CANADIAN RACE RELATIONS FOUNDATION
"MORE SOLITUDES”? CONTEXTUALIZING QUEBEC’S BILL 21 Augie Fleras University of Waterloo April 2020
“MORE SOLITUDES”? CONTEXTUALIZING QUEBEC’S BILL 21 By: Augie Fleras Abstract Quebec’s Bill 21 has come under sustained scrutiny and rampant criticism by Canada’s English speaking critics. While much of this critical reaction is justified, negative assessments of Bill 21 are often taken out of context, lacking nuance, and misleading to the point of provocation. This paper argues that the passage and popularity of Bill 21 (in addition to Quebec’s generally fraught relationship to religious minorities and the principle of religious accommodation) must be contextualized and understood on terms reflective of Quebec realities and aspirations as a distinct society with a right to self-determine its future. Rather than blindly criticizing Bill 21 by ethnocentrically framing it along Anglo Canadian lines, the paper situates its logic and rationale within the broader context of Quebec as the “nation within”. The convergence of the province’s strict secularism agenda (‘laicity’) with that of Quebec’s precarious status as a minority-majority nation, its fixation on a unique francophone identity, pressure from powerful women’s groups, and a commitment to the principles of interculturalism as a preferred diversity governance model, are shown to have created a “perfect storm” of factors in legitimizing Bill 21 for reasons Quebec deems to be right. Introduction: Right for the Wrong Reasons; Wrong for Reasons Thought to be Right Quebec is generally regarded as one of the more socially progressive provinces. Yet seemingly pejorative attitudes toward religious minorities and the principle of religious accommodation clash with its liberal agenda and appear to be out of sync with the rest of Canada (Serebrin 2019; Authier 2019; Yakabuski 2017; Conway 2012). According to a survey on human rights and diversity by Quebec’s Human Rights Commission entitled “A Majority of Quebecers Support the Key Principles of the Charter of Human Rights and Freedom According to a New Survey”, 1
Quebecers are deeply divided over the accommodation of religious practices such as women’s headscarves or public prayer spaces (Solyom 2016). Nearly half of the respondents say they mistrust anyone who openly expresses their religion; oppose religious diversity and public displays of faith; and dislike the idea of being served by a hijabi-wearing government employee. Interestingly, over two thirds of the respondents say they have a positive opinion of people who practice a religion different from theirs. Compared to Canadians at large, Quebecers generally convey more negative attitudes about the place of religion in society, including: limits to religious diversity and levels of religiosity, the relevance of religion in decision-making, and the status of non-Christian religious symbols in the public domain (Christian symbols such as the large cross on Mount Royal in Montreal are defined as acceptable if framed as history or heritage) (Dufresne et al. 2018; Helly 2016; CRRF 2014). Another survey including an Angus Reid Institute poll in 2013 (also 2017) found nearly two third of Quebecers believe the province is too accommodative of religious/cultural diversity; accordingly, laws should not be modified to exempt religious practices from rules that apply to everyone. Just over three quarters take the view that reasonable accommodation poses a risk to Quebec’s values, while over two thirds expressed a dislike of Islam (also Wilkins-Laflamme 2018). Points of controversy include the controversial Herouxville code of conduct that barred barbaric practices associated with (Muslim) immigrants, the contested Bouchard-Taylor hearings on reasonable accommodation, government moves to impose a secular charter of values which proposed to curb all conspicuous religious symbols for public sector employees, passage of Bill C-62 which prohibits fully veiled women from receiving provincial services, and the tabling and subsequent passage of Bill 21 which also bans the wearing of conspicuous religious symbols by civil servants in positions of authority (Authier 2019). Clearly, then, for many Quebecers the right to be free from religion would appear to be just as important as constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion and conscience (Yakabuski 2019). Unflattering assessments aside, the situation in Quebec is more complex and nuanced than portrayed by English speaking media (Bakali 2015; Yakubuski 2019). A combination of sensationalist media accounts and opportunistic politicians who fixate on the “gotcha factor” tend to fuel perceptions of Quebecers as xenophobes and intolerant nationalists (Delmar 2017; Helly 2016; Bouchard-Taylor Commission 2008). Issues involving racialized exclusions or 2
