Revista Prémio | Junho 2023

PUBLISHER

António Cunha Vaz

D IRECTORA EXECUTIVA

Sofia Arnaud

D IRECTOR DE ARTE

Miguel Mascarenhas

CONSELHEIRO

EDITORIAL

Diogo Belford

REDACÇÃO

Ana Valado, Bruno Rosa

COLABORAM NESTA

EDIÇÃO

André Veríssimo, Blandina

Costa, Filipe Santos Costa, João Almada, Luís Eusébio, Neil Bennett, Quingila Hebo

P UBLICIDADE

Telf.: 210 120 600

I MPRESSÃO

Soartes Artes Gráficas, Lda.

Rua A. Cavaco - Carregado Park, Fracção J

Lugar da Torre, 2580-512

Carregado

PROPRIETÁRIO E EDITOR

Cunha Vaz & Associados –Consultores em Comunicação, SA

NIF 506 567 559

D ETENTORES DE 5%

OU MAIS DO CAPITAL

DA EMPRESA

António Cunha Vaz

SEDE DO EDITOR

E DE REDACÇÃO

Av. da Liberdade, 144, 6º Dto 1250-146 Lisboa

C RC LISBOA

13538-01

R EGISTO ERC

124 353

D EPÓSITO LEGAL 320943/10

SUMÁRIO | CONTENTS

ESTATUTO EDITORIAL

EDITORIAL

OPINIÃO | OPINION

Neil Bennett, Co-CEO H/Advisors

AMO and H/Advisors – A short history

DESTAQUE | FEATURED

Conferências com chancela CV&A | The CV&A conferences

PORTUGAL

20 Anos depois, estamos assim tão diferentes? | 20 years later, are we really so different?

ENTREVISTA | INTERVIEW

A conversation with Henry Kissinger

THE ECONOMIST

Inflation and rising demands on governments are changing economic policy

PREVISÕES | FORECASTS

O mundo por maus caminhos | The world on the wrong path

ÁFRICA | AFRICA

ANGOLA | ANGOLA

Um país na flor da idade | A young but swiftly maturing country

MOÇAMBIQUE | MOZAMBIQUE

Uma evolução notável e potencial ainda por concretizar | Notable growth and still with potential to achieve

AMÉRICAS | AMERICAS

BRASIL | BRAZIL

Bruno Rosa, PRÉMIO

As idas e vindas da economia brasileira nos últimos 20 anos | The comings and goings of the brazilian economy over the last two decades

ÁSIA | ASIA

JAPÃO | JAPAN

Filipe Santos Costa, jornalista | journalist

www.revistapremio.pt/estatuto

Tokyo connection

ANTÓNIO CUNHA VAZ, PRESIDENTE DA CV&A CHAIRMAN AT CV&A

Construindo o futuro

Building the future

ACunha Vaz & Associados, também conhecida como CV&A, celebra o seu 20º aniversário no dia 15 de Junho de 2023. Durante as últimas duas décadas, a CV&A estabeleceu-se como uma empresa líder em consultoria de comunicação, especialmente focada em consultoria de comunicação institucional e assuntos públicos em Portugal, com presença na África de língua portuguesa e Brasil. Desde a sua criação, a CV&A está na vanguarda da comunicação corporativa e financeira, oferecendo aos clientes consultoria estratégica e soluções inovadoras para navegar em ambientes de negócios complexos, lidando com o mais diverso género de partes interessadas. Fruto do seu compromisso com a excelência, a CV&A tem sido consistentemente reconhecida como um ‘player’ de referência no sector. Ao longo dos anos, a CV&A trabalhou com um vasto leque de clientes, incluindo as maiores empresas nacionais, empresas multinacionais, agências governamentais e ONGs. A sua experiência em gestão de reputação, comunicação de crise e engajamento de partes interessadas ajudou os clientes a atingir os seus objetivos e construir relacionamentos duradouros com os seus ‘stakeholders’. Olhando para o futuro, a CV&A mantém o compromisso de oferecer o mais alto nível de serviço aos seus clientes e expandir a sua presença nos principais mercados. Com uma talentosa equipa de profissionais e um histórico de sucesso, a CV&A está pronta para continuar a sua trajectória de crescimento e causar um impacto positivo no cenário dos negócios por muitos anos. Afinal, a CV&A celebra 20 anos e é com orgulho que lidera o mercado em facturação, lucros

Cunha Vaz & Associados, also known as CV&A, celebrates its 20th anniversary on 15 June 2023. During these two decades, CV&A established itself as a leading communications consultancy, especially focused on institutional relations and public affairs in Portugal, with a presence in Portuguese speaking Africa and Brazil. Ever since launching, CV&A has been in the vanguard of corporate and financial communications, providing its clients with strategic consultancy and innovative solutions to navigate their complex business environments, dealing with the most diverse and different stakeholders. In keeping with its commitment to excellence, CV&A has received consistent recognition as a benchmark reference in the sector.

Over these years, CV&A has worked with a vast range of clients, including the largest national corporations, multinational firms, government agencies and NGOs. Its experience in reputation management, crisis communication and engaging with interested parties helped these clients achieve their objectives and build long lasting relationships with their stakeholders. Looking to the future, CV&A maintains its commitment both to provide the highest level of service to its clients and to expand its presence in key markets. With a talented team of professionals and a track record of success, CV&A is set to continue its trajectory of growth and bring about positive impacts on the business scenario throughout many years to come. After all, CV&A celebrates its 20th anniversary with due pride at being market leader in terms of turnover, profits and EBITDA and with only 32 members of staff.

• In 2022, we recorded over ten million euros in turnover — with only 2.5% of this stemming either from central, regional and local government or from state owned

e EBITDA, com apenas 32 trabalhadores.

• Em 2022 apresentámos mais de dez milhões de euros de facturação — apenas 2,5% com origem no Estado central, regional, local e empresas públicas — e três milhões de euros de lucro (dos quais 10% são distribuídos aos colaboradores e 5% destinados a donativos à sociedade civil – cultura, desporto e obras sociais).

• Na cultura, no desporto e no apoio às crianças do mundo, nenhuma outra empresa do sector investe como a CV&A. Patrocinamos a selecção portuguesa de rugby — LUSITANOS —, e apoiámos em exclusivo a oferta de uma obra de Vhils, Alexandre Farto, à Embaixada de Portugal no Japão. Apoiamos o IPDAL e a Casa da América Latina. Somos membros da UN Global Compact Network e do BCSD Portugal. As crianças sempre foram alvo da nossa atenção. Quando apoiámos a Acreditar, quando equipámos com leitores de DVD a ala pediátrica de Santa Maria, quando fomos patrocinadores da Raríssimas, quando apoiámos projectos dedicados a crianças na Guiné-Bissau e em Angola ficámos sempre gratos por terem deixado que colaborássemos. Nunca o anunciámos. Mas os nossos colaboradores merecem que, nestes vinte anos, se saiba que contribuem para a sociedade em que desenvolvem actividade. No dia deste vigésimo aniversário são as crianças ucranianas refugiadas em Kyiv que merecem o nosso apoio.

• Ainda em 2022, a CV&A tornou-se na primeira consultora certificada pela DGERT para dar formação em comunicação, o que nos permite uma diferenciação da qual nos orgulhamos. Ao mesmo tempo subscrevíamos as plataformas BCSD e UNGNP assegurando medidas para que, também a CV&A, contribuísse de forma sustentável para o desenvolvimento da economia em que se insere.

companies — and three million euros in profit (of which 10% are distributed to staff and 5% donated to civil society entities – culture, sport and social works).

• In culture, in sport and in supporting children around the world, no other company in the sector invests like CV&A. We sponsor the Portuguese rugby team — LUSITANOS —, and exclusively backed the donation of a work of art by Vhils, Alexandre Farto, to the Embassy of Portugal in Japan. We support IPDAL and Casa da América Latina. We are members of both the UN Global Compact Network and BCSD Portugal. Children have always been a target of our intentions. When we supported Acreditar, when providing DVD readers to the pediatric ward at Hospital Santa Maria, when we became patrons of Raríssimas, when providing support for children in Guinea Bissau and Angola, we were always grateful for being allowed to collaborate. We have never advertised this. However, our team deserve, after these twenty years, that there is a record of how they contributed towards society through undertaking these activities. On the date of our twentieth anniversary, it is Ukrainian child refugees in Kyiv who deserve our support.

• Furthermore in 2022, CV&A became the first consultancy to be certified by DGERT to provide communications training, which endows us with the factor for differentiation in which we take due pride. We have simultaneously subscribed to the BCSD and UNGNP platforms ensuring measures that again enable CV&A to make a sustainable contribution to the economic development of its surrounding society.

• Now, under the auspices of the 20th anniversary

• E agora, no âmbito da comemoração dos 20 anos, a Nova School of Business and Economics e a CV&A anunciaram a criação do programa de formação de executivos “Leadership and Crisis Management”. São duas décadas a contribuir para o sucesso das pessoas, instituições e empresas que nos escolheram ter a seu lado. Este é o ADN da CV&A, escrito pelas suas pessoas, com a ajuda dos seus fornecedores e pensado para servir os seus clientes. As conferências CV&A que agora são retomadas começaram quase no início da actividade da empresa. Sempre pensámos que trazer o pensamento do Mundo ao nosso País era dar seguimento ao que os portugueses de Quinhentos fizeram quando “…por mares nunca dantes navegados…” se aventuraram mar fora e, apesar de tanto “… do seu sal serem lágrimas de Portugal.”, souberam trazer outras culturas até nós, enriquecendo-nos, ao mesmo tempo que deixavam noutras paragens as sementes de um País maior que o seu próprio território. “As Relações Ibéricas e o Contexto do Diálogo Transatlântico”, pelo ex-primeiro-ministro espanhol José Maria Aznar, a Conferência “Leadership: Taking Charge”, com o general norte-americano Colin Powell, seguindo-se “The International Economy Today: Challenges and Opportunities” por John W. Snow., antigo Secretário do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos e a tão em voga palestra “Uma Verdade Inconveniente”, pelo antigo vice-presidente dos Estado Unidos, Al Gore foram marcos de um ciclo que estava para durar. “The Economic Development and the World Peace”, pelo ex-primeiro-ministro britânico Tony Blair, “Embracing our Common Humanity”, pelo antigo presidente dos Estados Unidos, Bill Clinton e “Chanllenging Poverty: The Growth of Microcredit”, por Muhammad Yunus, banqueiro e professor de Economia indiano e pai do micro-crédito, iniciativa que lhe deu a distinção como Prémio Nobel da Paz foram as conferências seguintes. Para além destes, outros brilhantes oradores se seguiram, como Mário Monti, Gerard Schroeder, que falou sobre “A Crise Europeia e as Reformas Necessárias”, David Plouffe, estratega de marketing político norte-americano e o homem que comandou a primeira campanha para a eleição do presidente Barak Obama ou Álvaro Uribe, ex-presidente da Colômbia e visto como o homem que recolocou o País no mapa mundial com o tema “The Rise of the South American Emerging Markets”. Os jornalistas de referência tiveram o seu lugar no ciclo de conferências com “Portugal: ameaça ou Oportunidade”, que teve a participação de Raphael Minder (Herald Tribune), Wolfgang Münchau (Financial Times) e Raul Llores (Folha de São Paulo), quadros de três dos mais prestigiados jornais mundiais. O escritório do Porto, no extraordinário Palácio da Bolsa, sempre com o apoio da Associação Comercial do Porto, foi palco do Primeiro Ciclo das Conferências do Palácio, sob o lema “O Mundo visto do Porto: a política externa de alguns dos grandes protagonistas da diplomacia mundial explicada pelos próprios”. O Segundo Ciclo teria por lema “A Economia vista pelos Empresários” e ambos deram origem a livros que mostram bem a importância de trocar ideias. O III Ciclo das

commemorations, the Nova School of Business and Economics and CV&A are announcing the launch of the executive training program

“Leadership and Crisis Management”.

Two decades of contributing to the success of the people, institutions and companies that choose to have us at their side. This is the very DNA of CV&A, written by its people, with the help of its suppliers and all designed to best serve its clients.

The now-resumed CV&A conferences stretch back right to the earliest activities of the firm. We always strove to bring the thinking of the world to our country and provide continuity to what the Portuguese of the 16th century did when embarking “…for seas never before sailed…” and who adventured overseas and, despite everything, “… from their salt came the tears of Portugal”, knowing how to bring other cultures back to us, enriching ourselves while simultaneously leaving behind the seeds of a country greater than its own territory.

“Iberian Relationships and the Context of the Transatlantic Dialogue”, by the former Spanish Prime Minister José Maria Aznar, the “Leadership: Taking Charge” Conference with the U.S. General Colin Powell, followed by “The International Economy Today: Challenges and Opportunities” with John W. Snow, the former U.S. Secretary of State for the Treasury and the extremely current speech “An Inconvenient Truth” by the former U.S. Vice President, Al Gore were landmarks in a cycle that was set to last. “Economic Development and World Peace”, featured former British Prime Minister Tony Blair, “Embracing our Common Humanity”, with former U.S. President Bill Clinton and “Challenging Poverty: The Growth of Microcredit”, with Muhammad Yunus, the Indian banker, economics professor and the father of micro-credit, an initiative that gained him the Nobel Peace Prize, were the conferences that followed. Furthermore, other brilliant speakers were still to come, including Mário Monti, Gerard Schroeder, who discussed “The European Crisis and the Necessary Reforms”, David Plouffe, the American political marketing strategist and behind the first presidential election campaign of Barak Obama, and Álvaro Uribe, the former President of Colombia and acknowledged as the man who put his country back on the global agenda, speaking on the theme “The Rise of the South American Emerging Markets”. Leading journalists got their opportunity to speak at the conference cycle “Portugal: Threat or Opportunity”, with Raphael Minder (Herald Tribune), Wolfgang Münchau (Financial Times) and Raul Llores (Folha de São Paulo), representing three of the world’s most prestigious newspapers. The Oporto office, in the extraordinary Bolsa Palace, with constant support from the Oporto Commercial Association, was the stage for the First Palace Conference Cycle, on the theme of “The World seen from Oporto: the foreign policies of some of the leading players in world diplomacy explained by themselves”. The Second Cycle approached the theme “The Economy Seen by Corporate Leaders” and both resulted in books that clearly convey the importance of exchanging ideas. The Third Palace Conference Cycle: “The Portuguese Economy

Conferências do Palácio: “A Economia Portuguesa vista pelos Reguladores” foi, também ele, um sucesso e o IV Ciclo das Conferências do Palácio, “A Economia sob o olhar dos Grandes Economistas”, fechou este período com chave de ouro. Os vinte anos de existência agora comemorados são o espelho dos seus Clientes, Fornecedores e, claro, Colaboradores. O percurso da empresa sempre foi coerente, mas o mercado tem curvas de crescimento e retracção, Portugal e outros mercados em que a empresa opera viveram momentos cíclicos distintos – politica e economicamente – e a saúde financeira hoje existente teve momentos menos bons entre os anos 2012 e 2015. Um negócio com risco mal calculado num mercado externo e as convulsões resultantes da falência de um banco e das empresas com ele, directa ou indirectamente, relacionadas levaram a CV&A a tomar medidas drásticas para poder sobreviver. A empresa contou, então, com o apoio dos Bancos com os quais tinha relação comercial, de alguns fornecedores e, sempre, dos colaboradores. O balanço geral, destes vinte anos que agora celebramos, é de um crescimento forte e sustentado, tanto em número de clientes como no que aos valores fundamentais respeita. A variedade de serviços prestados e a preponderância dos mesmos no volume de negócios foi variando, assim como o peso dos mercados internacionais foi reflectindo a forma como a gestão soube responder, mais ou menos bem, às exigências de cada cultura. Os pesos da comunicação de produto, da comunicação institucional, com a sua vertente financeira, da comunicação política, da mudança para formas e métodos adequados ao mundo digital, foram-se adaptando aos tempos vividos com o surgimento dos assuntos públicos com maior presença nos últimos anos e com tendência a aumentar. A empresa, que iniciou a sua actividade em Lisboa, conta hoje com cerca de 32 pessoas, tem escritórios em Lisboa, no Porto, no Funchal, em Luanda, em Maputo e em São Paulo, sendo membro da rede H/Advisors (a nova marca do Grupo Havas para o sector de Public Relations) e assegurando, assim, serviços em muitos mais países de todos os continentes. Nos vários anos de vida, a empresa esteve presente nas maiores operações financeiras realizadas no país, tanto no ‘buy side’ como no ‘sell side’ – destacando-se a OPA do Grupo Sonae sobre a então PT, que só não teve sucesso por interferência política –, liderou sempre a comunicação de desporto, sendo a consultora de comunicação e marketing fora do estádio do Euro 2004, numa importante parceria com a UEFA, que viria a revelar-se um verdadeiro pilar para outros serviços entretanto prestados nesta área. O acompanhamento estratégico do Sport Lisboa e Benfica constituiu, em paralelo, um dos importantes marcos nos serviços de relações públicas e de aconselhamento estratégico da empresa. A empresa continuou a acompanhar nos anos seguintes a UEFA na organização da comunicação e marketing fora dos estádios dos Europeus de Sub21, de Futebol Feminino, de Futsal, de Futebol de Praia, Liga dos Campeões e Liga das Nações. Em conjunto com a sua parceira espanhola, Grupo Albion, assessorou a comunicação financeira e de marketing no processo de aquisição, pela Ferrovial,

as seen by its Regulators” was also a resounding success while the fourth Cycle, “The Economy from the perspective of Great Economists”, closed this period with a golden key. The twenty years of experiences now being commemorated are the mirror of its Clients, Suppliers and, of course, Staff. The path of the company was always coherent but the market has many fluctuations of growth and contraction. Portugal and other markets the firm operates in went through their own distinct cycles – political and economic – and the financial health existing today went through troubled times between 2012 and 2015. A badly calculated business risk in an international market and the convulsions resulting from a bank going under dragging down all the companies directly or indirectly related, forced CV&A into drastic measures in order to be able to survive. The firm counted on the support of the banks with which it maintained commercial relationships, some suppliers and, as always, its staff.

The general overview of the twenty years under celebration is one of strong and sustained growth both in terms of the number of clients and in fundamental values. The variety of services provided and their preponderance in terms of turnover has varied alongside the weightings of our international markets reflecting the ways in which the management was able to respond, to a greater or lesser extent, to the demands of each culture. The weightings of product communication, institutional communication, coupled with the financial facet, political communication, the changes in the ways, means and methods ongoing in the digital world means adapting to the times lived in with the emergence of public issues with higher profiles in recent years and with this trend set to deepen. The company that started out in Lisbon, today employs 32 staff and also has offices in Oporto, Funchal, Luanda, Maputo and São Paulo and, as a member of the H/Advisors (the new Havas Group brand for the Public Relations sector) network, ensuring services in many more countries on these continents. In its various years of life, the company participated in the largest financial operations taking place in Portugal both on the buy-side and on the sell-side – highlighting the Sonae Group takeover bid for the then PT telecommunications company that only failed because of political interference -, and has always led in sports communication, serving as the non-stadium communications and marketing consultancy for the Euro 2004 championship, in an important partnership with UEFA, which would turn into a foundation for the other services provided in this area. The strategic advising of Sport Lisboa e Benfica constituted, in parallel, one of the most important brands for the public relations and strategic consultancy of the company. The company continued to render support to UEFA in the following years and organising the communications and marketing campaigns outside of stadiums for the European Sub21, Female Football, Futsal, Beach Football, Champions League and League of Nations football tournaments. In conjunction with its Spanish partner, Grupo Albion, the

da British Airport Authority que gere os aeroportos britânico de Heathrow e Gatwick, entre outros. Internacionalmente, a Cunha Vaz & Associados foi a empresa contratada pela Conferência Episcopal de Angola e São Tomé para coordenar todas as actividades de organização, logística e de comunicação referentes à visita apostólica de Sua Santidade, o Papa Bento XVI, a Angola e um ano depois a Cunha Vaz & Associados é escolhida, pelo Estado Angolano e pelo Comité Organizador do Campeonato Africano das Nações, para a realização das cerimónias de sorteio, abertura e encerramento desse mega-evento desportivo que foi o CAN 2010. Segue-se a escolha como a empresa responsável pela organização de todo o evento de apresentação da convocatória da Selecção Nacional para o Mundial 2010 e consultora responsável pela comunicação e assessoria mediática da Viagem Apostólica de Sua Santidade o Papa Bento XVI, a Portugal, seguindo-se a proposta vencedora do concurso de promoção dos Jogos Africanos Moçambique 2011. Dá-se a primeira intervenção no mundo da política internacional, com a CV&A a prestar assessoria ao MpD (Movimento para a Democracia) de Cabo Verde, que vence as eleições autárquicas, reforçado o número de mandatos e o número de votos expressos. Seguir-se-iam duas campanhas presidenciais vitoriosas em Cabo Verde, três intervenções semelhantes na Guiné-Bissau e diversas participações em campanhas legislativas regionais e autárquicas nacionais que muito nos orgulham. Não ganhamos eleições. Isso é trabalho dos políticos. Colaboramos nas campanhas eleitorais e como nem só de vitórias se fazem as campanhas – e uma das que mais nos orgulhamos foi aquela em que estivemos com António Carmona Rodrigues em que o nosso candidato não foi eleito. A última campanha política em que a CV&A teve intervenção foi em Israel, apoiando o partido “New Hope”, moderado, que perdeu as eleições, mas que nos deu a conhecer uma realidade que desconhecíamos até à data. Terminamos com os nossos números oficiais:

Facturação: €10.028.849,43 (dez milhões, vinte e oito mil, oitocentos e quarenta e nove euros e quarenta e três cêntimos).

