A crime related to human trafficking, but with a different connotation, is the smuggling of people and, especially, migrants. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights has pointed out that there is a growing tendency toward the criminalization, discrimination, exclusion, exploitation, and violation of the rights of migrants, particularly those migrants in transit (OHCHR 2010). According to Protocol 3 of the Smuggling of Migrants, the smuggling of migrants is defined as “the procurement, in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a signatory State of which the person is not a national or a permanent resident for the purpose of obtaining, directly or indirectly, financial gain.” In practice, it is difficult to distinguish human trafficking from the illicit smuggling of migrants, given that this latter group can become also trafficking victims; further, human traffickers can also act as smugglers of migrants (UNODC 2009). The smuggling of migrants occurs most often in the intense migration corridor through Central America —especially in the Northern Triangle —, Mexico, and the United States. The final destination is the United States, and the first point of entry is the northern frontier of Mexico—although this illicit activity occurs along the entire length of the region with varying levels of incidence. According to data from UNODC (2011), each year there are around three million illegal entries into the United States, but the percentage of persons who have been victims of illegal smuggling is unknown. The stiffening of immigration policy in

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Table 4.1.

per 100,000 inhabitants, selected countries, last available year

Kidnapping and extortion are two threats to security that are linked to an increase in generalized fear together with serious limitations for the human development of the citizenry. The impact of kidnapping is profound and affects not only the victims, Rate of domestic violence per 100,0 but also their immediateTable circle and 4.4.society as a whole (Navia y countries, Ossa 2001). Extortion, for its part, also has important negative various years. consequences, to the extent that it imposes illegal monetary Country Year Rate Year burdens on common citizens, businesses, and specific sectors, with consequences not only for people’s assets but also for the 2008 2011 Argentina freedom of its victims. In general, the perpetrators threaten 4.5 2009 their victims with death or destruction of theirNAproperty, tend NA Bolivia a to know their victim’sChile incomes and routines,2005 and often com507.5 2011 mit crimes in the name of an organisation 2005 (PNUD Guatemala31.5 2011 Colombia 2007-2008; Celedón et al. 2009). Extortion is often carried out 2005 1.1 2007 Costa Rica by criminal gangs, criminal groups with a strong territorial link, 2005 66.7 2011 Salvador and inmates operatingElfrom prison. 2005 22.0 2011 Guatemala 2008a fear of going 170.0 2011 The victims of kidnapping and extortion share Honduras to the authorities, due the possible reprisals NA against the vic- NA Nicaragua 2011 tims themselves andPanama their families, and as such 2005 prefer to pay 143.3 2011 a ransom or a periodicParaguay amount as demanded2005 by these criminal 3.1 2010 groups. Given this environment, it is difficult to ascertain the full 15.9 NA Peru in kidnapping and2004 dimensions and tendencies extortion crimes. Dominican Rep. statistics 2008 do not pro481.7 2011 The majority of the offices that generate 2011 duce information — Uruguay least of all public — on2005 this subject. 206.3

The administrative records of 14 countries in Latin America 65 . show that between 2009 and 2011 there were —at least— 18,423 kidnappings, which averages out to 17 kidnappings a day (2013). In comparative terms, some estimates indicate that 5 of the 10 countries with the most kidnappings in the world are in Latin America (Ikv Pax Christi 2008,Percentage 6). of incidence of sexual crime and ty Table 4.6. selected countries, 2013 In Colombia, a recent study that organized the information on kidnapping between 1970 and 2010 documented 39,058 cases Mexico Argentina Peru 66 of persons who were victims of this crime . Criminal networks were presumably responsible forof27% of these — close to the Proportion sexual 7.9 7.9 22 crime by country REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Type of relationship with victim

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

percentage carried out by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), responsible for 30% of the cases— (Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2013). In Mexico, according to the National Public Security System, between 2005 and 2011, the kidnapping rate rose from 0.3 per 100,000 inhabitants to 1.2, as did violence in the same period.

ure surpasses 20 for every 1,000 persons. In some cases, extortion has become a mechanism for extraction of resources that rightly belong to the State. According to data from the National Council of Small Enterprise of El Salvador (CONAPES 2013), 70% of affiliated businesses and 80% of informal sector merchants pay extortion.

Even if the figures for kidnapping cases which the LAPOP-PNUD survey recorded were very low, Venezuela, Mexico, Ecuador, and Argentina have the highest degree of victimisation for this kind of crime, much of which appears to be “express kidnappings” —that is, to detain people temporarily to carry out a quick robbery67—. In these cases the victims, are generally selected at random, and they may be held for a few hours until the ransom is paid (País Libre 2011). In some cases, when the victims resist being kidnapped, they can be seriously wounded or killed.

It is difficult to estimate the revenues that criminal gangs obtain through this system of illicit income—as it is anonymous and reporting is limited — but its negative consequences are widespread. The National Survey of Business Victimisation (ENVE) estimates that during 2011 4,324,529 crimes were committed against 1,389,000 businesses in Mexico, of which 14.5% were extortion. This makes extortion the third most frequent crime against businesses in Mexico. Further, the ENVE estimates that in 2011 the total cost of insecurity and crime to businesses is 115,200 million pesos (approximately US$9,000 millions68) (INEGI 2012).

In countries like Colombia and Mexico —where the surveys of victimisation are disaggregated by extortion and kidnapping— we find that 98.6% of victims of telephone extortion and 60 % of the kidnapping cases in Mexico are not reported (CIDE 2012). In Colombia, 78.8% of cases of extortion are not reported (DANE 2012). In Venezuela, approximately 62% of victims of kidnapping fail to report the crime, as do, 73.13% of the victims of extortion (National Survey on Victimisation and Perception of Citizen Security). Table 4.2 on inmate surveys provides support for what this report maintains: there are no reliable statistics on two of the crimes that most affect society: kidnapping and extortion. The results of the LAPOP-PNUD (2012) survey suggest that for the majority of countries, the victimisation rates are higher than those of the official records. Without losing sight of the limitations of this survey, its findings allow for a general, although insufficient, approximation of the levels of victimisation: 8 out of every 1,000 citizens say they were victims of extortion in Latin America; in countries like Mexico, El Salvador, and Peru, this fig-

habitants, ries, ear

0.5 3.1 0.1 0.1 0.9

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

Kidnapping

1.9

9.6

1.7

4.0

1.9

Extortion

0.2

19.3

0.3

0.6 0.0

El Salvador

Source: Comparative Study of the inmate population UNDP (2013). See Methodological-Statistical Annex. Note: The annotation NA refers to Data Unavailable

0.9 0.38 0

The increase in this type of crime is partly due to changes in the financing of criminal organisations, that in response to the State’s increasing investigation of certain illegal economic activities— especially drug trafficking— have decided to diversify their sources of income. In this context, aside from large businesses, other social sectors are also subject to extortion, although for smaller sums (Fundación Ideas para la Paz et al. 2010).

Percentage of persons imprisoned for kidnapping and extortion, selected countries, 2013

Table 4.2.

Rate

In the case of the Northern Triangle countries in Central America, where extortion by gangs is a frequent occurrence, according to a comparative study conducted in 2007, a clica (a local group of gang-members) collected on average US$1,000 a week in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras (Demoscopía 2007). Further, the number of extortion victims in Guatemala has almost quintupled, from 564 in 2000 to 2,757 in 2011 (according to administrative records compiled by the UNDP Country Office 2013).

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Brazil

Youth constitute the group most affected by crime and violence, and at the same time, are most often responsible for it. The relationship between youth and violence is usually analysed from the perspective of so-called “youth violence”, which portrays youth exclusively in their role as perpetrators. However, it is important to highlight their condition as victims and avoid their criminalisation and stigmatisation. The violence and crimes committed by youth tend to develop in the context of collective dynamics that range from temporary and unstructured groups —such as South American sports fans— to highly hierarchical criminal gangs (Cruz 2010). The latter are considered a particularly serious problem for the safety of the population in the region: criminal gangs represent, for many countries, the second most serious threat as perceived by the citizenry (see Figure 4.1). The perception of insecurity related to criminal gangs is expressed very strongly in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, where youth gangs called “maras” are found (LAPOP 2012). In Belize, there is evidence that Central American gangs with a strong criminal profile could be joining those already operating in the country (ONU Belice CCA 2012, 23). The “Maras “are organized principally in two separate networks, and their presence in the various countries and their level of organization and criminality has expanded in recent years—in many cases, as a result of the failed “iron fist” policies— (Hume 2007; Zilberg 2011). Although some of the members or former members of the maras have established links with organized crime (Cruz 2010), these groups and others in the region—like “las bandas” and “combos”, in Colombia, or the “comandos”, in Brazil— mainly continue to commit criminal acts such as robbery, kidnapping, and extortion at the local level (Guerrero 2010; Wolf 2012; Escalante 2012). The Central American “maras” are the most visible, although not the only example of the complex relationship between youth and violence. In Mexico, where the perception of the threat by organized crime and drug trafficking has reached alarming levels, some evidence suggests that there are at least 30,000 minors who actively cooperate with organized crime in activities which range from extortion and human trafficking to piracy and drug trafficking (Red por los Derechos de la Infancia en México 2011, 35). In Colombia, the combination between paramilitarism, guerrillas, drug trafficking, and organized crime has intensified recruitment, in some cases forced, of children and young

people by criminal groups (Ortega-Jurado 2012, 21). In Brazil, the principal criminal organizations, like First Commando of the Capital (Primeiro Comando do Capital) in São Paulo and the Red Commando (Comando Vermelho) in Rio de Janeiro, use young people as hired hands for undertaking street violence (Carvalho y Soares 2013). In Belize, the recruitment of youth by groups involved in regional drug trafficking has expanded, due to the influx of laundered money and easy access to weapons. However, it is important to point out that not all gangs are criminal in nature nor even less so, that their main objectives are crime and violence. Various studies show that in the majority of cases, gangs continue to operate as environments for socialization among peers and as self-protection mechanisms among youth, rather than organisations linked to organised crime (Wolf 2012; Rodríguez 2013; Rodríguez 2012). Further, the leadership and the control of the criminal organisations are usually in the hands of adults (Solís 2009, 83).

4 THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Violence and Crime committed by and against youth

The figures presented in Chapter 3 indicate that the principal victims of homicides committed in Latin America are youth. In many cases, violence against youth emanates from State institutions involved in security and the administration of justice (including prisons, the police, and offices of the justice system), as well as other institutions considered “private” (such as families), or “mixed” (such as schools). In the case of violence faced by youth from the State, the problems of overpopulation and overcrowding in prisons stand out. This problem affects youth particularly, given the early run-ins with the law of this group and the disturbing reduction of in the age of criminal responsibility, which has resulted in the “juvenilisation” of prison populations (WOLA y TNI 2010). Further, the lack of prisons committed to social reintegration doesn’t allow for compliance with the protection standards applicable to vulnerable population, in accordance with regional and international treaties for the protection of children and youth. The stigmatising of some youth groups, in particular those in the lower socio-economic income strata, is reflected in other kinds of violence perpetrated against them, such as the abuse of power by police: for a large number of youth, the police is more an institution they need to be wary of, rather than one they can turn to for protection. Finally, the “iron fist” policies that were designed to combat gangs, in particular the “maras” in Central America, have fuelled a rise in violence by and against youth, as a result of simplified responses to the problem of youth gangs (Thomas Bruneau et al. 2011). The survey of prison inmates in El Salvador shows that 37% of them belonged to a gang at the time of detention. Of the REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

remaining 63%, 10% joined gangs in prison (Estudio comparativo de población carcelaria, PNUD, 2013).

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Among families, multiple forms of violence are present that range from disciplinary measures and punishment imposed by parents to forms of abuse and sexual violence that principally affects girls and boys, adolescents, and women. Domestic violence against children and youth is particularly serious because it inhibits their human development as well as reproducing itself through an intergenerational cycle (BID 2005). School violence is a reflection of a central failure in the role of the school system as a space for expanding children’s capacities in the region and improving its quality as well as broadening its coverage. When it does occur, school violence “causes pain, damage, and humiliation in children, affecting their learning, development, and future”.69 School violence takes on two forms: there is the kind of violence that takes place within the school, and the violence that the school itself inflicts on young people. The first includes various forms of discrimination and abuse among students, for example the violence directed at women and lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transsexual persons (LGBT) (Molina et al. 2007). The violence directed by the school at young people refers to disciplinary standards that often constitute a violation of human rights which, in many cases, culminates with either the expulsion of the “problem” students or their dropping out of school (Furlán 2012; King and Ortega 2012). The prevention of both kinds of violence is fundamental to overcome the high levels of dropouts that hinder the human development of youth in the region. Based on the previous section, it can be said that the link between children and youth and different kinds of violence — in plural— requires comprehensive public policies which address the diverse situations of youth vulnerability, from homes and schools to the public domain.

Gender violence Gender violence is a form of aggression against a person or group of persons because of their gender, and is expressed most intensely and predominantly against women and girls.70 It includes acts of physical, psychological, and sexual violence, based on the unequal power relationships that persist between men and women, as well as in the set of social and cultural norms regarding gender and sexual identity (IASC 2005). Gender violence is one of the most persistent threats in Latin America, and as such, constitutes an obstacle to human development, public health, and human rights (Bott et al. 2012, XV). 82

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

This threat arises in the private as well as the public domain. It can take place in the family, in school, at work, in the community, or the neighbourhood, and in all the interactive spaces between agents of the State and its citizens. According to the results of the LAPOP-PNUD 2012 survey, almost a third of women have been victimized in their own home, while two-thirds were victims outside their home. Some of its principal manifestations are domestic violence, violence by a sentimental partner, sexual violence (including abuse and sexual harassment in the work place), feminicides, human trafficking, human smuggling, sexual exploitation, and institutional violence 71. That these forms of violence, previously considered “private matters”, are finally visible, has been possible thanks to the work of women’s organisations and international organisations like the United Nations (Craske and Molyneaux 2002, 11). Tables 4.3 and 4.4 provide an overview of the situation of sexual and domestic violence in the region. Box 4.3 provides data on rape from 14 countries in the region. Of these 14, 10 show an increase in the rates of recorded cases. Although it is possible that this increase can be attributed to a higher rate of reporting or changes in the systems of measurement and classification, the figures are not irrelevant, given the probably high levels of underreporting. Regarding domestic violence, Table 4.4 also shows that the rates are high for a number of countries. Despite the difficulties of data collection, it is clear that this form of violence continues to be an important threat in the region. It is important to point out that, in many cases, the low rate of reporting can disguise the low level of trust in the institutions where complaints are lodged. For example, countries like Chile and Uruguay that have high rates of domestic violence (see Table 4.3), are also countries where the high level of confidence in the police may explain the higher rate of reporting. A recent study by the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO) sheds light on the problem of violence against women perpetrated by their partners (Bott et al. 2012). This shows that for the period 2007 to 2008, the percentage of women who had ever been a victim of violence by their partner, goes from 16.1% in the Dominican Republic to 38.6% in the case of Peru (see Table 4.5). According to prison inmate surveys, of the total of those surveyed, sexual crimes represent: 8% in Argentina, Chile, and Mexico; 11% in El Salvador; 14% in Brazil, and 22% in Peru. It highlights that, depending on the crime, between 75% and 90% of the perpetrators knew their victims before the crime. Worse yet, between 20% and 40% were their relatives.

Understanding that the presence and impact of gender violence is not limited to the private sphere is a necessary step in shedding light on the dimensions of this threat. Further, it points to the importance of identifying the overlap between gender vioTable 4.3.

Country

Argentina Bolivia Brazil a Chile b Colombia Costa Rica El Salvador Guatemala Honduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Dominican Republic Uruguay

lence and other forms of violence, such as violence perpetrated by state agents or those linked to organized crime like human trafficking and smuggling, sexual exploitation, and violence against migrant and displaced populations (ACUNS 2013, 4, 6768). Despite its seriousness, gender violence is usually perceived as an “everyday” practice rather than a serious threat that requires attention. The results of the LAPOP-PNUD 2012 survey, for example, show that in Latin America, gender violence (domestic violence, violence perpetrated by a domestic partner, feminicide, sexual violence, etc.) is not included among the principal threats identified (LAPOP-PNUD, 2012). Although this survey does not reflect the magnitude of this threat in the region, both the administrative records as well as the data from the WHO presented in this section speak otherwise.

4 THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

There are significant challenges in the region regarding the quality of data and the existing records on gender violence in all its forms. Even though there is quantitative data on feminicides in some countries (though many cases are recorded as homicides), there are serious data gaps regarding sexual violence and domestic abuse. In Latin America as in other regions in the world, the majority of victims do not report these crimes to the authorities for a number of reasons: dependency and vulnerability of a physical, economic, and psychological nature with regards to the perpetrator —who is usually a partner or relative of the victim—, the fear of retaliation, a lack of knowledge about places to seek help, lack of trust in the capacity for conflict resolution, and fear of being doubly victimized, i.e. the fear by the victim of being humiliated by the authorities when lodging a complaint. In cases of sexual exploitation and human trafficking and smuggling, the risks of lodging a complaint are heightened by the victim’s condition as a foreigner or undocumented migratory situation.

Finally, as was shown in Chapter 3, homicidal violence against women has also increased in the region. The recent increase in feminicide in the region is particularly alarming, above all because of its invisibility and the level of impunity that has characterized the investigation and processing of these cases. It is crucial to change the structural conditions, the social norms,

Rape rates per 100,000 inhabitants, selected countries, circa 2005 to circa 2011 Year

2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2005 2008 2005

Rate

8.2 11.8 7.1 12.8 2.8 35.3 30.2 2.5 23.2 25.0 27.8 8.3 22.0 27.3 10.6

Year

2008 2009 2010 2011 2011 2010 2012 2011 2011 2011 2012 2010 2011 2011 2011

Rate

Percentage change circa 2005-circa 2011

8.5 26,2 14,7 16.2 2.9 34.6 6.3 3.9 21.7 29.0 14.2 8.9 25.0 56.5 9.0

4 .2 122.7 106.2 26.7 0.6 -2.1 -79.1 56.2 -6.4 16.0 -48.9 7.8 13.6 107.0 -15.5

a. The crime corresponds to “rape, statutory rape, and sexual abuse.” .

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Violence against women, selected countries, various years

Rape rates per 100,000 inhabitants, selected countries, circa 2005 to circa 2011

Table 4.3.

Rate of domestic violence per 100,000 inhabitants, selected Percentage change Year various Rateyears. Year Rate countries, circa 2005-circa 2011

Table 4.4. Country

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Country Argentina

Year

Bolivia

a Argentina Brazil b Bolivia Chile Chile a Colombia Colombia Costa Rica Costa Rica El Salvador

2008

Guatemala Honduras

2005

2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2005 2010 2005 2010 2005 2005 2008 2005

NA 2005 2005 2005

El Salvador Guatemala

2005

Honduras Mexico

2008

Panama Paraguay

2005

Peru Republic Dominican

2004

Nicaragua Panama

Paraguay Peru

2005

Dominican Rep. Uruguay

2008

Uruguay

2005

Rate

Year2008

8.2 11.8 7.1 12.8 2.8 35.3 30.2 2.5 23.2 25.0 27.8 8.3 22.0 27.3 10.6

4.5 NA 507.5 31.5 1.1 66.7 22.0 170.0 NA 143.3 3.1 15.9 481.7 206.3

Percentage change 4 .2 circa 2005–circa 2011

Rate8.5

2009

26,2

20112010

122.7

15.1 14,7

235.56 106.2

20112011

762.12.9

50.20.6

20072012

0.86.3

-27.3 -79.1

15.0 21.7

-31.8-6.4

62.9 14.2

NA -48.9

20092011

234.7 16.2

20112010

NA26.7

57.8 34.6

20112011

67.63.9

20112011

163.0 29.0

20112010

133.88.9

NA2011

NA 56.5

20112011 20112012

20102011 20112011 2011

83.2-2.1 1.456.2

-4.116.0 -6.67.8

5.225.0

65.813.6

623.09.0

29.3 -15.5

NA 107.0

482.9

134.1

a. The crime corresponds to “rape, statutory rape, and sexual abuse.” . .

Table 4.5. Table 4.6. Country

Violence against women, selected countries, various years Percentage of incidence of sexual crime and type of relationship with victim, percentages selected countries, 2013 Survey Violence by Frequency of Emotional abuse year Argentina perpetrator partner Mexico Peru Elviolence Salvador Brazil Chile (physical or sexual)

Proportion of sexual crime by country Bolivia

By any 7.9 perpetrator7.9 Partner

Type of relationship with victim 2003 - 2008

ColombiaKnown

2005

Ecuador

2004

Unknown

El Salvador

Other

Guatemala

2008

75.6 9.8

2008 - 2009 NA

(Including the partner)

Ever

In the 7.512 last months

15.0

53.3

25.5

44.2

32.3

17.0

73.9 12.0

79.7 39.7

85 22.1

69.9 41.5

84.5 21.9

11.1

NA 9.9

40.7 19.5 44.2 NA42.2

15.3 13.8 18.8 1.7 21.6

15.0 15.0 15.0

23.5 NA

12.0 12.0 12.0

13.1

32.4 26.3

NA 27.6

7.9

7.7

12.0

9.9

13.7

Nicaragua

2006 - 2007

15.0

13.0

29.3

9.3

47.8

21.2

Paraguay

2008

10.0

9.0

20.4

8.0

36.0

18.4

Peru

2007 - 2008

39.5

14.9

31.7

16.3

Dominican Republic

2007

12.0

5.0

11.7

26.1

20.8

Source: Bott et al. (2012, 20-27). Note: The women surveyed, between the ages of 15 and 49, were married or living with a partner. The annotation NA refers to Data unavailable. 84

14.1

18.0

Source: Comparative Study of the prison population UNDP (2013). See Statistical-Methodological Annex.

Honduras 2005 - 2006 Note: The annotation NA refers to Data Unavailable

In the

10.9last year

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Source: Comparative Study of the inmate population UNDP (2013). See Methodological-Statistical Annex. Note: The annotation NA refers to Data Unavailable

directed, sponsored, and protected by state officials (Mazzei 2009; Schlichte 2009). In this case, they include paramilitaries, civil defence groups, vigilantes, and death squads that are promoted, supported, or tolerated by governmental institutions.

Rate of domestic violence per 100,000 inhabitants, selected Extrajudicial executions by police and members of the armed IllegalTable Violence 4.4. by state actors countries, various years.

forces are the most visible phenomenon of this kind of violence. Rights (IACHR), in its In particular contexts and circumstances, state actors —individ- The Inter-American Commission on Human Percentage change Country Year Rate Year Rate second report on the situation of human rights workers2011 in the ually or collectively— can engender or perpetuate violence and circa 2005–circa crime. This category includes a wide range of activities, including Americas, noted that “murders, extrajudicial executions, and 2011 disappearances 15.1 235.56 particularly Argentina have increased in the region, the abuse of authority, or the 2008 direct participation4.5by officials in forced NA that constitute NA clear viola- in 2009 234.7 democracy has brokenNAdown, where those countries where organized crime groups, in actions Bolivia a there tions ofChile human rights. 2005 507.5 2011 an on-going armed 762.1 conflict, or where there 50.2is a constant confrontation with organized crime groups” (CIDH 2005 31.5 2011 57.8 83.22012, 12). Colombia The involvement in illegal or violent 2005 1.1 acts is usu- 2007 0.8 -27.3 Costa Ricaof state actors ally concentrated in particular units or bodies. However, when it The direct participation of state actors in criminal activities goes 2005 66.7 2011 67.6 1.4 El Salvador does occur, the violence has serious consequences not only for beyond their presence in criminal gangs and organizations. One 2011 15.0seriousness of this problem -31.8 is the citiGuatemala the indicators of the the direct victims, but also for2005 the institutions 22.0 of the State, as of 2008 170.0undermines zens’ 2011 perception that 163.0 Honduras the police participate in -4.1 illegal activities. it erodes their legitimacy, perpetuates impunity, Nicaragua NA in security and NA justice, and The 2011LAPOP-PNUD (2012) 62.9 survey provides a viewNAof the magnipublic trust in institutions involved tude of this threat from the citizens’ perspective: jeopardises the foundations of democratic rule (Cruz, 2010). 2005 143.3 2011 133.8 -6.644% of those Panama interviewed said that the police were involved 2005 3.1 2010 5.2 65.8in crime. This Paraguay supplements figures from other national studies that have There are two kinds of groups 2004 that participate in15.9 illegal violence data NA NA NA Peru by state actors. First, the individual or members of “formal” elicited concern 72. Dominican Rep. 2008 481.7 2011 623.0 29.3 groups, i.e., members of governmental institutions that form 2005 206.3 2011 violence by state 482.9actors heightens feelings 134.1of vulnerabilpart ofUruguay the state security apparatus—military personnel, police, Illegal and other members of security bodies— as well as prosecutors, ity and increases people’s perception of insecurity. When those judges, legislators, and public officials. Second, the “informal” persons entrusted with guaranteeing citizen security become . groups, which, although they have no formal link to state insti- themselves perpetrators, they discredit the fundamental oblitutions and nominally do not form part of State structures, are gation of the State: protection.

4 THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

and the cultural patterns that legitimise and reproduce this and other forms of violence against women, as well as to guarantee the effective application of the relevant laws in effect.

Coun

Boliv

Colo

Ecua

El Sa

Table 4.6.

Guat

Percentage of incidence of sexual crime and type of relationship with victim, selected countries, 2013 Argentina

Proportion of sexual crime by country

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Hond

Nica

Chile

Para

7.9

10.9

14.1

Peru

7.5

Dom

Type of relationship with victim

Source: B Note: Th

Known

75.6

73.9

79.7

69.9

84.5

Unknown

9.8

23.5

13.1

7.9

19.5

13.8

Other

1.7

Source: Comparative Study of the prison population UNDP (2013). See Statistical-Methodological Annex. Note: The annotation NA refers to Data Unavailable

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Corruption

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

Corruption, defined as the misappropriation of public assets, is a serious and widespread threat to citizen security in Latin America. The World Bank estimates that corruption absorbs around 9% of regional GDP. In addition to the direct damage to the population’s well being —in particular the most vulnerable—73 and to the development of a country (Elliot 1997, 247), the studies show that corruption undermines the political system (Burbano de Lara 2005; Serra, López and Seligson 2004; Rowland 1998). “Corruption corrodes societies and contributes to an understandable lack of trust and confidence in the management of public affairs” (Clark 2012). Corruption is a particularly difficult crime to measure. According to the results of the LAPOP-PNUD 2012 survey, only a small minority thought that corruption in their countries was “nonexistent” or “not widespread”: in 6 of the 18 countries included in this survey, more than 50% of those interviewed said that corruption was “very prevalent” 74. It is impossible to understand this threat without comprehending that many people tolerate and participate in it (LAPOP 2010). One way to grasp the impact of corruption on daily life is through victimisation surveys, which probably refer largely to “petty corruption”, i.e., bribery in which public officials and the average citizenry are involved. According to the LAPOP survey (2010), 17.9% of those interviewed experienced this kind of injustice during the 12 months prior to the survey, although the figure varies significantly from country to country. The percentage of people who consider that “paying a bribe is justified” diminished from 23.61% in 2006 to 12.58% in 2010. In addition to petty corruption, there are still cases of large-scale corruption in the region, despite massive efforts undertaken to combat corruption in many countries. Given the economic incentives and the weakness of controls, the range of opportunities for corruption is very wide: in the procurement of public contracts, in the illegal financing of electoral campaigns, or in certain circumstances, even passing legislation favourable to particular economic interests or sectors, among others. In such cases, Rule of Law does not protect the rights of the citizen — its assigned role—, but rather favours the interests of certain influential groups rather than those of the majority. Although we can only understand to some degree the scope of this phenomenon through opinion surveys, the information available from the prison surveys shows clearly that the prosecution and conviction of the perpetrators of this kind of crime continues to be a difficult undertaking. An important fact that il-

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lustrates the serious problem of impunity associated with white collar crime is that more than half of the inmates interviewed in all of the countries said that if they had had enough money, they could have avoided arrest and prosecution by paying bribes. The percentage of responses along this line was 55% in Peru, 52% in El Salvador, 59% in Chile, 60% in Brazil, 66% in Mexico, and 71% in Argentina. Similarly, the survey showed that in 14.5% of the crimes committed by inmates in Brazil and 10% of crimes in Mexico and El Salvador, some person in a position of authority had participated (police, military official, prosecutor, judge) (Comparative Study of the Prison Population, UNDP, 2013).

Recommendations 1. Provide comprehensive, but differentiated, responses to threats to security Public policies should be developed along various fronts at the same time, taking into account that the threats mutually reinforce each other. An adequate understanding of their relationship could contribute to the design of more effective policies and interventions. For example, it is of key importance to recognise the connection between domestic violence and juvenile violence in order to understand that violence prevention programmes aimed at children and youth need to take into consideration the family context and provide alternative spaces for protection and capacity-building. A social prevention approach is crucial for minor crimes, youth violence, and domestic violence, insuring that structural factors are addressed and attention is paid to the vulnerable condition of specific population groups. It is important that the justice system provides a clear response to the most serious crimes, especially those that affect the right to life and liberty. The use of force by the authorities must be strictly controlled, with zero tolerance for abuses, cases of corruption, the participation of public officials in illegal activities, and human rights violations. At the same time, there is a need for differentiated responses to the different kinds of threats, taking into consideration the characteristics of the perpetrators, the extent of harm and its impact, the spatial factor (public or private), as well as motivations and underlying factors. It is important to have reliable information regarding the principal threats responsible for violence and crime, addressed by interventions that combine preventive aspects with the pursuit of justice. Every municipality and locality has its own dynamics, and the regional experience shows that

al coverage. A mechanism should be established to coordinate multisector efforts, particularly with regards to citizen security policies.

2. Give visibility to and reduce gender violence

3. Give priority attention to youth, discontinue policies which promote an “iron fist” approach

Strengthening the capacities and freedoms of women must be at the centre of strategies to reduce gender violence. The priority objective is that interventions focus on improving the legal situation of women, especially access to justice, which would reduce their vulnerability and impunity in the face of violence. In the same vein, women’s access to education is key, with programmes that guarantee and promote secondary school training and thus open job opportunities. The use of campaigns at the local and global level (such as the UN campaign “Unite to put an end to violence against women”, which will be analysed in Chapter 9), are crucially important to place the issues on the table, shed light on the dimensions of the problem, and prevent it from being seen as normal or inevitable. School curricula are important tools to modify discriminatory patterns of behaviour, as well as raising awareness in the media regarding gender violence. One of the most important tasks is to guarantee that violence against women and girls can be reported without revictimisation or discrimination against the victims. To insure this, a better legal definition of this crime in the civil and penal codes is necessary, but also it is also important to institutionalise mechanisms that protect the security of the victims, such as shelters for women. It is also essential to strengthen monitoring and evaluation mechanisms with the use of periodic surveys and including an explicit gender variable in reporting systems, as well as disaggregation by sex. One the other hand, specialized training for public servants in all branches of government, including judges and prosecutors, should be available, as well as establishing women’s departments within the police. An important step is establishing special tribunals or special judicial proceedings that guarantee the timely and efficient processing of matters related to gender violence. Further, it is necessary to strengthen the links that ensure permanent cooperation between the State and civil society to implement comprehensive programmes directed at modifying behaviour patterns, not only in women who are potential victims of violence, but also young men. These programmes should progress by stages, until they are consolidated and have nation-

The programmes directed at young people should begin with an analysis of their socio-economic context, their hopes and aspirations, and the obstacles to achieving them, in light of this group’s vulnerability to the various security threats. There is a need to expand the opportunities for young people to devise a “life project”—legally-based— with which they can identify. It is important for the State to support and develop prevention, rehabilitation, recreation, and reintegration programmes that offer youth dignity and genuine development opportunities. Some measures to achieve this are training workshops, the creation of decent jobs, and places where youth can socialize, especially at the community level. To achieve this, close collaboration between State institutions, civil society, the school, the family, and young people, is fundamental.

4 THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

responses are more effective and meaningful when they take into consideration these peculiarities, and approach problems at the community level.

Efforts must be made to avoid school dropouts, to prevent violence on school grounds, and to carefully monitor children who abandon their home. In order to develop these violence prevention programmes, it is essential to have a better understanding of what happens in schools. In this regard, student surveys are an important tool to identify risks and vulnerabilities, including information on gang influence, perceptions on security, and incidents of victimisation. The family is central for prevention programmes, as it is the first environment for socialization of children and youth. The prevention of child abuse and domestic violence is a priority. At the community level, it is important to raise awareness and identify the key actors that exercise the most influence on youth. For example, it is important to recognize that gangs are collectives or groups with their own identity, that not all of them have criminal structures or are involved in criminal activities, and that they fill other social vacuums. Early warning systems that identify young persons who drop out of school or leave their homes are useful – these are some of the principal signs that link youth with gangs –, particularly in places where criminal organizations have a strong presence.

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4. Reduce the influence of organized crime

5. Control corruption and illegal violence by authorities

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

In order to confront the challenge of organized crime, actions by the State are needed at different levels. From the perspective of human development, it is important that the interventions are focused on citizen protection, particularly those communities that are directly affected by the presence of criminal organizations. The restoration of Rule of Law, with a strengthened institutional presence and the recovery of territory, is a first step. This needs to be supported by a comprehensive intervention that addresses social and economic vulnerabilities.

The control of illegal violence by the authorities requires a range of police reforms, from staff selection to permanent training in support of their professionalization. It is also important to set up an incentives system for police professionalization.

Different strategies are required to respond to the different kinds of crime and illegal markets. The formation of specialised police units is advisable, with appropriate investigative techniques and adequate intelligence systems, to confront crimes like extortion, kidnapping, and human trafficking. The creation of specialised units in the offices of public prosecutors will be useful, as well as the appointment of expert judges, who have both the protection and independence to prosecute criminal organizations. Joint efforts by both the security and justice institutions are essential to resolve these cases. Operations against criminal organisations should take into consideration the principle of the proportionality of sanctions and the need to strategically focus efforts. In this regard, it is important to concentrate on the most profitable linkages, the links where relationships are concentrated, the middlemen who facilitate transactions with the legal world, as well as the corrupt public officials who guarantee impunity. Effective interinstitutional coordination among distinct government agencies is essential to weaken criminal factions and dismantle criminal networks and their connections with the legal economy and political system. Measures against money laundering are a powerful tool to undermine criminal groups, as they have a direct impact on their finances and resources. International cooperation agencies can help in knowledge transfer in order to implement more efficient interventions, in the formation of specialised units in the police and prosecutorsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; offices, and in the academic strengthening of professionals working in the field of prevention, reintegration, and rehabilitation in areas controlled by criminal structures. Further, it is important to establish mechanisms for information sharing on transnational criminal activities, communicate and coordinate measures to address money laundering, as well as strengthening the capacities for the comprehensive management of borders, among other measures.

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Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen internal and external control over the organization of the police and its members. This requires appropriate legal norms that guarantee the efficient functioning of the internal disciplinary system, access to justice for the victims of police violence, and a policy directive from civil authorities that provides guidelines for democratic police behaviour. The role of the citizenry in the auditing of these institutions and their performance is fundamental, as is that of human rights organisations and academic centres that produce information on the police. The supervision of the police as an organisation and of its officials can be more effective if there is parallel action by the various actors, each using different means in accordance with their functions and objectives.

THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

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THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

CHAPTER

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

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THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Out of Context, Belkis RamÃrez, 2006

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CHAPTER

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Insecurity has multiple negative impacts in human development. It has a profound effect on people’s capacities and freedoms, the way they configure their lives in society, and their relationship with state institutions. Insecurity generates significant costs, from public spending by institutions and private spending by citizens to ensure their security, to irreparable costs in terms of the loss of life and damage to people’s physical integrity. A linear cause-and-effect perspective cannot address the impact of insecurity in human development. Its analysis requires an approach that takes into account the heterogeneous nature of causes and effects, as well as the connections that exist between different types of impact. Threats that affect individuals have consequences for society as a whole. In addition, what occurs in collective spaces —communities and institutions— has implications for all citizens. As well as affecting multiple dimensions, the different impacts can be inter-dimensional; that is, what happens in a specific arena —for example, at home— generates negative consequences in other spaces —for example, in school or in a public space—. The effects of insecurity have, therefore, a strong endogenous component, with negative effects that feed on, and reproduce, each other. This chapter aims to identify the main consequences and costs of crime and violence in the region, placing citizens at centre stage and identifying the economic, social, and institutional impacts of insecurity 75. In order to achieve this, an ecological-based analytical framework is proposed 76, with two main modifications: it will not concentrate on the causes but on the negative consequences of violence and crime, and singles out three dimensions that are linked with human development and the concept of citizenship:

3. Democratic governance, specifically the attitude of citizens towards the Rule of Law, their commitment to the social contract, and their support for democracy. In addition to these dimensions, the chapter analyses the costs of insecurity in Latin America through three distinct studies developed for the report. The first — carried out jointly between the IDB and the UNDP— explores the cost of violence in five Latin American countries; the second estimates the cost in terms of years of life; and the third explains how fiscal spending affects GDP in all countries. The main messages that emerge from this chapter are the following: • In Latin America, citizens have had to change their daily routine in order to avoid becoming victims of crime, something that has restricted their freedom in distinct ways. • Insecurity generates collective impacts: it transforms and changes the way people build their social connections, deteriorates public spaces, and accentuates inequality and urban exclusion. • Victimisation and fear of crime and violence erode people’s confidence and, in some cases, stimulate support for repressive measures that undermine citizens’ own democratic rights. • The lack of citizen security has significant consequences for Latin American society, with high costs in terms of GDP, public spending, and even life expectancy. This chapter is organized around six sections. The first is a reflection on the importance of services for victims of violence and crime. The following three address each dimension of impact. The fifth presents the costs of insecurity. The last chapter concludes with a series of public policy recommendations.

1. Individual capacities and freedoms that are key for developing life projects.

Victimisation and the fear of violence and crime

2. The social fabric and public spaces as arenas for cooperation that expand options and opportunities for improving the quality of life.

Each year, millions of people in Latin America are affected by violence and crime, making them direct victims of insecurity. Recognising the situation of these victims is the starting point

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

for understanding the impacts of insecurity on human development. Direct victims are those affected personally by an act of violence, a threat or robbery; but the consequences of crime and violence not only affect the victims themselves, but also the people around them as indirect victims.

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Several studies have demonstrated that the loss of someone economically active in a middle-income home can drive a family into poverty (OCDE 2011, 15). Being a victim of a criminal act can change people’s lives forever and permanently affect their immediate social circle. Knowing how many people have lost family members because of homicides and disappearances, and identifying who they are, is key for designing and implementing services for that segment of the population most affected by violence. The scarcity of available information about direct and indirect victims sets limitations not only for measuring the repercussions of violence and crime, but also more particularly for the ability of the State to offer prompt services for these people. According to Mexico Evalúa, a centre for public policy analysis, for every homicide in the country there might be three indirect victims (Mexico Evalúa 2012). Box 5.1. Circles for psychosocial accompaniment for women victims of sexual violence In 2012, the Programme for Strengthening Justice as part of the UNDP’s Basket Fund on Transitional Justice used a strategy of psychosocial follow-up for women victims of sexual violence in the context of the armed conflict in Colombia. Led by the People’s Defenders (Defensoría del Pueblo), programmes were implemented in Bogota, Pasto, Cali, and Medellín, consisting of women’s circles for accompaniment and training that used psychosocial and rights perspectives. These circles mainly sought to strengthen women’s psychosocial condition as victims of these crimes, in order to improve their emotional and relational conditions and thus overcome the impact caused by their experiences of violence. The circles also became a space for reflection about holistic approaches for their access to justice, the restitution of their rights, and their connection with emotional and relational aspects as victims. The People’s Defenders expanded the experience of the circles as best practice, to seven other regions of the country. Source: UNDP.

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This report also highlights the situation of vulnerability of women, children, and young people as direct and indirect victims of insecurity in Latin America. The impact of violence against women is difficult to measure given its invisibility, particularly in those cases involving acts of violence and threats in the home (OMS 2009, 39). However, the evidence indicates that the negative effects of this are diverse and deep: they affect women’s health and wellbeing, can result in permanent physical injury, and deep psychological harm as serious as the physical damage. In addition, violence against women limits their interaction with their surroundings and restricts their economic and social participation (ONU 2006, 62). Women are the main direct victims of domestic and sexual violence and people trafficking. This violence worsens in contexts of armed conflicts. In spite of varying consequences, depending on the level of violence, its repercussions for children and young people tend to be harmful and lasting: “Violence can provoke a greater susceptibility to suffering from social, emotional, and cognitive problems throughout life and to developing health-threatening forms of behaviour” (Pinheiro 2006, 12). Early exposure to violence can cause disorders in the nervous and immunological system 77, which poses serious limitations for the human development of children and young people in their early formation and process of maturity. Critical exposure to violence can result in low academic performances, high dropout rates, anxiety, aggression, and problems of self-control (UNICEF 2012, 42). In relation to lethal violence, young men are the main victims and the most frequent aggressors. Gangs, for example, have become environments for interaction that offer young people, and even children, a sense of identity and of belonging to a collectivity, as well as giving them access to resources (UNICEF 2012, 44). From this perspective, the expansion of gangs is an impact in and of itself, since a large number of young people that decide to join gangs bring with them a heavy burden of violence from their close social circles (Reguillo 2008, 205-225). Finally, as well as addressing the effects of particular crimes on victims, the consequences of subjective insecurity on human development should also be taken into account: that is, fear. For people who suffer from it, fear is a real experience and must be taken into account as such, independently from any analysis of its rationality or the correlation between fear and actual criminal acts 78. Some authors suggest in fact, that perceptions and subjectivities expressed as fear can end up having the same impact as objectively observed impacts of insecurity (Dammert 2010, 54; Carrion and Espin 2009, 24-25; Vilalta 2012).

reation) to self-protection (acquisition of weapons or payment for security services) (Vilalta 2013, 4-5).

In Latin America, many citizens have had to change their daily routines in order to avoid becoming crime victims, and hence have seen their freedoms curtailed. People’s behaviour is modified by their experience of victimisation and their sensation of risk, and they often end up adapting to what they feel to be a hostile and threatening environment.

This section explores the different responses to insecurity, based on the 2012 LAPOP-UNDP survey results and on the information from a number of national surveys on victimisation (see the methodological note on the LAPOP-UNDP Survey 2012). These sources provide an approximation of the percentage of people who change their habits and behaviour for fear of becoming crime victims.

This reaction depends on multiple variables —gender, age, socio-economic conditions, the available means for protection, and the perception of the State’s effectiveness, among others—, whose combination can generate diverse responses ranging from self-confinement (restriction of mobility and rec-

As maps 5.1 and 5.2 show, one in three citizens in Latin America has limited their shopping places, and one in three citizens has restricted their places for recreation. This proportion increases among people who have been crime victims: one in two have limited their places for shopping and four out of ten their places

Map 5.1.

5 THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Insecurity as an obstacle for the enhancement of capacities and individual freedoms

Percentage of people who have limited their places for buying due to insecurity, Latin America, 2012

Mexico 35% El Salvador 42% Nicaragua 35%

Dominican Republic 51% Venezuela 35%

Ecuador 35%

Brazil

16,8

Panama

17,7

Chile

20,7

Argentina

21,4

Uruguay

22,3

Honduras

28,1

Colombia

Paraguay

30,3

Guatemala

Bolivia 35%

31,2

Cost Rica

Peru

34,4

Nicaragua

Bolivia

35,2

Ecuador

35,2

Mexico

35,2

Venezuela

35,6

El Salvador

Dominican Republic

51,1 0

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). Note: The maps express only values greater or equal to 35%. Question: “Due to fear of becoming a crime victim, during the last 12 months, have you limited the places where you go to shop?”

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Sou Not

for recreation. Moreover, between 45% and 65% of those surveyed, depending on the country, no longer go out at night.

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

The evidence that insecurity produces these kinds of limitations coincides with the findings in available literature about the effects of fear. People who fear insecurity are more likely to suffer from depression, carry out less physical activity, and have a more restricted social life, from which physical and mental effects are a consequence (Hale 1996; Bennett et al. 2007). As maps 5.1 and 5.2 demonstrate, surveys on victimization are an important resource for exploring insecurity and people’s changing habits. The first map details how people have limited their places for shopping and the second, how this has affected their place of recreation.

Map 5.2 .

Business people and the private sector have also modified their behaviour due to violence. For example, in extreme cases business people – particularly small scale entrepreneurs – might change from a formal to an informal business or hide their earning in order to be less attractive to criminals. In countries where corruption and crime have penetrated state institutions, business owners fear that criminals may be able to gain access to confidential information about their businesses for extortion purposes. By hiding in the informal sector, businesses can exist in anonymity, since they don´t register their existence or report their finances to the State (Mena 2012). However, this increased informality denies valuable fiscal income for the State (Schneider and Enste 2000), which further weakens the capacity of its institutions, such as the police and judiciary (Moncada 2013). It also restricts the actions and often the growth of businesses themselves.

Percentage of people who have limited their places for recreation due to insecurity, Latin America, 2012

Mexico 35% El Salvador 43% Nicaragua 31% Costa Rica 30%

Dominican Republic 59%

Venezuela 40% Ecuador 33%

Bolivia 31% Paraguay 35%

Chile

20,6

Panama

21,6

Argentina

23,6

Guatemala

24,6

Brazil

24,7

Peru

25,1

Uruguay

25,3

Colombia

25,8

Honduras

26,7

Costa Rica

30,3

Bolivia

30,6

Nicaragua

31,7

Ecuador

33,3

Paraguay

34,7

Mexico

35,3 40,1

Venezuela El Salvador

43,3

Dominican Republic

59.1 0

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Impacts of insecurity in the social fabric, urban spaces, and communities Insecurity also produces collective impacts: it changes the way people build their social ties, alters their relationship with the community and the space in which they interact, while favouring processes of exclusion. Insecurity causes public spaces in cities to be abandoned, promotes an upsurge in closed or gated neighbourhoods and provokes the displacement of people and communities. In the communities where crime becomes established, the social fabric can become weak or even unravel, reducing the possibilities for community development. The relationship between insecurity and variables like the social fabric and trust is not unidirectional. In Latin America, there is an open debate about whether crime and violence have eroded trust among citizens and torn the social fabric, or whether the absence of trust and a fragmented social fabric could be conditions that help explain the prevailing high levels of homicide and other crimes. A study based on the results of the LAPOP 2006-2007 surveys found that people who had been crime victims or who had high levels of perception of insecurity showed greater levels of mistrust (Cruz 2008, 231). It also revealed that the increase in homicide rates has been accompanied by an increase in levels of mistrust. In urban settings, mistrust among peers has a key influence on feeling unsafe. For example, studies carried out in the neighbourhoods of metropolitan Santiago in Chile, have shown that greater levels of trust, cohesion, and interaction among neighbours are associated with lower perceptions of insecurity (Núñez et al. 2012, 87; Olavarria-Gambi and Allende 2012, 21). People’s freedoms and capacities improve in social environments that enable participation and interaction, and that offer conditions for the use and enjoyment of public spaces. Otherwise, citizens may be obliged to isolate themselves in private spaces,

as well as restrict their mobility and arenas for interaction with others (Magaloni et al. 2012, 213-214). The abandonment of public spaces has been identified as one of the main impacts of urban insecurity. Similarly, the abandonment of certain urban areas is coupled with the privatization of common areas — squares, streets, and parks— by legal and illegal actors (Dammert 2004, 94; Carrión 2008; Moser and McIlwaine 2006, 99). In the case of intervention by legal agents, the spaces that used to be public are controlled by installing metal bars, restricting access for unknown people, and limiting transit times. Generally, this is accompanied by the reinforcement of security measures (human and technological) that aim to dissuade. When these are applied indiscriminately, they affect citizens’ rights.

5 THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Many companies faced with insecurity have opted for strategically abandoning their business. In other words, the owner reduces or suspends investment in order to diminish the company’s visibility and attractiveness—for example, they let their infrastructure deteriorate to give the impression that their business is facing hard times—. Sometimes businesses abstain from expanding operations, even though they have resources and market opportunities exist. A study of one of the largest stores in Monterrey, Mexico, reveals how the owner decided to suspend the sales of expensive machinery and tools, and invest in less costly and less profitable items in order to avoid the scrutiny of criminal gangs and extortionists (Moncada 2013).

One phenomenon that goes hand in hand with the privatization of spaces is the upsurge in gated neighbourhoods and estates: dubbed the “architecture of fear”. This is a way of organising the city based on security and protection (Petrella and Vanderschueren 2003, 218). The upper and middle classes create safe private spaces that simulate public areas and exclude poor people. In Porto Alegre, Santiago, Quito, Lima, Guadalajara, or Buenos Aires, for example, condominium projects include housing, green areas and sports facilities, offices, stores and even hospitals, thus forming, in reality, private citadels or fortresses. This tendency inevitably deepens social inequalities and makes the construction of a collective identity as citizens even more difficult (Segovia 2002). In the second case, public space is seized illegally by groups of different kinds, from common criminals to organised crime groups, who control and dispute certain territories. In its report Violence in the city, the World Bank states that violence, or the fear of it, has the power to transform urban space drastically by turning some parts of the city into “no-go areas” where the police cannot enter. Under these conditions, specific neighbourhoods and areas are stigmatised and suffer even greater levels of marginalisation (World Bank2011, 27). In other words, violence and crime do not affect neighbourhoods and communities in the same way (Frühling and Gallardo 2012, 150-151). This is also the logic with which pockets of prosperity are created in highly guarded areas, and whose privileges continue to be unreachable for low income sectors affected by certain crimes — especially homicide— (ONU-Habitat 2012, 65). In the case of Bogotá, the evidence suggests that high levels of concentration of social disadvantage and disorder are related to high homicide rates, while the greater availability of services is a factor that is associated with low homicide rates (Escobar 2012).

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The forced displacement of people is another impact of insecurity that has been evaluated very little, in spite of having serious consequences for human development in Latin America (Muggah 2012). Internally displaced people face conditions of extreme vulnerability due to the loss of physical protection and of their means of subsistence. Also, in searching for a safer place people are exposed to new risks and often lack urban services such as potable water, health, housing, and education. Another factor that increases displaced people’s vulnerability is their invisibility. They have been displaced because of direct persecution or the fear of it, and this makes them avoid any form of detection to avoid falling into the hands of those from whom they are fleeing. These flows of internally displaced people can easily be confused with other kinds of internal migration or even, as in the case of Mexico, with Central American transmigration. All of this makes it difficult to assist displaced populations and to design adequate protection schemes for them (Rubio 2013).

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Latin America as a region is in third place on a world scale — after Africa and the Middle East— for the number of internally displaced people, with approximately 5.8 million victims (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre IDMC 2012). In the last decade, this phenomenon has intensified in those places where insecurity and violence have been exacerbated in association with organised crime and narcotics trafficking. However, the real dimensions of this type of displacement in the region are still unknown (Rubio 2013). As a result of the dynamics discussed here, and with differing levels of intensity, public spaces in various cities have been abandoned or seized and/or privatised by legal and illegal actors. Urban designs are marked by fear and self-protection — with the marginalisation and segregation of the communities with low resources—; and in the most extreme cases, violence has provoked the displacement of entire communities.

Box 5.2. Impacts of insecurity and violence in sustainable urban development and urban prosperity Insecurity generates impacts in urban development at different levels. The State of the World’s Cities Report (ONUHabitat, 2012) reveals that Latin American cities are those most affected by insecurity. The survey carried out by experts in 50 cities in low and middle-income countries, shows how insecurity has a negative impact on people’s quality of life as is defined in the City Prosperity Index developed by ONUHabitat (2012).

common knowledge that urban insecurity feeds on the deterioration and bad design of public spaces, problems of location and accessibility, and even the lack of street lighting and the bad quality of urban planning and infrastructure. At the same time, insecurity affects the public space, and for this reason, empty or violent public spaces are more difficult for the community to appropriate. The result is a negative effect on social co-existence: this is a common effect in Latin American cities.

The following impacts of insecurity on Latin American cities were identified:

Insecurity has an impact on the life of the city that is expressed in new attitudes: a preference —beyond criteria of comfort and product offers— for shopping malls instead of traditional commercial spaces; a preference for gated estates and condominium projects instead of areas with mixed soil use and social diversity. The result is urban segregation that over the long term also influences new practices in property development and of the production of the city.

Social cohesion. According to Antanas Mockus (Mayor of Bogotá 1995-1998 and 2001-2003), violence on different levels affects social cohesion, that is, the network of family, professional, spiritual, and neighbourhood relations that weave together to form a city. This weakens shared social connections and urban values. When societies are less united and don´t have points of reference for social or cultural control, they can be more vulnerable to violence and are more likely to incubate violent behaviour. The form and structure of the city. The form and structure of the city and its public spaces influence its insecurity: it is Source: Velásquez and Lopez-Moreno (2013).

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Urban governance. Insecurity tends to be coupled with an increase in the demand from citizens and public opinion for more effective public policy responses. If the local government is not able to ensure appropriate responses to crime and violence, the political management of the city is affected, and its legitimacy is reduced.

