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⽡⻩ᮆ⢅ 㗙˖㫵ᘽ䊰
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⥑ļ⊑᪲ഹ౧Ľ 㗙˖呹ᅝ䖾 㗏䅃˖ᇊ㥢
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⊑᪲ഹ౧
ॳ㨫˖ᛯᖋ㧃⒟(Edwards, Jonathan) 䅃㗙˖㕙ᐌ㢀ǃ៤ҕǃልՇ㖢
ၟ᪤⟹⤩ ᕔԴੑҸⱘ䘧ϞⳈ༨ 㗙˖䱇ᅫঢ় џЏ䁴 㗙˖䱇 〢
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ᖐ⊥ǰᶕ ㎼䔃䚼
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Ⴏপঝ⢰᷋ἌǢ ᬭࢭ㰩
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ထ】ঽᵟপ⽡✞ƽᄒ ᬭࢭ᳗䅄
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⦵ѝޑԯ 㸠ᬓ᳗䅄
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Џ㎼˖呹ᅝ䖾 㸠㎼䔃˖㕙ᐌ㢀 㕢㸧㎼䔃˖㚵ᯠ䈾 䳏䁅˖ ˖ⳳڇ ࡗ᩹ᐇ㰳˖ ᠊ৡ˖Ё㧃⇥ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌन᳗ ㎆ഔ˖ZZZ FUWV HGX ZZZ FUWVOLYH QHW ( PDLO FUWV#FUWV HGX Ё㧃䛉ᬓৄ࣫䁠ᄫ 㰳✻ ⱏ㿬⚎䲰䁠Ѹᆘ
Contents
ⱐ㸠Ҏ˖㫵ᘽ䊰 ⱐ㸠᠔˖䉵೬⊩Ҏᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌᅷᬭ᳗ ഄഔ˖ৄ࣫ᏖफҀᵅ䏃ಯ↉ Ꮛ 㰳
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ᬍ 䴽 ᅫ ⼲ ᅌ 䰶 䰶 㿞 ᳳ
⽡⻩ᮆ⢅ ҷ⧚䰶䭋 㫵ᘽ䊰 ↣ϔᑈ䭟ྟⱘᰖˈ៥㐑᳗ᇟ∖Џˈ
Njڇ䘧njᣛⱘϺϡাᰃNj䷇⽣ڇnjNj
㌺៥ϔ↉㍧᭛ˈ⚎خ䁆ᑈᑺࡾᅌ㖦ⱘ῭
䃯䘧njˈ㗠ᰃᅷЏⱘⳳ䘧 ㋨ℷⱘ䘧⧚ ˈ
ビDŽҞᑈЏ㌺៥ⱘ㍧᭛ᰃᦤᨽᕠಯゴ
⛵䂪ᰖ″ᰃ৺ড়䘽˗⫮㟇ϡ㛑主ঞ㙑㗙ⱘ
㟇 ㆔˖Njࢭ㽕ڇ䘧ˈ⛵䂪ᕫᰖϡᕫᰖˈ㐑
ডឝˈ䳔㽕䊀٭ǃ䄺៦ᰖˈህ࢛ᮐ䊀٭ǃ䄺
㽕ᇜᖗ˗Ϻ⫼ⱒ㠀ⱘᖡ㗤ǃῷⱘᬭ㿧䊀٭
៦˗䳔㽕࣌࢝ᰖˈህ⫼ᛯᖗএ࣌࢝DŽ⚎䗭
Ҏˈ䄺៦Ҏˈ࣌࢝ҎDŽ⚎ᰖ㽕ࠄˈҎᖙ
ϪҷᏆ㍧ᰃབֱ㕙᠔䁾ⱘNjᰖnj˖ϔᮍ
ঁ✽㋨ℷⱘ䘧⧚ˈ㘇ᴉⱐⰶˈህ䱼ᕲ㞾Ꮕⱘ
䴶ˈҎᇡⳳ䘧ⱘডឝᰃNjঁ✽njǃNj㘇ϡ
ᚙᝒˈ⏏དѯٙ˗ϺϨ㘇ϡ㙑ⳳ䘧ˈ
㙑nj˗ϔᮍ䴶ˈг᳝䀅Ҏ乃ߎᇡⳳ⧚ⱘ
أ㤦␎ⱘ㿔䁲DŽԴॏ㽕џ䄍ᜢˈᖡফ㢺
␈∖ ᳔䖥᳝Ҏϡ㋘㗠ৠ៥㸼䘨ˈҪࠄץ
䲷ˈڇ䘧ⱘᎹˈⲵԴⱘ㙋ߚnjDŽ
ᬭ᳗ᰃᛇ㙑⼲ⱘ䁅䁲 DŽ
䗭↉㍧᭛ᰃֱ㕙㌺ᑈ䓩ڇ䘧Ҏᦤᨽⱘ
ᇡᮐNjڇ䘧njⱘҎˈ៥ץ䳔㽕Njᇜ
࢝ࣉˈҪࠡ丁ҹ⠊⼲ⴷ⚎㽟䄝㗙ˈϺ
ᖗnjˈᛣᗱᰃᇜ⊼ǃ䲚Ёᖗ⼲ˈ䗭ןᄫгৃ
ҹ㘊〠ⱘݡ՚ǃᆽ߸ǃᓎゟᑺ⚎▔ࣉˈ
㗏Nj䷤٭དnj ĀEH SUHSDUHGā 㣅᭛ᮄ
ࡴᔋ䗭↉ಥⱘಈ㙙ᗻ ゴ ㆔ ˗ᴀ↉㍧
䱯⠜㘪㍧ DŽڇ䘧ҹˈܜ៥ץ㽕㞾ଣˈᰃ৺
᭛ᕠˈֱ㕙гҹ䴶㞼⅝䘧ेˈಲᛇ㞾Ꮕϔ
ᇜ⊼ᮐⳳ䘧˛ᰃ৺ϟᎹ䷤٭ད㞾Ꮕ˛བৠ
⫳⚎Џⲵᖴˈ⏅ֵᖙᕫ䊲䊰ˈ⚎خ᳔䁾᳡
᭛ҹᮃᢝⱘὰῷ˖Njᅮᖫ㗗お䙉㸠㘊㧃
ⱘ՟䄝 ゴ ㆔ DŽֱ㕙ϔ⫳⚎ⳳ䘧ག᠄
ⱘᕟ⊩ˈজᇛᕟ՟ゴᬭ㿧ҹ㡆߫ҎDŽnj ҹ
ϡវˈҪ䲶ϪࠡˈࡴᛳࠄϪᜟ♢⎐ˈ⭄
ᮃᢝ㿬ϗゴ ㆔ DŽℸˈ៥ץг㽕᳝ᖗ⧚⑪
ッ⣪⤫ˈᆺ䳔㽕᳝Ҏڇᡓ䗭Njڇ䘧njⱘՓ
ˈ٭䷤٭㞾Ꮕ㟛ڇ䘧ⱘ䘢Ёˈ䳔㽕Nj⫼
ੑˈ⬅ℸ㚠᱃ৃҹࡴᛳফ䗭↉ূಥⱘ䖿ߛ
ⱒ㠀ⱘᖡ㗤njǃNjџ䄍ᜢˈᖡফ㢺䲷njˈ
ᗻDŽ
Ⳉࠄ៥ץ៤ڇ䘧ⱘᎹˈⲵњ៥ⱘץ㙋 ߚDŽ ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶ℷᰃ⚎㚆䗭ῷⱘNjڇ䘧 Ҏnj㗠䀁ゟ˖ᇡᮐNj䘧njˈ៥ץෙᅜ㋨ℷⱘ ֵӄ˗ᇡᮐNjڇnjˈ៥ⲵץ㌺ৠᅌ᳔དⱘ ䷤٭㟛㿧㏈˗ᇡᮐNjҎnjˈ៥Ⳑץᳯ㛑仞 ᳝ᖗᖫǃ㛑ᖡ㗤ǃ丬䄍ᜢǃ㚃ফ㢺ⱘᎹ ҎDŽ䗭䞡㽕ⱘӏࢭˈᇡᮐ䗭Ϫҷᰃԩㄝ䖿 ߛˈህབֱ㕙᠔ᛳফⱘDŽ៥ץ䳔㽕ᙼ⫼⾅ਞ ՚ᠬԣ៥ˈץг䂟ᙼ⚎㞾Ꮕ⼜∖ˈᮄⱘϔ ᑈˈϡ䂪ᕫᰖϡᕫᰖˈг㛑ⲵᖗڇЏⱘⳳ 䘧DŽ
ܼ䰶⫳䗔ӥ᳗
ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
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⥑ļ⊑᪲ഹ౧Ľ An Introduction to the Freedom of the Will 㗙˖呹ᅝ䖾 㗏䅃˖ᇊ㥢 㕢 ᑈҹࠡⲯ㸠ࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽ˈԚ ࠄњ ᑈˈЏᔉ㞾✊⼲䂪㞾⬅⌒ⱘ⼲ᅌ
⊯ⱘ㿢䂪ˈҪץᏆߎ⠜њѠकѨᴀ䮰ᮐᛯᖋ
ㄝᅌ䁾ⱘҎˈ䱼㨫ଳ㩭䘟ࢩⱘϔ⊶ᗱ╂՚
㧃⒟ⱘ㨫DŽᕲᛯᖋ㧃⒟এϪⱘ ᑈⳈࠄ
ࠄᮄ㣅Ḑ㰁ഄऔDŽ䲪✊᪕䅋䗭㙵ᗱ╂ⱘҎϺ
ᑈˈچ᜶㗠⛵ⶹⱘᅌ㗙䭧⌕ڇ㨫ᇡҪ
ϡܼ䛑䎳䱼Ѳ⇥ᗉˈॏ㹿⅌串⚎NjѲ⇥ᗉЏ
ᣕ㑠ϡᮋⱘ䊊ᡥ㙆DŽ✊㗠ˈ⧒Ҟ䓗ҹᕔᏆ
㕽㗙njˈҪץᇛఆュࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽㫮⚎乼ᇮDŽ
⚎ϡৠDŽ䎳䱼ᛯᖋ㧃⒟᠔ⱘⷨお㌖ᮐ៤⚎
ҪⴐץЁˈࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽ᰃϔ༫㨑ᕠⱘᅫᬭ
㕢䖥ҷϞⱘ乃ᅌDŽ
储㋏ˈܙⓓⳒᛮ㷶DŽ䗭㕸NjѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽 㗙njߎ⠜њϔ㋏߫ⱘ㈡՚侕᭹ࡴ⠒᭛Џ 㕽ˈҪץ䁡⚎˖ࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽ⱘֵӄПϟˈ Ҏϡ䘢ᰃ″఼ˈ≦᳝䘧ᖋ䊀ӏˈᆓੑ䂪᳗䅞 ៤⛵䁸ⱘ⧚ˈঞϞᏱᰃ㔾ᚵⱘࡉྟ㗙DŽ Ϟ䗄⧒䈵䅧㋘ᣓஂˊᛯᖋ㧃⒟⫮⚎䮰
✊㗠ˈབᵰᙼϡڣᅌᆊ䙷ῷഄᗱ㗗ˈ ᙼᕜ䲷њ㾷䗭ᴀ䁾ѯҔ咐ʽᅗ᳝催ᑺ ⱘᅌᗻˈᴀ՚ህϡᰃ⚎њϔ㠀Ҏ᠔ᆿⱘˈ ᅗⱘЏ㽕䅔㗙ᰃᕲџᅌ㸧ⷨおⱘҎDŽ៥⏅⏅ ഄњ㾷ࠄˈ䗭ᴀᇡᮐᅌᆊҹⱘҎ՚ 䁾ˈ⛵䂪བԩ䛑ϡᯧ⧚㾷DŽ៥ᬭᅠϔ䭔
ߛDŽህҪ᠔ⶹˈѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ϡ䘢ᰃ⫼ϔѯ
⚎ᳳѠ䘅ⱘᆚ䲚䂆˖Njᛯᖋ㧃⒟䂪㞾⬅ᛣ
㢅㿔Ꮋ䁲ᇡࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽ⱘࡴӤˈ՚࣌
ᖫnjDŽ↣ූ䂆Ϟˈᭌᅌ⫳㣿✊ഄⳟ㨫៥
᳡Ҫⱘץ᪕䅋㗙ˈॏϡᕲџދ䴰ǃᆽᜢⱘ㿢
ⱘᰖ䭧ˈԨᥝञ㆔䂆DŽ៥ৃҹᛇڣҪץᖗ
䂪DŽҪץ㔎ⱘᰃᬃᣕ݊Џᔉⱘḍˈ㞾Ꮕ
Ёܙⓓ⭥ଣ˖Njઢਔਔˈ㗕ࠄᑩ䁾ѯҔ
㾎ᕫᕜ᳝ᡞᦵˈԚ䗭。ᡞᦵᰃߎᮐ䄀䁸DŽᮐ
咐ਔnj˛ʽ៥㌺Ҫⱘץὁᰃ˖ᇛ䗭ᴀⱘ
ᰃˈᛯᖋ㧃⒟ᆿϟϝᴀ⚎ಲឝDŽ᳔᳝ৡ
ϔゴ㗏䅃៤Ё᭛DŽⳳⱘᕜϡད㗏ˈԚৠᅌ
ⱘᰃ⭊ЁⱘϔᴀˈҹNj㞾⬅ᛣᖫnj⚎丠DŽ
ⱘץড়៤ᵰҸҎⓓᛣDŽᙼᕲ䗭ᳳⱘ䰶㿞ৃ
䗭ᴀЁˈᛯᖋ㧃⒟䂪䄝˖ᰃѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽
ҹⳟࠄҪⱘץ㗏䅃DŽህ៥᠔ⶹˈ䗭ᰃ佪ᑺ᳝
ܙⓓⳒᛮ㷶ˈ㗠䴲ࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽DŽ
Ҏخњϔゴⱘᅠᭈ㗏䅃DŽ˄㎼ᣝ˖⚎㆛
Nj㞾⬅ᛣᖫnjᰃϔᴀᕜẦⱘˈᗱᛇ
ᐙϞⱘ䰤ࠊˈ៥ץাߞߎ䚼ӑܻᆍ˅䲪✊ϡ
ⱘ⏅ᑺϞǃ㸼䘨ⱘ⏙᱄Ϟˈᛯᖋ㧃⒟䛑ҸҎ
ࠄৃҹߎ⠜ⱘഄℹˈ៥䙘䁡⚎ᙼ᳗ৠᛣˈҪ
ᡬ᳡ˈ≦᳝ϔᴀ㿢䂪㞾⬅ᛣᖫⱘৃ㟛Пऍ
ⱘץક≦᳝㍧䘢᷵㿖ⱘᚙ⊕ϟˈህᏆ㍧
ᭉDŽ⫮㟇ࠄњܽⱒѨकᑈᕠⱘҞ᮹ˈᰃ㿢
ᕜϡ䤃њDŽ
䂪㞾⬅ᛣᖫⱘᅌᆊˈ䛑ᖙ䷜䅔䗭ᴀDŽ
៥՚ㇵⷁഄҟ㌍ϔϟ䗭ᴀࠄᑩ䁾Ҕ
㘊元ᅌ⠜ᴀⱘᑣ㿔Ёˈֱ㕙ˊ㮡㽓 3DXO
咐৻DŽ⧒াᰃ⬹⚎储᳗ϔϟᛯᖋ㧃⒟ⱘ䁾
5DPVH\ 䁾䘧˖Njஂஂ䗭ᴀህ䎇ҹՓᅗⱘ
⊩ˈⳳ㽕ᅠܼ⧚㾷Ҫⱘᗱᛇˈ䂟ᙼ㽾㞾՚ᬍ
㗙۾䲙ഄℹܹ㕢㗠㟛᳔؝ⱘǃᅌᗻ
䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶ׂ䂆ˈད˛ 䙷咐ˈህ䭟ྟ৻DŽ
ⱘ⼲ᅌᆊϺ侩唞候njDŽ 㘊元ᅌ↣ᑈᛯᖋ㧃⒟ⷨおЁᖗⱘ㢅 䊏ᭌҹⱒ㨀㿜DŽ˄䂟㞾㸠ϞHGZDUGV \DOH
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HGX䗭ן㎆キ◣㾑˅⚎㞾⬅ᛣᖫϔᓩ䍋ᒷ
Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
៥ৃץҹ⫼ܽ。ϡৠⱘ䁾⊩ᦤߎѲ⇥ᗉ Џ㕽㗙ⱘЏᔉ˖ ˄ ˅䙌ᴀ䑿ህᰃ㞾⬅䙌ⱘॳˈձ
ᛯᖋ㧃⒟˄-RQDWKDQ (GZDUGVˈ ᑈ˅ 㕢᳔ߎ㡆ⱘ⼲ᅌᆊঞᅌᗱᛇⱘ䭟ᢧ㗙 ䷬ᇢकܿϪ㋔㕢㾎䝦ᕽ㟜䘟ࢩ
✻Ѳ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ⱘᅮ㕽ˈ⫼㞾≎㛑՚䁾ᯢ
ⱘࢩ″nj᠔≎ᅮˈ䗭Nj᳔ᔋⱘࢩ″njህㅫ
ᛣᖫᰃҔ咐DŽ
ᛯᖋ㧃⒟ᅮ㕽ϟⱘϔןNjॳnjDŽ᠔ҹˈѲ
˄ ˅䰸њ䙌ᴀ䑿Пˈ㢹ߎᮐ݊Ҫॳ خ䙌ˈ䗭ן䙌ህϡᰃ㞾⬅ⱘDŽձ✻Ѳ ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ⱘᅮ㕽ˈ؛䀁៥خץ䙌ᰖˈ䰸 њ䙌ᴀ䑿ˈ䙘᳝݊Ҫॳˈ䙷咐៥ץህ≦ ᳝䘧ᖋ䊀ӏˈҎϡ䘢ᰃ″఼ˈϞᏱ៤њ㔾ᚵ ⱘࡉྟ㗙ㄝㄝDŽ ᛯᖋ㧃⒟ⱘㄨ㽚Џ㽕ߚ⚎ҹϟϝ咲˖
⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙᧲䤃њDŽ៥ⱘࢩ″ϡᰃϔן䙌 ˈ㗠៥ϡএ䃯䘧ⱘ䙌ϔ㠀ᇡNj㞾⬅nj ⱘ⫼⊩ϟˈҡᰃ㞾⬅ⱘˈ៥ⱘৃ䊀ᗻгᰃ ℸDŽ䗭ℷ乃ߎѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙Ϟ䗄ܽןЏᔉⱘ 䄀䁸DŽ Ѡǃᛯᖋ㧃⒟キϔ咲ⱘ㌤䂪Ϟˈ䄝 ᯢѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙᳝ϡড়⧚DŽҪץЏᔉˈ ᛣᖫଃ᳝ߎ䙌ˈᠡᅮϟᅗ᠔䙌ⱘDŽ᠔
ϔǃѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ᡞ⠽⧚Ϟⱘॳࢩ ″Ϟⱘॳ᧲⏋њDŽ㟝ן՟ᄤ৻ˈ؛䀁៥ ⚎᯳ᳳ㽕এ催䲘䃯䘧ˈ䊋њϔᔉᮽϞϗ咲 ᕲৄ࣫ᕔ催䲘ⱘ催䨉䒞⼼DŽϡᑌⱘᰃˈ᯳ᳳ ݁ᰮϞさ✊ࠂ亅乼ˈ᠔᳝ⱘ䒞ǃ㟾⧁䛑㹿 䖿প⍜ˈ䗭ϟᄤ៥ⱘ䃯䘧гএϡ៤њDŽ䗭ᰃ ⚎⠽⧚Ϟⱘ㎷ᬙˈ៥ህϡ䘧ᖋⱘৃ䊀 ᗻDŽԚᰃˈབᵰ៥ϡএ䃯䘧ᰃ⚎≎ᅮ⬭ϟ ՚ⳟ䎇⧗䋑ˈḍᴀ≦᳝Ҕ咐亅乼ˈᛯᖋ㧃 ⒟᳗ᡞ៥ϡএ䃯䘧ⱘNjॳnjᅮ㕽៤˖㟈 䁾՚ˈህᰃ៥ᇡⳟ䎇⧗䋑ⱘ␈ᳯʽ៥ৃץҹ ㊒⺎ഄ䗭ῷ䁾ˈ៥ᇡⳟ䎇⧗䋑ⱘ␈ᳯˈ خ䙌ⱘ⭊ϟˈ㽕↨៥এ䃯䘧ⱘ␈ᳯ⚎ᔋ ⚜DŽ䘆ϔℹ՚䁾ˈ៥ץফ䗴ᰖˈህ᳝䗭ῷ ⱘॳࠛ˖ߎخ䙌ⱘ⭊ᰖˈ䙌ᰃ⬅Nj᳔ᔋ
ҹˈ⚎њ䅧ᛣᖫ≎ᅮ䙌ˈᖙᅮ䙘᳝Ѡן 䙌䗭˄ϔ˅ן䙌Пࠡ≎ߎخᅮDŽ䙷 咐ˈߎᮐৠῷⱘॳˈ㢹ᰃᛣᖫ≎ᅮѠן 䙌ˈᖙᅮ䙘᳝ϝן䙌≎ᅮѠן䙌 DŽ㨫ᖙᅮ᳝ಯן䙌ˊˊˊ䗭⛵⭥ᰃ ϡৃ㛑ⱘDŽᛯᖋ㧃⒟⫼њϔৃןᛯⱘ䁾⊩ਞ 䀈៥˖ץ䗭ῷ᳗Njᡞ㞾⬅䍩ߎ䗭ןϪ⬠njDŽ ḍҪ᠔䁾ⱘˈѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ⱘଣ丠ߎߚ ϡ⏙Ҕ咐ᰃⱘ㸠⚎ˈҔ咐ᰃ䙌DŽݡಲ ࠄ៥ࠡ䴶㟝ⱘ՟ᄤ৻DŽ៥ϡএ催䲘ⱘ䙌≎ ᅮњ៥ϡএⱘ㸠⚎DŽ≦᳝Ҏ᳗ডᇡ৻DŽ᳝ ଣ丠ⱘᰃˈNjᰃҔ咐≎ᅮњ៥ϡএⱘ䙌 ਸ਼nj˛ࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽㗙䁾ˈᰃ៥ফ䗴ⱘᮍᓣ ៥ⱘࢩ″DŽԚѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙䁾ˈNjϡˈ៥ⱘ ᛣᖫህ䎇ҹ≎ᅮnjDŽᛯᖋ㧃⒟ॏ䁾ˈབᵰҪ ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
3
ץ䃯ⱘ᳝䘧⧚ˈᛣᗱ֓ᰃ៥䙌њϡএ䃯䘧 ⱘ䙌DŽ䙷咐ˈ⛵䰤ⱘצ䗔ህ䭟ྟњDŽ ϝǃ䗭ϔ咲ᰃᛯᖋ㧃⒟᳔䞡㽕ⱘㄨ㽚˖ Ѳ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ⳟ䞡ᛣᖫᴀ䑿ⱘ㿢䂪ˈ㗠ᖬ њᔋ䂓ҎⱘᴀᗻҎᖗⱘ⫼DŽᛯᖋ㧃⒟ Џᔉˈ㕢ᖋܜᄬᮐҎᖗˈ✊ᕠᠡ㸼⧒䙌 ϞDŽབᵰᡞᴀᗻ↨ஏ៤ˈད㌤དᵰᄤ˗ າ㌤າᵰᄤDŽᴀᗻ˄˅ˈܜᅗ≎ᅮ䙌 ˄ᵰᄤ˅DŽ㘊〠ⴷ䙌ᅠܼⱘ㕢ǃᅠܼ ⱘˈ⚎⼖ⱘᴀᗻᰃᅠ㕢㗠㡃ⱘDŽҎץ 䙌ᚵˈ⚎ҎⱘץᴀᗻᰃᚵⱘDŽ䗭ןЏᔉ ϡڙড়Т㘪㍧ˈгᰃড়ТᐌᚙⱘDŽѲ⇥ᗉЏ 㕽㗙ॏᱫᱫഄᢦ㌩ᡓ䁡ᅗDŽᇡѲ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙 ՚䁾ˈ㕢ᖋϡᰃᄬᮐҎᖗҎⱘᴀᗻˈ㗠ᰃ ܜᄬᮐᛣᖫDŽҪץ䁾ˈ㢹ᛣᖫᰃ㞾⬅ⱘˈ֓ ϡ㛑᳝ᴀᗻⱘᕅ䷓DŽᛯᖋ㧃⒟ড侕˖Ҫץজ 㚵䁾ܿ䘧DŽ៥␈ⱘץᳯ⭊✊᳗ᕅ䷓៥ץ᠔ 䙌ⱘˈᛣᖫℷᰃ䗭。ᛣ㕽ϟ㹿≎ᅮњDŽ ᴀᗻ䉾ှⱘҎ↨ϔ㠀Ҏᆍᯧএ㸠ゞDŽ䗭ϔ 咲ᰃ↟ᒌ㕂⭥ⱘDŽԚ✻Ѳ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ⱘЏ ᔉˈᛣᖫ㢹㽕ᅠܼ㞾⬅ˈ៥ץḍᴀϡৃ᳝ӏ ԩ␈ᳯDŽ䗭ᰃܼ✊ϡড়⧚ⱘDŽℷ⚎Ҫץ䗭 ῷ䃯ˈҎᠡ᳗៤њ″఼ˈࡴ⠒᭛Џ㕽㟛ℸԩ ᑆDŽ ᛯᖋ㧃⒟ⱘ㾔咲⎉㪟Ѳ⇥ᗉЏ㕽㗙ᇡҪ ⱘܼ䴶䊾⭥ˈԚϡ៥ץ䗭㆛ᇢ䅔ⱘ㆘ೡ ܻDŽ᳝㟜䍷⏅ܹⷨおⱘҎˈ᳔དᕲ㘊元ᅌ ᠔ߎ⠜㞾⬅ᛣᖫϔⱘࠡ㿔˄ॳ㨫ᰃ㣅᭛˅ 䅔䍋DŽгℵ䖢ᙼϞᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶ⱘ㎆キZZZ FUWVOLYH QHW㾔ⳟ៥䃯ᥜⱘᆚ䲚䂆DŽ
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
⊑᪲ച๧ Freedom of the Will Ó&#x;â˝–á §áťŽŕ&#x;ă˜źŕˇŚĘ°ÓŞĎŤáżâŁ‹âŠ‘᪲ച๧ᚾ Ć âą™áŽ†ášľĆ†âŠ–ášľÇ„áťŠă˜źÓ˝ÎŒá€¤á‚ Äś
ŕĽłă¨ŤË–á›Żá–‹ă§ƒâ’&#x; (GZDUGV -RQDWKDQ ä…ƒă—™Ë–ă•™á?Œă˘€Çƒá&#x;¤Ň•Çƒáˆ?Շ㖢
㄀ϔ䚟 ă„€Ď?ă†”Ë–ä‚Şá–™âœŠÇƒĎĄŕ§ƒă›‘ÇƒĎĄ
Part I. Section III. Concerning the meaning of the terms, Necessity, Impossibility, Inability, &c. and of Contingence.