Número de colaboradores: 32 (trinta e dois)

Lucro antes de impostos: €3.113.062,66 (três milhões cento e treze mil e sessenta e dois euros e sessenta e seis cêntimos).

EBIT: €3.212.182,10 (três milhões, duzentos e dezoito mil, cento e oitenta e dois euros e dez cêntimos)

EBITDA: €3.136.368,85 três milhões, cento e trinta e seis mil, trezentos e sessenta e oito euros e oitenta e cinco cêntimos)

Portugal e os restantes países em que operamos têm progredido muito face a um passado recente e com menos de cinquenta anos. Mas muito há a fazer. Mãos à obra, pois! Contamos com todos para olhar o amanhã com optimismo. Num tempo de mudança global, num momento de incerteza na política internacional, que se vai reflectindo na economia em que nos movemos, todos os esforços são poucos para assegurar a construção de um futuro sustentável, com respeito pela história dos povos, sem julgamentos do passado e com a exclusiva preocupação de ajudar a construir um mundo justo para todos.

firm advised on the financial and marketing communications for the Ferrovial takeover of the British Airport Authority, which runs Heathrow and Gatwick, among other airports. Internationally, Cunha Vaz & Associados was the company contracted by the Episcopal Conference of Angola and São Tomé to coordinate all the organisational, logistics and communications activities around the visit of His Highness, Pope Benedict XVI to Angola and with Cunha Vaz & Associados, one year later, selected by the Angolan state and the Organising Committee of the African Nations Cup to stage the draw, opening and closing ceremonies at the mega-sporting event that was CAN 2010. This was followed by the company’s selection as organiser for the entire event presenting the National Squad for the World Cup 2010 and the consultancy responsible for media communications and advisor on the visit by His Highness Pope Benedict XVI to Portugal followed by winning the tender to promote the African Games in Mozambique in 2011. There was then the first intervention in the international political world with the CV&A providing advisory services to the MpD (Movement for Democracy) in Cape Verde, which won the local elections, strengthened the number of mandates and its share of the votes. This was then followed by two victorious presidential campaigns in Cape Verde, three similar campaigns in Guinea Bissau and various different contributions to national, regional and local election campaigns in Portugal of which we are deeply proud. We do not win elections. That is the work of politicians. We contribute to the electoral campaigns and these inevitably do not only produce successes – and one of the campaigns which we recollect with greatest pride was for António Carmona Rodrigues when our candidate did not win the election. The most recent political campaign in which CV&A intervened was in Israel in support of the moderate “New Hope” party that lost the elections but gave us insights into a hitherto unknown reality. We shall close with our official figures:

Turnover: €10,028,849.43 (ten million, twenty-eight thousand, eight-hundred and forty-nine euros and forty-three cents); Number of staff: 32 (thirty-two);

Pre-tax profit: €3,113,062.66 (three million, one-hundred and thirteen thousand and sixty-two euros and sixty-six cents);

EBIT: €3,212,182.10 (three million, two-hundred and twelve thousand, one-hundred and eighty-two euros and ten cents);

EBITDA: €3,136,368.85 (three million, onehundred and thirty-six thousand, three-hundred and sixty-eight euros and eight-five cents).

Portugal and the other countries in which we operate have progressed greatly given their recent pasts and less than fifty years of history. However, there is much to be done. Indeed, time to get to work! We count on everybody to look to the future with optimism. At a time of global change, with great international political uncertainties, which generate repercussions for the economies in which we act, all the efforts are scant to ensure the construction of a sustainable future, with respect for the histories of peoples, without judgements of the past and with an exclusive concern to help build a fairer world for all.

AMO and H/Advisors – A short history

NEIL BENNETT, CO-CEO H/ADVISORS

It all started 22 years ago on Madison Avenue. Three of the world’s most senior financial PR professionals met to discuss a ground-breaking alliance, that would change the shape of the communications industry. The agreement they forged on that unseasonably warm spring day in midtown New York laid out the principles and ambitions that still guide H/Advisors today, and created the organisation that is proud to have Cunha Vaz & Associates (CV&A) as a member. The three men were: Jim Abernathy, founder and chairman of Abernathy MacGregor, the US communications firm; Angus Maitland, Founder and Chairmen of The Maitland Consultancy in London; and Stephane Fouks, President of Euro RSCG in France (the agency that later become Havas Paris). Each of them had very different backgrounds, but one overriding common interest. Jim had been a journalist and communications professional before creating Abernathy. Angus had actually started his career as an economist before going on to run Valin Pollen and then founding his own agency. Stephane’s career began very differently, as a music producer before rising to become Chief of Staff to the French Prime Minister and then creating in turn his agency Omnium, which he later sold to Havas. Fate and high finance had brought them together. In the preceding months Havas had acquired stakes in both Abernathy and Maitland to add to its growing international empire. Now the three of them were colleagues. It was Jim who was the first to spot the opportunity in all this, to forge something greater out of the three constituent parts. So, he convened a conference for all Havas PR people in New York to discuss greater collaboration. It was quickly obvious to them that although they had in many ways been thrust together, they could use the opportunity to create something bigger than all of them – an alliance and a collaboration that would create one of the world’s first truly global communications groups. Naming it was tricky; they discussed long and hard what to call it. Stephane had the key: “it was obvious that it had to

be called after all three firms and my firm needed to be last. I said to Jim and Angus that it was either going to be called MAO or AMO. I am not surprised they chose the latter.” AMO it was, short and simple, with the added benefit that it means ‘I love’ in Latin - so perfect for a group of PR and communications firms. But more important than the name were the values behind it. AMO was not a company or a group, with one individual or one city or country dominating, but a network and an alliance. “From the start we were clear we wanted it to be based on willingness and friendship and on mutual respect rather than any corporate structure. That way we were confident it would bring the best out in everyone.” Today H/Advisors stays true to that founding principle. Each of our offices and agencies are treated as equals and we work together in a spirit of co-operation, which we strongly believe delivers the best results for our clients. Crucially we only invite members that are leaders in their own countries or cities, so our clients can be confident they are getting the very best service and advice wherever or whatever they need.

The three founding members of AMO quickly became five, as Angus’s longstanding-relationships with agencies in Spain and Germany asked to join. And the results were dramatic; since it was founded AMO and now H/Advisors has always been at or near the top of the M&A league tables, as compiled by Mergermarket. In time AMO grew and grew. In 2004 we welcomed Hirzel Neef Schmidt Counselors in Switzerland, when they reached out to Maitland to work with them on a particularly demanding brief for Sulzer. In 2010 we expanded into Asia for the first time when Havas acquired a majority stake in Porda, the leading Hong Kong agency. Hallvarsson & Halvarsson from Sweden joined, as did SPJ in the Netherlands. CV&A first joined us as an Associate member in 2020 and quickly made their mark. From the very beginning, AMO and now H/Advisors has been proud to be an ‘open architecture’ communications group. This means that while many of our offices and agencies are either

wholly or partly owned by Havas, we also welcome independent partners who for whatever reason, do not want to become part of Havas at that stage. So Ashton in Japan for example is a thriving member of H/Advisors, even though it has a different ownership structure. This belief marks us out from the ‘top down’, ‘one size fits all’ ethos of many of our competitors. More recently we have also expanded laterally into new disciplines, most notably public affairs. AMO was always a public affairs powerhouse in Paris, but in 2020 we transformed the practice into an international one, by acquiring Cicero in the UK and Brussels and opening a highly successful Abernathy office in Washington DC. Today we work on some of the world’s most prestigious public affairs mandates, from modest beginnings only a decade ago. After many years of growth and development, AMO was given a welcome endorsement at the highest level. Yannick Bollore, then Chairman of Havas and now Chairman of Vivendi, recognised the success of the network and announced in 2018 that Havas planned to invest €100 million in the network. That commitment accelerated our growth and development. We cemented our presence in Germany with the acquisition of DAA [Deekeling Arndt] that year, followed by the acquisition of Tinkle in Spain in 2022. Further acquisitions are in the pipeline. We also took steps to bring the whole network closer together. As part of this we introduced an exchange programme, where young ambitious consultants from each office are given the chance to spend four weeks working in another office, getting to know their international colleagues and their ways of working. Last year 14 took part, spanning the globe. Last year we took the next step in drawing our world-leading network together, with the creation of a powerful new brand and management team, to reflect a group that

now has more than 1400 colleagues in 20 countries. AMO was a name that had served us well over the years but was only ever intended as a starting point. We felt we needed a new name that reflects the scale and ambition of the group today and we chose H/Advisors – the H for Havas and Advisors because that is who we are – strategic communications advisors to the world most significant organisations. H/Advisors’ new management team reflects both a strong sense of continuity and link to our past, but also our ambition and drive. Stephane Fouks is our Executive Chairman, while Tom Johnson and I, respectively the CEOs of Abernathy and Maitland, are co-CEOs, with more than 30 years of combined experience of the business. Angus Maitland remains a special advisor to the group. Together we are working to expand H/Advisors further, while ensuring that we share its enormous pool of knowledge and talent for the benefit of all our clients. The work continues at pace. Last month [May] we opened our first office in the Middle East, in Dubai, with a reception for more than 200 people and a commitment to support clients during COP28, the environmental conference being held there in November. We also launched our latest piece of global research, on the prevalence of leaks in global M&A and the impact they have on deals. Plans are already well underway for our first global strategy summit in September that will bring hundreds of H/Advisors professionals together to discuss the future of the business.

On behalf of Stephane and Tom, and everyone at H/Advisors, we are delighted to count Antonio Cunha Vaz and all of his team as our colleagues and we are looking forward to working ever more closely with them, supporting clients when they need us most, learning from each other and taking H/Advisors on to its next chapter.

Conferências com chancela

CV& A

The CV& A conferences

Ao longo de duas décadas, a CV&A tem vindo a promover conferências de relevo e interesse nacional, com a presença de diversos ex-chefes de Estado e de Governo e dirigentes políticos de influência mundial, como por exemplo Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, José Maria Aznar, Al Gore ou Colin Powell. Este ano, e para comemorar o seu 20º aniversário, a CV&A traz a Portugal o antigo Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido David Cameron para um debate com Carlos Moedas, presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa e antigo comissário europeu, sobre o Futuro da Europa. O evento tem lugar no dia 15 de Junho, na Estufa Fria, em Lisboa.

Throughout these two decades, CV&A has been staging high profile conferences of great national interest and attracting the participation of former heads of government and political leaders with global influence, including Bill Clinton, Tony Blair, José Maria Aznar, Al Gore and Colin Powell, for example. This year, and to commemorate its 20th anniversary, CV&A is bringing David Cameron, the former British Prime Minister, to Portugal to debate the Future of Europe with Carlos Moedas, President of Lisbon Municipal Council and former European commissioner. This event is taking place on 15 June at the Estufa Fria in Lisbon.

s conferências Cunha Vaz & Associados (CV&A) são hoje dia uma referência a nível nacional. Ao longo dos seus 20 anos de atividade, a CV&A trouxe a Portugal protagonistas de projecção mundial com perspectivas únicas sobre a globalidade e que marcaram, por uma ou outra razão, em vários sectores, desde a economia, a política, sociedade, ciência e tecnologia, um determinado período no tempo. A primeira destas grandes conferências ocorreu logo em 2005, um anos após a fundação da CV&A, com José Maria Aznar (antigo presidente do governo espanhol), seguindo-se Colin Powell (Ex-Secretário de Estado dos Estados Unidos), George Bush (ex-presidente dos Estados Unidos), John Snow (antigo Secretário do Tesouro dos Estados Unidos), Al Gore (vice-presidente dos Estados Unidos), Tony Blair (ex-primeiro-ministro britânico), Bill Clinton (ex-presidente dos Estados Unidos), Muhammad Yunus (economista, Nobel da Paz de 2006), David Plouffe (director da campanha de Barack Obama à Presidência dos Estados Unidos), Álvaro Uribe (ex-Presidente da Colômbia), Gerhard Schröder (antigo chanceler alemão), John Bruton (ex-primeiro-ministro irlandês), Mario Monti (ex-primeiro-ministro da Itália), entre outros. Para além destas, juntaram-se mais três conferências

ANA VALADO

The Cunha Vaz & Associados (CV&A) conferences have long since become a national reference point. Throughout these 20 years of activity, CV&A brought to Portugal global figures with unique perspectives on the world and who have, in one way or another, impacted on various sectors, ranging from the economy, politics, society, science and technology, over a determined period of time. The first of these major conferences took place in 2005, two years on from the launch of CV&A, with José Maria Aznar (former Spanish Prime Minister), followed by Colin Powell (former Secretary of State of the United States), George Bush (former President of the United States), John Snow (former Treasury Secretary of the United States), Al Gore (former Vice-President of the United States), Tony Blair (former British Prime Minister), Bill Clinton (former President of the United States), Muhammad Yunus (economist, 2006 Nobel Peace Prize winner), David Plouffe (director of the American Presidential Campaign of Barack Obama), Álvaro Uribe (former President of Colombia), Gerhard Schröder (former Chancellor of Germany), John Bruton (former Irish Prime Minister), Mario Monti (former Italian Prime Minister), among others. In addition to these keynote speakers, there were also three thematic conferences: “Portugal: Threat or Opportunity”,

CONFERÊNCIAS CV&A / CV&A CONFERENCES

JOSÉ MARIA AZNAR

“As Relações Ibéricas e o Contexto do Diálogo Transatlântico”

“Iberian Relations and the Context of the Transatlantic Dialogue”

Lisboa, Abril 2005 | Lisbon, April 2005

COLIN L. POWELL

“Leadership: Taking Charge”

Lisboa, Dezembro 2005 | Lisbon, December 2005

JOHN W. SNOW

“The International Economy Today: Challenges and Opportunities”

Lisboa, Novembro 2006 | Lisbon, November 2006

AL GORE

“Uma Verdade Inconveniente”

“An Inconvenient Truth”

Lisboa, Fevereiro 2007 | Lisbon, February 2007

TONY BLAIR

“Economic Development and World Peace”

Lisboa, Dezembro 2007 | Lisbon, December 2007

WILLIAM J. CLINTON

“Embracing our Common Humanity”

Lisboa, Junho 2008 | Lisbon, June 2008

MUHAMMAD YUNUS

“Challenging Poverty: The Growth of Microcredit”

Lisboa, Outubro 2008 | Lisbon, October 2008

DAVID PLOUFFE

“Building a Grassroots Movement in the 21st Century”

Lisboa, Março 2009 | Lisbon, March 2009

ÁLVARO URIBE

“The rise of the South American emerging markets”

Lisboa, Maio 2011 | Lisbon, May 2011

RAPHAEL MINDER (Herald Tribune), WOLFGANG

MÜNCHAU (Financial Times), RAUL LLORES (Folha de São Paulo)

“Portugal: ameaça ou Oportunidade”

“Portugal: Threat or Opportunity”

Lisboa, Novembro 2011 | Lisbon, November 2011

GERHARD SCHRÖDER

“A Crise Europeia e as Reformas Necessárias”

“The European Crisis and the Reforms Necessary”

Lisboa, Dezembro 2012 | Lisbon, December 2012

A Nobel Day in Lisbon

Lisboa, Junho 2013 | Lisbon, June 2013

Al Gore, Museu da Electricidade

José María Aznar, Hotel Ritz

temáticas: “Portugal: ameaça ou Oportunidade”, em 2011, com Raphael Minder (Herald Tribune), Wolfgang Münchau (Financial Times), Raul Llores (Folha de São Paulo); “A Nobel Day”, em 2013, com John Gurdon, Oliver Smithies, Paul Greengard e Richard J. Roberts, Karin Schallreuter, Paul Riley e Clemens van Blitterswijk; e “Cybersecurity, em 2016, com Ofir Hason, Rui Gomes, Paulo Veríssimo e António Mexia. A CV&A promoveu, ainda, ciclos “Conferências do Palácio”, reunindo no Palácio da Bolsa, no Porto, alguns dos principais parceiros externos de Portugal, relevantes individualidades do tecido empresarial português, presidentes dos conselhos das mais importantes empresas nacionais e reputados economistas portugueses.

Este ano, no âmbito da comemoração do seu 20º aniversário, a CV&A traz a Portugal David Cameron, antigo Primeiro-Ministro britânico, para um debate com o presidente da Câmara Municipal de Lisboa Carlos Moedas. Neste fórum vai ser discutido o Futuro da Europa. As conferências com chancela CV&A fazem parte do ADN da consultora e além de já terem um público fidelizado. Cada conferência tem uma “taxa de ocupação” na ordem das 300 participantes.

in 2011, with Raphael Minder (Herald Tribune), Wolfgang Münchau (Financial Times), Raul Llores (Folha de São Paulo); “A Nobel Day”, in 2013, with John Gurdon , Oliver Smithies, Paul Greengard and Richard J. Roberts, Karin Schallreuter, Paul Riley and Clemens van Blitterswijk; and “Cybersecurity”, in 2016, with Ofir Hason, Rui Gomes, Paulo Veríssimo and António Mexia. CV&A has also staged the cycles “Conferences at the Palace”, held at the Bolsa Palace in Oporto, attracting some of Portugal’s leading external partners, prominent individuals from the Portuguese business sector, board presidents of leading national companies and renowned Portuguese economists. This year, under the auspices of commemorations of its 20th anniversary, CV&A is bringing the former British Prime Minister, David Cameron, to Portugal for a debate with the President of Lisbon Municipal Council, Carlos Moedas. This forum is set the theme of the Future of Europe. The CV&A staged conferences are part of this consultancy’s DNA and have already established a loyal public. Each conference attracts an “occupation rate” of around 300 participants.

Tony Blair, Culturgest

William J. Clinton, Museu da Electricidade

Gerhard Schröder, Lisboa

David Cameron foi Primeiro-Ministro do Reino Unido entre 2010 e 2016, liderando o primeiro Governo de coligação britânico em quase 70 anos e, nas eleições gerais de 2015, formando o primeiro Governo de maioria conservadora no Reino Unido em mais de duas décadas.

Cameron chegou ao poder em 2010, num momento de crise económica e com um desafio fiscal sem precedentes. Sob a sua liderança, a economia do Reino Unido transformou-se. O défice foi reduzido em mais de dois terços, foram criadas um milhão de empresas e um número recorde de postos de trabalho, tornando-se a Grã-Bretanha a economia avançada com o crescimento mais rápido do mundo. Este cenário criou a estabilidade que o governante necessitava para reduzir os impostos, introduzir o salário mínimo obrigatório, transformar a educação, reformar a segurança social, proteger o Serviço Nacional de Saúde e aumentar as pensões. As decisões difíceis que tomou traduziram-se, enquanto a economia crescia, numa diminuição das famílias dependentes da assistência social, num aumento do número de estudantes que frequentam a universidade e do número de pessoas a trabalhar, sendo o mais elevado comparando com qualquer outro momento da história britânica.

A nível internacional, David Cameron desenvolveu uma política externa na era pós-Iraque que abordou os novos desafios da Primavera Árabe, bem como uma Rússia mais agressiva, assegurando ao mesmo tempo que a Grã-Bretanha desempenhasse um papel na luta global contra o ISIS. Sob a sua direcção, o Reino Unido construiu uma forte parceria com a Índia e tornou-se o parceiro preferido da China no Ocidente. Durante todo o período da sua governação, defendeu a estreita relação entre o Reino Unido e os Estados Unidos. Depois de acolher com êxito os Jogos Olímpicos e Paraolímpicos de Londres 2012, David presidiu à Cimeira do G8 de 2013 em Lough Erne, na Irlanda do Norte, onde salientou a necessidade global de impostos justos, maior transparência e abertura comercial. Na sequência desta cimeira e de um debate mundial que durou dois anos, liderado por um painel de alto nível das Nações Unidas, ao qual co-presidiu, foram acordados os Objectivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável (ODS).