Understanding the impact of violence and crime in communities requires knowing how they organise, what factors determine their identity, and what kinds of relations they have with institutions and illegal actors. This begins with the recognition of a community’s capacity to overcome situations that threaten its existence, and its ability to adapt to particular circumstances (Davis 2012, 31-38; Moser and Horn 2011, 6-8). ‘Community’ is understood as a living social fabric, whose interconnections present options and opportunities for improving the quality of life, and spaces for inclusive cooperation. The social fabric acts as an intricate series of relationships and actions among individuals, families and communities, which feed back to each other through a complex structure of communications channels (Romero 2006, 225). The social fabric can reconfigure itself in a negative way and give way to a social order based on threats and violence (Perea Restrepo 2008). Criminal organisations may eventually be able to impose their own rules, provide goods and services that supplant State functions, and offer protection from robbery and violence by administrating their own justice outside of the law (Perea Restrepo 2004; Arias 2006a; Garzón 2010). Low levels of social development and the weak presence of state institutions facilitate the emergence and expansion of criminal organisations in these territories. At the same time, the situation of insecurity makes access to services and opportunities difficult for these communities (Adams 2012; Rodgers 2009; Leeds 1996, 68). For criminal groups, the establishment of ties with the community generates a space favourable for recruiting new members and provides a source of resources. This creates negative social capital that flows according to the interest of the criminal organisations (UNODC 2012).

group. Paradoxically, low homicide rates or lows crime rates are not the best way of measuring insecurity in these territories. On the contrary, they tend to be an expression of successful domination by a criminal organisation (Guerrero 2011; Pereyra 2012; Garzón 2010). Informal rules imposed by criminal groups can vary from one neighbourhood to another. When criminal factions burst into the social life of a community or neighbourhood they leave devastating after-effects among populations often already enmeshed in situations of marginalisation and exclusion.

5 THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Impacts in communities affected by crime and violence

The impact of insecurity on democratic governance Democratic governance can be negatively affected in places where repressive policies glean support from situations of victimisation and the fear of crime. These phenomena also erode the trust of citizens in institutions and in the provision of legal security by the State. Insecurity inhibits the consolidation of democracy in the region and as such, demands deeper reflection about its effects on the relationship between citizens and the State. As the joint OASUNDP report points out, “the evidence suggests that support for democracy as a system of government in the region is seriously affected by the high perception of insecurity and the assessment of governmental performances in fighting crime” (OEA-UNDP 2011, 185). The studies used for this report indicate that people who are victims of violence and crime in the region show less support for this political system and are more willing to support hard line positions (i.e. repressive policies), as well as responses outside the law.

In these environments, the inhabitants of the community will probably perceive police incursions as a threat to their own security and as a perturbation to the existing order (Hume 2008a; Misse 2010, 38-39). Here, the notion of security has little to do with guaranteeing rights and freedoms. Zubillaga (2013) refers to this situation as anti-citizenship: “…there are no institutions to which demands can be made, there is no State to go to in order to re-establish justice, to give support or compensate any loss, and much less guarantee self-preservation”.

A common threat in the region is posed by processes of cooptation and reconfiguration of the state by illegal actors from organised crime, particularly in the area of citizen security. While insecurity tends to be linked to the absence of state institutions, there is evidence to suggest that in several countries in Latin America public officials and elected authorities have forged links with criminal groups (Arias 2006b; Bravo and Maldonado 2012; Garay and Salcedo-Albarán 2012). When the State is captured by criminal organisations, its responsibility in protecting citizens and guaranteeing their rights is clearly undermined (Bailey and Godson 2000; Casas Zamora 2012).

These areas are characterised, in addition, by low levels of denunciation. When the inhabitants have some problem or are victimised, they prefer not to denounce it for fear of reprisals, or they opt for speaking with the head of the gang or criminal

Most evidence indicates that victimisation and fear increases the tolerance of citizens in breaking with legality in order to deal with insecurity. Insecurity puts pressure on citizens’ support for the Rule of Law, with demands for quick and effective responses, REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Box 5.3. Informal rules imposed by criminal organisations in areas under their control Invisible boundaries and restrictions to mobility. The territories under the influence of criminal groups are defined by boundaries that are invisible for people who do not live there but well known for community members. Gangs and organised crime groups mark off and protect their areas, and they frequently become no-go areas for state authorities. In this context, any citizen wanting to cross these boundaries is risking his or her life, as they will be entering rival territory. They may also receive sanctions from criminal groups that restrict mobility as a way of obtaining protection money.

norms for the organisation’s internal discipline. This system of sanctions tends to develop without any right to self-defence and as a detriment to the rights and freedoms of most of the population.

Payment for protection. A system of taxes is established which is enforced as a guarantee of protection for the inhabitants. In reality, this is a veiled form of extortion through which the criminal group offers the population protection in return for not carrying out actions against them, something they will do if people don´t pay. This extortion is a fixed income for crimiCurfews and restriction of schedules. It is common for nal organisations and creates a heavy burden not only for busicriminal factions to declare curfews that prohibit individuals nesses, but also for the inhabitants of communities who often from circulating in the street after a certain time, generally are living with minimal resources. once it is dark. This is a way to control mobility, avoid incursions from rival groups, and maintain control over nocturnal Recruitment of children. When children and young people are life, thereby leaving the streets and common areas clear for exposed to the influence of gangs, their recruitment is always criminal activity. forced, as they are not in a position or do not have the capacity to decide and measure the consequences of their actions. Often Arbitrary sanctions, in an informal justice scheme, with children consider members of criminal factions to be models to no guarantee that rights and freedoms will be respected. follow: they are figures of power that make up for the absence When criminal organisations dominate an area they create of authority and orientation that in other circumstances would a parallel form of power that establishes its own system of come from the family and school. The histories of children as rules, including the regulation of conflicts between neigh- hired assassins in Mexico, Colombia, Brazil, and the Northern bours, sanctions for behaviour considered to be prejudicial Triangle of Central America are clear evidence of the profound for the communities, “social cleansing” —which especially impact of criminality on these populations. targets addicts, LGBT populations, and petty thieves—, and

Sources: Mendoza (2012); Hume (2008b); UNODC (2012); Garzón (2010); Adams (2012); Rodgers (2006); Leeds (2006); Martínez (2013).

and the application of rigorous measures against criminals, although these translate into restrictions on rights, the expansion of police powers and, in some cases, human rights violations (Costa 2011, 7). The studies available in the region coincide in pointing out that victimisation and fear of crime have had a strong impact on the legitimacy of political systems and governments. Support for political institutions from people with a low perception of crime is at least 3% more than those with high levels of fear (Carreras 2009, 17). The evidence, beginning with the LAPOP research, suggests that citizens living in unsafe environments and who do not have a positive evaluation of the performance of State institutions tend to support hard line (repressive) responses to crime. This is more evident in Central America (Cruz 2008, 219).

100

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The 2012 LAPOP-UNDP survey allows us to illustrate this support for hard line policies in Latin American countries. Figure 5.1 illustrates differentiated reactions in the region as a response to criminals, except in reference to the preference for tougher laws, which is almost uniformly distributed. The tolerance for measure outside the law, as well as the demand for tougher sentencing and more severe punishment for criminals, place democratic governance in a position of vulnerability. This creates fertile terrain for the emergence and consolidation of authoritarian political forces, whose security agenda is clearly distanced from human development.

How much does the present situation of insecurity cost Latin American countries? From an economic perspective, the costs can be classified in two large groups: quantifiable —that can be measured and monetised— and non-quantifiable —more difficult to measure through quantitative methods— (Heaton 2010) 79. In this section, both methods will be used to measure impacts. First, the costs of crime and violence will be analysed with an accounting focus. This approximation seeks to create a sum total of direct monetary expenses associated with insecurity. An assessment of the losses and damage associated with crime is included in these, as well as spending for containment, attention, and prevention. This allows us to calculate the feasibility of interventions and their efficiency (World Bank2011).

Figure 5.1.

The second focus consists in estimating years of life lost due to homicides, that is, the impact of lethal violence on life expectancy. Using the DALY estimation method (Disability-Adjusted Life Year) it is possible to calculate the average loss, both in years of life and in GDP, due to high levels of homicidal violence.

5 THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

The costs of insecurity for Latin America

Accounting Method The accounting estimation method of costs calculates the impact in public spending, private spending, and the losses sustained by victims. Box 5.4 distinguishes three types of costs: firstly, prior costs are those incurred by the State and private actors in order to reduce the risk of victimisation, including, for example, hiring private security and other preventative spending; secondly, there are costs produced as a consequence of the crime, for example, damage to property or repair/compensation for victims;

Percentage of support for hard-line repressive responses and support for tougher laws as the best measure for confronting criminals, Latin America, 2012

Hard-line response

Support for tougher laws

Costa Rica

50.8

Honduras

50.0

Peru Guatemala El Salvador

43.4 42.4 39.5 38.4

Dominican Republic Chile

35.6 32.7

Paraguay Ecuador

31.0

Argentina Bolivia Mexico

30.5

85.3 84.7 83.1

20.0

87.7

Argentina Venezuela Panama

81.9 81.7

Colombia El Salvador

15.7 0.0

88.6 88.1

Mexico

17.1

Venezuela

92.6 91.1 90.7 90.3

87.8

22.1

Nicaragua

Brazil Bolivia

Dominican Republic Guatemala

26.7 23.6

Panama

93.6 92.8

Honduras Nicaragua

26.8

Uruguay

93.9

Ecuador Chile

36.3 35.8

Colombia Brazil

Peru Paraguay Costa Rica

81.3 77.8

Uruguay 40.0

60.0

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012).

Figure 5.2.

Months of life expectancy lost due to the occurrence of homicides, Latin America, 1990, 2000, 2009 REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T

2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

101

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

and thirdly, there are costs incurred by the State in identifying, pursuing, and punishing those responsible, as well as further expenditures for social reinsertion. The identification of these different types of costs can help define more effective public policies for reducing insecurity. The IDB-UNDP study, quoted in Chapter 3, analysed the costs of crime and violence in five countries —Chile, Costa Rica, Honduras, Paraguay, and Uruguay— with respect to crimes committed against people and their property. In order to do this, they homologated their definitions according to the international crime classification developed by the United Nations (UNODC 2013). In this analysis, the accounting method was used to calculate losses and expenses, which were separated into prior costs, consequences, and response costs. With the available information about common threats, a basic estimate was produced of the costs of crime and violence in the five countries analysed. Table 5.1 shows the costs as a percentage of GDP, divided in the three categories. The last line presents the sum of the three previous ones, all of which reflect the total costs of crime and violence as a percentage of GDP. One thing that can clearly be observed with these results is that the proportions of all of the items across the different countries are not homogeneous. The highest cost for four out of five countries seems to be that produced as a consequence of crime. The exception is Uruguay, where the response to crime is its highest cost. This report suggests that a similar analysis for the whole region would be relevant in order to understand the proportions of

these costs throughout the remaining countries, which could contribute to greater efficiency in each category of spending.

Losses in life expectancy and GDP per capita A study carried out for this report by the Resource Centre for the Analysis of Conflicts (CERAC), calculated the probable gains in GDP and in life expectancy had no excessive deaths due to homicide have occurred. ‘Excessive deaths due to homicide’ refers to the difference between reported homicides for every country and the homicides calculated under the “natural homicide rate”80 in the year being studied. The exercise involves calculating life expectancy at birth, that is, how many years a person will live. To do this the study created a scenario in which the difference between the number of homicides in Latin America and the rest of the world was zero, and contrasted this with the current context of violence occurring in the region81 (see statistical - methodological appendix A.5). Thanks to this, it was possible to calculate, for each country, the total number of years lost as a consequence of higher homicide rates in the region compared to the world average. The study takes into account information from 15 Latin American countries. In 2009, the region lost 331 million years of life, when considering loss of life expectancy with the population. As can be observed in Figure 5.2, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Venezuela are the countries that have the greatest losses in life expectancy attributable to the high number of homicides.

Box 5.4. Accountable Costs of Crime Prior - Spending on security - Spending on insurance - Preventative spending - Spending on crime prevention - Spending on private security

Direct consequences - Stolen or damaged property - Emotional and psychological impact - Health services - Spending on support for victims - Compensation for victims - Diminished accumulation of physical, human and social capital - Deterioration of physical infrastructure

Sources: Cafferata (2011), Ospina and Giménez (2009), Brand and Price (2000).

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R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Response - Police - Prosecutors - Prisons - Magistrates and courts - Legal defence spending - Investigation spending - Spending on rehabilitation and reinsertion

tougher laws as the best measure for confronting criminals, Latin America, 2012

Hard-line response

Support for tougher laws

Costa Rica

Costs of crime and violence as a50.0 percentagePeru of GDP, selected countries, 2010 Paraguay Peru 43.4 Costa Rica Guatemala Type of cost Chile 42.4 Costa Rica BrazilHonduras Paraguay El Salvador 39.5

Prior to crime Dominican Republic Chile of crime As a consequences Response Colombia to crime Brazil Total cost of crime and violence

0,71 38.4 2,1136.3 0,5035.8 3,3235.6

0,34 1,47 0,71 2,52

32.7

Paraguay

1,50 8,01 1,03 10,54

Bolivia

Ecuador Chile Honduras Nicaragua

0,72 6,26 1,72 8,70

26.8

26.7 23.6

Panama

With reduced numbers of homicides, these nations would have 22.1 Uruguay gained more than a year in average life expectancy. In addition, 17.1 Nicaragua with the exception of Colombia, Peru, Nicaragua, and Chile, 15.7 there wasVenezuela an increased loss in years of life expectancy in the period 1990 to 2009. 0.0 20.0 40.0 60.0

Uruguay 92.6 91.1 0,49 90.71,22 90.3

1,29 88.13,00

Dominican Republic Guatemala Source: Our own calculation based on Costs of crime and violence, IDB-UNDP (2013). 30.5 Argentina Mexico Bolivia Mexico

93.6 92.8

88.6

87.8

31.0

Ecuador

93.9

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Table

50.8

Honduras 5.1.

87.7 85.3 84.7 83.1

Argentina Venezuela toPanama the Latin

81.9country is repreAmerican average in 1990. Each 81.7 and 2009). In Colombia sented in three different moments (1990, 2000, El Salvador 81.3

this sense, the best quadrant is the upper left one: high life ex77.8 Uruguay pectancy and low losses by homicide. A transition upwards over the years0.0 indicates an increase in life expectancy; 20.0 40.0 60.0 80.0 100.0 at the same time, a transition towards the right hand side shows an increase in the months of life lost due to excessive deaths by homicide. Figure 5.3 divides the countries into four groups, differentiating Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). them by high or low life expectancy and high or low numbers of The case of Chile shows a positive evolution, since over time it Relationship between expectancy lost due and to excess with life expectancy, Latin America, 199 displaces upwards towards homicide the left. life months lost due to the excess of deathslife by homicide, relativemonths Figure 5.3. Months of life expectancy lost due to the occurrence of homicides, 90Figure 5.2. Latin America, 1990, 2000, 2009 High life expectancy, low loss in months of life by homicides 30

PER

PER CR

months

75 15

CHI CR

URU PAR CHI

URU URU

CR NIC

NIC

ECU

ARG PAR PER PAN NIC ARG MEX

ARG ECU

PAR

MEX

VEN

PAN

PAN ECU

COL

BRA ES

BRA CHI

BRA

VEN

VEN ES

2000

Uruguay

GUA

Peru

Paraguay

2009

82 Source: 55 UNDP-CERAC (2013) based on Restrepo (2013) and data from the WHO, UN and Penn World Tables.

Panama

Nicaragua

Mexico

Guatemala

El Salvador

Ecuador

Chile

Low life expectancy, low loss in months1990 of life by homicides 0

COL

GUA

Costa Rica

Brazil

65 0

ES COL

GUA

Average Latam 72 Argentina

Years of life expectancy

Venezuela

Colombia

High life expectanc months of life by h

Low life expectan months of life by

Average Latam 9 15

Losts months in life expectancy by excess of deaths by homicide

1990

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

2000

2009

25 103

104

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

URU

URU PAR CHI

CHI NIC

ARG ECU VEN

ARG PAR PER PAN NIC ARG MEX

NIC

PAR

MEX

ECU

BRA

PAN

ECU

Low life expectancy, low loss in months of life by homicides

Average Latam 72

PER

High life expectancy, low loss in months of life by homicides

CHI

BRA

Figure 5.4.

VEN GUA

Average Latam 9

GUA

COL

GUA

VEN

2000

2009

Percentage of GDP per capita that would have been gained by eliminating excess deaths by homicide, Latin America,1990, 2000, 2009

1990

Losts months in life expectancy by excess of deaths by homicide

BRA

PAN

ES COL

Low life expectancy, high loss in months of life by homicides

COL

High life expectancy, high loss in months of life by homicides

Relationship between life expectancy months lost due to excess homicide with life expectancy, Latin America, 1990, 2000, 2009

Source: UNDP-CERAC (2013) based on Restrepo (2013) and data from the WHO, UN and Penn World Tables 83

Figure 5.3.

Years of life expectancy

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

URU 70

BRA VEN

MEX

VEN

CHI

BRA

GUA

GUAthe annual per When studying the effect of deaths by homicide on life expec- a reduction of 10% in homicides could increase Average Latam 72 tancy, it is important to take into account the repercussion of capita GDP by 1.0% in El Salvador, 0.7% in Guatemala and Hon65 this in reduced income for each country. Figure 5.4 portrays this duras, and 0.3% in Panama and Nicaragua (World Bank2011). phenomenon. According to these calculations, in 2009, the GDP GUA per capita that was lost because of homicides in Latin America was 0.5%. Over this same year, the average annual income in Efficiency of state spending on public 60 order and citizen security the life region was US$8,897.00. Low expectancy, low loss inWithout monthsthe excess of deaths by Latin American countries would have gained on averAverage Latam 9 ofhomicide, life by homicides age US$51 in GDP per capita. In countries such as El Salvador, 55 Guatemala, and Venezuela, this value would have exceeded While it is important to analyse the magnitude of spending by 0 5 10 15 on public order and citizen 20 security, the Latin American States US$70 in per capita GDP. efficiency of this spending in relation to indicators Losts months in life expectancy by excess of deaths by homicideof violence In addition to the estimates on losses in a context with a high is of particular relevance. CERAC carried out a study to quantify 1990 2000 2009 number of homicides, some institutions have offered calcula- and analyse the efficiency of spending on public order and citi85 tions about the potential gains in GDP if they manage to reduce zen security, using data from 15 countries from 1990 to 2011. ce: UNDP-CERAC (2013) based on Restrepo (2013) and data from the WHO, UN and Penn World Tables 83 homicides. The World Bank points out that in Central America

Figure 5.4.

COL

5 THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Years of life expect

ARG ECU

Low life expectancy, high lo months of life by homicides 25

Percentage of GDP per capita that would have been gained by eliminating excess deaths by homicide, Latin America,1990, 2000, 2009

120

GDP per capita in US dollars

100

1990

2000

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Paraguay

Panama

Nicaragua

Mexico

Guatemala

El Salvador

Ecuador

Costa Rica

Colombia

Chile

Brazil

Argentina

2009

Source: PNUD-CEPAL (2010) based on Restrepo (2011) and data from WHO, UN, and Penn World Tables84.

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

105

An efficiency benchmark for production was devised based on the countries that achieve the greatest levels of public order and citizen security with a given level of public spending. As a result, a country is considered inefficient when it is a long way from this efficiency benchmark; that is, the situation of public order and citizen security does not coincide with its level of spending.

THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Figure 5.5 shows Latin American countries at four moments in the period studied, in their positions relative to the efficiency demarcation for the production of order and citizen security. The farther away the country is from the origin, the more inefficient it is in producing public order and citizen security. The study concludes that Latin America is a heterogeneous region in terms of the efficiency of spending on public order and citizen security. Not all the countries follow the same tendency over time, probably because efficiency involves internal factors that differ among countries. However, in general, we can say that the spending levels in the region are high relative to present homicide rates, especially compared to the rest of the world. In spite of the region undertaking considerable spending in this area, the homicide rates continue to be the highest.

The efficiency analysis of spending to reduce homicides underlined, first, that European countries in general, are more efficient than Latin American countries in providing order and citizen security. It is also well known that the Southern Cone countries have the greatest levels of efficiency in the region. Comparing the results for different years, we can find examples, like that of Colombia, of improved efficiency over time. However, in general we can observe a deterioration of efficiency in the region.

Efficiency benchmark of spending on public order and citizen security versus homicide rates per 100,000 inhabitants, Latin America, 1995, 2001, 2005, and 2009

Figure 5.5 90

80 COL

BRA

60 GUA

50 VEN

30 ECU

20 10

ARG PAR MEX PAN NIC R.U FIN CHI CR PER URU ALE FRA ITA IRL ESP HOL AUS

POR LUX

0 0

0,005

0,01

0,015

COL

Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants

GUA

60 50

40 30 CHI

MEX

ECU

0,025

0,03

URU

LUX

0 0,02

ARG

POR

R.U

FIN HOL ITA

IRL FRA

0,005

0,01

0,015

Europe

VEN

ES COL

Homicides per 100,000 inhabitants

0,03

Latin America

40 BRA

30 20

ECU

PAN MEX

ARG LUX

0 0

0,005

R.U FIN IRL AUS ALE FRA ESP HOL

CHI

0,01

BEL

PAR CR

PER

NIC

GUA

BRA

PAN

0,025

0,03

Europe HOL: Holanda ALE: Alemania IRL: Irlanda

AUS: Austria BRA: Brasil GUA: Guatemala

0,005

URU:Uruguay R.U: Reino Unido FRA: Francia

Europe ES: El Salvador COL: Colombia FIN: Finlandia

ESP: España CHI: Chile CR: Costa Rica

NIC

ALE FIN URU AUS

R.U

IRL ESP FRA

MEX: México ECU: Ecuador POR: Portugal

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PAR

CHI

HOL

0,01

0,015 Spending on O&S as % of GDP

Latin America PAN: Panamá NIC: Nicaragua PAR: Paraguay

POR

ARG

LUX

0,02

ECU

MEX

0,015

COL

Spending on O&S as % of GDP

106

0,025

GUA

Nota: LUX: Luxemburgo ARG: Argentina

0,02

Spending on O&S as % of GDP

Latin America

ALE

AUS

ESP

Spending on O&S as % of GDP Europe

CR BEL

Latin America

0,02

0,025

0,03

1. Support, protect, and compensate victims of insecurity. The recognition of individual and collective victims must be a crosscutting concern in security policies. Public policy needs to be focused on people and communities affected by violence and crime, and this requires professional support and advice, mechanisms for providing information on criminal justice, access to medical and social services, procedures and resources for compensation, prevention of revictimisation, protection systems for victims and witnesses, and a clear commitment to reducing violence. In order to guarantee support service, protection, and compensation, a key element is the promotion of a law for victims in which the universe of people in this category are clearly defined—especially direct victims and their families—, with assigned resources and institutional responsibilities (at national and local levels). Services for victims need to be expanded to ensure an effective response for their fundamental needs (with specific support services according to gender and age, and especially for children). In terms of compensation, information needs to be improved about the economic impact of different crimes, with greater precision in estimating the costs of programmes to compensate victims and providing coverage for physical and mental health. Victimization surveys are a valuable tool for estimating the magnitude of the affected population, the most recurrent crimes, the affected geographical areas, and the basic needs of the population. In addition, public defenders and human rights organisations are of vital importance to oversee achievements, evaluate services, and formulate public policy recommendations. The security of victims and measures to prevent their revictimisation are the main priority. This requires the services of social workers to give emotional support, psychological counselling, and management of anger and desires for vengeance — this is especially important in contexts with high levels of violence—. The priority for the police system should be to prevent aggression. 2. Adopt a damage reduction and impact mitigation focus. The reduction of damage of the impact produced by different types of threat is a criterion that should be incorporated in State interventions. Institutional actions should never raise the levels of vulnerability of people and communities. The collateral

effects of pursuing criminals should not worsen the existing risk situation. The recommendation is to establish the protection of communities as a primary objective, beyond the persecution of criminals and the application of coercive measures. This requires a paradigm change for interventions by police and security bodies, whose effectiveness should not be measured by the number of arrests or seizures, but by their success in guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of citizens. In order to measure this, success indicators must incorporate people’s perceptions of the improvements to citizen security, the reduction of levels of fear, and the direct and indirect effects of crime and violence, including their costs.

5 THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Recommendations

Any strategy for damage reduction and impact mitigation must take as its starting point the recognition that it is not possible to put an end to the different illegal markets, diverse criminal expressions, and multiple threats. States have limited capacities and resources for responding to these challenges. Based on this perspective, the report recommends shifting objectives towards prevention and the reduction of negative impacts. In order to do this, States need to work directly with the population and with non-state actors. 3. Promote inclusive and safe cities, reducing violence and criminality in urban environments. The reduction of insecurity impacts demands leadership by local governments, as they have the capacity to respond to the daily needs of the population, provide solutions to the threats faced by communities and neighbourhoods, as well as mitigate the impacts of these threats on citizens’ capacities and freedoms. Any strategy or programme hoping to contribute to reducing violence and crime requires a diagnostic study that identifies the characteristics, principal problems, and factors of local risks. On a city level, insecurity impacts can be mitigated with social policies and urban planning that reduces marginalisation and fragmentation and expands the notion of public space. The first requisite is to provide citizens with protection; any intervention must offer minimum basic security services. A first step is to reaffirm authority, with strict respect for human rights. A top priority would be to project a police presence into marginal areas with specialised units trained in prevention, in addressing social problems of co-existence, and in working with young people. The coverage of public services should be expanded and areas that have been disconnected from the city should be reintegrated. This requires establishing access routes and improving the availability of public transport.

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THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

Interventions aimed at recovering isolated areas and the safety of public spaces as well as their expansion—especially those under the influence of criminal groups—, should avoid the displacement of their inhabitants; the population should be a key participant in the planning and implementation processes as a way of expanding opportunities. The report recommends exploring alternatives to support productive activities with the inhabitants, such as access to low interest loans, grants for refurbishing houses, access to microcredit, low cost plans for repaying debts, and public-private alliances in support of productive activities for the people. 4. Rebuild and strengthen the social fabric in the areas affected by organised crime. The positive reconfiguration of the social fabric requires holistic strategies that involve the community, local leadership, civil society organisations, churches, and the private sector. A plan needs to be developed for the re-establishment of state presence, the generation of trusting relationships, and effective responses to threats —especially the influence of organised crime—. Priority must be given to the reduction of violence and the promotion of mechanisms for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The latter requires interdisciplinary and inter-institutional teams to be trained and to operate in coordination, with constant monitoring and evaluation of the measures implemented. In addition, budget allocations need to be made to ensure increased social investment and public infrastructure in these areas. State institutions must be transparent in reforming their conduct and procedures with the active participation of citizens: they must act with determination against the abusive treatment of citizens and cases of official corruption, re-establish security in the streets, offer rapid responses to domestic violence, and establish new norms for co-existence. There should be constant police presence in order to avoid reprisals against the population by criminal organisations, including transition mechanisms to develop a police force with a community focus that can create close relationships with the communities. It is essential to work from the outset with families and educational establishments through programmes that seek to influence social interaction and develop social control and sanctions of violence. It is also essential to take into account local power dynamics, the economic dependence of the population on illegal activities, and the social accumulation of violence. Generating sustainable transformations in the community is fundamental, starting with people’s own capacities and their recognition as an integral part of the solution.

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5. Combine work on different territorial levels, with attention to the three dimensions linked to human development: individual, social, and institutional. Interventions that aim to mitigate the impact of threats to human development must take into account the interaction between the individual dimension (which affects people), the collective dimension (which affects the community), and the institutional dimension (which affects state institutions). This requires coordination between national governments and local authorities and participants in their distinct manifestations. The processes to design, implement, evaluate, and adjust policies must flow in both directions —from national to local and vice versa—. This articulation is recommended because it avoids the duplication of efforts and makes for a more efficient use of resources. To the extent by which it is possible, the report recommends decentralising response mechanisms by taking advantage of local capacities. Finally, alliances between cities can be very productive in dealing with common problems and sharing experiences. Constant dialogue is needed between institutions in charge of achieving justice and those linked to prevention, such as the Ministries of Health, Labour, Social Development, and Education. The design of interventions in which each institution acquires a commitment according to its responsibilities (with defined goals, work timetables and calendars, indicators and evaluation mechanisms) generates a critical mass for reducing insecurity impacts and with it, an expansion of the conditions necessary for human development.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

CHAPTER

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

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109

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Participatory Workshop, ART Programme (UNDP El Salvador), 2012

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CHAPTER

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

The State is the only actor with the mandate to ensure the provision of citizen security as a public good. The objective of this chapter is to analyse the critical challenges in public security provision in Latin America and offer recommendations so that the region’s States can overcome them. This report argues that the principal factor explaining both the achievements and limitations of the reforms and policies undertaken in Latin America in citizen security are the institutional capacities of the State. When these capacities have weakened or are insufficiently developed, citizen security policies tend to fail or have limited, unstable, or reversible results. Similarly, when these capacities are strengthened, one sees positive and sustainable outcomes. Strong institutions need to be accompanied by a citizen security policy that places the physical and material integrity of persons and human rights at its core. Likewise, the reports emphasizes that the success of a citizen security policy should be measured not merely by its impact in reducing crime and violence, but also on its capacity to guarantee rights and freedoms of all citizens and to strengthen social inclusion processes. As such, human development and commitment to human rights should be seen as both a means and an end of citizen security policies. This chapter is divided into five sections. The first provides an overview of the concept of State capacities, and the key aspects of its organization and operation in relation to citizen security. The following four sections analyse the specific areas of the State’s role in providing security: police, justice, prisons, and prevention policies. It concludes with a series of recommendations to strengthen State capacities and the provision of citizen security.

The State’s capacities: its organization and operation This report analyses the capacities of the State in three dimensions: institutional environment, strategic autonomy, and legitimacy.86 Institutional environment. States with high degree of institutional development depend on merit-based recruitment. This contributes to a positive institutional culture, i.e., a corporate spirit that discourages institutionalized corruption and supports continuity and leadership based on competence and qualifications. Further, strong bureaucracies show adherence to clear rules for internal discipline, advancement, and appointment.87 The use of public administration procedures for the hiring and firing of employees ensures that the institutions responsible for citizen security are governed by objective performance evaluations rather than by political pressures or demands 88. Strategic autonomy. The development of a strategic Statesociety relationship is based on a close relationship with the citizenry wherein the State remains a sphere where policies should be formulated and implemented for the public good 89. A State that does not maintain its autonomy from certain sectors of society runs the risk of being monopolized by actors whose interests do not coincide with the public good or are contrary to it 90. By contrast, a state that is perceived as irrelevant or far from citizens’ interests can be seen as illegitimate. Strategic autonomy consists, thus, in maintaining an equilibrium between independence from and collaboration with society. This allows it to benefit from essential inputs from citizens for the design of public policies that best meets their needs and requirements (Arias y Ungar 2009). Legitimacy. Legitimacy can be defined as the condition under which the State and its policies are perceived as preferable to any other option and, as such, are respected by society (Linz 1988, 65). For example, in a context where citizens consider the criminal justice system to be legitimate, it is more probable that they will channel their conflicts towards the formal criminal justice system when they seek a solution. In many Latin American REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

111

countries, the criminal justice system suffers from low levels of legitimacy and confidence, and consequently, citizens often resort to other means to resolve their conflicts.

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Table 6.1 summarizes State capacity in its key dimensions, and how this capacity is reflected on citizen security. In Latin America, the consolidation of the institutional capacities of the State confronts the following obstacles:

Conviction

• Charges

The quantitative analysis of these capacities is not a simple matter, but some criteria can be suggested. For example, the effectiveness of bureaucracies can be measured in terms of the reduction of crime rates and levels of impunity. Legitimacy, on the other hand, can often be analysed through opinion surveys, as well as by how a community accepts a State policy or intervention. The tax revenue collection capacity of the State is another key element to insure the public provision of citizen security. The majority of Latin American countries collect less than expected, given that their level of income and taxes continue to be regressive. That is, in the region, the poor pay more proportionally than the rich (OEA-PNUD 2011, PNUD-Informe Centroamérica 2009, 282). In the sphere of citizen security, this inequality translates into the presence of a privileged class that pays proportionally

Judges

Litigation

Public Ministry

Police

Complaint

Crime

Figure 6.7.

• Insuﬃcient cause to proceed INvestigation • Further investigation required

• Complaint by the victim or a third party • Arrest in flagrante delicto

State capacity building is not a new theme in the region. The successive reforms of the last three decades have concentrated on building capacity. The first generation of reforms during the decade of 1980 sought to reduce the large state bureaucracies, seen to be an obstacle to the creation of more competitive markets in the international arena, as well as being fertile terrain for corruption and “rent-seeking”91 (Schneider y Heredia 2003). However, these reductions often ended up seriously weakening the administrative and management capacity of the State. Therefore, the “second generation” reforms of the 1990s had to accept that in a context of volatile socioeconomic conditions, the Latin American States needed to offer their citizens a range of basic goods and services, including security. This shifted the attention to focus on “good governance” (Grindle 2007; Tendler 1997) and “capacity-building” to strengthen the State, so as to develop and implement effective public policies.

• Acquittal • Conviction

Recidivism

• The politicisation or appropriation of state institutions by private actors, both legal and illegal, which seeks to protect their own interests to the detriment of the public provision citizen security. • The limited legitimacy of state institutions that results in citizens pursuing security measures that undermine democracy and human development.

The Justice Chain

• Citizens use informal mechanisms for security and justice • Citizens respect Rule of Law • Precondition and result Legitimacy

• Limited technocratic knowledge in the process of public policy formulation • State lacks allies in society for the reform process • Access to technical knowledge for public policy formulation • Society support for reforms oriented towards citizen security Strategic autonomy

Institutional Environment

• Merit-based recruitment, rules for promotion, and internal discipline • Public administration procedures

• Strategic links with society

• Institutional ineffectiveness • Incentives for institutional corruption • Use of institutions for political or personal ends rather than for the public good • Use of the armed forces for police work

Low State Capacity

High State Capacity • Institutional effectiveness • Restriction on corruption • Limited politicisation • Both coordination that is transversal (between distinct State functions) and vertical (between distinct levels of government) • Professional knowledge Key Dimensions

State capacity: Key dimensions and consequences for citizen security in conditions of high and low capacity

Table 6.1.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Police per 100,000 inhabitants, countries with data, circa 2011

Venezuela Uruguay Dominican Republic Nicaragua Mexico Guatemala El Salvador Colombia Chile Brazil Bolivia Argentina

Figure 6.2. THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Figure 6.1.

297,8 876,4 307.9 199 447,7 156,2 343,1 349,6 318,3 178 363 222,2

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1000

Number of police per 100.000 inhabitants

Venezuela Uruguay Dominican Republic Peru Paraguay Panama Nicaragua Mexico Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Ecuador Costa Rica Colombia Chile Brazil Bolivia Argentina

Source: Official administrative records compiled by UNDP 2013. Note: Argentina: 2008; Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico: 2010; Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela: 2012. Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012),

10,1

• Police reforms continue to be one of the on-going challenges for the democracies of the region. 9,76 • Politicisation and the rigidity of previous structures has been an obstacle the ence of the State in the area Consequently, 0 of security. 2 4 6 their ac8 10 12 in promoting 14 16 reforms 18 undertaken 20 in the region and for efforts to promote accountability. tion or inaction has significant consequences for the legitimacy Jueces 100.000 • habitantes The development of strong and enduring links between the of security policies and for relations between the State andporsopolice and communities and barrios where they operate is ciety. Source: Official administrative records compiled by the UNDP (2013). promising strategy confront violence and to strengthen Note: Venezuela: 2005; Chile: 2007; Argentina and Paraguay: 2010; Mexico, Panama, DominicanaRepublic, and Uruguay: 2011;toColombia and Ecuador: 2012. their legitimacy. Generally, social and political leaders tend to identify a larger number of police as the essential element to reduce crime and • Citizen perception of the police as an institution that is both ineffective and possibly penetrated by criminal interests neviolence. However, the relationship between the density of pogatively affects its legitimacy. Chile 5.98 For the citizen,Argentina the police are the most visible and tangible pres-

Figure 6

300 250 200 150 100 50 0

Argentina

The police Colombia

involved in criminal activity? W

Density per 100 spaces

fewer taxes than the poor and that opts to invest resources in lice in a country and the level of criminality is neither simple nor private security before strengthening the capacities of the State. direct. For example, Cruz (2011) compares the cases of high levIn Central America, the expenditures in private security are esti- els of violence—El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras— with Number of Judges per 100,000 inhabitants, selected countries, Figure 6.3. to 1.5% of GDP in 2006, a percentage the case of low levels of violence in Nicaragua, and shows that mated to have increased last year available that surpasses what a country like Guatemala spends on citizen the number of police officers is not the variable that determines security (PNUD-Informe Centroamérica 2009, 92). the effective operation of the police in the latter country. The Venezuela 6,86 monograph on Citizen Security by the UNDP Nicaragua emphaUruguay 14,49 In general, and as it is argued in this report, the presence of more sizes the importance of factors such as the social fabric and the 6,74 creation of a new police force with a preventive and community policeDominican or more Republic judges does not necessarily signify greater State Paraguay 16,2 that has remained in capacity or better citizen security. Consequently, the quantita- approach during the Sandinista revolution Panama 8,3 tive criteria will be interpreted through a qualitative analysis of effect until now. state capacities. Mexico 4,28 Ecuador 6,95 A review of the scope and obstacles of the reforms undertaken in Latin America during the 1990s yields the18,2 following lessons: Costa Rica

Source: Carranza (201 Note: Data was not re REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Police Reform Police reform processes are linked to democratisation processes in the world, and Latin America is no exception (Pinc 2010). For example, the creation of new police institutions in Central America after the civil wars sought to establish a new civilian force to carry out internal security activities. According to Ungar (2011, 5), police reforms should aim to: 1) reorganize senior police staff, including decentralized management and streamlined decision-making; (b) establish and restructure the internal and external accountability mechanisms; (c) professionalize police and administrative management; and (d) increase the collaboration between the police and communities. Along the same lines, Bayley (2006, 8) argues that a democratic police force should be responsible before the law rather than before the government, incorporate human rights as the guiding principle for police action, empower society to regulate police activity, and make the security needs of citizens and the community its highest priority. An important step to increasing police professionalization includes implementing programmes aimed at improving and increasing the collaboration between police and communities through the community-policing model 92. Community policing implies a broad change in the organizational structure, the decision-making process, and the institutional culture of the police in its relationship with communities (Frühling 2012, 78). This change includes operative decentralisation in smaller territories and closer ties with the community for investigative work, collaboration, and oversight of police work by citizens. Community policing work could also strengthen the articulation between state and non-state actors around comprehensive intervention strategies that promote human development in the communities. According to Frühling (2012) and Muller (2010), the community policing programmes implemented in Latin America have had a limited impact. The human and economic resources invested have been limited. Further, the institutional subculture of the police is sceptical regarding the success of such programmes for crime reduction. In some cases, the community component is visible in the police institution’s own base (WOLA 2009). In others, plans for community patrolling have been developed to intervene in specific areas where there is greater community collaboration —Chile and Colombia. In Colombia, an experimental evaluation of the impact has shown that the crime rates have dropped by 11% in

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areas where this initiative has been implemented (BID 2012). In the case of Chile, community programmes have been accompanied by the creation of a Tactical System for Crime Analysis (STAD) that seeks to respond before there are concrete manifestations of crime; however, evaluations are few. The programmes for community policing in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have shared challenges: the lack of coherence and vision regarding community policing within the institution itself, the lack of concrete norms and policies to adopt this vision, and the refusal on the part of some police officers to abandon traditional practices (WOLA 2009).

State capacity and the challenges of police reform Some of the efforts at police reform have been focused on restructuring processes of hiring, administration, and promotion of personnel, as well as furthering the specialisation and professionalization of staff and state actors (Frühling 2003, 17-23). These reforms have shown some progress in the training and capacity building of police (Johnson, Mendelson and Bliss 2012). Human rights have been incorporated as an area of particular relevance in many training processes. Further, the minimum entrance standards have been improved, which makes it possible to improve the educational and training processes. In addition, the topics of citizen security and community policing have been included, among other aspects of more modern police strategies. In various countries, the police institutions have established agreements with research centres and universities that improve the quality of training, both for the police themselves, as well as the faculty in charge of their instruction. Despite efforts to strengthen the police as an institution, the initial training period is brief and fails to instil either the discipline or the content necessary for the development of the multiple tasks required of the upper echelons. On-the-job education or training processes tend to be sporadic, such that in many cases, a senior police officer only receives one or two training courses throughout his or her career. Further, the lack of financing or thematic priorities prevents the consolidation of strategic training in areas necessary to confront new challenges, such as organized crime. In addition, the politicisation of the police creates a dependent relationship between the staff of the institution, political elites, and private interests (Frühling 2003, 20). The efforts to establish democratic controls over police bureaucracies can be conditioned by political interests that lead to the appointment of

000

In the Dominican Republic, a Citizen Security Plan was launched in 2013 to reform the structure of the National Police. To this end, a National Security Council was formed, headed by the President of the Republic and constituted by other state security actors. Simultaneously, a draft law was presented to Congress, which promoted a new legal framework and structural changes in this institution. This legal framework aimed to strengthen a preventive approach, with respect for human rights, and promote the permanent training and capacity building of its members. In Nicaragua, the National Police’s high degree of acceptance is linked to a model of community policing that has been in place since its founding during the Sandinista revolution in the 1980s (Policía Nacional Sandinista). It has been favourably evaluated for its positive results and legitimacy (Basombrío 2012). The UNDP in Nicaragua (2011) identified eight processes which explain the success of the police: (a) a community profile; (b) a preventive approach to youth violence; (c) a differentiated approach, preventive and comprehensive, to domestic and sexual violence; (d) the police education system; (e) a gender approach; (f ) institutional planning; (g) institutional statistics; and (h) management of public relations, public information, and the public institutional image.

In El Salvador and Guatemala, new police institutions emerged as part of the peace accords. However, the increase in crime has strengthened support for repressive measures, which have threatened the reform processes. In Colombia, there was an effort at institutional change in the police, undertaken in the 1990s, as a result of the scandals associated with drug trafficking and its poor public image (Casas 2005). With each reform there was a major police purge that contributed to both improve efficiency and citizens’ perception of the institution. The challenge facing the police continues to be overcoming the military character and structure of the police that it has had since 1953 (Casas y González 2005, 73).

6 THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Box 6.1. Changes and Reforms in the police in Latin America

The Chilean Investigative Police were so discredited by end of the dictatorship that its takeover by the Carabineros police force was discussed. However, it was purged, reorganised, and modernised with success. The Carabineros of Chile have also been the object of institutional modernisation processes, which has earned them a positive internal and external image (Candina 2005).

Public perception of police participation in criminal activity, Latin America, 2012 percentage

Figure 6.2. Venezuela Uruguay Dominican Republic Peru Paraguay Panama Nicaragua Mexico Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Ecuador Costa Rica Colombia Chile Brazil Bolivia Argentina

The police protect the people from crime. The police are involved in crime. Both or neither.

100

Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012), involved in criminal activity? What do you think?” REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

Figure 6.6.

Prison overcrowding, Latin America, 2005-2007 and 2011

115

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

police chiefs based on personal relationships rather than merit (Hinton 2006). Even when new state institutions are set up to investigate police abuses, they often fail to materialize as the police continue to be considered an important source of political patronage (Ungar 2011, 72). Another factor that challenges State capacity to reform the police is the nature of the relationships between the police and different sectors of society in the countries of the region. Figure 6.2 reflects citizen perception of police performance and their possible participation in criminal activity, based on the LAPOP-PNUD 2012 survey. The countries where police are believed to mostly fulfil their protective role are Panama (63%), Chile (59%), and Nicaragua (54%). On the other hand, the countries where the police are most believed to collude with crime are Honduras (63%), Guatemala (61%), and Bolivia (60%). At a regional level, only an average of 36% of those surveyed consider that the police protect citizens against crime, while an average of 43% believe that the police are involved in criminal activity. The perception that the police continue to participate in criminal acts continues to be relatively widespread. The perception of police participation in criminal activities or complicity with criminal actors undermines their legitimacy before the citizenry and makes them appear alien or removed from the concerns of citizens. In the specific case of youth, some recent surveys have shown that the police are seen as the least respected and least trusted institutions among young people in Latin America (OIJ 2013). This indicates that this segment of the population does not recognise the police as an institution capable of providing protection and security. Regarding sexual violence and its impact on women, a study found that only 5% of adult victims reported these incidents to the police in Latin America and the Caribbean (Sexual Violence Research Initiative 2010, 9). Shame, fear of retaliation, and lack of knowledge about rights prevents complaints by the victims, a situation that is worse in rural areas and among indigenous women and women living in poverty and marginalisation. In addition, there is the fear of being re-victimised by discriminatory practices or male chauvinist views that downplay this kind of violence. The latter simply confirms the need for police in the region to both incorporate a gender approach and promote the participation by women in their ranks (Chinchilla and Rico 2006, 64). There is some important progress in these areas in the region. In Central America, efforts have been made to promote the participation of women in the police force through campaigns and special recruitment processes. The creation of the Commissioners for Woman inside the police has permitted a specialised

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response to the problem of gender violence, and in particular, domestic and sexual abuse. There are some successful experiences in Nicaragua, Brazil, and Argentina (Dâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;Angelo, Molina y Jubb 2008, 12-15). The abuse of force is another obstacle for police reform. It has the same corrosive effect as corruption. Moreover, eliminating it is as difficult as eradicating corruption. The police can temporarily deprive persons of their freedom, restrict the full enjoyment of their rights, and in extreme circumstances, exercise violence and carry out lethal actions against citizens. All these attributes, when based on high degrees of discretionary power, can result in threats to citizen security. The Latin American democracies have not been able to completely eradicate these practices (Cruz 2010). The Comparative Study of the Prison Population conducted by the UNDP (2013) in six countries reported that a significant percentage of the inmates said that they had suffered beatings and mistreatment after their arrest by the police: 38% in Argentina, 41.2% in Mexico, 38.5% in Peru, 25.5% in El Salvador, 42.6% in Brazil, and 34.6% in Chile (see StatisticalMethodological Annex). Evidence indicates that these abuses are usually carried out against youth from the lower socioeconomic strata or against ethnic minorities, which in turn generates greater social conflict (Dammert 2010). Finally, one of the challenges for Latin America for police modernization is the changing nature of organized crime (FelbabBrown 2012). It reconfigures territorial frontiers, participates in the market, penetrates social and political structures, and jeopardises the progress achieved in the construction of the State and the democratic system. Although differentiated, it is present in every country in the continent (GarzĂłn 2012). Penetration by organized crime is greater in countries with more fragile institutions, as it takes advantage of institutional weaknesses to penetrate and corrupt (Felbab-Brown y Olson 2012). In the face of the threat that organized crime represents, some Latin American States have decided to include the participation of military forces in civilian tasks, as a short term measure to address the deficiencies in police capacity.

The Armed Forces in police functions in Latin America The democratic processes in the region resulted in the withdrawal of the armed forces and the delimitation of its functions, principally to the defence of territory (SepĂşlveda and Alda 2008; RESDAL 2012).

In a number of countries in the region, the participation of the armed forces in citizen security issues is concentrated in three areas. The first are actions to combat organized crime, principally drug-trafficking in its various aspects: the destruction of plantations, intelligence gathering, and terrestrial, aerial, and maritime protection of borders, among others. The second is combatting common or street crime, which affects the majority of the population and which can becomes serious in certain areas, above all when it overlaps with other threats, such as organized crime or State corruption. The third is the creation of specialized forces within the police that undergo military training or the appointment of military officers to command posts within police institutions (Benítez Manaut 2012). In the two largest and most populous countries of Latin America —Brazil and Mexico—, military participation in citizen security tasks has intensified in recent years. In Brazil, military units were used in support of intervention strategies for the pacification of specific favelas carried out by the Police Pacification Units (UPP). In Mexico, security missions in states with high levels of violence—like Guerrero, Michoacán and Chihuahua— have had the support of military armed forces. These missions have not been able to reduce violence levels, and on the contrary, have given rise to numerous complaints regarding human rights abuses committed by some members of the armed forces. As a result, the creation of a body of “gendarmerie” has been announced, conceived of as an “intermediate military-police force”, that in principle would allow for the reduction of the direct participation of military personnel.93 In Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras, combatting drug trafficking and the gangs with “iron fist” policies led to a leading role for the armed forces. Their participation did not yield the expected results, but rather caused an increase in the levels of violence that these countries then sought to reverse by resort-

ing to more comprehensive policies, with a larger prevention component. In particular, one can point to the case of the truce between the gangs, discussed in this report (see Chapter 9). In the case of Venezuela, due to the increase in the levels of violence, Secure Homeland Plan was designed, and subsequently implemented by the national government in coordination with the state governments, municipalities, and the armed forces. This plan is supposed to come to an end when national police and police agencies are sufficiently strengthened to assume these tasks.

6 THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

However, the emergence of new internal and external threats has limited the democratic evolution of the armed forces and its subordination to civil institutions (Mitre 2010). The following four elements explain this phenomenon. The first is internal: the weakness of public democratic institutions in confronting threats to security. The second is related to organized crime, which has the potential to destabilise political systems and corrupt security institutions (Solís y Rojas 2008). The third is geostrategic: the emergence of terrorism as a threat that a number of countries have established as a priority, in line with the position of the United States after the September 11th attacks of 2001.The fourth is the increase in the perception of insecurity and in the levels of violence, and as the police were perceived in some cases to be overwhelmed by the situation, the armed forces were called in to contain some forms of crime and violence.

The participation of the military in citizen security tasks raises serious problems for the development of a democratic citizen security policy. In the first place, it complicates the consolidation of a relationship between government leaders and a military subordinated to civilian authority. Second, the use of the military to compensate for the institutional weaknesses of the police creates a vicious circle in which the replacement of the police for citizen security work postpones the adoption of precisely the changes and reforms that would strengthen them. Third, it could constitute a threat to the guarantee of respect for human rights and accountability before the citizenry due to jurisdictional issues specific to the armed forces regarding military immunity. Fourth, while civilian police are mandated and trained to protect the population through the minimum use of force, the training of the military is geared toward combatting and defeating the enemy (Cruz and Santamaría 2013, Isacson 2013). This is why it is necessary that governments consider a feasible strategy for the military’s gradual withdrawal from citizen security tasks, which would allow them to be replaced by professional civilian police.

The justice system The justice system is an essential component for the consolidation of Rule of Law and to address crime in a just and efficient manner. This section presents first a brief description of the processes of judicial reform, and second, analyses the challenges that these reforms have faced. The following findings are highlighted: • Despite the reforms undertaken in the last decades, the lack of confidence in the justice system continues to be a challenge in the region. • The politicisation of the courts has limited the consolidation of Rule of Law and the impartial functioning of justice, as well as contributing to corruption. • The justice systems continue to show an inability to resolve the cases that come before the courts and to generate alterREGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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native measures to pre-trial detention. The impunity levels Justice System Reforms continue to be very high in many countries of the region. â&#x20AC;˘ For certain sectors of the population,Police access per to justice admi- inhabitants, countries with data, circa 2011 100,000 Figure 6.1. nistration continues to be limited for social, economic, cultu- Latin America has undertaken various reform initiatives aimed at strengthening Rule of Law through the transformation and ral, and institutional reasons. of the judicial system. The reforms that were carâ&#x20AC;˘ Building strategic links Venezuela between the citizens and organized improvement 297,8 ried out during the decade of the nineties were undertaken in civil society increases theUruguay probability of success, legitimacy, 876,4 context of the transition to democracy, and as such sought and consequently, the sustainability of judicial system re- the Dominican Republic 307.9 to eliminate the vestiges of dictatorial control over the judicial forms. 199 Nicaragua system. The initiatives focused primarily on Central America, Mexico 447,7 Figure 6.3 shows the number of judges by country per156,2 every where international donors had already started to cooperate Guatemala regional jurists who had been arguing for a reform that 100,000 inhabitants for some countries in the region. One notes with 343,1 El Salvador align Rule of Law with the international human rights an important variation: 4.28Colombia in Mexico and more than 16 per would 349,6 principles. These reforms put emphasis on the criminal justice every 100,000 inhabitants in Costa Rica and Paraguay. Just as in Chile 318,3 system and in shifting from an inquisitorial legal system to an the case of the police, it is important Brazil to situate these quantita178 tive indicators in the institutional environment of each country. adversarial Bolivia 363 one, with special emphasis on the strengthening of judicial system capacity, its political independence, and the proMore judges do not necessarily translate into a more effective 222,2 Argentina fessionalization of the judicial bureaucracy (Hammergren 2007, justice system. For example, Chile, a country considered to be a 0 100 200 3009-11, 400 500 600 700 800 900 1000 Hammergren, 89-91). success story for its judicial reforms, has one of the lowest numbers of judges per 100,000 inhabitants. In sum, the quantitative Number of police per 100.000 inhabitants indicators need to be interpreted through the qualitative char- Another focal point of the reforms emphasised increasing the independence of the judicial branch from politics and in improvacteristics of Official the local institutional context.by UNDP 2013. Source: administrative records compiled ingGuatemala, its transparency to promote confidence on the part Note: Argentina: 2008; Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico: 2010; Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Uruguay, greater and Venezuela: 2012.

Sou

inv

Number of Judges per 100,000 inhabitants, selected countries, last year available

Figure 6.3. Venezuela Uruguay

6,86

Dominican Republic

6,74

14,49

Paraguay

16,2

Panama

8,3

Mexico Ecuador

4,28 6,95

Costa Rica Colombia

18,2 10,1

Chile Argentina

5.98 9,76 0

Jueces por 100.000 habitantes Source: Official administrative records compiled by the UNDP (2013). Note: Venezuela: 2005; Chile: 2007; Argentina and Paraguay: 2010; Mexico, Panama, Dominican Republic, and Uruguay: 2011; Colombia and Ecuador: 2012.

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The principal initiatives of the justice system reform in Latin America have focused on the transformation of penal procedure (see box 6.2). From the perspective of the State’s response to crime, the most important change consists of granting the Public Prosecutor’s Office the power to prosecute crimes. With an adversarial criminal justice system, the judge does not investigate, but rather judges, convicts, and sentences. Before the reform, in all of the countries in the region, except Mexico and Panama, the figure of investigative magistrates pursued crime as part of their responsibilities, in addition to exercising their more traditional work of deciding between acquittal or conviction. At present, criminal prosecution and the responsibility for investigation fall to the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and as such it acquires enormous importance in criminal proceedings. Now the Public Prosecutor’s Office is charged with supervising the investigative work of the police and providing the flexibility and dynamism necessary to the investigation to guarantee efficiency for all judicial work.