ă›‘Çƒâ€Ťâą?ي‏ᗝă„?ä€˛âą˜á›Łă•˝ ೟㿢䂪Nj㞞⏅ᛣᖍ΍)UHH :LOOÎŹÇŒ ŕŠ Ç‹ä˜§á–‹äŠ€Ó?㗙΍0RUDO $JHQF\ÎŹÇŒ ä—串â ä…„á—ťâą˜ä¸ âł‚á°–Ëˆáł—á?Œá?ŒáŚ¤ŕ „‍ڣ‏Nj á–™âœŠâą˜ÎŤQHFHVVDU\ÎŹÇŒÇƒÇ‹ĎĄŕ§ƒă›‘âą˜
THE words necessary, impossible, &c. are abundantly used in controversies about Free-Will and Moral Agency ; and therefore the sense in which they are used should be clearly understood.
ÎŤLPSRVVLEOHÎŹÇŒă„?á„Ťâ´?Ë—á ”ŇšŕłźŐ“âŤźá…—â€Ť×Ľâ€Ź Đ&#x;ŕ ĄËˆáž?‍â?™Üœâ€ŹáźŽŕ´„Ńšăžˇá…—â€Ťâą˜×Ľâ€Źá›Łă•˝Ç„ á&#x;Ľŕťťŕ§ƒŇšä žËˆâŠáś¤Ď”Ń&#x;â ˝á°ƒá–™äˇœ ÎŤPXVWÎŹá„Źŕłźá&#x;Şâą?âŤłâą˜ă— ĎĄă›‘ĎĄŕ˝–â„¸âą˜Ëˆ ă•™á?Œă˘€
䙡ĺ’?á…—áˆ…á°ƒá–™âœŠâą˜Ç„Ôšá°ƒŕ˝–â„¸Ď”Őšä—‍×&#x;‏ᅎ 㕽ϺϥᙄâŠËˆŕ˛´âšŽá&#x;Ľá–™á…ŽŕŚœáł—㞡äž&#x;Ň”ĺ’?á°ƒ á–™äˇœÇ„â€ŤÚŁâ€ŹÇ‹á–™äˇœÇŒÇƒÇ‹ă›‘ FDQ ÇŒÇƒÇ‹ĎĄă›‘ FDQQRW ÇŒä—串ᄍâ´?Ëˆâ„ˇŕ˝–Ç‹á–™âœŠâą˜ÇŒÇƒÇ‹ ĎĄŕ§ƒă›‘âą˜ÇŒĎ”áżˇËˆŃ ă—™ä›‘äł”ă˝•ŕĄ´Ňšăžˇä žËˆÝŠ
Here I might say, that a thing is then said to be necessary when it must be, and cannot be otherwise. But this would not properly be a definition of Necessity, any more than I explained the word must, by the phrase, there being Necessity. The words must, can, and cannot, need explication as much as the words necessary, and impossible; excepting that the former are words that in earliest life we more commonly use.
á?‚߹া೼áŽ?˖ᇣᄽᄤ↨䓗á?ŒâŤźÇ‹á–™äˇœÇŒÇƒÇ‹ ă›‘ÇŒÇƒÇ‹ĎĄă›‘ÇŒÇ„ Ҏ೟᎚á?Œä‚›ä …Đ Ëˆá°ƒáĄžÇ‹á–™âœŠâą˜ÇŒĎ” 䀲âŠÔ°âłŒá‡Ąá—ťâą˜Ë—ϺϨă&#x;›â€ŤŘ›â€Źä€ âą˜Ď”ß›ŕŚĄá‡Ą á ”áŚ¤Ń&#x;â ˝âą˜ŕĄŻäžŁáł?äŽ°Ë–ĎĄá°ƒáŁ›â€ŤÜ&#x;‏᳥њ‍؛‏ä€
The word necessary, as used in common speech, is a relative term; and relates to some supposed opposition made to the existence of a thing, which opposition is overcome,
áŹ?ä´˝á…Ťâź˛á…Œä°śä°śăżž
5
ⱘডᇡˈህᰃᣛᅗץϡ䎇ҹ䰏⻭ǃᬍ䅞䙷ϔ џ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳DŽNj䙷џᖙ✊བℸnjᴀ՚ ⱘǃℷ⺎ⱘᛣᗱህᰃ䁾ˈϡㅵ᳝ᇥ؛䀁ⱘ ডᇡˈ䙷џҡᰃབℸDŽ⭊៥ץ䁾ᶤϔџ⠽ᖙ ✊བℸˈेᰃ䁾˖㽕䗭ӊџϡབℸᰃϡৃ 㛑ⱘDŽ✊㗠ˈNjϡৃ㛑ⱘnjϔ䀲乃✊ᰃⳌ ᇡᗻⱘˈᣛ⚎њ៤ህᶤϔџ⠽㗠᳝ᶤϔ。 䞣⫶⫳ˈԚ䴴䙷。䞣䙘ϡ䎇ҹ䘨៤Ⳃ ⱘ˗ℷབNjϡ㛑ⱘnjϔ䀲гᰃⳌᇡᗻⱘˈᰃ ᣛࡾ㛑ϡDŽজབNj⛵⊩ᡫᢦⱘnj LUUHVLVWLEOH ϔ䀲ˈгᐊ᳝Ⳍᇡᗻˈᐌᐌ ᰃᣛᶤ。ࢶⱘᕅ䷓Ὁˈ⫼݊Ҫⱘ䞣ⱚ ϡ䎇ҹ䰏ᅗⱐ⫳⫼DŽ᠔ҹˈNjᖙ✊nj㟛 Njϡৃ㛑nj䗮ᐌᐊ᳝џ㟛丬䘩ǃ᳝䘂ⱘ ᛣ⎉DŽ䮰ᮐℸ咲ˈᇮ䷜⬭ᛣབϟ˖ ˍΦϔ㠀՚䁾ˈџ⠽ⱘᖙ✊ᗻᮐϡ䂪 ᳝ӏԩ؛䀁ⱘডᇡ䛑ᰃབℸˈϨ䛑ᇛᰃབ ℸDŽԚ៤ϔ。䁾⊩ˈᇡ៥ץ՚䁾ᖙ✊བ ℸˈࠛᣛϡ䂪៥ץ᳝ӏԩ؛䀁ⱘডᇡ䛑ᰃབ ℸˈϨ䛑ᇛᰃབℸDŽ䗭ܽ。ϡৠᛣ⎉г䘽⫼ ᮐNjϡৃ㛑ⱘnjঞ㟛݊串Ԑⱘ⫼䁲ϞDŽ ˎ ⫼Njᖙ✊ⱘnjǃNjϡৃ㛑ⱘnjǃNj ⛵⊩ᡫᢦⱘnjㄝ⫼䁲䁾ᯢ㟛㞾⬅ǃ䘧ᖋ䊀ӏ 㗙Ⳍ䮰ⱘ⠁䅄ᰖˈ݊ᛣ⎉ᰃࠡ䗄ⱘѠ。䁾 ⊩ˈѺेϡ䂪៥ץডᇡࡾˈᇡ៥ץ ՚䁾䛑ᖙ✊བℸDŽ ˏ ህڣϔ㠀ҎՓ⫼Njᖙ✊njϔ䀲ᰖᐊ ᳝Ⳍᇡᗻˈ䗮ᐌᣛ؛䀁ডᇡⱘ䘧ϡ˗ ⭊៥ץ䁾ᶤӊџᇡ៥ץ՚䁾ᰃᖙ✊ⱘˈህᰃ 㟛៥ⱘץᛣᖫⳌডⱘ؛䀁Ⳍ䮰ˈᰃ៥ץ ⳌডᮍϞЏࢩഄՓDŽ⚎៥ץབᵰϡߎ ᮐЏࢩˈህ⛵⊩ডᇡӏϔџ⠽DŽ᠔䃖ᇡ៥ץ ՚䁾џᚙϔᅮⱐ⫳ᖙ✊᳗བℸˈᣛⱘᰃϡ 䂪៥ץབԩ␈ᳯࡾ䅧ᅗᳱⳌডⱘᮍⱐ ሩˈ䀺೪䰏ℶǃᫎ㛿ᅗˈᅗҡᰃᇛᰃབ ℸDŽԚ៥ץ䗭ῷⱘডᇡϡᰃᯢ䁾ህᰃᱫ⼎៥ ⱘץᛣᖫ㟛ПⳌডDŽ ϔ㠀ҎՓ⫼㟛ࠡ䗄Ⳍ串Ԑⱘᄫⴐǃ⠛ 䁲ᰖˈ乃✊䛑ᰃᣝ✻䗭。ᮍ⊩DŽᶤϔӊџϡ ㅵ៥ץᗢ咐خ䛑ϡᕫϡབℸˈࠛ៥ץ䁾ᅗᰃ
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
or proves insufficient to hinder or alter it. That is necessary, in the original and proper sense of the word, which is, or will be, notwithstanding all supposable opposition. To say, that a thing is necessary, is the same thing as to say, that it is impossible that it should not be. But the word impossible is manifestly a relative term, and has reference to supposed power exerted to bring a thing to pass, which is insufficient for the effect; as the word unable is relative and has relation to ability, or endeavor, which is insufficient. Also the word irresistible is relative, and has always reference to resistance which is made, or may be made, to some force or power tending to an effect, and is insufficient to withstand the power, or hinder the effect. The common notion of Necessity and Impossibility Implies something that frustrates endeavor or desire. Here several things are to be noted. 1. Things are said to be necessary in general, which are or will be notwithstanding any supposable opposition from whatever quarter. But things are said to be necessary to us, which are or will be notwithstanding all opposition supposable in the case from us. The same may be observed of the word impossible, and other such like terms. 2. These terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c. more especially belong to controversies about liberty and moral agency, as used in the latter of the two senses now mentioned, viz. as necessary or impossible to us, and with relation to any supposable opposition or endeavor of ours. 3. As the word Necessity, in its vulgar and common use, is relative, and has always reference to some supposable insufficient opposition; so when we speak of anything as necessary to us, it is with relation to some supposable opposition of our Wills, or some voluntary exertion or effort of ours to the contrary. For we do not properly make opposition to an event, any otherwise than as we voluntarily oppose it. Things are said to be what must be, or necessarily are, as to us, when they are, or will be, though we desire or endeavor the contrary, or try to prevent or remove their existence: but such opposition of ours always either consists in, or implies, opposition of our wills. It is manifest that all such like words and phrases, as vulgarly used, are understood in this manner. A thing is said to be necessary, when we cannot help it, let us do what we
ᖙ✊ⱘDŽৠῷഄˈᇡ៥ץ՚䁾ᶤϔџ⠽ᰃϡ ৃ㛑ⱘˈᰃᣛे֓៥ࡾץএخឝᏆ៤ህ ᶤϔџ⠽ˈজ㟇ᇥ៥␈ץᳯϺᇟ∖ᅗˈԚ ᠔᳝ⱘ␈ᳯǃࡾⱚᰃᇛ᳗ᰃϔจぎDŽ⭊ ᶤӊџޠ侩ᮐ៥ץᇡᅗ᠔ϔߛⱘডᇡǃᡫ ᢦࡾПϞˈ៥ץህ䁾ᅗᰃ⛵⊩ᡫᢦⱘDŽ জ⭊៥ץ䀁ᛇЁⱘ␈ᳯࡾϡ䎇ҹ៤ህᶤ
will. So any thing is said to be impossible to us, when we would do it, or would have it brought to pass, and endeavor it; or at least may be supposed to desire and seek it; but all our desires and endeavors are, or would be, vain. And that is said to be irresistible, which overcomes all our opposition, resistance, and endeavor to the contrary. And we are said to be unable to do a thing when our supposable desires and endeavors are insufficient.
ϔџ⠽ᰖˈ៥ץ᳗䁾خϡࠄDŽ ៥ץ㋘ᅮ៤֫ഄឝ⫼ǃњ㾷ࠡ䗄⠛䁲ˈ 䗭ῷⱘ㖦ᕲᇣԈ䱼㨫៥ץ䭋ˈ䅞ᕫ⠶ϡ ৃ⸈DŽ᠔ҹϡ䂪ԩᰖˈ⭊៥ץᬊࠄڣ䗭ῷ ⱘ㿞ᙃᰖˈ៥ץᇡᮐᶤϔ؛䀁ⱘᛣᖫǃ␈ ᳯǃࡾⱘⳟ⊩ˈ䛑䗭ѯᄫⴐᙃᙃⳌ䮰DŽ 䗭ѯ㾔ᗉǃ䖁ᔭᰃབℸഄ㎞ᆚⳌ䗷ǃܡϡњ 㽕ৠᰖߎ⧒ˈᦤࠄϔןህ䅧Ҏᛇࠄϔˈן ៥ץ㌖݊ϔ⫳䛑⛵⊩ᇛᅗߚץ䭟՚⫼DŽ䲪✊ ៥ץᇛ䗭ѯᄫⴐ⭊៤ᰃᅌ㸧Ϟⱘ⫼䁲ˈԚ䰸 䴲៥ץ䴲ᐌഄ䄍ᜢˈ৺ࠛ䙘ᰃ᳗ϡ㍧ᛣഄڒ ᮐ䗮֫ⱘ⫼⊩ˈҹ㟈ᮐ䘽⫼䗭ѯᄫⴐ ᰖˈ⫶⫳कߚϡϔ㟈ⱘᚙᔶˈህㅫ៥؛ץ㺱 ᅗץᰃ⫼䁲ˈ䗭ῷⱘϡϔ㟈䙘ᰃ᳗⧚ঞ 䂪䗄Ϟℎ俭⏋⎚៥ץDŽ
ᮐࠡ䗄ˈ⭊៥ץᇛᖙ✊ⱘǃϡৃ㛑 ⱘǃϡৃᡫᢦⱘǃϡ㛑ⱘ䗭串䖁ᔭ⫼៥ץ ≦᳝؛䀁ᛣᖫϡ䎇ҹϡ㛑៤ህᶤϔџ⠽ˈ Ԛ䗭串䖁ᔭᴀ䑿ᕲ݊ᗻ䊾Ϟॏᇛӏϔ؛䀁ⱘ ডᇡǃᛣᖫࡾࡴҹᥦ䰸ˈ䙷咐៥ץህ ϡᰃᡞᅗ⫼ץᕫᕜᙄ⭊DŽ⧚⬅ᕜㇵஂˈ៥ץ 䗭。ᚙ⊕ϟϡ㛑⫼䗭ѯᄫⴐᣛ⍝ӏԩ؛䀁 ⱘডᇡǃᛣᖫࡾDŽℷབℸˈ㢹ᰃ᳝Ҏ 䗭ῷⱘᚙ⊕ϟএՓ⫼䗭ѯᄫⴐˈҪϡᰃ⫼ ᕫᕜ䲶䄰ˈህᰃՓᅗॳᛣⲵ༅DŽ՟བˈ㢹 ᳝Ҏ✻㨫䗭。ᮍ⊩ˈЏᔉҎ䙌㗠䴲ᚵˈ ℸџҪأད㗠䴲ᚵᰖህᰃᖙ✊ⱘˈজ㢹 ᳝ҎЏᔉা㽕Ҫᣕ㑠خ䗭ῷⱘ䙌ˈҪৠᰖ ᇛ᳝݊Ҫ䙌ህᰃϡৃ㛑ⱘDŽ䗭Ҏህ᳗ᡞᖙ ䷜ǃϡৃᡫᢦⱘ䗭串ᄫⴐ⫼ᕫᕜ䲶䄰ˈᰃ 㟛ᅗⱘץ᮹ᐌ⫼⊩Ⳍএ⫮䘴ˈ㗠᠔䃖᮹ᐌ⫼ ⊩ˈህᰃࠡ䗄᠔々؛䀁ⱘডᇡǃϡ丬ᡫᢦ
We are accustomed, in the common use of language, thus to apply and understand these phrases: we grow up with such a habit; which, by the daily use of these terms from our childhood, becomes fixed and settled; so that the idea of a relation to a supposed will, desire, and endeavor of ours, is strongly connected with these terms, whenever we hear the words used. Such ideas, and these words, are so associated, that they unavoidably go together, one suggests the other, and never can be easily separated as long as we live. And though we use the words, as terms of art, in another sense, yet, unless we are exceedingly circumspect, we shall insensibly slide into the vulgar use of them, and so apply the words in a very inconsistent manner, which will deceive and confound us in our reasonings and discourses, even when we pretend to use them as terms of art. 4. It follows from what has been observed, that when these terms necessary, impossible, irresistible, unable, &c. are used in cases wherein no insufficient will is supposed, or can be supposed, but the very nature of the supposed case itself excludes any opposition, will, or endeavor; they are then not used in their proper signification. The reason is manifest; in such cases we cannot use the words with reference to a supposable opposition, will, or endeavor. And therefore if any man uses these terms in such cases, he either uses them nonsensically, or in some new sense, diverse from their original and proper meaning. As for instance; if any one should affirm after this manner, That it is necessary for a man, or what must be, that he should choose virtue rather than vice, during the time that he prefers virtue to vice; and that it is a thing impossible and irresistible, that it should be otherwise than that he should have this choice, so long as this choice continues; such a one would use the terms must, irresistible, &c. with either insignificance, or in some new sense, diverse from their ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
7
ㄝᛣᗱDŽ✊㗠ˈ䗭。ᚙ⊕ℷᰃ៥ץ㽕ࡴҹᥦ 䰸ǃ৺ᅮⱘˈ⚎៥ץ᠔؛䀁ⱘЗᰃ丬ᛣⱘ خ䙌ⱘᚙ⊕DŽ
⬅ℸৃ㽟ˈᅌᆊǃᔶϞᅌᆊץᐌՓ ᖙ✊ⱘǃϡৃ㛑ⱘ䗭串⫼䁲㟛ᅗץ᮹ᐌⱘǃ ॳ՚ⱘᛣ㕽䲶ᕫᕜ䘴DŽ⚎Ҫץᇛ䗭ѯ䖁ᔭ ⫼ϡৃ؛䀁ӏԩডᇡⱘᚙᔶDŽ՟བҪץՓ ⫼䗭串䖁ᔭᣛࡉ䗴ПࠡˈϞᏱⱘᄬᰃᖙ ✊ⱘˈ⚎䙷ᰖ≦᳝ӏԩⱘᄬৃᢉ⼖ⱘ ᄬˈᰃ䂪ঞϞᏱⱘ䀅ᗻᚙ⚎ˈڣ ᰃϞᏱᛯ⼖㞾Ꮕǃᛯℷ㕽ǃᘼᚵ㔾ㄝㄝDŽҪ ץгᇛ䗭串⫼䁲ᣛ؛䀁⧚ᗻⱘফ䗴㗙᠔ ᳝ⱘ。。ڒ㸠⚎ˈ㗠ᥦ䰸њ㟛ᛣᖫⳌড ⱘϔߛᚙ⊕DŽ
ᔶϞᅌᅌϞⱘᖙ✊ᗻˈ㟛݊᠔䃖⺎ ᅮᗻϺ⛵ϡৠDŽ៥⧒᠔䁾ⱘϡᰃ䮰ᮐⶹ䄬 ⱘ⺎ᅮᗻˈ㗠ᰃᄬᮐџ⠽ᴀ䑿ⱘ⺎ᅮᗻˈᅗ ℷᰃ៥ץᕫҹ⺎ᅮഄ䁡䄬џ⠽ⱘ⻢ˈᮋ 㿔ℸϔџ⠽ᄬⱐ⫳Пੑ丠ᰃ⛵䁸ⱘ⧚ ⬅DŽ ᳝ѯᅌᆊᇡᮐᖙ✊ᗻ᠔ϟⱘᅮ㕽ˈ䁾 Njᶤϔџ⠽ϡᕫϡ✊njǃ䁾Njᶤϔџ⠽ϡ 㛑᳝݊ҪⱘᄬnjˈԚ䗭ܽ。䁾⊩㔎Уড়⧚ ⱘ㾷䞟DŽ៥ץডᇡҪ⬅⧚ןܽⱘץབϟ˖ ϔ⬅⧚ןᰃˈ㛑ϡ㛑ㄝᄫⴐ䳔㽕ࡴҹ㾷䞟 ⱘᑺˈϡϟᮐᖙ✊ᗻ˗㗠Ϩ៥ৃץҹ⫼ࠡ 㗙՚䁾ᯢᕠ㗙ˈℷབ⫼ᕠ㗙՚䁾ᯢࠡ㗙ϔ ῷˈᰃकߚড়⧚ⱘDŽℸˈ⭊៥ץ䁾ᶤϔџ ⠽ϡᕫϡ✊ᰖˈབᵰ᳝Ҏଣ៥ץおコ䁾ѯ Ҕ咐ˈ៥ৃץ㛑᳗㾷䞟䁾ˈ䙷џᖙᅮǃᖙ✊ ᰃབℸDŽህڣ៥⫼ץᶤϔџ⠽ϡᕫϡ✊՚䁾 ᯢҔ咐ᰃᖙ✊ᗻϔῷˈᰃकߚড়⧚ⱘDŽѠ ⬅⧚ןᰃˈℸϔᅮ㕽᳗ᐊ՚བࠡ᠔䗄Ὁⱘ ϡ֓ˈ⚎ϡᕫǃϡ㛑䗭串ᄫⴐℷᰃ᳝Ⳍ ᇡᗻˈ㟛⚎њ㽕៤ህᶤϔџ⠽᠔⫶⫳ৃ㛑 ⫶⫳ⱘ䞣᳝䮰DŽԚПࠡ៥Ꮖ䁾䘢ˈᅌᆊ 㿢䂪ᖙ✊ᗻ䗭ѯᄫⴐᰖˈϺϡࣙᣀⳌᇡ ᗻDŽ
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
common use; which is with reference, as has been observed, to supposable opposition, unwillingness, and resistance; whereas, here, the very supposition excludes and denies any such thing: for the case supposed is that of being willing, and choosing. 5. It appears from what has been said, that these terms necessary, impossible, &c. are often used by philosophers and metaphysicians in a sense quite diverse from their common and original signification; for they apply them to many cases in which no opposition is supposable. Thus they use them with respect to God’s existence before the creation of the world, when there was no other being; with regard to many of the dispositions and acts of the divine Being, such as his loving himself, his loving righteousness, hating sin, &c. So they apply them to many cases of the inclinations and actions of created intelligent beings wherein all opposition of the Will is excluded in the very supposition of the case. Metaphysical or philosophical Necessity is nothing different from their certainty. I speak not now of the certainty of knowledge, but the certainty that is in things themselves, which is the foundation of the certainty of the knowledge, or that wherein lies the ground of the infallibility of the proposition which affirms them. What is sometimes given as the definition of philosophical Necessity, namely, “That by which a thing cannot but be,” or “where by it cannot be otherwise,” fails of being a proper explanation of it, on two accounts: First, the words can, or cannot, need explanation as much as the word Necessity; and the former may as well be explained by the latter, as the latter by the former. Thus, if any one asked us what we mean, when we say, a thing cannot but be, we might explain ourselves by saying, it must necessarily be so; as well as explain Necessity, by saying, it is that by which a thing cannot but be. And Secondly, this definition is liable to the fore-mentioned great inconvenience; the words cannot, or unable, are properly relative, and have relation to power exerted, or that may be exerted, in order to the thing spoken of; to which as I have now observed, the word Necessity, as used by philosophers, has no reference.