discriminatory patterns in Quebec may be blown out of proportion and stripped of any context by a self-righteous English media ready to pounce on any scandal that emits even a whiff of racism or proof of Anglo moral superiority (White 2019; Delaney 2008). And yet it’s quite possible that Quebecers are no more racist or xenophobic than Anglo-Canadian. They may be simply more open in admitting their reservations and suspicions toward religious minorities (Serebrin 2019). Perhaps English Canada’s inclination toward politeness and avoidance of disagreement is less of a virtue in Quebec where vigorous political debates are de rigueur, even if they expose the province to criticism or ridicule. In other words, controversies in Quebec often serve as a crucible for and an incubator of important national conversations over religious accommodation “a canary for the Americas” as noted by Zahra Jamal (2019; also Delmar 2017). Alternatively, consider the possibility that Quebecers may oppose accommodation for religious reasons, not because they are more biased, but because of a historically fraught relationship with Catholicism (Dufresne et al 2018). In short, this “talking past each other” based on how religious accommodation in general, Bill 21 in particular, are framed – either as discrimination against religious minorities or as defense of Quebec’s secular identity and state neutrality – serves to underscore a “two solitudes” imaginary. It also exposes yet more French-English solitudes – that is, Anglo framing of Bill 21 as “discrimination” may be right, albeit for the wrong reasons; conversely, Quebec’s defence of the Bill as “survivance” may be wrong but for reasons that it thinks are “right”. Context is critical, and this paper argues that the passage and popularity of Bill 21 (and Quebec’s uneasy relationship to religious minorities and the principle of religious accommodation) must be contextualized and framed on terms reflective of Quebec realities (Bakali 2015). Applying the lens of a critical cultural relativism begins by positioning Bill 21 as a narrative rooted in an overarching vision of a sovereign Quebec nation with the right to selfdetermine its future. Or, as pointed out in the preamble to Bill 21: “As the Quebec nation has its own characteristics, one of which is its civil law tradition, distinct social values, and a specific history that have led it to develop a particular attachment to State laicity (“secularism”, insertion mine)…[It] is incumbent on the Parliament of Quebec to determine the principles according to which and the manner in which relations between the State and religions are to be governed in Quebec”. In other words, rather than blindly criticizing Bill 21 by refracting it through the prism 3
of an Anglo Canadian lens, this paper situates its logic, rationale, and support within the broader context of Quebec nationhood, cultural identity, and diversity governance. This paper also argues that the interplay of Quebec’s strict secularism (‘laicity’) with that of its precarious status as a minority-majority nation, a fixation with preserving a unique francophone identity, pressure from powerful women’s groups, and an adherence to interculturalism as a preferred governance model, have colluded to create a “perfect storm” of factors in legitimizing Bill 21 at political and public levels. Finally, the paper concedes that, despite efforts to justify Bill 21 by contextualizing it, critics are within their right to call out an initiative that compromises the equality of all its citizens by curbing the religious freedom of some. Quebec’s Laicity: A Strict Secularism A historical context sheds light on the politics of religion in Quebec. In a relatively short period of time, Quebec has evolved from a society dominated by the social and political edicts of the Catholic church to a robustly secular society (Behiels and Hayday 2011) whose commitment to the principle of laicity in defining a national unity and identity constitutes a fundamental pillar of Quebec society (National Assembly 2019; also Bakali 2015). Quebecers experienced a steep decline from one of the world’s most religious citizens to among the least pious following a cultural revolution that eviscerated the Catholic Church and the clergy as power brokers while establishing a secular state in nurturing a distinct Quebec nationalism. The defence of the French language and a secular culture displaced Catholicism as the provinces badge of distinction and symbol of francophone nationalism (Bakali 2015; Economist 2016; Dwivedi 2019). The demise has been nothing short of astonishing; for example, it is estimated that only two to four percent of Montreal’s population attend Mass (not surprisingly, 34 of the 50 churches in and around Montreal are slated for closure [Allan 2019]); just 11 percent of those in Quebec are regular church goers, although 75 of Quebecers identify as Catholic (Economist 2016; also Warren 2019). The transformation from a Catholic identity to a secular identity reinforces a governance divide (Dufresne et al (2018; Ballingall 2019). An Anglo multiculturalism may inform the national identity of English speaking Canadians who embrace a ‘soft’ secularism that prioritizes a constitutionally protected freedom of religious expression. But the situation differs in a Quebec where fears abound that too much freedom of religion may be wielded as a proxy to justify 4