Box 6.2. Principal changes initiated by the justice system reforms in Latin America

- Change from written to oral judgements - Strengthening of the Public Prosecutor’s Office - Increase in due process for accused during police investigation and during phases prior to judgement - Creation of alternative measures to pre-trial detention - Introduction of the use of early warning mechanisms to resolve prison conflict - Elimination of investigation magistrates

6 THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

of investors and establish a foundation for economic markets (Messick 1999). Finally, in recent years, there has been growing pressure to reform the judicial system with the objective of improving citizen’s access to justice, above all the most disadvantaged. The logic underlying the justice movement is that the judicial system can contribute to alleviate conditions of poverty and inequality, adopting measures that enable and empower society’s most vulnerable to exercise their rights (Anderson 2003, Abregú 2001, Hammergren 2008, 92-93).

Sources: Duce and Pérez Perdomo (2003, 78); Hammergren (2008, 91); and Langer (2007, 618-619).

accused of committing a crime (Hammergren 2008, 93-94). In addition, the number of judges and court officers has increased, the organisation has been restructured in important ways, and completely new institutions have been established like the Public Prosecutor’s Office.

In some countries, this change has implied creating a whole new institution. In others, this power has been transferred to existing agencies within the judicial system, agencies that had carried out different and less important tasks, in general those linked to insuring the legality of process. In addition, some laws have assigned some discretionary powers to prosecutors to simplify the process, to apply the principle of discretionary prosecution (instead of bringing a public action) to shorten the proceedings. These new criminal prosecution bodies have been energetically introduced in Latin America. In the majority of countries, the number of prosecutors is similar to that of developed countries, and their budget has increased in recent years.

However, according to the Centre for Justice Studies of the Americas (CEJA) 96, the reforms have encountered three types of pressures. First, the process of setting up the new institutions has generated problems such as slow resource allocation, the difficult and reluctant adjustment of staff to new tasks, and the complex interaction with the rest of the system’s bodies that are older, and that have, in many cases, resisted the arrival of this new actor (fundamentally, judges and police, but also other sectors of the State, such as the governments themselves or investigative services). Secondly, the need to investigate cases of governmental corruption has given rise to conflicts between prosecutors and governments resulting in constitutional crises, as well as the weakening of their independence and operation. Third, these institutions have been subject to significant criticism and pressures within the context of the increase of citizen fear in the face of crime and high expectations with respect to the efficacy of the criminal justice system for its prosecution.

The scope and rhythm of criminal justice reform varies country to country and within each country 94. In his analysis of the impact of citizen security reform, Pásara (2007, 38) notes that the reforms to the criminal justice system have had two key impacts in the region. Firstly, it has significantly diminished the time spent in the processing of legal cases 95. Secondly, there is greater compliance with, and application of, legal rights for those being processed through the judicial system and those

Finally, a shared challenge for the justice systems in the region has been their incapacity to develop mechanisms that guarantee the application of preventive measures as an alternative to pre-trial detention, as well as effective compliance with alternative sanctions to imprisonment. To this end, it is key to ensure the effective articulation of the justice system with other sectors, such as health, education, and social development, and with other social actors. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

State capacity and the criminal justice system

inmates that said that a judge was present for their statements was less than 35% in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Even more important, in the six countries in the region, more than 50% of the inmates said that they had understood little or nothing of what had occurred in the trial or the hearings. This highlights the deficiencies in the justice system from the perspective of the accused or those facing a judicial process.

The problems that the region’s justice reform process has confronted explains the system’s profound legitimacy crisis, reflected in the low levels of confidence placed in the system and by the generalized perception that the system is corrupt, inefficient, and favours impunity. In practice, judges continue to struggle with an excessive number of cases, and the complexity of the legal system continues to generate confusion among staff and the citizenry.

The judicial system’s incapacity to administer justice adequately has reinforced the citizen perception that laws are insufficiently tough, that justice doesn’t punish those who deserve it, and that there are too many acquittals (Dammert and Salazar 2009). It is worrisome that there is a demand to lower the age of criminal responsibility, based on the generalized perception that youth violence has increased (Basombrío 2012).

Figure 6.4 illustrates the percentages by which citizens perceive the justice system to be efficient and legitimate. As one can see, with the exception of Nicaragua and Panama, more than half of the citizenry in Latin America expressed little or no confidence that the courts would act in a reliable manner in the case of victimisation by robbery or assault. These percentages indicate that the majority of countries in the region have a long and difficult road ahead to strengthen the legitimacy of the justice system.

The lack of legitimacy of the criminal justice system creates incentives for individuals to avoid channelling their conflicts and complaints through the legal system and seek, instead, to resolve matters through informal institutions and practices. In some places, the lack of confidence in the justice system and criminal impunity has given rise to the justification for private and community security systems. An extreme case is the phenomenon of lynching, an illegal practice resulting from the desperate reaction of populations that are poorly protected by the State from criminality and violence. This practice has been

Table 6.2. illustrates the conditions of due process in 6 countries in the region based on the results of the comparative study on prison populations (PNUD 2013). For example, the proportion of Figure 6.4.

system, Latin America, 2012

Venezuela Uruguay Dominican Republic Peru Paraguay Panama Nicaragua Mexico Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Ecuador Costa Rica Colombia Chile Brazil Bolivia Argentina

A lot Somewhat A little Not at all

100

Source: LAPOP –PNUD (2012),. would punish the guilty person?” 120

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Figure 6.5.

Untried and unconvicted detainees, Latin America, 2000 and 2009 percentages

Conditions of Due Process, selected countries, 2013 Percentages

Cases where the judge was present at statements Cases where the lawyer was present during statements Understood little of what was happening during trial and during investigative statements in hearings Understood nothing of what was happening during trial and in hearings

Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

30.6

28.4

84.7

82.8

34.1

77.5

74.8

69.1

73.7

83.2

57.0

77.4

21.9

44.2

45.5

38.7

31.8

25.3

34.4

32.0

24.1

29.6

38.3

30.6

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Table 6.2.

Source: Comparative Study of the Prison Population, UNDP (2013)

documented in countries like Mexico, Guatemala, Brazil, EcuaBox 6.3. National Plans to eradicate violence dor, and the Andean highlands Security of Peru andand Bolivia (Snodgrass against women violence in prisons, selected countries, 2013 6.3.2012). 2006;Table Santamaría percentages Regarding gender violence, the effective implementation of curArgentina rent laws to prevent and punish it continues to be a challenge forPercentage the region.that From a formal perspective, countries have shown feels less secure (in prison) 66.5 comparedprogress. to previous residence important In 97% of the countries, laws against domestic violence have been approved—although less than half Proportion of those beaten in the last 18.2 explicitly 6 monthspenalize marital rape—, 8 countries have laws or reforms of their codes criminalizing femicide/feminicide, and 10 Percentage that report beating of them have approved second generation legislation that 76.8has directly incorporated the concept of violence against women PercentageMujeres that report beating (PNUD-ONU 2013). 35.8 by other inmates

Mexico Peru El Salvador Brazil to eradicate Chile The adoption of national plans and policies

violence against women is fundamental to ensure the ef76.4 prevention 74.1 and sanction 44.1 67.5form of violence. 79.4 fective of this At present, approximately a third of the 32 countries in have a specific 15.1Latin America 14.4 and the3.5Caribbean4.4 25.5 national plan to address violence against women (PNUDONU Mujeres 2013). These plans have contributed to 40,2 48,7 65,9 36,4 71,8 the development of mechanisms for inter-institutional and inter-sector articulation. To improve their opera73.4 58.2 95.5 27.3 43.1 tion, countries should overcome the following obstacles:

However, in practice, the lack of a strategic program with a Source: Comparative study of prison population, (2013) - Insufficient capacity for management and articulacomprehensive and multi-sector approach prevents the justice tion in the face of complex institutional frameworks. systems from punishing gender violence in an effective way. - Lack of a comprehensive approach in the responsAccording to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, es. Whilewomen, 100% ofselected the plans and policies of the 32 Type of with crimes committed countries, 2013 thereTable is a pattern impunity respect to the ju- by incarcerated 6.4.of systematic percentages countries studied define strategies and objectives dicial prosecution of violence against women (CIDH 2007). This prevention and attention issues, they do pattern is exacerbated by the already low levels of reporting and Mexico to address Argentina Peru El Salvador Chile so to a lesser degree in the areas ofBrazil sanction (58%) limited use of the judicial system by women victims of violence, and compensation (39%) for the crimes of violence at Robbery the expense of their human rights. Given this29.6 situation, coun- 36.7 10.8 9.1 18.4 34.9 against women. tries have recognized the need to adopt national plans which 13.9 19.4 - Weak8.3 19.1 and the persistence 7.8 9.2 Homicide technical capacity of dispermits them to approach violence against women in a coordicriminatory socio-cultural patterns towards women 52.8to all areas in 5.4 69.2 25.2 66.0 55.0 nated and comprehensive way, from prevention that “normalize” violence against women. theProportion chain of justice (see box 6.3). that consumed alcohol - Monitoring and evaluation still incipient in plans. or drugs during the six hours previous 25.0 18.2 10.3 7.6 33.0 40.2 - Limited budget allocation. to the crimeinclude, for example, gender mainstreaming in the Other efforts justice system institutions. In Argentina, with the support of the Source:and Comparative study of the population. UNDP (2013for Domestic VioUNDP UN-Women, anprison Office for Attention lence Victims was opened in 2009 within the Supreme Court of

Table 6.5.

Source: UNDP-UNWomen (2013).

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T Family Situation of women inmates, selected countries, 2013 percentages

2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

121

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Justice of the Nation. This Office has handled hundreds of cases, largely women who have been abused, generally, by their current or former partners. With this support, the Women’s Office of the Supreme Court of Justice achieved greater visibility and was institutionally strengthened97 (PNUD Argentina). One of the most important challenges for the justice system is the politicisation of the courts. The clientelist and patronage networks link the courts and their staff to politicians and party machinery. Further, appointments are often based on political affiliation and loyalty rather than qualifications and training (Domingo 1999, 160; Riego 2002, 45). This politicisation corrupts the administration of justice, induces the system to respond to private interests, undermines the efficient prosecution of cases, and further erodes the legitimacy of the courts. In addition, it undermines the capacity for investigation and prosecution of accusations of corruption against State functionaries (Rivas 2001, 26-27). The experience of Chile illustrates the positive effect that the institutional capacity building can have through reforms. The Chilean reform, often praised as a regional model, began in 1998 with the creation of the National Congress’ Public Ministry (OEA 2007, 56), which assumed responsibility for investigation and which had constitutional autonomy. Two years later, the reform process established new bodies and restructured others, in addition to replacing the written system with a new oral system. The reforms were introduced over five years; they began in two regions of the country in 2000 and ended in Santiago in 2005. This reform enjoyed wide political support in that the criminal justice system reform was inserted into the broader democratisation process after a long period of authoritarian rule; on the other hand, strategic links were established with leaders and organisations from academia, human rights, and organized civil society. In sum, the Chilean reform showed governmental capacity and a solid public-private collaboration. Despite this, Chile still shares some of the start-up problems that other countries have faced; for example, the resources allocated to the prosecutors are limited and inadequate in relation to their work overload.

The prisons The application of effective and proportional sanctions, directed at the rehabilitation of those who break the law, is an indispensable step to strengthen the capacity of the State in citizen security. In Latin America, the prison system is in crisis in practically all countries in the region, to differing degrees. The following factors can be highlighted: 122

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

• The prisons, as the final link in the chain of the criminal justice system, are affected by the institutional deficiencies of the police and the courts. • Overcrowding and the abuse of preventive detention are the clearest symptoms of the crisis facing the justice and prison system in the region. • Women are in a situation of double disadvantage and vulnerability, due to the specific threats to their physical, material, and emotional integrity in prisons. • The rehabilitation function of the penitentiary systems has not been a priority and, on the contrary, prisons have emerged as a site that has promotes violence, human rights abuses, criminal networks, and criminal recidivism. • The citizen perception of imprisonment as a solution to security problems has impeded progress in reforms to reduce the inmate population, adopt alternative measures, and promote social reinsertion.

Prison reform The generalised use of preventive detention in Latin America has multiple origins: clearly, the inquisitorial judicial system left traces that persist until the present day: for example, the concentration of investigative responsibility and prosecution in judges, the preference for written judgments over oral ones, and the lack of financial resources for the efficient operation of the courts. The various dimensions of the penitentiary system merit analysis. As Figure 6.5 shows, the use of preventive detention has characterised the Latin American prison system for a number of decades. This figure indicates that in 2009, the percentage of inmates awaiting sentencing went from 21% in Nicaragua to 74% in Bolivia. The situation of unconvicted women detainees has deteriorated in recent years. In 2010, it was estimated that there were 74,000 women detainees in this situation, in contrast to 40,000 in 2006. This figure indicates that approximately 4 out of every 10 women detainees have not been sentenced (Open Society Foundation 2013). In addition, data from 2013 compiled in the UNDP comparative study of prison populations (PNUD, 2013), show a very high proportion of inmates who were prisoners at the time of sentencing. Further, for all the six countries in the study, the number of unconvicted prisoners has increased. The number is equal to or higher than 90% in Argentina, Mexico, Peru, El Salvador, and Brazil; in Chile, it is 85.2% (see statistical-methodological annex).98

Source: LAPOP –PNUD (2012),. would punish the guilty person?”

Untried and unconvicted detainees, Latin America, 2000 and 2009 percentages

Venezuela

Uruguay Peru

Paraguay Panama 31

41 41

Mexico Honduras 34

44 26

Costa Rica Chile

Bolivia

50 70

40 74

Argentina 0

Brazil

Colombia

Ecuador

Guatemala El Salvador

Nicaragua

6 THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Figure 6.5.

40 c. 2009

50 c. 2000

59 60

100

Source: Ibero-American Justice Ministers Conference (COMJIB 2011). Harmonized Statistics and Indicators of the Justice Systems: Latin America.

The consequences of preventive detention are many. At an individual level, in addition to loss of employment, there is the distancing from the family and the stigma. For society, preventive detention represents a high cost that prevents channelling these resources to social development. For the State, it contributes to the low level of legitimacy, as it reveals the State to be incapable of processing individuals in an effective, efficient, and transparent manner. In addition, overcrowding in the prison system is of serious concern. There is a clear gap between capacity and the number of incarcerated inmates. The European Committee for Criminal Problems (1999) considers that prisons with a density greater than 120% have serious overcrowding problems. As Figure 6.6 shows, many Latin American countries surpass this level. El Salvador has the most serious overcrowding (298%). Prison overcrowding and prolonged preventive detention are symptoms of the most extensive deficiencies of the capacities of the State that correspond to other institutions, such as the police and the judicial system.

With these levels of overcrowding, the prisons in the region are permanently functioning at the limits of their capacity. Strikes, riots, and fires have become a risk factor for the prisons’ operative system, and for the security of the guards, inmates, and those circulating in the compound, such as visitors. In addition, the overcrowding, as well as the lack of control in prisons has contributed to the growth and strengthening of criminal networks, where extortion, kidnapping, and other violent acts are planned (Santamaría 2013). The UNDP comparative study on the inmate population (2013) provides a general panorama of the conditions under which inmates live in reclusion. In areas such as the health services provided in prison, the proportion of inmates who said they had received medical attention was greater than 40% in all countries and reached up to 80% 99. In general, the majority of the inmates (more than 60% in all cases) said they had received support from their families, especially food and clothing. The percentage that work and study in prison is more than 35% in Argentina, Mexico, El Salvador, and Chile 100. In Brazil, this percentage is much lower (9.6%), while the percentage that neither work nor REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

123

involved in criminal activity? What do you think?”

6 Figure 6.6.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Prison overcrowding, Latin America, 2005-2007 and 2011

300 250 200 Density per 100 spaces

18,2

150 100

Venezuela

Uruguay

Peru

Paraguay

Panama

Nicaragua

México

2011

Dominican Republic

2005-2007

Honduras

Guatemala

El Salvador

Ecuador

Chile

Costa Rica

Colombia

012.

Brazil

Bolivia

Argentina

es,

Source: LAPOP-PNUD (2012),

Source: Carranza (2012, Tabla 1a). Note: Data was not reported for Chile for the period 2005-2007. No data was reported for Argentina, Bolivia and Peru for 2011.

study reaches 39.7% (see Statistical-Methodological annex). However, the study produced very worrisome results regarding the security conditions for the inmates in the prisons. With the exception of El Salvador, in all of the countries where the surveys were conducted, the percentage of inmates who said they felt more insecure inside the prison than outside where they lived previously was higher than 60%. This is attributable to the levels of violence that prisoners face inside prisons. The percentage of inmates who reported having been beaten by prison staff was higher than 60% in El Salvador, Chile, and Argentina. Violence on the part of other inmates is also high. More than half reported having been beaten by other inmates in Mexico, Peru, and El Salvador. In this last country, the percentage is very high: 95.5% (see Table 6.3). Excessive penalties are another relevant problem. In countries as disparate as Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, Peru, and Uruguay, the number of persons incarcerated for crimes related to drugs, including possession, is enormous and constantly growing (WOLA 2011). This problem has its origins in 124

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

the progressive toughening of penalties related to drug trafficking, which is disproportionate in comparison to how other serious crimes are punished (Parra Norato et al. 2012). This tendency affects women and youth particularly, who are being incarcerated at increasingly younger ages (WOLA-TNI 2011). The data from the UNDP comparative study on the inmate population (2013) sheds light on the scope of the problem. In five of the six countries in the survey, drug trafficking or possession was reported to be the principal crime committed by the inmates — above robbery and homicide. In the case of Argentina, Peru, Chile, and Brazil, the percentage of women incarcerated for drug trafficking or possession is in fact greater than 50%. In El Salvador, the percentage is 25.2%; in Mexico, it is much smaller: 5.4%. It is important to note that, in some countries like Chile, Brazil, and Argentina, more than 25% of the inmates reported, further, having consumed alcohol or drugs during the six hours previous to the commission of the crime (see Table 6.4).

Security and violence in prisons, selected countries, 2013 percentages Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

Percentage that feels less secure (in prison) compared to previous residence

66.5

76.4

74.1

44.1

67.5

79.4

Proportion of those beaten in the last 6 months

18.2

15.1

14.4

3.5

4.4

25.5

76.8

40,2

48,7

65,9

36,4

71,8

35.8

73.4

58.2

95.5

27.3

43.1

Percentage that report beating Percentage that report beating by other inmates

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Table 6.3.

Source: Comparative study of prison population, (2013)

Table 6.4.

Type of crimes committed by incarcerated women, selected countries, 2013 percentages Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

Robbery

29.6

36.7

10.8

9.1

18.4

34.9

Homicide

13.9

19.4

8.3

19.1

7.8

9.2

52.8

5.4

69.2

25.2

66.0

55.0

25.0

18.2

10.3

7.6

33.0

40.2

Proportion that consumed alcohol or drugs during the six hours previous to the crime

Source: Comparative study of the prison population. UNDP (2013

The human rights agenda in the region is exerting an influence Even if the general conditions within prisons tend to be difficult all inmates,selected women face additional challenges. Among them on the problems of the prison system. The Inter-American Family Situation of Court womenforinmates, countries, 2013 Table 6.5. of Human Rights recommended percentages in 2011 that necessary meas- are prisons that are frequently unprepared to attend specific ures be adopted to insure that persons in detention be incarcer- medical necessities; the vulnerability to sexual abuse by prison NUmber of childrens Salvador Argentina Mexicostaff; incarceration Peru in menâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;sElprisons Chile in order Brazil to be close to famated in decent conditions consistent with principles of humane treatment. In particular, it insisted on the need to adopt con- ily, or in womenâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s prisons far from family members, including None 13.9 16.5 children (UNODC 11.7 17.5 9.1 2008, 7-22). 13.7 crete measures to prevent and eradicate overcrowding. One 13.9 16.2 20.2 19.5 25.2 21.6 Two 17.6 28.5 25.4 30.5 27.2 19.8 based on the36.3 UNDP comparative study on 49.5 the In the case adolescents and youth, the54.6 lack of special prisons38.8 Table 6.5 shows, Three or of more 42.7 30.1 inmate population (2013), the situation of women incarcerated thatProportion provide a rehabilitation and societal reintegration approach of women with to this1.2 study, the great contributes to theinearly criminalisation of7.5 youth and limits any8.3 in relation to their children living prison 7.6 children. According 3.9 8.3 realwith opportunities for development (Zilberg 2007). The UNDP majority of the inmates are mothers, and a significant percentthem

comparative study of the prison population highlighted the age reported having three or more children. However, very few Source: Comparative study of the prison population, UNDP (2013). (See Statistical-Methodological Annex). worrying number of inmates that had been incarcerated in have children living with them in prison, a reflection of a situahomes for minors, particularly in the case of Brazil (18.6%), Ar- tion of profound family dislocation that affects both the incargentina (19.4%), and Chile (40%). In Mexico, Peru, and El Salva- cerated women and their families. dor, the percentages reported were less (9%, 6.9%, and 11.9%, Percentage of recidivism, selected countries, 2013 Table 6.6. respectively). Argentina 38.6

Mexico

Peru

29.7

15.8

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

47.4

68.7

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10.4

125

Source: Comparative study of the prison population. UNDP (2013

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Table 6.5. NUmber of childrens None One Two Three or more Proportion of women with children living in prison with them

Family Situation of women inmates, selected countries, 2013 percentages Argentina

Mexico

Peru

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

13.9 13.9 17.6 54.6

16.5 16.2 28.5 38.8

11.7 20.2 25.4 42.7

13.7 19.5 30.5 36.3

17.5 25.2 27.2 30.1

9.1 21.6 19.8 49.5

7.5

8.3

7.6

3.9

1.2

8.3

Source: Comparative study of the prison population, UNDP (2013). (See Statistical-Methodological Annex).

State capacity and prison reform Table 6.6.

In Chile, the implementation of the prison concession system

(which countries, hands over to2013 private companies the construction and Percentage of recidivism, selected

The State is at the centre of the solution of the prisonMexico problem, Argentina as it is the principal entity responsible for punishment, designing and financing programmes for 38.6 rehabilitation and29.7 for postprison productive reintegration. Even if programmes and initia23.1been undertaken, 9.9 their tives linked to the private sector have women inmates impact is still limited.

administration of prisons, with the exception of security services) systemBrazil capacity; likewise, El Salvador Peru has increased Chile a new criminal prosecution system has diminished the number of unconvicted 15.8 10.4 y Desarrollo 47.42012). 68.7 inmates (Libertad 12.2 3.8 the release 30.1 15.8prisoners has been In other countries, of unconvicted

one of the measures to reduce congestion in the prison system. In Brazil, in 2011, a change in the law of preventive detention entered into force. This regulation states that a judge should consider nine precautionary measures -among them electronic monitoring or house arrest -before sending someone to prison for four years who has been accused of having committed a crime with a lighter penalty -such as robbery or counterfeiting foreign currency. According to official data, between 2003 and 2009, the National Secretariat for Public Security, attached to the Ministry of Justice, invested 1,000 millions Brazilian reales (some US$625 million) in the construction of 97 prisons and in the reform of another 37, which has allowed it to expand capacity, although the effort is still less than required (RESDAL 2011). In addition, Brazil has promoted a public-private enterprise model in the state of Minas Gerais: in 2011, they inaugurated two prisons with a capacity for 3,000 persons.

Source: UNDP Comparative Study of the prison population (2013). See Statistical-Methodological Annex.

In moving towards a more effective and just prison system, it is important to recognise that the functions of investigation, criminal prosecution, punishment, and reintegration, are essentially different. It is therefore important that there is a clear organizational separation between the prison system and the police (Coyle 2002; OCDE-DAC 2008). However, this separation doesnâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;t automatically translate into effective models of government management. In some countries in the region, the prison system is subordinate to a ministry. In others, it is an independent national system, administratively subject to an authority within a central, state or regional government. In a number of countries, prison administration falls under the Ministry of the Interior, from which the police services also depend. This is justifiable in small countries where human and financial resources are insufficient to separate judicial functions from security functions. In Latin America, there are some promising experiences. Among the most relevant is that of the Dominican Republic (see Box 6.4). The reform included the hiring of civilian personnel outside the police and armed forces, as well as the introduction of obligatory educational programmes inside prisons. In addition, this reform has provided support for the inmates to find work after their release, and to adopt concrete measures to confront the problem of overcrowding 101.

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In Venezuela, the government decreed in 2004 a â&#x20AC;&#x153;prison emergencyâ&#x20AC;? with the objective of improving conditions on prisons. Among other initiatives, a model rehabilitation centre and five community treatment centres were opened, and programmes were launched for training, skill development, and support for the prison community. Among the most notable of these activities is the creation of a network of prison symphony orchestras, comprised at the moment by seven sections.

In 2005, the President of the Dominican Republic announced the development of a new model of penitentiary management, based on a respect for fundamental rights of individuals and on the conviction that persons deprived of freedom have the right to reintegrate into society. In this context, they established the Correction and Rehabilitation Centres as spaces where inmates can acquire skills and capacities for their reintegration within the framework of the law. At present, there are sixteen Correction and Rehabilitation Centres in the whole country, and twenty based on the traditional model. Although the so-called “old model” (traditional) continues functioning, in April 2013, 28.5% of the total inmates were interned in the new model centres. This new model involves a constant training of the inmates and

their insertion in educational and vocational programmes that will make them more productive as well as contributing to the operative and logistics maintenance of their own centres. There is individual attention, based on the profile of the inmates with respect to educational level, social, familial, and employment situation, age, and conduct. Some inmates participate in obligatory literacy programmes, which have particular relevance in a country where 12.9% of the population is illiterate.

6 THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Box 6.4. The new penitentiary management model in the Dominican Republic

The new installations, their equipment, and the training of administrative and operational personnel in the National Penitentiary School mean additional expenses for the General Prosecutor of the Republic. However, the results have been very heartening, in particular, in the reduction of recidivism to 2.7 percent. The Dominican government affirms its intention to continue supporting the new model’s expansion.

Source: UNDP.

The justice chain in Latin America The three institutions analysed – police, judges, and prisons – represent the nodal points of the so-called “justice chain”. This is defined as the series of instances or institutions that the citizen needs to follow to access justice (ONU-Mujeres 2011, 48). The chain is complex and varies according to the judicial system of each country. Figure 6.7 provides a simplified version of the chain. The first link is the commission of the crime, followed by the complaint, the investigation, the charges, and the sentence. If the judge issues a guilty verdict, the accused may end up in prison. In this schema, recidivism has been included for analytical purposes; should it occur, the justice chain returns to its first link. The chain functions like a funnel. In other words, it narrows as the process progresses. The majority of crimes remain unpunished, as they go unreported: this is the so-called “hidden figure”. Only a small fraction of the cases reach the trial stage, and an even smaller proportion of criminals go to prison (Carranza 2004, 57). The limited confidence in the judicial system influences the low levels of complaints: for example, in Colombia crimes are reported in 24.5% of the cases (survey carried out by DANE 2013). In Mexico, crimes that are unreported or that are not pursued after a preliminary inquiry represented 91.1% of the total in 2011 (INEGI 2012). Some estimates indicate that 1 in 100 crimes

result in a conviction (Shirk 2012). In Colombia, according to data from the Prosecutor’s Office, 5.9% of the cases that enter the accusatory system end in a conviction, and in the case of serious crimes, like homicide, this figure could drop to 3% (Advisory Commission on Criminal Policy 2012). In Brazil, according to estimates, less than one out of every four homicides is solved (Beato 2012). In the case of Belize, the conviction rate for homicide cases is less than 10%, with clear signs of weakness. Among the problems of the judicial system are the low budgetary allocation for judicial operations, the lack of a formal system of evaluation of judicial effectiveness, the low level of legitimacy of its actions, the absence of alternative mechanisms for resolving conflicts and disputes, poor communication with the police, and permanent tension with judges and magistrates who require extremely long periods of time to conduct trials 102. Meanwhile, the high levels of impunity are attributed to weak criminal investigation and poor preparation of cases 103. In El Salvador, according to data from the Attorney General of the Republic, from the beginning of 2008 to June of 2010, 8,108 complaints were reported for sexual offences. Of this number, 43% were litigated; of those cases litigated, 30% ended in temporary or definitive stays in proceedings. Of those cases that reached sentencing stage, 7.7% ended in acquittal and only 5.9% resulted in conviction for the aggressor (Instituto Salvadoreño para el Desarrollo de la Mujer 2010, 32).

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

127

Figure 6.7.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

The Justice Chain

Crime

Recidivism

Complaint Police

• Complaint by the victim or a third party • Arrest in flagrante delicto • Insuﬃcient cause to proceed INvestigation • Further investigation required

Public Ministry

Litigation

• Charges

Conviction

• Acquittal • Conviction

Judges

Sentencing

Penitenciary System

• Fine • Conditional liberty • Indeminization Prision

Source: Diagram based on framework proposed by UN-Women (2011).

The effectiveness of the justice system varies according to the Box 6.6 illustrates the levels of recidivism based on the prisons’ population, included in the UNDP comparative study of the prisof the crimes. Theofjustice chain, generTable 6.7. gravity and complexity Types and Objectives prevention programmes ally, shows higher rates of criminal charges with crimes that on population (2013). The cases of Brazil and Chile stand out, require less effort to investigate. The police, prosecutors, and where repeat offenders represent 47.4% and 68.7%, respecIn all cases, repeat offenders in the case of judges, and punishment tively, of all inmates. Type tend to concentrate on the detention Objective Intervention Exam of people who are easy to detain, instead of pursuing organized women inmates was proportionately less. Social Prevention centred on the Chile Grows with You 107 upon the risk factorswork lead toand youth i) Increased programme activities directed criminals, which requireActgreater intelligence interinfamily, the school or the gender violence at youth risk. system is not the only factor which influences if the at prison stitutional coordination.violence, (Bergman 2002). Thisand is problems the case for Even community Barriohard Adentro-Altos de San Lo ii) Psychosocial assistance at adolescents in directed the rehabilitation programmes, crimes characterized by their blatancy, such as robbery, weap- recidivism, deficiencies Sub-Secretariat of Children and communities. and families. ons possession, or crimes related to drugs. In the case of homi- prison conditions, and the exposure to criminal networks in the (CESC, 2011) iii) Prevention of drugs and alcohol consumption. cides or rape, the charges are more difficult to ascertain, and prisons all combine to produce a negative impact that reproas such there are fewer (La Rota and Bernal 2013). The UNDP duces crime and violence (Pucci et al. 2009, Briceño-León et al. comparative study of the inmate population (2013), for exam- 2013). ple, notes that the proportion of inmates who were detained in the act the day the crime was committed was high in the States need to focus attention on each of the links in the chain i) Actions to improve living conditions in areas Juan Bobo Urban Project, Nuev Improve the security conditions in mechanisms that connect the processes Northeast that cor- Medellin, 2001 (Alva six countries in the survey. The percentage is greater than 60% andofpromote concentrated social disadvantage through areas to each link, the and police, topresence. the public prosecutors, in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico; in Peru, it is 56.4% and in El respond comprehensive urbanfrom projects police to the judges, and the penitentiary A practice which Salvador, 44.8% (see Statistical-Methodological Annex). ii) Situational interventions that seek tosystem. reduce the (Felbab-Brown opportunity to commit public are spaces. offers interesting lessonscrimes in thisin sense the Integrated Atten- (2011) This situation is exacerbated by high indices of recidivism, as tion Model Centres (MAI) in Nicaragua, which have allowed the repeat offenders constitute an overload for the justice system. integration of work of all of the bodies involved in preventing 128

Actions directed at criminal

Reduce human R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1the 3 -2 0 1 4 cost and facilitate

the rehabilitation and reintegration of detained adults and adolescents

i) Services previous to trial. ii) Establishing of alternative sanctions to prison. iii) Educational, work training, and drug treatment

Preventive Measures Unit for A Mexico (UMECA)108

Source: Comparative study of the prison population, UNDP (2013). (See Statistical-Methodological Annex).

Percentage of recidivism, selected countries, 2013 Argentina

women inmates

Mexico

Peru

38.6

29.7

15.8

23.1

9.9

12.2

El Salvador

Brazil

Chile

10.4

47.4

68.7

3.8

30.1

15.8

Source: UNDP Comparative Study of the prison population (2013). See Statistical-Methodological Annex.

and punishing violence against women, including the Women’s Department of the National Police, the Institute of Legal Medicine, the Ombudsman’s Office, and the Public Prosecutor’s Office. By locating these institutions in the same building and with the same attention model, these centres can offer comprehensive service and access to justice for the victims, and have reduced re-victimisation and impunity 104.

Crime Prevention Policies Preventive policies seek to act against those factors that cause, facilitate, or contribute to criminal conduct. International scientific evidence shows that specific preventive programmes have direct effects on violence and that, in some cases, their impact can be rapid and cost-effective (Schochet, Burghardt y McConnell 2008). Despite the evidence, up to a few years ago the response of the region’s States to crime was principally focused on using the criminal justice system for deterrent purposes, supported by police action to identify criminal law offenders, who were later accused before the courts and eventually punished. This has seen a gradual change, and the public discourse has integrated preventive programmes as effective efforts to reduce crime levels. In contrast to activities linked to application of the law, preventive actions are not the exclusive prerogative of the State, since private and civil society organizations can carry them out. The weakness of State action can create space for initiatives by other actors. Further, public budgets assigned to preventive programmes are inadequate and are at a disadvantage when compared to those assigned to criminal justice tasks. For example, an analysis carried out by the UNDP (2011) regarding security expenditure in the Central American isthmus shows that between 2006 and 2010 public spending in security has been on the rise, from 2.28% of GDP to 2.66%. During the same period, spending on preventive projects rose, but continued to be a small fraction of the spending channelled to combat crime by traditional methods (PNUD 2011).

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Table 6.6.

Recently, prevention has begun to gradually filter towards the governments of the region. First, dissemination of the interventions carried out in Latin America has made known its positive impact on crime reduction. Secondly, there has been a sustained effort by international cooperation to put in practice or support this kind of intervention in the region. In the case of the IDB, its operations have focused on supporting social crime prevention actions, on programmes directed at situational prevention, on preventive activities carried out by the police or the judicial sector, and on programmes for reintegration and rehabilitation directed at those released from prison (Abizanda et al.2012). The UNDP has supported Costa Rica and Honduras in the design of public security policies that incorporate effective components of prevention (see Box 6.5). Likewise, the World Bank, the US Agency for International Development (USAID), and the European Union have all provided significant financial and technical assistance for the introduction of preventive programmes. Preventive projects are often an effective complement to police and criminal justice actions, without replacing them. This occurs for example with interventions in highly dangerous urban areas, like Seguro Barrio in Chile, or similar initiatives in the Dominican Republic, which combine police actions with preventive ones (Frühling y Gallardo 2012). This also improves the population’s perception of the State. The case of Bogotá is one of the most relevant as well as the one showing the greatest impact. Between 1993 and 2009, homicides were reduced from a rate of 80 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants to 23. The preventive security policy in Bogotá combined the recovery of public spaces, disarmament policies, limiting the hours for the sale of alcohol, and support for the Metropolitan Police in communication, mobility, and the strengthening of civic culture (Mockus, Murraín and Villa 2012; Costa 2007). Even if the verdict on this experience’s impact is not unanimous (Casas and González 2005), it has, without a doubt contributed to establishing preventive programmes as a component of regional policies. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

129

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Box 6.5. The Comprehensive and Sustainable Policy for Citizen Security and the Promotion of Social Peace in Costa Rica On February 14, 2011, the government of Costa Rica presented its Comprehensive and Sustainable Public Security and Social Peace Policy (Polsepaz), a programmatic tool for the articulation of state action with a multisector approach, and with the year 2021 as its horizon. In devising this policy, the UNDP supported the consultation process, in which 5,000 actors participated, including institutions and individuals (Alfaro 2013). The consultation served as the conceptual and strategic foundation for the National Development Plan 2010-2014. Polsepaz conceived the problem of security as a human development and social peace issue requiring a comprehensive response to social and economic vulnerabilities. Polsepaz’ objectives included establishing mechanisms for the

permanent financing of citizen security; launching a plan for the prevention of violence and the promotion of social peace; strengthening the police and the penitentiary system; and reinforcing the battle against organized crime. In the area of prevention, this policy was implemented in ten high-risk zones, and programmes carried out in 20 cantons. Its activities are directed principally at the youth population (Frühling 2012, 25). As a result of the implementation of Polsepaz, the homicide rate diminished from 12.4 in 2010 to 8.8 in 2012 105. Other crimes also show important reductions or remained stable. From the perspective of public perception, the percentage of persons who considered insecurity the country’s major problem, dropped from 49% in July 2011, to 18% in March 2013 106.

Sources: Frühling (2012); Alfaro (2013); information from UNDP Costa Rica.

The great diversity of programmes and projects that are implemented today in Latin America are presented in Box 6.6; the priority areas of these interventions, their objectives, and some of the examples in the region are detailed. Despite the fact that these experiences are promising, an analysis of the design of some of these programmes show that their objectives are diverse and insufficiently targeted, that their design does not respond to specific theories of violence, and that the activities implemented are not those best suited to the achievement of the established objectives (Frühling 2012). Further, despite the fact that in the majority of cases the implementers monitor the launching of the projects, few have been rigorously evaluated. Even so, many of them have achieved significant results and have been studied in other countries. In Brazil, Chile, and Colombia programmes have been undertaken for the prevention of risky behaviours in girls and boys, in which, for example, they have expanded the number of extracurricular activities after classes. An example in Brazil is the open schools programme Opening Spaces, launched by UNESCO in 2001 and adopted by the Ministry of Education. The programme offers sports, culture, arts, and leisure activities and initial skill-building work for youth during weekends. Evaluations have shown beneficial effects regarding the levels of violence reported in the schools and surrounding areas (Waiselfisz and Maciel 2003). In São Paulo, the programme of open schools,

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known locally as the Family School, was implemented in 5,306 schools between 2003 and 2006, and in this period, criminal acts were reduced by 45% (Banco Mundial 2011). Other specific programmes and projects have been focused on improving the security conditions of certain urban areas. This is the case in the interventions in areas where socially disadvantaged sectors predominate, and which reflect urbanisation processes with high degrees of social segregation. These areas often reflect concentrations of interpersonal violence, a presence of criminal networks, weak adherence to legal norms, and a low level of respect for the police (Frühling and Gallardo 2012; Escobar 2012; Sampson 1985; Bursik 1988; Manzano 2009). These interventions seek to improve community living conditions and increase people’s capacity to respond positively to problems of crime and violence (ONU-Habitat 2011). Some of the interventions in these areas require a strong police presence to eradicate criminal gangs, which often replace legitimate authorities and forge bonds of collaboration and complicity with local leaders and community groups. In this sense, one of the principal experiences in Latin America is that of Medellin, which applies a combination of social urbanism principles that promote the idea that any territorial intervention should be based in a process of comprehensive social management. The elements that have underpinned the urban interventions are shown in Box 6.7.

Type

i) Actions to improve living conditions in areas of concentrated social disadvantage through comprehensive urban projects and police presence. ii) Situational interventions that seek to reduce the opportunity to commit crimes in public spaces.

Improve the security conditions in

i) Services previous to trial. ii) Establishing of alternative sanctions to prison. iii) Educational, work training, and drug treatment programmes directed at inmates.

i) Measures for situational prevention. ii) Limited hours for alcohol sales. iii) Preventive programmes for juvenile and gender violence. iv) Measures that promote civic culture. v) Statistical Information Observatories on crime.

Reduce the human cost and facilitate the rehabilitation and reintegration of detained adults and adolescents provisionally detained or convicted.

Involve diverse government agencies and implement actions in a coordinated manner.

Actions directed at criminal

Programmes of a multisector character carried out in municipalities and cities

areas

communities.

i) Increased programme activities directed at youth at risk. ii) Psychosocial assistance directed at adolescents and families. iii) Prevention of drugs and alcohol consumption.

Intervention

Act upon the risk factors lead to youth violence, gender violence and problems

Objective

Types and Objectives of prevention programmes

Social Prevention centred on the family, the school or the community

Table 6.7.

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Barrio Seguro Programme and Social Prevention and Live in Peace in Dominican Republic , (Vanderschueren et al. 2009; Mockus, Murraín and Villa 2012; Basombrío 2012; De Lima and de Paula 2012)

Bogota and Medellin in Colombia Diadema and Pernambuco in Brazil San Salvador, Santa Tecla, and Sonsonate in El Salvador

Programme for the Prevention of Recidivism in Adults in four prison units: Colina I, Colina II, CP Valparaíso y El Manzano, Chile 109

Remote control sanctions (Di Tella, y Schargrodsky 2009)

Preventive Measures Unit for Adolescents of Morelos, Mexico (UMECA)108

(Felbab-Brown (2011)

Juan Bobo Urban Project, Nuevo Sol de Oriente Commune, Northeast Medellin, 2001 (Alvarado and Abizanda 2010)

Barrio Adentro-Altos de San Lorenzo Programmeof the Sub-Secretariat of Children and Adolescents of Argentina (CESC, 2011)

Chile Grows with You 107

Examples

131

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

A requirement for a prevention programme’s effectiveness is specific targeting at groups or places that show significant crime levels or risk factors. An example of targeting is the 24-hour Programme for Comprehensive Security for Boys, Girls, and Adolescents in Chile. In principle, it aimed to establish a timely and effective exchange of information between the municipalities and the Carabinero police. In effect, it contributed to the municipalities’ developing a psychosocial intervention methodology to attend all those younger than 18 who had been recorded at a police unit (ONU-Habitat y Universidad Alberto Hurtado de Chile 2010). In 2010, the programme was renamed New Life (Vida Nueva), the result of joint efforts between the Subsecretariat of the Carabineros, the Office for Family Protection of the CarabinerosDiprofam, and the National Service for Minors. In its original design, it had planned for a three-year pilot project, and aimed to structure and articulate a public and private attention network related to the problem of children whose rights had been violated or who were juvenile offenders. Beginning in January 2012, a major socio-criminal dimension was added to the analyses of children identified as offenders, to identify their exposure to socio-criminal risk. For treatment, they were provided with Multisystemic Therapy (Monreal, Neira and Olavarría 2012; Frühling 2011). The evaluation indicates that those who successfully completed some of the attention programmes showed 61% less returns to the police unit, in comparison with those who had not

Box 6.7. Social urbanism principles applied in Medellin • Action through comprehensive urban projects, implemented in areas with high levels of social exclusion. • Provision of broad ranges of cultural and educational activities in disadvantaged areas. • New social housing and housing improvement programmes for the most vulnerable sectors. Included are alternatives for relocation for families in highrisk zones. • Recovery of public spaces as a fundamental value, through intensive programmes that include boulevards, parks, and emblematic streets that reconnect these areas with the city. • Security and social peace efforts with citizens incorporated from the first stages of planning and design of comprehensive urban programmes. Source: UN- Habitat (2011).

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completed the programmes to the same extent (Monreal, Neira and Olavarría 2012, 33).

The capacity of the State and crime prevention The recognition of prevention programmes in the reduction of violence has expanded the repertoire of responses to confront violence in Latin America. The existing information shows that the number and kind of projects for preventive intervention have increased, and show positive management features. However, weakness in state capacity constitutes a significant obstacle to their effectiveness. A comprehensive security policy requires coordination between distinct levels of government. From an institutional point of view, the implementation of these programmes has been supported by the increasingly prominent role of the region’s local governments in crime prevention. This is a constant in the region, despite the fact that there are few countries whose local governments have constitutional responsibilities in the area of citizen security. In the great majority of countries, the responsibility for citizen security is in the hands of the national Executive branch, as is the case in Chile, Ecuador, and El Salvador. In countries that are organised federally, like Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, the responsibility for citizen security is, in some cases, shared by subnational entities, despite the fact that they have facilitated a municipal role in security issues, which allows them to carry out preventive activities at the local level. The local multisector programmes that are successful have tended to be concentrated in important municipalities and cities that have their own resources or have national budget support; they also have trained professionals to design and execute programmes, with sufficient political weight to forge collaborative links with public entities of a national character, such as the police and ministers in the social areas. The smallest municipalities have been significantly marginalized from this process (Dammert 2007). This explains why the cases of Bogota, Medellin, Diadema, Belo Horizonte, Peñalolén and Puente Alto are often mentioned as successful. The implementation of comprehensive policies of an intersectoral nature that complement crime control with preventive programmes requires quality information. The targeting of these programmes should be based on information on violence in the area, the victims’ vulnerability, or the presence of risk factors that suggest that crime will increase in the future. The initiatives often depend on the availability of international cooperation,

The countries with greater experience and bureaucratic capacity tend to have also greater institutional strength. As such, in the case of Colombia, the National Policy for Citizen Security and Coexistence, coordinated by the Presidential High Council for Citizen Security, focuses on the implementation of plans in 20 municipalities where the highest number of priority crimes are concentrated: homicides and robberies. The principal instruments for the local application of the policy are the Comprehensive Plans for Social Peace and Security that the local governments develop by law, with the advice of the Council (Alta ConsejerĂa Presidencial para la Convivencia y Seguridad Ciudadana 2011). Likewise, some preventive interventions in the region have experienced difficulties in shifting from a pilot phase to wider coverage programmes; they have even had problems to remain in operation over time. In addition, there are intervention areas that are clearly deficient in human and financial resources, reflected in the limited training of the staff in charge, poor financing of on-going programmes, and an absence of impact evaluations. The case of prevention programmes focused on adults or juvenile offenders is very clear in this respect: in general, penitentiaries are institutionally very weak, and the reintegration programmes have serious deficiencies. In the penitentiary systems, international experience shows that there are intervention models with positive results regarding the reintegration of inmates (Pantoja 2010). Among the activities that stand out are courses focused on helping inmates complete their studies, vocational workshops that aim to train them in a craft, treatment and harm reduction for addiction, as well as agreements with public or private enterprises to assist in their employment. However, preventive actions directed at juvenile offenders are still incipient, are not carried out in all countries, and their coverage is very limited. The successful implementation of preventive strategies rests on the professionalization of the personnel in charge of interventions, some of which are complex and costly, such as addiction treatment and the psychosocial intervention targeted at youth offenders. However, this personnel is scarce in the region; further, the treatments and interventions are expensive and in some cases need to be sustained over the long-term, which ob-

jectively limits reaching many beneficiaries. In the face of such limitations, these programmes often rely on methodologies that may not be effective: workshops, recreation or sports activities for youth, without the support of specialized psychosocial interventions (FrĂźhling 2012). Preventive interventions should build on knowledge derived from the evaluation of processes and impact. The majority of projects do appear to monitor the implementation processes. Impact evaluations compare information about crime at the time of the initiation of the project with that of the period following the intervention. However, this kind of evaluation is inadequate for identifying the factor that could explain the reduction of crime, in as much as the evidence is incomplete. Further, the capacity of the governments in the region to carry out impact evaluations is limited.

6 THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

on political circumstances or fortuitous conjunctures, which limits the effect, scope, and permanence of the initiatives. The lack of specialized personnel in the management of preventive projects results in the absence of clear standards that are commonly agreed upon and supervised with respect to compliance, ensuring the quality of the respective interventions (Abizanda et al. 2012).

A recent study on programmes that address youth violence in the region found that only 11 impact evaluations that were carried out and published on projects on Latin America and the Caribbean complied with the required technical standards (Moestue, Moestue y Muggah 2013). Another seven studies are being planned in Central America or have not yet been completed. For now, the available studies are focused on projects implemented in Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Jamaica. None of the studies was requested by a government: the majority were commissioned or published by an international organisation. In sum, some countries in the region are embarking on a promising path, but important problems persist that need to be solved. Among them are the limited awareness that exists in political and governmental circles regarding the possible impact of these programmes; a majority preference for punitive solutions to confront crime, which affects the political will to undertake preventive programmes; and the generalized assumption that only police action can achieve results in the short term.

Recommendations 1. Strengthen State capacities, placing the physical and material protection of persons, as well as respect for human rights, at the centre. It is imperative that decision makers change the parameters by which the success of a security policy is measured. Success cannot be measured solely by the reduction in crime levels, but rather by the capacity to do so without increasing the levels of existing violence and within a framework that guarantees the human rights of all citizens, including those who break the law.

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It is key that citizen security be developed as a State policy that transcends governmental periods. The appointment of a professional cabinet, with the necessary training and capacity for management in the security area, could contribute to ensure the continuity of security policies. It is necessary that State institutions democratize citizen security, through the inclusion of the non-state actors in the analysis, definition, evaluation, and auditing of public policies. The broad participation of actors that are representative of society can contribute to restoring and strengthening confidence in institutions, as well as provide important information on community priorities. 2. Modernize the police, bringing them closer to the citizenry. States need to implement police reform initiatives through plans with distinct stages, establishing clear objectives with indicators that permit evaluations for the short, medium, and long term. Community policing models should be developed with a view to a preventive function, with incentives and monitoring systems that allow some state officials to overcome their reluctance to change. Creating the necessary material and institutional conditions is essential for the police to function as a professional institution, that is both highly valued and respected, and that can offer its employees a lifetime career. It is important to democratise the processes of recruitment and to work systematically in the incorporation of a greater percentage of women and indigenous people in all areas of the police. The creation of specialised units to provide services to vulnerable groups, such as women, children, and indigenous people, is fundamental. The participation of the military in citizen security tasks should only take place under exceptional circumstances, within a framework of absolute respect for legality with strict civilian supervision. It should be accompanied by a feasible withdrawal plan and be subject to strict civilian supervision, ensuring respect for human rights and accountability.

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3. Strengthen the justice system, reducing impunity. Security system reforms need to be implemented in a balanced manner with justice system reforms, in order to avoid critical bottlenecks and the saturation of particular links in the justice chain. One of the principal keys to radically diminish impunity lies in the articulation between the police and the offices of the public procecutors. Judicial reforms should advance through a close and thoughtful dialogue between the State and diverse segments of civil society, from the associations that represent the legal profession, to the base-level organisations promoting civil rights, and on to academia. It is necessary to adjust upward the number of courts, with the aim of reducing the caseload and the pressure on the administration of justice. An important step in this direction is the establishing of physical offices of the judicial system in the communities affected by insecurity in the periphery of urban centres, to facilitate access to justice for the populations in these areas. It is imperative to guarantee the effective application of current laws to prevent and punish violence against women in the region, including the laws against domestic abuse and the laws related to feminicide. A gender focus across all the offices of the justice system should be seen as a core component of the strengthening of the system. Likewise, it is necessary to conduct an open debate and a profound and informed review of current penal frameworks and of proportionality in the approach to different crimes with respect to seriousness, to ensure more equitable justice administration and to strengthen legitimacy before society. 4. Transform the prison system. It is essential to abandon the idea of prison and harsher punishment as an alternative for security problems in the region. Prison should be considered a final recourse, and it should never be conceived of as a pivotal cornerstone of citizen security policy. The reduction of provisional detention and the adoption of alternative measures to incarceration, especially for minor crimes, are important steps to alleviate pressure in prisons and stop overcrowding in the prison system. It is necessary to review and reconsider the severity of the penalties applied to women and youth linked to crimes like micro trafficking in drugs.

The penitentiary systems require personnel with decent working conditions, professional training, and internal control systems to reduce cases of corruption and abuse. It is necessary to reinforce reintegration programmes that facilitate the socioeconomic incorporation of former prisoners and reduce the high rates of recidivism in many countries in the region.

THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

Conditions for women in detention should be substantially improved, as well as guaranteeing respect for their integrity and rights. 5. Make prevention a priority, with evidence-based programmes tailored to local realities. It is necessary to advance prevention through the designation of a responsible authority, with attributions of inter-sector policy coordination, as well as officials with the capacity to manage projects that are centred on groups or places at risk. It is important to transfer capacity to implement projects to all the municipalities, so that policies can be brought close to the communities. It is essential to have the human and financial resources to put into practice preventive actions in a sustainable way. The programmes that have proved most effective need to be able to scale up their coverage once pilot programmes have been shown to be successful. Resources should be assigned as a priority to the necessary professional specialisations for the effective implementation of preventive programmes in the field of psychosocial interventions, for the treatment for addictions and for attention to those being released from the prison system. It is important to generate data based on the prevention programmes underway in the region and disseminate their results as broadly as possible among the population. To achieve this, collaboration should be promoted with universities and research centres that have expert knowledge in the fields of indicator design, statistical analysis, and programme evaluation.

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Spider Girls, Luis Barrales, 2008

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In spite of citizens’ security being mainly a responsibility of the State, the participation and joint efforts of citizens are essential in guaranteeing that security is effective, democratic, and inclusive. In this chapter, we examine the responses to insecurity adopted by non-state actors (NSA) such as civil society organisations, the private sector, academia, and communications media. The report identifies three types of responses adopted by NSAs that have a direct impact on citizen security: functional responses, dysfunctional responses, and grey area responses (see Figure 7.1). Functional responses refer to actions that complying with human rights, complement or strengthen democracy and legitimate citizen security. This security should be provided by the State in collaboration with non-state actors and include counterbalancing mechanisms such as advocacy. Dysfunctional responses are mechanisms that in practice challenge the State’s monopoly use of legitimate violence and hence contribute to the reproduction of violence.

Figure 7.1.