Cameron defendeu as questões ambientais com o objectivo de criar o governo mais ecológico de sempre - como tal, fez crescer a economia britânica enquanto as emissões de carbono diminuíram drasticamente; criou o primeiro Banco de Investimento Verde do mundo; e assegurou que o Reino Unido desempenhasse um papel de liderança no bem-sucedido Acordo de Paris sobre as alterações climáticas.

Liderou o caminho a nível internacional ao aprovar a lei britânica sobre o casamento entre pessoas do mesmo sexo, estabeleceu as práticas de voto no Reino Unido durante uma geração, através de três referendos nacionais realizados enquanto esteve no nº 10 da Downing Street; e ofereceu mais dois votos nacionais

decisivos: o primeiro sobre o lugar da Escócia no Reino Unido; o segundo sobre o lugar do Reino Unido na União Europeia. Ao vencer o referendo escocês de 2014 garantiu que a Escócia continuasse a fazer parte do Reino Unido. No entanto, apesar de argumentar que a Grã-Bretanha era mais forte dentro da União Europeia, em Junho de 2016, o povo britânico votou a favor da saída da UE.

Na sequência desta derrota, Cameron demitiu-se do cargo de Primeiro-Ministro e líder do Partido Conservador a 13 de Julho de 2016. Em Setembro de 2016, demitiu-se do cargo de deputado ao Parlamento.

David Cameron tornou-se líder do Partido Conservador em 2005, depois de ter cumprido menos de cinco anos como deputado ao Parlamento. Foi eleito com um mandato para reformar e modernizar um partido que tinha perdido três eleições consecutivas. Foi por acreditar num conservadorismo moderno que David se candidatou a líder e também o que o levou a formar

David Cameron was Prime Minister of the United Kingdom between 2010 and 2016, leading the first British coalition government in almost 70 years before, in 2015, forming the first majority Conservative government in over two decades. Cameron came to power in 2010, during a period of economic crisis and with the country in an unprecedented fiscal position. Under his leadership, the British economy was transformed. The deficit was reduced by over two-thirds, a million companies got launched and there were records in terms of job creation, turning the United Kingdom into the advanced economy registering the fastest growth rate. This scenario brought about the stability that the government needed to cut taxes and introduce the national minimum wage, transforming education, reforming the social security system, protecting

the National Health Service and raising pensions. The difficult decisions then taken reflected in, as the economy grew, a fall in the number of households dependent on social welfare, a rise in the number of students attending university and the numbers in employment reaching the highest level at any point in time in British history.

At the international level, David Cameron advanced with foreign policies in a post-Iraq era that approached the new challenges of the Arab Spring, as well as a more aggressive Russia, while ensuring the United Kingdom played a significant role in the global struggle against ISIS. Under his leadership, the United Kingdom built up a strong partnership with India and became the preferred partner of China in the West. Throughout his time in office, he defended a close relationship between the United Kingdom and the United States. After having successfully hosted the Olympic and Paralympic Games in London during 2012, David chaired the 2013 G8 Summit in Lough Erne, in Northern Ireland, where he highlighted the need for fair global taxes, greater transparency and commercial openness. In the wake of this summit and a global debate that lasted two years, led by a high level United Nations panel that he co-chaired, there was agreement over launching the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).

Cameron always defended environmental issues and strove to create the most ecological government ever – as such, the British economy was able to grow even while its carbon emissions fell sharply; he founded the world’s first Green Investment Bank and had the United Kingdom playing a driving leadership role in the Paris Agreement on climate change. He led the way internationally in approving the British law allowing for same sex marriages, and changed the voting practices that had prevailed in the United Kingdom for a generation by staging three national referenda while the occupant of number 10 Downing Street; and two were particularly significant: the first on the place of Scotland in the United Kingdom; the second on the place of the United Kingdom in the European Union. In winning the Scottish referendum in 2014, he guaranteed Scotland remained part of the United Kingdom. However, despite personally arguing that the United Kingdom was better off inside the European Union, in June 2016, a small majority of the British people voted in favour of leaving the EU. Following this defeat, Cameron resigned as Prime Minister and leader of the Conservative Party on 13 July 2016. In September 2016, he resigned as a member of parliament. David Cameron became leader of the Conservative Party in 2005, after having completed less than five years as an MP. He was elected on a mandate to reform and modernise a party that had lost three consecutive elections. It was out of his belief in modern conservatism that David ran for the leadership and also led him to form the first coalition government in the United Kingdom for seven

PERFIL PROFILE

o primeiro Governo de Coligação do Reino Unido em sete décadas, governando assim como Primeiro-Ministro.

Durante a sua liderança promoveu a justiça e a acção social; fez avançar a agenda ecológica; definiu a protecção do Serviço Nacional de Saúde como uma prioridade para o Reino Unido e orgulhou-se de ver um aumento significativo do número de mulheres e de candidatos de minorias étnicas que se candidataram pelo Partido Conservador e foram eleitos para o Parlamento.

Enquanto deputado pelo círculo eleitoral rural de Witney, em West Oxfordshire, desde 2001, David ocupou uma série de cargos na bancada da oposição antes de se tornar líder do partido. Após as eleições gerais de 2005, foi nomeado Secretário de Estado Sombra da Educação. Anteriormente, ocupou vários cargos políticos.

Antes de se tornar deputado, David trabalhou em várias empresas e na administração pública.

Após passar pelo colégio secundário de Eton, nos arredores de Londres, Cameron estudou Filosofia, Política e Economia no Brasenose College da Universidade de Oxford.

Depois de se licenciar, entrou para o Departamento de Investigação do Partido Conservador, onde trabalhou para a Primeira-Ministra Margaret Thatcher e para o seu sucessor John Major. Mais tarde, foi nomeado Conselheiro Especial do Governo, primeiro no Tesouro e depois no Ministério do Interior.

Posteriormente, passou sete anos na Carlton Communications, uma das principais empresas de comunicação social do Reino Unido, e fez parte do conselho de administração.

Desde que deixou o nº 10 de Downing Street, David continuou a centrar-se nas questões que promoveu enquanto esteve no cargo: apoiar as oportunidades de vida dos jovens e construir uma sociedade mais forte e mais justa; defender a investigação médica; e promover o desenvolvimento internacional.

David Cameron é Presidente do Patronato do National Citizen Service (NCS), o principal programa de desenvolvimento juvenil do Reino Unido. É também Presidente da Alzheimer’s Research UK, a principal instituição britânica de investigação médica com especial incidência no financiamento da investigação biomédica sobre a causa, a prevenção e a cura da demência.

No âmbito do papel que assumiu enquanto Primeiro-Ministro na defesa dos Objectivos de Desenvolvimento Sustentável das Nações Unidas, tem trabalhado com a London School of Economics e a Blavatnik School of Governo da Universidade de Oxford.

Também faz parte do Conselho Global de Relações Externas e é membro do Conselho de Administração da ONE Campaign. Para além destas funções, David Cameron aconselha e trabalha com várias empresas internacionais nos sectores da tecnologia, finanças e inovação médica.

Nascido em Londres em Outubro de 1966 e proveniente de uma família aristocrática, David Cameron é casado e tem três filhos. A família sempre foi a parte mais importante da sua vida, sustentando-o ao longo da sua carreira política e no cargo de Primeiro-Ministro.

decades and thereby taking office as Prime Minister. During his leadership, he fostered justice and social actions; he deepened the ecological agenda; defined protecting the National Health Service as a priority for the United Kingdom and took due pride in significantly raising both the number of women and ethnic minority candidates running for office on behalf of the Conservative Party and the numbers reaching Parliament.

As MP for the rural constituency of Witney, in West Oxfordshire, since 2001, David occupied a series of positions on the opposition bench prior to become party leader. Following the general election of 2005, he was nominated Shadow Secretary of State for Education. He had previously held a series of political positions. Furthermore, prior to becoming an MP, David worked for various companies and in public administrative positions. After attending Eton, on the outskirts of London, Cameron studied Philosophy, Politics and Economics at Brasenose College of the University of Oxford. After graduating, he joined the Research Department of the Conservative Party, where he worked for Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and her successor John Major. He was later nominated a Special Adviser to the Government, first in the Treasury and subsequently in the Home Office. Subsequently, he spent seven years at Carlton Communications, one of the leading media and public relations companies in the United Kingdom, where he sat on the Board of Directors. Ever since leaving number 10 Downing Street, David continued to focus on the issues that were his priorities in office: supporting life opportunities for young people and building a stronger and fairer society; promoting medical research; and advocating for international development. David Cameron is Chairman of the Patrons’ Board of the National Citizen Service (NCS), the leading youth development program in the United Kingdom. He is also President of Alzheimer’s Research UK, the leading British medical research institution with a particular focus on financing biomedical research on the causes, prevention and cure of dementia. Within the scope of the role played as Prime Minister in defending the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations, he has worked with the London School of Economics and the Blavatnik School of Government at the University of Oxford. He is also part of the Global Board of External Relations and is a Board Member of the ONE Campaign.

In addition to these functions, David Cameron advises and works with various international companies in the technology, financial and medical innovation sectors. Born into an aristocratic family in London in October 1966, David Cameron is married and has three children. His family was always the most important facet of his life, sustaining him in his long political career and while holding office as Prime Minister.

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CH-6925M-EBBK

CH-6925M-EBBK

Open Gear ReSec Blue on Black Edição Limitada (50)

Open Gear ReSec Blue on Black Edição Limitada (50)

Movimento Automático C.301 com design inovador “OPEN GEAR” e apresentação retrógrada dos segundos

Movimento Automático C.301 com design inovador “OPEN GEAR” e apresentação retrógrada dos segundos

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Mostrador em guilloché feito à mão, com design so sticado em 3D composto por 42 peças Caixa em aço de 44 mm com revestimento DLC

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Mostrador em guilloché feito à mão, com design so sticado em 3D composto por 42 peças Caixa em aço de 44 mm com revestimento DLC

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20 anos depois, estamos assim tão diferentes?

20 years later, are we really so different?

tender para a consideração de que nada mudou, em 20 anos. Todavia, atentando no quadro social, na dinâmica económica, na própria configuração do Parlamento ou até nos nossos meios de comunicação — cada vez mais digitais —, percebemos que a nossa realidade se transformou radicalmente. Duas décadas depois, este é, decerto, “outro país”, não deixando de ser “o Portugal de sempre”.

The structural problems today shaping the Portuguese reality have been on the agenda for decades. In this fairly grim scenario, we might be led to consider that nothing has changed in these last 20 years. However, taking into account the social framework, the economic dynamics, the very configuration of parliament or even our – increasingly digital – means of communication, we may grasp how our realities have undergone radical transformation. Two decades later, this is certainly “another country” while never giving up on being “the Portugal of always”.

Palavras como “sustentabilidade”, “electromobilidade”, “inteligência artificial” ou siglas como “ESG” e “LGBTQIA+” mostram um mundo bem diferente daquele que existia em 2003. Na altura, já fazíamos contas em euros, mas ainda estávamos a dar os primeiros passos no universo da Internet. Hoje, vivemos nas redes sociais, ouvimos músicas em plataformas digitais, compramos ‘online’ e usamos aplicações móveis para pagar as nossas contas. Estamos apetrechados com o mundo de possibilidades dos ‘smartphones’ e ‘smartwatches’. Somos, cada vez mais, adeptos dos carros eléctricos e estendemos milhares de ciclovias pelo país. De um mundo mais fechado e conservador, passámos para um cenário em que pessoas do mesmo sexo podem casar, em que é legal interromper voluntariamente a gravidez até às 10 semanas de gestação e em que se debate a eutanásia.

Words such as as “sustainability”, “e-mobility”, “artificial intelligence” or abbreviations such as “ESG” and “LGBTQIA+” convey the differences of the contemporary world to that prevailing in 2003. At the time, we were already doing our sums in euros but still taking our first steps into the universe of the Internet. Today, we live on social networks, we listen to music on digital platforms, we purchase online and have mobile apps to pay our expenses. We are all fitted out with the world of opportunities put forward by our smartphones and smartwatches. We are ever more enthusiastic about electric cars and hundreds of cycle paths have popped up across the country. From a more closed and conservative world, we entered a scenario in which same-sex marriages happen, abortion is legal through to 10 weeks and the debate around euthanasia is

Os problemas estruturais que marcam, hoje, a realidade portuguesa, persistem na agenda há décadas. Neste cenário pouco esperançoso, poderíamos

BLANDINA COSTA

LUÍS EUSÉBIO

Acompanhamos as tendências que vão moldando um mundo onde a pirâmide de poder coloca, progressivamente, a China no topo, numa balança global que pende, notoriamente, para o quadrante asiático. Ficou evidente a dependência que a Europa e os Estados Unidos têm das fábricas asiáticas, nas quais se produz grande parte dos ‘chips’ e dos semicondutores, que incorporamos nos nossos carros e equipamentos.

ongoing. We accompany the trends that are shaping the world in a pyramid of power that is progressively placing China at the top, in a global balance that is notoriously tilting towards Asia. The dependence of Europe and the United States on Asian factories which produce many of the chips and semiconductors to be incorporated into our cars and equipment. The very European Union changed, reconfigured in the wake of

A própria União Europeia (UE) reconfigurou-se, ainda no rescaldo da queda do Muro de Berlim. O maior alargamento da sua história aconteceu logo em 2004, com a entrada de 10 novos países, seguindo-se mais três entradas, em 2007 e 2013. No entanto, com o Brexit, a esta Europa de 28 subtraiu-se, em 2020, o Reino Unido. Estas mudanças profundas estendem-se até hoje: a morte da Rainha Isabel II,

the fall of the Berlin Wall. The greatest enlargement in its history took place in 2004 with a total of 10 new states joining, followed by another three arrivals in 2007 and 2013. However, with Brexit, this Europe of 28 became one fewer with the departure of the United Kingdom in 2020. These profound changes are still ongoing: the death of Queen Elisabeth II, an unquestionable symbol of stability throughout over 75 years, gave way to a

símbolo inequívoco de estabilidade, durante 75 anos, deu lugar a uma nova era. Em 2023, coroou-se o Rei Carlos III, o mesmo ano em que se celebram os 650 anos da mais antiga aliança do mundo, reafirmando as relações bilaterais entre Portugal e Reino Unido. Mudámos muito, porém, agora — como há vinte anos —, continuamos familiarizados com duas palavras: “crise” e “guerra”. De uma crise económica, resultante da bolha das “dot-com”, chegámos a crises pandémicas e energéticas, tendo passado por uma crise financeira internacional. Da guerra no Iraque, no rescaldo do ataque terrorista às Torres Gémeas em Nova Iorque, partimos para uma guerra às portas da Europa, com a invasão da Ucrânia pela Rússia. Portugal não só não é alheio a estes acontecimentos, como defronta agora múltiplos (e repetidos) obstáculos. Em 2003, o país “estava de tanga”, como descreveu o recém-chegado primeiro-ministro social-democrata, Durão Barroso, referindo-se à crise económica que se vivia. Hoje, enfrentamos uma crise inflacionista, depois de uma crise de saúde pública, sempre acompanhados de uma alarmante crise ambiental, que parece não ter fim à vista. Neste contexto, a turbulência política e social é visível. Sucedem-se greves e manifestações de professores, médicos, enfermeiros ou jovens activistas, por exemplo, num país onde os mais novos só conseguem vislumbrar um futuro digno fora das fronteiras. A preocupante emergência da direita radical e populista evidencia o descontentamento de uma população que vive endividada perante o aumento do custo de vida, marcado pela inflação e pela subida das taxas de juro. Mas, contas feitas, estamos mais ricos ou mais pobres? Vivemos melhor ou pior do que em 2003? Qual é a relação entre os ciclos económicos e políticos? (ver infografia pág. anterior)

Após tantos abalos, quão robusta está a economia portuguesa?

Um olhar atento à evolução da taxa de crescimento do Produto Interno Bruto (PIB) evidencia as dificuldades que o país atravessou, nas últimas duas décadas. Neste período, contam-se seis anos de recessão. Só alcançámos taxas de crescimento acima dos 3% — valor médio registado na última década dos anos de 1900 — em três anos.

Da crise das dívidas soberanas à crise pandémica, passando por um resgate internacional

Principiámos o século XXI com a crise económica, nascida do rebentamento da bolha das “dot-com”, após a euforia das tecnológicas com o advento da Internet. Seguiu-se uma derrocada bolsista, que abalou toda a economia global, nos anos seguintes. Portugal não escapou ao contágio. Em 2003, o país já provava o sabor amargo da recessão. Na memória dos portugueses está mais fresca a crise desencadeada pela pandemia de COVID-19. Porém, os piores anos de recessão aconteceram antes disso, na sequência da crise financeira internacional — iniciada com a célebre queda do banco americano Lehman Brothers, em 2008, conhecida como “crise do subprime”. Essa crise levou Portugal, em 2011, a seguir os

new era. In 2023, King Charles III was coronated in the same year as commemorations of the 650th anniversary of the oldest diplomatic alliance in the world and reaffirming bilateral relationships between Portugal and the United Kingdom. We have changed a lot, nevertheless, now — just like twenty years ago —, we remain familiarised with two words: “crisis” and “war”. From a crisis resulting from the dot-com bubble, we arrived at the pandemic and energy crises having passed through the international financial crisis along the way. From war in Iraq, in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on the Twin Towers in New York, we now contemplate war at the entrance to Europe following the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Portugal was not only no stranger to these events but faced multiple (and repeated) obstacles. In 2003, the country “was flat broke”, as the recently appointed social democratic prime minister, Durão Barroso, said in reference to the prevailing economic recession. Today, we are dealing with an inflationary crisis trailing in the wake of a public health crisis and always accompanied by an alarming environmental crisis that would seem to be endless in scope. In this context, the political and social turbulence is visible. There are successive strikes by teachers, doctors, nurses or young activists, for example, in a country where the young people are only able to perceive dignified futures beyond the national borders. The concerning emergence of a radical and populist right-wing reflects the discontent of a population who are heavily burdened by the rise in the cost of living, driven both by inflation and the interest rate hikes. However, when all is said and done, have we become richer or poorer? Do we live better or worse than in 2003? What is the relationship between the economic and political cycles?

After so many tremors how robust is the Portuguese economy?

A close look at the trend in the GDP growth rate displays the difficulties the country has experienced over these last two decades. In this period, there were six years of recession. We only obtained growth rates of above 3% — the average value registered over the 1900s — in three years.

From the sovereign debt crisis to the pandemic crisis, with an international bailout along the way

We started out in the 21st century with an economic crisis born out of the bursting of the dot-com bubble that had grown around the technologies and the advent of the Internet. This was followed by a stock market slump that sent ripples through the global economy in the following years. Portugal did not escape contagion. In 2003, the country was already tasting the bitterness of recession. Certainly fresher in the memories of the Portuguese is the crisis triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic. Nevertheless, the worst years of recession had happened earlier in the wake of the international financial crisis — sparked by the spectacular implosion of the American Lehman Brothers bank

passos da Grécia, com a solicitação de um resgate internacional à “Troika” — conjugação de FMI, Banco Central Europeu e Comissão Europeia —, no valor de 78 mil milhões de euros. Esta crise foi uma das duas mais longas da história da economia portuguesa, tendo em conta o tempo dedicado à recuperação do PIB para níveis anteriores: começou em 2009 (seguindo a crise financeira mundial) e terminou apenas em 2018 (quando o PIB ultrapassou o valor de 2008).

Como evoluíram os principais indicadores económicos do país e a posição de Portugal na Europa?

Ao fim de duas décadas (e múltiplas crises), o país ficou relativamente mais pobre, comparativamente com os seus parceiros europeus. No início do século XXI, o PIB ‘per capita’ era de 85% da média europeia. Até 2022, esse valor regrediu para 77%, segundo estimativas preliminares, igualando assim o da Roménia que, em 2000, tinha apenas um terço do PIB ‘per capita’ português. Só cinco países da UE estão, hoje, piores do que Portugal: Letónia, Croácia, Grécia, Eslováquia e Bulgária. Resumindo, em 2003, cada português produzia uma riqueza de 17.253,1 euros (PIB ‘per capita’ a preços constantes), valor bastante similar aos 18.949,5 euros registados em 2021 (últimos valores disponíveis).

O Banco de Portugal fez as contas: entre 2000 e 2020, o crescimento médio anual do PIB real ‘per capita’ foi de apenas 0,3%. Os anos da pandemia de COVID-19 contribuíram fortemente

in 2008 in what became known as the subprime crisis. In turn, this led Portugal to follow in the steps of Greece and, in 2011, to request an international bailout from the Troika — the combination of the IMF, the European Central Bank and the European Commission — for a total amount of 78 billion euros. The recession was one of the two longest in Portuguese economic history, taking into account the time required for GDP to recover to the previously existing level: beginning in 2009 (in the midst of the world financial crisis) and ending only in 2018 (when GDP again exceeded the 2008 level).