practices contrary to its secular core, Moves to avert this erasure of Quebec’s national identity are thus driven by a strict secularism that advances the paramountcy of a common good at the expense of individual religion rights. The separation of church (religion) from state in the aftermath of the Quiet Revolution played a pivotal role in crafting a modern Quebecois society (Bakali 2015; Ballingall 2019). Under a hardcore secularism (“laicity”) that opposes religion as a public expression, the state neither imposes an official religion on religious minorities nor intervenes in church affairs (conversely, the church is expected to stay out of government business). The state in Quebec strives to establish as neutral a public domain as possible, thereby eliminating the dangers of workplace disruptions, charges of favouritism, and risks of ethnic/religious entanglements by politicized ethnicities. This closed form of secularism with its rigid sacred/secular split reflects a perception of religion as unenlightened, an impediment to social progress, inimical to sound decision-making or a stable social order, and rife with violent tendencies (Seljak 2012). A closed secularism is also predicated on the premise that religions and religious expressions do not belong in public, especially when they clash with core values, but are best kept under wraps and parked at home or in the pew. According to the explanatory notes of Bill 21, religious rights may be protected by Quebec law and its Charter; nevertheless, all citizens in exercising their fundamental freedoms and rights must maintain a dutiful respect for Quebec’s laicity (National Assembly 2019; McManus 2017; Bramadat 2009). The formal and sometimes aggressive exclusion of religion from Quebec’s public sphere is justified on grounds it secures the legitimacy of the secular state, ensures state neutrality for discharging obligations and allocating rewards, and upholds state impartiality in protecting everybody’s right to private religion. Not surprisingly, resentment against the public display of religious symbols or their accommodation prevails in a province that had exorcised Catholicism from the pulpit of power, only to see a resurgence of minority religious practices by recent immigrant groups. Bill 21 as code epitomizes this ongoing struggle to liberate Quebec from the grip of religion in general, Islam in particular, amidst alarm that any concession to religious accommodation runs the risk of a slippery slope (Sharif-Funk and Guzik 2018).
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To further complicate matters, women’s rights groups in Quebec disagree over the accommodation of religious practices at odds with Quebec’s staunch secularism. References to veiling as a political (feminist) statement, a woman’s right and a personal choice compete with narratives that condemn the veil as patriarchal, regressive and an unsettling reminder of female oppression around the world (Baxter 2019). Debate over Bill 21 exposes a rift among Quebec feminists in terms of what feminism means. To one side are the “universalists” who cannot believe a woman would voluntarily submit to wearing a seemingly oppressive and demeaning religious symbol such as a niqab; to the other side are the “intersectionalists” who claim that many factors including race and class must be considered to take into account diverse experiences and realities [Montpetit 2019]). For some, including Gabrielle Bouchard, president of the Federation des Femmes du Quebec, the Bill is sexist and violates the basic feminist principle of our bodies, our choice (cited in Montpetit 2019). It reflects a patriarchal compulsion to police women’s clothing and behavior – not altogether different from the burqini bans that restrict the volume of bathing attire worn by Muslim women at French beaches (ironically, 50 years ago the bikini in France was criticized as unduly provocative for its skimpiness [Dimonis 2017]). For others, Bill 21 is not about state secularism; rather, it is about imposing a state atheism, a not so subtle grab for votes and a political wedge that appeases populist pressure and far right demands, and an indictment of white Quebec’s compulsion to control minorities by mainstreaming bigotry (Sahi 2019; Jamal 2019). For still others, including Christiane Pelchat, former head of a women’s rights advisory body the Conseil du statut de la Femme, Bill 21 constitutes a continuation of the struggle for gender identity including the recognition of Quebec women as individuals under the law (it was not until 1964 that Quebec passed a law conferring on married women the same legal rights as their husbands, although women across Canada had acquired constitutional recognition as legal persons in 1929). And whereas Canadian women received the right to vote in 1922, Quebec women were not fully enfranchised until 1940 [Bourdages 2018]) (cited in Montpetit 2109). The fragility of these recently acquired gains is thought to require constant vigilance since religion (particularly Islam when framed around symbols of oppression and misogyny such as the headscarf) poses an open threat to Quebec society and Quebecois women (Bakali 2015). Under these circumstances, Quebec’s feminists