ᅌϞⱘᖙ✊ᗻˈህাᰃᣛᶤϔןᮋ㿔 ᶤϔџ⠽⚎ⳳⱘੑ丠ˈ݊Џ䁲ᬬ䗄䁲П䭧 ᄬ㨫ᅠܼϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖DŽ䗭ῷⱘ䮰֖ϔᮺᄬ ˈህᅌϞⱘᛣ㕽㗠㿔ˈϡ䂪؛䀁Ϟ᳝ ⛵ডᇡ䞣Ⳍডⱘࡾˈ䁆ੑ丠᠔ᮋ㿔ⱘ џ⠽ህᰃᖙ✊ⱘDŽᮋ㿔ᶤϔџ⠽ǃᴀ䊾ǃ ∈ᑇǃࢩ㰩๗ᄬПੑ丠Ёˈབᵰ݊Џ 䁲ᬬ䗄䁲П䭧ˈ᳝ᅠܼ⺎ᅮⱘ䮰֖ˈᕲᔶ Ϟᅌⱘᛣ㕽՚䁾ˈ䙷ϔџ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳ᰃ ᖙ✊ⱘDŽϟ՚ⱘ䂪䗄Ёˈ៥᳗ҹ䗭。ᛣ 㕽Փ⫼ᖙ✊ᗻϔ䀲ˈࡾএ䄝ᯢᖙ✊ᗻ㟛㞾 ⬅ⱘὖᗉϺϡⳒDŽ
៥ץᮋ㿔ᶤϔџ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳ᰖˈ ᳗ҹЏ䁲ᬬ䗄䁲㌘៤ੑ丠ⱘᔶᓣ՚㸼䘨ˈ ҹϟ䁾ᯢЏ䁲ᬬ䗄䁲䭧᠔᳝ⱘϝ。䮰 ֖ˈ䗭ῷⱘ䮰֖ᰃᅠܼϡ䅞㗠⺎ᅮⱘDŽ ᅗץѠ㗙䭧ⱘ䮰֖ᇛ᳗ᰃᆚߛ㗠ᅠ 㕢ⱘˈ⚎㢹䴲བℸˈ֓ᰃⳒकߚϡড় ⧚ⱘDŽℸˈ᳝䀅џ⠽ᄬᴀ䊾Ϟⱘᖙ✊ ᗻDŽϔ㠀՚䁾ˈᄬ᳝ⱘ∌ᄬᗻᰃᖙ✊ⱘˈ ⚎㢹৺䁡ℸ咲᳗⫶⫳᳔ⱘϡড়⧚ˈ᳗ㄝ ᮐ䁾Ҕ咐䛑ϡᄬDŽгㄝᮐᰃ᠔᳝Ⳓⱘ㐑 ˗㢹ᰃড়䘽ⱘഄ咲៥ץ᳗㛑䄝ᯢDŽℷ བϞᏱⱘ⛵䰤݊Ҫቀᗻᰃᖙ✊ᄬⱘˈѠ ࡴѠㄝᮐಯгᰃᴀ䊾Ϟⱘᖙ✊DŽᕲ೧ᖗ⬿ࠄ ೧਼ⱘ↣ϔṱⳈ㎮䭋ᑺⳌㄝгᰃᖙ✊ⱘDŽNj Ҏ⭊ץҹ㞾Ꮕឝ㹿ҪҎབԩᇡᕙⱘᮍᓣˈএ ᇡᕙҪҎnjгᰃᖙ✊ǃড়䘽㗠ᙄ⭊ⱘDŽህڣ 䀅ᔶ㗠Ϟⱘǃᭌᅌⱘᅮ⧚݊ᴀ䑿ህ᳝ᖙ✊ ᗻˈ⚎ᮋ㿔ᅗץ㗠ᄬⱘੑ丠݊Џ䁲ᬬ䗄 䁲䭧г᳝ᅠܼᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖DŽ
ӏϔџ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳㢹䘢এᏆ㍧ ៤ህˈг᳗Փᕫᮋ㿔ℸϔџ⠽ᄬⱐ⫳ⱘ ੑ丠ˈ݊Џ䁲ᬬ䗄䁲䭧᳝ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰 ֖ˈ⚎⧒ᄬ᳒㍧ⱐ⫳ⱘџ⠽ˈ݊ᄬ ⱐ⫳䛑ᰃ⺎ᅮⱘDŽℸˈᶤϔџ⠽⧒ ᄬⱐ⫳䘢এˈࠛᮋ㿔ℸџ⧒䘢এ
Philosophical Necessity is really nothing else than the FULL AND FIXED CONNECTION BETWEEN THE THINGS SIGNIFIED BY THE SUBJECT AND PREDICATE OF A PROPOSITION, which affirms something to be true. When there is such a connection, then the thing affirmed in the proposition is necessary, in a philosophical sense; whether any opposition or contrary effort be supposed, or no. When the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms the existence of any thing, either substance, quality, act, or circumstance, have a full and CERTAIN CONNECTION, then the existence or being of that thing is said to be necessary in a metaphysical sense. And in this sense I use the word necessity, in the following discourse, when I endeavor to prove that necessity is not inconsistent with liberty. The subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms existence of something, may have a full, fixed, and certain connection several ways. 1. They may have a full and perfect connection in and of themselves; because it may imply a contradiction, or gross absurdity, to suppose them not connected. Thus many things are necessary in their own nature. So the eternal existence of being generally considered, is necessary in itself: because it would be in itself the greatest absurdity, to deny the existence of being in general, or to say there was absolute and universal nothing; and is as it were the sum of all contradictions; as might be shown if this were a proper place for it. So God’s infinity and other attributes are necessary. So it is necessary in its own nature, that two and two should be four; and it is necessary that all right lines drawn from the center of a circle to the circumference should be equal. It is necessary, fit and suitable, that men should do to others, as they would that they should do to them. So innumerable metaphysical and mathematical truths are necessary in themselves: the subject and predicate of the proposition which affirm them, are perfectly connected of themselves. 2. The connection of the subject and predicate of a proposition, which affirms the existence of something, may be fixed and made certain, because the existence of that thing is already come to pass; and either now is, or has been; and so has, as it were, made sure of existence. And therefore, the proposition which affirms present and past existence of it, may by this means be made ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
9
ᄬⱘੑ丠ᰃϔᅮϨᖙ✊ⱘˈ݊ⳳᆺᗻᰃ⛵ ⊩ᬍ䅞ⱘDŽ 䘢এⱘџ⠽Ꮖ㍧ᇛџ⠽ᴀ䑿㟛 ݊ᄬⱐ⫳ᅮǃ≎ᅮϟ՚њˈϺϨᏆ㍧ 䗣䘢䁆ੑ丠ⱘᬬ䗄䁲ϡᕫϡড݊ⳳᆺDŽ ℸˈᕲ⧒՚ⳟᏆ㍧៤ህⱘᄬˈህᰃᖙ✊ ⱘᄬDŽᶤϔџ⠽Ꮖ㍧བℸˈ䙷咐ᅗϡৃ㛑 ϡབℸDŽ ӏϔџ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳㢹ᰃᶤϔॳ ⱘ㌤ᵰˈгৃ㛑Փᕫᮋ㿔ℸϔџ⠽ᄬⱐ ⫳ⱘੑ丠ˈ݊Џ䁲ᬬ䗄䁲䭧᳝ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ 䮰֖ˈϺՓℸϔџ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳ˈ᳝㌤ᵰ Ϟⱘᖙ✊ᗻDŽℷབᅗৃ㛑㟛݊Ҫ᳝ᖙ✊ᗻⱘ џ⠽᳝ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖DŽ⚎ᅗ㽕ϡᰃᅠܼ ᖍᑩഄ㟛᳝ᴀ䊾Ϟ㌩ᇡⱘᖙ✊ᗻПџ⠽᳝ ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖ˈህᰃ㟛ᄬⱐ⫳ⱘџ⠽ ᳝ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖DŽ䗭。ᖙ✊ᗻᰃ⚎ܽן ੑ丠П䭧ⱘ䮰֖ᕫߎⱘ㌤ᵰˈѺे㟛ᖙ✊ᄬ ⱐ⫳ⱘџ⠽П䭧ˈ᳝ᅠ㕢䗷㌤㗙ˈ݊ᴀ 䑿г᳝㌤ᵰϞⱘᖙ✊ᗻDŽ ៥ץ㟇ℸህৃᕫߎˈ᠔᳝՚ᕲ⧒ 䭟ྟᖙ✊ᄬⱐ⫳ⱘџ⠽ˈাࠡ䗄ⱘ ᳔ᕠϔ。ᔶᓣ᳝ᖙ✊ᗻDŽᅗⱘץᄬⱐ⫳ ϡ᳝ᴀ䊾Ϟⱘᖙ✊ᗻ˗⚎㢹ᰃᴀ䊾Ϟ ⱘˈᖙᅮᰃ՚བℸDŽᅗⱘץᖙ✊ᗻгϡᰃ ⚎䘢এ᳒㍧៤ህDŽℸˈӏԩ՚ᇛ㽕៤ ህⱘџ⠽㽕᳝ᖙ✊ᗻˈ㽕ϡᰃ㟛ᴀ䊾Ϟᖙ✊ ⱘџ⠽ⱐ⫳䮰֖ˈህᰃ㟛Ꮖ㍧ᄬⱐ⫳ⱘ џ⠽ⱐ⫳䮰֖ˈҹ㟈ᮐᅗᖙ✊᳗ᄬⱐ ⫳DŽা᳝䗭。ᚙ⊕ϟˈ䰸њ∌䘴ᄬⱘџ ⠽Пˈ᠔᳝䘢এⱘџ⠽ᇛ㽕៤ህПࠡ ᳝ᖙ✊ᗻDŽϺϨˈা᳝䗭。ᚙ⊕ϟˈ᠔᳝ ㌤ᵰџ⠽ˈ᠔᳝᳒㍧ᇛ㽕ሩ䭟ⱘџ⠽ˈ ᖙ✊᳗៤ህˈᕲℸҹᕠᖙ✊ᄬⱐ⫳DŽ ℸˈ䗭。ᖙ✊ᗻℷᰃ៥ץ⠁ᮐᛣᖫ 㗠᳝᠔㸠ࢩℸϔ䅄丠ᰖˈ᠔㽕㿢䂪ⱘᖙ✊ ᗻDŽ ៥ץϟ՚㽕䘆ϔℹᗱᛇᔶϞᅌⱘᖙ✊ ᗻˈ㟛ϔ㠀Ҏ᠔⧚㾷ⱘᖙ✊ᗻ乃✊᳝߹ˈ䗭 咐خᇡࠡ䗄⠁䅄ⱘ䞤⏙᳗᳝ᐿࡽDŽ᠔䃖џ⠽ ⱘᄬⱐ⫳᳝ᔶϞᅌⱘᖙ✊ᗻˈϡাᮐ ᱂䘡ⱘᚙᔶˈг䘽⫼ᮐ߹ן⢔⊕DŽ⭊៥ץ㗗
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
certain and necessarily and unalterably true; the past event has fixed and decided the matter, as to its existence; and has made it impossible but that existence should be truly predicated of it. Thus the existence of whatever is already come to pass, is now become necessary; it is become impossible it should be otherwise than true, that such a thing has been. 3. The subject and predicate of a proposition which affirms something to be, may have a real and certain connection consequently; and so the existence of the thing may be consequently necessary; as it may be surely and firmly connected with something else, that is necessary in one of the former respects. As it is either fully and thoroughly connected with that which is absolutely necessary in its own nature, or with something which has already received and made sure of existence. This Necessity lies in, or may be explained by, the connection of two or more propositions one with another.——Things which are perfectly connected with other things that are necessary, are necessary themselves, by a Necessity of consequence. And here it may be observed, that all things which are future, or which will hereafter begin to be, which can be said to be necessary, are necessary only in this last way. Their existence is not necessary in itself; for if so, they always would have existed. Nor is their existence become necessary by being already come to pass. Therefore, the only way that any thing that is to come to pass hereafter is or can be necessary, is by a connection with something that is necessary in its own nature, or something that already is, or has been; so that the one being supposed the other certainly follows.—And this also is the only way that all things past, excepting those which were from eternity, could be necessary before they come to pass; and therefore the only way in which any effect or event, or any thing whatsoever that ever has had or will have a beginning, has come into being necessarily, or will hereafter necessarily exist. And therefore this is the Necessity which especially belongs to controversies about the acts of the will. It may be of some use in these controversies, further to observe concerning, metaphysical Necessity, that (agreeable to the distinction before observed of Necessity, as vulgarly understood) things that exist may be said to be necessary, either with a general or particular Necessity. The existence of a thing
ᝂњ᠔᳝ⱘ⢔⊕ˈ䁡⚎ᶤϔџ⠽ϡ䂪བԩᖙ ᅮᄬⱐ⫳˗ᰃᕲ᳔᱂䘡㗠ܼ䴶ⱘ㾔咲 ⳟ՚ˈᶤϔᮋ㿔ᅗᄬⱐ⫳ⱘੑ丠ǃ݊Џ 䁲㟛ᬬ䗄䁲П䭧᳝㨫ⳳᆺ⛵䁸ⱘ䮰֖ᰖˈ៥ ץህৃ䁾ℸϔџ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳ϔᅮ᳝᱂ 䘡ⱘᖙ✊ᗻDŽ ⭊៥ץ䁾ᶤϔџӊǃ䁾ᶤϔџ⠽ⱘ ᄬⱐ⫳ᰃϔᅮⱘˈᰃᣛ⭊≦᳝ӏԩ䮰ᮐ Ҏǃџǃᰖㄝ㋴᳗ᬍ䅞ᶤϔ⡍ᅮ⢔⊕ᰖ˗ ᣛ≎ᅮᮋ㿔ᶤϔџ⠽ᄬⱐ⫳ⱘੑ 丠ǃ݊Џ䁲㟛ᬬ䗄䁲䭧ᰃ৺᳝ⳳᆺ⛵䁸ⱘ䮰 ֖ᰖˈ䁡⚎᳝ড়⧚ⱘḍˈ៥ץህৃ䁾ᶤϔ џӊᶤϔџ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳᳝ⱘ߹ןᖙ ✊ᗻDŽ᠔ҹˈ㟇ᇥᇡᮐ䁆⡍ᅮⱘҎǃџǃᰖ 㗠㿔ˈ៥ץᡞ݊ᖙ✊ᗻ⭊དڣᰃ᳔᱂䘡㗠 ㌩ᇡⱘDŽℸˈϡ㗗ᝂןҎПᛣᖫⱘᚙ⊕ ϟˈϡ䂪䁆ᄬⱐ⫳ⱘџ⠽ᰃ৺᳝᱂䘡ⱘ ᖙ✊ᗻˈҪ≎ߎخץᛣⱘ⭊ᰖˈᇡҪץ㗠 㿔ˈ݊ᖙ✊ᗻᮐ䁆џ⠽ⱘᄬⱐ⫳䰏ℶ њᇡ䁆џ⠽ߎᮐ݊Ҫᛣᖫ㗠᳝᠔㸠ࢩDŽ៥ᠧ ㅫҹϟⱘ䂪䗄Ёˈᡞࠡ䗄ᛇ⊩䘽⫼ᮐ߹ן ⱘџ՟DŽ᳝ⱘ߹ןᖙ✊ᗻПⳌৠџ⠽ˈህ ㅫϡ٭᱂䘡ⱘᖙ✊ᗻˈгϡᰃ៥⧒ץ᠔ 㽕㗗ᝂⱘDŽे֓བℸˈᅗг⛵⊩ᬍ䅞៥ץᇡ 。ᖙ✊ᗻⱘ⢔⊕᠔ⱘऔߚDŽ
៥ࠡ᭛ЁᏆߚܙഄ㾷䞟䘢Njᖙ✊ⱘnj 㟛Njᖙ✊nj䗭ܽ⫼ן䁲ˈ᭛ᅌЁˈᔶϞ ᅌЁ㟛⼲ᅌ⠁䂪ⱘ᭛ゴЁˈᅗⱘץᛣ㕽ˈ ᰖᐌ㹿䘢ᑺᓊԌՓ⫼ˈ⫮㟇ϔ㠀ⱘॳᛣϡ ৠDŽ བℸഄ䁾ᯢNjᖙ✊ⱘnj㟛Njᖙ✊nj 䗭ܽ ៤ҕ
⫼ן䁲ⱘᛣ㕽ˈᇛ᳗ᐿࡽ㾷䞟ᅗⱘץড㕽䀲 Njϡৃ㛑ⱘnj㟛Njϡৃ㛑njDŽ⚎ᅗץП䭧 ଃϔⱘϡৠᰃˈϔ⚎㚃ᅮˈϔ⚎৺ᅮDŽNj ϡৃ㛑njህᰃNj৺ᅮⱘᖙ✊njˈᰃNjᖙ✊ ϡབℸnjⱘᛣᗱDŽ⭊ᅗ㹿⭊៤⫼䁲ˈህ㛿䲶 њॳ՚ⱘ᱂䗮ᛣ㕽DŽ
may be said to be necessary with a general Necessity, when, all things considered, there is a foundation for the certainty of their existence; or when in the most general and universal view of things, the subject and predicate of the proposition, which affirms its existence, would appear with an infallible connection. An event, or the existence of a thing, may be said to be necessary with a particular Necessity, when nothing that can be taken into consideration, in or about a person, thing, or time, alters the case at all, as to the certainty of an event, or the existence of a thing; or can be of any account at all, in determining the infallibility of the connection of the subject and predicate in the proposition which affirms the existence of the things; so that it is all one, as to that person, or thing, at least, at that time, as if the existence were necessary with a Necessity that is most universal and absolute. Thus there are many things that happen to particular persons, in the existence of which no will of theirs has any concern, at least, at that time; which, whether they are necessary or not, with regard to things in general, yet are necessary to them, and with regard to any volition of theirs at that time; as they prevent all acts of the will about the affair.—I shall have occasion to apply this observation to particular instances in the following discourse.—Whether the same things that are necessary with a particular Necessity, be not also necessary with a general Necessity, may be a matter of future consideration. Let that be as it will, it alters not the case, as to the use of this distinction of the kinds of Necessity. These things may be sufficient for the explaining of the terms necessary and Necessity, as terms of art, and as often used by metaphysicians, and controversial writers in divinity, in a sense diverse from, and more extensive than, their original meaning, in common language, which was before explained. What has been said to show the meaning of the terms necessary and necessity, may be sufficient for the explaining of the opposite terms, impossible and impossibility. For there is no difference, but only the latter are negative, and the former positive. Impossibility is the same as negative necessity, or a Necessity that a thing should not be. And it is used as a term of art in a like diversity from the original and vulgar meaning, with Necessity. ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
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៥ץгNjϡ㛑ⱘnj㟛Njϡ㛑nj䗭ܽן ⫼䁲П䭧ˈⳟࠄ串Ԑⱘ䮰֖DŽ៥ץᏆ㍧⊼ᛣ ࠄˈᅗॳץ՚ⱘᛣ㕽ᰃ㟛ᛣᖫࡾ᳝䮰֖ ⱘˈџᆺϞгឝ⭊ᰃབℸˈᅗⱘᛣᗱህᰃ ᳝㛑䘨ࠄᖗ㺣ⱘ丬ᳯࡾⱘⳂ῭DŽԚᰃ ⭊ᅌᆊ㟛⼲ᅌϞՓ⫼䗭ѯᇜ䭔⫼䁲ᰖˈ ⡍߹ᰃ䙷ѯ⠁䂪㞾⬅ᛣᖫⱘᅌ㗙ˈץᇡᮐ䗭 ѯ⫼䁲㍧ᐌᰃϡ⭊ⱘՓ⫼䘢ᑺⱘ㾷䅔ˈ 䀅ᆺ䱯ⱘឝ⫼Ϟˈॏϡ᳝㛑䘨ࠄᖗ㺣 丬ᳯࡾⳂ῭ⱘᛣᗱDŽ ⭊⠁䂪ⱘᅌ㗙ץՓ⫼Njᖙ✊ⱘnjǃNj ϡৃ㛑ⱐ⫳njǃNjϡ㛑ⱘnjㄝㄝ⫼䁲ᰖˈ䗭 ѯᄫህ㛿䲶ᅗⱘץϔ㠀㾷䞟ˈৠῷⱘᚙ⊕г ⱐ⫳Njⱘⱐيnj䗭⫼ן䁲ϞDŽձ✻៥ࠡץ 䴶ⱘ㿢䂪ˈ⭊ϔӊџ㟛ᅗⱘࠡП䮰֖ˈ ϡ㛑㹿ᯢⱑഄ䕼䄬ᰖˈ៥ץህ々П⚎Njي ⱐnjˈᰃᛣⱐ⫳˗гህᰃ䁾៥䷤⊩⛵ץ ␀ᅗDŽ⡍߹ᰃˈ⭊ᶤџⱐ⫳ᰖ៥ץџܜϡⶹ ᚙˈᅗϡ៥ⱘץ㿜ࡗЁˈгϡ៥ⱘץ 㛑㆘ೡПܻˈᅗህ㹿៥ץ々П⚎Njⱐي ⱘnjˈᰃᛣⱘDŽ ԚᰃNjⱐيnj䗭䀲㍧ᐌ㹿⏋іՓ⫼ˈϺ ≦᳝㹿⫼㟛ࠡП䮰֖ϡ㛑㹿ߚ䕼ⱘᚙ⊕ ϟˈҹ㟇ᮐᅗᰃৃҹ㹿䷤␀ⱘˈড㗠㹿⫼ ᶤѯᅠܼ≦᳝ࠡӏԩ⧚⬅ⱘџᚙϞˈ 䗭џᚙⱘⱐ⫳㟛᠔䃖ⱘࠡ⧚⬅ᰃ≦᳝ӏ ԩⱘ䮰㙃DŽ
ಯ㆔˖औߚ㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊ǃ䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊ ϡ㛑 ࠡ᭛᠔㾷䞟ⱘNjᖙ✊njৃߚ⚎Nj䘧ᖋⱘ ᖙ✊nj㟛Nj㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊njܽ。ˈᅗ⺎ץᆺ ᳝ڣᰃⳈᬬহᄤЁˈЏ䁲ᬬ䗄䁲䭧ᅮϡ 䅞ⱘ䮰֖ˈ䗭。ᖙ✊ᗻ⫼Ҏ⼲ⱘ䑿Ϟˈ
The same may be observed concerning the words unable and inability. It has been observed, that these terms, in their original and common use, have relation to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient for the bringing to pass the thing willed and endeavored. But as these terms are often used by philosophers and divines, especially writers on controversies about Free Will, they are used in a quite different and far more extensive sense, and are applied to many cases wherein no will or endeavor for the bringing of the thing to pass is or can be supposed. As the words necessary, impossible, unable, &c. are used by polemic writers, in a sense diverse from their common signification, the like has happened to the term contingent. Any thing is said to be contingent, or to come to pass by chance or accident, in the original meaning of such words, when its connection with its causes or antecedents, according to the established course of things, is not discerned; and so is what we have no means of foreseeing. And especially is any thing said to be contingent, or accidental, with regard to us, when it comes to pass without our foreknowledge, and besides our design and scope. But the word contingent is abundantly used in a very different sense; not for that whose connection with the series of things we cannot discern, so as to foresee the event, but for something which has absolutely no previous ground or reason, with which its existence has any fixed and certain connection.
Section IV. Of the distinction of natural and moral Necessity, and Inability. That Necessity which has been explained, consisting in an infallible connexion of the things signified by the subject and predicate of a proposition, as intelligent beings are the subjects of it, is distinguished into moral and natural Necessity.