How did the main national economic indicators and the position of Portugal in Europe evolve?

At the end of two decades (and multiple crises), the country was left relatively poorer in comparison with its European peers. At the beginning of the 21st century, the GDP per capita stood at 85% of the European average. Through to 2022, this average had fallen back to 77%, according to some preliminary estimates, thus level par with Romania that, in 2000, had a per capita GDP rate only a third of the Portuguese. Only five EU member states are today poorer than Portugal: Latvia, Croatia, Greece, Slovakia and Bulgaria. In summary, in 2003, each Portuguese citizens produced wealth of 17,253.10 euros (GDP per capita at constant prices), a broadly similar figure to the 18,949.50 euros registered in 2021 (latest figures available).

para esta queda. No entanto, mesmo se os excluirmos, o crescimento médio foi de 0,8% — valor bem distante da taxa média anual da segunda metade do século passado (3,9%). Mesmo com um crescimento insignificante, isso não significa que esteja tudo igual. Analisando com mais detalhe os vários ramos de actividade e os seus respectivos contributos para a produção de riqueza, o ex-ministro da Economia, Pedro Siza Vieira, constata que o perfil da economia portuguesa se alterou. O peso da construção e do imobiliário diminuiu, bem como o dos serviços financeiros. Por outro lado, o turismo e as tecnologias de informação e comunicação conquistaram importância. A indústria cresceu à boleia das exportações, que atingiram um peso de 50% no PIB nacional. Como referência, verificamos que, em 2003, as vendas ao exterior valiam apenas cerca de 28%. Examinando um caso específico, a nossa dependência económica do turismo intensificou-se. O contributo desse sector para o PIB nacional cresceu de 4,5%, em 2003, para 10,9%, em 2022. Mesmo mostrando sinais promissores, para que a economia possa crescer, revela-se crucial diminuir o endividamento, quer do sector público, quer do sector privado, sobretudo numa época de subida das taxas de juro.

O caminho atribulado das contas públicas

Na sequência da crise das dívidas soberanas, que levou Portugal a pedir o resgate internacional em 2011, a dívida pública atingiu um máximo de 132,9% do PIB, em 2014. Tendo Portugal saído do resgate financeiro internacional no período definido de quatro anos, nos anos seguintes foi possível reduzir, de forma significativa, o rácio da dívida, que em 2019 era já 116,6% do PIB. Nesse ano, Portugal assinalou outro feito nas contas públicas, com as administrações públicas a registarem o primeiro excedente orçamental da democracia portuguesa: 0,1% do PIB. O ministro das Finanças da época, Mário Centeno, atribuiu este feito à dinâmica da economia e do mercado de trabalho, que permitiu incrementar a receita fiscal e as contribuições das empresas para a Segurança Social. De facto, o país conseguiu reduzir a taxa de desemprego do pico histórico de 17,1%, em 2013, para menos de metade. Em 2022, situava-se nos 6,5%. A Portugal valeu a política monetária acomodatícia (‘quantitative easing’) do Banco Central Europeu, até meados de 2022, que beneficiou as contas públicas nacionais, como afirmou, em 2016, o presidente do BCE, Mario Draghi, numa sessão com os eurodeputados: “As reduções das taxas de juro do BCE estão a beneficiar, em grande medida, países vulneráveis da zona euro, e a fragmentação dos custos de financiamento e as condições de empréstimo em diferentes países têm diminuído.”

A trajectória das contas públicas e da economia nacional parecia apontar para um futuro mais risonho, todavia, a pandemia de COVID-19 não deu tréguas. A dívida pública em percentagem do PIB voltou a disparar para o máximo histórico de 134,9%, em 2020. Já o saldo orçamental das administrações públicas registou um ‘déficit’ elevado, de 5,8% do PIB. Após este tombo, em 2023, a economia portuguesa apresenta já sinais de recuperação. O rácio da dívida pública no PIB passou para 113,9% em 2002 e, recentemente, o Fundo Monetário Internacional mais do que duplicou a projecção de

The Bank of Portugal did the maths: between 2000 and 2020, average annual growth in real GDP per capita was only 0.3%. The years of the COVID-19 pandemic contributed strongly towards this poor figure. However, even when excluding them, average growth stood at 0.8% — a figure far distant to the annual average growth rate over the second half of the last century (3.9%). Even with this fairly insignificant growth, this does not mean everything is equal. After analysing the different sectors of activity in greater detail and their respective contributions to the production of wealth, the former Economy Minister, Pedro Siza Vieira, described how the profile of the Portuguese economy has changed. The weightings of construction and property declined in conjunction with financial services. On the other hand, tourism and the information and communication technologies have gained in importance. Industry grew on the back of exports, which attained a weighting of 50% in national GDP. In contrast, we may report that in 2003, sales to the exterior accounted for only around 28%. Examining the specific case, our economic dependence on tourism has intensified. The contribution of this sector to national GDP grew from 4.5% in 2003 to 10.9% in 2022. Even demonstrating promising signals, in order to get the economy growing, it is essential to cut the level of debt, whether of the public or the private sector, especially in a period of rising interest rates.

The rocky path of the public coffers

In the wake of the sovereign debt crisis that led Portugal to request an international bailout in 2011, public debt peaked at 132.9% of GDP in 2014. With Portugal emerging from the international financial bailout within the defined period of four years, it did prove possible to make significant progress in cutting the debt ratio that in 2019 had already fallen back to 116.6% of GDP. In this year, Portugal commemorated another feat in the public accounts with the state registering its first budgetary surplus in the history of Portuguese democracy: 0.1% of GDP. The Minister of Finance at the time, Mário Centeno, attributed this to the dynamics of the economy and the labour market that drove rising fiscal revenues and company contributions to the social security system. In fact, the country was able to drive down the unemployment rate from a historical peak of 17.1% in 2013 to less than a half. In 2022, this rate came in at 6.5%. Portugal benefitted from the accommodative monetary policy (quantitative easing) in effect at the European Central Bank through to mid-2022, which benefitted the national financial position as the ECB president stated in 2016 when appearing before MEPs: “The reductions in the ECB interest rate are to a large extend benefiting the vulnerable Eurozone countries and the fragmentation of financing costs and loan conditions in the different countries has decreased.”

The trajectory in the public coffers and the national economy appeared to be set for a rosy future, however, the COVID-19 pandemic brought an end to such prospects. The debt to GDP ratio once gain shot up to a historical maximum of 134.9% of GDP in 2020. In turn, the state registered

crescimento de Portugal para este ano (de 1% para 2,6%). Conseguiremos aproveitar estes ventos favoráveis para estabilizar o rumo do país e contrariar a ideia (confirmada nos últimos 20 anos) de que Portugal está condenado à cauda da Europa?

Além das crises, os motivos estruturais para a nota “medíocre” do país

Um estudo da SEDES sobre o desenvolvimento económico de Portugal, que analisa as primeiras décadas do século XXI, dá uma nota “medíocre” à evolução do país, apontando factores estruturais que explicam o reduzido crescimento: “Nos últimos 20 anos, o país tem-se revelado incapaz de acumular capital e estimular o crescimento da produtividade do factor “trabalho”. Desde 2000, Portugal tem registado níveis de investimento fracos, com reduzida ou negativa eficiência marginal do capital investido, dentro de 10 anos, a produção ‘per capita’ potencial em Portugal não irá além de 35% da do Luxemburgo ou 41% da Irlanda”. Para o país experienciar um aumento do nível de vida, seria necessário incrementar a produtividade do factor “trabalho’”. Contudo, isso não tem acontecido, segundo o estudo da SEDES. Simultaneamente, precisaríamos de atrair investimento de qualidade, o que, por sua vez, exige a incorporação de conhecimento e tecnologia na produção. A este contexto teremos de adicionar o elevado nível de impostos que sobrecarrega os portugueses. Os dados de 2022, divulgados pelo INE, revelam uma carga fiscal em percentagem do PIB de 36,4%. Embora esteja abaixo da média da UE-27 (40,5%, em 2021), trata-se do valor nacional mais elevado desde que há registo. Caracterizando o tempo desde o início do século XXI, na obra “Crise e Castigo: Os desequilíbrios e o resgate da economia portuguesa”, Fernando Alexandre, Luís Aguiar-Conraria e Pedro Bação usam a expressão “longa estagnação”, salientando que este fraco crescimento “é o mais grave problema estrutural da economia portuguesa”. Sem solucionar estes problemas estruturais, o país torna-se cada vez mais vulnerável a interferências e choques externos — como se verificou com a pandemia, em 2020, e a Guerra na Ucrânia, que eclodiu em 2022 e não apresenta fim à vista.

As dificuldades vividas pelos portugueses denotam-se em diversos indicadores, entre os quais o risco de pobreza e os níveis de rendimento. Apesar de a taxa de risco de pobreza — proporção de habitantes com rendimentos monetários líquidos (por adulto equivalente) inferiores a 6.608 euros (551 euros por mês) — ter recuado de 20,4%, em 2003, para 16,4%, em 2021, o impacto da pandemia nas condições de vida e no rendimento da população portuguesa foi intenso, refere o relatório “Pobreza e exclusão social em Portugal”, de 2022, do Observatório Nacional de Luta Contra a Pobreza. Este estudo indica ainda que se verificou um acentuado incremento das desigualdades sociais. Aliás, Portugal apresenta-se como o Estado-

a very significant budget deficit at 5.8% of GDP. Following this fall, the Portuguese economy is already displaying signs of recovery in 2023. The public GDP debt ratio dropped back to 113.9% in 2022 and, recently, the International Monetary Fund more than doubled its growth forecast for Portugal (up from 1% to 2.6%). Shall we be able to harness these favourable winds and stabilise the direction of the country and counter the idea (confirmed over the last two decades) that Portugal is condemned to bring up the rear in Europe?

In addition to crises, the structural motives for the “mediocre” national ranking

A study by SEDES on the economic development of Portugal, which analyses the first decades of the 21st century attributes the grade of “mediocre” to national evolution and pointing to structural factors explaining the lack of growth: “In the last twenty years, the country has demonstrated its inability to accumulate capital and stimulate growth in the “labour” factor of productivity. Since 2000, Portugal has registered low levels investment, with reduced or negative marginal efficiency of the invested capital over a 10-year period, and potential output per capita in Portugal does not amount to more than 35% of the level of Luxembourg or 41% of Ireland. For the country to experience rising standards of living, there is the need to boost the productivity of the “labour” factor. However, this simply has not happened according to the SEDES study. Simultaneously, Portugal needs to attract quality, which, in turn, requires the incorporation of knowledge and technology into production.

To this context we have to add the high level of taxation weighing on the Portuguese. The 2022 statistics, released by the INE, report a fiscal burden coming in at 36.4% of GDP. While this ranks below the EU-27 average (40.5% in 2021), this represents the highest national taxation rate since there were records. Approaching the period since the beginning of the 21st century, in their work that translates as “Crisis and Castigation: The imbalances and the bailout of the Portuguese economy”, Fernando Alexandre, Luís AguiarConraria and Pedro Bação apply the expression “long stagnation”, highlighting that this weak growth “is the most serious structural problem of the Portuguese economy”. Without resolving these structural problems, the country remains extremely exposed to external interference and shocks — as verified with the pandemic in 2020 and the Russian war against Ukraine triggered by invasion in 2022

and with no end in

sight.

The difficulties experienced by the Portuguese reflect in various different indicators, including the risk of poverty and levels of indebtedness. Despite the risk of poverty rate — the proportion of inhabitants with net income (per equivalent adult) of below 6,608 euros (551 euros per month) — having fallen from 20.4% in 2003 to 16.4%, in 2021, the impact of the pandemic on the standards of living and earnings of the Portuguese population was intense as detailed in the report “Poverty and social exclusion in Portugal”, published by the

membro com o maior aumento nos níveis de desigualdades de rendimento, relativamente ao inquérito anterior (não abrangendo a Eslováquia). Observando as duas primeiras décadas do século XXI, a evolução da remuneração média por trabalhador, em termos reais, cresceu 6,8%, entre 2000 e 2010, e 3,1%,

National Observatory for the Campaign against Poverty in 2022. This study also conveys how there has been a sharp increase in social inequalities. Indeed, Portugal features as the EU member states with the largest increase in levels of income inequality, relative to the previous survey (not covering Slovakia). Taking the last twenty years, the growth in average employee

desde então. Progrediu, é certo, mas esse crescimento revela-se bem distante, por exemplo, do período entre 1990 e 2000, de 37,8%. Em 2022, a remuneração bruta total mensal média por trabalhador foi de 1 411 euros, o que representa um aumento de 3,6% em termos nominais e uma queda de 4,0% em termos reais. À pandemia aliaram-se a inflação e a subida das taxas de juro, penalizando o rendimento familiar. Os efeitos da subida dos preços nas condições das famílias notam-se no agravamento das situações de privação material e social, como salienta Carlos Farinha, professor do ISEG, num artigo sobre a pobreza e a desigualdade.

Entre a política de causas e a política de casos, onde fica a credibilidade do sistema?

A vida dos portugueses está ainda mais difícil e os governantes não têm conseguido dar resposta aos problemas estruturais do país. O professor de Economia Abel Mateus explica que a qualidade da democracia tem falhas graves, sendo percepcionada pelos cidadãos como “deficiente”. Esta perceção estende-se das instituições ao Governo, passando pelo Parlamento e, sobretudo, pelos partidos políticos.

remunerations in real terms advanced 6.8% between 2000 and 2010, and 3.1%, from then onwards. This was progress, certainly, but this falls far short of the period between 1990 and 2000 when earnings surged 37.8%. In 2022, the gross total monthly level of employee remuneration stood at 1,411 euros, which represents an increase of 3.6% in nominal terms and a fall of 4.0% in real terms. The pandemic, allied to inflation and the rise in interest rates, penalised household income. The effects of the rise in prices on the conditions of families reflect in the worsening situation of material and social deprivation, as ISEG professor, Carlos Farinha, highlighted in an article on poverty and inequality.

Between the politics around the causes and the cases, what is left of the credibility of the system?

The life of the Portuguese is still more difficult and successive governments have not been able to appropriately respond to the country’s structural problems. The Economics Professor, Abel Mateus, explains that the quality of democracy displays serious failings, perceived by citizens as “deficient”. This perception extends to the institutions of government, on to parliament and especially the political parties. The data effectively conveys the degradation in the quality of Portuguese democracy. The “Democracy Index” produced by the Economist Intelligence Unit reflects this fact: in

Os dados, efetivamente, demonstram a degradação da qualidade da nossa democracia. O “Democracy Index” da Economist Intelligence Unit reflete esse facto: em 2006 (primeiro ano de divulgação deste indicador), Portugal ocupava a 19.ª posição do ‘ranking’, com uma avaliação global de 8,16. Actualmente, segundo os dados de 2022, o nosso país desceu para o 28.º lugar, com uma pontuação de 7,95. Portugal deixou de pertencer às “democracias completas”, passando a integrar-se no grupo das “democracias com falhas”, em virtude de uma fraca cultura política, baixos níveis de participação na vida política ou problemas relativos ao funcionamento da governação.

A reconfiguração do panorama partidário e o reaparecimento do discurso de ódio

Descontentes, os portugueses apontam o dedo à classe política, que não só se revela incapaz de resolver os problemas, como vai evidenciado casos de corrupção e má gestão pública. Entre estes, surge o episódio, inédito em Portugal, da detenção de um ex-primeiro-ministro. José Sócrates foi detido a 21 de Novembro de 2014, no âmbito de uma investigação, por suspeitas de fraude fiscal qualificada, corrupção e branqueamento de capitais. Apesar de ter cumprido cerca de 10 meses de prisão preventiva, o ex-primeiro-ministro ainda não foi julgado e o processo arrasta-se, com risco de prescrição, adensando o descrédito do sistema. Se, por um lado, a reacção dos portugueses se expressa no alheamento relativamente à participação política, com o aumento das taxas de abstenção nos atos eleitorais (passaram de 38,4%, nas eleições legislativas de 2002, para 48,6%, no mais recente ato eleitoral para a Assembleia da República), por outro, decidiram dar voz a pequenos partidos à margem da governação. Basta reparar na configuração da Assembleia da República: em 2002, apenas cinco partidos tinham assento parlamentar. Actualmente, são nove as bancadas partidárias.

Perdeu-se o CDS-PP, mas ao PS, PSD, PCP e Bloco de Esquerda juntaram-se o Chega, a Iniciativa Liberal, o PAN e o Livre. Simultaneamente, a democracia portuguesa enfrenta obstáculos semelhantes aos que proliferam na Europa e nos EUA, salienta Abel Mateus, mencionando “(...) o fenómeno do populismo (...), a polarização e o radicalismo induzidos pelas grandes plataformas digitais ou a falta de qualidade das elites da governação”. O fenómeno do partido de extrema-direita Chega, liderado por André Ventura, revela-se um exemplo claro do populismo, alicerçado no discurso de ódio, que também atinge Portugal. Criado em 2019, em quatro anos, o partido transformouse na terceira força política no Parlamento português, conquistando seguidores no seio de uma população que enfrenta vários desafios, não só económicos, mas também sociais, começando pela própria demografia.

Sociedade: mais velhos, mais digitais, mais tolerantes e mais vulneráveis

Os dados do Eurostat, actualizados em Fevereiro de 2023, são expressivos: a população portuguesa é aquela que,

2006 (the first year of publication for this indicator), Portugal took 19th position in the ranking, with a global evaluation of 8.16. Currently, according to the 2022 ranking, Portugal has dropped back to 28th place with a score of 7.95. Portugal no longer belongs to the group of “complete democracies”, falling back into the group of “democracies with failings” due to the shallow political culture, low levels of participation in political life and problems relating to the functioning of governance.

The reconfiguration of the party panorama and the re-appearance of discourses of hate

Discontent, the Portuguese point the finger at the political class unable to resolve their problems and compounding them by the incidence of corruption and bad public management. Among such cases, there was the episode, unprecedented in Portugal, of the arrest of a former prime minister. José Sócrates was taken into custody on 21 November 2014 within the scope of an investigation into suspicions of qualified fiscal fraud, corruption and money laundering. Despite having spent almost 10 months in custody, the former prime minister has yet to stand trial with the proceedings dragging on and now on the verge of expiry, only deepening the lack of faith in the system. While, on the one hand, the reaction of the Portuguese comes with their alienation from political participation, with a surge in election abstention rates (rising from 38.4% in the general elections of 2002 to 48.6% in the most recent national parliamentary elections), on the other hand, voters have opted for small parties hitherto on the fringes. For example, in the Parliament of 2002, there were five parties with representation. In the current parliament, there are nine parties. The CDS-PP may be missing in action but the PS, PSD, PCP and Bloco de Esquerda have been joined by the right-wing Chega, Iniciativa Liberal, the pro-animal rights PAN and Livre parties. Simultaneously, Portuguese democracy has encountered obstacles similar to those cropping up in Europe and the United States, emphasised Abel Mateus before mentioning “(...) the phenomenon of populism (...), the polarisation and radicalism induced by the large digital platforms and the lack of quality of the governing elites”. The success of Chega, led by André Ventura, reveals a clear example of populism, leveraged by hate speech, that has also afflicted Portugal. Launched in 2019, in four years, the party has surged to become the third largest political party in the Portuguese parliament, winning over followers in segments of a population facing various challenges and not only economic but also social, beginning with the demographics prevailing.