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may be somewhat more vigilant in defending preemptory measures for protecting hard fought rights in the wake of what they see as religious backsliding. Nationalism in Quebec: Negotiating a Majority/Minority Status The politics of ethno-religious accommodation (including Bill 21) cannot be understood outside the context of Québécois nationalism (Bouchard and Taylor 2008). Insecurities over Quebec as a beleaguered francophone minority, engulfed by the menace of an English-speaking monolith, are said to intensify the province’s discomfort with religious and cultural minorities (Jiwani 2018; Deveaux 2013). Yes, francophones in Quebec constitute a majority at 72 percent of the province’s population, yet the 5 million or so francophones also represent a minority adrift in vast English-speaking sea (the low fertility rate in Quebec is below the population’s replacement level). Such a precarious status means Quebecers as a minority/majority cannot take anything for granted in the constant struggle to preserve their language and culture. The ambiguities associated with a majority/minority status intensify both anxieties and a defensiveness over perceived threats to their identity and integrity – prompting a reference to Quebec as a “worrier nation” in the wording of Stasiulis and Gouws (2013). Its double-edge status as a Frenchspeaking oasis in a North American Anglo-scape reinforces a preference for an explicit integration model of accommodation (Sharify-Funk 2010). A sovereigntist aspiration to affirm Quebec identity and protect its culture in light of its double-bind status as a Quebec majority but a Canadian minority may also bolster Quebec’s more militant approach in curbing religious accommodation (Peker 2017). In other words, just as Quebec believes it must be on perpetual guard to nip any English encroachment on the French language, so too must it take preemptive action to prevent the “creep” of religion into the secular domain. Quebec’s majority-minority status also plays a role in the governance of minorities. Put bluntly, Canada’s official multiculturalism and Quebec interculturalism (see below) differ as governance models in “managing” diversity (Fleras 2019). An official multiculturalism focused on dethroning Canada’s Anglo-centric identity and Anglo-normative framing of Canada without offering a replacement model in return. A multiculturalism model of tolerant coexistence envisages a scenario in which all ethnoreligious identities can coexist because none is 7
officialized. Endorsement of a mosaic model also acknowledges the obvious: English-speaking Canada can afford a looser approach to multiculturalism as governance. It possesses the luxury of not worrying over English as a threatened language, less insecurities because of its majority status, and minimal concern for protecting its status as a founding nation (McCullough 2017). But the paradoxical status of Quebec as French majority in Quebec but a minority within Canada precludes any embrace of an Anglo multiculturalism. Quebec’s growing pluralism can flourish only against a backdrop that acknowledges its vulnerability as a beleaguered cultural minority within the maw of an English-speaking juggernaut (Bouchard and Taylor, 2008; also Nootens, 2014). That the nature of the minority-state relationship differs between the jurisdictions should come as no surprise. Whereas the Canadian state is fundamentally liberal in securing individual rights, Quebec endorses a more collective view of the state as embodying the spirit of the nation and expression of national will (Lintott 2019). While Quebec’s Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms imposes limits on the exercise of individual rights vis-à-vis democratic values and state laicity, the Canadian state leans toward a spirit of laissez-faire, including a 2015 ruling by the Nova Scotia Supreme Court that dismissed the Canadian Charter as a blueprint for moral conformity (Hutchinson 2018). The Bouchard-Taylor Commission conceded as much when proposing that Quebec and English-speaking Canada play the diversity game by different rules. Unlike the rest of Canada, French-speaking Quebec as a minority culture requires a strong and secure national identity to allay its anxieties. To think otherwise, namely, by endorsing Canada’s multiculturalism paradigm of a tolerant coexistence might spell societal suicide. Instead, as pointed out in the Bouchard-Taylor Commission Report (2008), Quebecers should continue to support the principles of interculturalism, including an immigrant integration process that reflects Quebec’s distinct realities, a moral contract between newcomers and Quebec-born around mutual expectations and obligations, and the vitality of its lingua franca in advancing Quebec’s survival as irrevocably French yet also cosmopolitan and modern. Quebec Interculturalism as Governance Contract Of particular importance in contextualizing Bill 21 are the governance precepts and practices of interculturalism. Quebec’s commitment to interculturalism as immigrant integration was first articulated in the 1990 Policy Statement on Immigration and Integration (Quebec 2015). Initially an aspirational statement whose antecedents could be traced into the 1980s (for example, the city 8