Grey area responses, if they are well regulated, can contribute to improving citizen security. However, if they are not adequately managed, they can favour the reproduction of violence. Finally, we also examine the impact of communications media responses in strengthening, or weakening, functional responses and the process of building citizen security. The central arguments of this chapter are the following: • Women and men as citizens are the only actors that can demand, complement or dialogue with the State to ensure it offers authentic citizen security. Nevertheless, they should not replace the function of the State in providing security. • There are successful experiences and lesson to be learned with regard to NSA’s functional responses. These experiences can serve as examples of best practices for other NSAs and for the State. • The cooperation of the NSAs with state institutions and their accountability to citizens, are fundamental in establish-

Categories of responses to insecurity by non-state actors (NSA)

Responses to Insecurity by NSA

Communications Media

Functional

Complement the Responses of the State Prevention

Transfer of Knowledge and Resources

Grey Zone

Oversight and Advocacy on the Responses of the State Social Movements

Citizen Oversight and Advocacy

Dysfunctional

Neighborhood Watch Organisations

Lynchings

Private Security

Social Cleansing

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ing effective and legitimate citizen security policies in the democracies of the region. Governments have the central challenge of stopping or slowing the emergence of dysfunctional responses and ensuring that grey area responses are regulated. • The communications media have a core responsibility in guaranteeing democracy and citizen security. Because of this, they require adequate information management and effective protection by the State in order to contribute to security.

public in general, and aim to have an impact on public opinion. Because of this, they generally operate through the mass media, and frequently with its support 110.

This chapter is divided into five sections. The first three analyse possible responses to insecurity by non-state actors: functional, dysfunctional, and grey area responses. The fourth section examines communications media responses in relation to citizen security and the challenges they face in making a positive contribution to citizen security. The last section provides a series of recommendations.

Recently these types of campaign have increased the use of alternative communications media, such as blogs and social networks. New Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) are essential because of the way in which young people communicate and they have become “weapons of mass cooperation” that challenge the hierarchy of traditional communications media (Tapscott and Williams 2008). Both civil society organisations (CSOs) and private enterprises doing violence prevention campaigns use these new media. Examples of these include YouTube “viral” chains developed with campaigns like “Raise your voice against violence towards women” by the Avon Foundation in Mexico, or the international campaign by Civil Society Organisation networks against violence from the so-called war on drugs.

Functional responses for building security Functional responses complement or influence the provision of citizen security by the State through citizen participation and accountability mechanisms. Given the challenges faced by state institutions in Latin America, these types of initiatives are fundamental in strengthening institutions and guaranteeing citizen security. In this section, complementary responses and those involving citizens’ advocacy will be analysed, with emphasis on their achievements, benefits, limitations, and remaining challenges.

Responses that complement State policies Two large groups of citizens’ responses complement state actions: those that address violence and crime prevention, and those that contribute by generating information and knowledge. Citizens’ prevention Violence and crime prevention is the most visible arena of NSA actions in citizen security. In terms of prevention, information campaigns have played a fundamental role in warning citizens about the negative consequences of certain practices, while they also disseminate information about unnoticed types of violence and appeal to the citizens’ sense of responsibility. The main feature of these preventative campaigns is that they target the 140

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Some preventative campaigns at reducing triggers of crime, such as alcohol and drugs and the use of weapons. Others focus more on fighting prejudices and changing perceptions about issues related to insecurity, making violence against women or other vulnerable segments of the population more visible and contributing to its prevention.

In Latin America, high quality campaigns abound. In Argentina, the campaign called “Disarm domestic violence” aimed at getting authorities to outlaw the acquisition of weapons by people with histories as perpetrators of domestic violence 111. In Chile, a campaign was launched to create a National Commission on arms trade control 112. Other outstanding campaigns have been: Drug law: we must change, in Brazil, and “15 ideas for a new drugs law” in Argentina, that advocated the decriminalisation of narcotics consumption. Unfortunately, no measurements are available to quantify the effectiveness and impact of these campaigns. In Colombia, a project on new masculinities and new femininities began in 2011 in six Pacific coastal municipalities and three municipalities in the Nariño Mountains. The Bogota-based Men and Masculinities Collective, and the Nariño Growing Together Programme113 made a commitment to a strategy for cultural transformation, which provided the framework to develop the Masculinities, Peaceful Practices, and Gender Equality Project. The project implemented mobilisations for women’s rights and the campaign 16 Days of Activism and Non Violence towards Women. In both cases, young people have taken on a new leadership role in gender equality, and are promoting new gender identities with innovative methodologies using dance and music for action against machismo.

Various evaluations (Baires, Bermejo and Montalván 2010; Buvinic and Morrison 2002) suggest that community prevention functions in a more efficient way when: there is greater social cohesion in the neighbourhood or community, the implementing agent is perceived to be trustworthy, the external support is firm, the work highly professional, and the efforts are maintained over a long period. An example of this is the Construir Foundation (Bolivia) that focuses on preventing domestic violence against women and children, through women’s empowerment, the participation of civil society, and training for public servants. This CSO has maintained the continuity of its initiatives in violence prevention based on collaborative work with the communities and the government. This has allowed residents to take ownership of the project and for the organisation to develop its follow up work. Thanks to their straightforward methodology, best practices were shared with municipal governments in the programme’s areas of intervention, with the support of the Centre for Women’s Information and Development (CIDEM). This has allowed the Foundation’s initiative to increase its possibility for replication, ensure continuity, and generate impact, while strengthening the capacity of the State and civil society in providing citizens’ security (Latin America and Caribbean Bank of Best Crime Prevention Practices). Another form of prevention is individualised attention to people at risk, with outreach to people likely to become involved in criminal or violent activities—individuals with problems of drug or alcohol addiction, children or young people in conflict with the law, ex-convicts— and people who have been victims of violence. These programmes make an important contribution to social reinsertion and to strengthening a peaceful social fabric. At the same time, they share a decisive challenge: this work has a relatively high unit cost because it requires personalised attention. In very diverse Latin American contexts, young people are organising and are trying to build their own capacities in order to confront adverse situations and deal with poverty and insecurity. In many cases, these efforts have the support of a wide range of civil society organisations. These initiatives have a positive impact in terms of “resilience”, that is, the capacity of the young people themselves to face adversity and try to build alternatives for personal development and social inclusion.

Some of these initiatives include young people at risk through their direct participation as volunteers. In exchange they receive technical training to create their own microenterprises and reintegrate into society. This is the experience of Youth Builders (Jóvenes Constructores) who began their project in El Salvador in 2009 115. Another example is Grupo Ceiba, in Guatemala. It offers training for young people in situations of vulnerability through its Educational Enterprise Programme. Participants are trained in technical and small business skills, as well as basic English, to facilitate their insertion into the workplace or in developing their own businesses. The programme’s evaluations indicate that its participants have attained a 50% insertion into the workplace, 10% higher than the average for Latin America116 (Central American Coalition for the Prevention of Youth Violence, CCPVJ 2009, 43-50).

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There are also specific CSO-designed or supported programmes focused on violence prevention in key areas or neighbourhoods. These programmes tend to emerge through alliances between state and non-state actors. The CSOs involved perform very diverse tasks, but they tend to be especially active on two fronts: home visits and workshops with adolescents and parents 114. Workshops include talks on security and co-existence or sports and arts programmes aimed at young people.

In Honduras, the JHA JA Civil Association (Jóvenes Hondureños Adelante, Juntos Avancemos) stands out in sponsoring initiatives and proposing alternative opportunities for children and young people, particularly among those involved in gangs. This association has generated several programmes to strengthen the capacities and self-esteem of youth participants. Its work has contributed on a national level to a reduction in the levels of violence and addiction and to the prevention of key risk factors. JHA JA Civil Association has also achieved an important impact in terms of the social reintegration of young Hondurans at risk (Photo 7.1). Another of the pathways used by civilian youth organisations has been popular music. This is the case of the Brazilian Afro Reggae Group that seeks to promote inclusion and social justice through art, Afro-Brazilian culture, and education projects in the most conflictive areas of the country. They see music and art as instruments for creating bridges between different social groups and for strengthening children’s and young people’s ability to exercise their citizenship. BARG offers an alternative lifestyle to young people by introducing them into the world of music, art, and dance and including among its activities contortionist shows, circus, urban art, music, football, waste recycling, and capoeira 117. With respect to preventing gender violence, a group of women called Solidarity Promoters of the Women’s Commissariat (of the Police) in Nicaragua work in forming alliances with neighbourhood organisations to provide support for victims of gender violence. The majority of this group’s members have been victims of violence themselves. Their actions in prevention, education, and risk detection have increased women’s knowledge of their rights and have contributed to a rise in formal REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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Photo 7.1.

aw into one’s America, 2012

e nd

Would approve 15.8 26.2 14.0 8.8 19.1 12.3 25.0 28.9 29.5 37.3 14.6 17.9 10.2 13.7 23.3 26.6 20.9 18.1 20.1

e of this person being killed; or rstand it?

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“Life not Arms”

observatory carries out quantitative and qualitative analysis on femicides, violence against women, and sexual enslavement and trafficking of women 118.

Other observatories are linked to universities, as is the case of the Observatory on Violence of the University Institute for Development, Peace, and Security (IUDPAS) and the National Autonomous University of Honduras. For the last 10 years, this observatory has been systematising and analysing information about insecurity based on data that have been gathered and validated Photograph: JHA JA Organisation, Honduras (CCPVJ 2009, 61). with different government institutions 119. Under this method, useful information is produced to improve the understanding of accusations of gender-based violence. Among its main achieve- the problem and to contribute to decision-making. One of the ments is the timely detection of cases of domestic and sexual contributions of this observatory is the definition of unified criviolence and the expansion of coverage to attend to a greater teria that allows for the homologation, refining, validation, and number of victims—including men— in all those places where registering of information about criminal activities collected by government institutions. Periodically, the Honduran Violence the women’s Commissariats exist. Observatory produces bulletins about insecurity and publicaIn spite of these achievements, there is still a lack of consistent tions on specific acts of violence against the population living situationsfor of taking vulnerability. evaluations in order to measure more accurately the effective- ofinapproval Percentage the Moreover, through UNDP support Table 7.3.initiatives lawtointo one’s for own faced thehands initiative, thewith Observatory has been providing technical ness of these experiences. In order for these be repLatin America, aid in establishing other regional observatories on licated, clear methodologies are crucial, along with abuse, processes to support to2012 Would not violence, Wouldthus not strengthening build close relationship with the communities and foster collabWoulda culture for the evidence-based approve nor design approve but policies.approve of public oration with the authorities. The success of these programmes understand is also closely tied to strengthening technical capacities inside would understand 36.8promoted the creation of observa38.6 sector has also 24.5 The business and outside of the organisations,Argentina in order to ensure their institu46.4 of commerce. In Colombia, the 31.5 diverse chambers 22.1 tories through tional cohesion and transparencyBolivia (CCPVJ 2009). 33.3 created observatories in Bogota 34.2of commerce have chambers 32.5 Brazil (Bogota36.7 Chamber of Commerce Transfer of knowledge and resources 33.1 2013) and Barranquilla (Barran30.2 Chile quilla Chamber of Commerce 33.9 2013). In Panama, the Chamber of 36.7 29.4 Colombia Commerce, Agriculture of Panama has created an In addition to the contributions inCosta prevention, NSAs can comple31.4 Industry, and26.5 42.0 Rica 120 Observatory on Citizen Security . This public-private alliance ment State delivery of citizen security by generating and analys40.5 33.7 25.8 Ecuador decided to create a specialised space in which to gather and ing security-related information,Eland collaborating directly26.4 with 37.9 35.7 Salvador systematise useful data and information for orienting citizen state institutions in staff training and professionalization. 34.9 39.1 26.1 Guatemala security. While they employ official data —gathered from the 42.4 37.5 20.1 Honduras NSAs provide information for public debate and for security continuously updated administrative records of the Integrated 28.1 31.7 System for Criminal Statistics (SIEC), the National Police policies through information andMexico data gathering and with the National40.2 32.2 36.2 Nicaragua Judicial Investigation (DIJ)—, the inproduction of primary statistics from surveys. Most surveys seek and the Director’s Office of31.6 21.3 with surveys on victimization and 37.4is complemented 41.3in- formation to register or measure levels of Panama victimisation and perceived 34.5 (Observatory on Citizen Security 24.3 41.2 or the social perception of security security, but can also evaluate aParaguay government’s performance 121 52.0 27.2 20.8 Peru Panama 2012) . public approval levels for a specific policy. More comprehensive research about a particular threat —such Republic as domestic violence 35.8 39.7 24.6 Dominican Transparency is key in guaranteeing the legitimacy of the obor corruption— can make theseUruguay problems more visible. 21.5 40.0 38.5 servatories, firms, and academic institutions. By 33.8 38.7 public opinion 27.5 Venezuela making their funding sources As well as gathering data, some Regional observatories, research centres, 35.7 public, they are contributing to an 35.2 29.1 average informed and democratic debate about citizen security. Some and universities produce relevant analysis about citizen secuSource: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). Note: Question: a person killed someone who had raped theirare daughter son, would examples theorCentre foryouPolitical, Economic, and Social Studrity and its evolution in the region. Some Suppose of these observatories approve of them killing the rapist; would you not approve of them being killed but understand it; or would ies (CEPES) and the Centre for Research on Economic and Social originated in civil society. In theyouDominican Republic, for examnot approve of them being killed nor understand it? Reality (CERES) in Uruguay, both of which are sponsored by a ple, the Women and Health Collective runs the Observatory on Women’s Exercise of Citizenship. Among other activities, this considerable number of private firms. (Garcé and Uña 2010).

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In addition to the production and analysis of information, NSAs complement the work of state institutions in sharing their technical expertise and in reinforcing the capacities of the state. For example, in Monterrey, Mexico, the human resources divisions of the city’s main businesses have put together an investigation and selection process for hiring new police officers in the state of Nuevo Leon (Moncada 2013a). In this way, the resources and technical capacities of the business sector can complement and strengthen the capacity of the state in ensuring its public policy implementation. Businesses also have direct participation in building public security programmes. In Cali, Colombia, during the 1990s, some local businesses collaborated extensively with the national government and with security officers in designing local security policies (Moncada 2013b). At that moment, the Cali municipal government faced serious institutional and financial challenges, derived in part from the penetration of the Cali cartel in local governments, the economy, and society at large. In response to this scenario, the city’s business elites and governmental institutions worked in close coordination with the national government to strengthen the local and regional economies. At the same time they interacted with the police and military to confront threats to local security. Businesses have also offered their support to state security forces throughout the region, with some basic inputs such as vehicles or gasoline (Ungar 2011). For example, beginning in the first decade of this century, the Bogota Chamber of Commerce has provided key financial support for the Secure Areas (Zonas Seguras) programme (Llorente and Rivas 2005). The role of businesses in strengthening public institutions is important. However, it also opens up questions about the appropriate limits or reaches of NSA’s responsibilities. Transparency, citizen monitoring, and accountability mechanisms are basic to ensuring that the contribution of resources helps strengthen

state institutions rather than appropriating them for special interests (Moncada 2013b). In addition to the private sector, citizens themselves, usually organised in neighbourhood associations, can give direct support to the authorities to guaranteeing citizen security in their communities. Among other activities, citizens have organised to install railings in their neighbourhoods, hire security guards, and offer talks or sports activities especially for children and young people. The experiences of neighbourhood committees or associations show that these organisations tend to have difficulties that typically arise from collective action (Arriagada 2003, 573), that is, their activities tend to be short term and with low levels of investment. This limits them in being able to address more complex problems or more expensive security needs. Moreover, neighbourhood organising and their activities and efficacy tend to diminish when levels of violence are high and the social fabric is very fragmented —that is, precisely when collective action is most needed— (Dammert 2011, 7).

7 THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

Other sources of information that provide quantitative data about criminal incidents or specific crimes, are telephone help lines or open access websites, as well as the monitoring of local media.122 Although these sources encourage citizens to report crimes and violence —sometimes with the backing of recognised institutions123—, they face evident risks in terms of coverage, subjectivity of informants, and the bias of whoever compiles the information. Because their criteria are not subject to outside scrutiny, the numbers they produce are open to debate. This is especially so when dealing with information that the State should be handling and in contexts of political polarisation,124 of crimes that affect powerful interests125 or minority groups 126.

Citizen’s advocacy and social auditing In order to respond to the challenge of violence and crime, governments need to establish state-delivered citizen security policies. In the context of democracy, this requires the active participation of citizens in defining these policies and ensuring their correct implementation (WOLA 2006; Tapia Álvarez 2010, 8). Citizen’s advocacy and social auditing responses may pertain to two categories depending on the effect they generate—or seek to generate—in state institutions: mobilisation and lobbying. Mobilisation and social movements Given that insecurity in the region is increasing, actions tend to be developed —with different levels of organisation and duration— to demand that authorities address critically unsafe situations. Social mobilisation—by definition— is not constant and lacks the clear institutional aims or resources that enable greater continuity. In general, mobilisations occur after acts of violence or criminality that become symbols of ill-being or of tiredness with repeated problems. When the Honduran police killed the son of the president of the National Autonomous University in October 2011, it unleashed a wave of citizens’ protests.127 In Chile, the indignation caused by the brutal murder of young Daniel Zamudio in March 2012 made the government pass a stronger REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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law against discrimination and turned Zamudio into a symbol against homophobic violence in his country and in the region 128 . In 2009, the kidnapping of a Colombian child gave birth to the “march of a million voices” against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC). In Mexico, the kidnapping of a young businessman led his mother to create the civil association 129. In Dominican Republic, the murder of young Vanessa Ramírez Fallas in 2006 led her family members to create a foundation that promotes the culture of peace among young people. Between 2008 and 2010, many marches for peace and non-violence were held in Latin America 130. Often, social mobilisations express people’s weariness and indignation about violence, as well as their repudiation of criminals. The State itself has also been the object of recriminations, due to either corruption or the passivity of authorities in addressing insecurity.

Libre de Violence contra las Mujeres)133 In this sense, women’s networks are articulating these kinds of efforts around specific agendas in alliances between organisations and institutions at a national level but also in connection with others throughout the Latin American region.

In contrast, social movements defending the rights or aspirations of particular sectors of the population tend to be more lasting and institutionalised than spontaneous citizens’ mobilizations. Social movements tend to bring together people who are organised because they share a cohesive sense of identity and common interests, and who are attempting to demonstrate the validity of their demands in a sustained and constant way (Tarrow and Tilly 2009, 442). In other words, although it may be arise from an accumulation of citizens’ mobilisations, a social movement is a more long-term phenomenon. It is not limited to the street, but exerts pressure on the state by other means (Tarrow 1997, 19).

Movements of victims or families of victims have also proliferated in the region. Some arose during transitions to democracy, as a result of the mass disappearances carried out by military governments in the Southern Cone and in Central America. In almost all countries, these organisations continue to denounce murders, rapes, and disappearances, as well as protesting impunity or government inaction in clearing up or prosecuting people for crimes attributed to the police or other state actors. In Argentina the protests, accusations, and monitoring of trials organised to pressure state governments, have had some success in achieving sanctions against guilty parties (Pereyra 2012).

In particular, women’s movements have been growing in Latin America 131. They are making the problem of violence against women more visible, especially sexual and domestic. Women’s movements tend to adopt a holistic focus, referring not only to the direct forms of violence women face due to their gender, but also to structural forms of violence, that exclude and limit women in the workplace, for example, and forms of symbolic violence that normalise gender violence. With regards to femicide, these movements have proposed legal reforms and specific immediate demands. In Mexico, two examples are the Mexican Social Movement (Movimiento Social Mexiquense) in the State de Mexico and the organisation Our Daughters Return Home (Nuestras Hijas de Regreso a Casa) in Ciudad Juárez 132. Other examples include Peruvian women’s organisations that made femicide a statutory offence in 2011; or women’s organisations in Guatemala that achieved legal sanctions against this crime through a special law (ACSUR 2008). In El Salvador, after a multitudinous march to the National Assembly in 2010, women achieved the approval by a wide margin of lawmakers to establish the Special Integral Law for Life without Violence against Women (Ley Especial Integral por una Vida 144

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In terms of gender violence, LGBT movements also stand out, for example, the Movement for Homosexual Integration and Liberation (MOVILH) in Chile, and the Strategic Group for the Human Rights for Sexual Diversity (GEDDS - Grupo Estratégico por los Derechos Humanos de la Diversidad Sexual) in Nicaragua. Both are involved in struggles to make the rights of their communities more visible, and in speaking out about the risks and forms of violence they face due to discrimination based on sexual identity.

In recent years, diverse movements have arisen involving the victims of the growing spiral of violence linked to organised crime, guerrilla or paramilitary movements in the region, as well as of some governments that have taken hard-line measures to fight these security threats. In this context, the families of victims have affirmed that they are “legitimate” actors in the legal and political arenas in preventing crime from intensifying. Through its networking with other citizens’ coalitions, the Mexican National Victims Movement has created bridges for dialogue between different sectors and has contributed to developing and sustaining specific proposals for citizen security, including the approval of the country’s General Law for Victims (Centro de Colaboración Cívica 2010; Concha 2012). In conclusion, the main achievement of these citizens’ mobilisation and social movements consists in having made the population’s situation of insecurity visible and in bringing it to the attention of government authorities and public opinion. While generally speaking they function in the short term, citizens’ mobilisations express discontent with the and serve to denounce threats to their security (Serbin 2008, 156-158). Some of the actions organised by social movements have managed to transcend over time —and in their impact— because of their

vate sector can take advantage of its investigative know-how to promote their points of view. For example, business associations in Bogota, in Guatemala City, in Buenos Aires, and in Monterrey sponsor surveys that are frequently broadcast by the media, together with criticism, on occasion, of current policies and recommendations for improving them (Moncada 2013a).

Lobbying Transparency and accountability are extremely important, given the unequal power for advocacy of the different social actors, as well as the presence, in some areas of the region, of illegal actors with wide ranging influence. Strict norms and careful control mechanisms must be established over electoral finances, and funding for the police should be covered with taxes rather than direct donations.

Lobbying is another method used by citizens individually and collectively as a tool to ensure that their security needs and interests are represented in decision-making processes (Bobbio 1985). In a democratic context, it is essential for governments to maintain active listening and open dialogue with citizens, in order to understand how insecurity affects different social actors in direct but distinct ways. In this sense, security agendas and policies must be open to advocacy by citizens. At the same time, citizens have the duty and the right to participate, defend their interests, and position their concerns and proposals.

Dysfunctional responses for building security

Nevertheless, the interests of a particular group in terms of security issues are not necessarily adequate for the whole of society. There are corrupt and violent ways of influencing the state and these include attempts to co-opt the state in order to serve the security needs of a particular group to the detriment of the rest of the citizenry. As a consequence, this type of influence may generate —or increase— dynamics of exclusion in accessing security, depending on the power of special interest groups in furthering their particular agenda. These dynamics become even more complex in contexts where illegal actors, such as organised crime, have a wide-ranging influence in the communications media and in governments.

Not all strategies by non-state actors are legal nor do they contribute to building inclusive security for all the inhabitants of the region. Given the growing environment of fear, the stigmatisation of certain social groups, and the normalisation or legitimisation of a culture of violence that lets people take the law into their own hands, the citizenry may adopt dysfunctional responses. These are actions aiming at providing security that because of their very nature tend to reproduce violence and usurp the punitive authority of the state. This line of reasoning will be developed by looking at two dysfunctional responses to insecurity that, in different places, eventually attain a certain social legitimacy: lynching and “social cleansing”.

In the majority of Latin American countries, the private sector has advantages over other NSA in being able to advance its interests through lobbying. One common way of exercising this influence is by holding private meetings with high-level officials (police chiefs, mayors, governors, and even presidents) to discuss security conditions, exchange confidential information, seek ideas, and achieve commitments from the state. These meetings can also be part of “campaigns” to demand specific interventions from the state. On other occasions, business people try to wield their influence by importing “model” strategies from other countries. For example, business people from Guatemala City have invited mayors and police officials from other countries to instruct and advise them about legal reforms they consider to have been successful 134. As well as having direct dialogue with public authorities, business people also attempt to influence public opinion. Because of their preferential access to the communications media, the pri-

7 THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

ability to define clearly their denunciations, demand prompt action from the State, and carry out effective advocacy with institutions. In preventing the reproduction of violence in Latin America, it is vital that these protests maintain their autonomy and avoid becoming criminalised.

Lynchings Lynchings are a public act of collective violence against assumed perpetrators of crimes (Snodgrass 2002, 640). Although no reliable numbers are available,135 recent reports and studies indicate that lynching is particularly predominant in poor neighbourhoods throughout the region and is on the increase (Santamaría 2012; Centro de Noticias ONU 2011; Notimex 2012; El Diario, El Editorial 2012). Lynching tends to occur when people are surprised in fraganti or are singled out for committing common crimes such as child abuse, rape, hold-ups, kidnappings, or ordinary robberies. Lynching is a summary and arbitrary way of passing “judgement” about the responsibility for specific crimes. In the minds of its perpetrators, lynching is a necessary form of justice because the state apparatus does not function (Santamaría 2012). REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

145

Insecurity by NSA

THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

Its intention, on the one hand, is to mete out punishment (or Social cleansing vengeance), on the other to dissuade other potential offenders. Communications This idea ofMedia judgement explainsFunctional why lynching is public (to the Grey Zone Dysfunctional point of being filmed and given to the communications media) Some citizens seek to gain greater security for themselves —or 136 . It also explains why sometimes the mob will turn over the do justice— through actions of “social cleansing”, by using scare Complement the and tactics or eliminating orNeighborhood expelling “prisoner” to the authorities after a beating. A studyOversight on lynchWatch stigmatised people. In some Lynchings Responses of Advocacy on the Organisations places, state actors themselves may be involved in this “cleansing in Ecuador that in a third of the cases, the person theconcludes State Responses of the State detained is handed over to the police. However, in a similar per- ing” by the illegal use of force against suspected criminals or by permitting the reproduction of this practice within communities centage of cases, theTransfer group isof not willing to do this, and there Citizen Social Knowledge and Oversight Prevention Social Cleansing (Cruzand2011). Other casesPrivate includeSecurity urban restructuring operations have been cases where the population has gone to police sta- Advocacy Movements Resources tions where the suspects are being held in order to drag them that provoke the displacement of people (Dossiê da articulaçao nacional dos comités populares da copa 2011). out and lynch them (Santillán 2008).

Table 7.1.

Percent who accept taking the law into one’s own hands, Latin America, 2012 Disapprove

Approve

Argentina

82.3

17.7

Bolivia

69.6

30.4

Brazil

86.6

13.4

Chile

80.5

19.5

Colombia

77.8

22.2

Costa Rica

84.8

15.2

Ecuador

62.4

37.6

El Salvador

65.6

34.4

Guatemala

66.2

33.8

Honduras

77.7

22.3

Mexico

77.8

22.2

Nicaragua

68.8

31.2

Panama

88.7

11.3

Paraguay

76.9

23.1

Peru

71.3

28.7

Dominican Republic

65.1

34.9

Uruguay

83.4

16.6

Venezuela

85.1

14.9

Total

76.1

23.9

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). Note: Question: To what extent do you approve or disapprove of people taking the law into their own hands when the state doesn’t punish criminals?

146

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Knowledge gathering about the dimension and modus operandi of this phenomenon is a complex task. In Colombia, Mexico, and Central America reported cases of these occurrences have been particularly visible. In Colombia, there have been denunciations of extrajudicial executions of young people (Coalition against linking girls, boys, and young people to the armed conflict in Percentage of approval Colombia 2008), as well as of human trade unTablerights 7.2.defenders, hands when faced with ionists, and journalists (High Commissioner for Human Rights of the United Nations February 2012 Week 2012). Would not approve understand These acts are generally carried out against groups innorsitua-

tions of vulnerability, such as Argentina members of rejected minorities 47.7 in a community, or groups thatBolivia are marginalised or stigmatised 32.8 because of their identity, for example, LGBT people, sex workBrazil 52.6 ers (Brown 2009), drug users, homeless people (Pérez García Chile 2011). In contrast with 59.9 2003) or small-scale criminals (Samayoa 37.9 lynching, the object here is not Colombia the punishment of the perpetrator of a crime, but the removal ofCosta people because they belong to Rica 66.7 a social minority. In this sense,Ecuador social cleansing is a hate crime, 35.7 often with the complicity or passivity of neighbours and authorEl Salvador 32.3 ities (UNDP 2009). Guatemala

27.7

Honduras 22.4 “Taking the law into one’s own hands”, which can refer to private acts of vengeance as well as collective Mexico acts involving lynching, 45.4 has considerable social acceptance in Latin America. Of those Nicaragua 46.6 surveyed in the LAPOP-UNDP (2012) study, 23.9% approve of Panama 61.5 people taking the law into their own hands when the State does 62.4 not punish criminals (see Table Paraguay 7.1). Peru

36.9

The LAPOP survey added threeDominican hypothetical situations to this Republic 32.6 general question. The first situation was: “If someone kept the Uruguay 42.7 community in a state of fear andVenezuela someone else killed him or her, 37.9 would you approve of this person being killed? Would you not Regional average 43.5 approve of them being killed but understand it; or would you LAPOP-UNDP (2012). not approve of them beingSource: killed nor understand it?” One out of Note: Question: If someone kept the community in a state of fear and someone else kille five surveyed would approve killing (see Table 7.2) and it; or would you not approv wouldof youthis not approve of them being killed but understand more than 70% would at least understand it.

Grey Zone

ght and y on the of the State

Dysfunctional

The second question was: “Suppose a person killed someone who had raped their daughter or son, would you approve of them killing theNeighborhood rapist; would you not approve of them being Watch killed but understand it; or would you not approve of Lynchings them beOrganisations ing killed nor understand it?” In this case, 36% of Latin Americans approve of vengeance (see Table 7.3).

nor understand it?” Here approval descends to 13.8%, but 30.1% would “understand it” (see Table 7.4).

social cleansing, that is, kill people that some consider to be undesirable, would you approve of killing people considered undesirable; would you not approve of them being killed but understand it; or would you not approve of them being killed

or may even reproduce violence. However, it is not possible to catalogue them clearly as dysfunctional responses, because they use legal tools to ensure security, and when they are well regulated, they can contribute to building security.

“Life not Arms”

“Grey area” responses: the importance of their regulation

Citizen Oversight and Private Security Social Cleansing Responses in the “grey area” are those that cannot be classified as Advocacy The third question was: “If a group of people begin to carry out functional as they can generate inequalities in accessing security

012

Table 7.2.

n hands

sing for

7 THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

Photo 7.1.

Percentage of approval of taking the law into one’s hands when faced with threats, Latin America, 2012 Would not approve nor understand

Would not approve but would understand

Would approve

Argentina

47.7

36.4

15.8

Bolivia

32.8

41.0

26.2

Brazil

52.6

33.4

14.0

Chile

59.9

31.2

8.8

Colombia

37.9

43.1

19.1

Costa Rica

66.7

21.0

12.3

Ecuador

35.7

39.3

25.0

El Salvador

32.3

38.8

28.9

Guatemala

27.7

42.8

29.5

Honduras

22.4

40.3

37.3

Mexico

45.4

40.1

14.6

Nicaragua

46.6

35.5

17.9

Panama

61.5

28.3

10.2

Paraguay

62.4

23.9

13.7

Peru

36.9

39.8

23.3

Dominican Republic

32.6

40.8

26.6

Uruguay

42.7

36.4

20.9

Venezuela

37.9

44.0

18.1

Regional average

43.5

36.4

20.1

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). Note: Question: If someone kept the community in a state of fear and someone else killed him or her, would you approve of this person being killed; or would you not approve of them being killed but understand it; or would you not approve of them being killed nor understand it?

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

147

THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

ne’s 2012

Table 7.3.

uld approve

Percentage of approval for taking the law into one’s own hands faced with abuse, Latin America, 2012 Would not approve nor understand

Would not approve but would understand

Would approve

15.8

Argentina

24.5

38.6

36.8

26.2

Bolivia

22.1

31.5

46.4

14.0

Brazil

32.5

34.2

33.3

8.8

Chile

30.2

36.7

33.1

19.1

Colombia

29.4

36.7

33.9

12.3

Costa Rica

42.0

31.4

26.5

25.0

Ecuador

25.8

33.7

40.5

28.9

El Salvador

26.4

35.7

37.9

29.5

Guatemala

26.1

39.1

34.9

37.3

Honduras

20.1

37.5

42.4

14.6

Mexico

31.7

40.2

28.1

17.9

Nicaragua

36.2

32.2

31.6

10.2

Panama

41.3

37.4

21.3

13.7

Paraguay

41.2

24.3

34.5

23.3

Peru

20.8

27.2

52.0

26.6

Dominican Republic

24.6

39.7

35.8

20.9

Uruguay

21.5

38.5

40.0

18.1

Venezuela

27.5

38.7

33.8

20.1

Regional average

29.1

35.2

35.7

eing killed; or

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). Note: Question: Suppose a person killed someone who had raped their daughter or son, would you approve of them killing the rapist; would you not approve of them being killed but understand it; or would you not approve of them being killed nor understand it?

munities where collaboration is limited to a “watch committee”137 that informs police about possible threats to security. In other cases, “neighbourhood councils” are created and receive some training from the police,138 and give informal advice and provide some logistical support to police officers —for example, through the relationships among residents or the organiNeighbourhood or community watch sation of telephone chains in response to emergencies— (El 139population that organisations Percentage of the Tiempo 2012) . In general, these neighbours’ organisations Table 7.5. aim to support police planning processes to ensure attention their America, to protection, priority areasLatin identified by the2012 community, prevent or avoid In several Latin American countries, the police organise groups crime, and improve trust of the community in the authorities Yes No of residents to support them in their work. There are also com- (Dammert 2002, 5). To illustrate the lessons and impact of these types of responses for the security of thepopulation in the Latin American region, two key examples of the grey area are analysed below: community watch institutions and private security firms.

148

Private security R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT guards

2013 -2014

Argentina

37.0

63.0

Bolivia

51.9

48.1

Brazil

20.7

79.3

Chile

26.3

73.7

7 Degree of approval of social cleansing for people some consider undesirable, Latin America, 2012

Table 7.4.

Would not approve nor understand

Would not approve but would understand

Argentina

75.9

18.3

5.8

Bolivia

43.3

37.4

19.3

Brazil

67.7

23.5

8.8

Chile

77.0

18.3

4.7

Colombia

46.1

37.2

16.7

Costa Rica

78.9

16.2

4.9

Ecuador

44.6

34.4

21.0

Joint work with local residents is the best way to gather information, facilitate prevention, and increase, in this manner, the efficiency of police work. From this perspective, the councils or neighbourhood security committees are an instrument of what is called the “community police” —although this is a broader and more complex model—, and their success depends on certain conditions.

El Salvador

41.7

36.6

21.8

Guatemala

29.2

43.2

27.6

Honduras

29.5

38.5

32.0

Mexico

58.3

32.8

8.8

Nicaragua

50.9

35.0

14.1

Panama

68.6

24.1

7.3

Paraguay

73.6

18.8

7.7

Some of the conditions that councils or neighbourhood security committees require in order to function and ensure security, are the following: there must be trust and fluidity in the relationship between police and citizens; the institution needs to be decentralised in order to adapt and respond to each community; rank and file police and officers need to be trained and motivated to do specialised and demanding work; there needs to be a good relationship with “hardcore” units or activities (judicial police, arrests of suspects, organised crime); the programme needs to be lasting and extensive —which implies a large staff—; and controls must be in place to avoid abuses by neighbours or state actors (Skogan 2006). In the absence of these conditions —as evidenced by multiple studies in countries where the “community police” has been taken on in a serious way—, the neighbourhood committees are no more than a public relations gesture or even worse, run the risk of becoming a threat to citizen security (Mastrofski 2006; Frühling 2007 and 2013).

Peru

44.4

37.6

17.9

Dominican Republic

53.2

35.2

11.6

Uruguay

76.3

15.9

7.8

Venezuela

49.2

39.0

11.8

Regional average

56.1

30.1

13.8

Would approve

THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

However, these initiatives may create risks for citizen security, by establishing, for example, gun-carrying neighbourhood “patrols” that carry out searches for which they are not authorised or qualified, make unsubstantiated denunciation or commit abuses as an organisation in order to settle personal scores of their members. The Guatemala Human Rights Committee has expressed its concern that the country’s local security councils —originally constituted to prevent crime— are replacing State functions related to territorial control and the use of force; according to information confirmed by the Committee, these councils commit abuses and violations of the law 140. In Peru, rural patrols have been criticised for using “not very conventional methods” for imposing sanctions on people detained by them under suspicion of crimes, and for abusing their power (Gitglitz 1991).

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). Note: Question: If a group of people begin to carry out social cleansing, that is, kill people that some consider to be undesirable, would you approve of killing people considered undesirable; would you not approve of them being killed but understand it; or would you not approve of them being killed nor understand it?

Private security: private guards and bearing arms

ing hired at an estimated growth rate of 10% per year (Ungar 2007, 20). In many cases, this has meant an imbalance between the relative sizes of public and private security services. Despite high levels of under-registration, the imbalance in Latin America between police officers and private security guards is much greater than that in the developed countries (Mota 2010). In fact, in some cases one could speak of a “hypertrophy” of private security, especially in those Latin American countries where — due to a lack of effective security guarantees from the State, or its absence— armed citizens themselves are assuming neighbourhood or community watch services.

Due to the growing perception of insecurity in Latin America, the expansion of the middle classes, and the “thinning out” of the State, increasing numbers of private security guards are be-

As Figure 7.2 indicates, there are 3,811,302 private guards and 2,616,753 police officers in the region. The most serious hypertrophy is in Guatemala, where 19,900 police officers have to attend to 12.7 million inhabitants and 120,000 private guards REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

149

THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

hands

Argentina

47.7

36.4

15.8

Bolivia

32.8

41.0

26.2

Brazil

52.6

33.4

14.0

Chile

59.9

31.2

8.8

42.8

29.5

protect those who hire them. Honduras follows, with 12,301 Colombia 37.9 police officers and 60,000 private guards - a proportion of 4.9 Costa Rica for every police officer 66.7 there are 2.1 private to 1. In Nicaragua, Ecuador guards. Outside of Central America, 35.7 Colombia had 119,000 police officers as compared to 119,146 private El Salvador 32.3 guards (2005-2007), and Argentina, Guatemala120,000 and 150,000, 27.7respectively (2007). It is important to highlight cases such as that of Bolivia, where only Honduras 22.4 500 private security guards exist, compared to 19,365 police of45.4 ficers,Mexico even though some ethnographic studies have registered a Nicaragua 46.6 considerable increase in private security (Goldstein 2005).

guards” that are directly hired by households; and (d) neigh19.1 43.1 bourhood watchmen hired by the residents of less wealthy 12.3 in patrolling the area. There is, then, 21.0neighbourhoods who help 39.3a diverse and complex 25.0 market in private security, hence gener28.9 38.8alisations should be avoided.

It is certainly true that security is a legitimate industry and in 37.3 40.3 all Latin American countries there are reputable companies that 14.6 40.1 use state of the art technologies and adhere closely to the law. 17.9 of private security guards are infor35.5However, a large proportion Panama 10.2and “watchmen” who do not belong 28.3mal workers: “caretakers” 61.5 PrivateParaguay security agents in Latin America 13.7 or who are employed by small busi62.4 are the most armed in 23.9to any registered company the world, with a rate for arms possession per agent 10 times nesses that compete by paying low salaries and providing bad Peru 23.3 39.8 36.9 more than that of Western Europe. The situation varies a lot from working conditions, which means lack of training, supervision Dominican Republic 26.6 40.8 32.6 one country to another and, in general, seems to be less where and, of course, State control (Frigo 2003). Also of concern is the 42.7 services. (Small Arms 36.4ambiguous relationship20.9 there Uruguay is more confidence in state security that currently exists between the public 18.1 44.0and private arenas in this 37.9 SurveyVenezuela 2011). field. On the one hand, the State reguindustry’s performance, but on the othRegional average 36.4lates and supervises the20.1 43.5 The uses and risk of private security can be appreciated by diser, many government offices hire their security from these same Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012). tinguishing different modalities: protection ofhim firms companies, Note: Question: If four someone kept the community in a state (a) of fearthe and someone else killed or her, would you approve of which this personare beingoften killed; orowned by retired military officer — would you not approve of them being killed but understand it; or would you not approve of them being killed nor understand it? (banks, factories, businesses) by their own “security depart- in fact, several countries allow active police officer to work part ment” or a legally constituted security guard firm (that some- time for them— (FLACSO-Chile, 2007). For this reason, there is times handles transport of valuables and electronic security); a risk of corruption (Ungar 2007), and there are known extreme (b) residential security guards that these companies provide cases in which “security firms” function in reality as appendages to households with high income levels; (c) residential “watch of organised crime or as extortion rings (UNDP 2009).

ing for

8.8 14.1

Source: OEA-Alertamérica (2012). Note: Private guards: the countries with ** Small Arms Survey (2013).

7.3 7.7 17.9 11.6 7.8

150

R E G I O N A L HU MA N D E VELOPM ENT REPORT 2 0 1 3 - 2 0 1 4

Venezuela*

Uruguay*

Perú

Paraguay

Panama

Mexico

Honduras**

Dominican Republic*

32.0

Nicaragua**

27.6

Guatemala*

21.8

El Salvador*

21.0

Ecuador

4.9

Costa Rica*

16.7

Private security guards Colombia*

4.7

Chile*

8.8

Latin America, last available year.

Brazil*

19.3

Bolivia*

5.8

1.000 900 800 700 600 500 400 300 200 100 0

Argentina

Would approve

Rate per 100,000 inhabitants

Figure 7.2.

So N ap yo

Honduras

20.1

37.5

42.4

14.6

Mexico

31.7

40.2

28.1

17.9

Nicaragua

36.2

32.2

31.6

10.2

Venezuela*

Uruguay*

Dominican Republic*

Perú

Paraguay

21.3 37.4role for security 41.3 Clear and rigorous legislation of the private security Panama industry is Media response: a key 13.7 an urgent priority for Latin America. Both inside and outside 34.5 24.3 41.2 Paraguay the 23.3 region there are good regulatory practices to be replicated that the press should 52.0 27.2 be “free, but responsible” Peru — The aphorism20.8 these ac- Republic sums up well 24.6 the ideal role of the39.7 communications media 26.6 such as increases in staff and resources for supervisingDominican 35.8 within tivities, and a complete and updated registry of the companies, the framework of a democracy. Freedom implies security for 20.9 40.0 38.5 21.5 Uruguay their workers, and the weapons in their possession. As Chapter carrying out its work, security that must be guaranteed by the 18.1 27.5 2 has analysed, bearing firearms facilitates crime andVenezuela violence, State. Responsibility, on the other38.7 hand, refers to its 33.8 central role 20.1 and as such should be exceptional and strictly controlled 35.2to be informed 35.7 29.1the right of citizens Regional by theaverage in guaranteeing and to con(2012). to public debate (UNDP Paraguay 2009, 18; Scherman State (UNLIREC 2011; Scheye 2009; Páez 2007). Source: LAPOP-UNDP tribute f this person being killed; or Note: Question: Suppose a person killed someone who had raped their daughter or son, would you and Etchegaray 2012, 573). In effect, information is a citizen’s and it? approve of them killing the rapist; would you not approve of them being killed but understand it; or would With regards to citizens’ perceptions about the needyou or not justificaright, information approve of them beingand killedgood nor understand it? is prerequisite for making good detion for security measures or private protection, LAPOP showed cisions. that 38.8% of Latin Americans would like to have a firearm for their protection (see Table 7.5). The empirical evidence in Chap- Freedom of the press means that people working in the media ter 2 underlines that the supposed defensive advantages of should not be restricted by the use of violence or threats, nor bearing arms are questionable, if not mistaken (Bandeira and subject to censorship from criminals or the State. In the current Burgois 2006). context of increasing violence in Latin America’s countries, cities, and sub-regions, there are alarming levels of censorship and As in the private security industry, the effective capacity of the attacks against journalists. Because of this, the right to freedom State in controlling the possession and use of arms is fundamental. This capacity however, seems to be limited in Latin America. Percentage of the population that The number of registered firearms is less that those not regisTable 7.5. tered; it is also estimated that “almost all the arms held illegally their protection, Latin America, 2012 were legal at some moment” (Godnick 2007, 4). The limited capacity of the State is linked to diverse factors. Partly, it is due to Yes No the large scale economic and political interests behind the na37.0 63.0 Argentina tional and transnational arms trade, along with illegal interests 51.9 48.1 Bolivia or activities such as organised crime that manage to penetrate Private security 20.7 79.3 Brazil and corrupt the legal channels of this business (Olson 2013). guards The national and international regulation of the arms trade (see 26.3 73.7 Chile chapter 8), is a complex process, which requires coordination 27.2 72.8 Colombia among multiple actors, as well as differentiated policies that 35.9 64.1 Costa Rica distinguish between the wide variety of weapons, the systems Ecuador 45.4 54.6 for registering arms, ammunition, licence concession and moni36.8 63.2 El Salvador toring, storage, and seizures (UNDP-OPCR 2008).

THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

37.3

There are successful experiences in disarmament, such as the example of Brazil, in which citizens turned in 459,000 firearms in exchange for deposits in their bank accounts (United Nations Conference 2006). Another example is from Mendoza, Argentina, where there is an annual programme for destroying arms under state custody (Godnick 2006), or a similar one in San Martín, El Salvador, that helped reduce homicide rates by 40% (Jiménez 2006). In all cases, the process was in the hands of civil authorities and not the Ministry of Defence, which continues to be in charge of arms control in many countries. In general, these processes have benefitted from the active participation of local governments and NSAs that generate information for diagnostic studies and evaluations of the processes, as well as contributing to the creation of alliances among new actors (Godnick 2007, 17).

Guatemala

30.4

69.6

Honduras

39.8

60.2

Mexico

47.6

52.4

Nicaragua

51.1

48.9

Panama

28.6

71.4

Paraguay

52.2

47.8

Peru

51.0

49.0

Dominican Republic

60.5

39.5

Uruguay

28.0

72.0

Venezuela

25.0

75.0

Total

38.8

61.2

Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012).

REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

151

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of expression is heavily restricted and many communications media have opted for self-censorship. This grave situation is limiting the work of all organisations whose mission is to deliver clear and objective information. In this section, we will analyse responses made by the communications media in covering issues of insecurity and their impact on the responses of other NSAs.

Challenges for the media in contributing to security If journalism is to contribute to citizen security, it must adhere to professional media standards, exercise freedom of expression with responsibility, as a guarantee for the right to information and the right to security. However, the media currently face an array of challenges to achieve this type of news coverage. In the first place, there is the problem of giving priority to the speed of news coverage instead of reliable and quality information. This is linked to reporting criminal activities out of context. In seeking the attention of the audience in order to sell its wares (UNDP 2009), most media outlets centre on immediate events and forget the context. Secondly, in aspiring to larger audiences some media fall into sensationalism and, as Vargas Llosa points out, “the borderline that traditionally separated serious journalism from scandal and the gutter press has been losing its definition” (Vargas Llosa 2009). The competitive struggle for audiences tends to substitute priority contents: the newness of information displaces that which is important, that which entertains over what is educational, and that which generates resources over information that produces less income (Giró 2006). When sensationalist journalism is applied to information about insecurity, it brings with it: an increased perception of fear; a distortion or magnification of reality that widens the gap between the perception de insecurity and actual events; the weakening of confidence in institutions; and/or the stigmatisation of people and groups in situations of vulnerability, such as young people, who are criminalised when unlawful or violent activities are attributed to them as a group (UNDP 2009, 313). This stigmatisation is a form of symbolic violence that tends to normalize dysfunctional responses —such as “social cleansing”— against these groups.

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Recent research reveals a key association between the concerns expressed about crime levels in neighbourhoods and the levels of their media consumption (Maldonado 2012, 1). This is particularly worrying when some communications media point the finger at supposedly guilty individuals without any formal trial, in violation of the principle of presumed innocence. On the other hand, the media sometimes broadcast images, audio recordings, or videos of victims of violence, without taking into account the risk this may carry for them 141. Thirdly, the editorial choice involved in covering certain criminal acts over others, tends to highlight the most visible violent occurrences such as homicides. This can contribute to the invisibility of other threats such as violence against women. As this report underlines, sexual and gender violence is very prevalent in the region. However, the communications media tend not to give equal importance to these crimes. In general, this type of violence —silenced on a daily basis— only appears as a way of filling up criminal statistics.

Towards the free and responsible coverage of crime and violence Without a doubt, advances have been made in overcoming sensationalism and in achieving news coverage with greater professionalism in both form and content. With regards to media content related to crime and violence, investigative journalism and other digital media operate in closer proximity to citizens’ needs as platforms for knowledge management and monitoring. Over the last few years thanks to new technologies, increasing numbers of new communications media are appearing across the region that are basing their information on deeper investigation and are touching on themes and angles hardly covered by the traditional press. By taking advantage of the low cost of Internet and the support, in some cases, of institutions— such as Open Society or the University of Texas’ Knight Centre for Journalism in the Americas—, these media and their journalists seem more likely to denounce corruption or insecurity. This way of covering issues of insecurity in the media provides robust support in promoting functional strategies for citizens’ accountability and for strengthening democracy in the region. Digital media, such as El Faro (The Lighthouse) from El Salvador, relies on young professionals who are willing to investigate topics such as corruption or insecurity. Backed by its 15 years of experience, El Faro publishes reports and chronicles in its Sala Negra section142 for which it has received, among other prizes,

There have also been noteworthy advances in making visible forms of violence that frequently are normalised, such as gender violence, something that is essential for prevention. The evidence shows that at least in some countries in the region, violence against women is beginning to gain wider coverage in the media. A recent study undertaken between January and June 2012 in five South American countries (Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, and Ecuador) shows that 456 journalistic reports were published on events related to violence against women. Without a doubt, form is also content, and the advances in coverage by the communications media must go hand in hand with professionalization in the way this information is presented to the public. When analysing the increased coverage of gender violence, it is clear that acts of sexual or homicidal violence against women are presented as isolated events, rather than portraying them as systematic violations of human rights that require public policy to guarantee the women’s security and gender equality (Regional Observatory of Women in the Media). In various countries, self-regulatory mechanisms have been developed about the way in which information is presented. In Mexico and Colombia, the Agreement for the News Coverage of Violence and the Code of Ethics of the Bogota Journalists Circle have established a series of criteria for the responsible dissemination of information about violence. Some of these commitments consist in establishing common editorial criteria for the news coverage of violence in Mexico, for example. In Colombia, they have emphasised a rejection of sensationalism and a commitment to investigative journalism: “the journalist must contextualise information and avoid altering the meaning of quotes that are transcribed” (art. 4 and 7) 144. The Journalists’ Code of Ethics of the Uruguayan Press Association, approved in 2013, establishes a series of general recommendations for promoting

quality journalism. The code takes into account aspects such as informational rigour, the correct and inclusive use of language, journalistic balance, and an unrestricted respect for communities and people independently of their gender, ethnicity, religious beliefs, sexual preferences, or physical appearance. One of the recommendations of this code points to a key aspect in press coverage of news events related to insecurity: the presumption of innocence (APU 2013, 5) 145. While these are only tools that mark a possible route to follow in improving press coverage and especially the accuracy of what is published in the media, these self-regulatory practices in many cases have become little more than lip service. In order to guarantee compliance, journalists’ activities need to be regulated by establishing external and legally binding frameworks, albeit based on a respect for freedom of expression in the media and for citizens’ right to information. Finally, the media have a central role in promoting functional responses from NSA and in building citizen security. Some communications media have advanced with platforms for knowledge management and monitoring that contribute to strategies in counterbalancing state responses through monitoring and citizens’ accountability mechanisms. One example of this is Proyecto Presunción de Inocencia (The Presumed Innocence Project) in Mexico, created in 2004 146. This project seeks to promote the presumption of innocence through the rational use of precautionary measures included in the new criminal justice system, particularly that of preventative imprisonment, in accordance with international standards for due process and the rule of law. The programme arose from the process to establish a new prosecution model in Mexico and with it, the understanding that “journalists are key actors in the success or failure of its implementation and because of this they must perform a scrutinising function, become agents for social change, and help build a just society 147.”

7 THE RESPONSES OF NON-STATE ACTORS

the Ortega y Gasset award for journalism in 2011, for “defending freedoms, independence, rigour, and honesty as essential virtues of journalism.”143 Some of these digital communications media also share contents and establish alliances (Quesada 2013). Coordinated by Insight Crime, a US research institution whose mission is to analyse organised crime in the Americas, some digital publications—such as Animal Político (Political Animal) from Mexico or El Faro, Plaza Pública (Public Square), and Verdad Abierta (Open Truth) from Colombia— have contributed valuable investigative work on issues related to drug trafficking. These spaces promote and manage knowledge about this issue, provide theoretical and practical tools that contribute to the professionalization of journalists, and carry out important work through their virtual platforms by overseeing and monitoring from a civil society perspective.

The UNDP has worked to facilitate the construction of citizens’ security through the communications media. It has organised various fora and gatherings with Latin American journalists (UNDP 2009) and has contributed to the formation of a network of communications professionals in coordination with the Fundación Nuevo Periodismo (New Journalism Foundation). The efforts being made in Central America are particularly important in the framework of the Feria de Conocimiento Compromiso Centroamérica (Central American Knowledge Commitment Fair), as well as cooperation with the region’s media, such as El Faro, and the development of concrete academic programmes. Under the sponsorship of the University of Panama and the National Council of Journalism, the first diploma course on Journalism

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and Citizen Security was held in 2012 with a view to increase knowledge and tools for analysis, enabling communications professionals to improve their work performance.

these experiences would enhance the continuity and impact of violence prevention initiatives and citizen-led accountability mechanisms.

Recommendations

Citizens’ accountability mechanisms are indispensable for preventing and resolving problems of corruption and impunity that erode the legitimacy of democratic state institutions. A strategic duty of citizens is to promote the development of initiatives that strengthen accountability mechanisms for monitoring state institutions, particularly in the areas of security and justice. The State needs to promote citizens’ observatories on issues of insecurity at local, national, and regional levels, to complement information generated by the authorities, and to ensure a more objective analysis for orienting and evaluating security policies.