ᰃ៥ⷨץおⱘᇡ䈵DŽ ℸᰖˈ៥ϡᠧㅫお䗭ߚן䕼ᰃ৺ᰃᙄ ⭊ⱘᅠ㕢ⱘ˗Ԛॏ㽕㾷䞟䗭ܽ。Njᖙ✊nj ϔ㠀ⱘᚙ⊕ϟˈҹϟⱘ㿢䂪Ёˈᰃབ
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
I shall not now stand to inquire whether this distinction be a proper and perfect distinction; but shall only explain how these two sorts of Necessity are understood, as the terms are sometimes used, and as they are
ԩ㹿Փ⫼ⱘDŽ Nj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊nj㹿ᮍ䴶ⱘՓ⫼˗᳝ᰖ 㹿⭊ᰃ䘧ᖋ䊀ӏⱘᖙ✊DŽ᠔ҹˈ⭊ϔןҎ ফࠄ䊀ӏ㟛㡃ⶹⱘᴳ㏯ˈℸҪϡᕫϡሹ㸠 Ҫឝ䁆ˈⱘخ៥ץህ䁾ˈ䗭Ҏᰃᖙ✊᳗䉴 䊀DŽ៥ץᐌᐌᦣ䗄䞡䊀ӏᰖՓ⫼ᖙ✊䗭 ן䀲DŽ᳝ᰖNj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊njᰃᣛџ⠽П䭧᳝ ᯢ乃ⱘ䮰֖ˈ䗭ן䮰֖䎇ҹ䄝ᯢ䘧ᖋϞ᳝ ᖙ✊ᗻ˗гℸˈৃҹ㟛Nj㌩ᇡⱘᖙ✊njऔ ߚ䭟՚ˈ㌩ᇡⱘᖙ✊ᣛџ⠽П䭧ⱘᖙ✊ᗻᰃ ⺎ᆺ⛵䁸ⱘDŽ䗭。⫼⊩Ϟˈ⚎Ҏץ䮰់ Ҫץ㞾Ꮕⱘᅝܼ㟛߽ⲞˈϪҎⱘ㸠⚎㟛㟝ℶ 䗮ᐌህᰃ㮝㨫䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊ˈ՚㎁ᣕ⼒᳗ⱘ 䂻DŽϔѯᰖˈ䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊ᰃᛣ䃖ࠡ㟛 ᕠᵰⱘᖙ✊ˈᅗᰃᕲ䘧ᖋⱘॳ᠔⫶⫳ⱘˈ ՟བڒ㟛ࢩ″ⱘᔋᑺ䀅ᚙ⊕ϟ≎ᛣ ঞ㸠⚎᳝䮰DŽህڣᰃڒⱘᔋᑺˈᰃࢩ″ ⱘᔋᑺˈ䀅ᚙ⊕ϟˈᰃ㟛ᶤѯ≎ᛣ㸠 ⚎䭧᳝ᶤ。ϔᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖DŽ䗭ᴀЁˈ ៥Փ⫼Nj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊nj䗭䀲ᰖˈᰃᣛᕠ䴶ϔ 。ᅮ㕽DŽ ᠔䃖Nj㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊njˈᰃᣛ⭊ᅗ䘟⫼ Ҏ䑿ϞᰖˈҎህ㰩㞾✊㽣ᕟⱘࠊПϟˈ ᅗᰃ㟛᠔䃖ⱘ䘧ᖋॳϡৠDŽ䘧ᖋⱘॳབ ϟ˖ןҎⱘ㖦ǃܻᖗⱘأདǃҹঞ䘧ᖋⱘ ࢩ″݊Ҫⱘ䁬DŽབℸˈ䀅ᚙ⊕П ϟˈ៥ץ䗣䘢㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊ህ៤⚎ᛳᅬⱘЏ 储˖↨བ䁾ˈ䑿储ফࠄڋᆇᰖˈ៥ץᛳࠄ ⮐⮯˗⭊ⴐᰃᔉ䭟ⱘᰖˈᯢ҂ⱘܝ㎮ ϟˈ៥ץህⳟࠄਜ⧒ⴐࠡⱘ᱃⠽˗↨བ 䁾ˈা㽕ⶹ䘧ᶤѯ⫼䁲ⱘᛣ㕽ˈ៥ץህᖙ✊ ⶁ㾷᠔䱇䗄ⱘᅮ⧚˗ህབ ࡴ ㄝᮐ ˈ咥㡆ϡ ᰃⱑⱘˈܽṱᑇ㸠㎮∌䘴ϡ㛑ⳌѸDŽজ↨བ 䁾ˈᕲ㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊՚ⳟˈ㢹≦᳝ӏԩⱘᬃᩤ
used in the following discourse. The phrase, moral Necessity, is used variously: sometimes it is used for a Necessity of moral obligation. So we say, a man is under Necessity, when he is under bonds of duty and conscience, from which he cannot be discharged. Again, the word Necessity is often used for great obligation in point of interest. Sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that apparent connexion of things, which is the ground of moral evidence; and so is distinguished from absolute Necessity, or that sure connexion of things, that is a foundation for infallible certainty. In this sense, moral Necessity signifies much the same as that high degree of probability, which is ordinarily sufficient to satisfy mankind, in their conduct and behavior in the world, as they would consult their own safety and interest, and treat others properly as members of society. And sometimes by moral Necessity is meant that Necessity of connexion and consequence, which arises from such moral causes, as the strength of inclination, or motives, and the connexion which there is in many cases between these and such certain volitions and actions. And it is in this sense, that I use the phrase, moral necessity, in the following discourse. By natural necessity, as applied to men, I mean such Necessity as men are under through the force of natural causes; as distinguished from what are called moral causes, such as habits and dispositions of the heart, and moral motives and inducements. Thus men, placed in certain circumstances, are the subjects of particular sensations by Necessity: they feel pain when their bodies are wounded; they see the objects presented before them in a clear light, when their eyes are opened: so they assent to the truth of certain propositions, as soon as the terms are understood; as that two and two make four, that black is not white, that two parallel lines can never cross one another; so by a natural Necessity men’s bodies move downwards, when there is nothing to support them.
ᰖˈҎⱘ䑿储ᰃ᳗ϟ㨑ⱘDŽ ᳝ᑒῷ䮰ᮐ䗭ܽ。ᖙ✊ⱘџˈᰃឝ䁆㽕
But here several things may be noted concerning these two kinds of Necessity.
⊼ᛣⱘDŽ Nj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊njᰃڣNj㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊nj ϔῷⱘ㌩ᇡDŽгህᰃ䁾ˈNj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊nj 㟛 ᅗⱘ䘧ᖋॳ᳝ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖ˈህབNj 㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊njг᳗㟛㞾✊ⱘॳ᳝ᅮϡ
1. Moral Necessity may be as absolute as natural Necessity. That is, the effect may be as perfectly connected with its moral cause, as a natural, necessary effect is with its natural cause. Whether the Will in every case is necessarily determined by the strongest ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
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䅞ⱘ䮰֖DŽϡ䂪䗭ᛣᖫᰃ৺ᰃ⬅᳔ᔋⱘࢩ″ ᠔≎ᅮˈгϡ䂪䗭ᛣᖫᰃ৺᳒ᢉ䗭ࢩן ″ˈᰃ᳒㍧ডᇡ䙷᳔ᔋⱘڒˈᰃ᳒ ডᇡˈ؛བ䙷ן䘢ᰃ᳝⠁䂪ᗻⱘˈ៥䙘 ⣰ᛇ≦᳝Ҏ᳗৺䁡ˈᶤ。ᚙ⊕ϟˈ⚎ܹܜ Џⱘ៤㽟䙷ࢩ″ˈ㢹ᰃ䴲ᐌⱘᔋ⚜ˈ䙷咐 䗭ןᛣᖫⱘ㸠⚎ᖙᅮ㟛ᅗץ᳝ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰 ֖DŽ᠔᳝ⱘҎ䛑᳗ৠᛣˈ㢹᳝ᔋ⚜ⱘࢩ″ ៤㽟ˈᢉᅗץᇛ᳗䴲ᐌೄ䲷DŽᅗץ㢹ᰃᰃ ᔋѯˈ䙷ೄ䲷ᑺ᳗ᰃⱘDŽᮐᰃˈ؛ བᅗⱘץᔋᑺ㹿ࡴࠄᶤϔᑺˈ៤⚎Ὁ ⱘೄ䲷ˈᅗᑒТᰃᅠܼϡৃ㛑㹿ܟ᳡њˈձ ✻䗭ןㇵஂⱘ⧚⬅ˈϡ䂪Ҏབԩএᇟᕫ䙷ܟ ᳡ೄ䲷ⱘ㛑ˈԚ䙷㛑ϡ᳗ᰃ⛵䰤䞣ⱘˈ ᠔ҹᅗϡ᳗䍙䘢ϔᅮⱘ䰤ᑺDŽ؛㢹ϔןҎ᳝ Ѡकߚⱘ䞣ˈҪ㛑ܟ᳡कߚⱘᶤ。ೄ䲷 ᰃ⚎䞣ⱘᔋᑺ䍙ߎೄ䲷ⱘᔋᑺDŽԚ㢹 ೄ䲷ᑺࡴࠄϝकᑺˈϔⱒᑺˈ⫮㟇ϔग ᑺˈ㗠Ҫⱘ䞣≦᳝䎳㨫ࡴˈ䙷咐Ҫⱘ 䞣ᇛᅠܼϡ䎇ҹܟ᳡䙷ೄ䲷DŽ᠔ҹ៥ץᖙ䷜ ᡓ䁡ˈᶤϔןᚙ⊕ПϟˈNj䘧ᖋⱘॳnj 㟛Nj䘧ᖋⱘ㌤ᵰnj᳝ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖ˈ䗭 ᴀЁˈ៥ᇛ䗭。ᖙ✊々П⚎Nj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ ✊njDŽ ˎ ⭊៥⫼Nj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊nj㟛Nj㞾✊ ⱘᖙ✊nj䗭ܽןϡৠⱘৡ々ᰖˈᏠᳯϡ㽕㹿 䁸㾷⚎⭊䂪ঞ䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊ᰖˈ᠔᳝㞾✊ⱘџ 䛑㟛ᅗ⛵䮰ˈডПѺ✊DŽ៥ⱘ㿢䂪Ёˈ៥ ϡ᳗ࣙ⭊ϔן䘧ᖋ㖦ࢩ″ᕜᔋ⚜ˈՓ ᛣᖫⱘ㸠ࢩᅠܼ䎳䱼ᅗˈᰃ৺гߎᮐ㞾✊ⱘ ॳDŽԚᰃNj㞾✊ⱘnj㟛Nj䘧ᖋⱘnjܽ⫼ן 䁲ˈাᰃ㹿⫼՚々䗭ܽ。ϡৠⱘᖙ✊˗ ⚎ᅗץП䭧᳝ѯᏂ⭄ˈ䗭ѯᏂ⭄ᇡᅗᕠᵰⱘ ᕅ䷓ᰃᕜ䞡㽕ⱘˈ᠔ҹᅗץᖙ䷜ҹϡৠⱘৡ 々՚औ߹DŽ✊㗠ˈ䗭Ꮒ⭄Ϻϡᰃᮐᰃ৺᳝ ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖ˈ㗠ᰃાܽ。џ⠽Ϟ᳝ ᅮϡ䅞ⱘ䮰֖DŽ䮰ᮐ䘧ᖋᖙ✊ᗻˈᅗⱘॳ ᰃᕜ⡍⅞ⱘˈ䗭ॳᰃ䓗⚎⡍⅞ⱘˈህᰃ 䁾ˈᅗᰃቀ䘧ᖋⱘॳˈϔࠛᰃ䘢এ㟞᳝ⱘ 㖦ˈ㗙ᰃᶤѯᯢ乃ৃⶹⱘࢩ″DŽ䮰ᮐ䘧 ᖋᖙ✊ᗻˈᅗⱘ㌤ᵰгᰃ↨䓗⡍⅞ⱘˈᰃ㟛 䘧ᖋⱘᗻ䊾᳝䮰˗ᅗᰃ⬅ϔѯܻᖗⱘڒ
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
motive, or whether the Will ever makes any resistance to such a motive, or can ever oppose the strongest present inclination, or not; if that matter should be controverted, yet I suppose none will deny, but that, in some cases, a previous bias and inclination, or the motive presented, may be so powerful, that the act of the will may be certainly and indissolubly connected therewith. When motives or previous bias are very strong, all will allow that there is some difficulty in going against them. And if they were yet stronger, the difficulty would be still greater. And therefore, if more were still added to their strength, to a certain degree, it would make the difficulty so great, that it would be wholly impossible to surmount it; for this plain reason, because whatever power men may be supposed to have to surmount difficulties, yet that power is not infinite; and so goes not beyond certain limits. If a man can surmount ten degrees of difficulty of this kind with twenty degrees of strength, because the degrees of strength are beyond the degrees of difficulty; yet if the difficulty be increased to thirty, or an hundred, or a thousand degrees, and his strength not also increased, his strength will be wholly insufficient to surmount the difficulty. As therefore it must be allowed, that there may be such a thing as a sure and perfect connexion between moral causes and effects; so this only is what I call by the name of moral Necessity. 2. When I use this distinction of moral and natured Necessity, I would not he understood to suppose, that if any thing come to pass by the former kind of Necessity, the nature of things is not concerned in it, as well as in the latter. I do not mean to determine, that when a moral habit or motive is so strong, that the act of the Will infallibly follows, this is not owing to the nature of things. But natural and moral are the terms by which these two kinds of Necessity have usually been called; and they must be distinguished by some names, for there is a difference between them, that is very important in its consequences. This difference, however, does not lie so much in the nature of the connexion, as in the two terms connected. The cause with which the effect is connected, is of a particular kind; viz. that which is of a moral nature; either some previous habitual disposition, or some motive exhibited to the understanding. And the effect is also of a particular kind; being likewise of a moral nature; consisting in some inclination or volition of the soul, or voluntary action.
㗙ᰃЏࢩⱘ㸠⚎᠔㌘៤DŽ ៥⣰Njᖙ✊nj㹿々⚎Nj㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊njˈ ᰃ⚎њ㟛Nj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊nj᳝औߚˈህᰃ㟛䙌 ⛵䮰DŽ⭊៥ץ⫼㞾✊䗭⫼ן䀲ᰖˈ㞾✊ ҷ㸼ⱘᛣᗱህᰃ≦᳝䙌DŽ⚎៥ץᕲᇣህ ᰃᕲ䙷ѯᯢ乃ৃⶹⱘџϞˈ՚䁡䄬㞾✊DŽ 㗠Ϩˈᇡ᠔㾔ᆳࠄⱘ䗭ѯџˈ៥ⱘץ䙌 䛑ϡ㛑ⱐᧂӏԩࡳ㛑˗⡍߹ᰃ䙷⠽䊾ⱘϪ ⬠㺣˗ᭌⱘᚙ⊕ϟˈ៥⧚ץ᠔⭊✊ഄ ফњ㞾✊ⱘᬭ㿧ˈгᡓফњ㞾✊᠔Ѹ ㌺៥ⱘץDŽԚ៥ץॏ≦᳝䁇㌄ⱘߚ䕼䙷ѯ㞾 ✊ⱘ㽣ࠛঞ䮰֖ˈ䲪✊ձ✻Ꮖ㍧ᓎゟⱘ⊩ ࠛˈᅗץП䭧ឝ䁆᳝ᶤѯ䮰֖ˈ៥ץॏϡ⫼ 㞾✊䗭ן䀲՚ᦣ䗄ᅗץDŽ៥ץг᳗ⱐ⧒ˈे Փ⠽䊾㟛≦᳝⫳ੑⱘϪ⬠㺣ˈ䙷ѯ≦✻ৃ ⶹⱘ㽣ࠛⱐ⫳ⱘџˈ៥ץϡ々䗭ѯџᚙ⚎ 㞾✊ˈ㗠ᰃ々ᅗ⚎ץᛣǃ″᳗ǃⱐيᗻㄝ ㄝDŽ᠔ҹˈҎץऔ߹㞾✊㟛䙌ˈདڣᅗץ ᰃᅠܼ≦᳝䮰֖ⱘDŽ✊㗠ˈ៥䙘⣰ᛇ≦᳝Ҏ ᳗ডᇡˈ䀅ᚙ⊕ϟˈ䙌ᰃᕲNj㞾✊nj ⭊Ё㸡⫳ߎ՚ⱘˈህབৠ݊Ҫџӊϔ㠀DŽԚ ᰃˈձ⧒᳝ⱘᅮᕟˈ䙌ⱘ㸠⚎㟛䙌 ⱘॳП䭧ⱘ䮰֖ˈϺϡᰃ䴲ᐌᯢ乃DŽϺ Ϩˈ៥⧒ⱐץNj䙌njᰃϔן㸠⚎ⱘᮄॳ ࠛˈ㟛䘢এ᠔䁡ⶹ䮰ᮐ㞾✊Пџ⠽᳝᠔ϡ ৠDŽNj䙌njᕔᕔ᳗ҟܹǃᠧᮋˈϺ䔝⿏ џᚙⱘⱐሩ䘢ˈᬍ䅞џᚙⱘ䘆㸠ᮍDŽ ПᕠˈNj䙌njህ㹿⭊ϔן㟛Nj㞾✊nj㌩ ᇡϡৠⱘ㸠⚎ॳࠛˈ㹿⭊ᰃ㟛㞾✊Ⳍডⱘ ⫼䁲DŽℷབҎץᰃձ✻џ⠽ⱘ⡍ᖉᛳফ՚ ੑৡˈϺ≦᳝㍧䘢⏅ᗱ❳ᝂDŽ
ˏ ៥ץᖙ䷜⊼ᛣˈḍҹϞ᠔㾷䞟ⱘˈ ៥ץᇡNj䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊njПᅮ㕽ˈ㟛ॳ՚ⱘᾟ ᛇϡৠˈг㟛䁆ᄫⱘॳᛣ᳝߹˖ձࠡ᭛ⱘ 㿢䂪ˈ䗭ѯ⫼䁲՟བ˖ᖙ✊ⱘǃϡৃ㛑ⱘǃ ⛵⊩ᡫᢦㄝㄝˈϔ㠀ⱘ㿔䁲Ё᳔ᙄ⭊ⱘ㾷 䞟ˈ䛑᳝Ⳍᇡⱘᛣᗱˈгህᰃϡ䎇ҹࢱ䘢 ডᇡⱘ䞣ᰃⲵ㞾Ꮕⱘࡾгϡ㛑䘨ࠄDŽ
I suppose, that Necessity which is called natural in distinction from moral Necessity, is so called, because mere nature, as the word is vulgarly used, is concerned, without any thing of choice. The word nature is often used in opposition to choice; not because nature has indeed never any hand in our choice; but, probably, because we first get our notion of nature from that obvious course of events, which we observe in many things where our choice has no concern; and especially in the material world; which, in very many parts of it, we easily perceive to be in a settled course; the stated order, and manner of succession, being very apparent. But where we do not readily discern the rule and connexion, (though there be a connexion, according to an established law, truly taking place,) we signify the manner of event by some other name. Even in many things which are seen in the material and inanimate world, which do not obviously come to pass according to any settled course, men do not call the manner of the event by the name of nature, but by such names as accident, chance, contingence, &c. So men make a distinction between nature and choice; as if they were completely and universally distinct. Whereas, I suppose none will deny but that choice, in many cases, arises from nature, as truly as other events. But the connexion between acts of choice, and their causes, according to established laws, is not so obvious. And we observe that choice is, as it were, a new principle of motion and action, different from that established order of things which is most obvious, and seen especially in corporeal things. The choice also often interposes, interrupts, and alters the chain of events in these external objects, and causes them to proceed otherwise than they would do, if let alone. Hence it is spoken of as if it were a principle of motion entirely distinct from nature, and properly set in opposition to it. Names being commonly given to things, according to what is most obvious, and is suggested by what appears to the senses without reflection and research. 3. It must be observed, that in what has been explained, as signified by the name of moral Necessity, the word Necessity is not used according to the original design and meaning of the word: for, as was observed before, such terms, necessary, impossible, irresistible, &c. in common speech, and their most proper sense, are always relative; having reference to some supposable voluntary opposition or endeavour, that is insufficient. ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
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Ԛ᳝䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊ᗻⱘᰖˈ៥ץϡ㛑؛䀁 ᳝ডᇡⱘ䞣ˈгϡ㛑؛䀁ᡫ㸵ⱘᛣᖫࡾ ˈ⚎䘧ᖋⱘᖙ✊ᗻᰃࣙڒ㟛ᛣᖫⱘ ᅮϡ䅞ˈॏ≦᳝؛䀁ᛣᖫডᇡᡫᢦDŽ ℸˈ䁾ϔןҎডᇡҪ㞾Ꮕℷ䙌ⱘџᰃ ϡড়⧚ⱘˈ⭊ϟⱘ䙌ᰃডᇡ㟛ᡫᢦ⭊ϟ ⱘ䙌ˈгᰃϡড়⧚ⱘ˗ℷབ䁾ˈϔן⠽储 ৠϔᰖ䭧ˈ㛑ܽⳌןডⱘᮍ⿏ࢩˈ䙷 ᰃৠῷϡড়⧚ⱘDŽ᠔ҹˈ៥؛ץ䀁᳝䘧ᖋⱘ ᖙ✊ᗻⱘᰖˈḍᴀህϡৃ؛䀁ϔןডᇡ
But no such opposition, or contrary will and endeavour, is supposable in the case of moral Necessity; which is a certainty of the inclination and will itself; which does not admit of the supposition of a will to oppose and resist it. For it is absurd, to suppose the same individual will to oppose itself, in its present act; or the present choice to be opposite to and resisting present choice: as absurd as it is to talk of two contrary motions, in the same moving body, at the same time.— And therefore the very case supposed never admits of any trial, whether an opposing or resisting will can overcome this Necessity.