of Montreal endorsed the principle of interculturalism in 1987), interculturalism as diversity governance was codified into a principled format by the Liberal government in 2008, although Quebec governments have never formally ratified as a comprehensive official state policy [Quebec 2015; Rocher 2015]). Under an intercultural governance model, newcomers were expected to adopt a declaration of ‘common values of Quebec society’ (Barker 2015), one that acknowledged the worth of cultural diversity without compromising Quebec’s preeminent status as a founding society. Provisions of the moral contract concede the primacy of French as the language and culture of Quebec, the priority of prevailing cultural norms and the rule of law in a democratic society, active participation as citizens in Quebec’s secular and pluralist society, involvement in community dialogue and exchanges, respect toward differences within the framework of a common vernacular, and obedience to constitutional principles and practices related to gender equity (Quebec 2015; Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007). Gagnon and Iacovino (2005: 30) point to the centrality of a moral contract at the heart of Quebec’s common public culture: [Interculturalism] contends that the incorporation of immigrants or minority cultures into the larger political community is a reciprocal endeavor – a ‘moral contract’ between the host society and the particular cultural group, in the aim of establishing a forum for the empowerment of all citizens – a ‘common public culture’. Reference to a moral (or social) contract is helpful in sorting through the accommodation impasse. Since March 2015, immigrants to Quebec have had to sign a declaration agreeing to the common values of Quebec, including those pertaining to a separation of political and religious powers, equal rights for women and men, and the exercise of human rights and freedoms within the context of respecting those of others and the general welfare of society. And as of January 2020, all foreign nationals and their family members wishing to live in Quebec excluding those under 18 years of age must pass a values test (called an “Attestation of learning about democratic values and the Quebec values as expressed by the Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms”) that incorporates Quebec’s secular status as a key tenet (Thevenot 2019; Miekus 2019). An insistence on a moral contract is consequential. It places Quebec’s common public culture at the forefront of any debate over diversity governance (Leroux 2012); it also puts the onus on newcomers to 9
comply with the province’s rules or expectations - or risk exposure to public censure or political control. In promoting integration as a prerequisite for participation in the construction of a common public culture (Gagnon and Iacovino 2016), the contractual code of interculturalism recognizes that members of diverse groups are free to maintain their cultural distinctiveness, but only for as long as this distinctiveness and contribution do not clash with Quebec’s constitutional norms (Bouchard 2008) or the right of a historic nation to shape its public space in its own secular image (Thomspon 2018). In that fears are mounting over the growing public profile of religious minorities, too much accommodativeness under interculturalism is thought to compromise the limits of inclusion. That the niqab and hijab are perceived as an affront to Quebec’s secularism as well as a betrayal of the social contract in a society of pervasive Islamophobia – a 2016 study by the Canadian Race Relations Foundation found that only 24 percent of Quebecers and 49 percent of English Canadians had a positive view of Muslims (also Angus Reid Institute 2017; Wilkins-Laflamme 2018) – does not bode hope in brokering a cooperative inter-existence. Federal multiculturalism and Quebec’s interculturalism yield opposing positions in the religious accommodation debate. To be sure, some analysts dismiss any difference between the “isms” as largely semantic or ideological. Both models of diversity governance endorse a respect for diversity, espouse liberal values, and promote integration into common public culture in advancing national interests (Nootens 2014; Taylor 2012; Fleras, 2012). They as governance models focus on accommodating minorities and facilitating migrant integration, although a federal