Society: older, more digital, more tolerant and more vulnerable

The Eurostat figures, updated in February 2023, are expressive: the Portuguese population is that which, out of the group of 27 EU member

no conjunto dos 27 Estados-membros da União Europeia (UE), está a envelhecer a um ritmo mais acelerado. Este fenómeno demográfico, fruto da redução da taxa de natalidade e do aumento da esperança média de

states, is ageing at the fastest pace. This demographic phenomenon, courtesy of a reduction in the birth rate and the increase in the average lifespan, is taking place across Europe to a greater or lesser

vida, verifica-se um pouco por toda a Europa, não sendo uma novidade. Não obstante, se, em 2003, a idade mediana da população portuguesa se situava nos 38,5 anos, em 2022, o cenário tornou-se bastante diferente. Os portugueses têm, em média, 46,8 anos — idade superior à mediana dos residentes da UE (44,4 anos). Perante estes dados, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, Presidente da República, considerou este tópico decisivo para o futuro: “Queremos uma Europa que recupere economicamente, queremos uma Europa que seja socialmente justa, que dê oportunidades aos mais jovens? Isso tem a ver com a demografia”, declarou. A este quadro não é alheia a evolução da emigração jovem. Assistimos, nos últimos anos, a uma verdadeira “fuga de cérebros” do país. Em 2003, segundo dados do INE, a maioria

extent and is nothing new. Irrespective, while, in 2003, the average age of the Portuguese population was 38.5 years, in 2022, the scenario was substantially different. The Portuguese are now aged an average of 46.8 years — higher than the pan-EU average of 44.4 years of age. Given such data, the President of the Republic, Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa, considered this issue decisive to the future: “Do we want a Europe that recovers economically, we want a Europe that is socially just, that provides opportunities for young people? The answer relates to the demographics”, he declared. Compounding this problem is the trend in youth emigration. In recent years, we have witnessed a veritable national brain-drain. In 2003, according to INE data, the majority of Portuguese emigrants held only primary school education

dos emigrantes portugueses possuía o Ensino Básico (77,4%), apenas 9% tinham completado o Ensino Secundário/Superior. Segundo os Censos de 2021, o perfil da emigração portuguesa é, hoje, bastante distinto: 47,6% têm diploma do Ensino Superior. De facto, são incontáveis os desafios que decorrem deste retrato demográfico: do significativo aumento da pressão sobre a rede de Segurança Social, ao urgente fortalecimento da capacidade de resposta do Sistema Nacional de Saúde, passando pelo combate à solidão e ao isolamento da população idosa. Contudo, se, por um lado, Portugal se apresenta progressivamente mais envelhecido, com a paulatina redução da população em idade ativa, por outro, o tecido social e económico nacional nunca esteve tão dinâmico e aberto ao mundo. O incontornável processo de digitalização do país pode ser apontado como um dos principais responsáveis deste fenómeno.

Do nascimento do Facebook à era da inteligência artificial

Vivemos, hoje, uma fatia cada vez maior do nosso quotidiano ‘online’. A implementação do universo digital em Portugal tornou-se determinante na evolução do país, ao longo dos últimos 20 anos. Afinal, a Internet transformou radicalmente o modo como interagimos, dialogamos, trabalhamos, estudamos, acedemos a conteúdos, fazemos compras, fechamos negócios ou tomamos decisões. De acordo com os dados do INE, em 2003 — um ano antes do aparecimento do Facebook, a rede social que revolucionou o mundo —, apenas 11,3% das micro, pequenas, médias ou grandes empresas nacionais marcavam presença ‘online’. Em 2021, eram 40,1%. Similarmente, segundo a ANACOM, 88,2% das famílias possuíam conexão à Internet, em 2022. Esta percentagem é corroborada pela evolução, nas duas últimas décadas, do número de pessoas assinantes de um serviço de Internet, em Portugal. Neste contexto, importa destacar o protagonismo insuperável das redes sociais no nosso quotidiano. De acordo com o estudo da Marktest Os Portugueses e as Redes Sociais, publicado em 2022, 63% da população utiliza redes sociais. Cada um destes utilizadores conta com cerca de seis contas, em diversas plataformas. Por sua vez, a Data Reportal assegura, no relatório Digital 2023: Portugal, que os portugueses dedicam uma média de 2,25 horas por dia às redes sociais. Afirma ainda que 92,2% dos utilizadores de Internet no país possuem conta em, pelo menos, uma rede social. Contudo, quase 20 anos após a criação do Facebook, estes espaços de interacção, omnipresentes na vida dos portugueses, assistem, também, a uma transformação radical, que deixa o futuro destes ecossistemas em aberto. Num artigo intitulado “The Future of Social Media Is a Lot Less Social”, publicado no The New York Times, defende-se: Concomitantemente, o mundo da tecnologia digital depara-se com a eclosão de um conjunto de plataformas revolucionárias para a sociedade e a economia. O ano de 2023 trouxe para as capas dos jornais um

(77.4%), only 9% had completed Secondary/Higher education qualifications. According to the 2021 Census, the Portuguese emigration profile is now significantly different: 47.6% hold a higher education degree. In fact, there are countless challenges arising from this demographic position, the significant rise in pressure on the social security system, the urgency of strengthening the response capacity of the national health service and extending to combating loneliness and isolation among the elderly population. However, on the one hand, while Portugal appears to be steadily ageing with only a slight reduction in the active population, on the other hand, the national society and economy has never been quite as dynamic and open to the world. The unavoidable process of digitalisation that the country has embarked on may represent one of the key drivers of this openness.

From the launch of Facebook through to the era of artificial intelligence

We today live with an increasingly large percentage of our time spent online. The advance of the digital universe in Portugal has become determinant to national evolution over the course of the last 20 years. After all, the Internet has radically transformed the ways in which we interact, dialogue, work, study, access content, go shopping, close deals and take decisions. Again according to INE data, in 2003 — one year prior to the appearance of Facebook, the social network that swept the world —, only 11.3% of the micro, small, medium or large Portuguese companies maintained an online presence. In 2021, that level was 40.1%. Similarly, according to ANACOM, 88.2% of households had an Internet connection in 2022. This percentage corroborates with the growth in the numbers signing up to Internet services in Portugal over the last twenty years. In this context, we should highlight the overwhelming weighting of the social networks in our daily lives. According to a Marktest study The Portuguese and the Social Networks, published in 2022, 63% of the population use social networks. Each of these users run around six different accounts across the various platforms.

In turn, Data Reportal affirms, in its Digital 2023: Portugal report, that Portuguese citizens dedicate an average of 2.25 hours per day to their social networks. They maintain that 92.2% of national Internet users hold an account with at least one social network. However, almost 20 years on from the launch of Facebook, these spaces of interaction, omnipresent in the lives of the Portuguese, shall also undergo a radical transformation that shall leave the future of these ecosystems in question. An article entitled “The Future of Social Media Is a Lot Less Social”, published in The New York Times, defends that: In parallel, the digital technology world is facing the mushrooming of a set of platforms revolutionary both for society and the economy.

2023 saw the newspapers lead with headlines that, twenty years ago, would rarely have surged outside of

dos tópicos que, há 20 anos, poucas vezes surgia fora da ficção científica. No final de 2022, o aparecimento do ChatGPT, modelo de linguagem de Inteligência Artificial (IA) generativa, marcou a agenda global, pela sua surpreendente capacidade de simular, com naturalidade e fluidez, a comunicação humana.

O mundo no bolso, uma pandemia sem fronteiras e a saúde mental a sair da sombra

A conectividade que o país conquistou, nos últimos 20 anos, revelou-se determinante na navegação da crise global que abalou o início da década de 2020: a pandemia de COVID-19. Afinal, foram essas ferramentas digitais que permitiram manter o funcionamento de inúmeros sectores da vida social e económica, ainda que tenham emergido novos desafios e carências. Por conseguinte, os confinamentos, resultantes desta pandemia,

science fiction. At the end of 2022, the appearance of ChatGPT, an Artificial Intelligence (AI) generative language model impacted on the global agenda in keeping with its surprising capacities to simulate, with naturalness and fluidity, human communication.

The world in your pocket, a borderless pandemic and mental health emerging from the shadows

The connectivity that the country built up over the last two decades proved determinant in navigating the global crisis that erupted in early 2020: the COVID-19 pandemic. After all, these digital tools enabled countless sectors of social and economic life to continue functioning, even while new challenges and shortcomings also emerged. Consequently, the periods of confinement resulting from this pandemic brought about a significant rise in

provocaram um significativo aumento das comunicações electrónicas. O recurso às tecnologias de informação abriu as portas ao teletrabalho: uma possibilidade que parece ter vindo para ficar, viabilizando, hoje, novas formas de trabalhar que favorecem o nomadismo digital e a migração para o interior. Apesar da conexão viabilizada pelas plataformas digitais, a pandemia originou um conjunto vasto de consequências invisíveis na saúde mental da população. Perante este cenário, o Serviço Nacional de Saúde (SNS) destaca o impacto do distanciamento social, do isolamento, do medo e da incerteza relativamente ao futuro e à perda de rendimentos no bem-estar dos portugueses. Quase metade dos adultos portugueses (47%) afirma, segundo o STADA Health Report 2022, que os seus níveis de ‘stress’ pioraram com o início da pandemia. Ora, se o tema da saúde mental já tinha conquistado algum espaço, ao longo das duas últimas décadas, a pandemia converteu-o num tópico verdadeiramente incontornável.

Os números divulgados pelo SNS ajudam, também, a perceber este fenómeno:

electronic communications. The recourse to information technologies opened the doors to remote working: a working dimension that looks to have arrived to stay, and today enabling new ways of working that encourage digital nomadism and migration to inland areas. Despite the connectivity built up by the digital platforms, the pandemic led to a vast set of invisible consequences to the mental health of the population. Given this scenario, the SNS – the Portuguese National Health Service, highlights the impact of social distancing, isolation, fear and uncertainty in relation to the future and the loss of earnings to the wellbeing of the Portuguese. Almost a half of Portuguese adults (47%) affirm that, according to the STADA Health Report 2022, their levels of stress worsened at the beginning of the pandemic. Indeed, while the theme of mental health had already gained some space over the course of the last two decades, the pandemic converted it into a truly unavoidable issue. The numbers published by the SNS also

Há 20 anos, termos como “ansiedade”, “depressão” ou “burnout”, por exemplo, surgiam com muito menos frequência no quadro social, mediático e político nacional. Hoje, a saúde mental constitui, no entanto, uma preocupação basilar na nossa vida em sociedade. Do combate ao ‘bullying’ nas escolas à implementação de políticas laborais que permitam erradicar as situações de ‘burnout’, passando pela luta contra o assédio ou o isolamento da população idosa, múltiplos problemas associados à saúde mental têm assumido um crescente protagonismo nas prioridades político-sociais do país. Por exemplo, a ecoansiedade — caracterizada pelos especialistas como “medo relativo às consequências nefastas da crise climática” — revela-se um transtorno com crescente incidência na população mais jovem. Afinal, a luta ecologista constitui o grande impulsionador do envolvimento político das novas gerações, que cada vez se reveem menos nos fóruns político-partidários convencionais. Estes jovens portugueses, que tomarão conta do leme do país nas duas décadas que se avizinham, têm trazido para o debate público novos temas e novas prioridades: do combate antirracista às reivindicações igualitárias do feminismo ou da comunidade LGBTQIA+, passando pelos direitos dos animas ou pela luta pela justiça climática. Trata-se, evidentemente, de uma agenda radicalmente distinta daquela que tomava conta dos noticiários, em 2003. Nestas duas últimas décadas, derrubámos fronteiras, mas também promessas. O país sofreu e transfigurou-se com as crises que marcaram os ciclos económicos. Porém, o futuro da economia e da política parece continuar hipotecado por problemas estruturais que se perpetuam. Os próximos 20 anos levantarão, certamente, uma série de desafios: da crise do clima à ameaça às democracias, passando pelo impacto das profundas transformações digitais que agora emergem. Afinal, que visão tem Portugal para o futuro? Como nos iremos posicionar, neste horizonte? E daqui a duas décadas, estaremos assim tão diferentes?

help in grasping the extent of this issue:

Twenty years ago, terms such as “anxiety”, “depression” or “burnout”, for example, appeared with far less frequency across the national social, media and political contexts. Nevertheless, today, mental health constitutes a core concern to our life in society.

From combating bullying in schools to the implementation of labour policies capable of curbing the incidence of burnout, as well as the struggle against harassment and loneliness in the elderly population, multiple problems associated with mental health have shot up the list of national political-social priorities.

For example, eco-anxiety — characterised by specialists as “fear related to the negative consequences of the climate crisis” — reflects a trauma with growing incidence among younger persons. After all, the ecological issue represents the great driver of the political involvement of the younger generation, who perceive themselves ever less in the conventional party political forums. These young Portuguese, who will be taking the helm of the country over the next couple of decades, have brought new themes and new priorities to the public debate: combating racism and the demands for equality whether on behalf of feminism or the LGBTQIA+ community, as well as animal rights and the struggle for climate justice. This is clearly a distinctly radical agenda when compared with the issues dominating the news back in 2003. In these last two decades, we have broken new frontiers but also promises. The country suffered and was transfigured by the crises buffeting the economy over these cycles. Furthermore, the future of the economy and politics still seem shackled by the persisting structural problems. The next twenty years shall certainly raise a series of challenges: from the climate crisis to the threat to democracies and taking in the impact of the now emerging deep digital transformations. After all, what vision does Portugal hold for the future? What position should the country take within this framework? And in two decades time, will we really be so different?

A conversation with Henry Kissinger

Over two days in late April 2023, The Economist spent over eight hours in conversation with Dr Kissinger. Just weeks before his 100th birthday, the former secretary of state and national security adviser laid out his concerns about the risks of great power conflict and offered solutions for how to avoid it. This is a transcript of the conversation, lightly edited for clarity.

The transcript of his meeting with our journalists

HENRY KISSINGER , AMERICAN DIPLOMAT, POLITICAL THEORIST, GEOPOLITICAL CONSULTANT, AND POLITICIAN

DAY ONE

The Economist: Dr Kissinger, thank you so much for doing this. The topic of our conversation is how to avoid a third world war. The relationship between the usand China, the two most important countries in the world, seems genuinely broken, on a path that could end in conflict. We want to talk about how to avoid this. And we want to talk about how to create a more stable global order. That involves more than the us and China: we will need to discuss the roles of Russia, of Europe, of India, and others. But can we start with how great is the risk of war? Are we on a path to great power conflict?

Henry Kissinger: We are on the path to great power confrontation. And what makes it more worrisome to me is that both sides have convinced themselves that the other represents a strategic danger. And it is a strategic danger in a world in which the decisions of each can determine the likelihood of conflict. And in such a situation it is natural to attempt to be preeminent, technologically and materially. So a situation can arise in which an issue escalates into a confrontation about the overall relationship. That is the biggest problem, at the moment. And, when you have an issue like Taiwan, in which concessions become very difficult because it involves fundamental principles, that becomes even more dangerous.

The Economist: So we’ll come to Taiwan. For the moment I want to stick with the more abstract concepts, because you’ve spent your career, as a scholar and as a statesman, thinking about the concepts of world order. How does the threat today compare with previous episodes?

Henry Kissinger: Let me answer in terms of the

evolution of my thinking. The nature of sovereignty begins with the definition of interests of states. And it is also inherent that sovereign interests will not always coincide, and that nations will need to explain their interests to each other. So if either of those elements come into being where those interests are close enough to permit a negotiation of differences, it becomes a mediating influence. Where sovereign nations use force to prevent outcomes, military conflict may occur. The general challenge of diplomacy is to bring those interests into connection with each other and not to settle issues by war. In our period, that is compounded by the domestic system that expresses itself particularly clearly as a system of values. I started thinking about this very early on in my life - probably when I was in military service during the war. How to prevent that catastrophe from happening again was a conventional question. And the conventional answer, at the end of World War Two, was to prevent aggressors from imposing their will early enough, so that they could not achieve military dominance.

My first book was written on the subject of the balance between power and legitimacy at the end of the Napoleonic Wars. It dealt with the different conception of countries like England, which looked at it primarily as a strategic problem, as compared to the European perception, which needed a greater component of legitimacy. The British conception was to be in a strategic position of being able to achieve your objectives militarily; the European position being to pre-empt the evolution of such a political problem.

As my life evolved, I started writing about this issue. And I think when I entered government, I was still leaning to the position of achieving stability through strategic superiority. As I became obliged to study the military capabilities that were being produced and I reached a position in which my recommendation would be part of a final decision to go to war, I asked myself increasingly how one could ever [have] a stable system based on mutual

assured destruction. It was the dominant theory, but it presented us with a paradox which we haven’t solved. We can all take credit for avoiding nuclear war for 75 years. That is an important achievement, but it was never explicitly negotiated. So, by the accident of life, I was hired by the Council on Foreign Relations as a researcher for a group of eminent Americans—great men of that scientific period—and it became important in my thinking about the avoidance of nuclear war. That was enhanced when I entered government. So, this led me to supporting arms control from a perspective different from that of some of the scientific people, our perspective being that the issue of war would arise generally when there was a conflict and acutely when there was a crisis. So, the distinguishing feature of the Nixon administration was that in a crisis—that was imposed on us—we would escalate very rapidly in order to reduce the margin of escalation so that we did not slide by little steps into unanticipated catastrophe. It worked because we were stronger than Russia. Although, phrasing it that way has its limitations, because in the nuclear field, “stronger” is not a physically accurate description, since a huge level of destructiveness is reached very quickly. So, in each case, the crisis ended very rapidly after we did that. And so, it’s the principle for crisis management, which I don’t recommend. But it had some application to the situation. In the course of government service, I learned the importance of using arms control negotiations for the two sides to learn about each other’s military capabilities, and thinking, to limit it in a way that is domestically bearable for each side. So I became an advocate of arms control, even though I was then attacked by the neoconservatives. And that’s true for Americans, and I think for many Europeans, that the view associated with arms control is also associated with a view of total [denuclearisation], which is not achievable in the present world, in any

short period. So, this view that I’m describing—principles, commitment to strategic stability—coupled with a view of overall stability became pretty fixed. Since then, circumstances have changed enormously.

The cold war was a strategic situation in which we started in an inherently stronger position. But the word “stronger” needs understanding, because the dilemma was—and remains—that countries like Vietnam could defeat a superpower that had nuclear superiority, but did not wish to use it. And that imbalance applied also to nato [strategy], which perceived Russian conventional superiority, and which in turn enabled Russia to exert a dominant influence.

When we’re in an adversarial world with mutually assured destruction, you owe it morally to your society to avoid it. [The situation] never got to it during the cold-war period. But it is a hell of a responsibility to kill 110m people in a week, which was the estimate for such a war. And in any conduct of crises, you disarm yourself totally. So, you have to operate by escalation, but with the moral recourse to avoid the slide to a crisis, which is my fear in Taiwan today.

The Economist: You describe a cold-war relationship that was simpler in some ways. It had two big protagonists. Now we have more players. Is the right historical analogy [today] that of your doctoral thesis: 19th-century Europe, the world of Castlereagh and Metternich? Or is that itself inadequate, and we’re moving from the American-led global order to something completely new.

Henry Kissinger: In any diplomacy of stability, there has to be some element of the 19th-century world. And the 19th-century world was based on the proposition that the existence of the states contesting it was not at issue. What was at issue was some objective which only improved their relative position. Even that didn’t come about easily, because there was

a long period of wars triggered by the French Revolution which concerned the legitimate existence of states, or their internal structure. But for about 100 years, that 19th-century model worked. So you had wars like the Crimean War, which brought together a number of European countries for different objectives: France to reintroduce themselves into the international system, England to constrain Russia, Austria which really couldn’t make up its mind whether to be in or out, or to try to balance Balkan outcomes, and Piedmont in order to establish a basis for Italian unification. And they then came out with a solution that lasted another 60 years. For that the element of legitimacy has to be in it. And by that, I mean moral values as conceived.

The Economist: Do we have that now?

Henry Kissinger: Well, what we were trying to do is to introduce China into certain systems and, based on our experience, determine how systemabiding China would become. It’s interesting that Mao was certainly the most ideological leader that I encountered. But he was also ruthless in applying stabilising principles when they benefited China. And so, the Soviet Union and China found themselves in a conflict in Manchuria. And one of my first experiences of that conflict was a briefing from a rand analyst, who said that most of the military actions were initiated by Russia. So the problem for us became, if there’s a conflict between two countries, and with one of which we have no contact whatsoever, what do you do?

And by great power principles, I recommended—and Nixon autonomously came to the same conclusion—that, given the dilemma, you should support the weaker against the stronger. On the Chinese side, what happened is that Mao was faced with the problem of potential isolation. So, he pulled four generals that were in concentration camps, whose family

he had destroyed, and who lived in abject conditions, and brought them to Beijing. And he said, “Here is my problem. What should be my strategy?” The significance of this for our current discussion is that there is in China a degree of cultural patriotism that transcends personal suffering imposed by [their own] system. They gave him an answer, to open to the United States, which he followed. Those documents exist. The answer was to begin dealing with the United States, as a counterweight to Russia, [which fit both] Chinese and our purposes. I became the person to execute it. We decided that we would not list our disagreements, but we’d see whether we could create on that first visit a basis for continuing dialogue, because that dialogue in itself would affect the situation. The American side was deeply influenced by the Vietnam War, which we were determined to end in a way that reserved the people that relied on us [in Asia]. Whatever the merit of the war, we inherited it—we couldn’t start from scratch. So this was our motive. The Chinese motive was parallel, about building a relationship to resist the Soviet Union. The difference was that China in the interval has become a strategic force, and acquired technological capabilities that make it a genuine rival. When we opened to China, the Chinese position was parallel to Europe, in that the threat of conventional Soviet forces was becoming their principal strategic challenge.