1. Ensure adequate coordination between the State and civil society organisations. The success of the state’s citizen security strategies requires coordination between its institutions and NSAs. If it is to guarantee legitimate forms of security, the State must contribute to strengthening democracy and open up spaces that guarantee its citizens’ right to freedom of expression. It becomes vital, therefore, to work in generating and disseminating clear and accessible information about the situation of violence and crime, about the security and justice institutions, and about the public policies they implement. The aim of this work must be to create incentives for informed debate and a more effective and functional participation among the different actors involved in citizen security. The processes for dialogue in the region are relevant to this, in generating agreements between actors from different sectors, visions, and interests, and enabling advances to be made in security, governance, and human development. Equally, solid bridges need to be built through dialogue between government, the private sector, civil society, and academia, to design, monitor, and evaluate public security policies, and to plan and implement reforms in state institutions and mechanisms for continuous accountability. 2. Professionalise civil society organisations in order to expand their influence in the prevention of violence and in the accountability by citizens of their governments. The success of prevention programmes is intimately related to strengthening the technical capacities and institutionalisation of civil society organisations. In terms of information and analysis, the value of studies carried out by the NSA depends fundamentally on their methodology and their periodic nature, in order to evaluate changes over time in key indicators. The continuity of these efforts requires that institutions that carry out surveys maintain high professional standards that ensure the quality of their results. The members of social organisations need training in order to develop clear methodologies, systematised process. and assessed results. This is key to understanding the effects of social initiatives and for sharing best practices with other organisations and even governments. The possibility of replicating

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In addition, the transparency and accountability of NSAs themselves is indispensible in guaranteeing their legitimacy. Transparency mechanisms are essential, for example, when resources are transferred from NSAs to different state authorities so that this support contributes to genuine institutional strengthening rather than feeding corrupt networks inside bureaucracies. 3. Promote community strengthening and a culture of peace. In the process of building safer and more peaceful communities, an inclusive relationship with communities is vital for achieving continuity and scaling up the impact of these initiatives. As a result, the incorporation of communities in the design, follow-up, and evaluation of security programmes, especially in terms of prevention, is central for their appropriation, effectiveness, and monitoring. Building communities with a culture of peace is necessary if the stability of security in the region is to be maintained. Instead of avoiding crime and violence based on the fear of punishment, the culture of peace seeks to ensure the non-violent resolution of conflicts. This is possible through the recognition of the conflict and its transformation through dialogue and negotiation. This focus, used in initiatives for community mediation and other means for the peaceful transformation of conflicts, centres on compensating or repairing damage and strengthening the social fabric. Given the way in which crime fractures interpersonal relations, this fabric also needs to be “repaired”. Finally, over the medium to long term, policies for equitable social development, social inclusion, and citizens’ coexistence (for example, the recovery of public spaces, cultural activities) are key to fomenting relationships among citizens based on trust, reciprocity, and shared norms and values. This enables people to

4. Regulate the bearing of firearms by non state actors All mechanisms of private security and the bearing of arms by individuals must comply with strict regulation of this type of protection measures in order to avoid the reproduction of violence. The licensing process, training requirements, and conditions for the use of weapons must be rigorous, as well as the government regulations that define their ownership and the hiring of police officers in active duty. There needs to be a strict control over the bearing of weapons, especially by private security companies authorized to use firearms. Psychological evaluations and background checks must be required of staff, as well as tests on their ability to use firearms and clear reporting mechanisms for loss or theft of weapons in their possession.

such as young and/or LGBT people. This requires the support of the main communications media as well as a wide range of qualified peers, who can transmit positive messages while defusing messages that stigmatise these groups. Faced with unfounded and arbitrary stereotypes, messages should show how groups in vulnerable situations can and are contributing to human development in the region. Finally, the communications media have an important effect and impact on public discourse about insecurity. They offer elements for debate, as well as possible and desirable responses to this regional challenge. In this context, the media have a central role in sensitising public opinion about the inappropriateness of hard-line measures in resolving the regionâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s insecurity challenges. The solution lies, rather, in transmitting proposals and messages that focus on citizen security and human development.

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strengthen ties and prevent the growth of violence within communities.

5. Guarantee the security of journalists and contribute to building citizen security through the communications media. The state guarantee of safety for people working in the communications media is vitally important for ensuring freedom of expression and citizensâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; rights to information. At the same time, the media need to strengthen their capacities in contributing, through their work, to the construction of an informed debate about citizen security. The communications media must continue to raise the professional level of journalists. They must clarify and explain to audiences their editorial criteria for dealing with the issue of insecurity; work on making visible the violence against groups in situations of vulnerability; place news in a context that ensures its proper dimension and meaning; and disseminate better quality statistics, criminological analysis, and evaluation of policies on a more frequent basis. In terms of form, the media should abstain from using images, adjectives, details, and generalisations typical of gutter press journalism. The core issue of the communications media that should be regulated in the region is respect for the presumption of innocence. Deliberate and systematic efforts should be made to de-stigmatise groups in situations of marginalisation or stigmatisation, REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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INXILIO: The Trail of Tears, Álvaro Restrepo (play), Olga Paulhiac (photography), 2010

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In recent years, efforts to promote international cooperation in security issues have multiplied in Latin America: prevention programmes have increased along with an unprecedented commitment to promote common agendas between donors and recipient countries and to strengthen existing cooperation mechanisms. Despite these advances, the international cooperation panorama for security falls short of addressing the current challenges. The real and perceived insecurity that Latin America faces requires international cooperation that is both efficient and committed to the joint development of citizen security to mitigate its negative impact on human development, and on the social and institutional environment. This report highlights four messages regarding international cooperation in the area of Latin American citizen security: • It is necessary to step up efforts to align donors’ and recipients’ objectives in the various cooperation initiatives. • Innovative approaches must be consolidated for bilateral and multilateral cooperation that strengthen local capacities, not only in the context of govertment, but also with non-state actors. • It is critically important to redouble efforts to improve evaluation mechanisms, which both generates greater confidence in donors and improves the effectiveness of projects at the local level. • Latin America’s new role as a leading player in security cooperation should supported, through a common security agenda based on a strengthened regional architecture. This chapter is divided into three sections. First, it presents the concept of an “intersecting constellation”, as an expression for the different cooperation modalities that exist in the region. Second, it analyses three specific and relevant areas of cooperation: sub-regional cooperation, Latin American cooperation with the United States, and cooperation between Latin America and international organisations. Finally, it lists a number of recommendations in this area.

International Cooperation: an intersecting constellation The actual practice of international cooperation can be conceived of as an “intersecting constellation” of different modalities of cooperation, with differentiated actors, objectives, and instruments. Cooperation modalities in security refer to the actors which have implemented them (between States, multilateral or decentralized148), the development levels of involved parties (North-South or South-South)149 and the mechanisms used for their interaction (bilateral150 or triangular151). A constellation of strategies favours both convergence and synergy for international cooperation in security, but it also has an enormous potential for duplication, tension, and even contradiction. Box 8.1 illustrates the complexity of responses of traditional and non-traditional cooperation, and without being exhaustive, lays out the different cooperation modalities, the approaches, and the principal execution mechanisms (technical advice, information exchange, resource transfer, among others). An analysis of cooperation in the region as an “intersecting constellation” allows us to highlight three points: 1. There is no single definition or even a common approach regarding security on the part of the participants in regional international cooperation. However, one can assert that security cooperation has started to distance itself— without abandoning it completely— from traditional national security approaches, which were almost exclusively focused on combatting transnational threats. The new perspective increasingly incorporates aspects related to human development and institutional strengthening. 2. The change in the approach to security is having an impact both in the strategies as well as on the mechanisms of cooperation. For example, the conventional mechanisms, based on the need to control crime, have given way to comprehensive strategies that view security problems as complex and multidimensional phenomena (Arriagada and Godoy 2000). This has

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8 Chart 8.1

Security Cooperation Actors and Modalities

Modality b

Examples of actors

Bilateral (North-South)

United States Spain Canada Russia

Asset Laundering Terrorism Insurgency

Bilateral (South-South)

Brazil Colombia c Chile Mexico Nicaragua Panama Venezuela

Contraband Organized Crime Arms and munitions control

Multilateral (sub regional in Latin America)

CAN Mercosur SICA UNASUR

Multilateral (hemispheric organizations)

Multilateral (extra-regional organizations)

Multilateral development and specialised organisations)

Community of Police of the Americas (Ameripol) OEA

European Union

World Bank IDB ECLAC Interpol UNHCHR UN-Habitat UN-Women UNDP UNICEF UNODC

Traditional security cooperation

Non-Traditional Security Cooperation

Organized Crime

Organized Crime Asset laundering

Prevention Intelligence Institutional Strengthening Human Rights

Technical advice, training and capacity-building Resource Transfer Information exchange Strategy coordination

Prevention Institutional Strengthening Human Rights Anti-corruption

Technical advice, training and capacity-building Information exchange Good Practices Dissemination Operative tactics

Prevention (human development) Institutional Strengthening Human Rights Anti-corruption

Organized Crime

Asset laundering Terrorism Smuggling of persons Cybercrime

Terrorism Drugs Transnational Crime

Vehicle theft Money laundering Gender violence Corruption Organised Crime

Prevention (drug consumption, youth and gender violence) Institutional Strengthening Transparency Norms

Prevention (Youth and gender violence) Institutional Strengthening Human Rights Judicial system reform Social cohesion Alternative development

Institutional Strengthening Prevention (social and situational, drug consumption) Human development Rehabilitation Policies Support to vulnerable sectors

a The information is not exhaustive and only seeks to illustrate the dynamics of security cooperation for Latin America. b All the modalities can be implemented with or between states or in a decentralised manner (subnational actors). c This country also has triangular cooperation initiatives with the United States.

160

Priority Cooperation Mechanisms

Vehicle theft Cybercrime

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Regional Coordination and integration Common strategies and plans of action Information Exchange Good practices Dissemination Reciprocal Assistance Technical advice, training and capacity-building Common strategies and plans of action Information exchange Evaluation, promotion and management methods for regional security Research projects Coordination mechanisms Consolidation of national observatories Development of local capacities and information systems Advice and Technical Assistance Research Information exchange Analytical work, project monitoring and evaluation Research Advice and technical assistance Loans Dialogue spaces Information exchange Technical Cooperation Joint operations

The judicial convictions for the crime of asset laundering are notoriously low in Latin America (Mutual Evaluations of Gafisud and Gafic, MEM-OEA reports and INL-EE. UU. reports). The dynamics of convictions for asset laundering show a central weakness in the antidrug policy in the region: the emphasis in the criminal investigations is on other links in the chain—production, trafficking, and sale. The judicial action against the economic circuits of trafficking is minimal and proportionally very low. Comparison of arrests for drug trafficking and asset laundering convictions Arrests for drug traffickinga

Convictions for asset laundering b

Argentina 6.962 1 Chile

14.717 3

Ecuador 902 2 El Salvador

1.036

Peru

4.529 4

Uruguay 1.024 1 Source: a UNODC, annual averages 2006 to 2011. b Gafic and Gafisud, annual average for last years available. For El Salvador, the Supreme Court of Justice, Directorate of Institutional Planning, Unit for Information and Statistics (2013).

contributed to progress in preventive policies that complement control measures, and that favour the strengthening of local governments. 3. Despite the fact that bilateral cooperation to combat narcotics trafficking continues to be the modality that receives the majority of the funds, decentralized and triangular cooperation have opened up new avenues of collaboration. These innovative initiatives can address the wide range of local expressions of insecurity and take advantage of the benefits of cooperation between Latin American countries, which opens up greater opportunities for the parties to adopt shared visions. However, these pioneering forms of cooperation need to improve their effectiveness in order to ensure a sustainable impact on regional security.

Despite the evolution and the refinement of coordination, cooperation, and regulation mechanisms for asset laundering, its contribution to crime and violence reduction isn’t clear. From criminological theory to public policies, there are incipient attempts to analyse the relationship between the control of asset laundering and variations in criminality (Walker and Ungar 2009; Harvey 2005; Levi and Gilmore 2003; Morgan 2003; Johnson and Lim 2002).

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Box 8.1. Cooperation in the area of assets laundering

Three conclusions emerge regarding cooperation for combatting asset laundering in the region: • Impact measurement of anti-asset-laundering policies is at an initial stage and has still not determined the scope of the problem (Walker and Unger 2009). • The insistence on establishing very diffuse policy objectives, such as “end asset laundering” or “adopt control measures” makes systematic, objective, and evidencebased evaluation difficult (Walker and Unger 2009). • Despite advances in normative issues, local and national government capacities are limited in effectively combatting asset laundering, which undermines any deterrent effect on organized crime finances. As Morgan (2003) noted, the countries in the region have not appropriated the “standard” international model, as it relates to exogenous processes that do not develop sufficient local institution to be effective.

Subregional cooperation: The rise of Latin America South-South cooperation has a growing role in the Latin American context. This horizontal interaction with the counterparts’ active participation has advantages when compared with the traditional type of bilateral and multilateral cooperation. For example, it enables the partners to benefit from the exchange of experiences on joint capacity building, as it draws on a relationship between countries with similar experiences and problems. Consequently, it generates trust, solidarity, and understanding between the parties, which can advance cooperation in security.

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Bilateral and triangular cooperation between Latin American countries The majority of the countries in the region have been cooperation recipients or donors in the area of citizen security. For example, Panama and El Salvador have developed and exchanged experiences in institutional strengthening, in particular, in the area of information management and the justice system. The Chilean carabineros are an institution with a consolidated cooperation experience through their training schools and the dissemination of experiences and best practices. Within the framework of international cooperation policy, Chile has an International Cooperation of Uniformed Police Programme (CECIPU) that offers training to police in 25 countries. In addition, the carabineros have advised Guatemala and Honduras in the development of strategies using a quadrant plan approach (Emol 2007; Vásquez 2012). Since 2001, Brazil has developed a border defence and security initiative called Plan Agatha. This cooperation programme’s objective is to combat crime, drug trafficking, illegal mining, and contraband in the border zones (Kane 2012; Infodenfensa 2011). In 2003, Brazil launched the National Strategy to Combat Money Laundering (ENCCLA) to improve the coordination of governmental actors that participate in the different phases of prevention and control of money laundering crimes152. This area of cooperation has been innovative and relevant, given the difficulties that the region has faced to consolidate institutional capacities in combatting assets laundering (see Box 8.1). Some of the success of the strategy inspired technical cooperation efforts with other countries in Latin America. For example, since 2004, the strengthening of institutional capacities through the National Programme of Training and Capacity-building to Combat Corruption and Money Laundering has trained, government officials from Peru, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Colombia. Similarly, the Brazilian model of the Technology Laboratories on Money Laundering (LAB-LD) was transferred to Bolivia.153 Other specific actions that had emerged from the ENCCLA contributed to the development of international instruments of judicial and police cooperation to combat transnational crimes in the region. For example, the Agreements of International Juridical Cooperation in Criminal Matters were used to recover public resources sent illegally abroad; along these lines, Brazil has developed important links with Uruguay, Paraguay, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru .154

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The National Police of Nicaragua (PNN) is an institution recognized both in the region and the world for its police model with a “preventive, proactive, and community” approach.155 This had opened up new opportunities to share experiences and to strengthen the technical-professional cooperation with similar institutions. In 2011, the PNN, with the support of the UNDP, designed their South-South Cooperation Strategy (ECSS). Officials from the Directorship and the various specialised areas participated, and inputs were received from the Systematization Group of the Proactive Community Policing Model. The case of Colombia, although more recent,156 has received increasing recognition as a result of its success in combatting organised crime and in the reduction of certain violence indicators. The Colombian cooperation brings together, in an original way, four elements: traditional cooperation, new models for institutional strengthening and state consolidation, utilisation of South-South cooperation, and triangular efforts with the United States. This innovative approach has made possible the “export” of the Colombian model. According to figures from the Ministry of Defence, between 2009 and 2012, the National Police of Colombia (PNC) gave courses to 14,427 officials of 40 different nationalities, within and outside the country. The majority of the training (almost 50%) was carried out in Mexico, in the framework of a bilateral agreement in place between 2009 y 2010. The current tendency in cooperation is to support a programme in Central America,157 where the PNC participates increasingly in training, advice, and assistance to the police forces in the sub region. In general, their work has dealt with the professionalization of the police and the strengthening of the justice system. The relatively recent creation of South-South cooperation programmes in Latin America – and even more so of the triangular cooperation programmes with the United States – as well as the lack of systematic evaluations, do not allow for definitive judgments about their effectiveness. Despite this, a growing number of countries see in sub regional cooperation a window of opportunity to address their internal problems of citizen security.

Sub regional integration and alignment of efforts With the end of the Cold War and the process of democratisation in South America, the creation and strengthening of regional mechanisms to promote transparency and mutual trust have been increasingly important. Processes for cooperation in security in South America have matured significantly in recent

Despite the fact that Mercosur is one of the most highly institutionalised integration models in the region, cooperation in security is less dynamic than in areas like trade. For its part, Unasur sees security as a crosscutting theme.158 Even if there is a common methodology for sharing information in the region, not all of the countries show the same transparency in their expenditures. Despite this, there are mechanisms, like the South American Record of Defence Expenditures, that promote a new sense of community.159 In this regard, a positive advance was the creation of the South American Security Council in December of 2008, a coordination and consultation body in defence issues. An effort that offers important lessons learned is the case of the Central American Integration System (SICA). In 2007, in the face of the worsening security situation in the sub region, the Heads of State made a first effort at developing a Central American security policy, in recognition of the importance of a shared vision in confronting violence, organised crime, and drug trafficking. The Central American Security Strategy emerged from this initiative, as an instrument to harmonise the diverse national efforts on security issues, facilitate coordination and exchange of information and experiences, and identify and manage the necessary resources for their implementation.160 The Central American governments decided to review their strategy and as a result, a process was initiated with the technical support of regional as well as global multilateral organisations. Based on principles of shared responsibility, complementarity, and synergies, the donor communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s commitment and interest was strengthened to improve coordination and agree upon a common policy to face insecurity and violence. The process of strategy formulation was a positive step not only in the efforts to construct a common agenda in citizen security, emanating from and endorsed by the Central American governments, but also to achieve a shared vision regarding the magnitude of the problem, the transnationalisation of crime, the alignment of the various actors, and the need to integrate sub regional efforts. 161 One of the most positive results of this process was the conformation of the Group of Friends of Central America, which brought together the principal bilateral and multilateral donors in the region. The Group is constituted by 16 countries from the Western Hemisphere, Europe, and Asia (United States, Canada,

Chile, Mexico, Colombia, Spain, Germany, Italy, Finland, United Kingdom, Georgia, Israel, Korea, Japan, Australia. and Norway), the European Union and various multilateral organisations (IDB, the World Bank, UNDP, the UNODC, IOM, the OAS, the Central American Bank for Economic Integration, and the General Iberoamerican Secretariat. The conformation of the Group of Friends represents an effort to re-energize the coordination of cooperation at a sub regional level around a theme of mutual concern. This mechanism provided the opportunity to establish a strategic collaboration and alignment with external aid and local, national and sub regional initiatives. The variety of actors who participate in the citizen security field in Central America requires an effort at the national, regional, and global level to coordinate actions and avoid unnecessary duplication in the financing of projects (and including possible contradictions among the interventions).162

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years. The sub region has key mechanisms for developing mutual trust and has moved toward the consolidation of war-free zones (Mares 2001). However, it has still not advanced towards a consolidated security community in South America, based on shared identities, values, and objectives.

The UNDP has provided support to the General Secretariat of the SICA since 2009 through the Security in Central America Project (UNDP, the Spanish Agency for International Cooperation for Development (AECID), and has been focused on the institutional strengthening of the General Secretariat of the SICA (SG-SICA) and of regional institutional structure to address issues of violence prevention. A decisive moment for this cooperation was during the International Conference of Support for the Central American Security Strategy (ESCA) that took place in Guatemala in 2011, and in the organisation of the Knowledge Fair: Commitment Central America, carried out in PanamĂĄ, in 2010. Both initiatives have ensured that gender is an overall priority in the new strategy. Further, the UNDP has devised, in collaboration with the SG-SICA, the Monitoring and Evaluation Strategy of the ESCA, and has developed a battery of impact indicators on themes of citizen security and violence. Despite these advances, there are still obstacles to the effective development of the strategy that impedes the emergence of a unified vision to consolidate sub regional cooperation. In addition, some national action plans in various countries in the sub region have lacked coordination and remained at the margin of the discussions and processes of the SICA, thus limiting the possibilities for better articulation between nationally adopted measures and the sub regional strategy. The scope of the efforts is also affected by capacity and resources differences in the institutional architecture of the Central American countries. These differences affect the implementation of certain joint actions and exchanges of information. An example is the case of the drug strategy at the regional level: despite the agreements in SICA, each country continues implementing its own initiatives independently at the regional and international level. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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The institutional asymmetry between countries also puts at risk the harmonisation of the collective initiatives.

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Likewise, the processes set in motion by the ESCA have lacked systematic and accessible participation mechanisms for civil society. The Consultative Committee of the SICA (CC SICA), the civil society arm of this organisation, is an exception that represents important potential to institutionalise citizen participation. Finally, just as with other sub regional mechanisms, the instruments created by the SICA to coordinate the inputs provided by the multiple cooperating parties, as well as the communication between them, has not been sufficient. The creation of the Group of Friends to coordinate the position and the response of the donors to the SICA represents an advance for cooperation alignment, but it is still essential to give sustainability to the group, and, if necessary, provide for its expansion.

Sub regional cooperation and dialogue: the debate on drug policy There is an open and intense debate on drug policy in Latin America. Academic groups, civil society organisations, and ex-Heads of State have started to assume a critical posture in relation to the predominant approach in the region. This latter approach argues for the repression of all the links in the chain, including consumers, who are seen as a problem that should be addressed by the criminal justice system. The number of persons convicted for possession or trafficking has increased in the last years, and a study carried out by the OAS, which has become a key reference in the drug debate (“The Problem of Drugs in the Americas”), points out that 70% of women in prison were accused of non-violent micro-trafficking (OEA 2013, 62). The surveys carried out for this report in prisons in six countries in the region also show that, especially in Argentina, Brazil, and

Box 8.2. Principal conclusions of the OAS Report “The Problem of Drugs in the Americas”. 1. The drug problem is a hemispheric issue. The drug problem is manifested and affects the countries in the hemisphere in a differentiated way. But the problem involves all countries, all of which share responsibility, although differentiated, in the search for solutions that significantly reduce drug addiction, the risk to the population – especially youth – and criminal violence. 2. The drug problem requires a specific approach to each of its phases and in each of the countries where they are manifest. The different components of the drug problem – production, distribution (or transit), sale, and consumption of controlled drugs – should be addressed separately to establish their real dimension and impact. 3. There is not an inextricable relationship between the drug problem and the insecurity situation that many citizens face in the Americas. Although the drug problem is a reason for concern for all countries in the region, the principal source of fear for citizens is the violence that it generates, linked to the ever-expanding activities of organised crime.

Source: OAS (2013).

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4. Insecurity affects those societies more whose States have no effective response capacity. Strengthening police, judicial, and prison institutions is urgent to effectively face the violence and insecurity associated with the activity of organised crime gangs. 5. Addressing the consumption of drugs requires a public health approach. The fundamental change in this area lies in the notion of the user as a victim, an addict, rather than a criminal or an accomplice to drug trafficking. 6. The drug problem should be approached in a differentiated and flexible manner in our countries, depending on the particular way in which they are affected. The drug problem has very diverse manifestations and impacts in the hemisphere’s countries and sub regions. Addressing the problem requires a multi-faceted approach, great flexibility, an understanding of the different realities, and the conviction that, in order to be successful, the countries in the hemisphere need to maintain unity in diversity.

In the framework of the Summit of the Americas that took place in Cartegena in 2012, the region’s leaders agreed to open up the debate, something that had not happened since the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs of 1961. The OAS was given the mandate to produce a special report that would serve as a referential framework for confronting the problem and the definition of future policies. Under this mandate, the OAS submitted the report “Problem of Drugs in the Americas” to the President of Colombia, Juan Manuel Santos, in May of 2013. It contained a critical analysis of drug policy and presented new approaches, a landmark in the debate about the current approach (OEA, 2013). The report does not offer recommendations, but rather provides a series of scenarios to guide the discussion regarding what path the countries decide to pursue.

The future of the debate on drug policy in Latin America depends, to a large degree, on a change in the tone of the discussion on drug policy in the United States,15 as well as an increase in creative initiatives to evaluate and propose adjustments to drug policy in local, state, and national contexts, from a public health perspective. However, opening up the debate has not meant an end to disagreements between the countries in the region. Some continue to support the prohibition against all of the components of the chain from drug production to consumption, while others are approaching the decriminalisation of consumption and the control of the illegal drug market. In terms of the interventions focused on security, the positions range from the repression of illegal economies as a priority — with a punitive focus— to the reduction of violence as a central objective – from the perspective of deterrence (Youngers 2013). In the midst of these options, there are countries that, whilst open to the debate, are comfortable with the current policy, while others strongly insist

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Chile, the number of women in prison for drug trafficking is very high. The new debate seeks to effectively address the spiralling violence related to the threat of organised crime and drug trafficking, as well as the impact of drug policy.

Box 8.3. Arms Trafficking Although a direct causal link between firearms and criminality has not been demonstrated, there is a correlation between lethal violence and the availability of firearms. The majority of countries in Latin America —with the exception of Argentina, Chile, and Uruguay— have levels of homicides committed with firearms that are higher than the global average: 70% to 42% (Small Arms Survey 2012, 2).

• The number of arms bought in the United States and trafficked to Mexico between 2010 and 2012 has been estimated at between 106,700 and 426,729, at a value of between US$53.7 and US$214.6 million. • According to estimates, only 15 percent of the total numbers of arms that cross the border are seized: US authorities only seized 2% (McDougal et al. 2013).

The major exporters of small and light weapons to the region are (in millions of dollars) the United States (821), Germany (495), Italy (473), Brazil (326), Switzerland (215), Israel (183), Austria (167), Russia (157), South Korea (138), Sweden (132), Belgium (128), and Spain (117). At the same time, the principal Latin American importers are (in millions of dollars) Colombia (91), Mexico (56), Peru (36), Brazil (27), Argentina (20), and Chile (11) (Small Arms Survey 2013, Statistical-Methodological Annex 8.1 y 8.2).

The so-called grey market has also expanded, in which arms distribution is carried out through legal channels although destined to illegal actors (Fleitas 2009, 5).

The majority of smuggled arms come from the United States and, to a lesser degree, Europe. • In 2012, the Justice Department estimated that 70% of the arms used in Mexico come from the United States.

Latin America has promoted agreements and has participated in global, regional, sub regional, and bilateral institutions to address the smuggling of arms. Despite the vast array of agreements and other cooperation initiatives, their effective implementation faces on-going obstacles ( Jaeger 2012). However, one should not lose sight of the positive results that have been generated by the national and local public policies on disarmament, among which Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, and Mexico stand out (Small Arms Survey 2012).

Source: Jaeger (2012); McDougal et al. (2013); Small Arms Survey (2012 y 2013); Fleitas (2009).

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on change. Within this framework, the search for consensus regarding the route to follow will require patience and leadership. The regional and global dialogue spaces that will contribute to generate a common agenda in citizen security themes will be of great relevance.

United States: Traditional cooperation and opening to new alternatives The United States continues to be the largest actor in security cooperation in Latin America. Between 2000 and 2013, the accumulated value of assistance to security forces in Latin America totalled US$15 billion. In this same period, the judicial systems in the region received between US$2 billion and US$ 3 billion. During the last 13 years, the principal beneficiary countries of Box 8.4. Extradition from Colombia and Mexico to the United States For Colombia, extradition has become an important component of anti-drug policy. From 1999 to 2012, 1,535 persons were extradited to the United States (National Police Drug Observatory). For Mexico, extradition has been an instrument of international criminal justice cooperation, especially with the United States (Pérez Kasparian 2007). The extradition treaty dates back to 1978, but its use had been limited. During the government of Felipe Calderón (2006-2012), its use grew. The following concerns have emerged regarding extradition as a common practice: • The institutional pressure within anti-drug organisations to show better results, such as arrests and drug seizures, can result in an indiscriminate practice that doesn’t distinguish between big drug trafficking “bosses” and small distributors (SSP, SRE and PGR 2009; FIP 2011). • In an immediate sense, extradition eliminates some bosses and mid-level operatives from the business; however, experience shows that the spaces that they occupy in the productive chain are rapidly filled with other individuals (FIP 2010). Sources: Ideas for Peace Foundation-FIP (2010; 2011); Pérez Kasparia (2007); Attorney General of the Republic (2012); Secretariat for Public Security, Secretariat of Foreign Relations, and Attorney General of the Republic (2009); Zuleta (2010); Drug Observatory of the National Police.

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Box 8.5. Deportation processes from the United States to El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras

In the last 10 years, total deportations from the United States have steadily increased: they rose from 165,168 in 2002 to 391,953 in 2011. Mexico, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras occupy, respectively, the first, second, third, and fourth place in number of deportees (DHS 2012). The United States maintains bilateral agreements on information exchange regarding persons in deportation processes with the three countries of the Northern Triangle. The information on deportees, which includes biometric and biographical data, is prepared by the Enforcement and Removal Operations (ERO) of the Department of Homeland Security and is verified by consulates and directorates general of migration of the Central American countries. Some problems have been detected in the deportation processes: • There are significant differences between the processes, the information systems, the infrastructure, and training of the personnel in the various reception centres. These differences reveal the fragility in the early identification of people, which can affect insecurity in the countries of the region. • The lack of standardisation in procedures hampers the effective use of the information made available by ERO as a tool that generates security information. • The United States makes every effort to avoid retaining persons in US territory with irregular migration status who also have a criminal history for violent crimes.

Sources: ACS (2011); DHS (2011); DHS (2012).

Since the middle of the 1980s, when drugs were declared a threat to the national security of the United States, drug trafficking has occupied the central place in the cooperation between Washington and Latin America. The use of bilateral channels, as well as strategies of coercive diplomacy (like the old certification mechanism and the subsequent approval or denial of economic and military aid) contributed to the adoption of policies linked to the American approach in the whole region.165 At present, United States’ cooperation practices have diversified and expanded towards areas of prevention and strengthening of local capacities. However, the majority of the security assistance of the United States to Latin America continues to focus on internal problems which are perceived, directly or indirectly, to be threats to US security: trafficking in general, organized crime, and insurgency-terrorism.

Traditional cooperation The security cooperation from the United States to Latin America is concentrated in three programmes: Plan Colombia, the Mérida Initiative, and the Regional Security Initiative for Central America (CARSI). Plan Colombia, between 2000 and 2013, represented US$6.6 billion in US assistance, equivalent to 45% of all the military and police aid to Latin America.166 The security cooperation from the United States to Mexico represents less than a third of the resources allocated to Colombia: US$2.1billion in military and police aid between 2000 and 2013.167 One the other hand, the amounts of aid to Mexico increased substantially beginning in 2008, with the approval of a bilateral cooperation plan: the Merida Initiative.169 Finally, in the Central American isthmus, the United States is the principal cooperation partner. Since 2008, it has committed almost US$769.7 million, the majority for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras, principally through CARSI (WOLA-BID). These three US assistance packages differ in their dimensions, objectives, and strategies,169 but some lessons can be derived from them regarding impact evaluation and the definition of “success”.170 The impact of these three assistance packages continues to be measured with quantitative indicators.

New areas of cooperation with the United States Despite the fact that cooperation towards the region during the government of President Barack Obama diminished, largely due to the budget crisis, programmes have proliferated to carry out judicial reforms, look for alternative development routes, and generate economic opportunities for at-risk population groups, especially youth. Programmes of this type are initiatives of the International Narcotics Control and Law (INCLE) and the International Monetary Fund (Haugaard et al. 2010).

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this cooperation were Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru, in addition to Central America and the Caribbean through regional projects.164

During the last phase of Plan Colombia, even though 60%171 of resources are allocated to conventional security areas, various programmes have started up aimed at vulnerable populations and youth-at-risk, as well as for judicial reform and alternative development. Along similar lines, during the years 2009-2012, the Merida Initiative was partially re-oriented towards nonconventional issues such as the strengthening of justice sector institutions and the prevention of youth violence. Since its beginning, cooperation of the United States with Central America through CARSI has maintained its central objectives focused on a broader security vision, and has increasingly incorporated a preventive and decentralised component (US Department of State 2012). With USAID’s coordination, projects have been developed to offer educational, recreational, and vocational opportunities, and as such address youth violence with a strong community and municipal leadership component (CARSI 2012).172 The Municipal Alliances Programme for the Prevention of Violence in Central America (AMUPREV),173 has been consolidated through the association of US and Central American cities (AMUPREV 2012).174 Another example of decentralized cooperation for prevention is USAID support to Los Angeles authorities to promote an exchange of experiences regarding attention to youth gangs between this city and the countries of the Northern Triangle.175 In sum, the prevention of violence and crime and the strengthening of local capacities, have acquired relevance within the cooperation agenda of the United States. These experiences mean progress towards a cooperation dialogue that is more symmetrical and aligned with the security objectives of the United States and Latin America. There is still room for improvement in the coordination between the agencies in charge of the “soft” components of United States assistance, especially USAID, and those responsible for the “hard” ones, like the Pentagon. The major challenge continues to be the budget allocations, as 88% of total security cooperation from the United States to Latin America continues to be centred on traditional threats.176

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International Organisations: Local level strengthening, global level alignment In the last decade, cooperation initiatives promoted by international organisations to address insecurity have multiplied in the region. The following section presents some representative initiatives of international organisations177 to highlight their relevance for the strengthening of local governments, the prevention of insecurity, and the necessity for interinstitutional coordination in all areas of citizen security.

Cooperation to strengthen local governance Cooperation from international organisations with Latin America has shown considerable progress in the area of decentralized cooperation. This kind of cooperation has been focused primarily on the strengthening of capacities of local governments and the citizen ownership of the programmes. Decentralised cooperation has great potential, to the extent that citizen security has a specific geographical expression at the local level. Strategies designed at the subnational level tend to be more effective in providing solutions to specific problems (Dammert 2007) and tend to be better supported by the citizenry. The proximity strengthens legitimacy and continuity in security policies. In the case of cooperation with the European Unión, one of the most relevant initiatives is the URB-AL Programme, in which programmes have been designed to promote citizen security at the local level.178 Between 2009 and 2013, a project was developed on local policies for violence prevention in marginal urban areas, which promoted violence prevention actions, institutional strengthening, and the promotion of civil society advocacy. The programmes have been implemented in Pernambuco, Brazil, in the region of Loreto, Peru, and Paysandu, Uruguay.179 The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala (CICIG), established by an agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Guatemala, is another excellent example. This organisation operates with financial resources contributed by the international community (CICIG 2012) and its central objective is the disarticulation of the illegal groups and clandestine security apparatuses (CIACS). To achieve this, the Commission has concentrated its attention in three broad areas: (a) to determine the existence of the CIACS, their structure, their modes of operation, their sources of financing, and their possible links to state bodies or actors or other sectors that act 168

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against civil and political rights in Guatemala; (b) to collaborate with the State in the disarticulation of the CIACS and promote the investigation, criminal prosecution, and punishment of the crimes committed by their members; and (c) recommend to the State the adoption of public policies to eradicate the CIACS and prevent their reappearance, including judicial and institutional reform. The CICIG is considered a model of criminal justice cooperation, with a double approach of support for criminal investigation and criminal prosecution, and promotion of tools for legal and institutional reform, which could be replicated in other countries (Hudson y Taylor 2010). Further, the United Nations has progressed in the development of other initiatives of decentralised cooperation that seeks to strengthen local capacities to ensure the security of Latin America’s citizenry. An example is the case of UN-Habitat (2011 and 2012), the organisation that implemented the More Secure Cities programme since 1995 to address the problems of crime and violence that have spread in some of the cities. UN-Habitat provides direct technical assistance to the subnational governments and cooperates with national governments to facilitate aid delivery to the local level. In Latin America, the results of the cooperation between UNHabitat and the government of Chile are relevant, which, through the Commune Secure-Commitment 100, promotes the organisation of community councils on citizen security in those urban areas with the greatest crime problems (ONU-Habitat 2007).180 In Medellin, Colombia, a model of comprehensive urban intervention was developed: best practices applicable to different areas of citizen security were systematized and served as a guide for collaboration with local governments (Assiago 2012; Laboratorio Medellín 2011). UNDP also promoted local and municipal initiatives, through comprehensive citizen security and social peace programmes. For example, in the case of Honduras, the support of the UNDP has been decisive for the local adoption of the national comprehensive citizen security policy (2012-2022). This initiative operates through programmes called “More Secure Municipalities”, developing security plans to consolidate strategies and intersectoral actions for crime prevention and control, and the promotion of social peace. In addition, they promoted alternative mechanisms for conflict resolution, and for the creation of mediation and conciliation units in the justice systems in municipalities. In El Salvador, the UNDP has contributed to strengthening public institutional capacities and those of civil society in the area

In Colombia, the UNDP has supported the government to consolidate Rule of Law in two areas: strengthening the justice system and promoting social peace. Along these lines, reparation for victims and national reconciliation efforts has been promoted. At the local level, efforts have been undertaken to strengthen justice institutions and to facilitate access to justice for victims of the conflict and the vulnerable population. At the national level, initiatives focus on the improvement of institutional capacities, such as the Human Rights Ombudsman, the National Commission for Disappeared Persons, the Institute for Legal Medicine, and the offices of the Attorney General and the Prosecutor. In Belize, among the UNDPâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s priorities are improving youth employability through capacity building and the promotion of social cohesion in urban areas, particularly Belize City. At the local level, it has sought to strengthen the technical capacity of the police that work directly with youth, and also to improve the institutional response capacity for the defence of youth in conflict with the law, including their rehabilitation in pre-trial detention. Another UNDP project focuses on improving access to justice services for marginalised persons, especially women and children. In Brazil, El Salvador, Uruguay, Guatemala, and Panama, the UNDP is carrying out similar programmes to strengthen access to justice by the poor. The approach of the multilateral and international organisations to intervene at the level of the municipality, as a priority point of intervention, is promising. Given the diverse nature of crime, it is more feasible at the local level to identify the problems, propose solutions, and undertake follow-up to the security policies. Despite progress in decentralized cooperation by these organizations with cities in Latin America, this kind of programme still needs to become more widespread, as does the need to advance quantitatively and qualitatively in the solution of the citizen security problems in the region: not all of the Latin American cities have benefited from decentralized cooperation, nor have they all participated to the same degree in these projects. In general, only those cities with the minimum necessary economic, institutional, and organizational conditions can take full advantage of the opportunities that this kind of cooperation offers (Chiodi and Lossio 2008).

Cooperation for the Prevention of Insecurity The international organisations are developing a variety of cooperation frameworks focused on the prevention of crime and violence. These efforts have a comprehensive approach that seeks not only to reduce risk factors, but also to contribute to strengthening the social fabric and a more peaceful environment, which would widen the opportunities for human development in Latin America.

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of gender violence. In addition, since 2012, and in coordination with the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the UNDP accompanied the government in the creation of an inter-institutional roundtable for the design and validation of a system of indicators for violence against women, which in 2013 was housed in the General Directorate for Statistics and Census (DIGESTYC).

Two of the six lines of action of the IDB refer to the prevention of insecurity.181 In the area of social prevention, they have formulated at least 55 regional and national projects that address themes such as youth violence (Argentina, Mexico, and Nicaragua), organised crime (Costa Rica and Colombia), and drug consumption and gender violence (Ecuador, El Salvador, Haiti, and Trinidad and Tobago). Of the 55 programmes, the largest number (13) are executed at the regional level, followed by Jamaica (6) and Nicaragua (4). The IDB cooperation also includes situational prevention182 through instruments like technical assistance and investment loans in countries like Mexico and Brazil. Specifically, the city of Rio de Janeiro, with Urbaniz, and Ciudad Juarez, through support for a project of urban planning, design, and management, have benefited from these cooperation initiatives. The World Bank also approaches the problem of citizen insecurity from a perspective of interpersonal violence prevention (Banco Mundial 2011; Willman and Makisaka 2010). The World Bank is undertaking various efforts to design crime and violence prevention projects that incorporate different sectors such as health, social protection, and urban development, among others. There are a number of relevant decentralised cooperation projects such as the Barrio-City of Honduras, the Jamaica Inner City Basic Services for the Poor Project, and the Judicial Reform Programme in Guatemala. In addition, the World Bank develops cooperation projects through the Conservation Strategy Fund (CSF), a fund that provides small loans to civil society organisations with initiatives addressing violence prevention.183 The United Nations System in Panama, through the joint Alliance for a Life without Violence against Women, supports local networks in the ArraijĂĄn jurisdiction and in Canto del Llano. The networks are an articulation strategy to coordinate, plan, and implement actions that contribute to the prevention of and attention to domestic and sexual violence, as well as well as for the strengthening of governmental, non-governmental, and community mechanisms. Similarly, in El Salvador, the UNDP advised the Salvadoran Institute for the Development of Women (ISDEMU) in the formulaREGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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Box 8.6. Millennium Development Goals: Conflict Prevention and Peace Consolidation Despite the fact that the theme of security is not explicitly incorporated in the Millennium Development Goals (MDG), various projects have been financed in the region related to peace building, in recognition that peace is a fundamental prerequisite to achieve the MDGs. Almost 15 percent of the budget in those programmatic area has been channelled to gender interventions and those projects implemented by various UN agencies and local and national counterparts, both from the government and from civil society. In Latin America, projects are supported in 10 countries, with a total investment of US$ 54 million. Bolivia: Comprehensive Prevention and Constructive Transformation of Social Conflict. The programme has promoted a process of comprehensive integration and the constructive transformation of social conflicts through a change in values and behaviour in different social strata, as well as in state structures and civil society. Conflicts were approached from two perspectives: as potential factors of social change and as events that can set in motion negative effects with respect to achieving the MDGs. Among the results of the programme are the support to initiatives related to gender equity, combatting racism and discrimination, the search for transparency in the management of public resources, and the promotion of human rights. Similarly, support was provided for the design of a strategic plan and the identification of possible hotspots of conflict via a conflict map. Brazil: Security with Citizenship: violence prevention and strengthening of citizenship in Brazilian Communities. The goal of the programme has been to prevent violence and promote citizenship, emphasizing the importance of adopting a multidisciplinary strategy to forestall violence, given its multiple causal nature. This programme has strengthened the joint work of the UN organisations, governmental institutions, and civil society organisations. Among the concrete results, particularly relevant are the creation of three local governance committees and the implementation of a seminar on citizen security and social peace.

Source: United Nations (http://www.mdgfund.org/es/)

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Costa Rica: Networks for Social Peace, Communities without Fear. The programme has focused on improving the security index in nine of the most insecure cantones, to transform them into communities without fear, thanks to the simultaneous reduction of violence and fear. Networks for social peace have been established, with capacity to promote violence prevention actions and promote pacification; three state institutions have joined efforts in these networks: the Ministries of Justice, Security, and Education, together with local governments, social organisations, and the private sector. The following results of this programme should be highlighted: (a) the formulation of a National Plan for Violence Prevention, Peace Promotion, and Citizen Security; (b) the training and awareness raising of teachers and 124 officials of nine cantons in promotion of culture of peace themes; and (c) the opening of Justice Houses in Santa Cruz, San Jose, Desamparados, and Heredia. El Salvador: Violence Reduction and Construction of social capital: a new transition in El Salvador. This initiative has sought to strengthen State capacities for the prevention and reduction of armed violence, and for the building of consensus in national and local institutions of the metropolitan area of San Salvador. It promoted the implementation of plans for violence prevention and citizen security, with the central participation of youth and women, recovering public spaces as sites of social peace and increasing the youth capacity building. Among the principal results are the approval of a strategic plan for a national security and social peace policy, the approval of a ban on weapons in public places in San Salvador and another 26 municipalities, as well as mobile courses for youth.

Since 2011, UN Women and the UNDP have supported the White Ribbon campaign in Argentina and Uruguay. The White Ribbon is a symbol of peace that represents an effort to change cultural patterns, to foster a peaceful culture, and to promote equitable gender roles that would eliminate violence against women.185 It is a pioneering initiative with respect to the participation of men, youth, and children in activities aimed at training, awareness raising, and prevention of violence against women. Within this framework, support was provided to implement the White Ribbon campaign and to promote prevention and awarenessraising in ever-wider areas of the country. In recent years, various programmes have been implemented focused on “conflict prevention and peace consolidation”, with the support of the United Nations and financed with resources from the Spanish Fund for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (FODM). These programmes have been implemented in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Mexico, and Panama, seeking to be responsive to the local differences and specificities (see Box 8.6). The midterm evaluations in all of the cases, and final evaluations in those at the end of their cycle186, show encouraging results, both in relation to the relevance of the strategic approaches used and to the impact in the communities and the participating young populations. Despite the obvious value of prevention programmes that multilateral organisations support or implement in Latin America, it is critically important to improve the mechanisms for follow-up and evaluation of impact. Further, it is indispensable to coordinate these programmes with institutional strengthening policies, as well as with mechanisms for effective citizen participation. The latter is key to guarantee ownership of these efforts for prevention of crime and violence by governments and local communities, in addition to increasing their legitimacy, effectiveness, and continuity.

Coordination among international organisations for citizen security Clearly, the diversity of the multilateral support for Latin America is a valuable contribution to the region. However, a key aspect for the effectiveness of multilateral cooperation is alignment in

the efforts of different international organisations in the area of citizen security, to avoid duplication and even contradictions. A mapping of cooperation programmes of 20 regional organisations carried out by the UNDP reflects the richness of the collaboration with Latin America, but also highlights the fragmentation and the lack of coordination. The multilateral organisations require greater clarity in their objectives, in their specific niches of activity, and in their aggregate value with respect to the rest of the international actors (PNUD 2011, 52-53).

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tion of the document “Secure Cities: Guidelines for the Municipal Plan for the Prevention of Violence against Women” addressed to people and local bodies that are committed or interested in contributing to the prevention of violence against women.184

As the Support to Development Committee noted, there is a need for “coordinated, coherent, and comprehensive international responses between governments, intergovernmental organisations, and NGOs”. Within the framework of citizen security, the multilateral coordination mechanisms should be strengthened to ensure better governance at the different levels: local, national, and supranational. In the area of security, a useful example is the UNETE campaign to end violence against women. Launched by the United Nations Secretary General in 2008 and implemented by UN Women, UNETE aimed to raise public awareness and strengthen political will to prevent and respond to all forms of violence against women and girls in the world. In Latin America and the Caribbean, the campaign began in November of 2009; from its inception, at least 15 organisation of the United Nations System, in addition to the UNDP, — UNHCR, ECLAC, ILANUD, UNHCHR, UN Women, UNICEF, UNAIDS, PAHOWHO, UNESCO, UNODC, ILO— and IOM and ICM-OAS, among others, have promoted actions in all of the countries of the region and with all sectors, governmental and non-governmental, that seek to address this kind of violence. The UNETE campaign has developed an access to justice strategy for all women in the region, providing concrete guidelines in judicial areas, and encouraging the creation of the Central American and Caribbean Network of Prosecutors against Gender Violence. It has also opened spaces for reflection on current themes such as the new forms of violence against women that are emerging in the context of drug trafficking and organised crime. In an important contribution, it has succeeded in placing the prevention of femicide on the regional agenda. In addition to access to justice for women, UNETE has sought to promote cultural change and work with a prevention approach to violence. This campaign evidences the great potential of coordinated and joint work of multilateral organisations, funds, and programmes

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to leverage human and financial resources, mobilise national and regional actors simultaneously, and share experiences and knowledge within the framework of South-South Cooperation. This has proven fundamental to achieve a regional and global view on central themes for advancing citizen security, human development, and human rights. The development of the MDGs is a collective and global effort to focus the terms of the development debate. In the current ODM, the security theme is absent, due in part to the difficulty in building consensus: security continues to be seen as a central element in the autonomy and sovereignty of the States. However, security and human development are inextricable issues, as is becoming apparent in the initial consultations to establish the Post-2015 Development Agenda. As such the objective of expanding citizen security would be an indispensable strategic theme to strengthen human development in the region.

Recommendations 1. Strengthen mechanisms for dialogue and regional coordination to design and implement a shared agenda on citizen security. Create a Regional Forum on Citizen Security in Latin America. As the countries in Latin America adopt a common vision on citizen security as a shared and urgent challenge, they should be able overcome some of the obstacles to date that have limited the effectiveness of cooperation. To strengthen security in the region in its totality and avoid the so-called “balloon effect” —transplanting the problem of security from one country when crime control has increased to another where the control is less —, there is a need for common and coordinated policies. The countries in Latin America need to recognize that policies adopted at a national level to deter security threats, especially those that have a transnational dimension, like organised crime, can generate negative effects for the security of other countries. The “iron fist” policies aimed at the criminal gangs, the punitive combatting of drug trafficking, or policies on migration and deportation, can result in the movement of a threat from one country to another, or the expansion of their transnational networks. There are numerous mechanisms for dialogue and cooperation at the regional level, which have been unable to address the challenges. It is important to analyse the shortcomings or obstacles to their effective functioning and work jointly in their improvement or renovation.

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To this end, the creation of a Regional Forum on Citizen security in Latin America might be useful, for dialogue among the principal actors, public and non-state, and decision makers on the challenges and lessons learned from public policies of security issues, taking the Public Security Forum in Brazil as an example. 2. Strengthen the coordination mechanisms among the different actors of international cooperation and align the cooperation modalities with the objectives, needs, and capacities of the recipient countries. It is essential to strengthen the coordination between global, regional, and sub regional organisations. Similarly, there is a need to align cooperation with the objectives, strategies, and capacities of the recipient nations. The Post-2015 Agenda will set out the goals, indicators, institutional framework, and the financing that will guide the new Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). In the framework of the review of the MDGs and the formulation of the Post-2015 Agenda at a global level, it is important to underscore the importance of the shared challenge that is insecurity. In addition, it is important that the Post-2015 Development Agenda reflect the goals, indicators, and cooperation models that acknowledge the common challenge of the principal security threats and which contribute to promoting more fluid and stable interaction between governments at various levels. 3. Strengthen institutional capacity and local ownership of citizen security policies through decentralised cooperation models. In order that cooperation does not generate dependency dynamics and so that countries can assume their responsibility for the provision of citizen security, it is crucial that capacity building in the recipient countries is included as both an objective and a criterion of success. Many programmes have economic resources and innovative approaches, but fail to be adopted or implemented adequately by the recipient country, which undermines their sustainability and effectiveness. The work of organizations like CISALV to improve information management and create comparable indicators at a regional level, is a practice that permits decision-making based on dependable information and more reliable measurement of results of security policy. In the same way, decentralised cooperation offers interesting opportunities for horizontal interaction, encouraging a fluid and useful exchange of good practices among sub national actors. By

identifying the principal manifestations of citizen insecurity, this modality of cooperation has been shown to be more efficient at addressing specific problems, and facilitates the local communityâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s participation and ownership of programmes.

INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

4. Improve the instruments for the evaluation of cooperation effectiveness and impact, in prevention areas as well as in combatting transnational threats, with an approach stressing institutional strengthening, human development, and non-reproduction of violence. It is essential to obtain better results from international cooperation. Beginning in the 21st century, and with greater urgency after the financial crisis of 2008, governments and multilateral bodies have taken on the challenge to improve the evaluation instruments of international cooperation, and its effectiveness. Despite the fact that these concerns originated principally in the Declaration of Paris (2005) and in the Accra Action Plan (2008), promoted by the Committee for Development Assistance (CAD) of the OCDE, they have also been extensive in the security field188. It is essential to develop a culture of evaluation of projects and initiatives of international cooperation in the area of citizen security, to strengthen, and when possible, replicate the most successful models. The best way to maximize efforts is to give them continuity and establish transparent and comparable indicators of success.

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Students of “The School of Body”, Álvaro Restrepo (play), Olga Paulhiac (photography), 2008

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CHAPTER

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The challenges posed by citizen insecurity do have solutions. The valuable experiences already accumulated in Latin America are worth examining and understanding. However, there is no single, infallible response to citizen security problems. This chapter aims at analysing lessons learned from some Latin American responses and interventions in preventing and mitigating the impact of violence and crime on the wellbeing of people and their communities. This chapter has three sections. The first is a general introduction to the kinds of responses that specialized literature and empirical evidence identify as the most appropriate in addressing the different threats to citizen security. Threats like corruption and unlawful violence involving State actors are addressed as one because even though they produce different forms of abuse, they require similar responses from the State. The second section discusses some of the consequences and negative effects of hard-line policies in the region. It examines some of the challenges to date that have impeded attempts to restrain these types of responses across Latin America.

they favour strengthening institutional capacity, prevention, and dialogue, as well as restoring trust, and rebuilding the social fabric. • Context with high levels of violence. These interventions respond to a context with high concentrations of violence and crime. This report has insisted that insecurity is a problem shared by all countries in the region, albeit in different forms. This chapter will address only those interventions that respond to contexts in which violence and crime have reached critical levels. In addition to these criteria, a certain geographical and thematic balance was sought to reflect the different Latin American sub regions and to cover the six main threats addressed in this report. The case studies are: Fica Vivo (Brazil), Plan Cuadrante (Colombia), Barrio Seguro (Dominican Republic), truce between gangs (El Salvador), and Todos Somos Juárez (Mexico). It is important to point out that this chapter does not claim to offer an exhaustive list of interventions in the region and hence will inevitably exclude cases in which important lessons have also been learned.189 The main lessons of this chapter are the following:

The third section analyses five cases of interventions that have produced positive results and serve to illustrate the opportunities and challenges that security policies of the Latin American States may face. The section concludes with a series of recommendations based on the analysis of these cases. The five cases were selected based on three criteria: • Regional pertinence. All five cases have been analysed and debated on a regional level, and although not all have been evaluated with the same rigour, their achievements in reducing lethal violence or crime have placed them at the centre of regional discussions about citizen security. • Focus. The cases chosen are compatible with peoplecentred citizen security policies that aim to protect citizens’ physical and material integrity. None of these cases gives preference to a repressive or hard-line focus: on the contrary,

• Empirical evidence shows that interventions that function well are preceded by a series of reforms and key changes in State capacities that contribute, eventually, to a successful programme or policy. • The sustainability of these interventions depends on building strategic alliances between the State, non-state actors, and international cooperation organizations. • The active participation of communities is vital in ensuring legitimacy, information, and resources for an intervention. If the aim is to maximise achievements, any initiative or programme must ensure communities ownership and recognise shared norms from the specific location as a guide for intervention. • If a policy is to be effective and sustainable, it must be entirely institutionalised and internalised by all appropriate security agencies.