multiculturalism leans toward recognition of a generalized pluralism, while interculturalism prioritizes integration into a particular society (Fleras 2019). To the extent they exist, perceptions of any differences are semantic (for example, Quebec’s openness in defining the limits and drawing the line) rather than substantive. Others argue that Canada and Quebec possess divergent governance agendas (Maxwell et al., 2012). While Quebec’s interculturalism arguably shares affinities to Canada’s federal multiculturalism, it conceivably reflects differences in nation-building logic (Gagnon and Iacovino, 2007; Taylor 2012; Weinstock, 2014). Bouchard (2011) argues that an Anglo-multiculturalism reflects a diversity paradigm in which all constituent groups in theory occupy an equal footing, unlike an interculturalism paradigm that upholds the primacy of a majority francophone culture. Quebec’s interculturalism model is based 10
on the principle of cultural convergence – namely, an integration anchored in a broader conception of lived inter-existence – compared to Anglo multicultural focus on a mosaic-like coexistence as a national virtue (Leroux 2012). Unlike multiculturalism’s foundational assumption that attends to the principle of a tolerant coexistence of individual rights, institutional responsiveness, and respect for cultural plurality, interculturalism is predicated on the importance of prioritizing Quebec’s national context as a precondition for integrating newcomers into a francophone society (Lintott 2019; Levrau and Loobuyck 2018), primarily by balancing the rights of migrants with their duty to respect Quebec’s language and culture (Zapata-Barrero 2017; Taylor 2012; Barker 2015). Admittedly, Canada’s official multiculturalism is not nearly as freewheelingly tolerant as implied by critics or supporters; rather, it is implicitly restrictive, including an expectation that newcomers must acquire an official language if they have any hope of full participation or equal contribution Perhaps, then, differences between an Anglo multiculturalism and a Quebec interculturalism in the governance of religious accommodation are discursive instead of definitive – namely, Quebec’s willingness to be openly candid about what is expected of migrants and what they can expect in return, the limits of acceptable behavior, and deference to the unassailable primacy of the French fact (Stevenson, 2014). French/English reaction to the place of religion in society reflects divergent logics in the art of living together differently (Fleras 2019; Nootens 2014). An official multiculturalism is thought to endorse a mosaic vision of Canada of multiple cultural identities, whereas Quebec’s interculturalism model emphasizes social cohesion and integration through communitarian values. Interculturalism as governance assumes a more assimilationist approach to the integration of ethno-religious minorities in order to safeguard the sanctity of Quebec society (Bakali 2015); by contrast, an official multiculturalism takes a integrationist approach to assimilation in promoting a rights-based coexistence. Diversity governance under Canada’s multiculturalism regime resembles a planetary model – that is, minority cultures in varying orbits around a mainstream centre and captured by the expression, ‘You can be Haitian and Canadian’ but only as long as you obey the laws, do not violate peoples’ rights, and respect core constitutional values. Quebec commits to a “tree trunk” model of accommodative governance known as interculturalism (McAndrew 2015). According to an arboreal model of immigrant governance, the tree trunk is unflinchingly French in language and culture, while minority cultures represent 11
the branches grafted on to the trunk. With interculturalism, immigrants are welcomed into the fold; however, they must abide by the following rules as part of the admission agreement, including: the preeminence of the French language, prevailing cultural norms, the rule of law, democratic principles and practices, and adherence to a secular ethic (Gagnon and Iacovino 2007). Clearly, then, Quebec’s intercultural diversity governance model articulates the outlines of a distinct political community whose cultural and language priorities trump ethnic diversities and parochial identities, that is, ‘You can be Haitian but you are always a Haitian in Quebec’. Problematizing Bill 21: Context Matters Quebec continues to wrestle with the politics of publicly accommodating religious expression. Current debates on the role of religion in public life go back to the controversy over reasonable accommodation that coalesced around the Bouchard-Taylor Commission (2008), including fears over Quebec losing its secular identity, that the province was being excessively accommodative of religious minorities, who, in turn, were taking advantage of Quebec’s hospitality, and anxieties that the most valuable legacies of the Quiet Revolution – secularism and gender equality – were about to be compromised (Dwivedi 2019). The introduction of ethics