Now the situation is that China is developing genuine [strategic] capabilities, plus an economy that is competitive, to some extent, with the United States. So, we’re in the classic pre-World War One situation where neither side has much margin of political concession and in which any disturbance of the equilibrium can lead to catastrophic consequences. In that situation [it] gets inherently worse on a technological side.

Anyone who has talked to Mao could have no debate about his ideological proclivities. But when you read these conversations—I had five of them

with Mao–[they evince a] strategic objective. That strategic aspect was expressed by Deng, who was a great leader conducting moderate policies, even by Western standards. He put forward two sets of principles. I don’t have the exact text in my mind. They were basically to “know your objectives, but [pursue] them quietly, without assertiveness.” And there was a sub coda attached to them, which said, “the enemy is at the gate and we must be very prudent in our conduct.” That is changing through technology. What we’re debating endlessly in the West is whether the existing leadership is inherently more radical. My [answer] to that is, I don’t know. But it’s our duty to test it. In other words, it is our duty to maintain the equilibrium but also to [provide] for a peaceful world.

The Economist: So let’s focus on China. And backtrack slightly. Because one thing that is difficult sometimes to understand is what China’s own conception of its global role is. I believe, when you first met Zhou Enlai you had dinner and you were discussing conceptions of world order. It was like a conversation amongst international relations professors…

Henry Kissinger: In my first conversation, I had prepared a little speech of how we got there. And it ended with “So we now find ourselves in what, to us, is a land of mystery.” And before I finished Zhou said, “May I interrupt? Tell me what is so mysterious about China.” And I gave a banal answer, because he said, “Let us see that we can take the mystery out of it. And after you know us better, there is a billion of us. I hope it will not be so mysterious to you…” That was a very good way to proceed. So then we had only 48 hours, and I wanted to achieve a meeting between Mao and Nixon, because that affected all our other concerns. It was also important for our public, so that they could see that there was a quest for order. If you read the transcript of the first day, which is available, the

first thing the Chinese did is to tell me to go to bed—and it was around noon. The meeting was scheduled for 5:30 in my residence. The next morning, they took us to the Forbidden City, which was closed for our visit; so we’d already spent one afternoon doing nothing, diplomatically. And then we spent another morning doing nothing diplomatically. And then at lunch, he began by discussing the Cultural Revolution, saying that it was important that we understood it. It was an attack on a society that was being dominated by pure bureaucracy, he said. But there were serious problems now [beyond that]. So we discussed our stated views on Taiwan, and we had still troops in Taiwan. And I said that we can’t talk about these troops until the war in Vietnam [is over].

The Economist: What did he say about China’s view on Taiwan?

Henry Kissinger: If you go through the sequence of discussions, we talked about Japan and Russia, but in a sort of conceptual way, until Zhou said that we needed to discuss what we’d say about the visit. So we agreed then that each side would draft something. He said he had to go to a meeting with the Korean leader who was in China. So we had an evening of uncertainty about whether the whole trip was wasted. We met again the next day, when I had to leave—I had to get to Paris by midnight, that night. I had to be there because I had a meeting with the Vietnamese scheduled for the next day. So they presented their version, with slight modifications, and the issue was: who invited whom? And it said something like Chairman Mao—or maybe it was Zhou—having learned of Nixon’s desire to visit China at some point, has decided to extend an invitation for Nixon to visit, which was a key element. We thought—and when I say we, I mean that Nixon had his view firmly in his own mind separately from me. I hadn’t met Nixon until he appointed me. Indeed, I opposed him publicly. On that second visit, we decided to prepare a communiqué. The Chinese

proposed that each side state their own objectives, their own goals, and not pretend that we agreed after 25 years— by osmosis—on everything. So we listed a lot of disagreements, including on Taiwan. There we stated that the Taiwan solution needed to be settled, or whatever the phrase is—you can look it up—without the use of force. And then we listed a number of agreed objectives, one of which was to oppose hegemony by anybody, as a principle of policy. The [Shanghai] Communiqué was essentially agreed on this visit, except for the part on Taiwan, which was left open because only Mao had the right to do so formally. But Mao had seen and approved the statement of opposing objectives. When Mao and Nixon met, whenever Nixon raised a concrete subject, Mao said, “I’m a philosopher. I don’t deal with these subjects. Let Zhou and

Kissinger discuss this.” That had the advantage that if we deadlocked, it wasn’t Mao’s failure—that was the reason, I think. But when it came to Taiwan, he was very explicit. He said, “They are a bunch of counterrevolutionaries. We don’t need them now. We can wait 100 years. Someday we will ask for them. But it’s a long distance away.” That, in effect, accepted our non-military use formula de facto. So, this became the basis of our arrangement. We’d stated in our version of the communiqué [that] the United States [acknowledges] that the Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait have the goal of One China. The United States [does not] challenge that proposition. So that was our commitment to One China. But the formulation of that time recognized Taiwan as the authorities of China. There is no doubt that the

implication of our conversations was that we would not support the Two China policy. And that they would not use force… The one important thing to add is, this became a bipartisan policy. Not necessarily in this detail, [but in substance,] every American administration of both parties made it clear that we had a commitment to One China and to a peaceful outcome on Taiwan. So it’s lasted into the Trump administration.

The Economist: Let’s fast forward to today. Have either or both of those elements changed? Has the US position changed on Taiwan?

Henry Kissinger: Well, first of all, the position that we established endured through three Democratic presidents who followed—Carter, Clinton, and Obama. It was that China and the US would attempt to solve strategic issues between them, and attempt to keep them from arising. Now, in the Bush administration, the key people in office had been trained in the Nixon periodpartly because in the ‘50s, the people with Chinese experience and education had been eliminated from the State Department. So, that policy towards Taiwan was continued until the Trump administration, which through the visit of Trump to China sort of followed the established principles, but then took a Trumpian turn, that he wanted to be perceived as exacting demands he made in the economic field. I agreed with the objectives: he wanted to get a better balance [of trade]. But he then turned it into a formal confrontation. There was a trade treaty negotiated in that period. At the signing ceremony of that treaty, he made it very clear that it had been exacted from the Chinese. That was a turning point. Now, the Biden administration is pursuing a Trumpian foreign policy towards China with liberal rhetoric.

The Economist: There now seems to be an arms race developing across the Taiwan Strait, in which China wants to keep open its option for being able to use force if necessary. And the US wants to defend, to be

THE POSITION THAT WE ESTABLISHED ENDURED THROUGH THREE DEMOCRATIC PRESIDENTS WHO FOLLOWED—CARTER, CLINTON, AND OBAMA.

able to defend Taiwan, which in turn leads China to continue to arm itself. How do you stop this unstable dynamic?

Henry Kissinger: Well, the basic question is this: “Was it possible?” Or “is it possible for China and the United States to coexist without the threat of all-out war with each other?”

I thought and still think that it was, that the negative proof has not yet been given. Because Taiwan is a special case. Every Chinese leader has asserted its essential connection to China; so did Chiang Kai-shek. So the margin for concession here is very limited. On the other hand, with the way things have evolved to now, it is not a simple matter for the United States to abandon Taiwan without undermining its position elsewhere. So that should be off the table. What I hope [is] that both leaders come to one fundamental understanding. Traditionally, in diplomacy, the proper set up [is to] settle something easy first, to get used to that.

That may not be possible here. I’m not opposed to that. But I don’t believe that climate change will, by itself, create huge confidence - although I wish Kerry well. So, the key question is, is it possible for China and the United States to establish a relationship of a nature that reduces the danger of conflicts that arise autonomously, not sought by either side? And how do you do that? Well, I have thought—and what I’m saying now, I’ve said to leaders, to people in China with access to their leaders, and of course to American leaders also— that if the two presidents meet, rather than list all their grievances, which they know… hopefully the American president, from my point of view, would say: “Mr. President, the two greatest dangers to peace right now, are us two. In the sense that we have the capacity to destroy humanity. I think we should agree between ourselves to try to avoid such a situation.” Structurally, Europe has never recovered from World War One. Because they could not bring their objectives into relationship to their capabilities.

“We should recognize that, since it’s a

unique decision that has never formally been taken. We should appoint—each of us–a small group of advisors specifically asked to do this and these advisors should have rapid access to each other and meet at some designated relatively brief interval, but long enough so that they can learn from developments. And then you and I should meet once or preferably twice a year to review that agenda. With some issues like Taiwan, what that means is that we both reduce the rhetoric on that subject. But not try to change it fundamentally, on either side. If it were private, we will try to reduce or eliminate “two-Chinalike” proposals. And you will reduce additional threats in the region, and we will act [accordingly].”

Of course, the question is—that would certainly be said by opponents—“the Chinese are so dangerous; they’ll get a lot more information than they give, and they’ll use it to their advantage.”

When you get into a Ukraine sort of war, a war over Taiwan, it will destroy Taiwan and destroy the world economy because of the chips that are made there. So there are reasons other than an agreement between the two presidents not to have that.

The Economist: You’ve raised a number of questions here. One is that that kind of agreement or approach between the presidents requires a level of trust. And one challenge now, I think, is that in Washington, there is a view that China wants to supplant the US as the world’s dominant power. And that must be stopped. And then in Beijing, the view is that the US wants to contain China and keep it down. And with those two positions, is the kind of approach you’re talking about feasible?

Henry Kissinger: I think it’s necessary. I keep repeating it in some form. It may fail. And therefore, we have to be militarily strong enough to sustain the failure. But it may be the nature of modern technology. The easy thing to say is, “We must be superior.” Then the question is “what do you mean by superiority?” How do you use it operationally? But isn’t the capacity

for damage in the nuclear massiveretaliation age—or unacceptabledamage-age—you’re not going to be ever constrained with modern technology by capacity.

The Economist: So that suggests if you don’t have this approach, we are headed to conflict; that this is essential for the avoidance of war.

Henry Kissinger: You have to trust yourself enough to believe that you will be strong enough [such] that there is no military reason to attack you. But of course, there can be differences in the assessment of pain you are willing to accept, and then in that the West may become inferior, through its own fault.

The Economist: Isn’t one of the problems here that there’s an asymmetry? China wants Taiwan more than the West is willing to defend it, and China knows that. It would prefer to prevail over Taiwan without war, but if necessary [it will use] war; that would destroy American power in the Pacific. So, in a way, it’s better for China to have a trial of strength over Taiwan than it is for the West. That asymmetry makes it hard to solve.

Henry Kissinger: But a war over Taiwan would set back China’s internal evolution substantially. So, at the end of the war, they might find themselves in the position of the winners of the first world war, who were afraid to enforce its provisions. The ambiguity of the nature of superiority now is an inherent flaw of the system. But the question we now face is that, whatever capabilities China has, technology accentuates it. So if we get into a trade war, if you take the views of the traditional hawks on this, it is that China really must be given no opportunity to develop itself. Under 19th-century principles, there will be some areas of special interest— Central Asia will always be an area in which China has a special geographic interest. And in fact, I’ve been told by pretty responsible people in China that an original motive for the Belt and Road policy was as an alternative to other Asian policies, which would lead to more

confrontation with the United States. To do what I believe needs to be done— and something towards which the administration is tacking—it’s very close to what I’m describing. The only problem is, you can’t just say it, you have to do it. And you have to do it with a series of intangibles. Because there is no certain answer. You know, in 1938, at the time of Munich, it was not an implausible argument to say that, if you thought you were going to get into conflict with Germany, you better yield – i.e. appease, than go to war then. But that’s a complicated question and, having lived in Nazi Germany, I know that war was inevitable because Hitler needed it. I don’t think the Chinese need it. My perception of the Chinese is that they’re more Confucian than Marxist in their basic thinking. And the strength of China has been historically that the selection of personnel through the educational system and through the appointment did bring forward people who were nationally trained. So, the Confucian system teaches two things: to achieve the maximum strength of which they are capable, and they want to be respected for it. But not personal respect in the Western sense, but respect in the sense that any negotiations should reflect some recognition of pragmatic capacities and accomplishments. It is of course possible that they drive it to a point, where the Chinese definition of respect is incompatible with our security. That will lead to conflict, but even then it would be better that the conflict be limited, rather than all-out.

The Economist: Is it the case that their goal—as so many in Washington say—is to supplant the us as the world’s leading power?

Henry Kissinger: It is highly likely that a significant part of Chinese thinkers believe America is on a downward slope. And, therefore, as a result of a historic evolution, they will eventually supplant us. But if you believe that, then in your policies, you maintain the option of adversaries to assert themselves. So in the first phase of what I’m talking about, you need a kind of tacit agreement, which has all the dangers that the Washington people recommend, except they have no alternative to it. It has dangers. And there is a danger that, in America, we then will not keep up strategically. And there is a danger that our allies will start moving. It’s uncertain that [they] will move [all the way] but near certainty at least some of them will start moving. While, if we pursue the course I recommend, we will always have more options. But I have great sympathy for the administration on this.

The Economist: So, let’s imagine your approach is being followed. And you’ve already described how you think climate change may not be the right ground on which to build diplomatic engagement. What would you be looking to instead? What are the possible areas where the two presidents could sit down?

Henry Kissinger: I would probably do two things at the beginning. I would say, first of all, let’s lower the rhetoric on Taiwan. And we don’t need to make an announcement of it, we can just do it. And, secondly, on Taiwan we can deploy our forces in such a way that assures our intention. Because, realistically, I’m sure Taiwan can’t be maintained in its present form in a war. So I think that’s

an achievable objective, if we don’t state it as an announcement. And secondly, I think we have to begin exchanges on the impact of technology on each other. We have to take baby steps towards arms control, in which each side presents the other with controllable material about new capabilities. I had an experience in Russia once with Brezhnev, with whom I was negotiating arms control. We were discussing an agreement about technical capabilities. And Brezhnev said, “I’m going to assign [their execution] to the minister of production,” who was at the meeting. So I began my discussion of the weapon capabilities—the minister of production had a hysterical fit. He made so much noise they took him out of the room; then they brought him back, I began speaking, and he again had a fit. So we couldn’t go any further. And, later, when we thought about it, we weren’t sure if Gromyko knew what the weapons’ capabilities were, because he was only a foreign minister at that time - he wasn’t yet in the Politburo. The basic problem was that their weapons had more throw weight, but ours had more accuracy— and we had more variety of weapons. So it was easy for the hawks to play with these disparities, and if you had the wrong people in office… Now, we are in a world in which you invent technologies that will have huge and novel applications. And it isn’t so easy to say, “Let me tell you what we think the consequences are.” Because the people who develop llms [large language models] wanted to build office machinery, they sought to teach a computer how to complete sentences and then make that an imperative for American businesses. The newfound machines understand more than humans ever originally conceived. So that is

THE NEWFOUND MACHINES UNDERSTAND MORE THAN HUMANS EVER ORIGINALLY CONCEIVED.

something that affects the Chinese as much as us.

What I have in mind requires two leaders to have wisdom on each side and a domestic structure that can sustain it. Because the danger for the West is to say, “the danger is gone”. That’s the great danger.

The Economist: One more question on this idea of finding ways to coordinate. Is there scope to coordinate over, let’s say, Iran and the Middle East? And let’s say the war in Ukraine—and all these are things that look like threats—could they actually be opportunities to build confidence?

Henry Kissinger: We all have to admit we’re in a new world…there is no guaranteed course.

My impression of talking to Chinese leaders is that what is grating on them is our assumption that we are on the right course, and that if they behave themselves, we will grant them certain privileges. And also when we speak of a world system, a rules-based system, we made all the rules. And they want to participate in whatever new rules emerge. There’s another part that thinks that the Americans will never grant us that, so it’s foolish to fall for it. But if that happens, if you look at the evolution of technology, the concept of these llms didn’t exist before. They were inconceivable before.

Now, we have tremendous confidence feeding them information that, by definition, nobody else can get. It costs a billion dollars to build that learned information. So there can only be, perhaps, 10 in the whole world. And then you deal with another country by monopolising that knowledge. And if you then rely entirely on what you can achieve through power, you’re likely to destroy the world. Because you will not know the consequences, fully. The people who started World War One thought it would end in six months. So, the current leaders will have to be strong and, beyond that, understand that they cannot use the limits of this. And so, what are the limitations that you can achieve either by agreement, or by

practice, or indirectly? But I will admit, what I want to achieve requires above all confidence in oneself. But the alternative is worse.

The Economist: You’ve laid that out very clearly. And we’ll talk in a little while about the context in which these decisions are being made. But firstly, another way in which the world is now more complicated and more dangerous is that it is not just the two players - we’ve been discussing the US and China—there are the emergent players. And then there are arguably the collapsing players; and I wanted to go next to Russia. You were just describing Putin, whom you know well. And let’s start with where we are now. Russia has destroyed, I think, any chance of finding a way to live with Europe. In the short term, it’s going to be a junior partner to China, even as it is sort of clinging to its imperialist dream, with the invasion of Ukraine. Was where we are now inevitable, was it a failure of Western diplomacy? Or was it a catastrophic failure of judgement by Putin?

Henry Kissinger: It was certainly a catastrophic mistake of judgement by Putin at the end. I wrote an article, which you’ve probably seen, in which I substantially predicted the evolution. I thought that the decision to leave open the membership of Ukraine in nato was very wrong. It was unwise, because if you looked at it from the Russian point of view, in 1989, they controlled Europe up to the Elbe River. They then withdrew from there, under compulsion of their internal system, but still—they withdrew from it. And every square inch of what they withdrew from became part of nato. The only territory that was left was the country they always considered the little brother closest to them organically and historically. And now it’s going into nato, too. So [that] was a big turning point, it was a final turning point. And at that time Putin was even saying that he didn’t object to Ukraine becoming part of an economic system with Europe, but not nato. The year before the war, he made a proposal

on nato’s long-term evolution. And we didn’t take it seriously. It was not acceptable by itself but could have been a starting point. Our negotiator was a wonderful lady, I like her very much, but she hates Putin so totally.

Compare that with how the West reacted to the Berlin Ultimatum. Both Macmillan and Eisenhower used it to start long negotiations that went on for 20 years until Nixon and Brezhnev found the preconditions for a new Berlin agreement, which then lasted the rest of the cold war. We didn’t do that with Ukraine. And in fact, our negotiators said at the negotiation, that one American basic principle is that any country that meets our membership qualification can join. So that meant Russia will be totally surrounded by nato countries. What is Georgia doing in nato? We have every right to defend it, but why as part of a multilateral institution? In the 19th century Britain might have defended for a strategic reason. But it wouldn’t have brought in everybody else.

To Putin, Ukraine membership in nato was an obsession. So now I’m in the weird position that people say, “He’s changed his mind, now he’s in favour of full membership of Ukraine in nato.” And my reason for that is twofold. One, Russia is no longer the conventional threat that it used to be. So the challenges of Russia should be considered in a different context. And secondly, we have now armed Ukraine to a point where it will be the best-armed country and with the least strategically experienced leadership in Europe. If the war ends like it probably will, with Russia losing many of its gains, but retaining Sevastopol, we may have a dissatisfied Russia, but also a dissatisfied Ukraine—in other words, a balance of dissatisfaction.

So, for the safety of Europe, it is better to have Ukraine in nato, where it cannot make national decisions on territorial claims.

The Economist: So your argument for having Ukraine in nato is an argument for reducing the risks of Ukraine to Europe rather than an argument about the defence of Ukraine?

Henry Kissinger: We’ve proved now

the capability to defend Ukraine. What the Europeans are now saying is, in my view, madly dangerous. Because the Europeans are saying: “We don’t want them in nato, because they’re too risky. And therefore, we’ll arm the hell out of them and give them the most advanced weapons.” And how can that possibly work? We shouldn’t end it in the wrong way. Assuming the outcome is the probable outcome, that would be somewhere along the line of the status quo ante that existed [prior to February 24, 2022]. The outcome should be one in which Ukraine remains protected by Europe and doesn’t become a solitary state just looking out for itself. I want to avoid that. Before I wanted Ukraine to be a neutral state. But with Finland and Sweden in nato it doesn’t make sense. I want Russia to give up much of what it conquered in 2014, and it’s not my job to negotiate a peace agreement. I can tell you the principles of an enhanced, independent Ukraine, closely tied to Europe and either closely tied under a nato guarantee or part of nato. It’s not an ideal outcome. That would be my view on what will likely happen.

The Economist: And what about Russia? Is Russia now fated to be the junior partner or the vassal state to China? And what will be the consequences of that?