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• The most effective interventions are able to adapt to local circumstances and respond to citizen security problems that are identified and defined jointly with the communities involved.

Responses to threats to citizen security One of the first steps in building an effective citizen security policy is to understand how security threats are interconnected and expressed in a given context. As this report has shown, each country, city and, municipality has a different combination of threats, some of which intersect on a local level. Because of this, the most effective responses to insecurity depend less on a single isolated policy and more on a correct combination of policies based on an accurate diagnostic study of local reality. According to criminological theory, where crime appears in a disorganised and opportunistic way, a standard combination of measures can be applied to inhibit crime, such as the development of georeferential information and the deployment of patrols at strategic points (Felson and Clarke 1998). Other responses might include improving street lighting, reorganising public spaces, promoting greater pedestrian circulation or closing bars earlier in order to prevent fights or violent incidents related to alcohol abuse. Where moderate levels of organised crime exist, such as youth gangs, it becomes necessary to strengthen ties between comFigure 9.1.

munities and local authorities in order to prevent and control crime. Community policing, or police work in a close relationship with people in the area, is fundamental in ensuring focalised interventions and services for the population at risk. Educational programmes, resource transfer or technical training, and the promotion of recreational activities in neighbourhoods or communities can help strengthening the connection between vulnerable groups and the rest of the community, as well as reducing the risk factors associated with juvenile violence. The presence of highly organised criminal groups requires more specific responses. The growing presence of drug trafficking networks or criminal groups involved in extortion or kidnapping, for example, requires greater investment in investigation, intelligence work, and collaboration between different offices of security. When organised crime achieves a deep level of penetration in a community’s internal dynamics, the State needs to regain control of the territory and strengthen local institutions including the public security apparatus. When criminal organisations manage to permeate the operation of state institutions —through co-optation, corruption, or by capturing the entire apparatus—, the response must be different. Threats such as corruption and illegal violence involving public officials, require the state to strengthen structures for internal accountability and discipline, as well as mechanisms for external accountability by citizens. Nevertheless, as with all other threats, violence and corruption involving state actors may occur at different organisational levels. The use of internal control mechanisms tends to be sufficient when corruption

Types of response to threats and levels of organised crime Threats Level of organisation

Lesser

Greater

Street crime

Violence and crime exercises against and by young people

Organised crime

Gender violence

Responses: improved information gathering; optimisation of police presence and prevention of risk factors that foster criminal activity —such as alcohol abuse, badly lit or abandoned public spaces.

Responses: greater collaboration and proximity between police and communities; programmes that strengthen the social fabric and prevention work with high-risk groups.

Responses: capacity strengthening for investigating the entire crime chain; in critical situations, recovery of territories through State presence.

Responses (to gender violence): improve the quality and management of information; encourage a holistic response including the whole range of state systems from health and education to the judiciary and police; launch campaigns to make these practices visible and eradicate them. Special emphasis should be made on transforming masculinities and discriminatory social and behavioural patterns.

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Levels of corruption and use of illegal violence involving State actors

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Figure 9.2.

Corruption and use of illegal violence involving state actors Level of organisation Lesser

Greater

Isolated or disorganised corruption Responses: : improve information gathering and transparency; improve internal investigations; creation of obstacle-free mechanisms for citizens to report their complaints.

Corruption and abuses coordinated at certain levels of the structure

Systemic corruption and violence at all levels of the state structure

Responses: greater control over middle and senior management; improve the mechanisms for internal and external accountability; promote investigation and intelligence capacities.

Responses: drastic reform of existing structures; strengthening of mechanisms for removing and renewing top leadership; formation of international alliances on intelligence matters.

Information gathering and analysis has been fundamental in developing better control strategies for street crime. A classic example of this is New York City’s COMPSTAT programme (acronym for Computer Statistics or Comparative Statistics). At the beginning of the 1990s, this programme used advances in information technology to build georeferenced databases based on police reports. As a result, public officials and citizens could see the spatio-temporal distribution of crime across the city. This Public opinion about the need for police to abide by system allowed the police to improve its distribution of crime the law when pursuing criminals, Figure 9.4. prevention resources, and made it easier to locate and arrest Figure 9.1 summarizes the America type of responses that can be adoptLatina, 2012 ed to counteract different threats to citizen security, depending criminals. Venezuela of crime and violence. Gender vioon the level of organisation Uruguay lence can be located at any point on this spectrum; that is to say, Some similar data-based crime control programmes have been Dominican Republic as a form of “disorganised” Peru violence (domestic violence) or as a successful in Latin Americans cities, such as Bogotá, Recife, Total homicides a marked form of organisedParaguay crime (human trafficking and sexual exploi- Medellín, Rio de Janeiro, and Sao Paulo. While this isChart 9.1. programmes are Panama tation, among others). Figure 9.2 illustrates different levels of improvement, there are limitations to statistics and information Nicaragua gathering methods. Even with the best of information systems, organised crime andMexico illegal violence involving state actors. T there is still no systematic data on certain crimes (Frühling 2012, Honduras Location Beginning 2001 Guatemala 34). Those formulating public policy must consistently improve El Salvador Street crime their data collection and be on constant alert forAlto failures their Vera in Cruz and Taquaril 2005 18 Ecuador information gathering systems (Basombrío 2012, 22). 14 Cabana do Pai Tomás 2005 Costa Rica appears to be isolated or only affecting some elements of the police. However, if corruption or police abuses become extensive in specific sectors or jurisdictions, the State must consider a change in leadership. In extreme cases, if the leadership itself is affected, deep reforms in the security structures will probably be necessary. Non-state actors and civil society, in general, can play a crucial role in promoting transparency and accountability (Peruzzotti and Smulovitz 2006).

Colombia

Paulo VI and Ribeiro de Abreu

In terms of street crime, Chilethe responses that have had the most Another appropriate response to street crime consists of using Pedreira Prado Lopes Brazil the following three elements: (a) positive results incorporate 190 and managing public space to improve security. According to and Ventosa Morro das Pedras Bolivia meticulous analysis of crime and victimisation data, (b) greater some studies, dynamic public spaces generate an of “pasArgentina Cityarray of Belo Horizonte knowledge and control of public spaces, and (c) improved inter- sive” observers, whose presence limits opportunities for crime 0 25 50 75 100 action between the police and society, which allows the police (Jacobs 2002). This and other ideas have givenSource: Ungar (2009). riseAriastoandcrime to improve their knowledge understanding On occasion mayand proceed beyond the boundaries ofofthethe law com-Always must abide by the law prevention programmes that use environmental designs and munities in which they work. In other words, while responses improvements in urban landscapes to facilitate police work.191 Note: The question for this graphfocus was: “In order to be able to capture and criminals, do you think should always respect the law or on to organised crime must on investigation greater in-the authorities A recent example of this kind of urban strategy is the “Green occasions can they cross the line?” ternational exchanges of information and intelligence between Line” in Aguascalientes, Mexico. In this case, the national and governments (Shelley 2010), responses to street crime should municipal governments collaborated to turn an 11 kilometre have a greater focus on improving the availability and analysis of strip of the city affected by marginalisation and conflicts belocal data, in order to distribute State resources more efficiently. tween gangs into a green area. The strip became a park used as

2005 2004 2002 -----

19 9 19 640

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Since the creation of the “Green Line”, the local perception of security has improved by 70% (Acero 2013).

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The city of Diadema, in Brazil, offers another example of public space management. In this city —that had the highest homicide rates in the country—, a team of decision-makers and local business people decided to control the closing times of bars and restrict the sale of alcohol to certain hours of the day. A later study showed that these restrictions achieved a reduction in homicides in Diadema to nine per month, as well as reducing violence against women (Duailibi et al. 2007, 2276-2280). Finally, a third strategy to counter street crime consists in the strategic orientation of surveillance and police patrols, using improved knowledge of the spatio-temporal distribution of local crime.192 Dubbed “community-oriented surveillance”, this combination of strategies increases police presence in neighbourhoods and improves the interaction between police officers and citizens. By establishing stronger ties and cooperation, police and citizens can generate security measures that respond to local needs (Arias and Ungar 2009; Moncada 2009). This approach has produced positive results in Colombia, Brazil, and Honduras.194

Violence and crime by and against young people In countering violence and crime by and against young people, specific policies are required to focus services on their particular needs and vulnerabilities. In a Latin American context of inequality, low social mobility, and job scarcity, young people can become involved in illegal economic activities or in gangs as a way of satisfying their needs. Public investment in improving schools is fundamental for reducing the exposure of young people to violence and for promoting better perspectives for their lives (Chaux 2012, 31-32). The development of school programmes that target high-risk youth can help to prevent their participation in criminal activities and reduce their ties with gangs. Teachers and school staff can be key actors in understanding young people’s needs and the social tensions that affect them. In some cases, extending time in school can help to reduce crime by keeping youth off the streets (Frühling 2012, 8). Domestic violence also is usually linked to juvenile violence (Herrera and McCloskey 2001; Basombrío 2012, 16). The Nicaraguan TV programme Sexto Sentido (Sixth Sense) offers a good example of how television can be used to create awareness, with 180

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a gender perspective, about domestic violence and its impact on young people by dealing with issues such as sexual abuse and its consequences, sexual and gender discrimination, adolescent pregnancy, and the impact of drugs. State and non-state actors can also regulate informal markets where young people work, in order to protect them from criminal activities. For example, the cultural group AfroReggae, in Rio de Janeiro, the Fica Vivo programme in Belo Horizonte, and the Fuerza Joven (Youth force/strength) programme in Medellin, all seek to reduce young people’s involvement in gangs, and increase their educational and job opportunities (Tocornal, Tapia and Ayala 2011). These kinds of programmes may also focus on specific State interventions (Llorente and Guarín 2012).

Gender violence State institutions can offer an array of responses to gender violence. The first of these is to create an appropriate environment for effective reporting by gender crime victims. While there are many strategies for achieving this, a key one is the establishment of specialised police units. Another is the creation of public or private institutional systems that can support people when they decide to report this type of crime. The first strategy can been seen most clearly in Brazil and in Nicaragua, where the police have special police stations or Comisarías exclusively focused on gender violence. These specialised units can be strengthened if the other links in the justice chain (public prosecutors and judges) also have specialised gender units with trained staff. The establishment of shelters for victims of domestic violence can also improve data gathering, support people presenting formal complaints, and provide key information to prevent future abuse (Wathen and MacMillan 2003). The Police and other criminal justice institutions must be aware of the magnitude of gender violence and create structures that enable victims to be protected. In Campeche, Mexico, the Public Prosecutor’s Ministry has developed solid initiatives to support victims in obtaining judicial protection orders and to facilitate their application.194 A third group of strategies consists of campaigns that give greater visibility to this problem and offer information to potential victims about how best to protect themselves. A good example is the campaign by the United Nations Secretary General, “UNiTE to end Violence against Women”, that has helped create a global platform to address this issue, while encouraging all countries to adopt effective responses and strategies (for more information, see chapter 8). Campaigns aimed at young and adult men can also have a positive effect in building violence-free masculini-

Corruption and illegal violence involving State actors When people representing or working with the state participate in corruption and illegal violence, it has noxious effects on citizen security. Both these phenomena undermine the potential for cooperation between security institutions and the community, while weakening State strategies to control and apply the rule of law (Soares 2003; Kilcullen 2009). As previous successful experiences demonstrate, the State can adopt relatively straightforward responses to counter violence and police abuse. The development of training programmes and refresher courses with a community and human rights focus can help police institutions comply with higher standards. The UPP (Police Units for Pacification) programme in Rio de Janeiro provides neighbourhoods in critical situations — around 33 communities by the end of 2013— with recently recruited police officers who have received special training.196 Governments can also establish and apply strict rules that limit the use of lethal force by police, as happens in the United Kingdom (Kennison and Loumansky 2007, 152). In addition, a limited number of bullets or only certain types of firearms can be turned over to police officers in order to reduce the lethal consequences of their actions. Governments can implement supervision systems, by establishing civil inspections or reviews and creating the figure of Ombudsperson, to give the population more options for lodging complaints against the police (Chevigny 1995). If police violence is to be controlled, any complaint must be in the hands of individuals who can take police officers to court. The cooperation of civilians in the local, national, and sometimes international arena is essential if the police are to be held accountable (Arias 2004).

Organised crime Organised crime appears in cities and specific localities, when criminal groups find themselves at an advantage over other

organisations (USAID 2013; WWC 2013; Varese 2011). These groups can eventually extend their reach and begin to operate transnationally. Sometimes they transport goods and operate through what have been called “supernodes” or international intermediaries that help to mediate exchanges between large local or national criminal groups (Farah 2008). If these organisations are to be controlled, the investigative capacity of local police forces must be strengthened and there must be greater regional coordination for identifying illicit transactions beyond national boundaries. Key to this process is the passage and enforcement of laws enabling investigations and legal actions against these groups to be more effective. Improvements to mechanisms for exchanging intelligence information and establishing cooperation between police forces in different countries are also vital.197

9 INTERVENTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

ties based on equal gender relations. Important lessons can be learned from campaigns by the Latin America regional network of the MenEngage organization or the campaign launched in Guatemala “Soy orgulloso chapín and no soy violento” (I´m a proud Guatemalan man and not violent), which is part of the UNiTE campaign to end violence against women.195

On a local level, it is important to recognise the vulnerability of people living in the neighbourhoods and areas where these organisations operate. The lack of basic public services, particularly in poor urban neighbourhoods, can create opportunities for organised crime to provide these services in exchange for economic resources or community members’ support for criminal activities (Gambetta 1996; Arias 2009). Here, an effective response to organised crime involves the resolution of structural problems related to weaknesses in the state, and the recovery of territories that are perceived to be abandoned. An example of this is the UPP work in Rio de Janeiro. Given that corruption is a necessary condition for financing and sustaining activities linked to organised crime, any response must also improve the supervision of police actions.198 This might include new or stronger National Auditors’ Offices, improvements in transparency and accountability, adequate protection for journalists working on documenting organised crime (Arias 2009) 199, and the opening of judicial files.

Hard-line responses and their negative effects The hard-line policies adopted in the region have failed to attain their goal of reducing violence and crime. They have also had a deeply negative effect on democratic co-existence and the respect for human rights, both of which are the foundation for human development. With their punitive focus, which emphasises repression, increases in severe sentencing, and the use of force, these hardline policies have had negative repercussions, many of them unexpected, on citizen security in Latin America. Outstanding REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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examples of these are: increases in lethal violence, strengthened to public opinion and to existing perceptions of these policies, criminal networks, congested prison systems —that already by making their negative consequences and ineffective results were overcrowded—, human rights violations —particularly more visible. against young people and children— and abuses of authority (Hume 2007, Zilberg 2011, Basombrío and Dammert 2013). In Several countries in the region have adopted policies of this Figure 9.1. Types of response to threats and levels of organised crime sum, the experience demonstrates that hard-line policies are an kind. In Brazil, particularly in Rio de Janeiro, repressive measobstacle to building an inclusive and sustainable model for citi- ures were applied to counteract growing urban crime rates. TheThreats most notorious of these strategies was implemented in the zen security that adheres to a respect for human rights. Level of organisation mid-1990s. Officially known as “Gratificação por Pecúnia (MonIn Latin America, there is overwhelming approval for tougher etary Bonus) this strategy promoted payments and economic Lesser Greater punitive measures as a way to counteract criminality. Figure 9.3, incentives for police officers who showed a “harder” or “braver” attitude (Oliveira based on results from LAPOP-UNDP 2012 survey, shows that and Streetthe crime Organised crime Violence crime towards exercisescriminals against during security operations and by young people an average of 87% of those surveyed indicate their agreement and Machado 2012). The consequence of this strategy was an (very much agree or somewhat agree) that the best way to fight increase in police violence and in the crime rate (Hinton 2006; Gender violence Torres 2007). The use of excessive force in security operations crime is to impose harsh punishments. has been documented in another 18 Responses: states of Brazil, a majority Responses: improved information gathering; Responses: greater collaboration and proximity capacity strengthening for of which are attributed to the so-called military police (Ahnen Alongoptimisation these sameoflines, Figure 9.4 shows to what extent the repolice presence and prevention of between police and communities; programmes that investigating the entire crime chain; in factorsconsider that foster criminal activity —such as bystrengthen social fabric criticalthat situations, of territories 153). and The prevention number ofwork civilian deaths occurredrecovery because gion’srisk citizens that the Police should “abide the law” the2007, abuse, badly lit or abandoned spaces. with high-risk through presence. of confrontations between security forces andState alleged criminals whenalcohol they pursue criminals. An averagepublic of 35% expressed their groups. willingness to accept police violation of the laws in stopping is of particular concern. These are serious violations of human rights and due process (Canoa holistic 2010). response including the whole range of state criminals. In other words,violence): around one in three peopleandsupport Responses (to gender improve the quality management of information; encourage the violation of the rule of law as part of a response to crime. systems from health and education to the judiciary and police; launch campaigns to make these practices visible and eradicate them. Special emphasis should be made on transforming masculinities and discriminatory social behaviouralpor patterns. Theand Gratificação Pecúnia system in Rio de Janeiro did not This evidence allows us to explain why adopting these measures translate into a reduction of violence and crime. In fact its aphas been perceived at certain moments, as being preferable to plication coincided with the highest homicide rates in the state. implementing long term institutional and social changes. It also Similarly, in São Paulo, the highest crime rates of the eighties demonstrates the need to make drastic changes in the region and nineties also coincided with considerably high levels of po-

Public opinion about hard-line policies, Latin America, 2012

Figure 9.3. Venezuela Uruguay Dominican Republic Peru Paraguay Panama Nicaragua Mexico Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Ecuador Costa Rica Colombia Chile Brazil Bolivia Argentina

Very much in agreement Somewhat in agreement Somewhat in disagreement Very much in disagreement

0 Source: LAPOP-UNDP (2012).

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100

Public opinion about the need for police to abide by the law when pursuing criminals, America Latina, 2012

Venezuela Uruguay Dominican Republic Peru Paraguay Panama Nicaragua Mexico Honduras Guatemala El Salvador Ecuador Costa Rica Colombia Chile Brazil Bolivia Argentina

Chart 9.1.

Location

INTERVENTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Figure 9.4.

Alto Vera Cruz and Taquaril Cabana do Pai Tomás Paulo VI and Ribeiro de Abreu Pedreira Prado Lopes Morro das Pedras and Ventosa City of Belo Horizonte

On occasion may proceed beyond the boundaries of the law

100

Source: Arias and Ungar (2009).

Always must abide by the law

Note: The question for this graph was: “In order to be able to capture criminals, do you think the authorities should always respect the law or on occasions can they cross the line?”

November January March

September

July

November January March May

September

July

January March May

November

September

July

November January March May

July

September

Rate

lice abuse. In contrast to these policies and their results, recent police operations focused on incarcerating all those suspected reductions in homicide levels in Rio have been attributed to the of being gang members and due process was violated in many development of policies based on the use of georeferrenced cases. It also contributed to the saturation of the prison systems information, the expansion of prison capacities, and the im- in each country. plementation of programmes like the UPP that target specific The hard-line policiesrate adopted these countries had negative communities. According to a recent assessment, the pacification Evolution of the monthly homicide perby100.000 inhabitants, Figure 9.6. consequences in the levels of violence and crime. Lethal violence process launched by this programme has allowed approximately El Salvador, 2009-2013 60 lives to be saved for every 100,000 inhabitants (Cano 2012). remained high and intensified in all three countries, particularly 100 3 2011). Crimes linked to during the 2005 to 2010 period (UNODC 2 80 the maras also increased and diversified, including kidnappings During the first part of the decade of 2000, Honduras, El Salva60 dor, and Guatemala40adopted hard-line policies to try to curb the and extortion, and there was an increase in the participation development of the20gangs called maras, identified as the main 4of gang members in activities linked to organised crime (Cruz 0 group responsible for rising crime and the deterioration of secu- 2012). Similarly, the massive imprisonment of the maras facilirity in these three countries. These policies had different names. tated the development of criminal networks and the formation In Guatemala, the policy was called Plan Escoba (Clean Sweep of more hierarchical and highly organised structures within prisPlan); in Honduras, Libertad Azul (Blue Freedom), and in El Sal- ons (Santamaría 2013). Paradoxically, the increase in the prison strength. vador, Plan Mano Dura (Firm Hand Plan) 2009 and later, Súper Mano2010population became a platform 2011 for the maras to gain 2012 Dura (Super Firm Hand). While these policies were translated into an array of country-specific measures and laws, they shared After recognising the negative . consequences of their policies, all a common central focus: the imprisonment of gang members, three countries have now adopted alternative measures to enincreased police presence and powers in key areas and neigh- hance work in prevention and reinsertion. The most emblematic bourhoods, and the criminalisation of all activities linked to case, because of its results and vision, is the truce between the the maras (Ungar 2009; Huhn, Oettler and Peetz 2006, 13-14). maras in El Salvador. Moreover, the military-type strategies used by the police force effectively suspended the civilian nature of the police and its Another case that illustrates the negative consequences of role in protecting citizens’ rights as enshrined in the institutional hard-line policies is Mexico, where a fully-fledged war against reforms implemented in all three countries (Cruz 2012). These organised crime was waged in response to growing violence January March May

Tot pro

2013

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Beg

2 2 2 2 2

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and drug trafficking associated with these groups. The measures systematically implemented from 2007 onwards included military style security operations, seizures of drugs and illegal arms, and imprisonment of leaders of the main criminal organisations. (Benítez 2009). The security policy also included institutional strengthening for security agencies and the judiciary, and designs for prevention programmes, but these measures had much less financial backing (Meyer 2011). An exception to this was the Todos Somos Juárez (We are all Juarez) programme, which is considered to be a successful intervention. The so-called “war against organised crime” in Mexico did not reduce the levels of violence and crime in the country. On the contrary, according to official statistics, homicide rates surged from 8 to 24 per 100,000 inhabitants between 2007 and 2011.200 Moreover, the visibility and brutality of the violent confrontation between criminal organizations significantly increased, which augmented the perception of insecurity in the country as a whole (Reguillo 2012). In terms of criminal behaviour during this period, kidnapping and extortion became a central part of the insecurity scenario as a consequence of the “diversification” of crimes committed by these groups (PGR 2008). In sum, the policies adopted in Mexico, while based on an interest in strengthening security, did not prevent an increase in organised crime. On the contrary, they coincided with a severe intensification of violence. Recently, Mexico’s security policy has placed more emphasis on prevention, which indicates that the State is putting into practice some of the lessons learned.

Interventions: lessons, challenges, and replication There are no simple solutions to the insecurity problems faced by Latin American countries. However, examples are proliferating of well-developed public policies and successful interventions that are professionally managed and have systematic support. At the heart of several of these interventions are: the development of trustworthy information and analysis; the adaptation of responses to context-specific social, economic, and political problems; and the sustained and committed participation of public officials and civil society. In this section, we will present the histories, characteristics, and lessons learned from five pertinent interventions in the region: Fica Vivo (Brazil), Plan Quadrant (Colombia), Barrio Seguro (Dominican Republic), Tregua entre pandillas (El Salvador) and Todos Somos Juárez (Mexico).

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Fica Vivo, Brazil Towards the end of the 1990s, the city of Belo Horizonte, in Minas Gerais, experienced a sudden increase in its rates of crime and lethal violence, as a result of the rapid penetration of cocaine trafficking and the growing consumption of crack. In response to this scenario, the Minas Gerais government developed a series of strategies aimed at countering the spiral of lethal violence and the violence generated by gangs who were selling and distributing drugs locally. The gangs were operating in a disparate fashion and without the capacity to co-opt or penetrate government structures. The most important of these strategies, Fica Vivo — which means “Stay Alive”— is an innovative initiative aimed at controlling the homicide rate among young people. Background The Fica Vivo project began in 2001, as an initiative of the Centre for Studies on Criminality and Public Security (CRISP) at the Minas Gerais Federal University. It was launched and led by the university, in association with the military and civil police, the Belo Horizonte Prefect’s Office, local business associations, and civil society organisations. Based on georeferenced data, the project identified the statistical and territorial distribution of homicides, and this allowed it to determine that homicidal violence was concentrated in six Belo Horizonte favelas, that were affected by drug trafficking and inter-gang warfare. The governor of Minas Gerais, Aecio Neves, launched the project in 2003 as part of his government’s public policy, which also identified best practices in other parts of Brazil and the world. Inspired by an innovative community police project implemented in Rio de Janeiro, and by community police and violence prevention programmes in cities such as Boston, in the U.S., the Secretary for Social Defence in Mina Gerais developed a community police programme that would later become Fica Vivo. With the support of academics, foundations, and the federal government of Brazil, this programme adopted a two-track strategy. On the one hand, it promoted more efficient and rapid policing response and, on the other, it created social programmes to transform the relationship between target communities and government offices. The practical first step of the intervention began halfway through 2002 in Morro das Pedras, a poor neighbourhood located in a relatively comfortable sector of the city. The policing component of the initiative consisted of a small police detachment for high risk areas, known as the Grupamento de Polícia em areas de Risco (GEPAR, or Police Group in Areas at Risk), led by a lieutenant linked with the local battalion of the Minas Gerais Military Police. Police deployment began some time be-

Structure and results In 2004, the Morro das Pedras social programmes were reorganised in a new pilot project under the name Fica Vivo. This project, managed by public employees with experience in social work and psychology, was explicitly designed to expand services for young people under the greatest risk of being murdered. The programme began with specific workshops—such as dance classes or athletics—, to keep young people occupied and away from the streets while they were out of school. The majority of the people coordinating the workshops were from the community and had local credibility and leadership potential. They also took on a key role in dialogues with local leaders and gang members so that Fica Vivo could maintain its presence in the community during periods of local tension. In addition, these facilitators also served as key community spokespersons to mediate with police in improving the quality of surveillance. Fica Vivo produced positive and noteworthy results over the short and medium term. The most positive of these was the drastic reduction of neighbourhood violence. The success of the pilot project led to the expansion of the Fica Vivo programme to include other areas of the city: Taquaril and Alto Vera Cruz, Pedreira Prado Lopes, Paulo VI, Ribeira de Abreu, and Cabana do Pai Tomás. All these new programmes began with a GEPAR police unit and a Fica Vivo centre that operated jointly. Strategic working groups were also created and included civil police officers, prosecutors, and state representatives of child welfare agencies and schools. The idea of these groups was to develop long term strategies to work on each area’s problems and to ensure that repeat offenders who committed crimes would face the justice system. From 2004 to 2007, the levels of violence drastically diminished in the communities where the combined Fica Vivo-GEPAR existed. All five target communities experienced a reduction in homicides of more than 50% on average, a figure well above the statistics for the whole city (see Box 9.1). Not surprisingly, these initial successes led to an increased demand for expanding the programme into the metropolitan conurbations and the interior of Minas Gerais state.

Challenges and replication The Fica Vivo programme in Belo Horizonte was not without its difficulties. The reduction of homicides required the consistent participation of the police and social workers with local leaders and other members of the local intervention team, which included prosecutors, police investigators, local public school employees, and child service workers. The creation of these programmes did not instantly eliminate the underlying problems inside the Minas Gerais Military Police. While changes in doctrine and some development initiatives were implemented, the police assigned to the programmes continued to have a “traditional” institutional culture, focused more on fighting crime than on protecting citizens. Among other failures, there were cases of police violence against the population. Information gathered by Fica Vivo and by community members permitted the identification, retirement or transfer of some police officers, and this helped improve police behaviour and operations.

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fore the establishment of parallel social programmes designed to reduce the presence and impact of the gangs and criminal activity, and to address the needs of the population of young people at risk. However, under the direction of the police, these social programmes were not well coordinated and in 2003 they collapsed due to internal problems and the substitution of the commander in charge.

From 2005 onwards, the expansion of Fica Vivo to cover the entire state of Minas Gerais generated positive effects, but also substantial challenges. One of the keys to success of Fica Vivo’s pilot programme in Belo Horizonte was the close working relationship between the State Governor and the Mayor in the capital city. While the State government controls most of the local security forces, the city government has a key role in public services such as roads, street lighting, and public schools. The solid relations of cooperation that existed enhanced the work of local government in developing information for the crime maps that helped launch the Fica Vivo programme. However, the State government didn´t manage to build equally positive relations with other municipal leaders outside the capital. As a result, the new Fica Vivo programmes faced problems associated with a lack of cooperation and political commitment, the quality of assigned staff, and deficits in programme monitoring. The Fica Vivo intervention paved the way for important innovations in citizen security. Fundamentally it was a model for debate and practice in Brazil about information management and community intervention. Even the most recent UPP work in Rio de Janeiro reflects lessons learned from Fica Vivo. Among the innovations generated by Fica Vivo, has been the use of technologies and knowledge to obtain positive results, particularly the georeferenced maps of Belo Horizonte; these have centred on “hot spots”, but also on the location of key social sectors and services. These maps enabled government officials and academics to develop an integrated georeferenced system to address crime, which in turn facilitated the introduction of micro level police stations in areas of high criminality, and a citywide programme for policing oriented towards the community, based on neighbourhood forums, social investment, and programmes REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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Chart 9.1.

Total homicides in communities where Fica Vivo -GEPAR programmes are implemented, Brazil, 2001-2007 Total homicides

100

Location

Beginning

Alto Vera Cruz and Taquaril Cabana do Pai Tomás Paulo VI and Ribeiro de Abreu Pedreira Prado Lopes Morro das Pedras and Ventosa City of Belo Horizonte

2005 2005 2005 2004 2002 -----

2001 18 14 19 9 19 640

2002 54 36 26 11 27 900

201

2003 53 26 39 5 33 1.174

2004 67 16 57 61 16 1.284

2005 63 16 52 23 11 1.100

2006 36 12 29 14 16 998

2007 31 11 23 9 18 1.002

Source: Arias and Ungar (2009).

the law

against violence in schools. A key point in evaluating this experience is that as the programme has evolved over time it is able to introduce innovations based on the lessons learned.

d always respect the law or on

2012 .

November January March

September

July

November January March May

July

September

As a programme mainly aimed at controlling lethal violence, Fica Vivo was not designed to counteract specific threats such as sexual and domestic violence. However, the programmes’ content and dynamics have allowed it to look into cases of gender violence. The programme functions through “Crime Prevention e per 100.000 inhabitants, Hubs”, which work closely with communities, holding workshops and meetings led by social workers and psychologists. The workshops also serve to inform the community about public 3 services that address different forms of violence (Instituto Elo 2 2011). The work of the Hubs includes a programme to prevent conflict and domestic violence. One of the modules, known as Conviver Mulher (Women and Co-existence), aims explicitly to reduce the impact of conflicts directly affecting women’s security and wellbeing.202 The Fica Vivo programme came about at a time of important institutional 2013changes within the Minas Gerais police, and of widespread improvements in information gathering. The programme incorporated successful experiences from elsewhere, but introduced its own innovations and adapted general ideas to distinct local conditions (for example, the disparate presence of gangs, high levels of lethal violence, and local drug trafficking and distribution). It also managed to strengthen ties between the State and the community, create alliances with academia, and develop a focus on high-risk populations, particularly young people. Police effectiveness improved because of the closer relationship to the communities which facilitated relations of cooperation in preventing and controlling local violence and crime. Fica Vivo has been evaluated by the Minas Gerais government and by academic studies. As a result, there is a detailed registry 186

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of the programme’s positive achievements and of the challenges it has encountered. This programme’s success depends on the existence of high quality georeferenced data. It also requires a context in which criminal groups are not highly organised and do not have the capacity to co-opt authorities. The programme’s main goal is to promote policing in the communities, in association with social programmes that help keep young people safe from lethal violence. In order to replicate this experience in other cities, governments must have adequate technical and financial resources and access to the georeferenced information that enables programme implementation in a specific neighbourhood or series of neighbourhoods. This response is specific to a scenario in which crime is disorganised or dispersed, and in which corruption is not a pertinent threat.

National Plan for Community Quadrant Surveillance The Colombia homicide rate has decreased significantly over the last few years, and especially over the last decade. What underpins this reduction is a series of institutional transformations and new programmes that were adopted nationally and on municipal levels. The National Police in particular, has undergone an intense reform process that has generated profound changes in its behaviour, codes and use of data. It has also changed the way it interacts with the population (Borrero 2012; Beato 2009, 1114; IGAC 2004, 4). Background and operations In July 2010, the Colombian National Police announced it was launching the National Plan for Community Quadrant Surveillance (PNVCC in Spanish) in eight of the country’s largest cities: Bogota, Medellin, Cali, Barranquilla, Cartagena, Bucaramanga, Pereira, and Cucuta. The aim of this plan, based on experiences

The PNVCC has changed the way the Police operates: it centres attention on the problems of social co-existence within communities, in close collaboration with institutions and local actors. Its implementation is based on a strategic reading of each quadrant, supported by georeferenced information, enabling more informed decision-making and improved resource distribution (Llorente, Bulla, and Castillo 2011). This plan made an important innovation by increasing the autonomy and decision-making capacity of local units. The patrols assigned to the neighbourhoods were given flexibility in determining their work with the communities, in gathering information, and in developing programmes to respond to local needs. In terms of participatory surveillance, each area’s police commander plays an important role in interpreting crime data and, in collaboration with other local actors, decides on the best responses. PNVCC training explicitly includes training for police officers to work in close coordination with local communities to control crime (Mejía, Ortega, and García 2013, 11). The programme also allowed for closer relations to be created between the PNVCC police and other units within the National Police. The PNVCC supports programmes that are decentralising the investigative capacity of the Judicial Police and the intelligence services. The Judicial Police, in particular, became involved in the plan so that its investigation units could respond more effectively by coordinating with the PNVCC police (2010, 74) by using information gathered from the quadrants as evidence for solving crimes in specific areas. PNVCC patrol routines are designed based on the needs of each quadrant and on available information about the time and place of crimes that have occurred in the area during the previous week. This means that patrolling is now more efficient and better able to prevent new crimes (PNVCC 2010, 43-44). Quadrant team members are expected to work with station or sub-station commanders to ensure a series of short, medium, and long-term goals. The changes promoted by what ex-President Alvaro Uribe called his “Policy for Democratic Security” (2002-2010), centred on the concept of co-responsibility. This concept underlines the impor-

tance of collaboration between the police, local authorities, and other organs of the criminal justice system in addressing security problems. The PNVCC (2010, 16) seeks precisely to build this concept of co-responsibility through its practice with key local actors. Currently, the PNVCC has also taken on support services and prevention work to counteract sexual and domestic violence. There is increased collaboration to this end between the National Police and organisations that work with cases of sexual and domestic violence, such as the Defensoría de la Familia (Family Legal Services), Consultoría Médico Forense (Forensic Medicine Clinic), Defensoría del Pueblo (People’s Legal Services), Fiscalía General de la Nación (National Public Prosecutor’s Office), and the Centros de Atención a Víctimas de Violencia y Delitos (Centres for Service to Victims of Violence and Crime). The PNVCC has also developed closer ties with police investigations through the National Plan for Criminal Investigation by Quadrant (PNIPC). The objective of this plan is to create more agile forms of interaction between police involved in investigation and prevention, and it has improved the processing and resolution of cases related to people trafficking, sexual exploitation, and sexual violence (PNVCC 2010, 61-70).

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inspired by the community police model, is to improve policing by dividing cities into small jurisdictions called quadrants. The idea is that a specific number of police officers work in each quadrant in direct and close contact with the population. The Colombian Quadrant Plan was inspired by the Quadrant Plan for Preventive Security, carried out by the Chilean Carabineros from 2000 onwards.

Results In cooperation with the Ideas for Peace Foundation (Fundación Ideas por la Paz - FIP), the police has evaluated the results of the PNVCC. Police stations where the PNVCC programme was fully operational were compared to stations in which the PNVCC was not operating. This was done with solid methodologies that generated comparative and trustworthy crime statistics. The researchers analysed the effect of the programme on four crimes: homicide, burglary, vehicle theft, and interpersonal disputes. The analysis of data from the different cities studied showed that police stations staffed with officers totally trained in the PNVCC operational model were more effective in crime control than untrained officers in similar stations. In general, the findings suggested that the application of the PNVCC tended to reduce the number of homicides, burglaries, and vehicle thefts, the three most trustworthy indicators of criminal activity. According to FIP’s assessment, the PNVCC managed to halt the increase in crime between January 2007 and June 2012 and even reduce the occurrence of some crimes in the areas where it was implemented. This assessment attributes an 18% drop in homicides in all eight cities to the PNVCC. When comparing PNVCC-trained and non-trained units, the homicide rates were 16% lower in the PNVCC-trained areas. This means that for every 10 homicides not committed, almost two were the result of the new surveillance strategy. The plan also contributed an 11% reduction of cases involving individual bodily harm and a 22% REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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Figure 9.5.

Pyramid of responsibilities under the Quadrant Plan

Plans policing activities in order to contribute to the improvement of social harmony and citizen security. Heads activities to promote understanding and community integration Organizes police services in the quadrant to promote shared responsibilities in public security. Establishes direct contact with citizens to problems.

• Coordinator Head of police station • Head of quadrant Chief of local police station •Quadrant team All personnel assigned to the quadrant. • Patrol Made up of two police

Source: PNVCC National Plan for Community Surveillance by Quadrant (2010) .

drop in car theft (FIP 2012). The burglary rate was 9% lower and car theft was reduced by 22%. These programmes have a particularly important effect in most of the areas with higher crime rates. In other words, the achievements of the PNVCC are more noticeable in neighbourhoods that have the highest crime rates, and they are not uniform in all neighbourhoods of any given city (Llorente, Frühling, and Bulla 2013, 27-28, 33).

A the same time, the FIP evaluation points up the high level of rotation among police officers in the biggest cities, as an element which impedes an improvement in the results (Llorente, Frühling, and Bulla 2013, 17). This underscores the importance of continuous training during the development of the programme, and of incremental efforts to improve cooperation between police agencies.

Homicide car theftand statistics, Ciudad Juarez, Mexico, 2010-2013 9.7. Challenges replication In addition to the analysis of crimeFigure rates, the FIP carried out a and survey of people in the areas where the PNVCC was implemented, and measured the effectiveness of the programme based on As the FIP evaluation points out, the strategy’s main weakseveral key indicators of success. These results were also evalu- ness is the threat of inertia and resistance to change, probably 450of each group trained in the related to the demand for more systematic and rigorous ways ated by measuring the effectiveness of working, in conceptual and analytical terms. In smaller muPNVCC method. nicipalities, the programme’s implementation faces some key Most of the key indicators of police performance improved after challenges, such as insufficient studies of the problems being 300 the first and second rounds of training in the participating cit- addressed and the weakness of the institutions in these locaies. There was a clear increase for police performance in terms tions (Llorente, Bulla. and Castillo 2011). In future, the PNVCC of people’s perceptions of the programme, effective police work, will have to improve its coordination with other areas of the good collaboration between police150belonging to the PNVCC and police force and institutions, and re-examine the high rotation other police units not belonging to the programme, work with rates of police officers. other surveillance entities such as the Judicial Police and intelligence officers, and a clear capacity to work with other local gov- In its eight biggest cities, Colombia has managed to reduce sigJul 2010 2011 of armed Jangroups 2012 linked toJul 2012 and Jan 2013 nificantly theJulpresence guerrillas ernment departments. Despite the positive results after the firstJan 2011 and second rounds of training, police performance ratings went paramilitary forces. Organised crime, nevertheless, continues to Homicides Vehicle theft given the enormous availability of firearms, viodown after the third round in some of the indicators, especially be a threat and, problem. in comparison with the significant improvements obtained after lent crimes continue to be a serious . the second round. This suggests that while the programme has achieved real success, it still faces some significant challenges in The success of the Quadrant Plan, of course, rests on the government’s achievements in reducing urban violence. The prothe future (Llorente, Frühling, and Bulla 2013, 16-24). 188

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The evaluations carried out by the Colombian National Police and by FIP could be an excellent reference points for future replications of this plan in other contexts. The implementation of a similar programme, at least on a limited scale, depends on the existence of high quality georeferenced data and on the existence of a scenario in which security threats can be managed by the civil police with a community focus. The greatest challenge to replicating the programme would be to implement it manteining the same scale. Implementing the PNVCC meant taking on a massive reorganisation and redistribution of resources in eight of Colombia’s biggest cities. This type of change requires a total commitment by the police, and by politicians at a local level, as well as sufficient financial resources.

Barrio Seguro, Dominican Republic Dominican Republic has experienced high levels of economic growth over the last three decades. However, the combination between high level growth, low social investment, and inequality have generated favourable conditions for crime and violence rates which have shot up over the last decade (Bobea 2011, 95, 159, 168-169, 173). Homicide rates in 1999 were 13 per 100,000 inhabitants; in 2006, the rate had reached 26 per 100,000. In the region around the country’s capital, which includes the city of Santo Domingo, homicide rates reached 40 per 100,000 inhabitants in 2005 (Bobea 2011, 442). During this period, the absence of clear security policies resulted in an increase in violence. Police officers were involved in 16% of homicides, which contributed to a crisis of trust in police work and increased perceptions of insecurity. This was particularly pronounced among the most socially excluded populations and in those areas where high crime rates and low denunciation rates were prevalent (Howard 2009, 302; Bobea 2012, 59). In this context, the government of the Dominican Republic (2004-2012) developed the Plan for Democratic Security (PSD in its Spanish acronym), inspired by the Colombia programme of the same name and by the experience of Brazil.203 According to this plan, security is built as a participatory process in which the police, local authorities, and communities work together to improve neighbourhood security (Howard 2009, 303-304). Structure and results

In general terms, the PSD presupposed a concentrated effort to improve relations between the State and society, through social programmes aimed at high-risk areas. The plan promoted an understanding of citizenship and security as two mutually constituting dimensions. In other words, its initial assumption was, that by increasing the participation of responsible citizens in security, the security services would also be transformed and develop a greater sensitivity to the concerns of society as a whole (Bobea 2011, 396-398). The plan included Barrio Seguro (Safe Neighbourhood), a localised surveillance programme that sought to control criminal activity in a violent area of the capital city (Howard 2009, 305; Cano 2007, 5, 14). Barrio Seguro was established as a pilot programme in the Capotillo neighbourhood in August 2005, and in 2006, it was extended to 13 surrounding neighbourhoods that together covered a population of approximately 170,000 people living in northern Santo Domingo (Howard 2009, 305).

9 INTERVENTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

gramme has promoted joint work with local communities, the main civil society actors, and academia, in order to develop and evaluate the programme. It has also tried to improve collaboration between units within the state apparatus and with police management.

The first component of the programme involved a general increase in investment for policing in specific neighbourhoods, including some elements derived from community policing. The programme also tried to use a conflict resolution model for police conduct. The second strategy of Barrio Seguro was to increase the number of simultaneously launched social programmes, focused on reducing the risk of crime and the promotion of citizen cooperation with the police. The last element of the project focused on strengthening community organisations in selected areas so that these groups could serve as partners and co-protagonists of government actions in security. Although the PSD is not focused specifically on the prevention and control of gender violence, the Dominican Republic Public Prosecutor’s Office includes sexual violence, domestic violence, and people trafficking as priorities in its general guidelines and these have been integrated into the programme. In addition, the Dominican Republic has a series of other programmes that address the different manifestations of gender violence on a national level (Fundación Comunidad Esperanza and Justicia Internacional et al. 2013). One of the key elements that enabled the programme to achieve positive results was the increase of police presence in the selected neighbourhoods. An evaluation commissioned by the UNDP found a significant increase in the number of police officers in these areas, and registered efforts to exclude officers with backgrounds of corruption or abuse from working on the programme (Cano 2007, 16-17). The police assigned to the programme received 15 days of training before starting their work with Barrio Seguro, although the initial plan had been to give police three months of training. Depending on their rank, police assigned to REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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the areas received a bonus of US$31 to US$413 a month over and above their salary, as well as a bonus for food.

INTERVENTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

This same evaluation demonstrated that residents of the beneficiary communities considered that in general, the programme had managed to improve the quality of police intervention. The people interviewed distinguished between the police force before Barrio Seguro —considered to be part of the problem of crime and abuse affecting the local population— and the police after the implementation of the programme —who were perceived as more polite and attentive—. The Barrio Seguro programme contributed to noticeable improvements in objective and perceived security. The available data on homicides, for example, shows a significant downward trend.204 Moreover, the increase in police presence in the neighbourhoods seems to have boosted residents’ confidence in the criminal justice system. One figure that corroborates this is the increasing number of complaints being made to the local Public Prosecutor’s offices, which have risen from around 900 to almost 1200 in the neighbourhoods where interventions were made (Cano 2007, 38). In addition, community beneficiaries have indicated that the programme has generated a drastic drop in shooting incidents and, consequently, the sensation of security in the neighbourhoods has increased. This improvement in the perception of crime was also documented in a survey carried out in the beneficiary neighbourhoods.205 However this does not mean that the communities are now free from criminal activity or that police corruption has been eradicated (Cano 2007, 38-39). Challenges and replication In general terms, the levels of homicide in Dominican Republic have remained high over the last few years. This tendency is compatible with other scenarios that demonstrate how difficult it is to reduce the rate of violence once it has reached a certain level. In the 2005 to 2011 period for example, the country was unable to keep its homicide rate under WHO epidemic levels (10 per 100,000 inhabitants). Despite the improvements experienced because of Barrio Seguro, its achievements were limited by the persistence of other problems, such as corruption and the lack of state reforms needed to improve police conduct. In the long term, these problems undermined the PSD and limited its effectiveness. Nevertheless, the PSD and Barrio Seguro demonstrated that it is possible to achieve a fundamental change in the relationship between communities and local authorities, and provide a favourable climate for the acceptance and participation of the community in the programme. In part, this was achieved thanks

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to the investment of public resources in the neighbourhoods, including recreational facilities, training programmes, and milk distribution projects. As well as these social programmes, Barrio Seguro tried to build a greater level of social networking around the issue of security, through community forums. The PSD sought to respond to the problem of violence and crime in neighbourhoods where police and community relations were weak, and where there had been abuses by the police in the past. At the beginning of 2013, the Dominican President launched the Citizen Security Plan. This includes a component aimed at expanding the goals of the previous programme and incorporating a new programme called Vivir Tranquilo (Living Peacefully), which has a holistic focus and includes institutional strengthening.

Tregua entre pandillas (Truce between gangs), El Salvador El Salvador is one of the Latin American countries with the greatest levels of lethal violence. Among other factors, this violence can be attributed to the activities of gangs known as the maras, to drug trafficking, and to the limited achievements and negative effects generated by hard-line policies (Cruz 2010). Background and structure At the beginning of March 2012, the national press informed the public that the two biggest gangs in El Salvador — the Mara Salvatrucha 13 (MS13) and the Barrio 18 gang— had agreed to a truce. Key figures from the church and civil society, on an individual basis, had served as negotiators, with the help and logistical support of the Ministry of Justice and Security. The support for the truce from national and international institutions and organisations was diverse in nature. On a national level, the government role has been as a facilitator.206 Despite the open participation of Bishop Colindres, the Catholic Church announced it had no institutional participation in the truce and that Colindres was acting as an individual. The most visible international support has been from the OAS, which acts as a guarantor and plays an important role in the organisation of those involved, providing orientation and legitimacy to the process. This has also allowed the truce to receive the support of international aid organisations, and this has protected it from critics who warned that the process could end up strengthening the gangs’ criminal activities. A Technical Committee, made up of key stakeholders, helped to formalise the process, communicate it, and increase the support for the

truce among ordinary Salvadorans. In addition, the Fundación In January 2013, the truce entered into a second phase with the Humanitaria (Humanitarian Foundation) was created – an NGO introduction of the Municipalities Free from Violence (Municiwhose purpose is to try to soften the population’s levels of rejec- palidades Libres de Violencia or MLV), a strategy that could be tion of the truce and to obtain donations for projects to improve key in deepening and institutionalising the process. The Minof Justice definestothe MLV asbya space for dialogue between conditions for the prison population. Lastly,opinion the Salvadoran As-the istry Public about need for police abide local governments and civil society actors and for developing sociation of Ex-Penitentiary (Asociación de Ex-Internos the law when pursuing criminals, Figure 9.4.Inmates America Latina, 2012 Penitenciarios de El Salvador AEIPES) supported the truce pro- opportunities favouring the socio-economic reinsertion of young people at risk. The aim is to support the implementation cess from the very beginning. Venezuela of the MLV in 18 municipalities. Uruguay Results Dominican Republic Peru Challenges and replication Total hom Paraguay Chart 9.1. A few days after the announcement of the truce, the country’s programm Panama homicide levels droppedNicaragua by more than half. By mid 2013, a sus- The truce has been the object of diverse criticism. The public tained reduction of 40% inMexico the national homicide rate was at- perception of the gangs is difficult to eradicate if it is not acHonduras tributed to the truce (UNODC 2012; Cruz 2013) (see Figure 9.6). companied by more profound changes. Gangs are still seen as Location Beginning Guatemala a source of threats and they continue to operate as extortionists However, despite the Elreduction in homicides, the crime and Salvador Vera Cruz and Taquaril 2005 reduced extortion rate have not changed Ecuador in any significant way (Cruz in a number of communities. While homicide rates haveAlto Cabana do Pai Tomás 2005 Costa Rica by half, extortion has continued at an accelerated pace (Dudley 2013). Colombia Paulothat VI and Ribeiro de Abreu 2005 and Pachico 2013, 5). Some people have even affirmed Chile Pedreira 2004 The truce has also produced a demonstrable effect on other the reduction in homicides has caused the appearance of new Prado Lopes Brazil Morro das Pedras and Ventosa 2002 gangs. Although the MS13Bolivia and Barrio 18 were the initiators of threats and forms of intimidation by less visible gangs, such as Argentina Cityofofthe Belo Horizonte ----the truce, three more gangs have become involved in the pro- disappearances or the institutionalisation/normalisation 0 25 50 75 100 2013; cess. As a result, gang confrontations are fewer. Moreover the criminal dominance of the maras over certain areas (CruzSource: Arias and Ungar (2009). Villalobos 2013). truce has allowed for a public Ondebate about some of the underlyoccasion may proceed beyond the boundaries of the law Always must abide by the law ing factor associated with the gangs —such as poverty, excluis also ashould generalised sion, youth unemployment, school dropout Note: The question for this graph was: “In order torates, be able family to capturedisintecriminals, do you There think the authorities always respect concern the law or onabout how the gangs have occasions can they cross the line?” gration— that affect especially children and young people. This managed to become actors in national politics, capable of negohas helped reorient programmes targeting high-risk youth and tiating and obtaining concessions from the State. Gang leaders has favoured public and private investments in projects address- have shown they have a coherent command structure that aling the social factors that could be driving youth participation in lows them to speak as one voice. The fact that the gangs have gangs. Even with certain reservations, many service organisa- contributed to a drop in more than 40% in homicides on a nations, diverse regional organisations, and some private enter- tional level, confirms the cohesion and discipline of their organisational structures. prises are now supporting the process with funds. INTERVENTIONS: LESSONS LEARNED

Evolution of the monthly homicide rate per 100.000 inhabitants, El Salvador, 2009-2013

100 80 60 40 20 0

2009

2011

November January March

July

2012

September

November January March May

September

July

January March May

November

July

2010

September

November January March May

September

July

4 January March May

Rate

Figure 9.6.

2013

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Despite the different visions about the truce, it has contributed for more than a year to a homicide rate reduction in one of the most violent countries in the region. Perhaps one of its most significant contributions over the long term is that it has opened up the debate about adopting alternative measures to hard-line policies aimed at counteracting the security problems associated with gangs. The truce has catalysed a process to develop a much wider range of alternatives for social reinsertion and integration, as well as creating space to address the underlying factors associated with violence. It also demonstrates that hard-line and “super hard-line” measures have been incapable of providing, for the moment, an effective response to the phenomenon of violence and crime. Whatever the case, the truce is a window of opportunity for the government and different sectors of Salvadoran society to build more sustainable initiatives and policies for reducing violence and crime (Dudley and Pachico 2013, 4). If risk factors for children and young people are to be reduced, this requires, among other things, improvements to the police and security forces’ investigative capacity, the expansion of efforts to counteract crimes such as kidnapping and extortion, and processes to strengthen —with resources and institutional presence—existing social initiatives. All these elements are key in strengthening the local autonomy of the State and its capacity in formulating citizen security policies. When assessing the possible replication of the truce in other contexts, it is important to take into account how the particular expressions of the gang phenomenon vary from country to country and how these variations can alter the effectiveness of any of these measures. Their sustainability will depend to a large extent on accompanying public policies that strengthen the institutional capacities of the State and contribute to the development of social programmes that address the structural factors associated with juvenile violence. In order to contribute to the continuing reduction in homicide rates, the UNDP coordinated with the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the National Youth Institute (Instituto Nacional de la Juventud), local governments, civil society organisations, and private enterprise, to design the Youth Entrepreneurs in Safe Cities (Jóvenes Emprendedores en Ciudades Seguras). This programme promotes the socio-economic insertion of young people at risk, including young people who are already linked to the gangs and their families.