and religious cultural course has proven a lightning rod as well. Mandated in the provinces’ schools since 2008, the program is intended to give elementary and postsecondary students the skills to understand and engage Quebec’s religious history and the provinces different religious systems (Morris 2011; Nakanechny 2019). A proposed Charter of Secularism (Brosseau 2013) was introduced in 2013 when the Parti Quebecois released plans for a values charter (Bill 60 or Charter of Quebec Values) that would impose restrictions on religious clothing (from niqabs and burqas to kippas and turbans) and ostentatious religious symbols (large crucifixes) on those giving or receiving public services in domains such as schools, hospitals and courts (Bakali 2015; Dufresne et al 2018). According to the Parti Quebecois, this ban embraced good intentions, namely, ensuring gender equality by rejecting any accommodation for public employees at odds with women’s rights while keeping Quebec secular and religiously neutral through a separation of church and state (Deveaux 2013). The defeat of the Parti Quebecois as the province’s governing party in the spring of 2014 did not dampen public appetite for the Charter of Values (Jedwab 2014), resulting in a later iteration of the Charter that also sought to preserve the state’s religious neutrality. Passed into law in October in 2017 but temporarily 12
shelved pending a constitutional challenge [Ross 2018]), Bill 62 withholds municipal or provincial service delivery (receiving or issuing) for those few who believe it necessary to cover their faces – a move not altogether different from comparable bans across European jurisdictions (Jamal 2019; Lipka 2019; Yakabuski 2017). France banned headscarves and religious symbols in public schools in 2004, followed in 2011 by full face bans in public (Lipka 2019) Interestingly, the European Court on Human Rights has ruled that bans on veiling do not violate European Human Rights conventions (Kalantry and Pradham 2017). In the spring of 2019, Bill 21 was tabled in Quebec’s National Assembly and eventually passed into law in June. The Bill marked the fourth time that various Quebec governments tabled comprehensive secularism legislation, two of which never made it into law (Patriquin 2019; Wells 2019). Bill 21 proposed to respect the laicity of the state by enshrining its paramountcy in Quebec law (National Assembly 2019). It sought to impose restrictions on civil servants in positions of authority, from police officers to elementary/secondary school teachers, to be free of all conspicuous religious symbols when on the job (Authier 2019; Montpetit 2019). The Bill to ban religious items applied only to those new to the job, changing jobs, or in line for a promotion (for example, teachers hired before March 29, 2019 are exempt from the law unless they change jobs or are promoted (or demoted) [Stevenson 2019]). It also extended the ban to those who received provincial services that require formal identification to do so with their faces uncovered (Dwivedi 2019); allowed for exceptions including a sunset clause for those already employed or those individuals with disabilities or health issues; and invoked the notwithstanding (constitutional opt-out) clause to exempt it from Supreme Court challenges for a period of five years [National Assembly 2019; Jamal 2019]). For critics, this ban reflects both religious bias and racial discrimination since, in practice, it impacts more heavily on those racialized groups such as Muslims and Sikhs whose faith obliges them to dress modestly (Coyne 2019; Valiante 2019). They point to a recent Quebec Court of Appeal ruling that may have upheld the legality of Bill 21, although all three judges concurred that it violates individual rights and inflicts irreparable damage on the most vulnerable [Shingler 2019]) Others prefer to tiptoe around the charge of discrimination. They argue that the Bill neither discriminates against anyone who wears a specific item of clothing nor prohibits the practice of religion itself. Rather those in authoritative positions in the public sector must adopt non religious attire while working – less a 13
focus on how each person represents themselves in public but how they as public servants represent the state (McVicar 2019). In that the law seems to disproportionately target Muslim women, the logic behind Bill 21 may not be about religious symbols and women’s attire (that is, a fear that the wearing of religious symbols by teachers may constitute a form of religious indoctrination on impressionable minds [Dubitsky 2019]) as much as a proxy for panic over an evolving and diverse Quebec, most notably the visibility of Islam (Bakali 2015). Arguably, then, the logic and rationale for Bill 21 is not what it seems to be. On the surface, the text of the Bill declares that it’s “important that the paramountcy of State laicity” – an absence of religious affiliation – “be enshrined in Quebec’s legal order” (Wells 2019). The preamble puts it succinctly, “Whereas the