Henry Kissinger: Every student of history knows that Russia has been generally tied to Europe, at least since the 15th century. And so, much of the great history of Europe has involved Russia, and within Russia, there has always been this ambivalent feeling of living in unique danger from Europe but also having a unique cultural relationship to Europe. On the one hand, it has wanted to acquire European culture, but on the other it has [a view of itself] as the third Rome that will help define Europe. Putin has to be perceived as a character out of Dostoevsky, not as Hitler, and with all the ambivalences and the doubts about his own people.

So, that’s my general view of Russia. I have never met a Russian leader who said anything good about China. And

I’ve never met a Chinese leader who said anything good about Russia, they are sort of treated with contempt. And even when Putin is in China, he is not shown the kind of courtesies that they showed to Macron, [who] came to a special place that is tied to the history of the Chinese leader, and they don’t do that for the Russians. Symbolism is very important in China, so it’s not a natural alliance.

The Economist: Is it therefore a reasonable goal of us policy—and European policy, but particularly us policy—to try to split China from Russia to help to catalyse that process?

Henry Kissinger: Reintroducing Russia to Europe [is important]. If Russia isn’t in Central Asia as an operating great power, it will become open to a Syriantype civil war; all these many conflicts that are now in part restrained because they’re inconvenient to Russia would then be open to some extent to Turkey, to Iran, certainly to China with great ambivalence on the part of India about all of this.

You know, the practising political leader that is quite close to my views is the Indian Foreign Minister. That’s how I think he would analyse this situation. Which still makes them a block for China, and India is an important factor. But India doesn’t need a nato system for Asia to perform its role in the balance.

The Economist: So India will be playing a 19th century balance of power role in this?

Henry Kissinger: You may know Lyndsay Howard, she’s working for Bloomberg, and she organised a meeting at which I was present. A former Indian Cabinet Secretary said that the international system should be based on nonpermanent alliances geared to the immediate necessities, and foreseeable needs, rather than these huge multilateral structures which then tie you up.

Take Singapore. They share our view about dangers, but they certainly don’t want to be in the permanent frontline. Or

Japan. It has a pretty clear view of where they’re going; they’re heading towards becoming a nuclear power in five years. And they always want to be close to us. Except I wouldn’t exclude their making deals inconvenient to us. But they will always be worried about China, and the power relationship between them. Similarly, I don’t think Japan has any intention of being a permanent member of a global multilateral system that will constrain them.

The Economist: Let’s come back to that one. But just a couple of questions on Europe because this seems the most difficult bit of the puzzle that you’ve described. So, first, you describe Ukraine in nato, guaranteed by nato. And secondly, a European framework—which also requires the Europeans [to act]. And I guess my question on Europe is, is Europe capable of that kind of strategic autonomy? Is it capable of that kind of strategic thinking? And which countries in Europe would do that?

Henry Kissinger: I would look to Britain and France to take the lead, partly because Britain and France are the two countries that have practised it before—France with relation to Central Europe, Britain with relation to Europe and the world. Germany has had no historically consistent global or historical experience. They had a very great leader in Bismarck, who did it for 20 years. But after that, they could never clearly decide among the various options. And now, they’re only beginning with this kind of strategic reassessment. Because at the end of World War Two, they needed to link themselves [to the West] through people I admire greatly, and who were personal friends of mine. Now they are reassessing their new capacities and options. Now, these issues—which were wellhandled from that point of view—demand clarification in the post-Ukraine world. The young generation in Germany has been brought up on the history of the failures of their parents and grandparents. Germany will be a central part of that process and will always

play a significant role, but I think the intellectual leadership in this next phase needs to come from both Britain and France.

The Economist: One of China’s aims is to drive a wedge between Europe and America. How does that complicate this process?

Henry Kissinger: I would say a Russian and Chinese aim is to constrain [American] freedom of action. And in the Middle East, an American policy that had the elements that I mentioned before would complicate Russia operating in the Middle East; but at least we would attempt to put it into a joint effort so that it’s not an antiAmerican effort. Europe has to play a special role in

American thinking. And there needs to be a special relationship. I have always been a believer in the special relationship of Britain to the United States, because it is a natural evolution of our history. [That] is what people really believe. So Britain can play that role—though it hasn’t done it to the same degree in the recent years. As for France, de Gaulle believed that France could not act as it would have to if it didn’t have an autonomous belief in itself. And I don’t mean that America should require that its allies follow our lead in every tactical point. But we should have an agreement strategically; what are we trying to achieve? And what are we trying to avoid? Whenever a concrete issue arises like Iraq, there have been huge differences. But I could understand in

a modified arrangement that Europe could play a more important role in some areas. I am not offended by autonomy in my definition of it.

The Economist: So you were not offended by Macron’s recent comments, or his comments about nato being brain dead? Are they the manifestation of an autonomy?

Henry Kissinger: nato should be maintained. But it’s not the spontaneous place to define our future in every area of the world. So much dedication has gone into nato, and there are so many good people who believe in it and so many useful tendencies in its countries, but I don’t think nato is the place to develop creative policies for all the issues of the world you are asking me about. Its greatest utility is a defence of Europe. To the extent that European countries participated in, say, Iraq, it was to guarantee American support. The Eastern Europeans are different, but they feel the more immediate threat.

The Economist: Shall we turn now to America itself?

Henry Kissinger: Before we move to America, [let me say that] I don’t want to challenge China more than it’s essential. And I don’t want to hurt German feelings more than it’s essential.

The Economist: I understand your overriding view that in the long run, Russia and China, [their] underlying emotion is one of suspicion and contempt. But, for the time being, they’re working together. What can they accomplish in the short run and the medium term, if they work together successfully? What should we be worried about them doing together?

Henry Kissinger: Theoretically, you could say that if they split the developing world between themselves, that would give them an even greater impact. And to the extent that they both believe the United States is threatening them, and looking for opportunities to isolate China as they may think we’ve done to Russia, they’ll be more aligned. But they’re not natural allies. You don’t find in Russian history or in Chinese

I THINK THE INTELLECTUAL LEADERSHIP IN THIS NEXT PHASE NEEDS TO COME FROM BOTH BRITAIN AND FRANCE.

history any leaders who have advocated basing their policy on alliances with each other, through all the turmoil that both of them have experienced. Of course, for a big part of the history, China was too weak for such a role. When I was with Ford in Vladivostok, I peeled off to go to China to “brief them”—to show the Russians that we had a Chinese option. And Deng asked how I found Vladivostok, and I said that my overpowering impression of Vladivostok was the cold: “I’ve never known it could get so cold in this world.” And then—tactlessly—I said, “Now I know why you Chinese never went up there.” And Deng said, “What do you mean never went up there, it’s ours! And it’s called”—whatever it’s called in Chinese—“and all the cities around there are all ours.” And he gave me the names of all of them [in Chinese]. And it’s only very recently, well after the period that we opened to China, that they accepted the 19th-century border. And most of these territories were acquired in the 19th century.

So, what could they work together on?

India a little bit, through the Russian arms sales. The Middle East? It’s not a natural alliance. Because really, if you’ve been to China, what do people look to Russia for? Anything?

The Economist: Contempt.

Henry Kissinger: Contempt, yes, is the basic attitude. And it’s not wise for us to say we want to split them from China— but it’s something which we should have in mind. And the prerequisite for it is, first of all, not to destroy Russia totally in the war.

And after the war, [we can] declare its membership in Europe an important objective. Though it will be impossible— and understandably—to get the Eastern Europeans to agree to something like that easily.

The Economist: Does China have any natural allies?

Henry Kissinger: You know, they haven’t conceived of themselves [as a state needing allies]… When the first British ambassador came there in 1793, he

was treated with exquisite courtesy. But it was made very clear to him that a permanent ambassador was out of the question. And if he wanted to stay dressed like a Chinese, he could stay— but he’d never be permitted to leave. That attitude [remains]. I don’t think the Chinese are comfortable with the notion of sovereignty applied to them. China has natural allies when they have common grievances. But this is all conjecture. I’m not worried about the Solomon Islands. The intention they reflect is worrisome. But the execution of it over a substantial period of time is not natural.

The Economist: So is the China that we will be dealing with one that would like to inspire awe rather than respect, or perhaps recreate its traditional notion of a tributary system with it at the centre? A different notion of dominance perhaps than we might think of in a Western view.

Henry Kissinger: I have no problem of saying we should be wary. I’m not saying we can teach mutual love. It is also very hard for Americans. Our notion of alliances is not the 19th-century [one]. Ours is to create a system of equal thinking and of substantial American contribution, but never quite equality. But compared to China, we think of it as a pragmatic burden sharing.

The Economist: So let’s turn to America, which is the central actor in defining the world that we’re discussing. And perhaps start with your reflection on where America is now, in its long-standing intellectual tension between its idealism, which is so essentially part of it, and the realism that tempers its idealism—or the sense of frustration about the failure, so to speak— –of its idealism. Where is America now on that pendulum you’ve written about?

Henry Kissinger: America is in a strange position politically, because normally you would expect the Democrats to be exponents of pure idealism and the Republicans to be asserting something that at least contains my point of view.

But what has happened is they’ve turned upside down: the public perception is quite unified fear of the Chinese. And practically, there is a great conviction that we can master this like we did World War One and World War Two, by material superiority.

But if we look at the post World War Two history, the United States deserves huge credit for the generosity in which we ended the war with Germany. But we’ve messed up conflict in other regions with the same insight, starting with the Korean War. It was a good decision to enter the Korean war. It became a prelude of the Vietnam War, in the sense that the Chinese, after initially trying to defeat us, then were satisfied with showing the limits of American power. Our superiority was so great that I think the Chinese decided that they couldn’t exhaust us [into defeat]. But in Vietnam there was no constituency that could play the role of a European bureaucracy, and on which we could establish a democratic state. We didn’t analyse the premises of a democratic state.

So the division in America became absolute, with the realists and socalled idealists on opposite sides. But the people who got us into the war and who sent 550,000 troops, they weren’t realists; they were the idealists who believed an absolute victory was possible. There is a point I made in an article that I published after I was already appointed nsa.

The Economist: But as you say, now, both sides have a concern about China, both the realist and the idealist, for different reasons. Is the us now less of an idealist power?

Henry Kissinger: The paradox is that the people who most loudly affirm the importance of power are the idealists, and the realists join them by instinct. But you already find now the Florida Governor saying we should be out of Ukraine, which traditional realists would never say.

The key question is, is the fear of China justified? And if it is justified, is our policy adequate to it? I don’t believe that China, in its history, has ever aimed for world domination. They have

aimed at the maximum evolution of their capacities, inspiring so much respect that other countries would adjust their policies to Chinese preferences. The European idea that domination means physical presence in the country derives from the fact [that] European history has been made by relatively small physical states. So they had a concept of domination that involved direct control. In Chinese history, their biggest fear has been domestic upheaval. And they often tried to keep the foreigners out - they built the Great Wall [for that purpose]. So in the course of time, if they achieved superiority that can be genuinely used, would they drive it to the point of imposing Chinese culture? I don’t know. My instinct is no, but I don’t want to get to the test of that. I believe it is in our capacity to prevent that situation from arising by a combination of diplomacy and force. But if we fail in that, the first thing that would happen is the disintegration of our influence in the world.

The Economist: You say that both sides are motivated by a fear of China in the us, but one of the framings that the us is making is a very Wilsonian idealist one, which is the framing of democracies versus autocracies.

Henry Kissinger: The French Revolution certainly didn’t turn out to be peaceful. Certainly, insofar as the public in democracies can have a big influence on decision-making, and decision-making can be framed in a meaningful way that is relevant to the problem, it is, of course, better to live in a democracy. The difference is, I would think, that democratic power should be used, first of all, in the defence of the people who profess it. It should be used in some

limited way for the benefit of others, but not to the point of begging the war and peace question. And also with a modesty. If your conduct is announced to be the overthrow of the opponent, that makes it a more intense conflict. And of course, it would be worthwhile if the result were good, but since at least the invention of nuclear weapons a relationship between military and political goals remains a prime and serious goal of American policy. I differ with the people who make the military issue in terms of democracy against authoritarianism. It also disarms us, to some extent, from analysing the strategic dangers that can emerge. Those we must resist when they arise. But then it’s in the nature of statesmanship that a judgement has to be made, whether you are able to bear whatever the burden is of that particular exercise. We solved that issue in Europe to a large extent. When we have encountered that test with respect to the region outside of Europe, our unity was [transitory].

The Economist: You mean, in Iraq? Henry Kissinger: In Iraq, I was in favour of going in and overthrowing [Saddam], and then doing what we did after the Gulf War—letting a natural evolution take place, in which we could play a role similar to that of the great powers in Afghanistan. I even wrote an article calling for a Belgian-type solution of neutralisation, by which all the threatened countries could cooperate against terrorism…The curse of Afghanistan is that if you want to govern the whole country, no Afghan government can do so without an outside power to rally against.

The Economist: Just to be clear,

this focus on democracies versus autocracies that is currently fashionable in Washington, do you think that is weakening America’s ability to achieve the strategic goals that we’ve been discussing versus China? Does it make it less likely to have alliances, less likely to have support amongst emerging economies?

Henry Kissinger: No, though it makes it less likely to have the kinds of alliances which we favour, which are multilateral and permanent. I think [highly of] the Australian alliance; I’m very enthusiastic about close relations with India. I’m wary of the anti-Chinese definition of [American policy], but I’m not in favour of withdrawing from Asia.

The Economist: I was going to ask you whether India is a good test of this, in that there are all sorts of reasons why the interests of India and the interests of the usalign, particularly over some aspects of China. But, in Wilsonian terms, the government of Modi is increasingly oppressive and anti-Muslim and constrains the press and interferes in the courts. So, I wanted to ask you whether you thought India was an interesting test case of whether the us is able to think through these tensions between Wilsonian principles and the overriding [national] interest. How do you think about that? And how would you assess us treatment of India at the moment, and how it should be in the future?

Henry Kissinger: I agree with strengthening India militarily with respect to its conflict with China, because I think a military victory of

THE CURSE OF AFGHANISTAN IS THAT IF YOU WANT TO GOVERN THE WHOLE COUNTRY, NO AFGHAN GOVERNMENT CAN DO SO WITHOUT AN OUTSIDE POWER TO RALLY AGAINST.

China over India would then raise all kinds of problems of civil war in India. So, I would help India for that specific purpose.

And in India, I think we could, partly because of the previous British educational system, give expression to a preference for democracy in the form of encouraging private institutions for various purposes. And between India and the United States, there’s enough freedom of dialogue to express philosophical points.

When I was in government, the Indians were, by our standards, very difficult in stating their views in relation to some of our policies. But it never got us to the point of being hostile to India. In India today, there is scope for alignment. I have very high regard for the way the Indians conduct their foreign policy now, because it shows balance. So how

which we must solve. If we don’t, the predictions of failure will be proved true. I’m deeply worried at the kind of dialogue that goes on now… This has been going on for a long time, and, if you compare the charges against Nixon, he didn’t fight them. I mean, he fought them legally, but he did not attack the motives of his critics. But now a comparable situation to Watergate could lead to civil war-type conditions, and that deeply worries me. The nature of a political debate is so different from when I first came to Washington, without any knowledge of the system. Joe Alsop—I don’t know if you know who he was—he was a fantastic character. He gave a bipartisan dinner every Sunday night, with leaders of both parties. And they were intense but not acrimonious. George McGovern and I were on friendly

The Economist: And does that mean that American strategic thinking in the 1950s and the 1960s was predicated on a common perception of American strength? And that now -

Henry Kissinger: It was a common perception of America’s worth.

The Economist: Has that perception of America’s worth now been lost?

Henry Kissinger: In a way.

The Economist: That is what you hear in Beijing, that America is a declining power.

Henry Kissinger: It’s very hard for Americans—it’s hard for anybody—to learn the principles of coexistence in a world which is on the way to learning a

would they actually decide in various circumstances? I don’t know. Partly because of our history with India, it’s still varied, and we have had so much dialogue already. We have a greater scope for being understood when we put democracy and power together into one. And the Indians have a great talent; they have survived thousands of years under foreign occupation, without having a government of their own, which shows a great social tenacity—a remarkable social tenacity.

The Economist: Can I ask you about the domestic context in which American strategy is being formulated, and how different that is now from the years when you were in office? Is it possible to have the kind of long-term strategic thinking that you’ve described in modern American political life?

Henry Kissinger: That’s our big challenge

terms, which is unlikely today between a security adviser and a cabinet member from the opposing party. I met regularly with him. So even in the Nixon period with all its animosities, there was still a degree of unity. It started weakening in every administration, but I think Trump and now Biden have driven it over the top. You don’t see that kind of discussion now in Washington. And in order to get a strategic view, you need faith in your country. To some extent [the problem is] the teaching system, which makes the evils of the country the pre-eminent point. Of course, such evils are a special historical problem, there is no debate about it in my mind. But unless you educate people to have some faith in the future, then, in the difficult decisions of life, which are closeotherwise they wouldn’t be difficultthey’re confused about the real issues.

dialogue with machines. Which is going to happen. And we don’t know what we’re going to learn there, through that process.

The Economist: That’s the other element of the context that has changed so dramatically, technology. Let’s talk about that, again, because you’ve written about it—a man approaching his 100th birthday is writing about a technology of the future. It’s impressive. How worried are you that technology is going to make the kind of strategic thinking that we’ve been discussing even more difficult?

Henry Kissinger: I view this present period in technology [as] sort of comparable to the period after the invention of printing, in which the previous view of the world was challenged by a new technology. So it will affect everybody, but there will

IT’S VERY HARD FOR AMERICANS—IT’S HARD FOR ANYBODY—TO LEARN THE PRINCIPLES OF COEXISTENCE IN A WORLD WHICH IS ON THE WAY TO LEARNING A DIALOGUE WITH MACHINES.

always only be a few in any generation that can handle its implications across the whole spectrum. And that is a huge problem for every society now. You know, Europe had to learn this when it went through a comparable experience, in the wars of the 16th and 17th century, which were extremely bloody and destructive, and which killed a third of the population of Central Europe with conventional weapons. And it was only out of that war that the notion of sovereignty and international law emerged as a rallying concept. On China, some Americans think that if we defeated it, it will become democratic and peaceful. [But] there is no precedent for that in any part of Chinese history. The much more likely outcome is civil war between competing units, and civil wars fought about ideological principles will add a new element of catastrophe. It’s not in our interest to drive China to dissolution. So, here’s an interest principle that transcends the moral principle in the name of the moral principle. That’s the ambiguity of it. And if you ask me, how are we going to handle this? Where do we find the Lincoln? Nobody knows that.

The Economist: How does modern media, the news cycle, and social media complicate this process of shaping us policy?

Henry Kissinger: My theme is the need for balance and moderation. Institutionalise that. That’s the aim; whether it’s always succeeded is a different issue. When I first came to Washington, I had never had a press conference in my life, so I had to learn all of this, and the media were hostile to Nixon. But there were in the largely print media about 15 to 20 people who thought in the categories of national unity, but who didn’t always agree with me. But on Vietnam, it was possible to have a dialogue with them. I always took up to 15 journalists with me—I saw every day for an hour or so. I rarely answered very concrete questions, but that was understood. And they drove me nuts. For example, they would say things that provoked the Arabs during [shuttle diplomacy] that would complicate

negotiations with the Israelis even more. But that was part of the game, they weren’t unfair. So people like Scotty Reston, who was a consistent critic of Nixon, and Walter Lippmann—these were people with whom it was possible to have a dialogue. I don’t see many like this today. There’s no reward for reflective media thinking and no incentive for it. I think it’s a big problem.

The Economist: So if you put that together with what you were saying about educational problems and a sort of pessimism about America’s worth, what has that done to American soft power in the world, if you accept that category of analysis? And if so, what are the consequences of that?

Henry Kissinger: Look, no matter what media we had, we’d be in an age of transition now. You can’t blame it all on the media. We would need great leaders—or good leaders, like Gerald Ford, who inherited an administration in dissolution. He did decent things. And his opponents could also rely on him to do decent things. You don’t find that drive as a typical characteristic now; any means that can [start the unilateral] are acceptable. But what I don’t want to do is to sound pessimistic.

The Economist: You’re doing a very bad job in that case.

Henry Kissinger: I know I’m doing a poor job, but this is the problem that has to be solved. And I believe I’ve spent my life trying to deal with it. It’s not a problem easily solved right now. And I don’t necessarily know how it’s going to be solved. And in this book, I tried to show what six different leaders did to solve substantial problems. Can we do that today? We must.

The Economist: In your [latest book] you’ve looked back at historical figures and the nature of their leadership. When you look at it today, point to some of the characteristics of leadership that you’ve identified in the past that would be useful today.