Todos Somos Juárez, Mexico Between 2008 and 2010, Ciudad Juárez was considered to be the most violent city in the world. The homicide rate had reached 189 for every 100,000 inhabitants (Observatory on Security and 192

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Citizen Co-existence - Observatorio de Seguridad y Convivencia Ciudadanas 2011). Situated on the border between Chihuahua and the State of Texas in the U.S., Ciudad Juarez has been one of the most dynamic economic hubs in Mexico. It has also been an “exit city”: millions of migrants have passed through or have remained living here since the middle of the last century.207 With an estimated population of 1.3 million in 2012, Ciudad Juarez has an enormous manufacturing sector and has complex informal and black market commerce.208 Violence in Ciudad Juarez seems to be intimately connected to organised crime, the disputes between rival cartels, and the unexpected effects of the 2006 to 2012 governmental policies to fight drug trafficking (Vilalta and Muggah 2012). Structure and results In 2010, the federal government, joined forces with the Chihuahua state government and adopted a new strategy for citizen security with the Todos Somos Juárez programme. This programme tried to respond to 160 promises made by the authorities and civil society organisations to improve the basic living conditions of the population in less than 100 days. The strategy focused on six basic areas: public security, economic growth, employment, health, education, and social development. The initiative was framed as a holistic intervention that aimed to reduce chronic violent crime and resolve the territorial disputes between rival cartels and hundreds of street gangs (Dudley 2013b). Todos Somos Juárez was built upon several principles as its starting point. In the first place, the programme had a multi-sector focus. From the beginning it deliberately distanced itself from an approach based on strict compliance with the law and developed a holistic approach that addressed social risks and the persistent economic problems associated with vulnerability and insecurity. Secondly, the intervention placed emphasis on public participation; citizens were expected to play a central role in all aspects related to design, implementation, and monitoring. Residents were mobilised in working groups based on the six sectors and met regularly with delegated government authorities. Thirdly, the programme was implemented through three levels of government; federal departments were asked to work with their state and municipal level partners in a coordinated and effective way. Todos Somos Juárez was structured around several phases. As part of the initial design and planning phase, a diagnostic study was carried out on security and protection, socio-economic conditions, social capital, and crime-related behaviour. One of the first steps consisted of meeting with civil society organisations and representatives of the three levels of government to review

Figure 9.7.

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9 Figure 9.6.

Rate

evidence-based priorities, discuss the options and places for The results of Todos Somos Juárez were mixed. On the one hand, Pyramid of the responsibilities under thesector Quadrant Plan of homicides dropped drastically —there was the frequency determine investment required in each Figure 9.5. intervention, of public policy, establish adequate reference points, and design a reduction of approximately 89% between October 2010 and ans policing activitiesverification in order to mechanisms. Shortly after the design and planning October 2012—, and the same occurred with car theft and phase, several ntribute to the improvement of social specific interventions were carried out, all of other forms of victimisation. Analysts attributed this reduction • Coordinator rmony and citizen security. in homicide which were supervised by the recently created citizens’Head counof police station rates to the arrest of the leadership of some of the cils. The expectation was to turn 160 promises into results in most violent organised crime groups, the establishment of an less than 100 days. For example, one aim was to “reduce the re- effective community police force, and the increased spending on eads activities to promote • Head of quadrant assistance (ICG 2013). By the end of 2012, some sponse time of emergency staff and the police” and achieve Chief the of targeted nderstanding and community local policesocial station tegration goal of seven minutes or less. The strategy for implementation of the inhabitants who had emigrated from the city were returnconsisted of establishing a system to carry out georeferenced ing to their homes (Insight Crime 2013). ganizes police services in the quadrant monitoring on 760 police vehicles (TSJ 2010). •Quadrant team promote shared responsibilities in All personnel and assigned to Challenges replication ublic security. the quadrant. With Todos Somos Juárez, a considerable sum of resources was invested, although critics point out that the programme was developed tablishes direct contact with citizens to this should be put into perspective, given the Some• Patrol magnitude and economic importance of the city. For example, unilaterally integrating the needs of the population Made up– ofwithout two police oblems. in 2010, the total budget assigned by the federal government and of local governments – and that key projects were not exfederal for this intervention was more than US$263 million. In ecuted, including those focused on economic recovery. Other 2011, after a year’s implementation, 118 more actions were in- observations were made about how funded expenditures were ce: PNVCC National Plan for Community Surveillance by Quadrant (2010) . cluded in the programme, which required an additional invest- not made adequately or transparently, and that the accelerated ment of US$138 million (Calderón 2012). The total cost, without nature of such a complex and ambitious programme as this one, including private investment, exceeded US$400 million. Al- could undermine its long term perspectives for success (Milenio though there was a lot of spending in promoting security and 2011; Negroponte 2012). In terms of key concrete promises, critin economic development —that included the introduction of a ics pointed out that some actions were inconclusive, because in conditioned monetary transfer programme209—, almost three 2012, the item for programme support was eliminated from the quarters (74%) of the spending was on promoting health, edu- federal budget (Figueroa 2012). An example of this were the cation, culture, recreation, and interventions for social develop- vocational training goals for unemployed young people and the ment (Calderón 2012).

100 80 60 40 20 0

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Escuela Segura (Safe School) programme – which included lectures and workshops on violence prevention in school environments – neither of which were concluded.210 There is evidence that not all the promised interventions produced the desired results. This is because the investment in preventative measures —such as health, education, and social welfare— often requires a longer period to have noticeable effects. Some critics suggested that Todos Somos Juárez made excessive promises and generated unrealistic expectations. The energetic “violent pacifications” have also been criticised (Corcoran 2013) for involving, in some cases, sensationalist arrests for minor charges (such as the case of local people who didn’t have adequate identification) as well as accusations of human rights violations (Turati 2012). Finally, it is worth thinking about how a programme like this might be replicated in other contexts, even in other cities and municipalities in Mexico itself. The main obstacle for replication is the quantity of resources needed for implementation. Any intervention like Todos Somos Juárez would require considerable financial resources as the programme seeks to respond to threats by working on short, medium, and long-term goals. Nevertheless, in scenarios with high levels of organised crime and chronic lethal violence, an intervention of this kind may well be necessary to recover stability and governance over a particular territory.

Recommendations 1. Promote holistic interventions focused on responding to security threats identified as priorities by the communities that are affected. These interventions must also be preceded by a series of policies and institutional reforms that would allow the security and justice systems to be modernised, while creating closer relations between State institutions and communities. 2. Improve the quality of information and make use of new technologies for gathering crime data —such as the creation of georeferenced statistics— in order to reduce crime rates and optimise the use and assignment of resources—such as police patrols and units—. Universities and research centres are key allies in this area; the development of strategic alliances with these actors is recommended with a view to modernise information management using new technologies.

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3. Ensure the sustained commitment of decision-makers to the implementation of interventions that have proven to be successful, beyond electoral changes or divisions between political parties. When a security policy that has been working well is changed or abandoned, this can be very costly in terms of building citizen security. In this sense, the participation of citizens is key for promoting accountability and continuity in citizen security policy. The political commitment of all the different stakeholders and national parties is also vital. 4. Encourage citizens’ active participation in formulating and implementing interventions. In particular, the direct participation of people in the neighbourhoods and communities involved in these interventions must be understood as a pre-requisite. Local stakeholders need to be involved as an integral part of the programmes, to ensure that authorities are informed of local priorities and needs, and to assist in monitoring and evaluating the achievements of all programmes. 5. Strengthen the evaluation of these initiatives and establish clearer and more transparent ways of measuring success. While some interventions have been evaluated more rigorously, in most cases there continue to be significant challenges. In this aspect, the co-participation of civil society organisations and international actors is fundamental for providing financial resources and knowledge.

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For God the Sea, Ă lvaro Restrepo (book), Carlos Mario Lema (picture), 2003

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There is no silver bullet to deal with the challenges of citizen security in Latin America. As this report has shown, the threats to security are linked to multiple factors related to socioeconomic conditions, institutional weaknesses, and the presence of various drivers of crime.

4. Reduce impunity through the strengthening of security and justice institutions, while respecting human rights.

It is crucial to recognize the failure of the â&#x20AC;&#x153;iron fistâ&#x20AC;? policies adopted in the region and to discontinue them. The report offers important lessons learned to improve citizen security within a democratic framework and with strict adherence to human rights.

6. Expand the genuine opportunities of human development for youth.

This document provides decision makers and the Latin American citizenry with ten recommendations. Among them are actions to address and contain threats to citizen security that should be implemented in the short run. It also suggests long-term responses, such as the reform of security and criminal justice institutions and the alignment of efforts at the local, national, and international levels.

8. Actively protect victimsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; rights.

5. Engage the active participation of society, especially in local communities, to build citizen security.

7. Address and prevent gender violence in a comprehensive way, both in the home as well as in the public realm.

9. Regulate and reduce the triggers of crime, such as alcohol, drugs, and firearms with a comprehensive public health approach. 10. Strengthen the coordination and evaluation mechanisms of international cooperation.

This chapter presents specific recommendations for the three groups that the report has identified as critically important to advance towards the inclusive construction of citizen security: youth, women, and victims of crime and violence. Finally, it presents recommendations to enable the participation of the citizenry and the international community.

1. Align national efforts to reduce crime and violence, based on existing experiences and lessons learned.

The recommendations, based on the lessons learned in the region, are as follows:

Lines of Action

1. Align national efforts to reduce crime and violence, based on existing experiences and lessons learned. 2. Develop public policies oriented toward the protection of those most affected by crime and violence.

Take full advantage of governmental and non-governmental initiatives at the local, state, and national level that seek to contribute to security. Avoid duplication and contradiction in citizen security efforts, through dialogue and alignment of strategies with common objectives.

3. Prevent crime and violence, promoting inclusive, equitable, and high-quality growth.

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Recommendations 1.1 Establish in every country a National Accord for Citizen Security as State policy, based on national consensus and with the participation of civil society.

1.3 Establish mechanisms to coordinate the institutional action in all government sectors.

• Convene all areas of government, as well as representatives of civil society, to jointly develop a National Accord for Citizen Security on a strategy for citizen security, with indicators and follow-up mechanisms. • Define the roles, responsibilities, and the necessary steps for this National Accord, to align public and private efforts to common objectives. • Make the National Accord viable, with solid political and financial support. • Assign an institution with the necessary political, financial, and technical capacity to coordinate this effort. • Ensure that there is systematic and accessible information regarding the actions undertaken by different ministries and bodies responsible for security tasks. • Make the results of the implementation the National Accords public and transparent on a periodic basis, and have an independent monitoring and impact evaluation methodology in place from its inception.

• Empower the lead institution in citizen security issues with the authority to coordinate the actions of institutions, which from their specific sphere, carry out programmes related to people’s security. • Put in operation adequate mechanisms for intergovernmental management that permits coordinated action among the different levels of government: central, regional or state, and local. • Clarify the scope of action and responsibilities of state and municipal governments in the area of security, and strengthen the role that the municipalities can assume by improving management capacities.

1.2. Professionalise the management of citizen security, building professional capacity, especially for those who assume the leadership and implementation of policies at both central and local government levels.

Lines of Action

• Promote collaboration between the executive and legislative branches of government to strengthen and improve the institutional design of the security sector. • Create by law and ensure in practice a civil service career for the professional staff in the security sector, especially for those in policy management and implementation at central and local government levels. • Ensure that budgets and resource allocation are congruent with the magnitude of the challenge that insecurity represents. • Strengthen the training of civil servants who have a relevant role in the ministries and bodies that shape security policy. Invest in post-graduate scholarships or in the creation of institutes for higher studies for the specialized training of civil servants with leadership and management capacity over security organisations. • Train municipal personnel in the management of security policies, with courses on design, management, and evaluation of the projects developed to seek national funding

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and create a database on local projects in execution, which allows other municipalities to make use of the knowledge to implement similar initiatives.

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2. Generate public policies aimed at protecting persons most affected by crime and violence

Develop public policies that address, as a priority, the zones most affected by violence and protect vulnerable groups. The main objective of these responses should be to reduce violence, avoid its propagation, and optimise the use of state resources.

Recommendations 2.1 Address the most critically affected zones and the most serious crimes with immediate deterrence responses. • Strengthen police presence in the critically affected zones based on previous knowledge of territorial concentration of violence and crime. • Support police deployment with social programmes with the active participation of communities. • Optimize the work of crime prevention and response, producing analyses that reflect the residents’ demands and priorities. • Promote institutional articulation for intervention in critically affected zones, involving local administrations, the diffe-

2.2. Optimise the response to crime prevention and control through better information management. • Support the use of geo-referential information on crime and violence for the strategic utilisation and distribution of human, technological, and financial resources. • Improve the statistical information systems, diversifying the tools used to collect information and harmonising the databases used by the different state institutions. • Improve or strengthen the information systems on violence against women at the national level and ensure their articulation with inter-institutional coordination of plans and policies on the issue. • Generate statistical information disaggregated by gender, age, ethnic group, and socioeconomic context, to allow the targeting of State responses to guarantee the security of vulnerable groups. 2.3 Develop penalties and responses based on proportional criteria that effectively deter the commission of crimes that most affect citizens. • Define the mechanisms and main issues for the prosecution and punishment of crimes that are proportional to their gravity. • Give priority to those crimes that threaten people’s life and liberty, and contain the threats that affect their daily lives. • Promote inter-sector responses (police, Office of the Public Prosecutor, and other relevant bodies) for the investigation and prosecution of crimes of greatest impact (homicides, kidnapping, extortion, human trafficking, sexual exploitation, and disappearances). • Design the operations selectively, based on the behaviour of criminal organisations and the extent to which they affect citizens. • Develop early warning systems, based on clear methodologies that detect the risk of an escalation of violence. 2.4 Develop a specialised and comprehensive response to the spirals of violence associated with the presence of organised crime. • Implement comprehensive programmes for the dismantling of criminal organisation and their support networks (corruption, impunity, and assets laundering networks). • Strengthen national and international mechanisms to pre-

vent, detect, and punish laundering of assets originating from criminal activity. • Develop protection programmes for witnesses in crimes committed by criminal organisations. • Focus interventions on the most profitable links in the value chain of criminal economies (traffickers and distributors).

3. Prevent crime and violence by promoting inclusive, equitable, and high-quality growth Lines of Action

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rent government sectors (such as education, health, labour, and development), and the citizenry.

Prevention policies should strengthen the multiple factors that underlie security, promoting sustainable human development, better opportunities for all the population, and structural conditions that promote equity.

Recommendations 3.1 Promote initiatives that reduce social gaps, particularly in zones where vulnerabilities are concentrated. • Develop analyses that identify the principal social gaps and community needs in order to target resources. • Focus security policies on improving the living conditions of those who are particularly vulnerable to crime and violence. • Give priority to the reduction of social disparities in cities, ensuing full access to public services by residents in neighbourhoods with accumulated social problems. • Complement police presence in neighbourhoods with high crime levels with social programmes and improve their connectivity with the rest of the city. 3.2 Develop programmes and public and private campaigns to build a culture of peace in the region. • Promote at all levels the development of a culture of peace, based on peaceful resolution of conflict, the strengthening of spaces that foster social harmony, and the consolidation of mutual support practices and networks. • Implement programmes for the prevention of school and domestic violence that are geared towards the promotion of peaceful resolution of conflict.

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• Design programmes that encourage social cohesion and the readiness to intervene in the peaceful resolution of problems shared by communities, as well as the full respect for human rights. • Facilitate mechanisms for alternative resolution of conflicts in communities. 3.3. Promote initiatives for the situational prevention of crime that contain and reduce the sensation of insecurity. • Implement measures directed at protecting persons and their property through urban and environmental interventions that contribute to secure surroundings and that reduce the opportunities for the commission of crimes.

4. Reduce impunity through the strengthening of security and justice administration while respecting human rights. Lines of Action Ensure the sustainable success of security policies through a balance between the control and prevention of crime and violence, improving effectiveness, and guaranteeing accountability and respect for human rights by the institutions of security and justice.

Recommendations 4.1 Reform the police to guarantee that their action is effective, respectful of the law, and close to the communities. • Improve substantially the processes of police selection and recruitment. • Promote professionalization through police academies with a coherent curriculum and a focus on citizen security that provide opportunities for continual updating. • Dignify the police role, establishing a professional career with decent pay, salary incentives, and mobility based on merit. • Promote the constant and constructive presence of the police and their close relations with the community, by fostering collaborative relations with the citizenry.

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4.2 Develop capacity for the effective use of information systems for crime investigation, and the design and evaluation of security initiatives. • Implement better international practices to take advantage of the technology able to geographically reference complaints, and as a result strategically target security actions. • Improve the quality of criminal investigation through permanent and high quality training of personnel. • Base the Office of the Public Prosecutors’ actions on reliable information on those areas that suffer the most serious crimes and on persons or groups that commit the most violent crimes. 4.3 Design a new penitentiary policy with an emphasis on social reintegration, complemented by the use of alternative measures. • Provide an appropriate budget and train public officials to move progressively towards prison conditions that comply with international standards. • Ensure sufficient remuneration and an incentives policy, with possibilities for professional development for penitentiary personnel. • Design and implement a policy of social reintegration with specialised institutions in the design and compliance with these processes. • Establish public-private alliances that increase the training and employment opportunities inside prisons and facilitate processes of reintegration. • Employ pre-trial detention restrictively as an interim measure and design alternative measures that would allow, when possible, to serve a sentence outside prison, with due regulation of obligations under qualified personnel to supervise conditional liberty. 4.4. Integrate respect for human rights as a priority that informs the behaviour of security and justice institutions. • Incorporate criteria and protocols in the internal rules and in the training curriculum of the police forces, with the objective of regulating the use of force in accordance with international standards for the protection of human rights. • Establish mechanisms for internal supervision and effective sanction, particularly in the police forces. • Train and raise awareness on human rights among public officials in all of the security and justice institutions. • Strengthen, in collaboration with civil society organisations, the mechanisms for citizen oversight, complaints, and follow-up of human rights violations by state actors.

5.2 Strengthen mechanisms of monitoring, evaluation, and citizen oversight.

• Establish an efficient and transparent information system that can determine where police and police officials are assigned, and what activities are being carried out. • Assign sufficient resources to internal affairs units so that comprehensive investigations can be conducted. • Ensure periodic visits to police units and stations by internal affairs inspectors. • Create special units for the investigation of serious cases of corruption by public officials.

• Develop solid and effective bridges for dialogue between the government, the private sector, civil society, and academia for the monitoring and evaluation of public security policy. • Introduce incentives for universities and research centres to carry out independent evaluations with full access to the data from State interventions. • Develop participatory models for the design, monitoring, and evaluation of decentralised international cooperation programmes, particularly in the area of crime and violence prevention.

5. Promote the active participation of society, especially local communities, to build citizen security.

5.3 Reconstruct the social fabric to strengthen the capacity for collective action in those communities most affected by crime and violence.

Lines of Action Build bridges of trust and cooperation with the citizenry and the private sector to promote ownership of national and local public policies, as well as for international cooperation programmes in security. Strengthen transparency and accountability in state institutions, through incentives and the professionalization of citizen oversight initiatives.

Recommendations 5.1 Support mechanisms for the participation of the citizenry in the design and implementation of public security policies. • Articulate state action with the citizenry to design comprehensive interventions through permanent and transparent participation mechanisms that permit consultation, dialogue, and feedback in security policy. • Open community participation channels for the formulation of local analyses on sources of conflict and obstacles to social harmony, in order to design solutions. • Ensure the participation of representatives of organisations that defend the rights of those living in vulnerable conditions (youth, women, and sexual and ethnic minorities).

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4.5 Establish effective internal supervision regarding abuse of authority.

• Support the community development processes that contribute to strengthening families and local environments, and generate the synergies necessary to enhance the collective resilience capacities to face poverty, exclusion, violence, and insecurity. • Promote collective positive action that prevents and deters “vigilantism”. • Foster the empowerment of local actors, through opportunities for dialogue and the selection of actions to address their needs. • Establish a police presence that is protective of and close to the citizenry, in areas affected by high levels of violence and the presence of organized crime structures. • Carry out community projects for the recovery of public areas that contribute to the reconstruction of a collective identity in areas heavily affected by violence. 5.4 Stimulate cooperation with the private sector. • Facilitate cooperation with the private sector for citizen security programmes, ensuring transparency and ensuring the impartiality of the police. • Form joint groups to agree upon complementary actions between public security and private security companies, which need to be adequately regulated to prevent crime or identify perpetrators in places like shopping malls, banks, and commercial offices. • Promote a preventive and citizen security approach in the private sector leadership and business organisations.

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6. Increase real opportunities for human development for youth Lines of action Build security based on and directed at youth, perceiving them as individuals with rights and strategic development actors, and not merely as a group at risk. Address insecurity with public policies that take into account the dual nature of youth as victims and victimisers. Ensure comprehensive responses such that youth have access to quality education, an effective integration into labour markets with decent employment, the promotion of healthy lifestyles, and encouragement for their participation.

Recommendations 6.1 Adopt public policies to improve the quality and coverage of education, as well as how to generate high quality employment opportunities for young people • Support early childhood development through health services directed at poor families, through nutritional supplements, conditional cash transfers, training of parents, and financing of pre-school education. • Implement “after school” educational, recreational, and social programmes, especially to support minors in singleparent families. • Expand public and private investment for job creation and youth training, for insertion in the employment market, especially in urban settings with persistent poverty, and addressing the needs of young people who neither work nor study. • Implement social programmes and action strategies in concert with the central government that protect and distance youth from the influence of criminal structures. • Employ timely warning systems on violence in school settings, as well as actions to reverse it and improve school interaction.

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• Promote broad coverage of youth-related issues in the media, giving visibility to their role as development agents, and that places violence and juvenile crime in context and avoids their stigmatisation. 6.3 Avoid the attribution of criminal responsibility to minors, giving priority to alternative justice and investing in effective social reintegration for children and young people who are released from the criminal justice system. • Ensure the ratification and application of regional and international treaties related to the rights of children and youth. • Adopt measures and alternative sentences in the cases of children and youth who commit minor crimes, guaranteeing special protection measures. • Ensure that the loss of liberty of children and youth is applied exclusively as a last resort and for the shortest time possible. • Establish alternative measures to judicial process in the case of minors and youth accused of infringing criminal law, such that measures can be applied that promote their positive reintegration in society. • Guarantee that the internment conditions for youth are conducive to a process of rehabilitation and ensure improvement of the professional capacity of those responsible for youth treatment. 6.4 Support for regional research centred on youth. • Support comparative research among Latin American countries on the challenges and opportunities specific to youth, in line with the human development reports produced in Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Mercosur. • Evaluate at the local, national, regional, and global level, the policies and programmes that have been successful, as well as analysing the lessons in the errors regarding the problems that affect youth in the area of citizen security.

7. Address and prevent gender violence in a comprehensive way, both in the home as well as in the public context.

6.2 Broaden the spaces and capacities for youth participation in the construction of security, and avoid its stigmatisation.

Lines of action

• Establish accessible spaces for youth participation in crime prevention policies. • Contribute to the development of cultural expression and recreational and sports activities for youth.

Adopt proactively a gender approach in the citizen security initiatives to address and prevent violence and discrimination for gender reasons, as well as to contribute to the strengthening of equitable human development and the security of all.

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7.3 Develop public and private initiatives to make visible and prevent gender violence.

7. 1 Strengthen legislation and the effective application of existing laws to eradicate gender violence.

• Promote real opportunities for women, including girls and young women, such that they can fully exercise their rights to reaffirm their autonomy and overcome situations of vulnerability, dependence, and risk that affect them. • Strengthen and coordinate local, national and international efforts to prevent gender violence in all areas of social life. • Ensure that the training of public officials in all branches of government goes beyond technical training and includes programmes that promote awareness raising and education on gender to prevent discrimination. • Promote awareness from childhood to contribute to the development of respectful relations between men and women, and to promote alternative non-violent masculinities. • Create alliances with women’s movements and with civil society organisations specialised in gender issues, to insure greater coverage by prevention programmes inside communities.

• Guarantee the effective application of existing laws to prevent and sanction violence against women in the region, including laws against domestic violence, sexual violence, and the laws that codify feminicide. • Promote legislative review and harmonisation to strengthen the rights of women who are victims of violence. • Carry out campaigns in the media to inform the public on the existing legislation and raise awareness regarding women’s rights. • Integrate gender mainstreaming in all of the justice system institutions to eradicate discriminatory and chauvinist practices. • End the impunity that characterises cases of violence against women, guaranteeing access to the justice system and the human rights of women victims of violence. • Create appropriate conditions for the reception of complaints, assign resources to process them, and formulate more agile and transparent procedures. 7.2 Promote the development and implementation of national policies and international strategies for the prevention, attention, sanction, and reparation of violence against women. • Formulate and implement State policies with a comprehensive approach, a specific budget and inter-institutional and multi-sector coordination, appropriate to address the multiple causes of violence against women. • Guarantee greater participation of social actors in the formulation, monitoring, and evaluation of national plans to eradicate violence against women. • Adopt comprehensive and multi-sector programmes to approach violence against women in a coordinated and comprehensive way in all parts of the justice chain, jointly with the legal and forensic medicine institutes, and all of the branches of government with responsibility in this area. • Establish specialised units within police forces that can effectively address and prevent gender violence, in particular domestic abuse, sexual violence, and intimate partner violence. • Open shelters for women victims who require immediate protection, through thecoordination of efforts among public institutions and civil society organisations. • Promote strategies that recognise that violence against women can flare up in situations of poverty and marginality, as in the case of indigenous, Afro-descendant or other women who are subjected sexual or gender discrimination.

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Recommendations

7.4 Guarantee the security and the rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transsexual persons (LGBT). • Develop the relevant legislation and public policies that effectively guarantee the rights, liberties, and security of LGBT persons. • Address the specific situations of vulnerability that LGBT persons confront, with an emphasis on the effective prevention and punishment of the actions of discrimination, stigmatization, and violence against them.

8. Actively safeguard the rights of victims Lines of Action Recognize and respond to the victims of violence, to avoid their re-victimisation, repair the personal damage, and permit the progressive reconstruction of the social fabric.

Recommendations 8.1 Implement public policies for attention to victims to guarantee their rights and avoid re-victimisation.

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• Formulate a national policy and legal framework, with the active participation of the victims, which ensures timely attention, protection, and reparation of damages. Implement effective mechanisms for their application. • Define mechanisms for the reparation of damages and the range of services and benefits that the State will grant to the victims of violent crimes through inter-sector efforts. • Carry out media campaigns to raise awareness of the rights of victims and the procedures that needs to be followed to ensure compliance. • Ensure the economic protection of victims, through public resources, when the offender is unknown or insolvent, and when crime has a serious physical or mental impact on the victim.

Lines of action Design and implement specific initiatives at the national and international level to control the possession of firearms, legal and illegal, as well as reduce and address the consumption of drugs and alcohol from a public health perspective.

Recommendations 8.2 Construct special models of attention for cases of extreme violence and for groups in vulnerable circumstances, preventing their re-victimisation. • Train and professionalise public officials who have direct contact with the victims and their families, establishing protocols of attention, courses of action, and responsibilities. • Ensure specific attention to crimes such as feminicide, rape, human trafficking, the smuggling of migrants, and domestic violence. • Implement protection programmes focused on victims of kidnapping and extortion and their relatives, which facilitate the reporting of these crimes. 8.3 Make the complaint reporting mechanisms more accessible for persons in situations of extreme vulnerability. • Establish mechanisms for complaints that provide special protection for vulnerable groups, such as women, children, young people, LGBT persons, migrants, indigenous, and afrodescendants communities, among others, in crimes such as human trafficking and smuggling of migrants, feminicide, and domestic violence. • Encourage complaint reporting, guaranteeing the physical and mental protection of victims of violence through witness and victim protection programmes, as well as the management of spaces and mechanisms of protection. • Improve the training of authorities in the reception and processing of complaints coming from persons in vulnerable circumstances.

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9. Regulate and reduce the triggers of crime, such as alcohol, drugs, and weapons, from a comprehensive and public health perspective.

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9.1 Reduce the availability, sale, carrying, and use of firearms at the local and national level. • Regulate firearms possession for civilians, through the strengthening of the owners’ registry and the legal definition of the requirements for their acquisition, carrying, and ownership, ensuring that there is adequate control that takes into consideration physical and psychological requirements, as well as the criminal past of the user. • Establish strict control over the inventories and surpluses of the police and armed forces, in particular in those municipalities where homicide by firearms is more frequent. • Implement awareness-raising and disarmament campaigns, promoting amnesty measures and innovative arms collection programmes. • Carry out dissemination strategies, at the national and international level, aimed at reducing the legitimacy of the role of firearms for protection or for social recognition. • Strengthen controls of private security companies that are authorised to use firearms. 9.2 Strengthen the international regulation mechanisms for the purchase and sale of firearms. • Improve the system for controlling the sale and export of arms, both legal and illegal, above all from the United States to Latin America. • Strengthen the cooperation between States and undertake joint efforts to interrupt the illegal flow of arms between borders and prevent criminal organisations from having access to heavy weapons. • Sign and ratify the UN International Treaty on the Arms Trade.

Recommendations

• Give priority to the public health response to drug consumption, through prevention, treatment, harm reduction, and rehabilitation of consumers. • Develop alternatives to the incarceration of those who use drugs and who have committed crimes, subject to follow-up by treatment programmes. • Implement programmes and measures for sustainable and alternative comprehensive development programmes for the communities involved in the illegal drug economy.

10.1 Promote South-South cooperation between security and justice institutions.

9.4 Strengthen the regulatory mechanisms for problem consumers of alcohol. • Prevent and regulate the problem consumption of alcohol through preventive campaigns and regulatory measures that address its consumption. • Establish specialised agencies responsible for implementing policies that reduce the consumption of drugs and alcohol. • Establish restrictions for opening and closing hours for the purchase of alcohol in bars and distributors, enforcing strict control of sale of alcohol to minors. • Apply the laws rigorously for the granting of commercial licenses for the sale of alcohol and establish the liabilities to be incurred for infractions.

10. Strengthen coordination and evaluation mechanisms for international cooperation Lines of action Coordinate the initiatives of the different international actors and consolidate the institutional architecture to ensure that international cooperation has a positive and sustainable impact. To guarantee the success of international initiatives, it is essential to invest in capacity building in the recipient countries and establish success indicators with a citizen security and human rights approach.

• Implement South-South cooperation programmes for the strengthening of national institutions for security and justice. • Provide financing and technologically innovative mechanisms for governmental and non-governmental actors to share information on successful practices in the area of prevention, police operations, and joint work among prosecutors and police. • Make efforts, based on an exchange of experiences, to improving the congruence of data on security at the regional level and strengthen the systems for transmission of information between local governments in the region.

10 TEN RECOMMENDATIONS FOR A SECURE LATIN AMERICA

9.3 Address the consumption of drugs as a public health problem.

10.2 Support cooperation strategies for strengthening of institutional capacities at the local level. • Encourage exchange of experiences, transfer of capacities, and practical knowledge about organisational good practices and management in security issues. • Invest in the strengthening of technical and political capacity that allows local governments to determine their priorities in the area of international cooperation in security, as well as how to adapt the various projects, programmes, and interventions to national contexts. • Focus, as a priority, international cooperation efforts towards those countries, sub-national jurisdictions, and municipalities with fewer resources and greater institutional weaknesses. • Establish an evaluation of processes and impact of prospective projects as a requirement for loans and donations in the context of international cooperation. 10.3 Work for the construction of a regional and global vision for citizen security with a human development approach. • Create a Regional Forum for Citizen Security for Latin America and the Caribbean, open to the participation of non-state actors, with the purpose of identifying common challenges, sharing successful experiences, and identifying mechanisms for cooperation. • Achieve a better articulation of the citizen security agenda with the development agenda, based on the definition of shared objectives and complementary strategies and goals, for example, within the Post-2015 Development Agenda. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPO R T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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• Take into account the impact of the so-called “balloon effect” to prevent the externalities that security policies in one country or city can generate in others in the region. • Develop and strengthen regional mechanism for the exchange of information and intelligence between countries. • Promote the effective coordination of police operations in the region, with special emphasis in the disarticulation of transnational criminal networks and their support networks at the local level. 10.4 Evaluate the impact of international cooperation based on criteria of violence reduction and strengthening of local capacities. • Develop mechanisms for impact evaluation of citizen security strategies promoted by international actors at the local level. • Implement monitoring programmes that can measure the achievement of those programmes promoted at the local level, in order to establish the degree to which each initiative can be replicated.

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Notes CHAPTER 1. CITIZEN SECURITY AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT

1. The HDI registers the advances made in three dimensions: life expectancy, years in school, and the per capital gross national income. 2. The concept of security based on the human development paradigm was introduced in the 1994 Human Development Report. In Latin America, the Central America Report (2009-2010) and the Caribbean Report (2012) were the most recent reports of this kind (Dominican Republic was not part of the latter and as such its findings were not applied to this country). Before these, the national reports from Costa Rica (2005) and Colombia (2003) emphasise this aspect, along with others that, while not dealing necessarily with citizen security as a specific issue, make important contributions to the discussion: Venezuela (1997, 2001), Uruguay (1999), Guatemala (1998), Colombia (1999), and Chile (1998). For a non exhaustive list of UNDP reports linked to the issue of citizen security in the world up to 2005, see the Costa Rica Report (2005, 34). 3. Latin America has an HDI of 0.741, only a few points behind the regions of Europe and Central Asia (with 0.771) and well ahead of other developing regions such as Eastern Asia and the Pacific (0.683), the Arab States (0.652), Southern Asia (0.558), and SubSaharan Africa (0.475). 4. These are Peru, Ecuador, Colombia (high in human development), Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Bolivia, Paraguay, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Guatemala (medium human development) (UNDP 2013, 157-158). 5. According to UNODC (2011) figures, the countries with fewer than 10 homicides per 100,000 inhabitants are Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Perú, and Uruguay. 6. In Panama, a sustained increase has occurred in the level of victimisation during the last 4 years. In 2010, a 10.2% victimisation rate was registered, that is, one in every 10

Panamanians were victims of crime, while in 2009 this was 6.5%. The results of the Second Survey of Crime Victims 2012-2013 showed a 16% rate of victimisation, that is a proportion of at least two victims of crime or other forms of violence for every 10 inhabitants (Report on Victimisation and Perception in Panamá IPSOS-Observatory on Citizen Security -CCIAP in Spanish). 7. Concepts such as public security, democratic security, internal security, national security, human security, regional security, global security, and citizen security, to mention only a few, refer to the diversity of perspectives from which to analyse security (IHRC 2009, 6-10; Arriagada and Godoy 2000, 112). These concepts are not necessarily exclusive and their definitions are not static. The concept of citizen security itself can involve different definitions employed by international organisations or by agents on a local level (academics, decision-makers, civil society, communications media) (Moser and Winton 2002, 38; IDB 2012; IHRC 2009, 9). 8. “The concept of “citizen security” is associated with security against the threat of crime or violence and is used to refer to the most important form of security which is that of individuals and social groups.” (Caribbean Human Development Report 2012: 8). “Citizen security is the protection of the choices or opportunities for all people —their life, integrity and heritage— against a specific type of risk (crime) that alters in a ‘sudden and painful’ way the daily life of its victims.” (Central America Human Development Report 2009-2010: 31). “By citizen security we will understand then, the personal, objective and subjective condition of finding oneself free of intentional violence or dispossession by others.” (Costa Rica National Human Development Report, 2005, 35). 9. Other forms of violence exist, which in some contexts lack a specific criminal classification, such as the case of sexual violence and rape in situations of marriage

or common law partnerships (MESECVI 2012, 97-99). Nevertheless, according to international norms, these forms of violence are crimes and all States have the obligation to recognise them as such. 10. The Costa Rica Human Development Report (2005, 48) defines the objective dimension as a variety of “acts of violence and dispossession” that affect people. It also links the subjective dimension with perceptions of insecurity and the “attributed probability [by a person] of the occurrence of acts of violence and dispossession”. It also points out that the perception of insecurity can be derived from feelings of fear, vulnerability, and mistrust as much towards other people as towards institutions (53). The UNDP’s Central America Regional Human Development Report (2010, 28) points out that “subjective (in)security” refers to the “estimate that each person makes about the degree of risk to which he or she is exposed” and forewarns that this differs from the levels of “objective (in)security” or the levels of “real” violence and crime that are present in society. In a similar way, the conceptual framework about citizen security proposed by the IDB (2012, 4) indicates that violence, crime, and the fear of crime are three distinct dimensions of security. With regards to fear, the document points out that “although the impact of fear cannot be compared with the damage caused by violence, including violent crime... fear negatively affects individuals and communities” and increases people’s perception of insecurity. 11. The idea that citizen security constitutes a public good has been used by diverse authors and is especially relevant for this report. See Loader and Walker (2006, 165195) and Abello and Pearce (2007).

CHAPTER 2. BEHIND THE CRIME AND VIOLENCE

12. Younger than age 25 in Honduras; between 7 and 18 years old in El Salvador; between

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12 and 29 years old in Mexico; between 15 and 24 in Brazil, Bolivia, Ecuador, Peru, and the Dominican Republic; and between 15 and 25 years old in Guatemala (CEPAL y Organización Iberoamericana de la Juventud 2004). Some national youth laws– like those in Costa Rica and the Dominican Republic consider “youth” to be those younger than 35 years old. At the same time, other national laws– like that of Nicaragua, among othersonly include those older than 18 years old in the “youth” category. 13. Some of the first theories in criminology focused on poverty and marginalization as factors associated with criminal activity (Tarde 1907; Merton 1938; Shaw and McKay 1942). These theories argued that, given that property crimes were an illegal mechanism to obtain rapid revenue, some individuals with consumer aspirations who grew up in poverty and marginalisation were more apt to commit this kind of crime. However, evidence from studies from the United States on the relationship between poverty and crime has been weak (Tittle and Meier 1991), and for Latin America, there is an absence of empirical and comparative studies. 14. These programmes have a double objective. First, they seek to reduce existing poverty through cash payments of subsidies. Secondly, they are focused on the development of poor children’s human capital through payments conditional upon compliance with a series of co-responsibilities linked to health and education. The transfers are given, for the most part, to mothers, based on the assumption that mothers use more money for goods and services which benefit children: food, education, and health. (BID 2012). 15. The Gini coefficient is a number between 0 and 1 that indicates inequality in income distribution; the closer to zero indicates less inequality, while closer to 1 shows higher inequality. A Gini of 1 means that all income is concentrated in the richest decile. 16. Inequality, understood as the unequal distribution of economic resources in a society, is an argument that has been used to explain crime (Hagan y Peterson 1995; Braithwaite 1979; Fajnzylber et al. 2002). 210

In their approach, the relative privation of individuals with respect to the possibility of acquiring desired goods explains the commission of crimes. 17. There are methodological concerns regarding the measure’s validity, since the NINis wouldn’t reflect strongly the inability to find work by youth who don’t study, rather merely a proportion of them (see Martínez Restrepo http://www.revistahumanum. org/blog/jovenes-desempleados-o-ninisque-son-ninis/). 18. Exercise carried out on information about homicides from UNODC (2012) and on HDI from UNDP Human Development Report 2013. 19. Compilation based on data from the Brazilian Center for Latin American Studies and FLACSO (Mapa da Violencia 2013), and UNDP, the Joao Pinheiro Foundation, and IPEA (Atlas do Desenvolvimento Humano no Brasil 2013). The relationship coefficient is 2.4, signifying a confidence level of 95%. 20. Compilation based on data from the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences, and the Sub-Directorship of Social Promotion and Quality of Life of the Department of Planning of Colombia (index of multidimensional municipal poverty). The relationship coefficient is 964.5, indicating a confidence level of 95%. 21. Compilation based on data from the Secretariat of the Government of the United States of Mexico (statistics of criminal incidence of the Executive Secretariat of the National System of Public Security) and of the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy (2010 poverty measures by municipality. The relationship coefficient is -0.24, with a confidence level of 95%. 22. The exercises for Mexico were based on income data from the poverty maps developed by the World Bank and the National Council for the Evaluation of Social Development Policy. 23. This argument is based fundamentally on control theories (Hirschi and Gottfredson 1990) although they are also shared by some cultural theorists (Sutherland 1947) and those of social disorganization (Sampson

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and Laub 1995). According to these theories, what discourages a person (especially youth) from committing crimes or indulging in other anti-social or dangerous conduct is individual self-control. This is seen as the capacity that a person has to evaluate the risks which illegal activities pose and to postpone the immediate gratification that the act provides (for example the use of a stolen good). 24. This approach has been applied particularly in the United States. See Commanor and Phillips (2002); Antecol and Bedard (2007). 25. This is the case of Colombia (32), Guatemala (38), El Salvador (41.2), and Venezuela (50). 26. See http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/ xml/7/45607/LCG2513b_1.pdf 27. The school climate indicates the extent to which the student feels welcomed in the school and in the classroom. This indicator proposed by UNESCO “… is based on the feelings and states of mind evoked by different situations in the educational context with schoolmates and teachers. Further, it takes into consideration aspects related with the congeniality and tranquillity that the student feels while in the school, the extent of the sense of institutional belonging, and the relationship with the other students” (UNESCO 2009). 28. The victimisation surveys indicate the extent of robberies and other crimes, since it allows one to approximate the hidden figures, i.e. those crimes that are not reported. For example, in Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, where there are public and continual victimisation surveys, more than half of crimes go unreported. 29. According to ONU-Habitat, some of the first crime theories define a slum household as a group of individuals living under the same roof, lacking one of more of the following: housing of durable materials with adequate space, access to improved drinking water sources and sanitation facilities, and without risk of eviction. 30. R de Pearson of 0.06 for this data. 31. Brazil, Colombia, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, Dominican Republic, Mexico, and Panama. 32. The meta-analysis is a research methodology

used to review, organize, and synthesize data and results of a research question. The meta-analysis combines and summarizes data compiled previously in other studies. 33. The “rate of complaint to the police” refers to the percentage of crimes that the victim or a third person reported to the police, calculated on the basis of the most recent incident suffered by the victim. Information compiled from a victimisation survey http://www.oas.org/dsp/ Observatorio/database/indicatorsdetails. aspx?lang=es&indicator=197

CHAPTER 3. THE INSECURITY MAP

34. This report focuses its analysis on 18 countries in the region: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Dominican Republic, Uruguay and Venezuela. 35. Where validated official information is scarce, we proceeded with two guidelines: (a) existing official sources from other media were used; (b) information was left blank when it was not obtained from the countries. 36. This is not an absolute rule of course. When a country changes laws or information gathering systems, or when a decision is taken to manipulate data for political ends, time sequential data is more difficult to evaluate. 37. Under the leadership of the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB) and the Institute for Research and Development for the Prevention of Violence and the Promotion of Social Co-existence (Instituto de Investigación y Desarrollo en Prevención de la Violence y Promoción de la Convivencia Social - CISALVA), and with the support of the UNDP, serious efforts are underway to establish equivalence in information on crime from the different countries, validate figures, and develop systematisation processes, among other aspects. Among citizens’ initiatives in this area are

observatories that have arisen in some cities and countries that also seek to close gaps in information through joint programmes between civil society and governments. Two noteworthy examples are the Chamber of Commerce in Bogota and the Observatory in Honduras. 38. See: http://mingob.gob.gt/240/ 39. These countries were used as they have disaggregated data on a state or regional level that has been validated by national governments. 40. The database includes all countries in the region except Bolivia and Honduras. However, the data series does not include all years for all countries. The case of Peru, for example, only includes 1999, 2000 and 2007. In almost all countries, data exists for most of the years. For a detailed description of the data see Bhalla, Harrison, Fingerhut, Shahraz, Abraham and Yeh (2011, 249-253). 41. On reading this section, it is not appropriate to compare robbery figures between countries based on administrative records. This report recommends, for the purpose of analysing the information presented here, observing the changes in each country with respect to its own previous rates. 42. The 15 Latin American countries considered are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Panama, Peru, Dominican Republic and Uruguay. The 35 Eurasian countries are: Austria, Germany, Belarus, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Czech Republic, Finland, Georgia, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Luxemburg, The Ex-Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia, Malta, Republic of Moldova, Netherlands, Portugal, Rumania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakian Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, United States, United Kingdom, Turkey and the Ukraine. 43. *Question: During the last twelve months, ¿were you or was anyone in your home a victim of theft? **Question: During the last twelve months, ¿ were you or was anyone in your home a victim of robbery by surprise or stealth (mugging or bag snatching)? ***Question: During the last twelve

months, ¿has anyone stolen something from your home and entered by breaking doors, windows, walls, the roof or in another way not designated as an entrance? ****Question: During the last twelve months, ¿have you or has any member of your household been assaulted using violence, threats or intimidation? *****Question: During the last twelve months, ¿ were you or was anyone in your home a victim of an economic crime such as fraud, swindling, fraudulent cheques, etc.? 44. The criterion “circa” (“ca.”) is used as data is not available for these years in every country. Priority was given to data from official records. Where no information was available, other sources were used that also came from official records, such as the UNODC, OAS or directly from official sources in each country. In these cases the selection criterion was the immediately preceding year, and if this did not exist then the immediately previous years, and if this did not exist either, then this same logic was followed each two years. For 2011, the criterion used exclusively was to go to the first previous year in which information existed. Some exceptional cases were not included because of serious deficiencies in the data. Finally, when series of data were used that were different from information gathered by the UNDP, the reference was taken from the series whose percentage variation between the first measurement and the last was more moderate. 45. Only robbery with violence and simple theft were taken into account. 46. It is important to underscore the fact that for each person, the value of the belonging is not reduced to its market price and as such, these definitions are of course relative. 47. See El Tiempo (2013). 48. See El Periódico (2012). 49. The question was: Thinking about the last criminal act of which you were a victim, and from this list I am going to read you could you tell us to which kind of criminal act were you subjected? The category of “Robbery without personal violence” includes the crimes of “unarmed robbery without physical aggression or the threat of physical

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aggression” and “burglary, breaking and entering without anyone present in the home”, while the category “robbery with personal violence” includes the crimes of “unarmed robbery with physical aggression or the threat of physical aggression” and “armed robbery”. 50. Of course there is possibly a bias in the selection of cases if one supposes, for example, that people in prison are those who tend to use more violence during the robbery. 51. Homicide: low, less than 10 homicides per 100.000 people; middle, from 10-19.9 homicides per 100.000 people; high, more than 20 homicides per 100.000 people. Robbery: percentage of people victimised by robbery (LAPOP, 2012) in the last year: low from zero to 12.5%; middle between 12.5% and 16.7%; and high, more than 16.7%. This classification was made by taking into account these points, since 12.5% means that 1 in 8 people were victims, and 16.7 implies 1 in 6 people. In other words, a country has a relatively low robbery rate when 1 in 8 people was robbed in the last 12 months, and a country has a high robbery rate when 1 in 6 people have been robbed in the last 12 months. 52. The IDB-UNDP study was based on the crime typology and definitions shown in the UN’s “Global Report on Crime and Justice” (1999). In addition, with a view to establish common denominators, crimes in the countries analysed have been homologued according to the classification established by the United Nations (UNODC 2013). 53. In this type of robbery, the aim of using force is to overcome resistance from the protection measures that keep objects safe in the home, and to appropriate them illegitimately. 54. In this type of robbery the perpetrator proceeds with stealth or surprise, by creating false scenarios of fights in places where people gather, or by creating other manoeuvres aimed at bumping into people of causing confusion (Bascuñan 2002). 55. The removal of property without the consent of the owner, in an act in which force or violence was used or threatened. 212

56. The removal of property without the consent of the owner. 57. Physical attack against a person, that results in the bodily harm of the victim. 58. The removal of a car without the consent of the owner. 59. Illegitimate appropriation of something that is in the interior of a vehicle, whether it was attached to the vehicle, such as mirrors, radio or similar, or a separate belonging of the driver’s, the passenger or a third party. 60. A factor that should be considered is the effect of people’s capacity for adaptation in perceiving their own security and that of their surroundings. To the extent by which these phenomena become more common, people seem to adapt to them in a process that mitigates negative effects. This capacity for adaptation to negative phenomena can be positive from a survival perspective; however, it can also generate negative balances (Graham and Chaparro 2011, 27-28). From a human development perspective, as Amartya Sen warns, the people’s revealed preferences can become a distorted guide for understanding their most basic interests. When citizens find themselves in situations of disadvantage or subordination, this ends up including their own comprehension of wellbeing (Sen 1990). For example, in contexts where close relations have begun to develop between criminal organisations and the community, people may say they feel “safe” under this influence, in spite of the strong coercion that is exercised by threats such as these.

CHAPTER 4. THE MAJOR THREATS TO CITIZEN SECURITY

61. These responses refer to the following question from the LAPOP/PNUD study in 2012: “I’m going to mention some groups and I will ask you to indicate to me which of them represent the biggest threat for your security?” Other groups that were included in this question were: police or military, people belonging to their family and neighbours in the urban or rural community. 62. Marginalisation is a risk factor that

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interacts with other factors that explain the high levels of criminality; moreover, there are circumstances of other personal characteristics (psycho-social or biographical, according to several schools of criminology) the increase the propensity to crime among certain individuals (Machin y Meghir 2004; Núñez et al. 2003). 63. 90% of the flow of migrants that pass through Mexico by irregular means is made up of Central Americans from the Northern Triangle (Fernández de Castro 2012). These migrants have become a new market niche for organised crime. In particular, the massive kidnapping of migrants has become a highly lucrative activity (Casillas 2011). The intensification of criminal violence that Mexico has experienced, the lack of coordination between local, state and federal authorities, and the fact that migrants in transit don’t denounce the abuses committed against them, have all contributed to both the worsening and invisibilisation of this phenomenon (Fernández de Castro 2012). This invisibility is generated because migrants seek out isolated areas for their routes that also have a lower presence of any authorities and because very few people denounce the abuses committed against them. 64. These states include Baja California, Chiapas, Michoacan, Nuevo Leon, Oaxaca, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Veracruz and Zacatecas. 65. The countries that reported data were Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru and Dominican Republic. 66. This excludes express kidnapping, disputes over guardianship and child custody, forced disappearances and international people trafficking. 67. In countries such as Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Venezuela, Argentina and Panama this is called “secuestro exprés” (express kidnapping); in Colombia, “paseo millonario” (millionaire stroll); in Peru, “secuestro al paso” (one step kidnapping), y en Brasil, “secuestro relámpago” (lightening kidnapping).

68. Based on the exchange rate from the 8th of October 2013. 69. See: http://plan-international.org/files/ Americas/publications%20-%20english/ violence-in-schools 70. The United Nations defines violence against women as “all acts of violence based on belonging to the female sex that results in or may result in women’s physical, sexual or psychological damage or suffering, as well as the threat of such acts, coercion or the arbitrary loss of freedom, whether it be occurs in public or private life” (De la Cruz 2007, 44). 71. The latter refers to situations in which the laws or state policies are inadequate, insufficient or inexistant in protecting women facing threats against their lives, or emotional and physical wellbeing. (OASAlertamérica 2012, 51). 72. In Guatemala, as in Mexico, Honduras and El Salvador, top ranking police officers seem to be repeatedly involved in drug trafficking cartls and in organised crime groups (Beltrán 2009). In Bolivia and Ecuador, police institutions are frequently denounced for their participation in criminal groups and for forming large structures for extortion that operate from the upper echelons of the police. Fro example, in Bolivia, between 1982 and 2007, 18 police commanders were removed from their positions because of their links with crimes and cover-ups (Ungar 2008). In Ecuador, the head of the police force in 2007 controlled a large network involved in extortion and human trafficking that included all levels of police chiefs (Aznárez 2011). 73. Corruption, for example, can make basic services inaccessible, available only to those who can pay. 74. These perceptions about corruption probably refer to complaints made in the communications media, in which high level public officials and politicians tend to be involved. The six countries are Argentina, Colombia, Honduras, Panama, Peru y Dominican Republic.

CHAPTER 5. THE COSTS OF INSECURITY

75. The report was prepared through a process of multidisciplinary discussion, which had support from the International Development Research Centre (PECIDRC 2013), linking different focuses and methodologies. Key quantitative and qualitative elements were provided to measure the impacts of insecurity on human development through dialogue with researchers and officials working directly on in the terrain, the experience of national and international institutions involved in this area, testimony and media stories, and information obtained first hand through surveys. 76. The ecological focus maintains that each person is immersed in a multiplicity of interrelated levels—individual, family, community, and social— in which different expressions and dynamics can produce and reproduce violence (PHO 2002, 10-12). 77. See Perry (2001, 221-238). 78. Cecilia Varela, analysing the Argentinean case affirms: “We debated about whether fears are ‘irrational’ or ‘rational’, because in both cases we measured their degree of correspondence with the experience of the crime. Perhaps it is necessary, rather, to connect the fears that centre on street crime with other dimensions of analysis distinct from ‘objective’ criminality”. See Varela (2005, 155). 79. In the literature there tends to be a distinction between tangible and intangible costs. These two categories can be a problem from a human development perspective, since the “intangible”, while being difficult to estimate can also be much more evident for the victims. For this reason, this report will avoid using these terms. 80. The natural rate of homicide is calculated on the basis of homicides in all countries around the world that report to the WHO, excluding the Latin American countries in this study. 81. For these calculations, demographic growth was included within the model.