ᡫᢦⱘᛣᖫ㛑ࢱ䘢䗭ןᖙ✊DŽ ҹϞ᠔㿢䂪᳝䮰㞾✊ⱘᖙ✊㟛䘧ᖋⱘᖙ ✊ˈৃҹᐿࡽ៥ⶁץ㾷Nj㞾✊ⱘϡ㛑nj㟛Nj 䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑njП㕽DŽ⭊៥ץᛇ㽕خॏϡ㛑 ࠄخᰖˈ⚎䗮ᐌ㹿々⚎㞾✊ϡܕ䀅䗭џ㹿 خ៤ˈ⚎៥ץᛣᖫҹ᳝ѯᴀᗻⱘ㔎䱋 ᰃⱘོ⻭˗ϡㅵᰃᣛ䁡ⶹⱘࡳ㛑 Ϟǃ䑿储ⱘ⢔⊕Ϟǃᰃⱘᇡ䈵Ϟˈ 䗭ѯ㋴䛑䗴៤Nj㞾✊ⱘϡ㛑njDŽNj䘧ᖋⱘ ϡ㛑njϡᰃ⬅ҹϞⱘ㋴᠔䗴៤˗㗠ᰃ⬅ᮐ 㔎ᇥএ䙌ⱘڒˈᰃ⬅ᮐᔋ⚜ⱘϡএ䙌 ⱘڒ˗ᰃডᇡࢩ″ⱘ䞣ˈᰃ 㔎ᇥ䎇ⱘࢩ″՚哧㟲ᛣᖫএ㸠ࢩˈгৃ㛑 ܽן㋴䛑᳝DŽ㍰㗠㿔ПˈNj䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑nj ᰃᕲ㔎ᇥڒ⬅Ⳍডⱘڒ㗠՚DŽ⚎ϔ ןҎ⬅ᮐࢩ″ⱘ㔎ˈⳌডⱘࢩ″Ԩ۾ ࢶˈ㗠ϡ㛑ᶤ。䙌ᰖˈ䗭。ᚙ⊕ⱘ ᕅ䷓ϟˈ៥ৃץҹ䁾Ҫ⬅ᮐڒⱘ㔎ᇥⳌ ডⱘڒԨњϞ乼㗠ϡ㛑ᶤ。䙌DŽ
㟝ѯ՟ᄤ՚㾷䞟䗭Nj䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑nj˖ ϔԡᇞ䊈জ䉲┨ⱘ်ཇৃ㛑᳝Nj䘧ᖋⱘϡ 㛑njˈϡ᳗㟛ཌྷⱘک㸠ྺ⎿ПџDŽϔ⏅ן ᛯҪⱘ⠊↡জ䉴䊀ӏⱘᄽᄤৃ㛑ϡ㛑ᆇ㞾 Ꮕⱘ⠊㽾ˈгᰃ䘧ᖋϞⱘϡ㛑DŽϔןད㡆ⱘ ⬋Ҏˈ⭊Ҫ㰩ᮐད″᳗Ϻফࠄ䁬ᚥᰖˈ≦ ᳝ӏԩ⪄๗㆔ࠊПϟˈҪ䀅ϡ㛑ᢉ℆ᳯ ⱘ㸱ࢩDŽϔן䜫䜦ⱘҎˈᶤϔ⡍⅞ⱘจ ড়ˈ䀅ࠊܟϡњ㽕ୱ⚜䜦ⱘ℆ᳯDŽϔןὉ ݊ᚵ↦ⱘҎ䀅ϡ㛑ᇡᭉҎ㸠ҕⱘ㸠⚎ˈ гϡ㛑ῖ㽟ᭉҎ㟜ⲯ˗᳝ϔѯҎᰃབℸഄ ফ㔾ᚵⱘᗻḐ᠔䔘ࠊˈ⫮㟇ᇡ䙷ѯ᳔ؐᕫҪ
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
What has been said of natural and mora! Necessity, may serve to explain what is intended by natural arid moral Inability. We are said to be naturally unable to do a thing, when we cannot do it if we will, because what is most commonly called nature does not allow of it, or because of some impeding defect or obstacle that is extrinsic to the Will; either in the Faculty of understanding, constitution of body, or external objects. Moral Inability consists not in any of these things; but either in the want of inclination; or the strength of a contrary inclination; or the want of sufficient motives in view, to induce and excite the act of the Will, or the strength of apparent motives to the contrary. Or both these may be resolved into one; and it may be said in one word, that moral Inability consists in the opposition or want of inclination. For when a person is unable to will or choose such a thing, through a defect of motives, or prevalence of contrary motives, it is the same thing as his being unable through the want of an inclination, or the prevalence of a contrary inclination, in such circumstances, and under the influence of such views. To give some instances of this moral Inability.— A woman of great honour and chastity may have a moral Inability to prostitute herself to her slave. A child of great love and duty to his parents, may be thus unable to kill his father. A very lascivious man, in case of certain opportunities and temptations, and in the absence of such and such restraints, may be unable to forbear gratifying his lust. A drunkard, under such and such circumstances, may be unable to forbear taking strong drink. A very malicious man may be unable to exert benevolent acts to an enemy, or to desire his prosperity; yea, some may be so under the power of a vile disposition, that they may be unable to love those who are most worthy of their
ץᛯ᠈ⱘҎˈҪ䛑ϡ㛑ᛯDŽϔן䘧ᖋ催ᇮϨ 㘪┨ⱘҎˈҪৃ㛑⚎䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑㗠ϡᛯӏ ԩⱘ㔾㸠ˈৃ㛑ℸՓᕫҪϡ㛑㋡䙾ᚵ ⱘҎџ⠽ˈгϡ㛑䙌㔾ᚵ㗠أ䲶䘧ᖋⱘ ⫳⌏DŽᕲϔᮍ䴶՚ⳟˈ㖦ᗻⱘ䙾ᚵ㸠 ⚎ˈ᳗ՓᕫϔןҎ㔎ᇥ㛑এ୰ᛯ㘪┨˗г ᳗ՓᕫҪᅠܼϡ㛑এᛯ㘪┨ⱘҎˈϡ㛑এ 䙌ᇛ㘪┨⭊៤ҪⱘࡾⳂ῭DŽ
䗭㺵៥ץ㽕⊼ᛣ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑ⱘߚ䞢˖ϔ ⚎ϔ㠀㖦ᗻⱘ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑˗ϔ⚎⡍ᅮ⢔⊕ ⱘ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑DŽϔ㠀㖦ᗻⱘ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑ˈ៥ ᣛⱘᰃᗻᚙⱘϡ㛑DŽᇡᮐ᠔᳝ⱘᛣᖫ㸠⚎ˈ ⬅ᮐ᳝ⱘ㖦ᗻǃⅬ㔎ⱘ㖦ᗻ≦᳝㖦ᗻˈ 㗠Փᕫᛣᖫϡ㛑এ䙌DŽℸϔןᴀ䊾䴲ᐌ 䙾ᚵⱘҎˈϡ㛑ڣϔܙןⓓ㕢དᗻḐⱘҎ᳝ ҕᛯⱘ㟝ࢩDŽϔןᕲ՚䛑ϡᖗᄬᛳ▔ⱘ ልՇ㖢
Ҏˈ䀅ϡ㛑㸼⧒ߎᛳ䃱ⱘ㸠⚎ˈᰃ⚎Ҫ ᖗ㺵Ϻ≦᳝ᛳ䃱ⱘ㖦DŽ⡍ᅮ⢔⊕ⱘ䘧ᖋⱘ ϡ㛑ˈ៥ᣛⱘᰃϔן⡍ᅮⱘᰖˈᛣᖫᇡ ϔן⡍ᅮ㸠⚎ⱘϡ㛑䙌ˈ⬅ᮐ⭊ϟࢩ″ 䁬ⱘ䒳ᔅˈ⭊ϟ⧚ᗻⱘ߸ᮋˈՓᛣᖫ 䙌њϔן㸠⚎DŽབᵰ៥ࠡ䴶᠔䁾ⱘᰃᇡ ⱘˈ䙷ህᰃ˖ᛣᖫ∌䘴≎ᅮᮐ᳔ᔋⱘࢩ″ˈ 䙷咐ӏԩ㸠⚎Ёˈᛣᖫ䛑᳝⡍ᅮ⢔⊕ϟⱘ ϡ㛑DŽ⚎⡍ᅮ⢔⊕ϟˈҎϡ㛑䙌⭊ ϟ≦᳝䙌ⱘџ⠽˗ᛣᖫϡৃ㛑⭊ϟডᇡ ⭊ᰖⱘࢩ″ˈ䙷Ꮖᰃܼ䴶㗗ᝂᕠ᠔⫶⫳ ⱘࢩ″DŽϔ㠀㖦ᗻⱘ䘧ᖋϡ㛑ˈࠛᰃϔ㠀᳔ ᐌ㹿々⚎ϡ㛑ⱘˈ⚎䗭ן䀲ⱘॳᛣᰃ㟛㔎 ᇥࢩ″⛵䮰DŽϺϨˈ䗭ן䀲㹿⡍߹々Njϡ 㛑nj䙘᳝ϔॳןDŽ⚎ˈབПࠡ᠔⊼ᛣ ⱘˈNjϡ㛑nj䗭ן䀲ˈᑇᐌⱘ⫼䁲Ёˈᰃ ϔן᳝Ⳍᇡᗻⱘ⫼䁲˗ᛣᣛˈ㢹ϔןҎ丬ᛣ гᕜࡾˈ 䙘ᰃϡ䎇ҹՓ᠔␈ᳯ᠔ࡾ ⱘџ⠽ⱐ⫳DŽ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑ϡϔᅮⳟᕫߎ՚ˈ 㢹ϔןҎ᳝Ⳍ⭊ᅮⱘ㖦ᗻˈ៥↨ץ䓗ৃҹ ⳟߎ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑˗㗠⭊ᅗᰃ⡍ᅮ⢔⊕ϟⱐي ⱘ㸠⚎ˈ៥↨ץ䓗ⳟϡߎ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑DŽⱘ ⺎ˈ⭊ϟᛣᖫࡾᰃϡৃ㛑ডᇡϡৠ ᮐ⭊ϟⱘᛣᖫ㸠⚎ˈϡㅵ䗭ѯ㸠⚎ⱘ⫶⫳ᰃ ⡍ᅮⱘ㖦ᗻⱘڒ˗⚎⭊ϟⱘᛣᖫϡ
esteem and affection. A strong habit of virtue, and a great degree of holiness, may cause a moral Inability to love wickedness in general, and may render a man unable to take complacence in wicked persons or things; or to choose a wicked in preference to a virtuous life. And on the other hand, a great degree of habitual wickedness may lay a man under an Inability to love and choose holiness; and render him utterly unable to love an infinitely holy Being, or to choose and cleave to him as his chief good. Here it may be of use to observe this distinction of moral Inability, viz. of that which is general and habitual, and that which is particular and occasional. By a general and habitual moral Inability, I mean an Inability in the heart to all exercises or acts of will of that kind, through a fixed and habitual inclination, or an habitual and stated defect, or want of a certain kind of inclination. Thus a very ill-natured man may be unable to exert such acts of benevolence, as another, who is full of good nature, commonly exerts; and a man whose heart is habitually void of gratitude, may be unable to exert grateful acts. through that stated defect of a grateful inclination. By particular and occasional moral Inability, I mean an Inability of the will or heart to a particular act, through the strength or defect of present motives, or of inducements presented to the view of the understanding, on this occasion.— If it be so, that the Will is always determined by the strongest motive, then it must always have an Inability, in this latter sense, to act otherwise than it does; it not being possible, in any case, that the Will should, at present, go against the motive which has now, all things considered, the greatest advantage to induce it.— The former of these kinds of moral inability is most commonly called by the name of Inability; because the word, in its most proper and original signification, has respect to some stated defect. And this especially obtains the name of Inability also upon another account: — because, as before observed, the word Inability, in its original and most common use, is a relative term; and has respect to will and endeavor, as supposable in the case, and as insufficient to bring to pass the thing desired and endeavored. Now there may be more of an appearance and shadow of this, with respect to the acts which arise from a fixed and strong habit, than others that arise only from transient occasions and causes. Indeed will and endeavour against, or diverse from present acts of the Will are in no case supposable, whether those acts be occasional ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
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㛑⭊ϟⱘᛣᖫϡৠDŽ⭊✊ˈᛣᖫࡾৃ ҹᇡᡫ՚ᇛⱐ⫳ⱘᛣᖫ㸠⚎DŽ䗭Ϻ≦᳝ Ⳓˈ؛䀁ϔןᰖ䭧㺵ⱘᛣᖫ㸠⚎ˈৃҹ ᡫᢦϟϔןᰖ䭧ⱘᛣᖫ㸠⚎ˈϺϨৃҹ␈ᳯ ࡾএ䷤䰆▔ⱐⱐ⫳ⱘᛣᖫ㸠⚎DŽџ ᆺϞˈ䗭ῷⱘ␈ᳯࡾˈϡϔᅮ៤ࡳDŽ ⚎⭊ᆺ䱯ࠄњ䙷ן՚ᰖࠏˈ㖦ᗻⱘ䞣᳗ 㗏䗭ѯ␈ᳯࡾDŽ⬅ℸⳟ՚ˈ᳝ѯᰖ ˈҎϡ䘢ᰃᔋ⚜㖦ᗻⱘᚆᜬ䲌DŽԚᰃˈ ៥ץ᳝ѯᰖ䙘ᰃৃҹᬍ䅞ⱘˈ㢹៥≦ץ᳝ ᅮ㖦ᗻⱘڒˈ䙷ן՚ᰖࠏˈ៥ⱘץ ␈ᳯࡾᇛৃ៤ࡳDŽ᠔ҹ៥ץ᳗䁾ˈ᳝ 㖦ᗻⱘ䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑ˈ⡍߹㹿々⚎Njϡ㛑njDŽ ᠔ҹˈ៥ⱘץᛣᖫᰃৃҹᡫᢦ՚ⱐ⫳ⱘ 䙌DŽԚ㢹᳝ᔋ⚜ⱘ㖦ᗻᄬˈ៥ⱘץ㖦ᗻ ڒ᳗㗏䗭ןᡫᢦDŽ㗠Ϩ៥⧚ץᗻৃҹᡫ ᢦ⭊ϟⱘᛣᖫ㸠⚎ˈԚ㢹᳝ᔋ⚜ⱘ㖦ᗻˈ㖦 ᗻᐌᐌ᳗㗏⧚ᗻDŽ䗭ᚙᔶгᰃ៥ץ᠔ᐌ㽟 ⱘDŽ
៥ץ䳔㽕⊼ᛣ䗭ܽ。䘧ᖋⱘϡ㛑ˈ᠔䃖 ⱘϡ㛑䗭ן䀲ˈ䗭ܽ。Փ⫼ϞᏆ㟛ϔ㠀Փ ⫼ϡⳌৠњDŽℷ⺎ⱘ䁲⊩Ϟˈϡ㛑䗭ן 䀲াᛣੇ㨫㞾✊ⱘϡ㛑ˈϺϨা䘽⫼ᮐ˖े Փ៥؛ץ䀁Ҫ⭊ϟ丬ᛣ᳝ڒخᶤџˈ Ҫ䙘ᰃϡ㛑ⱘ䗭。ᚙ⊕DŽ᱂䗮ⱘ䁲⊩Ϟˈ ϡㅵϔןҎ᳝咐ഄ់ᘼˈ៥ץгϡ᳗䁾Ҫ ϡ㛑㋘ᴳҪⱘϡএᠧҎˈेՓབℸˈ៥ץ ϡ᳗䁾ˈҪгϡ㛑ᇡҪⱘ䜄ሙ㸼⼎DŽ ᰃˈϡㅵϔן䝝⓶᳝咐␈ᳯୱ䜦ˈ៥ץϡ ᳗䁾Ҫϡ㛑Փ䜦ᵃ䘴䲶ҪⱘఈᏈDŽಈḐ՚ 䁾ˈ៥ץឝ䁆䗭ῷ䁾ˈҎ㢹᳝ৃ㛑䙌এخ ᶤӊџˈҪህ᳝㛑এخ䙷ӊџˈ ᠔ҹ៥ ץϡ㛑䁾ˈҎ㢹丬ᛣҪৃ䙌خᶤӊџᰖˈ Ҫॏϡ㛑䙌ᅗDŽ㢹᳝ϔןҎⱘ㸠⚎ᰃҪ ৃ䙌ⱘ㆘ೡᑩϟˈϨ䗭㸠⚎ᰃᕜᆍᯧᅠ៤ ⱘˈҎ㢹䁾Ҫ⛵⊩خ䗭џˈᰃ䤃䁸ⱘ䁾⊩DŽ ϺϨˈ䮰ᮐ㸠⚎ˈ㢹ᰃབℸˈ䮰ᮐ䙌ˈ ᰃབℸDŽ ⚎䗭乃✊ᰃ䤃ⱘDŽ៥ץϡ㛑 䁾ˈ䗷Ҫᛇ䙌ᰖˈҪ䛑ϡ㛑䙌ᅗDŽ䮰ᮐ
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Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
or habitual; for that would be to suppose the Will, at present, to be otherwise than, at present, it is. But yet their may be will and endeavour against future acts of the Will, or volitions that are likely to take place, as viewed at a distance. It is no contradiction, to suppose that the acts of the Will at one time, may be against the acts of the Will at another time; and there may be desires and endeavors to prevent or excite future acts of the will; but such desires and endeavors are, in many cases, rendered insufficient and vain, through fixedness of habit: when the occasion returns, the strength of habit overcomes and baffles all such opposition. In this respect, a man may be in miserable slavery and bondage to a strong habit. But it may be comparatively easy to make an alteration, with respect to such future acts, as are only occasional and transient; because the occasion or transient cause, if foreseen, may often easily be prevented or avoided. On this account, the moral Inability that attends fixed habits, especially obtains the name of Inability. And then, as the will may remotely and indirectly resist itself, and do it in vain, in the case of strong habits; so reason may resist present acts of the Will, and its resistance be insufficient; and this is more commonly the case also, when the acts arise from strong habit. But it must be observed concerning moral Inability, in each kind of it, that the word Inability is used in a sense very diverse from its original import. The word signifies only a natural Inability, in the proper use of it; and is applied to such cases only wherein a present will or inclination to the thing, with respect to which a person is said to be unable, is supposable. It cannot be truly said, according to the ordinary use of language, that a malicious man, let him be never so malicious, cannot hold his hand from striking, or that he is not able to show his neighbor kindness; or that a drunkard, let his appetite be never so strong, cannot keep the cup from his mouth. In the strictest propriety of speech, a man has a thing in his power, if he has it in his choice, or at his election: and a man cannot be truly said to be unable to do a thing, when he can do it if he will. It is improperly said, that a person cannot perform those external actions, which are dependent on the act of the Will, and which would be easily performed, if the act of the Will were present. And if it be improperly said, that he cannot perform those external voluntary actions, which depend on the Will, it is in some respect more improperly said, that he is unable to
ä™ŒáŞ›Ëˆá‡ĄĎ”â€Ť×&#x;â€ŹŇŽŐšä žá°ƒá†?áŻ§âą˜Ç„á&#x;Ľâ€Ť×Ľâ€Źă˝•ä—ῡ ä žËˆă˘šĎ”â€Ť×&#x;â€ŹŇŽä¸Źá›ŁËˆŇŞá•œá†?áŻ§ä™ŒáŞ›ËˆŃ&#x;ᆺ ĎžËˆŇŞä¸Źá›Łä™ŒáŞ›ŕŠ ŇŞá°ƒŕłźÔ°ä™ŒáŞ›á°ƒâ‰Śáł?á?‚ßš âą˜Ç„ŕ˛´â„¸Ëˆŕłźä—ŃŻŃ&#x;ĎžËˆáĄžâ‰Śáł?â€Ťâą˜ŕ „ŘŽâ€ŹŃ&#x;â…Œ ੢áŽ?ă”ŽĐŁă›‘ŕĄŻá°ƒĎĄá‡Ąâą˜Ç„ŕ˛´âšŽá ”âƒ´ă”Žâą˜ĎĄá°ƒ ϔ‍×&#x;â€ŹŇŽâą˜ă›‘ŕĄŻËˆă— á°ƒĎ”â€Ť×&#x;â€ŹŇŽä™ŒáŞ›âą˜á›Łä¸ŹÇ„ŕłź ä—‍×&#x;‏ᚙ⊕Ď&#x;ËˆŇŽâą˜á–—ŕŠ á´€á—ťă˘šâ€ŤŮÝ‹â€Źá ”äł”âą˜ă›‘ ŕĄŻÇƒŕŠ ÝŠŇŞá ”áł?á–™â€Ťâą˜Ůâ€Źá Ąă›‘ŕŚ?ä™ŒáŞ›ËˆÔšă”Žá‡Ľ â€ŤÚ’â€Źŕ§ĽËˆŇŞá ”ă”ŽĐŁâą˜áˆ…ŕŚžáł?ᛣᖍDŽ
㄀Ѩ㆔˖㞞⏅ă&#x;›ä˜§á–‹äŠ€Ó?ă—™âą˜á›Łă•˝ ೟᎚á?ŒâŤźä ˛Đ ËˆăžžâŹ…äšƒâœŠá°ƒŇŽŕ§ƒŇšäąźá?… ᛣ㸠Ń&#x;âą˜ă›‘ŕĄŻá&#x;Şâ€łáł—Ç„á&#x;Şă—™ä žËˆŇŞŕ§ƒŇšâ›ľá˘Ź ⛾ᴳഄ‍؎‏Ó?ÔŠá›‡â€Ťâą˜ŘŽâ€ŹŃ&#x;Ç„ă— ăžžâŹ…âą˜âłŒŕŚĄŕ ›á°ƒ áŁ›ŇŽŕŚŤŕ „ä°?âťÇƒ á&#x;Şá°ƒĎĄă›‘äąźá?…ᛣ㸠Ń&#x;ǃá&#x;Şá°ƒ ăšżä–żä˜Šăš á–—á›ŁÇ„
ᑇá?Œá ”ä žâą˜ăžžâŹ…ă˘šâşŽá†şá°ƒá&#x;Ľä žâą˜ä™ˇâ€Ť×&#x;‏ᛣ á—ą á&#x;ĽâłŒÖľŕŚžă˝•á°ƒá?†ă?§á…Œáł—ä žä …âą˜ŇŽá&#x;Şá–—⛾ ‍أ‏ă˝&#x;âą˜ŇŽä›‘ĎĄáł—ŕ§şä Ą Ëˆä™ˇĺ’?ËˆŕłźáŽšá?Œâą˜âŤź ä ˛ĎžËˆĎĄä‚Şá°ƒăžžâŹ…á&#x;Şá°ƒÝŠŕŚĄă•˝Ëˆä›‘ϥ㛑ᥞᅗ ⅌ቀáŽ?Ó?Ԋ≌áł?á›Łá–Ťă›‘ŕĄŻâą˜ŇŽá&#x;Şâ ˝Ç„಴⚎޾ ≌áł?á›Łá–Ťă—™ËˆĎĄă›‘áł?Ó?ÔŠă›‘ŕĄŻŕŠ â€łáł—Őąá›Łá–Ť ă— ă¸ ËˆĐłĎĄáł—ăšżä–żâ€ŤßŽŘŽâ€Źä˜Šăš á–—á›Łâą˜Ń&#x;ËˆĐłĎĄ áł—ŕŚŤŕ „ä°?âťËˆĎĄŐąâœťá›ŁáŽźă— ă¸ Ç„ŕ˛´â„¸Ëˆŕ˝–áľ° á&#x;Ľâ€Ť×Ľâ€ŹáŁ?ăžžâŹ…âą˜ŕĽłá›ŁŐšá…Žă•˝Ëˆä žá›Łá–Ťá´€ä‘żáŞ•áł? 㞞⏅á&#x;ŞÝŠŕŚĄá›ŁĐ—á°ƒâ›ľá›Łă•˝âą˜Ç„ŕ˛´âšŽá›Łá–Ťá´€ä‘ż Ϻϥ᪕áł?á›Łá–ŤËˆŕ˝–ŕ§ ä™ŒáŞ›ă›‘ŕĄŻá´€ä‘żĎşĎĄáŞ•áł? ä™ŒáŞ›ă›‘ŕĄŻÇ„áŞ•áł?ä—á›Łá–Ťâą˜Đ—á°ƒŇŽËˆă— ĎĄá°ƒá›Ł ᖍᴀ䑿DŽ㢚Ҏáł?㞞⏅áŁ?á?…ᛣ㸠Ń&#x;ËˆŇŞáˆ…á°ƒăžž á?…áł?ăžžâŹ…Ëˆă— ĎĄá°ƒŇŞâą˜á›Łá–Ťáł?㞞⏅DŽ℡⺎՚ äƒŻËˆá&#x;Ľâ€Ť×Ľâ€Źáł—ä žËˆĎ”ä˛?áŹ’ßŽăˆ´âą˜ĺŠšËˆáł?äşŻâą˜ă›‘ ŕĄŻŕŠ ăžžâŹ…Ë—ă— ĎĄáł—ä žá°ƒä™ˇâ€Ť×&#x;‏亯㖨㛑९ᴀ䑿áł? äşŻâą˜ă›‘ŕĄŻŕŠ ăžžâŹ…Ç„ăžžâŹ…Ëˆă&#x;›â˘ľâ¤’Çƒŕ˘›áŹśÇƒŇ• ༎á&#x;Şá– ཌϔῡ ä›‘á°ƒä™ˇáł?ă›‘ŕĄŻâą˜ŇŽá ”áł?âą˜Ç„
exert the acts of the Will themselves; because it is more evidently false, with respect to these, that he cannot if he will: for to say so, is a downright contradiction; it is to say, he cannot will, if he does will. And in this case, not only is it true, that it is easy for a man to do the thing if he will, but the very willing is the doing; when once he has willed, the thing is performed; and nothing else remains to be done. Therefore, in these things, to ascribe a non-performance to the want of power or ability, is not just; because the thing wanting, is not a being able, but a being willing. There are faculties of mind, and a capacity of nature, and every thing else, sufficient, but a disposition: nothing is wanting but a will.