Quebec nation considers State laicity to be of fundamental importance”, while Section 9:1 points out that “In exercising his (sic) fundamental freedoms and rights, a person shall maintain a proper regard for …State laicity”. At another level, its accused of promoting a dogmatic – even militant - secularism in the public domain instead of a response to a pressing social problem such as security concerns and identity verification or, alternatively, a defence of state neutrality (Heath 2014). As described elsewhere, state neutrality implies a position of not taking sides, neither endorsing nor prohibiting beliefs or non beliefs, in the process of respecting religious differences rather than suppressing them (Bushfield 2019; Breakenridge 2019). In other words, instead of framing the public display of religious symbols as an affront to the neutrality of secular state, to be dealt with as expeditiously as possible, an indifference toward their expression in public may well represent the pinnacle of a principled neutrality. Not surprising, critics such as Benjamin Berger (2019) argue that Bill 21 will fail because of internal contradictions. It cannot possibly promote the principle of state neutrality when the state openly disapproves of specific religious practices or ways of being religious. Nor can it solidify a separation of church and state since state authorities will invariably be drawn into making distinctions over religious practices that are acceptable or not, defining what constitutes religious symbols, and determining when and where they may be displayed. Besides, justifying the Bill in safeguarding the neutrality of public space ignores how secularism itself is rooted in a Christian world view that normalizes a separation between the sacred and profane, although this distinction poses a problem for those faiths disinclined toward a public/private split (Morlack 2019). In that the Bill has the practical effect of unfairly targeting 14
minority faiths that adhere to a tradition of outwardly displaying their commitment, it goes beyond a question of banning religious symbols. More accurately, it’s about state interference in the actual practice of religion (Dwivedi 2019). For many, its unthinkable that the Quebec government would override constitutional guarantees of religious freedom and freedom of conscience to proclaim a law that borders on state sanctioned atheism (Hutchinson 2019; Gyapong 2019; Khan 2019). (It should be noted that, although all provinces are bound by the Constitution, Quebec has neither signed nor formally endorsed the Charter of Rights and Freedoms). As far as they are concerned, the politics of secularism are being manipulated as a pretext that restrains the exercise of religious freedom (Gyapong 2019), the brunt of which once was aimed at Catholicism but is now borne by Muslims (Bakali 2015). Moreover, wedge politics loom large as a hidden agenda. Leveraging voter traction through a mix of identity politics and moral panics that demonizes Muslims and Islam as the dangerous ‘other’ has long proven a shrewd political gambit (Bakali 2015). Criticism aside, the public in Quebec is onside of Bill 21 (Dwivedi 2019) (not all Quebecers are supportive, with striking differences among age groups [Lipka 2019] and location; for example, Montreal City Council unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the Bill [Patriquin 2019; Dubitsky 2019]). A poll of 1212 Quebecers by Leger Marketing for the Association of Canadian Studies in early May found two third of Quebecers support a ban on religious symbols for authorities on the job; in turn, a relatively small percentage had a positive view of Islam (28%) or Muslims (37%) but were supportive of other religions and the symbols of Catholicism or Judaism (also Csiliag 2019). Such a double standard has prompted, Jack Jedwab, president of Association of Canadian Studies to frame the Bill 21 as driven by resentment of hijabi women and niqabi fears; other religious symbols are largely collateral damage (Madger 2019). The survey also found that around 40 percent of those polled in Ontario, BC, Manitoba and Saskatchewan also endorsed the Bill and the ban (Dwivedi 2019). (Keep in mind that survey questions may lack conceptual clarity or precision; for example, they may conflate many different religious symbols in a single question or, more specifically, they may confuse full face veil covering for Muslim women (burqa and niqab) with a headscarf (hijab) [Vox Pop Labs 2018]). That the principle of curbing religious apparel has significant public support across English-speaking Canada speaks volumes about the complexities at play Notwithstanding blatant 15
misrepresentation and inflammatory rhetoric on both sides of the solitudes divide (Abedi 2017; Presse Canadian 2019; Adams 2017; also Madger 2019), multicultural English Canadians and intercultural Quebecers may share more in common than they might care to admit when it comes to the politics of public religion.
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