82. The data used in this study belongs to the databases of the World Health Organisation (ICD-9 e ICD-10), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (demographic structure), the United Nations (demographic structure) and the Penn World Tables (gross domestic product in terms of exchange). 83. The data used in this study belongs to the databases of the World Health Organisation (ICD-9 e ICD-10), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (demographic structure), the United Nations (demographic structure) and the Penn World Tables (gross domestic product in terms of exchange). 84. The data used in this study belongs to the databases of the World Health Organisation (ICD-9 e ICD-10), the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (demographic structure), the United Nations (demographic structure) and the Penn World Tables (gross domestic product in terms of exchange). 85. The countries examined in this study are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

CHAPTER 6. THE RESPONSE OF THE STATE

86. It is important to take into account that the dimensions of State capacity, as shown in Box 6.1 and analysed in this part of the chapter, pre-suppose “ideal” conceptualisations. 87. See Evans and Rauch (1999) for an analysis comparing different countries that links recruitment based on meritocracy and rules for internal promotion and assignments with economic growth. 88. These are similar to Weber’s rational-legal bureaucracy (1968). 89. About State autonomy, see Stepan (1978). 90. The link between the State and society in the development context is often called state-society incrustation or synergy. See

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Evans (1996) and Ostrom (1996). 91. See Krueger (1974) for the classical logic that underlies this theory. 92. For a general vision of the tendencies in community policing in Latin America, see Frühling (2007). About the specific initiatives of the community police in Brazil, see Alves and Arias (2012), in Brazil and Honduras, see Arias and Ungar (2009), and in Colombia, see Moncada (2009). 93. A survey registers 57% of the population as trusting the army in contributing successfully to the fight against drug trafficking, while only 7% trust the Federal Police. See Aguayo and Benítez (2013, 215). 94. The variation between countries is not only between sub-national units, as in the case of the federated states such as Argentina, buts also between individual cases. In Ecuador, for example, criminal cases initiated before the implementation of reforms to the criminal justice system have remained in the country’s inquisitorial system, while cases begun after the reforms are processed in the new accusatory system. See Hammergren (2007, 36). 95. Certain entities may have incentives for their staff and the judicial institutions to prioritise and process cases that will most probably be resolved through the legal system because of the preponderance of the evidence. See Pásara (2007). 96. The CEJA is an entity created in 1999 with its headquarters in Santiago, Chile that belongs to the Inter-american system, and has technical and operative autonomy. 97. Information given by the UNDP office in Argentina, see: http://www.undg.org/unct. cfm?module=JointProgramme&page=Joi ntProgrammeView&CountryID=ARG&&Joi ntProgrammeID=500& 98. Argentina (95.7%), Mexico (98.5%), Peru (92.1%), El Salvador (93.1%), Brazil (90%), Chile (85.2%). In Brazil the data was estimated based on requests and refusals of conditional liberty (Comparative study of the prison population, UNDP, 2013) 99. Argentina, 50.2%; Mexico, 71.5%; Peru, 80%; El Salvador, 49.5%; Brazil, 41.8%; Chile, 68.6% 100. Argentina (39.4%), Mexico (44.5%), El 214

Salvador (35.2%) and Chile (41.1%) 101. See The Economist (2012). 102. Belicana Consultoría y Desarrollo Ltd. (2010). 103. Gayle and Mortis (2010). 104. Currently the Centres for Integrated Services have been successfully implemented in the Police Delegations in Bilwi, RAAN (North Atlantic Autonomous Region) and District V in Managua (UNDP Office in Nicaragua). 105. Judicial System. Department for Planning, Statistics Section. 106. UNIMER for La Nación, 2011, 2013. 107. With regard to Chile Crece Contigo, see http://www.earlychildhoodmagazine.org/ issues/scaling-up-topics/mike/ 108. See http://www.presunciondeinocencia. org.mx/index.php?option=com_cont ent&view=article&id=406:repensan do-la-justicia-en-mexico-el-caso-demorelos&catid=36:noticias 109. See http://www.seguridadpublica.gov.cl/ rehabilitar.html CHAPTER 7. NON STATE ACTORS

110. The pro bono collaboration of the advertising agency for the design of the campaign “Weapons, not even as toys!”, the production of print, audiovisuals, and sound materials, plus the negotiation of free space in the mass media were decisive for the success of this campaign (Carballido 2009). 111. This campaign (Desarmando la Violence Doméstica) began in Argentina during the Global Week of Action against Gun Violence, from the 15th to the 21st of June 2009, organised by the Association for Public Policy (International Network for Action against Small Arms 2013). 112. Campaign organised by Amnesty International Chile, the World without Wars Movement, and the Institute for Political Ecology (Scheuch 2010). 113. Programa Creciendo Juntos This project was supported by UNDP. 114. The study carried out by the regional office of UNESCO recognised the role of national and international CSOs, church foundations, or organised civil society in the work of interconnecting schools, families, and

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communities (Hirmas 2008). 115. Project supported by Catholic Relief Service (CRS), with technical advice from YouthBuild International 116. This programme currently is in a second phase with support from the Inter-american Development Bank (IDB) 117. Available online: www.afroreggae.org 118. Available online: http://www. colectivamujerysalud.org. 119. Available online: http://iudpas.org/ observatorio 120. With technical support from the Bogotá Chamber of Commerce and the UNDP, under the auspices of the MDG Achievement Fund UN-Spain. 121. Available online: http://www.panacamara. com/index.php/sobre-el-observatorio 122. For example, the Citizens’ Council for Public Security in Mexico City operates a 24/7 phone helpline for denouncing extortion and it is committed to transmitting the details to the authorities (http://www. consejociudadanodf.org.mx); in Colombia the Papaz Network (network of fathers and mothers), the Active Generations Forum (Foro Generaciones Activas) and other CSOs, and the Telefónica Foundation established an agreement with two government ministries to open an online hotline for denouncing cases of child and adolescent pornography and sexual exploitation through the internet (Te Protejo 2013); the Association for Equality and Justice in Argentina has opened a webpage for citizens to denounce cases of corruption via the internet, with the aim of identifying cases, investigating them, and report them to the proper authorities (CIPCE and ACIJ 2013) 123. For example, the ICESI in Mexico and their webpage dedicated to reporting aggression http://www.notecalles.org.mx/ or País Libre (Free Country) in Colombia, dedicated to following up on kidnapping through their Centre for Attention to Victims, http://www. paislibre.org/site/ 124. As is the case of the CSO Quiero Paz en Venezuela and its interactive Wiki-Crime map, which produces the “real information” about criminality based on citizen reports

(http://www.wikicrimeccs.quieropaz.org/). 125. For example, Mexico United against Delinquency has carried out several surveys with the Mitofsky Consultancy group financed by business groups who place particular emphasis on kidnapping. The Ninth and Tenth Mexican National Surveys on Insecurity from November 2011 and March 2012 (MiamiDiario.com 2011) stand out. 126. The work done by the CSO La Casa del Encuentro in Argentina, which coordinates the Femicide Observatory. This CSO keeps statistics and publishes an annual report, as well as investigating the nature of femicides, their causes, profiles of the perpetrators, etc. (La Casa del Encuentro 2013). 127. See El Heraldo (2013). 128. See Huffington Post (2012). 129. The kidnapping and murder of their son in 2005 propelled Isabel Miranda de Wallace to create a new association Alto al Secuestro (Stop Kidnapping) and later to lead the white movement (Benassini and Caro 2009) that proposed her as a candidate for the PAN in elections in the Federal District (Paz, 2012). 130. The World March for Peace and Non Violence is a global initiative of the organisation World Without Wars. It began in New Zealand and culminated in the Andes Mountains en Argentina, in January 2010; organisations from several countries such as Venezuela, took advantage of it to disseminate the “Charter ‘for a world without violence” and ask for the support of the authorities (Vulcano 2010). 131. With outstanding cases such as the Frente Bicentenario de Mujeres de Venezuela (Venezuelan Women’s Bicentenary Front), the Consejo Provincial de la Mujer de Córdoba (Cordoba Provincial Council of Women), the women from the Brazilian Confederación de Trabajadores de la Agricultura (Agricultural Workers Confederation), the Red Nacional de Mujeres (National Women’s Network) in Colombia, the Nicaraguan Movimiento Autónomo de Mujeres (Autonomous Women’s Movement), the Movimiento de Mujeres de El Salvador (Salvadoran Women’s Movement), and the Honduran

Movimiento por la Paz Visitación Padilla (Visitación Padilla Movement for Peace). 132. See vanguardia.com 2012 and mujeresdejuarez.org 133. Available on: http://www.undp.org/ content/undp/es/home/presscenter/ articles/2011/03/21/el-salvador-womenin-parliament-unite-on-new-law-againstviolence/ 134. Interview with business leader, Guatemala City, Guatemala, January 20th, 2012. 135. In many countries there is no official registry, since the phenomenon is not typified as an independent crime. 136. In 2004, Televisa transmitted live images of a lynching in San Juan Ixtapoyan, in Mexico City (Santamaría 2012). More recently, the lynching of three men accused of raping and killing a young woman in the state of Chiapas, Mexico was captured on video, uploaded to YouTube and sold on the streets of San Cristóbal for 15 pesos (or one US dollar). On the cover of the DVD it said: “Rapist burned alive IMPRESSIVE News of the week! not apt for cardiac cases” (Mariscal 2013). The neighbourhood organisations 137. collaborating with the police in Guatemala and Mexico (in the cities of Villas del Ixtépete, Guadalajara, Jalisco), are called Committees for Citizen Security, in metropolitan Lima they are called Neighbourhood Boards, in São Paulo and in Santiago and Viña del Mar they are constituted as Citizen Security Neighbourhood Committees, among others. 138. In Bolivia, the Autonomous Departmental Government of Santa Cruz organised training for neighbours, in patrolling, first aid and personal defence, as well as giving participants uniforms to identify the group (Gobierno Autónomo Departamental de Santa Cruz 2013). 139. In Colombia, under the neighbourhood brigades system, each person has several numbers assigned to which they can call in an emergency; in this way, all members of the community can find out in a question of minutes about any situation that arises and they can ask for help from their neighbours (El Tiempo 2012). 140. Human Rights Committee Report, Volume I

104 period of sessions (12 to 30th of March 2012), UN General Assembly, 67 period of sessions, Supplement N 40 (A/67/40) available online http://www.ccprcentre. org/wp - content/uploads/2012/04/ A_67_40Vol-I_es.pdf 141. Interview with Homero Campa (Proceso, Mexico), August 2013. 142. See http://www.salanegra.elfaro.net/ 143. See El País (2013). 144. Available on: http:// circulodeperiodistasdebogota.com/ wpcontent/uploads/2012/02/1CODIGOETIC ACPB2006.pdf 145. Available on: http://www.apu.org.uy/wpcontent/uploads/2013/04/C%C3%B3digode-%C3%A9tica-period%C3%ADsticaVersi%C3%B3n-Final-9-4-13.pdf The Open Society Justice Initiative 146. (OSJI) was formed and the Mexican organisations Institución Renace (Rebirth Institute), ABP, Instituto por la Seguridad y la Democracia) Institute for Security and Democracy), AC, and Reintegra (Reintegrate), and they also have the Media and Access to Information Programme of the Institute for Penal Process Justice. 147. Available on: http://www. presunciondeinocencia.org.mx CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION

148. Decentralised cooperation implies the entirety of the actions for international cooperation carried out by sub-national governments. It is based on associations and exchanges between homologous institutions that work in close collaboration to transform and improve their surrounding context (Dammert and Paulsen 2008). This type of cooperation is achieving greater visibility, through initiatives such as twinning relations between local governments and networks for cooperation. North-South cooperation refers to 149. cooperation between developed countries and developing countries, while SouthSouth cooperation refers to cooperation between developing countries. In this chapter, the South-South cooperation that

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is examined is between Latin American countries. 150. Bilateral cooperation is the most common mode of practice in the security field on a world scale, and Latin America is no exception. In the region, the main cooperating nation is the U.S., followed by Canada and countries from the European Union, such as Spain or Great Britain (Labrousse 2006). 151. As well as the generation of South-South bilateral cooperation schemes, there have also been dynamics that include triangular cooperation in which the industrialised countries contribute resources that add to the capacities of middle income countries in benefiting other less developed ones. The aim of triangular cooperation is to use the experience and sensitivity of middleincome countries that share cultural and political affinities, as well as exposing daily situations of social exclusion, which is a feature of developing countries (Hirst 2010; Sanín 2010). 152. See http://portal.mj.gov.br/main. asp?View=%7B7AE041E8-8FD4472C-9C08-68DD0FB0A795%7D & B r o w s e r Ty p e = I E & L a n g I D = p t br&params=itemID%3D%7B3239224CC 5 1 F - 4 A 2 9 - 9 E 5 1 74AC98153FD1%7D%3B&UIPartUID=%7B2868BA3C-1C72-4347-BE11A26F70F4CB26%7D 153. The agreement with Bolivia was signed in 2013 to create the Working Group against Money Laundering between the Bolivian Unit for Financial Investigations (Unidad de Investigaciones Financieras - UIF) and the Brazilian LAB-LD. See: http://www. la-razon.com/nacional/seguridad_ nacional/Brasil-equipo-evitar-lavadodinero_0_1837616269.html 154. S e e ht t p : / / p o r t a l. m j. g ov. b r / m a i n . asp?View=%7B7AE041E8-8FD4472C-9C08-68DD0FB0A795%7D & B r o w s e r Ty p e = I E & L a n g I D = p t br&params=itemID%3D%7B3239224CC 5 1 F - 4 A 2 9 - 9 E 5 1 74AC98153FD1%7D%3B&UIPartUID=%7B2868BA3C-1C72-4347-BE11A26F70F4CB26%7D 216

155. See http://www.undp.org.ni/noticias/733 156. In building this case, interviews were carried out with the following U.S. and Colombian public and ex-public officials, between February and June 2013, with the condition that the specific declarations of each person would remain anonymous: Maria Angela Holguin, Colombian Minister of Foreign Relations; Michael McKinley, U.S. Ambassador to Colombia; William Brownfield, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs; James Story, Director, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy in Colombia; Carl Gettinger, Chief, International Coordination Division, Narcotics Affairs Section, U.S. Embassy in Colombia; Gabriel Silva Lujan, ex-Ambassador for Colombia in the U.S., ex-Minister of Defence; Advisor to the Minister, Colombian Embassy in the U.S.; General (r) Oscar Naranjo, ex-Director of the Colombian National Police; Colonel Joaquin Buitrago, Chief for International Affairs, Colombian National Police; General (r) Rosso Jose Serrano, ex-Director of the Colombian National Police and current advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Relations for International Cooperation Strategy for integrated Security in Colombia. 157. Data supplied by the Colombian National Police and the Ministry of Defence. 158. See UNASUR (2012). 159. See: http://www.ceedcds.org.ar/ Espanol/05-DocInf/05-03-Registro-GastoDefensa.html 160. Central American Security Strategy, SICA, 2007. Complete document available at: http://plan-sica-bcie-italia.org/admin/ documents/10 161. Available at: http://www.sica.int 162. See the multiplicity of donors at: http:// www.seguridadciudadana-centroamerica. org 163. In terms of this debate, the country has changed its discourse, avoiding making references to the “war against drugs”, with a new national strategy that addresses the common challenge of drugs as a public health issue and not only a security question. This shift responds to recent national-level changes. In 2012, for the

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first time voters in two states —Colorado and Washington— approved popular initiatives to legalise the possession of cannabis for recreational use, as well as its production and sale. In addition, a recent Pew Research Centre survey shows (March 13-17, 2013), 52% of citizens affirm that the use of marihuana should be legal – an increase of 11 points in comparison with 2010— (Pew Research Centre 2013). Beyond these changes in the internal context, during the last five years there has been a modest drop in U.S. military and police aid to Latin America, and an equally modest rise in the social and economic components of the fight against drug trafficking. 164. See Just the Facts (2013a) and (2013b). 165. The certification of aid against drug trafficking was in force from 1986 to 2002. For an analysis of the workings of this process in relation to Mexico and the U.S., see Dominguez and Castro 2008. 166. This includes the transference of equipment —helicopters, aviation, patrol boats, communications—, intelligence training and sharing, the fumigation of 1.5 million hectares of coca leaves (UNODC 2012), the accompaniment strategy (Just the Facts 2013d), the training of more than 80,000 members of the military and police and the creation of new brigades in the Army and Navy (Just the Facts 2013c). The amounts found on this page come from the official reports of the U.S. government. There are 12 reports on military training to Colombia, available at: http://justf.org/Country?country=Col ombia&year1=2000&year2=2013#traine es.) 167. See Just the Facts (2013f). See large number of governmental documents cited at the end of this page. 168. See Just the Facts (2013f). 169. The U.S. offers Mexico and Central America very little aid for crop eradication, territorial recovery and control, demobilisation and reinsertion. The intelligence component, that has been central in Colombia, does not have the same acceptance in México nor in Central

America. CARSI deploys some practical alternatives aimed at ensuring citizen security, such as the prevention of street crime. 170. See, for example, Ribando Seelke (2013), Lawson (2013), Acevedo, Bewley-Taylor and Youngers (2010). 171. See Just the Facts (2013g). 172. See U.S. Embassy for the U.S. in Honduras (2012). 173. For more information see: http://www. amuprev.org/index.php Associations have been established 174. between: Pinellas County, Florida and Colón and San Miguelito, Panama; Arlington, Texas and Panama City, Panama; Santa Ana, California and Sonsonate and Nahuizalco, El Salvador; and Santa Ana, California with Santa Catarina Pinula and Palencia, Guatemala. 175. For more information see: http://mayor. lacity.org/Issues/GangReduction/index. htm. 176. This aid has been channelled through two programmes in particular. The first is the International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement Fund (INCLE), administered by the Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) of the U.S. State Department; the second anti-narcotics programme is financed by the Defence Department, authorised since 1991 to use part of its budget to help the military and police forces in Latin American countries. From 2000 to 2013, it has paid out US$5,200 million to this end (Latin American Working Group 2007). The remaining 12% of aid is given to around twenty programmes, including Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and the International Military Education and Training (IMET), which have given US$1,400 million in aid to military and police forces and around US$184 million in military training programmes since 2000 (Just the Facts 2011; 2013a; 2013c). 177. The cases analysed were selected to illustrate certain dynamics achievements and challenges in security aid in Latin America, rather than seeking to give an exhaustive account of multilateral aid programmes in the region.

178. See: http://www.urb-al3.eu/index. php/contenido/proyectos?id_menu_ principal=6 179. For more information on this project see: http://www.urbalpernambuco.org/. On this webpage the publication Cooperación para Ciudades más Seguras (2013) can be downloaded, which presents an analysis of the interventions carried out during the four-year project. See: http://www. urbalpernambuco.org/adm/public/files/ destaques/CadernodoProjetoespanhol_ web--20130226101114.pdf 180. Seehttp://pdba.georgetown.edu/Security/ citizensecurit y/chile/documentos/ comunasegura.pdf 181. h t t p : / / w w w. i a d b. o r g / e s / t e m a s / seguridad-ciudadana/fortalecimientoinstitucional,2669.html 182. Situational Prevention is a focus aimed at reducing opportunities for crime and the population’s perception of insecurity in certain urban spaces, through strategies that seek to modify key spatial and physical risk factors and conditions. Definition available at: http://www.seguridadpublica. gov.cl/prevencionsituacional.html 183. In 2010, the CSF made 47 loans to 7 Latin American countries, in 2009 to 69 organisations in 10 countries and in 2008 the bank financed 83 entities from 14 States. For more information about the CSF, see: http:// web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/ TOPICS/EXTSOCIALDEVELOPMENT/EXTSMAL LGRANTS/0,,contentMDK:20507431~menu PK:1234307~pagePK:64168445~piPK:641 68309~theSitePK:952535,00.html 184. http://www.pnud.org.sv/2007/content/ view/1098/167?Itemid=154 185. Available at: http://www.lazoblanco. org/?page_id=4 186. Available at: http://www.mdgfund.org/es/ 187. Available at: www.cambioenpaz.org 188. See, for example, Woods (2005), Moroney, Marquis, Quantic Thurston and Treverton (2009), Adams and Williams (2011), Mosangini (2012), Ribando Seelke and Finklea (2013) and Lawson (2013).

CHAPTER 9. INTERVENTION: LESSONS LEARNED

189. For other initiatives or programmes pertinent to citizen security, see World Bank (2011); Basombrío (2012); Tocornal, Tapia and Ayala (2011). 190. This refers to work by Jacobs (2002), who observes that there is security where the natural urban order generates the conditions for passive observation, which impedes crime. 191. For an analysis of this focus see UNODC- ONU Habitat (2011, 38-39). 192. For example, if assaults increase rapidly in a particular area, the police can examine the data, make observations, and speak with residents, workers and local business people in order to develop a strategy aimed at stopping crime in the area. For a general vision of this concept, see Goldstein (1990). 193. About this practice in Colombia, see Fundación Ideas por la Paz (2012, 7-10). 194. See Campeche State (s.a.), “Caso de Éxito: Buenas prácticas contra la violence hacia las mujeres” (Success story: Best practices to stop violence against women) , unpublished leaflet. 195. See MenEngage site (www.menengage. org) and the campaign page “Soy orgulloso chapin and no soy violento” in http:// saynotoviolence.org/es/join-say-no/soyorgulloso-chapin-y-no-soy-violento 196. Observations from visits to the Programme’s Centres, July 2012. 197. Spain has begun a new initiative to support cooperation and training in these areas, between police forces in Spain and Latin America. See El Universo (2013). 198. This is because at least part of these organisations’ operational capacity in some places depends on the close relationship between State functionaries and organised crime figureheads. In fact, organised crime could not exist if it were not for a certain level of connivance from the State (Godson 2003). 199. For a more detailed analysis of the threats against journalists, see Reporters without borders (2013). Press Bulletin Instituto Nacional de 200. Estadística y Geography (INEGI), Number

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288/13. 30 July 2013, “In 2012 26 thousand 037 homicides were registered.” Available in: http://www.inegi.org.mx/inegi/ contenidos/espanol/prensa/Boletines/ muestra3.asp?tema=22&c=279 201. Data courtesy of the Centro de Estudos da Criminología de la Universidad Federal de Minas Gerais. Graph published in Arias and Ungar (2009). 202. Secretary of State for Social Defence (s.f). 203. Beyond the evident influence of Colombia, the Dominican PSD programme also reflects the underlying understanding, based on the experiences of Minas Gerais and São Paulo states in Brazil, that criminality is a multidimensional phenomenon requiring a complex body of responses with special attention to social exclusion and vulnerable populations (Bobea 2011, 334-337). 204. The evaluation team hired by UNDP received relatively little statistical information from the Dominican government about crime in these areas. However, it received information on homicides directly in the neighbourhoods. This was used to evaluate the effectiveness of the programme in comparison with similar neighbourhoods not included in the programme, and in comparison with the cyclical homicide rate in each neighbourhood from one year to the next. The data suggests there is a reduction during the period of programme implementation, although frequently the incidence of homicide begins its downward trend before programme implementation in any particular neighbourhood. Later investigations showed, however, that the homicide rates from one year to the next had been declining over time. The data also showed a downward trend in other similar neighbourhoods in the city (Cano 2007, 2030). 205. Departamento de Seguridad Pública (Department of Public Security), “Seguridad pública and privada en República Dominicana” (Public and private security in the Dominican Republic), Organization of American States OAS, ND, p. 19. 206. Speech of President Mauricio Funes from El Salvador, UN General Assembly, 2013. 207. Between 1942 and 1965, through the 218

Bracero programme, for example, hundreds of thousands of agricultural workers migrated to the U.S. from Ciudad Juárez. When the programme ended, the city had almost 400 thousand inhabitants. Later, the state’s and city’s industrial policies were reoriented towards industrialisation for the U.S. consumer market, and included hiring low qualified labour, in particular women, to work in maquila factories. However, the maquila initiative, in contrast to the Bracero Programme, has continued to attract young workers. It has also contributed to social structures that have resulted in the rapid growth of marginal neighbourhoods with no decent basic services, sustained male unemployment, working mothers with low salaries, and children being raised in monoparental homes. 208. During Prohibition in the 1930s in the U.S., for example, bars and clubs multiplied in the centre of the city just on the other side of the bridge over the Ciudad JuárezEl Paso border, which contributed to what is considered to be a form of social decomposition. 209. For more information on the Oportunidades (Opportunities) programme, consult the official webpage http://www. oportunidades.gob.mx/Portal/ 210. El Universal (2011).

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Monreal, Verónica, Claudia Neira and Mauricio Olavarría (2012), Informe Final de Evaluación Programa Vida Nueva, SENAME, Ministerio de Justicia, Subsecretaría de Prevención del Delito and Ministerio del Interior y Seguridad Pública, Santiago. Muller, Hugo (2010), Perú. Policía comunitaria: Nuevo paradigma de la seguridad ciudadana, Woodrow Wilson Center. Available at: http:// scela.wordpress.com/2010/06/30/perupolicia-comunitaria-nuevo-paradigmade-la-seguridad-ciudadana-hugo-mullersolon/ Neild, Rachel (2000), “Confronting a Culture of Impunity: The Promise and Pitfalls of Civilian Review of Police in Latin America,” in Andrew J. Goldsmith and Colleen Lewis (eds.), Civilian oversight of policing: governance, democracy, and human rights, Hart Publishing. Open Society Foundations (2013), Global Campaign for Pretrial Justice. Available at: http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/ projects/global-campaign-pretrial-justice Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD-DAC, 2008), Handbook on Security System Reform, supporting Security and Justice. Available at: http://www.oecd.org/development/ conflictandfragility/42033010.pdf Organization of American States (OAS, 2007), Accesso a la Justicia: Llave para la Gobernabilidad Democrática, Washington, DC. ------- and United Nations Development Programme (OAS-UNDP, 2011), Nuestra Democracia, Fondo de Cultura Económica, Mexico. Organización Iberoamericana de Juventud (OIJ, 2013), El Futuro ya llegó. Encuesta Iberoamericana de Juventud 2013, Informe Ejecutivo, Madrid.

Ostrom, Elinor (1996),“Crossing the great divide: coproduction, synergy, and development,” in World development 24(6):1073-1087. Pantoja, Rodrigo (2010), “La evidencia empírica de reducción de la reincidencia delictiva, como herramienta para la seguridad pública y la integración social,” in Debates Penitenciarios 13:3–18. Parra Norato, Jorge, Diana E. Guzmán and Rodrigo Uprimny (2012), La adicción punitiva: la desproporción de leyes de drogas en América Latina, Centro de Estudios de Derecho, Justicia y Sociedad, Dejusticia, Bogota. Pásara, Luis (2007), “Reforma procesal penal y seguridad ciudadana,” in Reforma Judicial: Revista Mexicana de Justicia 10: 37-57. Pinc, Tania M. (2010), “Police Reform: a determinant of democracy’s development”, Paper 19. Available at: http://opensiuc.lib. siu.edu/pnconfs_2010/19 Pucci, Francisco, Emiliano Rojido, Nicolás Trajtenberg and Ana Vigna (2009), “Criminalidad y políticas de rehabilitación en Uruguay. El caso del Centro Nacional de Rehabilitación,” in Informe de Investigación, Proyecto CSIC Sector Productivo 2007 – 2008.

Saín, Marcelo Fabián (2010), La reforma policial en América Latina. Una mirada desde el progresismo, Prometeo Libros, Buenos Aires. Santamaría, Gema (2012), “Taking Justice into their Own Hands: Insecurity and the Lynching of Criminals in Latin America,” in ReVista: Harvard Review of Latin America. Sampson, Robert (1985), “Neighborhood and crime: the structural determinants of personal victimization,” in Journal of Research in Crime and Delinquency 22: 7–40. Shirk, David (2012), Justice Reform in Mexico. Change & Challenges in the Judicial Sector, Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington DC. Schneider, Ben Ross and Heredia Blanca (eds.) (2003), Reinventing leviathan: the politics of administrative reform in developing countries, North-South Center Press, University of Miami, Miami. Available at: http://www. redalyc.org/pdf/111/11101509.pdf Schochet, Peter Z., John Burghardt and Sheena McConnell (2008), “Does job corps work? Impact findings from the National Job Corps Study,” in American Economic Review, 5(98): 1864–1886.

Red de Seguridad y Defensa de América Latina (RESDAL, 2011), Índice de seguridad pública y ciudadana en América Latina. El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras y Argentina.

Sepúlveda, Isidro and Sonia Alda (eds.) (2008), La Administración de la defensa en América Latina, Instituto Universitario General Gutiérrez Mellado, Universidad Estatal a Distancia, Madrid.

------- (2012), Atlas comparativo de la defensa en América Latina y el Caribe 2012, RESDAL, Buenos Aires.

Sexual Violence Research Initiative (2010), Violencia Sexual en Latinoamérica y El Caribe: Análisis de datos secundarios, March.

Riego, Cristián (2002), Informe Comparativo, Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Américas, (CEJA), Santiago.

Snodgrass Godoy, Angelina (2006), Popular Injustice, Violence, Community, and Law in Latin America, Stanford University Press.

Rivas, María Victoria (2001), Informe de Paraguay. Proyecto de Seguimiento de los Procesos de Reforma Judicial en América Latina, Centro de Estudios de Justicia de las Américas, (CEJA). Available at: http://pdf. usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACY358.pdf

Soares¸ Luiz Eduardo (2001), Meu Casaco de General: Quinhentos Dias no Front da Segurança Pública. Rio de Janeiro, Companhia das Letras.

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Solís, Luis Guillermo and Francisco Rojas Aravena (eds.) (2008), Crimen organizado en América Latina y el Caribe, FLACSO, Catalonia, Santiago. Stepan, Alfred (1978), The State and Society: Peru in Comparative Perspective, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Tendler, Judith (1997), Good Government in the Tropics, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. The Economist (2012), Prisons in Latin America: A journey into hell. Available at: http://www. economist.com/node/21563288 Transparency International, Global Corruption Barometer. Available at: http://gcb. transparency.org/gcb201011/in_detail/ Tulchin, Joseph S. and Meg Ruthenburg (eds.) (2006), Toward a Society under Law: Citizens and their Police in Latin America, Woodrow Wilson Center Press. Uildriks, Niels (2009), Policing insecurity: police reform, security, and human rights in Latin America, Lexington Books. Ungar, Mark (2009), “Democracy, Law and Order,” in Latin American Research Review 44(3). Available at: http://muse.jhu.edu/ login?auth=0&type=summar y&url=/ journals/latin_american_research_review/ v044/44.3.ungar.pdf ------- (2011), Policing Democracy: Overcoming Obstacles to Citizen Security in Latin America, Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore. ------- and Leticia Salomón (2012), “Community policing in Honduras: local impacts of a national programme,” in Policing and Society 22(1): 28-42. UN Women (2011), El Progreso de las Mujeres en el Mundo 2011-2012. En busca de la justicia. Available at: http://progress.unwomen.org/ pdfs/SP-Report-Progress.pdf

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UN-Habitat (2011), Building Urban Safety Through Slum Upgrading, Nairobi. ------- and Universidad Alberto Hurtado (2010), Guía para la prevención con jóvenes hacia políticas de cohesión social y seguridad ciudadana, Facultad de Derecho, Chile. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2009), Abrir espacios para la seguridad ciudadana y el desarrollo humano: Informe sobre desarrollo humano para América Central 2009-2010. ------- (2011), Información sobre el gasto público de seguridad y justicia en Centroamérica. Resultados preliminares para la Conferencia de apoyo a la Estrategia de Seguridad en Centroamérica. ------- and UN Women (2013), El compromiso de los Estados: planes y políticas para erradicar la violencia contra las mujeres en América Latina y el Caribe. Análisis comparativo. Study conducted within the framework of the General-Secretary’s UNiTE to End Violence against Women Campaign. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2008), Crime and instability. Case studies of transnational threats, UNODC, Vienna. Vandereschueren, Franz, Rosa María Olave, Juan Carlos Ruíz, Ezio Mosciatti, Germán Díaz and Cristián Del Canto (2009), Guía para la Prevención Local: hacia Políticas de Cohesión Social y Seguridad Ciudadana, UNHabitat and Universidad Alberto Hurtado, Santiago. Waiselfisz, Julio Jacobo and María Maciel (2003), Revertendo violências, semeando futuros: avaliação de impacto do Programa Abrindo Espaços no Rio de Janeiro e em Pernambuco, UNESCO. Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA, 2009), Protect and Serve? The Status of Police Reform in Central America? Available at: http://www.wola.org/sites/default/files/

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Asociación para la Cooperación en el Sur (ACSUR, 2008), “Se aprueba la ley contra el feminicidio en Guatemala,” in La Molotera, October 6. Available at: http://www.acsur. org/IMG/pdf/LaMolotera6.pdf

Weber, Max (1968), Economy and Society: an outline of interpretive sociology, Bedminster Press, New York. World Bank (2011), Violence in the City. Understanding and Supporting Community Responses to Urban Violence, World Bank, Washington, DC. Zilberg, Elana (2007), “Refugee Gang Youth: Zero Tolerance and the Security State in Contemporary U.S.-Salvadoran Relations,” in Sudhir Alladi Venkatesh and Ronald Kassimir (eds.), Youth, Globalization and the Law, Stanford University Press, California, pp. 61-89.

CHAPTER 7. NON STATE ACTORS Arriagada, Irma (2003), “Capital social: Potencialidades y limitaciones analíticas de un concepto,” in Estudios Sociológicos, El Colegio de México, September-December, XXI (3): 557-584. Available at: http://redalyc. uaemex.mx/ pdf/598/59806303.pdf Asociación de la prensa uruguaya (APU, 2013), Código de ética periodistica. Available at: http://www.apu.org.uy/wp-content/ uploads/2013/04/C%C3%B3digo-de %C3%A9tica-period%C3%ADsticaVersi%C3%B3n-Final-9-4-13.pdf Asociación Civil por la Igualdad y la Justicia and Centro de Investigación y Prevención de la Criminalidad Económica (ACIJ and CIPCE, 2013), Informe sobre acceso a la información pública. Available at: http://acij.org.ar/sin-

Baires, Olga, Enrique Bermejo and Mónica Montalván (2010), Evaluación externa de impacto: Proyecto prevención de la violencia, Centro de Prevención de la Violencia (CEPREV), Managua. Banco de buenas prácticas en prevención del delito en América Latina (2012), Estrategias Locales de Prevención y Atención de la Violencia Basada en Género, Bolivia. Available at: http://buenaspracticasenprevencion. org/bbp_docs/17_estrategias_locales_de_ prevencion_y_atencion_de_la_violencia_ basada_en_genero.pdf Bandeira, Antonio and Josephine Burgois (2006), Armas de fuego: ¿protección o riesgo? Guía práctica, Foro Parlamentario sobre Armas Pequeñas y Ligeras. Available at: http://www.comunidadesegura.org/ files/active/0/armas%20de%20fogo%20 protecao%20ou%20risco_esp.pdf Barata, Francesc (1996), El drama del delito en los mass media. Available at: http://www. ub.edu/penal/barata1.htm Benassini Félix, Claudia and Arturo Caro Islas (2009), “Isabel Miranda de Wallace funda movimiento contra candidatos ‘deshonestos’,” in Medios México, February 3. Available at: http://mediosenmexico. blogspot.com/2009/02/isabel-miranda-dewallace-funda.html Bobbio, Norberto (1985), Liberalism and Democracy, Verso, New York. Bolivia te vemos (2012), “El alto marcha contra la inseguridad ciudadana,” in Bolivia Te Vemos, March. Available at: http://www. boliviatv.net/2012/03/el-alto-marchan-encontra-la.html REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPOR T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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Brown, David (2009), Investigación sobre crímenes de odio contra las personas LGTB en Honduras, Asociación LGTB Arcoiris and Centro de Investigación y Promoción de los Derechos Humanos (CIPRODEH), Honduras. Available at: http://www.portalsida.org/ repos/I nforme_Crimenes_de_Odio_ Final[1][1].pdf Buvinic, Mayra and Andrew Morrison (2002), Preventing violence, InterAmerican Development Bank (IDB), Technical Note 5. Available at: http:// idbdocs.iadb.org/wsdocs/getdocument. aspx?docnum=362891 Cámara de Comercio de Barranquilla (2013), Seguridad, Colombia. Available at http://www.camarabaq.org.co/index. php?option=com_content&view=article& id=197:seguridad&catid=132:seguridad-yespacio-publico&Itemid=167 Cámara de Comercio de Bogotá (2013), Observatorio de seguridad en Bogotá. Available at: http://camara. ccb.org.co/contenido/contenido. aspx?conID=947&catID=86 Cámara de Comercio, Industrias y Agricultura (2012), Observatorio de Seguridad Ciudadana Panamá, Panamá. Available at: http://www.panacamara.com/index. php/sobre-el-observatorio/noticias/104observatorio-de-seguridad-ciudadana Carballido, Armando (2009), Desarmar la violencia: una década de prevención de la violencia armada en el Salvador, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Available at: http://www.scribd.com/ doc/36174204/DESARMAR-LA-VIOLENCIA Centro de Colaboración Cívica (2010), “Ley General de Víctimas”. Available at: http:// colaboracioncivica.org/esp/seguridadciudadana/lo-mas-destacado/ Coalición Centroamericana para la Prevención de la Violencia Juvenil (CCPVJ, 2009), Buenas prácticas de prevención, rehabilitación e inserción de la violencia juvenil en 250

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Centroamérica. Available at: http:// ccpvj.org/documentos/biblioteca/Pub_ CCPVJ/Buenas%20practicas%20en%20 prevencion%20de%20violencia%20en%20 Centroamerica.pdf Coalición contra la vinculación de niños, niñas y jóvenes al conflicto armado en Colombia (COALICO 2008), “La Coalición Colombia rechaza las ejecuciones extrajudiciales de jóvenes en diferentes regiones del país y exige investigaciones serias de los hechos,” October 30, Bogota. Available at: http:// www.coalico.org/archivo/301008.pdf Concha, Miguel (2012), “Ley General de Víctimas,” in La Jornada, March 3. Correa, Rosalía (2013), “Cali: la balanza se inclinó hacia Guerreo,” in Razón Pública, October 30, 2011. Available at: http://www. razonpublica.com/index.php/regionestemas-31/2510-cali-la-balanza-se-inclinohacia-guerrero-.html Cruz, Miguel (2011), “Criminal Violence and Democratization in Central America: The Survival of the Violent State,” in Latin American Politics and Society 53(4): 1-33. Dammert, Lucía (2002), Participación comunitaria en la prevención del delito en América Latina: ¿de qué participación hablamos? CED, Centro de Estudios para el Desarrollo (CED) Available at: http:// www.der.unicen.edu.ar/extension/upload/ Dammert.pdf -------- (2011), Desafíos para la Seguridad Ciudadana y la cohesión social, URB-AL III, San Salvador. Available at: http://www. urb-al3.eu/uploads/noticias/paper_Lucia_ Dammert_1.pdf Dossiê da articulaçao nacional dos comités populares da copa (2011), Megaeventos e Violaçoes de Direitos Humanos no Brasil, Comitê Popular Copa & Olimpíadas, Rio de Janeiro, December. Available at: http://comitepopulario.files.wordpress. com/2011/12/dossie_violacoes_copa_ completo.pdf

El Diario (2012), “Y en Bolivia: Aumento de los linchamientos”, April 26. Available at: http:// www.eldiario. net/noticias/2012/2012_04/ nt120426/ editorial.php?n=17&-aumentode-los-linchamientos El Economista (2009), “Movimiento blanco pide apoyar al Ejército”, August 3, Mexico. Available at: http://eleconomista.com. mx/notas-online/politica/2009/08/03/ movimiento-blanco-pide-apoyar-ejercito ------- (2012), “Aumentan los linchamientos en México”, February 19. Available at: http://eleconomista.com.mx/seguridadpublica/2012/02/19/aumentanlinchamientos-mexico El Heraldo (2013), “Castellanos: La madre coraje de Honduras”, April 2. Available at: http:// www.elheraldo.hn/Secciones-Principales/ Pais/Castellanos-La-madre-coraje-deHonduras El Tiempo (2012), “En La Paz se organiza brigadas de seguridad”, May 16, Ecuador. Available at: http://www.tuseguridad.ec/ noticias/en-la-paz-se-organiza-brigadasde-seguridad/ Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales (FLACSO-Chile, 2007), Reporte Sector Seguridad en América Latina y el Caribe. Frigo, Edgardo (2003), Hacia un modelo de seguridad privada en América Latina, Primer Congreso Latinoamericano de Seguridad Privada, September 24-26, Bogota. Frühling, Hugo (2004), “La policía comunitaria en América Latina: un análisis basado en cuatro estudios de caso,” in Hugo Frühling (ed.), En calles más seguras: estudios de policía comunitaria en América Latina, InterAmerican Development Bank, Washington, DC. Available at: http://www.cesc.uchile.cl/ publicaciones/op_01_policiacomunitaria. pdf

------- (2013), “A realistic look at Latin American community policing programmes,” in Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 22(1): 76-88. Available at: http://www.captura.uchile.cl/ bitstream/handle/2250/16574/Fruhling_ Hugo.pdf;jsessionid=D5F324F6D CBBB711 A6C69C0564511027?sequence=1 Garcé, Adolfo and Gerardo Uña (2010), Think tanks and public policies in Latin America, Fundación Siena-CIPPEC, Buenos Aires. Gobierno Departamental Autónomo de Santa Cruz (2012), Gobernación impulsa conformación de patrullas vecinales en Warnes, August 20, Bolivia. Available at: http://www.santacruz.gob.bo/ equitativa/seguridad/contenido. php?IdNoticia=7632&IdMenu=103 Godnick, William (2006), Case Study: Armas de Fuego por Mejores Condiciones de Vida en Mendoza, Argentina, Doctoral Thesis, Department of Peace Studies, University of Bradford, United Kingdom. ------- (2007), El control de las armas pequeñas en América Latina, Pan American Health Organization (PAHO). Available at: http:// w w w. bvs de. paho. o rg /bvs acd/cd5 7/ godnick.pdf Goldstein, Daniel (2005), “Flexible Justice: Neoliberal Violence and Self-Help Security in Bolivia,” in Critique of Anthropology 25. Guerrero, Elisabeth (2002), Informe sobre la violencia contra las mujeres en América Latina y el Caribe español 1990-2000, United Nations Development Fund for Women (UNIFEM), Chile. Available at: http://www. bvsde.paho.org/bvsacd/cd63/violencia01. pdf Gitlitz, John (1991), Decadencia y supervivencia de las rondas campesinas del norte de Perú, Centro Peruano de Estudios sociales. Available at: http://www.cepes.org.pe/ debate/debate28/02_Articulo.pdf

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Hirmas Ready, Carolina (2008), “Educar en la diversidad cultural: aprendizajes desde la experiencia innovadora en América Latina,” in Revista Latinoamericana de Educación Inclusiva 3(2, art. 6): 91-108. Available at: http://www.rinace.net/rlei/numeros/vol3num2/art6.pdf Huffington Post (2012), “Chile Passes AntiDiscrimination Law Following Daniel Zamudio’s Death”, April 4. Available at: http:// www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/05/ chile-discrimination-law-daniel-zamudiogay-death_n_1405406.html Human Rights Watch (2013), World Report 2013. Available at: http://www.hrw.org/ world-report/2013 Jiménez, Mirna (2006), “Saca no descarta que narcotraficantes están detrás de asesinatos,” in Diario CoLatino, July 27, San Salvador. La Casa del Encuentro (2013), “Feminicidios,” in La casa del encuentro: Feminismo popular entre todas las mujeres y con la sociedad, Buenos Aires. Available at: http://www. lacasadelencuentro.org/femicidios.html Llorente, María Victoria and Ángela Rivas (2005), Case Study of Reduction of Crime in Bogotá: A Decade of Citizen’s Security Policies, World Bank, Water, Disaster Management and Urban Development Group, Washington D.C. Maldonado, Arturo (2012), “¿Quiénes consumen noticias en los medios en América Latina y el Caribe?,” in Amparo Marroquín, Perspectivas desde el Barómetro de las Américas: 2011 70, Vanderbilt University. Available at “http://www. vanderbilt.edu/lapop/insights/IO870es. pdf Mastrofski, Stephen (2006), “Critic. Community policing: a skeptical view,” in David Weisburd and Anthony A. Braga (eds.), Police innovation. Contrasting perspectives,

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CHAPTER 8. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION Acevedo, Beatriz, Dave Bewley-Taylor and Coletta Youngers (2008), Ten Years of Plan Colombia: an Analytical Assessment, The Beckley Foundation Drug Policy Program. Adams, Gordon and Rebecca Williams (2011), A New Way Foward: Rebalancing Security Assistance Programs and Authorities, Stimson Center, Washington D.C.

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South American Financial Action Task Force and Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (GAFISUD and CFATF, s.d.), Third Round of Mutual Evaluations. Final reports for countries. Harvey, Jackie (2005), “An Evaluation of Money Laundering Policies,” in Journal of Money Laundering Control 8(4): 339-345. Haugaard, Lisa, Adam Isacson, George Withers, Abigail Poe, Joy Olson and Lucila Santos (2010), Waiting for Change: Trends in U.S. Security Assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Washington. Hirst, Monica (2010), “América Latina y la Cooperación Sur–Sur: reflexiones conceptuales y políticas,” in Bruno Ayllón y Javier Surasky (coords.), La cooperación Sur-Sur en Latinoamérica. Utopía y realidad, Madrid, 2010. Hudson, Andrew and Alexandra Taylor (2010), “The International Commission against Impunity in Guatemala: A New Model for International Criminal Justice Mechanisms,” in Journal of International Criminal Justice 8(1): 53-74. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB, 2012), “Constructing Public Safety with Civic Responsibility,” in Inter-American Development Bank Brochure. Jaeger, Joel (2012), The Long Road to Arms Trade Transparency in Latin America, Council on Hemispheric Affairs, Argentina. Johnson, Jackie and Y. C. Desmond Lim (2002), “Money Laundering: Has the Financial Action Task Force Made a Difference?,” in Journal of Financial Crime 10(1): 7-22. Just the Facts (2011), “U.S. Military and Police Trainees Listed by Program, All Programs, Entire Region, 1999-2011)”. Available at: http://justf.org/All_Trainees_Program

------- (2013a), “Grant U.S. Aid Listed By Program, All Programs, Entire Region, 2009-2014”. Available at: http://justf.org/All_Grants_ Program ------- (2013b), “Economic and Social Aid, All Programs, Entire Region, 2009-2014”. Available at: http://justf.org/All_Grants_ Program#econaid ------- (2013c), “Grant U.S. Aid Listed By Program, All Programs, Entire Region, 2000-2013”. Available at: http://justf.org/All_Grants_ Program?year1=2000&year2=2013 ------- (2013d), “Military and Police Trainees from Colombia, All Programs, 2000-2013”. Available at: http://justf.org/Country?coun try=Colombia&year1=2000&year2=2013#t rainees ------- (2013e), “U.S. Aid to Colombia, All Programs, 2000-2013”. Available at: http:// justf.org/Countr y?countr y=Colombi a&year1=2000&year2=2013 ------- (2013f ), “U.S. Aid to Mexico, All Programs, 2000-2013”. Available at: http://justf.org/ Country?country=Mexico&year1=2000&ye ar2=2013 ------- (2013g), “U.S. Aid to Colombia, All Programs, 2009-2014”. Available at: http:// justf.org/country?country=Colombia ------- (2013h), “U.S. Aid to Mexico, All Programs, 2009-2014”. Available at: http://justf.org/ country?country=Mexico Kane, Michael (2012), “Brazil Sends 10,000 Troops to Sothwest Borders,” in Insight Crime, August 7. Available at: http:// www. insightcrime.org/news-briefs/brazil-sends10000-troops-to-southwest-borders Laboratorio Medellín (2011), Catálogo de diez prácticas vivas, Mesa Editores, Medellín. Labrousse, Alain (2006), “La cooperación en materia de drogas entre la Unión Europea y América Latina,” in Proyecto Hombre 57:811. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPOR T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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Latin American Working Group (2007), Por debajo del radar: Programas militares de Estados Unidos con América Latina 19972007, Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), Washington. Lawson, Marian Leonardo (2013), Does Foreign Aid Work? Efforts to Evaluate United States Foreign Assistance, Congressional Research Service, February 13. Levi, Michael and William Gilmore (2003),“Terrorist Finance, Money Laundering and the Rise of Mutual Evaluation: A New Paradigm for Crime Control?,” in Mark Pieth (ed.), Financing Terrorism, Springer Netherlands, Heidelberg, pp. 87-114. Mares, David R. (2001), Violent Peace in Latin America, Columbia University Press, New York. McDougal, Topher, David A. Shirk, Robert Muggah and John H. Patterson (2013), The Way of the Gun: Estimating Firearms Traffic Across the U.S.-Mexico Border, Igarapé Institute- University of San Diego Transborder Institute, University of San Diego.- Morgan, Jesse (2003), “Dirty Names, Dangerous Money: Alleged Unilateralism in U.S. Policy on Money Laundering,” in Berkeley Journal of International Law 21(3): 771-803. Mesa, Manuela (2008), “La cooperación al desarrollo y la violencia transnacional: respuestas y retos pendientes,” in Pensamiento Iberoamericano 2. Available at: http://www.pensamientoiberoamericano. o r g / x n u m e r o s / 2 / p d f / pensamientoIberoamericano-56.pdf Moroney, Jennifer, Jefferson P. Marquis, Cathryn Quantic Thurston and Gregory F. Teverton (2009), A Framework to Assess Programs for Building Partnerships, RAND Corporation, Santa Monica. Mosangini, Giorgio (2012), “Evaluation of Public Decentralized Cooperation Initiatives”, URBAL III Methodological Guides 2, Barcelona. 258

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Organization of American States (2013), El Problema de las Drogas en las Américas. Pérez Kasparian, Sara (2007), “Cooperación Penal Internacional entre México y Estados Unidos: el Tratado de Extradición,” in Intertemas, Year 10, Vol. 2. Pew Research Center (2013), Majority Now Supports Legalizing Marijuana, April 4, 2013. Available at: http://www.people-press. org/2013/04/04/majority-now-supportslegalizing-marijuana/ Procuraduría General de la República (PGR, 2012), Sexto Informe de Labores, Mexico City. Ribando Seelke, Clare and Kristin M. Finklea (2013), U.S.-Mexican Security Cooperation: The Merida Initiative and Beyond, Congressional Research Service, June 12. Sanín, Clara (2010), “Casos exitosos de cooperación horizontal Sur-Sur bilateral,” in Informe de la Cooperación Sur-Sur en Iberoamérica 2010 5: 99-117, Estudios SEGIB. Available at: http://segib.org/actividades/ files/2010/12/inf-coop-sur-sur-2010.pdf Secretaría General del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana (SICA, 2007), Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica, Available at: http://plan-sica-bcie-italia.org/admin/ documents/10 -------- (2012), Informe de Situación de la Estrategia de Seguridad de Centroamérica. Available at: www.sica.int Secretaría de Seguridad Pública, Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores and Procuraduría General de la República (SSP-SRE-PGR, 2009), Presentación: Extradiciones de México ante el Mundo en la Administración Presente, Mexico. Small Arms Survey (2012), A Fatal Relationship: guns and deaths in Latin America and the Caribbean, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

------- (2013), Every day dangers, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.

------- (2012), Human Development and the Shift to Better Citizen Security, New York .

Tickner, Arlene B. (2007), Latin America and the Caribbean: Domestic and Transnational Insecurity, International Peace Academy, Coping with Crisis Working Paper Series, February.

United Nations General Assembly (2012), Informe anual de la Alta Comisionada de Derechos Humanos de la ONU, pp. 1516. Available at: http://www.hchr.org. co/documentoseinformes/informes/ altocomisionado/informe2012.pdf

The White House (2013), “National Drug Control Strategy,” in Office of National Drug Control Policy, Washington. Available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/2013national-drug-control-strategy. Unión de Naciones Suramericanas (UNASUR, 2012), Estatuto del Consejo Suramericano en Materia de Seguridad Ciudadana, Justicia y Coordinación de Acciones contra la Delincuencia Organizada Transnacional, Lima. Available at: http:// w w w. u n a s u r s g. o rg / u p l o a d s / b 7 / 3 8 / b738ebb857a7720d048c0b32a39b5f32/ Decision-14-Creacion-Consejo-SeguridadCiudadana-Lima-30-noviembre.pdf UN- Habitat (2007), UN-Hábitat por Ciudades más Seguras, Nairobi. ------- (2011), Guía para la prevención en barrios: hacia políticas de cohesión social y seguridad ciudadana, Santiago de Chile. ------- (2012), Estado de las Ciudades de América Latina y el Caribe 2012, Recife. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP, 2010), Abrir Espacios a la Seguridad Ciudadana y el Desarrollo Humano. Informe sobre Desarrollo Humano para América Central IDHAC 2009- 2010, UNDP, Guatemala. ------- (2011), Una Década de Trabajo en Materia de Seguridad Ciudadana y Prevención de Conflictos en América Latina y El Caribe 2001 – 2010. ------- (2011), Mid-term evaluation of regional program in Latin America and the Caribbean.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC, 2012), Colombia: Coca Cultivation Survey 2011, Vienna, June. Available at: https://www.unodc.org/documents/cropmonitoring/Colombia/Colombia_Coca_ cultivation_survey_2011.pdf URB-AL III (2013), Cooperación para Ciudades más Seguras, Provisual, Recife. Available at: http://www.urbalpernambuco. org/adm/public/files/destaques/ CadernodoProjetoespanhol_web-20130226101114.pdf U.S. Department of State (2012), The Central America Regional Security Initiative: Enhanced Levels of Cooperation and Coordination, Bureau of Public Affairs, Fact Sheet, February 6. ------- (s.d.), Narcotic Control Report, Diplomacy in Action. Available at: http://www. whitehouse.gov/ondcp/2013-nationaldrug-control-strategy. Vásquez, Iván (2012), “Comisión de Reforma a la Seguridad propone capacitación contra la delincuencia,” in El Heraldo, Honduras, July 10. Available at: http://www.elheraldo.hn/ csp/mediapool/sites/ElHeraldo/Economia/ story.csp?cid=609200&sid=294&fid=216 Walker, John and Brigitte Unger (2009), “Secretaría General del Sistema de la Integración Centroamericana,” in Review of Law & Economics 5(2): 821–853. Willman, Alys and Megumi Makisaka (2010), “Interpersonal Violence Prevention. A Review of the Evidence and Emerging Lessons,” in World Development Report, World Bank Background Paper, August. REGIONAL H UMAN DE VELOPMENT REPOR T 2 0 1 3 -2 0 1 4

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CHAPTER 9. INTERVENTION: LESSONS LEARNED

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