Section V. Concerning the notion of Liberty, and of moral Agency. The plain and obvious meaning of the words Freedom and Liberty, in common speech, is The power, opportunity, or advantage, that any one has, to do as he pleases. Or in other words, his being free from hindrance or impediment in the way of doing, or conducting in any respect, as he wills. — And the contrary to Liberty, whatever name we call that by, is a person’s being hindered or unable to conduct as he will, or being necessitated to do otherwise. If this which I have mentioned be the meaning of the word Liberty, in the ordinary use of language; as I trust that none that has ever learned to talk, and is unprejudiced, will deny; then it will follow, that in propriety of speech, neither Liberty, nor its contrary, can properly be ascribed to any being or thing, but that which has such a faculty, power or property, as is called will. For that which is possessed of no will, cannot have any power or opportunity of doing according to its will, nor be necessitated to act contrary to its will, nor be restrained from acting agreeably to it. And therefore to talk of Liberty, or the contrary, as belonging to the very Will itself, is not to speak good sense; if we judge of sense, and nonsense, by the original and proper signification of words.— For the Will itself is not an Agent that has a will: the power of choosing, itself, has not a power of choosing. That which has the power of volition is the man, or the soul, and not the power of volition itself. And he that has the Liberty of doing according to his will, is the Agent who is possessed of the Will; and not the Will which he is possessed of. We say áŹ?ä´˝á…Ťâź˛á…Œä°śä°śăżž
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ă— ä—ŃŻâĄ?äŠžá°ƒŇŽâą˜á ”áł?â ˝ËˆĎşĎĄá°ƒâĄ?䊞㞞á?… á ”áŞ•áł?âą˜Ç„
೟᎚á?ŒâŤźä ˛Đ ˈáł?ܽ‍×&#x;â€ŹăžžâŹ…âą˜ŕŚĄă•˝ä€˛Ç„ Ď”á°ƒá”‹ä–ż áˆ…á°ƒä žĎ”â€Ť×&#x;‏Ҏ㚿䖿‍ߎ؎‏ă&#x;›ăžžá?…ᛣ á—ąâłŒŕŚĄâą˜Ń&#x;Ç„ŕŚşĎ”â€Ť×&#x;â€Źá°ƒă‹˜á´łËˆáŁ›ŇŽŕŚŤŕ „ŕťŞŕĄŻ ፨ä°?Ëˆâ‰Śáł?ä•şâŠŠâœťăžžá?…âą˜á›Łá—ąă¸ Ń&#x;Ç„ÔšŢľá°ƒ ≌áł?á›Łá–Ťâą˜äŠ€Ó?‍×&#x;â€Źĺ‚¨Ëˆáˆ…ĎĄă›‘ŕŚŤá”‹ä–żá&#x;Şă‹˜á´ł њDŽ䎰áŽ?ä—‍×&#x;â€Źä…„ä¸ Ëˆá&#x;ĽĎĄäł”ă˝•ŕťŽä‚›Ëˆâ‹Żâ€ŤÜ&#x;‏á?† ă?§ŕłźŇŞâą˜ŇŽä¸˛á™łá—ťä‚ŞĎ”á›Đ ä ‡ăŒ„ăż˘ä‚ŞŃšÇ„
ԚᇥáŽ?ᑇá?Œá ”ă€…âą˜ăžžâŹ…Ëˆá&#x;Ľä™˜ă˝•ä žáŻ˘Ď” ĺ’˛Ëˆä™ˇáˆ…á°ƒËˆá ”äƒ–ăžžâŹ…á°ƒáŁ›ŇŽáł?㛑९á&#x;Şâ€łáł— ŕ§ƒŇšáŁ?âœťá ”á›‡ă˝•âą˜á&#x;Şá ”ä™ŒáŞ›âą˜ŕŚ?ă¸ ËˆáŽśĎĄŕŹŁ ä™ŒáŞ›âą˜ŕĽłŕ˛´á&#x;Şá¸?â‘¤âšŽÔŠËˆĐłĎĄŕŹŁŇŽŕ˝–ÔŠáł?ŕ˝– â„¸âą˜â‰Žá›ŁË–á°ƒâŹ…ŕťŞŕłźâą˜ŕ˘Šâ€łă— ŐšËˆá&#x;Şá°ƒÜťá–— âą˜ă–Śáœˇâ€ŤŘŁâ€Źŕ˝‘ă— ŐšË›á°ƒßŽáŽ?Üťá–—â€Ťâą˜â‰ŽÜœâ€Źá›Łŕ§ĽËˆ á&#x;Şá°ƒâ‰Śáł?༳಴ŕĽ?âą?âŤłâą˜Ë›á°ƒă&#x;›Đ&#x;ŕ Ąâą?âŤłâą˜Ń&#x; áł?á–™âœŠâą˜äŽ°Ö–Ëˆá&#x;Şâ†żâ›ľäŽ°Ö–Ë›ĎĄä‚ŞŇŽá°ƒŕ˝–ÔŠ ᔜá&#x;¤ä—áżˇâą˜á›Łä¸Źá&#x;Şä™ŒáŞ›Ëˆŕ˝–áľ°ŇŞă›‘ŕť´ĎĄŕŚŤă‹˜ á´łËˆŕˇ‹ă¸ ăžžá?…âą˜á›Łä¸ŹËˆáŁ?ăžžâŹ…âą˜Ď”ă €ă˝&#x;㞡՚ ä žËˆä—‍×&#x;â€ŹŇŽá°ƒá… Üźáł?ăžžâŹ…âą˜Ç„
ŕ Ąä´śá ”ä‚›âą˜ËˆäŽ‡Ňšă¸źáŻ˘Ď”ă €ŇŽá ”Ý€ä Ąâą˜ ăžžâŹ…ËˆÔšŕŚĄŕĄ´â ’á›âŒ’âą˜Ń˛ă‰‡á—‰âŒ’ËˆÔƒá˘?ă‹’âŒ’ ŕŚžÝŠŇŞŕ§˜âŒ’á‡Ąâ„¸ä€˛âą˜âŤźâŠŠËˆá›Łă•˝á… ÜźĎĄŕ§ Ç„ ŇšĎ&#x;á‘’ĺ’˛á°ƒŇŞâ€Ť×Ľâ€Źá‡ĄăžžâŹ…âą˜âł&#x;⊊˖ Ď”ÇƒŇŞâ€Ť×Ľâ€Źä ĄâšŽăžžâŹ…á°ƒËˆŕłźŇŽâą˜á›Łá–ŤĐ á ” ‍݋‏áł?âą˜ăžžâ‰Žă›‘ŕĄŻËˆá°ƒá›Łá–Ťá‡Ąá´€ä‘żŕŠ á…—âą˜âŒ?ࢊ áł?ϔ。Đ?⃞ˈăŽ?ℸᛣᖍ≎ᅎ㞞á?…âą˜á›Łä¸ŹËˆŕłź Ď”ß›âą˜â‰Žá…ŽĐ á…—ĎĄŐąä´´á´€ä‘żŇšŕťŞâą˜Ó?Ԋ಴ ă‹´ËˆĐłĎĄâ‰Žá…ŽáŽ?Ó?Ԋ೟ᛣᖍ㸠ࢊĐ&#x;ŕ Ąâą˜Ó?ÔŠ Ń&#x;⠽DŽ Ń ÇƒŇŞâ€Ť×Ľâ€Źá‡ĄăžžâŹ…âą˜â§šăžˇËˆŕŁ™ŕ§żŕ§ƒáł?ŕ§ƒâ›ľ âą˜á˝–á—‰Ëˆáˆ…á°ƒŕłźâ€ŤŘŽâ€Źä™ŒáŞ›Đ&#x;ŕ ĄËˆá–—áœ&#x;Ďžá°ƒĐ ă‚&#x;
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with propriety, that a bird let loose has power and liberty to fly; but not that the bird’s power of flying has a power arid Liberty of flying. To be free is the property of an Agent, who is possessed of powers and faculties, as much as to be cunning, valiant, bountiful, or zealous. But these qualities are the properties of persons; and not the properties of properties. There are two things contrary to what is called Liberty in common speech. One is constraint; otherwise called force, compulsion, and coaction; which is a person’s being necessitated to do a thing contrary to his will. The other is restraint; which is, his being hindered, and not having power to do according to his will. But that which has no will, cannot be the subject of these things.— I need say the less on this bead, Mr. Locke having set the same thing forth, with so great clearness, in his Essay on the Human Understanding. But one thing more I would observe concerning what is vulgarly called Liberty; namely, that power and opportunity for one to do and conduct as he will, or according to his choice, is all that is meant by it; without taking into the meaning of the word, any thing of the cause of that choice; or at all considering how the person came to have such a volition; whether it was caused by some external motive, or internal habitual bias; whether it was determined by some internal antecedent volition, or whether it happened without a cause; whether it was necessarily connected with something foregoing, or not connected. Let the person come by his choice any how, yet, if he is able, and there is nothing in the way to hinder his pursuing and executing his will, the man is perfectly free, according to, the primary and common notion of freedom. What has been said may be sufficient to show what is meant by Liberty, according to the common notions of mankind, and in the usual and primary acceptation of the word: but the word, as used by Arminians, Pelagians, and others, who oppose the Calvinists, has an entirely different signification.— These several things belong to their notion of Liberty. 1. That it consists in a self-determining power in the Will, or a certain sovereignty the Will has over itself, and its own acts, whereby it determines its own volitions; so as not to be dependent, in its determinations, on any cause without itself, nor determined by any thing prior to its own acts. 2. Indifference belongs to Liberty in their notion of it, or that the mind, previous
ⱘDŽ ϝǃҪץᇡ㞾⬅ⱘ⧚㾷гࣙⱐيᗻˈ ϺϨˈҪץ䁡⚎ेⱐيᰃ㞾⬅ⱘᴀ䊾DŽℸ ᛣ㕽ϞˈҪץ㟛ϔ㠀Ҏᇡ㞾⬅ⱘ䁡ⶹϡৠDŽ 䗭ῷⱘ㞾⬅ᰃ≦᳝ӏԩᖙ✊ˈг≦᳝ӏԩ㟛 ࠡⳌ䮰㙃ⱘџ⠽DŽҪ؛ץ䀁㞾⬅ⱘᴀ䊾ህ ᰃҹϞ᠔䁾ⱘϝ。ὖᗉDŽҪץ䁡⚎䰸䴲Ҏⱘ ᛣᖫᰃ✻䗭ѯὖᗉ㗠᳝㞾⬅ˈ䙷咐ϡ䂪Ҫݡ ᗢ咐✻㞾Ꮕⱘᛣᖫ㗠㸠ˈҪг≦᳝ⳳ㞾⬅ৃ
to the act of volition, be in equilibrio. 3. Contingence is another thing that belongs and is essential to it; not in the common acceptation of the word, as that has been already explained, but as opposed to all necessity, or any fixed and certain connexion with some previous ground or reason of its existence. They suppose the essence of Liberty so much to consist in these things, that unless the will of man be free in this sense, he has no real freedom, how much soever, he may be at Liberty to act according to his will.
㿔DŽ ϔן䘧ᖋ䊀ӏ㗙ˈЗᰃ䙷㛑㸠⚎Ё᳝ 䘧ᖋ⡍䊾ⱘҎˈ䗭。䘧ᖋ⡍䊾ᰃৃҹℷ⺎ⱘ ҹ䘧ᖋߚ䕼㸠ᚵ㸠ǃ㕢ᖋ䙾ᚵǃৃ䅮 㕢ⱘৃᣛ䊀ⱘDŽ䘧ᖋ䊀ӏ㗙ᠡ᳝䘧ᖋ㛑 ˈ䘧ᖋⱘᚵ㾔ᗉˈҹঞৃ䊈ϡৃ 䊈ǃৃ䅮㕢ৃᣛ䊀ǃᕫ䊲䊰ফំ㕄ⱘ㾔 ᗉ˗ৠᰖ㛑䅧䘧ᖋࢩ″⫶⫳ᕅ䷓㸠⚎ⱘ㛑 ˈ㛑ҹ⧚ᗻⱘ㾔咲ˈߎخড়Т䘧ᖋⱘџDŽ
䱑ᇡഄⱘ⚎ᕅ䷓ᰃᕜ㕢དϺ᳝ Ⲟⱘˈᅗ㛑Փഄ⑿ᱪˈ⫶⫳ᵰᆺˈԚᅗ Ϻϡᰃϔן䘧ᖋ䊀ӏ㗙˗ᅗⱘ⚎䲪✊དˈ ॏϡᰃ᳝䘧ᖋⱘҸҎᭀԽⱘDŽϔןජᏖ ⱐ⫳њ☿♑ˈ➦↔њ䚼ߚⱘජᏖˈ䲪✊ᅗ ᰃ᳝ᆇⱘˈ✊㗠ᅗॏϡᖙ䉴䘧ᖋ䊀ӏDŽᅗⱘ ᠔᠔⚎≦᳝䤃ǃ≦᳝㔾ˈгϡឝফߥ㕄DŽ ࢩ⠽гϡᰃ䘧ᖋ䊀ӏ㗙DŽ݊Ё᳝ѯࢩ⠽ⱘ㸠 ⚎ᰃᕜৃᛯⱘˈ᳝ѯࢩ⠽ॏᕜॅ䱾˗ ✊㗠⠴ץ᮶≦᳝䘧ᖋⱘ㛑ឝফ䊲㕄ⱘ㾔 ᗉˈ㗠Ϩ⠴ⱘץ㸠ࢩϡᰃߎᮐᖗⱘ䙌ˈ ⧚ᗻⱘᗱ㗗ˈ㗠ڙᰃߎᮐᴀ㛑ˈϡফ䘧ᖋࢩ ″᠔ᕅ䷓ˈ᠔ҹ⠴ⱘץ㸠ࢩህϡ㛑䁾ᰃ᳝㔾 ᳝ৃᭀԽⱘഄᮍ˗⠴ץгϡ㸠⚎㗠ফ䗭 。䘧ᖋⱘᕙ䘛ˈڣ䘧ᖋ䊀ӏ㗙ឝ✻⠴ᚵ ⱘ㸠⚎ফⳌ⭊ⱘᕙ䘛ϔῷDŽ 䗭㺵г䀅㽕⊼ᛣˈ䘧ᖋ䊀ӏ㗙ⱘㅵ⧚ 㗙ফㅵ⧚㗙П䭧᳝㨫ձᚙ⊕ϡৠ㗠⫶⫳ⱘ Ꮒ⭄ᗻDŽϡৠⱘᚙ⊕ϟˈ䘧ᖋ䁬᳗ձҪ ץফᕅ䷓ⱘৃ㛑ᗻ⫶⫳ϡৠⱘ㌤ᵰDŽ᳝㛑 ㅵ⧚㗙ϡৃ㛑ফ䘧ᖋᕟ᠔ᕅ䷓ˈгϡ᳗ڣ ফㅵ⧚㗙ϔῷ䁡ৃ䘧ᖋᕟⱘ࿕㛙ᡓ䃒ˈ
A moral agent is a being that is capable of those actions that have a moral quality, and which can properly be denominated good or evil in a moral sense, virtuous or vicious, commendable or faulty. To moral Agency belongs a moral faculty, or sense of moral good and evil, or of such a thing as desert or worthiness, of praise or blame, reward or punishments; and a capacity which an Agent has of being influenced in his actions by moral inducements or motives, exhibited to the view of understanding and reason, to engage to a conduct agreeable to the moral faculty. The sun is very excellent and beneficial in its action and influence on the earth, in warming and causing it to bring forth its fruit; but it is not a moral agent: its action, though good, is not virtuous or meritorious. Fire that breaks out in a city, and consumes great part of it, is very mischievous in its operation; but is not a moral Agent: what it does is not faulty or sinful, or deserving of any punishment. The brute creatures are not moral Agents: the actions of some of them are very profitable and pleasant; others are very hurtful: yet seeing they have no moral faculty, or sense of desert, and do not act from choice guided by understanding, or with a capacity of reasoning and reflecting, but only from instinct, and are not capable of being influenced by moral inducements, their actions are not properly sinful or virtuous, nor are they properly the subjects of any such moral treatment for what they do, as moral Agents are for their faults or good deeds. Here it may be noted, that there is a circumstantial difference between the moral Agency of a ruler and a subject. I call it circumstantial, because it lies only in the difference of moral inducements, by which they are capable of being influenced, arising from the difference of circumstance. A ruler, acting in that capacity only, is not capable ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
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â¤˘äŠ˛ŕŠ ßĽă•„Ë—ŰŹă…ľŇŞâ€Ťŕ§ƒ×&#x;Ü˝×Ľâ€Źă›‘ä›‘ßšßšŕŚŤŕ „ 䘧ᖋŕ˜ášľâą˜á•…äˇ“Ç„ŕ˛´â„¸ËˆĎžá?ąâ„¸Ď”‍݋‏áł?᳔傏 ŕ´„ÔĄâą˜ä˜§á–‹äŠ€Ó?ă—™ă&#x;›ÝŠŕŚŤä—´â ˝áł?á ”ĎĄŕ§ Ëˆâź– áł?ă›‘ŕĄŻă…ľâ§šËˆĎ¨âˆŒä˜´ĎĄÔ°ŕŚŤă…ľâ§šă—™Ç„Ďžá?ąâą˜ ă¸ âšŽËˆâĄ?ßšá°ƒä‘żâšŽä˜§á–‹ă…ľâ§šă—™âą˜ă¸ âšŽËˆăƒşŕ§œ Ńšä˜§á–‹âą˜äŠ›á¸?ËˆĎşĎ¨á°ƒáł”ĺ‚Źâą˜ä˜§á–‹ăĄƒŕ˜Ç„ä— ŃŻă¸ âšŽá°ƒá… Üźă˜Şâ”¨ŕŠ Ý€ă•˝âą˜Ç„á&#x;Ľâ€Ť×Ľâ€Źá–™äˇœä Ą ŕ§ ËˆĎžá?ąá ”ŕŚŤŕ „âą˜ä Źŕ˛´á°ƒăŒŠá‡ĄĎĄáŹ?ä…žâą˜ä˜§á–‹ âą˜ä Źŕ˛´Ç„Đłáˆ…á°ƒËˆâź–ŕłźâ†ŁĎ”ÓŠŃ&#x;Ďžá ”âł&#x;ŕ „âą˜ á°ƒä˜§á–‹âą˜ŕ˜Çƒä˜§á–‹âą˜ă•˘Ç„ŕ˛´â„¸Ëˆá•˛áł”ä˜˝âŠâą˜ 㞔ᗉ՚âł&#x;Ëˆâź–á°ƒä˜§á–‹äŠ€Ó?ă—™Ëˆá°ƒá ”áł?ä˜§á–‹ă›‘ ŕĄŻâą˜Őšâ‘¤Ëˆá°ƒá ”áł?ă•˘á–‹ŕŠ ä˜§á–‹ăĄƒŕ˜âą˜âŠ?â‘¤ŕŠ â‘Şŕ ›Ç„âŹ…áŽ?âź–âą˜á„Źŕłźá°ƒä?™ä?žĎ”ß›âą˜Ëˆâź–ĎĄŕ§ƒ 㛑೟á•&#x;⊊á&#x;ŞŕŠ‘ҸĐ&#x;Ď&#x;ËˆĎşĎ¨ĐłĎĄŕŚŤá•&#x;⊊á&#x;ŞŕŠ‘ Ň¸âą˜áĄ“äƒ’á&#x;Şŕż•ă›™Çƒâ¤˘äŠ˛á&#x;ŞßĽă•„ÇƒŕŁŒŕ¨žá&#x;Şä„şŕ¨ž á ”á•…äˇ“Ç„ä˜§á–‹äŠ€Ó?ă—™á–™ă˝•âą˜âĄ?äŠžá°ƒá„ŹŕłźáŽ?Ďž á?ąËˆâź–âą˜á… Üźá?†ä˜¨ŕ „á… Üźá ”ă›‘ä˜¨ă&#x;ˆâą˜áł”ŕťťŕ´„ ℚDŽ䘧ᖋ䊀Ó?ă—™âą˜âĄ?äŠžŕŁ™áŁ€Ë–ßšä•źä˜§á–‹ŕ˜ášľ âą˜á†łăžŽŕĄŻÇƒä˜§á–‹á‡Ąä¤ƒâą˜ă›‘ŕĄŻÇƒŕŞžŃŻá°ƒŕ§ƒá€á&#x;Ş Ř?á•Ťä…Žă•˘âą˜Çƒá°ƒáž?ŕŚŤáŁ›äŠ€á&#x;Şá&#x;†ă•„âą˜Ë—â§šá—ťä™Œ áŞ›âą˜ă›‘ŕĄŻËˆĎşáŁ?ŇŞä™ŒáŞ›á&#x;Şŕ°ŕ˝‘âą˜ŕŚ?ă¸ Ëˆá°ƒáł? 㛑९԰ä—ŃŻäœĄá•Ťáł”ĺ‚Źä…Žă•˘âą˜Ń&#x;⠽DŽáŽ?â„¸Ëˆŕłź ŇŽŕŚŤä—´âą˜ä™ˇâ€Ť×&#x;‏ᰖ‍×â€Źá°ƒă&#x;›Ďžá?ąâą˜á”śâ€ŤÚŁâ€ŹĎ”ă&#x;ˆâą˜Ëˆ á&#x;Ľâ€Ťŕ§ƒ×Ľâ€Źá•˛ŕĄ‰ĎŞăżŹă„€Ď”ă‚´ ă†”ŕŠ ă„€Đąă‚´ă„€ ㆔ᕍ✚ Ďžá?ąŇšâ„¸á”śâ€ŤÚŁâ€Źá‡›ŇŽâŹ…ŕ˘Šâ ˝ËˆŕĽ‡ăžž âœŠâą˜ă›‘ŕĄŻŕŠ ŕĽłŕ ›Đ ßšßšßŽŐšÇ„áł”ßąŇŽŕŚŤä—´âą˜ ᰖ‍×â€Źá ”äŠşŃœâą˜ä˜§á–‹ă•˘á–‹Ëˆŕłźä´œá—ťă&#x;›ä˜§á–‹á”śâ€ŤÚŁâ€Ź ĎžËˆá°ƒă&#x;›Ďžá?ąâą˜ŕť˝âœŠá”śâ€ŤÚŁâ€Źä´˛á?ŒâłŒÔ?âą˜Ç„
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of being influenced by a moral law, and its sanctions of threatenings and promises, rewards and punishments, as the subject is; though both may be influenced by a knowledge of moral good and evil. And therefore the moral Agency of the Supreme Being, who acts only in the capacity of a ruler towards his creatures, and never as a subject, differs in that respect from the moral Agency of created intelligent beings. God’s actions, and particularly those which he exerts as a moral governor, have moral qualifications, and are morally good in the highest degree. They are most perfectly holy and righteous; and we must conceive of Him as influenced, in the highest degree, by that which, above all others, is properly a moral inducement; viz. the moral good which He sees in such and such things: and therefore He is, in the most proper sense, a moral Agent, the source of all moral ability and Agency, the fountain and rule of all virtue and moral good; though by reason of his being supreme over all, it is not possible He should be under the influence of law or command, promises or threatenings, rewards or punishments, counsels or warnings. The essential qualities of a moral Agent are in God, in the greatest possible perfection; such as understanding to perceive the difference between moral good and evil; a capacity of discerning that moral worthiness and demerit, by which some things are praiseworthy, others deserving of blame and punishment; and also a capacity of choice, and choice guided by understanding, and a power of acting according to his choice or pleasure, and being capable of doing those things which are in the highest sense praiseworthy. And herein does very much consist that image of God wherein he made man, (which we read of, Gen. 1:26, 27, and chap. 9:6.) by which God distinguished man from the beasts, viz. in those faculties and principles of nature, whereby He is capable of moral Agency. Herein very much consists the natural image of God; whereas the spiritual and moral image, wherein man was made at first, consisted in that moral excellency with which he was endowed.
ၟ᪤⟹⤩ ᕔԴੑҸⱘ䘧ϞⳈ༨ 㗙˖䱇ᅫঢ় ಲ主ןҎֵӄ⅋ˈᕫ㽟ϞᏱ༛ⱘᐊ
ফⳳ⧚伉仞ⱘ↋ߛ䳔㽕DŽা丬ᛣⱘᖗˈᅌ
䷬ˈ⽣ᵃⓓ⑶ˈᖗЁܙⓓᛳᘽDŽ
㖦䷚᳡ǃֵ䴴ˈህ㩭 ⼲ϔ䏃ᓩ䷬DŽᣝ㨫
ᑈ ᳜៥ ⅆᰖˈ䲏䑿ࠄ催䲘Ꮊ➳
⼲ᅌ䰶᠔ᅌⱘᬭᇢᓳˈྍྤܘ䍞ࡴⱐ⧒ ⼲
䅔ᅌˈ䲶䭟㞾Ꮕⱘᴀᆊᴀᮣˈ䭟ྟ⤼㞾䴶
䞣㌺㞾Ꮕⱘ䊀ӏ㟛㙋ߚ᮹䞡DŽॳ՚ˈ᳡џⱘ
ᇡ⪄๗ˈᅌ㖦៤䭋DŽᅌᰖҷⳟࠄԡৠᅌ
⤢䊲ህᰃⱘ᳡џDŽឞᙨ㞾Ꮕᙨᬍⱘ
ϔϔֵЏˈᖗ㺵᳝㥿ৡⱘᛳᛇDŽ㨫Џᘽ㞼
ᰮˈ䝦ᙳ㞾Ꮕॳᰃϡ䜡ˈ㺱٭Ѻᰃϡ䎇DŽ
ࠄˈᅌ⬶ὁᕠϝᑈˈᎺ➳⊍ᒴᬭ᳗䍭
ᛳ䃱 ⼲ϔ䏃ᮄᭈןᆊᒁˈг䅧⡑
ᅫᔱ䭋㗕ⱘᐊ䷬ϟ≎ᖫ⾅ਞϺᮐ ᑈ㘪
Ҁᬺ᳝ৠῷ༝⥏ⱘᖗᖫˈϔৠ䷬ফϞᏱⱘ
䁩㆔ࠡফ⋫DŽ
ীDŽҞᦤࠡ䲶䭟Ꮉˈ䜡ড়ᬭ᳗᳡џ䳔㽕ˈ
ֵ߱Џᰖˈ䘅݁ǃ᮹㍧ᐌᎹˈЏ᮹⾂
ܼ㙋ᡩܹ⼲ᅌ䰶ህ䅔DŽ㩭㋡ܹᅌˈᛳ䃱呹
ᢰϺϡ〽ᅮDŽီᕠ䜡ড়Ꮉഄ咲ⱘ䅞㟛ᆊ
ᅝ䖾⠻ǃ㨝ᦤ⠻ǃ咗⾝⦷⠻ⱘᬭ
ᒁⱘᨀ䙋ˈߚ߹ᮐৄ࣫Ꮦ⍌ֵ᳗ᮄ⫳फ䏃ᬭ
ᇢˈҪ⏅ץ८ⱘᅌ仞㟛⫳ੑὰῷˈҸҎℑ
᳗ҹঞ催䲘Ꮦᕾ⧚᳗㘮᳗DŽ ᑈህ䅔ⷨお
㕼DŽᬭࢭৠᎹ䜁〢֤ྞྍǃỡ㣫Џӏ㟛㚵
᠔ˈݡᇛܼᆊ࣫䙋ˈ䘆ܹԣᆊ䱨ຕⱘЁ䘧
ᯠ䈾ᓳⱘܘ㽾ߛᣛᇢˈৠᅌ➅ץᚙनࡽ㟛䮰
⫳䭋㗕᳗㥦ܝᬭ᳗DŽ䖘Ҟ ᑈ⭊Ёˈ⼲ᐊ䷬
់ˈ↣䛑㛑ҹᛳᘽ୰ῖⱘᖗˈ՚ࠄ⼲ᅌ
䗣䘢㘮᳗ǃ᳡џˈ⏅ܹןҎֵӄ䗑∖DŽ
䰶ˈ䖢↣ן䂆ⱘᣥ᠄ҹঞᆊⱘὁᆿ
ᑈހˈᬭ᳗⠻ᮐ䒞⽡ᕠϔⳈ㽟ᒋ
DŽ
ᕽˈ䗁᳝ᬭ᳗䭋䙋ሙ䲶䭟ˈ䭟ྟᅌ㖦ᅝᥦ
џЏᑈˈ䗣䘢䅔㍧ǃ⾅ਞˈϞᏱⱘ䁅ᐌ
Џ᮹䃯ৄ䃯વǃ㿾᳗টǃ哧ࣉৠᎹগ㟛᳡
ᖗ㺣ˈ哧ࣉ៥ˈՓ៥ᖗ㺵᳝㛑DŽᐌᗱᛇן
џˈ㎁ᣕ䘅䭧㘮᳗Ϻ㟝䕺䷙⽣䷇⌏ࢩDŽ
Ҏ㩭ীᰖϞᏱⱘ䁅䁲ᳳ䀅㞾ᏅˈNj៥ⳟ㨀џ
ׂ㖦⼲ᅌˈྟᮐ ᑈ ᳜ ᮹DŽ㍧Ѩ㙵
ⲵ䛑᳝䰤ˈᚳ᳝ԴⱘੑҸὉ݊ᇀᒷnjǃNjԴ
ᕫ∈ᬭ᳗咗⏙䭋㗕՚ᬭ᳗ߚѿ᳡џ㍧倫㟛
䭟ᒷ៥ᖗⱘᰖˈ៥ህᕔԴੑҸⱘ䘧ϞⳈ
哧ࣉ࣌࢝ˈϺҟ㌍䁡䄬⬅⍋ᅷᬭ䖨ৄ䗄
༨nj˄䀽㆛ ゴ ㆔ঞ ㆔˅DŽᆺᰃ㔾
㙋ϔᑈⱘ䚅乃ℷڇ䘧ˈ䱼ेҹϔᇡϔ䭔ᕦ
Ҏˈᛳ䃱Џˈ㩭њᘽˈᕫҹ᳡џ ⼲ˈ
㿧ᮍᓣˈᅌ㖦䴜ੑᕽ㟜ǃᬭ᳗⊏⧚ҹঞ⽣䷇
᳡џҎˈ㟛 ⼲ৠ㸠DŽ
Փੑㄝⳳ⧚DŽ䘅䭧ᰮϞগࡴЁ㧃⽣䷇⼲ᅌ 䰶ᓊԌࠊ䘆ׂ䂆Ϻ㍧ᐌ㟇咗䭋㗕ᬭ᳗Ё㽟 㖦DŽ ⚎∖䘆⏅⼲ⱘ䁅䁲ˈ⏅ܹⳳ⧚䗴ህˈ ᑈ 䍋↣䘅Ѡᰮ䭧㟇ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䙌ׂᴢ䦂❭⠻ ⱘ㋏㍅⼲ᅌǃⴷ䂪ǃ䀽℠ঞ㘪䴜䂪ㄝ 䂆DŽᴢ⠻ⱘ㋏㍅ᗻᬭᴤ㟛ᬭᅌˈᇡᮐ䉿 䗮ᭈ⼲ןᅌᗱ㎁ˈᓩᇢֵӄḍⱘᓎ䗴ˈ⏅ ᆺⲞˈᬊ〿㡃DŽ 㨫ᛳࢩ䷬ফীˈϞᏱᬭ᳗ϡᮋ㟜 䍋⪄๗ǃῷⱘ㡅䲷㟛ᣥ᠄ˈⳟࠄᓳྍྤܘ ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
23
ၟ᪤⟹⤩
џЏ䁴
㗙˖䱇 〢 ⴷ䰶ଌᰖгগ㟛ᅌ᷵Ꮉ᳗ⱘ ᳡џˈ↣ᑈᆦᱥ؛ⷁᅷ䱞ࠄৄ☷䛝ᴥᬭ᳗ এ䜡ᨁ᳡џˈ݊Ёࣙᣀ㗕ҎǃܦスџᎹˈг 亯于䴦ᇥᑈЁᖗⱘ➳᳗㺣᪨ӏ䓨ᇢDŽ䙷ᰖ ᖗ㺣㐑᳝ᕜ⏅ⱘᛳ㿌ˈ᳝䙷咐Ҏϡ䁡䄬 ⼲ˈ᳝䙷咐Ҏ㍧⅋Ҏ⫳Ёⱘ䲷㰩ˈ䗋༅ 䗭⪄๗㺣ˈॏϡⶹ䘧এા㺣ᇟ∖ᐿࡽǃ ᅝᝄ" ⳟࠄҪץᣝ㨫Ҏⱘᮍ⊩䀺㨫㾷≎⫳ੑ Ёⱘೄ䲷ˈॏϡᕫ݊䭔㗠ܹDŽгⳟࠄϔѯҎ ᖗ㺣ᰃᕜぎ㰯ⱘˈҪץ㮝㨫㞾Ꮕⱘᮍ⊩՚ⓓ 䎇ˈॏাᰃ䱋ܹϔןぎ㰯DŽ䗭ѯ䛑䅧៥㾎 ᕫᕜ䲷䘢ˈ݊ᆺˈ䙷ᰖᖗ㺣ᛇⱘᰃˈᏠᳯҪ ץ䛑㛑䁡䄬⼲DŽ⭊✊г᳝ѯҎᕜஂ㋨ˈҪ ߚץѿ⼲ⱘᛯˈҪץህஂ㋨ഄⳌֵˈᖗ㺣г ⚎㨫Ҫஂץ㋨ⱘᖗ催㟜DŽ ᕲⴷ䰶⬶ὁᰖ៥Ϻ≦᳝এฅ㗗⼲ᅌ 䰶ˈϺϡᰃ䙷ῷⱘ䉴᪨⍜༅њˈ㗠ᰃ㾎ᕫ㞾 Ꮕ䙘䷤٭དˈ≦᳝ӏԩⱘ⼒᳗Ꮉ㍧⅋ˈ ԐТгᑈ䓩DŽ䴶ᇡ⼒᳗䗭ן⪄๗ᰖˈ ᖗᛇஂஂাᰃᛯ⼲ǃᛯҎᰃϡⱘDŽϔᮍ
ᕲϗⅆ䭟ྟϞܦスЏ᮹ᅌˈࠄབҞᏅ㍧ ᰃѠकᑒᑈњˈ៥ϔⳈ䛑᳝ᬭ᳗⫳⌏ˈгগ 㟛ᬭ᳗ⱘ᳡џⳈࠄ⧒DŽᰃ៥↡㽾ⱘྍྍ㕢
䴶ˈᬭ᳗ᣕ㑠ⱘ᳡џˈᰃᛇ㮝㨫᳡џৃҹ ⱘњ㾷ᓳⱘྍྤܘ䳔㽕䁡䄬㞾Ꮕˈг 㑐㑠ᇟ∖⼲ⱘᮼᛣˈ∖⼲ᐊ䷬ࠡ䴶ⱘ䘧䏃DŽ
㫂ྼᐊ៥䘆ࠄᬭ᳗ˈཌྷᰃᆊᮣЁϔԡⴷ ᕦˈֵӄϞཌྷᕜ䁡ⳳᭀ㰨ˈгकߚ➅ᖗ গ㟛ᬭ᳗ⱘ᳡џ䷇⽣ڇDŽཌྷᰃⳳⱘ丬ᛣᇛ
᳜ӑ՚ࠄ⾂䊶᳗ৄ࣫ූ᪨ӏ㸠ᬓᑍџϔ㙋ˈ
᳔དⱘ㌺⼲ˈᇡҎᬭ᳗䛑ᰃ⛵⾕ⱘ༝⥏ˈ
䅧៥㍧⅋ᬭ᳗ϡৠᮍ䴶ⱘ᳡џњ㾷ᬭ᳗ܻ
ཌྷᇡ៥ֵӄⱘᆺ䏤᳝ᕜ⏅ⱘᕅ䷓DŽгᛳ䃱
䚼ⱘ䘟储ࠊDŽᬭ᳗Ꮉⱘ䗭ᑒᑈᖗ㺣
⼲ˈֵӄⱘ⫳ੑЁ䘛ࠄᑒԡ⠻㗙ǃ䓨ᇢˈ
ᇡ䷇⽣ڇǃᅷᬭⱘᛳࢩ䉴᪨Ϻ≦᳝⍜༅ˈ
ҪץֵӄϞᰃᕜདⱘ㆘ˈڣᵫ䗄哢⠻
ড㗠䱼㨫ᰖ䭧ⱘ䘢এˈᛜ՚ᛜ㾎ᕫ㢹㽕⏅
ǃⲻ⎥ᙀ⠻ǃ䛁ᯢ⩟⠻ǃਇᰊ㟜ڇ
ܹⱘ᳡џˈᰃ䳔㽕ফᇜὁⱘ⼲ᅌ㿧㏈ˈᇛ⼲
䘧ĂĂˈҪⳌץ㰩ᰖˈⳟࠄг储᳗ࠄҪץ
ⱘ䁅ℷ⺎ⱘߎڇএˈᐿࡽҎᰖгϡ㛑া
⫳ੑ㺣᳔䞡㽕ⱘᰃҔ咐DŽ 㨫ᛯЏⱘ㎷ᬙ
ᚙᛳϞᬃᣕˈг㽕ᣝ㨫ⳳ⧚ՓҎಲࠄ⼲ⱘ䴶
Ҫץ丬ᛣ᳡џ⼲䷇⽣ڇϞҬҷˈۍҪץ
ࠡˈℸফᇜὁⱘ⼲ᅌ㺱٭ᰃᕜ䞡㽕ⱘDŽ
ⱘᜟᑺ䅧៥ᖗ㺣ᕜᛳࢩгᕜফ▔ࣉDŽ
24
⼒᳗ϞᎹᑒᑈᕠˈ᳝″᳗ ᑈ
Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
ᰃ⼲ᦔ䙌њ៥ˈᰃ⼖ᐊ䷬៥՚ࠄᬍ䴽ᅫ
⼲ᅌ䰶DŽ៥ᖗ㺣ᯢⱑⱘᰃˈ៥ϡ䘢ᰃן㩭
ᛳ䃱⼲DŽ⭊✊ˈ⫳ੑⱘ䘢㺣ᴀ՚ህ᳗䘛
ᘽⱘ㔾Ҏˈ⼖៥ᑈᑐᰖ䷬៥՚ࠄᬭ᳗䁡䄬
ࠄ䀅ⱘᛣϡབᛣˈ᳝ᰖг᳗䅧៥䱋ܹ
⼖ˈгᆊᒁ㺣⚎៥䭟䏃DŽ៤䭋ⱘ䘢㺣
Ԣ╂˗ԚⳌֵⱘᰃˈ⼲ⱘᘽ៥⫼DŽ៥ⶹ
៥ⶹ䘧ⱘᰃˈ⼲ϔⳈ䛑៥ϔ䍋ˈϡㅵ
䘧䙷ՓҎᔋⱘ䞣ᱎⱘ⑤丁ા㺣DŽ
Ҕ咐ῷⱘ᱃⊕ˈ⼖䛑䰾㨫៥䍄䘢⫳ੑ㺣ϡৠ
៥ᖗ㺣ᯢⱑˈ⼖ᰃᥠㅵϔߛⱘ⼲ˈ⼖ⶹ䘧៥
ⱘ䱢↉DŽⳟࠄ䀅Ҏ⫳ੑⱘ㽟䄝ˈ៥ⶹ䘧ˈ
ⱘᖗᗱᛣᗉˈᣝ㨫⼖ⱘᮼᛣড়䘽ⱘᰖˈ
ֵӄⱘ䏃Ϟ៥Ϻ≦᳝㍧⅋Ҕ咐ῷⱘ㢺䲷ˈ
៤ህড়䘽ⱘџDŽ
ᅌ⫳䮰់䓨ᇢᇣ㌘㘮令
ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
25
ᖐ⊥ǰᶕ
㎼䔃䚼 ᴀ᷵DŽᴀ䰶㘬䂟㕙ᐌ㢀ྞྍ՚ҷ᳓ỡ㣫 䭋㗕ˈཌྷ㚵ᯠ䈾ᓳܘ᳗䉴䊀ᴀ䰶ⱘ㸠ᬓ䚼 䭔DŽ㕙ᐌ㢀ྞྍᇛ䉴䊀ᬭࢭ㰩ǃ೪仼ӕ ࡗ㌘ⱘᎹˈ㚵ᯠ䈾ᓳܘᇛ䉴䊀㐑ࢭ㌘ǃҎ џ㌘ǃ䊛㿞㌘᠓ⱘᎹ˗ᴀ䰶г㘬䂟ᴢ ᄳࣇᓳ˄ܘᴀ᷵ᅌ⫳˅ݐ㙋Ꮉᮐ䊛㿞㌘ˈ
ਖ≯⏉⠻ ᬭᥜᆺ⫼㾷 ㍧ᅌ䂆
䱇Ԋྞྍҷ᳓㥞㚆㧡ྞྍ៤⚎ᴀ䰶ݐ㙋ⱘ ᳗㿜ৠᎹDŽℸˈ咗呫㉝ྞྍᐿᖭᅌ᷵ⱘ⏙ ┨Ꮉˈ丣Ϟ䈤ᓳܘ᪨ӏ䭧Ϟ䂆ᰖⱘؐ⧁ ᴀ䰶এᑈ⾟ᅌᄷ䭟ᥜб䭔䂆ˈ᳝݅ Ҏ䙌ׂ˗Ҟᑈϔ᳜ӑ䍋㟇Ѡ᳜Ёᯀ᳝݅
ৠᎹDŽ䗭ѯৠᎹᮐ݀ǃᮐ⾕䛑䴲ᐌᖭˈԚ ᛳ䃱ϞᏱⱘᘽҪץ䛑᳝々㙋ⱘџ༝DŽ
ಯ䭔ⱘᆚ䲚䂆˖ⷨお䂪᭛᪄ᆿঞᮍ⊩ὖ䂪ǃ ᛯᖋ㧃⒟䂪㞾⬅ᛣᖫǃહᵫࠡˈঞီࠡ
ᴀ䰶䖥ञᑈ՚୰џ䗷䗷ũỡ㣫䭋㗕ᆊ
䓨ᇢDŽ៥⚎ץᬭץ䁡ⳳⱘᥜ䂆ৠᅌץᇜ
ᮐএᑈϗ᳜݁᮹ᕫϔཇˈপৡકᅝ˗ᬭ
ᖗⱘᅌ㖦ˈᛳ䃱ϞᏱⱘᘽDŽ
㨝ᦤ⠻ᆊᮐकϔ᳜ಯ᮹ᕫϔᄤˈপৡ 1DWKDQˈϺᮐএᑈकѠ᳜कѨ᮹⚎ཇܦ
ᅌᄷᇛᮐ ᳜ ᮹䭟ྟϞ䂆ˈᴀᅌᄷ݅ 䭟ᥜб䭔䂆ˈ⬅ ԡϡৠⱘᬭᥜ䂆DŽ៥ץ ⡍߹催㟜᳝ϔԡᮄⱘᬭũྮ㟜⠻ࡴܹ ᥜ䂆ⱘ㸠߫DŽ䂟ᙼ㑐㑠⚎ᬭⱘץᥜ䂆ǃৠ
9DOHULH㟝㸠ီ⾂˗ᅌ⫳催ϔ䡬元ཡ৯ᮐএ ᑈकϔ᳜ѠकѠ᮹⫳ϔᄤˈপৡ催ሩ㿔˗丬 ⠊⼱⽣䗭ѯᄽᄤⱘ៤䭋ˈг䊰⽣ᮄᆊᒁⱘ ៤ゟDŽ
ᅌⱘץᅌ㖦ৠᎹⱘץџ༝ҷ⾅DŽ )&&⦡ᛯᆊᒁЁᖗˈ㞾Ҟᑈϔ᳜䍋ˈ㘬䂟 ᴀ䰶П㸠ᬓЏӏũỡ㣫䭋㗕Ꮖᕲᴀ᷵ ⬶ὁˈϨ✻㨫⭊߱ⱘ㿜⬿ˈ䲶䭟ᴀ䰶П㸠ᬓ Ꮉˈ៤⚎Ҫ↡᳗ⱘܼ㙋䭋㗕DŽ䜁〢֤ྞྍ ⧒Ҟܼᰖ䭧џ༝ᮐ⦡ᛯᆊᒁЁᖗˈ᪨ӏ䁆ஂ ԡП㸠䭋ⱘ㙋ࢭˈԚᰃཌྷᎹⱘഄ咲ҡ
ॳݐ㙋ৠᎹ䜁〢֤ˈ䔝ӏܼ㙋᳡џDŽ䂟⚎ ࢩNj㘪㍧䓨ᇢnjџᎹҷ⾅DŽ᳡ࢭ䷙Ⳃ᳝㟝䕺 ⷨ㿢᳗ǃ䃯ᑻǃ㿧䂆ǃஂ㽾៤䭋೬储ǃ 䅔᳗ǃןḜ䓨ᇢㄝDŽ䁆Ёᖗ佪㽕Փੑ⚎䜡 ড়ᬭ᳗ⱘ䳔㽕ˈनࡽᬭ᳗ࢩNj㘪㍧䓨
㥞㚆㧡˄ॳ᳗㿜˅ ỡ㣫˄ॳ㸠ᬓЏӏ˅ 䜁〢֤˄ॳᬭࢭৠᎹ˅
26
Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
न᳗˅DŽ䁇ᚙ䂟Ϟ䗭ן㎆キ˖ZZZ IFF RUJ WZDŽ ৄ☷ᬍ䴽ᅫ㗏䅃೬༥Ꮖ㟝㸠њܽൟ ⱘ㌘㐨᳗䅄ˈܽⱘ㈠٭᳗˗ᮐѠ᳜ӑᇛ 㽕䙌ߎྨવ᳗ǃ㸠ྨવ᳗㸠䭋DŽ៥ץ ᳔ᮄⱘ㿜⬿ᰃ䭟ྟϔן᳜ϔⱘᬍ䴽ᅫ䅔 ᳗ˈᮐℸৠᰖˈ㹿䙌ߎП㸠䭋ᇛ᳗䭟ྟ 㥋㰁ᬍ䴽ᅫᬭ᳗ 㿾ଣ
䘆㸠ϔן㗏䅃㿜⬿ˈ᠔㽕㗏䅃ⱘᰃǂ ᇢnjˈℵ䖢ᬭ᳗㟛ᴀЁᖗড়䭟䕺㿧䂆
-HUHPLDK %XUURXJKVǂ᠔ᆿⱘǂā7KH 5DUH
ǃ៤䭋೬储ㄝDŽ䭟䕺⌑䀶ᇜ㎮˖
-HZHO RI &KULVWLDQ &RQWHQWPHQWāDŽ䂟⚎
䔝 DŽҞᑈϞञᑈ⌏ࢩ㿜᳝˖⬅ৄ࣫Ꮦ
៥ץᡒࠄড়䘽ⱘ㗏䅃Ҏ䙌ҷ⾅DŽ䁇ᚙ䂟Ϟ䗭
ᬓᑰ⼒᳗ሔᣛᇢⱘϝᳳNj⋟㫹䅔᳗njǃϝ
ן㎆キ˖ZZZ FUWVOLYH QHWDŽ
᳜ӑᮐ᰼Ჺ᳗ⱘNj㘪㍧䓨ᇢnj㿧䂆ǃϝ ᳜ӑᮐ⠠ֵটූЏ᮹ᅌⱘNjট䂐ᓣन䂛nj 㿧䂆ǃಯ᳜ӑᮐ⋄ቅᬭ᳗㕢䭔ූⱘNj် ཇ៤䭋೬储njㄝˈ䂟⚎⌏ࢩ䷚߽ࢩҷ⾅DŽ 䁆ЁᖗℷࢩNj⦡ᛯᆊᒁПটnj⌏ࢩˈ䂟⚎ 䮰់ᆊᒁџᎹࢳℒҷ⾅ˈ↣17 ˈϔᑈ 17 ˈᙼৃҹᣃᬥ⸈ᆊᒁDŽ䛉ᬓࡗ ᩹˖ ˄᠊ৡ˖Ё㧃⇥ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ
䣶Ჰ䁴⠻ࡴ⠒᭛ߎ⠜⼒Ꮖ㍧ᅠ៤㋘ 㗄ˊࡴ⠒᭛⠻᠔ᆿNjⴷᬭ㽕㕽njⱘ㗏䅃 Ꮉˈ㗏䅃ࣙᣀњᭈᴀ㽕㕽ⱘܻᆍ 0F1HLO %DWWOHVⱘ䀏㝇㋶ᓩDŽᴀ䰶Ꮖ䷤㿖˔ˌ ༫ˈϨ⚎ߎ⠜ⱘ䊏⫼༝⥏DŽᴀ⭊✊᳗៤⚎ ᴀ䰶⼲ᅌ䂆ⱘᬭ⾥DŽ䂟⚎᳝Ҏ䷬ফ 䗭༫ᅠᭈⱘ㍧Пҷ⾅DŽ
㨝ᦤ⠻ ܼᆊ⽣
ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
27
Ⴏপঝ⢰᷋ἌǢ 2007 ᑈ 3~5 ᳜ Term 53
ᬭࢭ㰩
⾥ Ϟज
⾥㟛ᅌ⾥ ϟज
ᅌ⾥㟛ᓊԌࠊ ᰮϞ
ϔ
䴦ᇥᑈ䓨ᇢ 㨝ᦤ⠻
ࡉϪ㿬 ྮ㟜⠻
Ѡ
ࡴᢝ 㨝ᦤ⠻
㕙侀 ⱑ㸯⠻
⼲ଳ⼎ ᴢ䦂❭⠻
ϝ
Ꮰ㞬᭛˄Ѡǃಯঞ䅔㍧˅ 呹ᅝ䖾⠻
㿬䏃ᕫ㿬 咗⾝⦷⠻
ಯ
⧒ҷ 䛁ᯢ⩟⠻
Ѩ
ᬭ᳗䂪Ϫ䂪 ⥟⨲⦡⠻
⧁ ࡴᢝ 㨝ᦤ⠻ ᯳ᳳѠ Ϟज ᅌߚ 䗣䘢䂆䃯㾷㟛㿢䂪ˈᅌ⫳ᇛⷨ㿢ࡴᢝⱘ䞡㽕Џ丠ˈ⡍߹ᰃֵ々㕽㟛ᕽ⌏ⱘ䮰㙃DŽ ៥ץгᇛ⁶㽪⧒ҷ㕙侀Џᬭᇡֵ々㕽ⱘⳟ⊩DŽ䂆ූϞˈᅌ⫳䳔㽕ህᴀܻᆍ⑪ܽ٭䃯 䘧ˈ䁾ᯢ⼲ⱘᾂ㗔བԩ䗣䘢कᄫᶊ㹿乃ᯢߎ՚ ࡴ DŽ ᣛᅮ䮅䅔㈡˖ ᄫ㺣㮣⦡ˈᏈࠏ㨫 ㌺᳒⅌ℷ㗙ⱘ䄺ਞˈ㋘⨳㡒ጤ㨫 ᘽ༛ ⭄ˈ㜧㨫 া䁛ⴷकᶊˈ䥒侀⬄㨫 ⭊ҷᕽ㟜ⳳ㕽ˈ䥒侀⬄㨫DŽ ᣛᅮὁࣙᣀ˖ ᅌ⫳䳔㽕ህĀ⭊ҷᕽ㟜ⳳ㕽āϔЁᣛᅮⱘ㆛ゴᦤߎ䅔ฅਞDŽ ᅌ⫳ г㽕ϔן䭔ᕦ㿧㏈ⱘ㿜ࡗˈᇡᑒןҎଣो䂓ᶹˈϺϨ䙌ϔןҎᐿࡽҪ⏙Ἦᯢⱑഄњ㾷 ԩ䃖ֵ々㕽DŽ ᅌ⫳䳔㽕㿾ଣϔԡ⠻䮰ᮐᬭ᳗Ёᕟ⊩Џ㕽ⱘଣ丠DŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖㨝ᦤ⠻ˈ㕢㽓ᬣ⼲ᅌ䰶䘧ᅌঞᬭ⠻ᅌमDŽ᳒ӏЁ⽣䷇᳗⍋ᅷ ᬭ䭔ᕦ㿧㏈ᬭDŽ⧒ӏֵটූ㣅䁲䚼⠻ঞᴀ䰶㘪㍧䓨ᇢ⾥ЏӏDŽ
Ꮰ㞬᭛ 呹ᅝ䖾⠻ ᯳ᳳϝ Ϟज ᅌߚ ᴀ䂆ࠡ ᇣᰖϞᏠ㞬᭛᭛⊩ˉ䃯㕽कϝ㟇कϗ䂆ˈࣙߚ䀲ˈϡᅮ䀲ˈ؛䀁䁲⇷ˈ ੑҸ䁲⇷ˈ。ࡃ䀲ⱘՓ⫼DŽᕠ ᇣᰖϞᏠ㞬᭛䅔㍧ũ㋘㗄⽣䷇ǃᏪᩦ㕙ሐ䖺ࠡDŽ Ѡᑈ ㋮ᅌ⫳ৃҹ䙌ׂ᭛⊩䅔㍧ˈߚ߹⚎ ᅌߚDŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖呹ᅝ䖾⠻ˈ㕢ऍ㤆⼲ᅌ䰶䘧ᅌǃऍ㤆ᅌᅌमˈ᳒᪨ӏ㕢 䏃ᯧᮃᅝ䙷Ꮂゟᅌᅌ㋏ᇜӏᬭᥜǃ䘧⫳⼲ᅌ䰶ᇜӏᬭǃЁ㧃⽣䷇⼲ᅌ䰶ݐӏᬭDŽϔб бϗᑈ䍋ˈ᪨ӏᴀ⼲ᅌ䰶ᇜӏᬭঞᬭࢭЏӏDŽЏᥜᏠ㞬᭛ǃᮄ㋘㽓ᮍᅌDŽ
28
Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
ᬭ᳗䂪Ϫ䂪 ⥟⨲⦡⠻ ᯳ᳳѨ Ϟज ᅌߚ ᴀᄷᇛⷨ䅔㽓ᬣֵṱ 㟇 ゴˈܻᆍᰃ˖⼲ⱘᕟ⊩ǃ㞾⬅㟛㡃ᖗǃ⾂ᢰᅝᙃ᮹ǃᅷ䁧 䀅丬ǃᬓᑰǃီ࿏ǃᬭ᳗ǃ㘪ᕦⳌ䗮ǃ㘪令ǃ㘪⾂ǃ⋫⾂ǃ㘪令ǃំ៦ǃᬭ᳗᳗䅄ǃϪㄝक Ѩןᕜ䞡㽕ⱘЏ丠DŽ ᴀ䂆ᇛḍ㘪㍧ˈ䁇㌄ഄˈ䗤হഄˈЁ㣅ᇡ✻ഄᶹ㗗ǃ㾷䞟㽓ᬣֵṱDŽ䰸њ⑪⺎ഄњ㾷 ᅗⱘ㕽Пˈг㽕⏙᱄ഄ⅌㋡ߎᅗⱘ㌤ᾟ ㎅ǃ㋏㍅ ˈད䅧ৠᅌ༴ゟ㌂ᆺⱘ⼲ᅌḍDŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖⥟⨲⦡⠻ˈ㕢ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶⼲ᅌDŽ᳒ӏЁ⽣䷇᳗ߎ⠜䚼Џӏǃ䘧⫳ ⼲ᅌ䰶ঞᴀ䰶ݐӏᬭDŽ⧒ӏ㧃⼲ᓊԌ䚼ЏӏDŽ
⧁㟛ᅌ䚼 䴦ᇥᑈ䓨ᇢ 㨝ᦤ⠻ ᯳ᳳϔ ϟज ᅌߚ ᴀ䂆䞱ᇡЁǃ催Ё㟛ᇜᅌ⫳ሸߎϡもⱘଣ丠ˈ㌺ќ㘪㍧䓨ᇢ㟛䷤䰆ᬭᇢˈ㨝⠻㮝 ⬅ᬍ䴽ᅫⱘ㾔咲՚ᆳ倫ᅌᬭ㚆᠔᳝ⱘⳌ䮰Џ丠˗݊Ёᇛ㿢㞾ǃ↦ǃᇥᑈ⢃㔾ǃᨽ䭔ᬭ ዛᢰǃᡔ㛑পǃ㙋ὁ䃂䀶ǃ㋘᳗ǃ⌕⫶ǃৠᗻ។ǃီࠡᗻ㸠⚎ǃ䮅㾑㡆ᚙߞ⠽ǃϞ㎆៤ⱂǃ 仆亳⛵ᑺǃ䂆ὁວǃབԩ䴶ᇡ䲶ီⱘ⠊↡ǃབԩ䴶ᇡ⠊↡㽾ⱘᅫᬭֵӄDŽ᳔ᕠˈ⚎䗭ןᑈ唵 ሸⱘᮣ㕸ᦤկ᳔䘽ড়ⱘᬭ㚆䓨ᇢᮍᓣDŽ
㕙侀 ⱑ㸯⠻ ᯳ᳳѠ ϟज ᅌߚ 㕙侀ᰃᮄ㋘㘪㍧᠔ࣙП⽣䷇᳔᳝㋏㍅ǃ᳔ᅠᭈⱘ䁂䞟˄গ& ( % 㨫ǃ┬⾟ᵒ䅃㕙侀 䀏䞟Ϟݞ ䷕˅DŽᴀ䂆Ёˈ៥ץ᳗㿢䂪㕙侀ϔࠄܿゴDŽ䭟ྟⱘᰖˈ៥ץ᳗ ⷨおᅌ㗙ϡৠⱘⳟ⊩ˈ䮰ᮐ㕙侀ⱘ㍅ᭈǃ㎅ǃⳂⱘֱ㕙ᆿᰖⱘᚙ⊕DŽ䗭ो᳔䞡㽕ⱘ 丠ⳂᰃNjֵ々㕽njⱘⳳ⧚DŽ៥ץ᳗ⳟֱ㕙བԩⱐሩ䗭ן丠Ⳃˈঞᅗ㔾ǃ々㕽ǃ៤㘪ㄝ丠Ⳃ ⱘ䮰֖DŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖ⱑ㸯⠻ˈ㕢ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䘧ᅌǃ㽓ᬣ⼲ᅌ䰶ᬭ⠻ᅌमDŽⱑ⠻՚ ৄᅷᬭϝकᑈˈ᳒ӏ䮰⏵ⴷ䰶䰶䭋ˈ↡ཇࠡⳂܦгᰃ㕢ᬍ䴽ᅫ䭋㗕᳗ৄⱘᅷᬭ DŽⱑ⠻䴲ᐌ᳝䉴᪨՚ᴀ᷵ᬭᇢ⼲ⱘ䁅䁲ˈᑈࠡҪ᳒ᮐⱒᖭПЁ᩹ݫফ䙔ᮐᴀ᷵ᥜ䂆ˈᴀ ᅌᄷᕜᾂᑌݡ䙔䂟ⱑ⠻՚᷵䃯䂆ˈሚᰖҪᇛҹ⌕߽ⱘЁ᭛䃯ᥜDŽ
㿬䏃ᕫ㿬 咗⾝⦷⠻ ᯳ᳳϝ ϟज ᅌߚ ᴀ䂆ᇛⷨ䅔㟞㋘⅋˄ᕲ㿬ࠄ߫⥟㿬˅ⱘ䞡㽕䚼ӑDŽҹ㡆߫ⱘ⅋⺎ᆺ㟛៥ץ᳝ 䮰ˈཌྷ᠔䙁䘛ⱘ៤⚎៥ⱘץ䨥៦DŽ៥ץᶹ㗗⅋ˈ⚎䗭ᰃ㘪䴜᠔咬⼎ⱘˈᮐᬭ㿧ǃⴷ䊀ǃ ՓҎ⅌ℷǃᬭᇢҎᅌ㕽䛑ᰃ᳝Ⲟⱘ⅋˄+LVWRU\˅ˈᰃNj⼖ⱘᬙџnj ˄+LV 6WRU\˅ˈ乃ᯢ ϞᏱҎ串⅋Ёᥠ⃞DŽ៥ץՓ⫼⅌㋡ᓣⱘᮍ⊩՚ⷨ䅔ˈܜњ㾷ोⱘ㌤ᾟǃ⅋㚠᱃ˈ 㿢䞡㽕ⱘ⼲ᅌЏ丠ˈϺឝ⫼⭊ҷⴷᕦⱘ䑿ϞˈՓ៥ץгৠ㩭⼖㘪┨ⱘ䴜᠔ᛳࢩˈڇ䃯ϞᏱ 䁅䁲䙷∌䘴ϡᬍ䅞ⱘⳳ⧚DŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖咗⾝⦷⠻ˈ䶧催呫⼲ᅌ䰶䘧ᅌˈЁ㧃⽣䷇⼲ᅌ䰶⼲ᅌDŽ᳒ӏ䱯 䴦ᑈՓੑ೬㘪㍧ⷨ䅔ᅌ᷵ᬭˈ⧒ӏᬍ䴽ᅫ䭋㗕᳗∌ᮄᬭ᳗⠻DŽ
ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
29
ᅌ䚼㟛ᓊԌࠊ ࡉϪ㿬 ྮ㟜⠻ ᯳ᳳϔ ᰮϞ ᅌߚ ᴀ䂆䅔㖦㘪㍧ϔोNjࡉϪ㿬njˈ⬅݊Џ丠ⱘᬬ䗄⅋ ᦔ䙌 㾷䞟 ᕟ⊩ 㘪㋘ ՚䁡䄬㨀᳝ⱘ䍋⑤ϞᏱⱘ⚎DŽׂ㖦ᴀ䂆ⱘৠᅌ䷜ߎᐁϞ䂆Ϻগ㟛㿢䂪 䅔㖦㘪㍧ᣛᅮᬭ⾥ǃগ㗗 ঞⷨ㖦Ϻᅠ៤ᣛᅮὁঞ䅔ฅਞDŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖ྮ㟜⠻ˈ㕢ԯ㕙䞠䘨Ꮂ䃒ܟᮃ⼲ᅌ䰶˄.QR[ *UDGXDWH 7KHRORJLFDO 6HPLQDU\˅म ˄' 0LQ ˅ˈ⧒ӏ∌⽣ⴷᬭ᳗ ॳৡЏᘽ ⠻ DŽ
⼲ଳ⼎ ᴢ䦂❭⠻ ᯳ᳳѠ ᰮϞ ᅌߚ ⼲ଳ⼎ᰃ㋏㍅⼲ᅌᑣ䂪ⱘḌᖗ˗䂆ৡ々ᛣ⚎ᇡଳ⼎ⱘЏ储ũ⼲ũⱘ䁡䄬˗⼲ⱘଳ⼎ ᰃֵӄ㟛⼲ᅌⱘḍDŽ䂆Џ㽕Ⳃⱘ˖ ᅌ㖦ଳ⼎ঞֵӄঞ⼲ᅌଃϔⱘḍDŽ 㮝㨫ᅶ㾔ⱘ ଳ⼎ũ㘪㍧ˈᅌ㖦᳔㌖ⱘଳ⼎ũ㘊〠DŽ 㮝㨫ᅌ㖦ଳ⼎ˈᛳ䃱㗠џ༝ϞᏱDŽ 㮝㨫ᅌ㖦ଳ ⼎ˈᛯᚰϞᏱⱘ᠔᳝DŽ䂆㎅བϟ˖ ϔ ଳ⼎ⱘὖᗉ˖ 䁲⑤ⱘὖᗉ Ꮉⱘὖᗉ ⧒䈵ⱘὖᗉ ㍰ড়ⱘᅮ㕽DŽѠ ଳ⼎ ⱘЏ储˖ ϝԡϔ储⼲DŽϝ ଳ⼎ⱘᇡ䈵˖ ڇਞⱘᇡ䈵 ڇਞ㗙 ䷤㸼ⱘᇡ䈵 ䷤㸼㗙 ᳔ ㌖ⱘᇡ䈵 Ҏ串DŽಯǃଳ⼎ⱘⳂⱘ˖ ϞᏱⱘਞⶹ˖ϞᏱⱘᮼᛣˈҎ串ⱘ㰩๗ Ҏ串ⱘডឝ˖ 䁡䄬ˈឝ⫼DŽ Ѩ ଳ⼎ⱘᰖぎ˖ ଳ⼎ⱘ⅋ ࡉ䗴ˈ䷤㸼ˈ៤ህ ଳ⼎ⱘจ᠔˖أ ⱘˈ䙌ⱘˈ∌ᘦⱘDŽ݁ ଳ⼎ⱘᮍ⊩˖ ࡉ䗴ⱘᮍ⊩ ԡḐⱘᮍ⊩ ᛳࢩⱘᮍ⊩ 䘧 ⱘᮍ⊩ џӊⱘᮍ⊩ 䘧៤㙝䑿ⱘᮍ⊩ 㿬䣘ⱘᮍ⊩DŽϗ ଳ⼎ⱘܻᆍ˖ ϔ㠀ⱘଳ⼎ ⡍߹ⱘଳ⼎DŽܿ ଳ⼎ⱘ⠁䂪˖ 㟛㞾⬅⌒⼲ᅌⱘ⠁䂪 㟛䴜ᘽ⌒⼲ᅌⱘ⠁䂪 㟛ᬍ䴽⌒ ⼲ᅌⱘ⠁䂪DŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖ᴢ䦂❭⠻ˈ䶧㐑⼲ᅌ⼲ᅌ䰶䘧ᅌˈ⧒ӏᬍ䴽ᅫ䭋㗕᳗∌䭔ᬭ᳗⠻ ঞᴀ䰶ᬭDŽЏᥜ㋏㍅⼲ᅌDŽ
⧒ҷ 䛁ᯢ⩟⠻ ᯳ᳳಯ ᰮϞ ᅌߚ 㽕ⳳℷњ㾷ⴷᬭ㧃㟛ৄˈϔᅮ㽕䁡䄬䖥ǃ⧒ҷᬭ᳗ⱘᰖҷ㛜㌵㟛ֵӄ㛜㌵ˈ᠔ ҹᴀ䂆ᕲ᱂Ϫᬭ᳗㟛ᓓϪ㋔䁁䅞䄢ⱘ⅋ᰖҷ㚠᱃㿢ϟ߫䂆丠˖᱂Ϫᅷᬭ䘟ࢩҹঞ㟛݊ ᆚߛⳌ䮰ⱘᅌ⫳⽣䷇䘟ࢩ˗᱂Ϫᬭ᳗ড়ϔ䘟ࢩ˗ᕲ㞾⬅⌒ֵӄࠄ㽕⌒ֵӄࠄᮄ⽣䷇⌒ֵӄ˗ ᕲ㘪┨䘟ࢩⱐሩߎⱘϝ⊶䴜ᘽ⌒䘟ࢩ˗⧒ҷ⼲ᅌᗱ╂˖ᮄℷ㍅⌒⼲ᅌǃᄬЏ㕽⼲ᅌǃᮄ㞾⬅ Џ㕽ǃ㾷ᬒ⼲ᅌǃ䘆⼲ᅌǃ┬ᆻᶣ㟛㥿⡍᳐ㄝㄝ˗Џᬭ㟛ᵅℷᬭⱘⱐሩ㟛⼲ᅌ˗㽓ᮍᬭ᳗ 㟛ϝϪ⬠ᬭ᳗ⱘ㟜䍋˗བᵰᰖ䭧䀅ৃ䙘Ꮰᳯ㛑ҟ㌍ᕠ⧒ҷᗱ╂㟛ܼ⧗࣪ᇡᬭ᳗ⱘ≪▔DŽ ᬭҟ㌍˖䛁ᯢ⩟⠻ˈ佭␃Ё⼲ᅌⷨお䰶䘧ᅌDŽ᳒ӏЁ㧃ⴷᬭ⾂䊶᳗⠻ǃЁ 㧃ֵ㕽⼲ᅌ䰶䃯ǃ㧃⼲ֵӄ㟛᭛࣪ⷨおЁᖗⷨおવDŽ⧒ӏᴀ䰶ᬭˈЏᥜᬭ᳗⅋DŽ
30
Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
ထ】ঽᵟপ⽡✞ƽᄒ Џᕠ2007ᑈ1᳜㟇2007ᑈ8᳜ ᬭࢭ᳗䅄
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᳜
᳜
᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆䭟ྟ 呹ᅝ䖾㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆㌤ᴳ 呹ᅝ䖾㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆䭟ྟ ᠈ᖋ⧚㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆㌤ᴳ ᠈ᖋ⧚㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆䭟ྟ ᒋ⧚ܟ㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆㌤ᴳ ᒋ⧚ܟ㗕 ᮹ 䘢ᑈᬒ؛䭟ྟ ᮹ 䘢ᑈᬒ؛㌤ᴳ ᮹ 䭟ᅌ⾂ᢰঞ䀏ݞ ᮹ ᅌᄷ䭟ྟϞ䂆 ᮹ ᬒ؛ ᮹ ᬭࢭ᳗䅄ঞ䓨ᇢ᳗䅄 ᮹ ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌन᳗᳗વ᳗ ᮹ ᬒ؛ ᮹ 㺰؛ ᮹ ᅌᄷ㌤ᴳ ᮹ ᬭࢭ᳗䅄 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆䭟ྟ ਖ≯⏉㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆㌤ᴳ ਖ≯⏉㗕 ᮹ 㨷џ᳗᳗䅄 ᮹ ⬶ὁ⾂ ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆䭟ྟ 䞥㕽✹㗕 ᮹ ϔܹᅌ㗗䀺
᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆䭟ྟ ᴢعᅝ㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆㌤ᴳ ᴢعᅝ㗕 ᮹ Ѡܹᅌ㗗䀺 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆㌤ᴳ ᬺ㟜㗕 ᮹ ᆚ䲚䂆䭟ྟ ᬺ㟜㗕
ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
31
⦵ѝޑԯ 㸠ᬓ᳗䅄
&576 ᑈ ᳜㟇 ᳜ᬊᬃ㸼
ஂԡ˖ᮄৄᐷˋܗ
䉵೬⊩Ҏᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌᅷᬭ᳗ ᬊܹ
䉵೬⊩Ҏᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌᅷᬭ᳗ ⼒೬⊩Ҏᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌन᳗ 㕢Пট ϝ″ᾟড়Չฅ㸼
4,515,351
6,406,045
⼲ᅌᬭ㚆ϔ㠀༝⥏
1,092,090
1,092,090
ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌन᳗༝⥏
1,100,000
1,595,822
㕢Пট༝⥏
441,302
831,302
ⷨ㖦䊏ᬊܹ
917,250
917,250
ᇡᅌ⫳⤢ࡽ䞥༝⥏
1,000,000
ᇡᮄᑫᬭ᳗ᇜℒ༝⥏
370,000
370,000
ᇡ䱚ᆓ㟡ᇜℒ༝⥏
150,000
150,000
⾳䞥ᬊܹ
444,000
444,000
߽ᙃᬊܹ
709
5,581
ᬃߎ
4,531,703
4,922,456
Ҏџ䊏⫼
1,480,222
1,220,222
㸠ᬓ䊏⫼
1,208,656
1,209,409
䃯⌏ࢩџᎹ䊏⫼
1,209,823
1,209,823
ᇡ⦡ᛯᆊᒁ༝⥏ᬃߎ
263,002
263,002
ᇡᮄᑫᬭ᳗༝⥏ᬃߎ
370,000
370,000
ᇡॳᏂ᳗&5&ᬭ᳗༝⥏
650,000
㌤们
-16,352
&576 ᑈ ᳜ ᮹䞥㸼 䉵೬⊩Ҏ ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌᅷᬭ᳗
ஂԡ˖ᮄৄᐷˋܗ
⼒೬⊩Ҏ ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌन᳗
ড়㿜
⌕ࢩ⧒䞥
- 90731
೪ᇜℒ
8,098
8,098
64,000
64,000
ᄬֱܹ䄝䞥
873,620
782,889
ᦤ᩹䞥
201,254
201,254
ᅌ⫳⤢ࡽ䞥
910,000
910,000
ᬭ䞥
363,916
363,916
2,348,790.
2,330,157
㐑㿜 32
1,483,589
Џᕠ 2007 ᑈ 2 ᳜
- 18,633.
ჀǰҴ፯⊥ݪᰖΫỌ ሚዛᾂ⠻⼲ᅌᱼᬭ⠻䃯ᑻ ⼲ᅌ䃯ᑻ ϔූ˖ ᳜ ᮹ ݁ ϟज Ѡූ˖ ᳜ ᮹ ݁ ᰮ䭧 ϝූ˖ ᳜ ᮹ ᮹ ϟज ಯූ˖ ᳜ ᮹ ᮹ ᰮ䭧 Ć䗷㑠ಯූ䂟ⲵৃ㛑ܼগ㟛ˈҹ㖦ᕫ䗷䉿ᅠᭈⱘֵᙃ ഄ咲˖ゟৄ☷㆘ᅌ储㚆仼 ˄ৄ࣫Ꮦᑇᵅ䏃ϔ↉ 㰳ˊ᥋䘟㍴㎮ সҁキ˅
ᬭ⠻䃯ᑻ ᳜ ᮹ ϔ Ϟज ഄ咲˖⍌ֵ᳗់ᘽූ ˄ৄ࣫Ꮦᮄ⫳फ䏃 ↉ 㰳ˊ᥋䘟㍴㎮ ݀仼キ˅
⌑䀶䳏䁅˖ 䔝 䔝
㎆ഔ˖www.stemi.org.tw ㈠٭᳗Џᐁ೬˖ 䱇䨇˄Џᐁ˅ǃᅟ᭛ࢱǃᴢ䣺㎌ǃ呹ᅝ䖾ǃ 咗ᤃ㧃ǃ㫵⨲Ⲟǃ䋈ᓎǃϕ䘴ሣǂ㙃ড়ᭀ䙔
Џ䕺ஂԡ˖ Ё⽣䷇᳗ǃЁ㧃⼲ᎲᏂڇ᳗ǃЁ㧃⽣䷇⼲ᅌ䰶ǃ ৄ☷⍌ֵ᳗⼲ᅌ䰶ǃᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶ǃ ዛᾂ䱯Ԝ䘧न᳗ǃ᷵೦⽣䷇೬༥
न䕺ஂԡ˖ᘽߎ⠜⼒
ထ】ঽᵟপ⽡ 2007 ᪤ ៥ץℷী᳒Џゟᖫདད㺱٭㞾ᏅⱘҎ ৠᖗࡴܹ㧃Ҏᬭ᳗ⱘ⅌ℷ䘟ࢩ ᴀ䰶ᅫᮼ˖៥ץ㽕ᓎゟϔ᠔᳝∈⑪ⱘᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶ˈ༴ᅮ㧃Ҏᬭ᳗㌂ᆺⱘ㘪㍧⼲ᅌ ⻢ˈϺϨ㚆ᮄϔҷ᳝ᬍ䴽ᅫֵӄⱘ⠻ǃڇ䘧Ҏᬭ᳗ⱘ䷬㹪DŽ ᴀ䰶⡍㡆˖㘪㍧㐑ॳࠛ㾷㍧ǃϡ䷜ԣ᷵ǃᇣ⧁ࠊϞ䂆DŽ ܹᅌ㗗䀺˖ϔ⫳㗗䀺 ᳜݁ ᮹˗Ѡ⫳㗗䀺 ᳜ܿ ᮹DŽ 㗗䀺⾥Ⳃ˖ㄚ䀺˄㘪㍧ǃ㘪㍧㣅᭛˅ǃষ䀺DŽ
ᬍ䴽ᅫ⼲ᅌ䰶䰶㿞
33