Henry Kissinger: Identify where you are, pitilessly. So, this kind of analysis is useful for constructive things. Define objectives that can enlist people, find means, describable means, of achieving these objectives. Link all of these to your domestic objectives, whatever they are. I really do believe that if our leaders can find the courage to [articulate a vision], the American public—without understanding all the details—would go along with it. But what becomes hard to bear is an endless source of scandals as the conduct of debate. Bipartisanship, [too, is important]. A senator I knew from Mississippi, Senator Stennis, told me that on weekends he would go to courthouses to see law [practised], which bound all of America together. That was a very moving statement to me. Or Senator Jackson on the Democratic side.

The Economist: Henry Jackson?

Henry Kissinger: Yes. He often criticised me, but if he were here, he would consider this a valid discussion. Today, most presidential advisors would say, don’t waste your time on this. Let’s find some phrases that can be move people right away. Worry about being president once you’re president. But who can unify? The security adviser can, if the president backs him; the secretary of state can’t, he has clients in 160 countries. And in the British system, it’s almost automatic, if you get four or five first-class cabinet members.

The Economist: I don’t want to sound frivolous here, there’s a serious point to this question. But earlier, you talked about one of the steps to try and improve things between China and America is to get a group of people together who would sit and study and speak to each other. Now, if you could pick that group, anybody dead or alive, who would sit on that committee? Who would be your committee to save the world? Picking people dead or alive, from history, or people you knew?

Henry Kissinger: Three people to do this Chinese discussion, I think we can find. Among contemporaries I would pick

Bill Burns for sure. Then I’d find some academic. And one great technical guy. I could name 10 who could contribute to that.

The Economist: You mean someone who understands the technology?

Henry Kissinger: Yes, somebody from the technology world. Somebody that I liked among [them was] the head of Microsoft…

The Economist: Satya Nadella?

Henry Kissinger: Yes, Nadella. I think it can be done well, on the technology side— we’ll be forced to deal with it. When the public understands that it is surrounded by machines that act on a basis that is not understood, there will need to be an expanding dialogue about it. And I don’t know whether you know Winston Lord. When we intervened in Cambodia, he wanted to quit. And I told him, “You can quit and march around this place carrying a placard. Or you can help us solve the Vietnam War.” And he decided to stay. And he became head of the policy planning staff, then ambassador to China.

I think that what we need [is] people who make that decision—that they’re living in this time, and they want to do something about it, other than feel sorry for themselves. I’m not saying it can always be done dramatically. But we don’t often in history arrive at a point where a real transition is occurring, not just a visual one. This one is real, in the sense that amazing things are happening. And they’re happening to people who are not aiming for them. Necessarily, I’m talking about the technology [here]. And at the same time, if you look at military history, you can say, it has never been possible to destroy all your opponents, because of limitations of geography and of accuracy. [Now] there are no limitations. Every adversary is 100 percent vulnerable. So there’s no limit to this, and simultaneously with this destructiveness, now you can create weapons that recognize their own [targets]. So destructiveness becomes practically automatic. Though it is a

standard doctrine that there must always be a human being in the chain, it is not always possible in practice. Theoretically, it’s possible. But when you have all of this happening, and then you keep building more and more destructiveness without trying to limit the framework. The only trouble is that all the demonstrators in the various squares in the world say that too. And they want to solve it by feeling sorry for themselves and bringing pressure [onto governments]. They have two illusions. First, you cannot abolish this technology. Second, there needs to be an element of force in international politics. That is the essence of the issue.

The Economist: The other thing, I think, that comes through your writing is a sense of restraint. And I don’t think we live in a world where people are good at restraint.

Henry Kissinger: That’s inherent also in the media, and in the multiplicity of media. We may well wind up destroying ourselves. And a point is now quite reachable where the machines can refuse to be shut off. I mean once the machines recognised this possibility, they can build it into their advice prior to the contingency. Many genius scientists believe that—and they know more than I do.

The Economist: But just to bring this fascinating conversation together, there are the risks that come from both the us and China acting incautiously.

Henry Kissinger: You have to blame the Chinese too. It’s not that they are doing well and we’re doing badly and need to change.

The Economist: There are the risks that come from technology. Together with your careful assessment of risks that you’ve spent your career doing, how much time do we have?

Henry Kissinger: Look, probably not enough to give a perfect answer. And there’s never been a period where you

can say that these objectives have in fact been reached. But our first step has to be mitigation of them. I think the technology will become more and more dangerous when combined with the other factors, within five years. [Demis] Hassabis [is] one of the key scientists who understands where it’s going. So more and more scientists will become convinced of the stakes… The scientists are not strategists, but they have been affected by the turmoil of their times. And by the fact that, if you want to make any progress, you need to go down certain routes that are not necessarily popular. To stand apart and do well has become harder.

The Economist: Two questions to end on. One is that, if you look throughout history, as you have done, progress has been made—but it has often been made in the aftermath of prolonged and terrible conflict.

Henry Kissinger: Exactly. After the Napoleonic Wars, after the Thirty Years War, after World War Two, in the construction of Europe. But then when it became global, new factors complicated it, and then the people who had done a wonderful job in the post-World War Two period became too absorbed in immediate issues.

So progress has been made. I think it’s possible that you can create a world order on the basis of rules that Europe, China and India could join, and that’s already a good slice of humanity. So if you look at the practicality of it, it can end well—or at least it can end without catastrophe, and we can make progress through it. But it will require vision and dedication.

The Economist: When I read your books, on diplomacy and on world order, and on China, a common theme at the end of these books is to appeal to a more clear-sighted sense of the balance between America’s interests and its enduring values. And reading particularly Diplomacy, and your analysis of how Russia might behave after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it looks really prescient now. Because actually, Russia has pretty much

behaved like that, [and] the things you predicted have come to pass. And when I read your recommendations on how the us should think about its relations with China, and what would happen if it failed to do that, it looks like your warnings about there are also coming to pass. The calculation that balances between interests and principles that you’re asking of the us—is the us is actually capable of doing that?

Henry Kissinger: That’s our big challenge. I don’t know… Many great things in American history derive from commitment to principles. On the other hand, it hasn’t occurred to any country to try to reform every other. At the height of its power, that has never occurred to anyone [else]. And that reflected American optimism that it’s possible. And you read it even today

identity within it. In India it’s clearly possible. But how do you get to it for the next 10 years? It’s going to be a big challenge, because we’re now busy indicting the son of a president on top of all the other indictments already being pursued. You can say these were bad people to begin with. But a really effective system would eject them quietly and not make them symbols. It is dangerous to weaponize politics with the criminal process. We have problems now.

The Economist: For almost 100 years you’ve been in a world where on balance, optimism [has been validated and] progress has been made.

Henry Kissinger: But after some very terrible periods.

when de Gaulle disappeared for a day and went to the military headquarters of the French army in Germany. And he talked to the commander there, whom he had fired in Algiers, who therefore had every reason to hate him, and said, “I want to know your attitude when I resign.” The commander said: “You have no right to resign. You’re needed.” Which meant he supported him. So de Gaulle went back and called for a public meeting in the Place de la Concord and then called an election. He gained the only majority election in the French Republic history. And that shows what an inspired leader can do, because all the evidence was against it, every telegram within our government thought he was finished. And once he had done that, he resigned a year later, a little more than a year later, [without pressure, because he thought his task was completed.

with the crisis in Sudan. The progressive newspapers will say if we put enough resources into it [we can fix it]. Is that possible? On present evidence, I’d say no. But if I look at it for the future, if I say what should our task be, I would say the task of leaders is to make it possible to inspire small groups and build on it. That’s what I would say if this were a student discussion, and you can totally quote that if you want to. How optimistic am I about that?

If you look at the leaders whom I’ve respected, they didn’t ask that question. They asked, “Is it necessary?” And I think it’s possible in America. It is possible in countries in Europe. Is it possible in China? Over the years I have met Chinese leaders, who I thought would understand what we are talking about, and would even be sympathetic, as long as they are granted their cultural

The Economist: After some very terrible periods. Now, as you look forward, I think, actuarially, there are probably not another 100 years of you surveying this world. Are you—and we’ll close on this—are you fundamentally optimistic or pessimistic?

Henry Kissinger: Look, my life has been difficult, but it gives ground for optimism. And difficulty—it’s also a challenge. It shouldn’t always be an obstacle. So, I think, to inspire the young generation, they need a demonstration of faith in the future. And that can be done. For example, de Gaulle. In 1968, there was a student uprising in France that took over Paris. The prime minister was Pompidou, whom de Gaulle had appointed. [Pompidou] was already starting conversations about who would replace de Gaulle,

The Economist: So individuals can do that.

The Economist: That may be an apposite place to end, given the announcement today. [Referring to announcement by President Biden that he was running for reelection]

Henry Kissinger: We’ve done actually pretty well on that, when it happened, in this country. But in the conduct of presidents to their vice presidents, I have never seen an exception to this rule that they keep the vice president in a [lower] position; it’s always limited to some particular job rather than a continual one, because they can’t fire him or her.

The Economist: So the one subject we’ve barely mentioned is climate

I THINK, TO INSPIRE THE YOUNG GENERATION, THEY NEED A DEMONSTRATION OF FAITH IN THE FUTURE. AND THAT CAN BE DONE.

change. It struck me that you talked about inspiring the younger generation. Is that subject, which so animates the next generation, something that should be a greater part of the calculus?

Henry Kissinger: But it requires no sacrifice by them. That’s something they can observe and ask others to do. I’m all for [responding to climate change]. I just don’t think that in the Chinese mind, and in the American mind, it will create enough of a balance to the strategic mind. But I’m for it in principle, even quickly.

The Economist: I’m ending this conversation, I think on balance, somewhat pessimistic. But inspired that hopefully your committee of three people Bill Burns, Satya Nadella and Winston Lord—

Henry Kissinger: Well, Kennedy had that inspirational quality. So you need something like that first. And then you

and both of them thought they might win with this. So both offensives were carried out. Another million and a half people died, close to two million. And then they never got it together again. And they never had a strategy either, anymore, until we came in and overwhelmed it. We can’t afford to be in that position. I think if people in 1916 had understood that, they would have found a way to end it. It may not be demonstrable. But it’s not beyond conception. I think there are enough good people around who would know how to do this.

The Economist: We were putting a time [-frame] on this, and five to 10 years was the horizon. Well, five years takes us to 2028—in the next presidential term. And it looks as though the next presidential term is going to be between Biden and possibly Trump, and that’s not renewal. That’s not a Kennedy coming in, who can inspire something different. That’s a continuation.

everyone up to the need for the kinds of approaches you’re describing.

Henry Kissinger: I think thinking people have to start from that assumption. I do not like the way many of these discussions are going, but I think that’s a phase like others we’ve had as humans.

The Economist: Well, let’s hope they change direction in time. Dr Kissinger, thank you.

Henry Kissinger: I won’t be around to see it either way. Thank you for the way you’ve conducted this conversation.

DAY TWO

Henry Kissinger: The Chinese have called the Ukrainians and begun to be mediators.

The Economist: Yes.

Henry Kissinger: When you read over the statements that we make to the Chinese, it is to [ask them to] wake up and call it

can, in various fields, implement it in this generation. We need it immediately in the China field. But we need it also in the technology field. And we need it in the weapons field. Because the builders of technology and weapons don’t understand their implications, necessarily. But if you use them in a systematic way, you will lose control over them, and much quicker than in World War One.

But even in World War One, look at the discussions that were going on between Britain, Germany, and France, in 1916. And basically, the people talking agreed on peace without victory. But they didn’t know how to tell the people how to do that, when they had already lost a million casualties. At the same time, the Germans had prepared the Verdun offensive, the British had prepared the Somme offensive,

Henry Kissinger: I don’t think Biden can supply the inspiration, and I’m hoping that Republicans can come up with somebody better. Look, it’s not a great moment in history, but the alternative is total abdication.

The Economist: And potential annihilation.

Henry Kissinger: You know, it’s not inconceivable that the discussion of how to handle machines, when we’ve developed qualities in them which we now cannot yet fully foresee, will be a totally new subject of conversation.

The Economist: Maybe that will be the catalyst to the kind of thinking that should have happened in 1916, or indeed in 1930. And it will be the catalyst to waking

“Russian aggression.” That is not how the Chinese think. They don’t think in moral terms, but about the national interest. Ukraine is now a major state. The Chinese talk about joint relations. But for China and the Communist philosophy, joint is not nato. They are creating their own world order, in so far as they can.

On the entry of China [into Ukraine conflict diplomacy], if I were Ukrainian, I would think about the nature of the upcoming offensive. It is one thing if you conduct it to punish Russia, another to stay within the principles that the Chinese have laid down. It is the same for Israel. It used to be an axiom that if Iran reached a level of weapons-grade material, they would risk an Israeli preemptive strike. I’m not saying how to conduct the strategy, but they need to consider the interests involved.

ON THE ENTRY OF CHINA [INTO UKRAINE CONFLICT DIPLOMACY], IF I WERE UKRAINIAN, I WOULD THINK ABOUT THE NATURE OF THE UPCOMING OFFENSIVE.

The Economist: Yesterday, you discussed China as a dominant power. Today, you have elaborated that China has a conception of world order. Is China trying to play a global strategic role [in Ukraine conflict diplomacy]? What does that mean for the United States?

Henry Kissinger: It is trying to play a global role. We have to assess at each point if the conceptions of a strategic role are compatible. In principle, I would like a permanent dialogue with China, where the outcomes are on the table, and my hope is a consideration of outcomes that are compatible. If that fails, strategic decisions on both sides have to be taken. Then, there is the question of technology and what kind of assurances you can achieve. Those are the questions, in my view, to educate on all sides. The fact is that China is interested in Europe exclusively from its interest. I would have preferred to put the date [of China’s involvement] off a bit. But when you read the statements on the Western side, which say, “have the Chinese ever called it Russian aggression?”—I wouldn’t expect that they ever would, with the background of their “partnership without limits.” If China plays a constructive role, it would be, first, presumably compatible with their limits, and we will see if it is compatible with nato.

The Economist: China sees its strategic rivalry with the United States—

Henry Kissinger: To which we have contributed mightily.

The Economist: You say about the Ukrainian counteroffensive—

Henry Kissinger: No, the Ukrainians want the relationship. Zelensky has proven an extraordinary leader, and it is an exercise in wisdom on his part, because they could have thought, after the pledge of the “partnership without limits,” that China would never enter on a diplomacy parallel to nato. That could not happen. That doesn’t mean that one couldn’t distil an outcome that would contribute to peace. That’s what I tried to do in my

first Davos remarks. The war needs some political limits.

To the extent that the Chinese participate, their views need to be considered. It can’t be identical with ours. They have not expressed their views. The offer to participate is a big step. It is important to put limits on Russia. From my point of view, I would not have gone down this road, but settled on nato basically taking political steps. Chinese participation in this instance is a new challenge. But what we should not do is celebrate China joining us, because relative to an agreement with China, it is very complex and important. China does this, in part, because they do not want to clash with the United States. If Russia is totally defeated—two years of Chinese and Russian evolution cannot end in a total Russian defeat with Chinese acquiescence. In this new reality, China wants an independent Ukraine. And I’m impressed with the Ukrainian wisdom in being one step ahead of us on that road when they had to know how it would turn out. They couldn’t have expected China to be a nato ally. But China can support the outcome of having a strong and independent Ukraine.

The Economist: You argue that Ukraine should be in nato.

Henry Kissinger: My basic position was not to open nato to Ukraine, and the nato [expansion] debate was a basic mistake, because it challenged the perceptions of Russia fundamentally. Many Russians, including liberal Russians like Solzhenitsyn, who was a great opponent of the Soviet system, believe that Ukraine was a special case. I’ve never met a Russian in a leading position who did not believe that. [nato] took a chunk of Russia-dominated Europe and did not leave it there, but pushed it into a permanent military alignment with joint plans with other countries. [nato pursued] it ideologically, because in statements released afterwards, we said that any country that met our domestic structure could join nato. Any country in the Caucasus or Central Asia. That made security an issue. I don’t say that justified the Russian action of trying to return Ukraine to a satellite status or the means

used. I wrote an article before the crisis that Ukraine should be a bridge and not an outpost.

The Economist: Yesterday, you said –

Henry Kissinger: If the war had ended with the present major participants, I would have said that Ukraine is not safe, because the nationalist aspect would never be calm. Ukraine is safer in nato, where it has the guarantee of allies and needs their approval for military initiatives.

Zelensky must have known the Chinese perspective was not incompatible with his survival. But China’s affection for nato is not compatible with ours. Western statesmanship needs to take that into account. If we want China to back our outcome, it will not be a nato outcome.

The Economist: If Ukraine is safer in nato, how can it be a safer Europe if Chinese involvement precludes nato in Ukraine?

Henry Kissinger: Until the agreement between Putin and Xi at the Olympic Games, when Xi stated his opposition to nato expansion—I don’t think any Chinese leader had expressed a view on European evolution before this. Xi must have known that Putin would go into Ukraine. That is a serious Chinese commitment. They will not go to war for that. They’re not heading for world domination in a Hitlerian sense. That is not how they think or have ever thought of world order. [To them,] world order means they are the final judges of their interests. What they want is participation in how the rules are made. Not agreeing on the rules does not mean war, but it is a greater possibility. I haven’t seen the details of what the Chinese said. But what they say is usually invariably said after extensive meetings done in the Confucian way. Whether that is hopeful or not depends on what happens next. They might acquiesce in Ukraine in nato. I wrote in 2014 that Ukraine should be a bridge. If it is an outpost of nato in the east, it is within 300 miles of Moscow. If it is on the west side, it is within 300 miles of Warsaw and Budapest and 600 miles of Berlin. So, I thought that it would be better to have a Finnish type of neutrality in Ukraine. Now

that Finland and Sweden are joining nato, that is not possible. And it is not possible to say that you cannot select Ukraine for nato membership, because it is in the most vulnerable position [geographically]. America should make that argument. The Europeans don’t want Ukraine in nato. They want to give Ukraine as many arms as they want, but make them defend themselves. That won’t work. That is why, reluctantly, I have come to support Ukraine being in nato. But China won’t make their view depend on where the borders are. They will probably throw their negotiating weight in favour of something like my first Davos speech.

The Economist: Do you think this could be a building block for us-China relations?

Henry Kissinger: It can be, in my opinion. When you’ve been in my position, I feel great compassion for my successors, but I don’t want to prescribe tactics. My general principle is that the United States and China should establish dialogue for these unprecedented circumstances. They are two powers of the type where, historically, a military confrontation was inevitable. But this is not a normal circumstance, because of mutually assured destruction and artificial intelligence. We are at the very beginning of a capability where machines could impose global pestilence or other pandemics—not just nuclear, but any field of human destruction. The circumstances require responsible leaders, who at least make an attempt to avoid conflict.

The Economist: Have you discussed this with your successors, the idea of finding common ground? We met many people in Washington but did not see it.

Henry Kissinger: I know what they think. They say China wants world domination. They now seem to want dialogue. The answer is that they [in China] want to be powerful. So far, they have not sought a military confrontation on orderthreatening issues. We must try to bring China into some international system. I prefer a democratic system, on historical experience and my own life experiences. Our domestic system now must relearn [to reduce] domestic conflicts.

The Economist: Yesterday and today, you said that China and the United States should sit down and discuss their interests. What is the role of human rights and the Uyghurs in Xinjiang? American values impose an obligation to crusade for it.

Henry Kissinger: Yes. It makes a difference whether you approach it as something that is to be imposed or as something that is bound to affect their relationship but leaving the decision to them. I’ve always handled it in that manner and succeeded on individual issues. That does not mean that it would always succeed—by showing in individual cases that they might adjust their views. My formula is not to contest legality but to [have them] release the individual as an act of grace.

The Economist: Is [playing domestic politics] what the United States is doing now?

Henry Kissinger: The idea is that the United States can affect China’s domestic approach, but we cannot redo the world on our domestic basis. We tried that in Sudan—look at Sudan now—Vietnam, Iraq. Our perception is based on the Western experience. Of course, having lived in a totalitarian system, I prefer democracy. But [we live] in a world of unprecedented destructiveness, and machines that do not have feeling have to be considered. What to do case to case? China has adjusted to our preferences, even in the Mao era and substantially under Deng [Xiaoping], but that has to be worked out in practice.

The Economist: Is it fair to summarise that the United States oscillates between realism and idealism?

Henry Kissinger: And each side believes their conviction is absolute. People who rely on power do not think of limits. The missionary part also does not think of limits. Recognition of limits is imposed now.

The Economist: Should the world today be more realist?

Henry Kissinger: No. We have to begin with the correct assessment of the range

[of outcomes] in each of these spheres, and we have to get the security right, because if not, you’re at the mercy of the most irresponsible group. Where to draw the line, I don’t want to say, because you have to learn it in practice.

The Economist: On your style of diplomacy: it depended on secrecy, and that seems hard today with social media.

Henry Kissinger: That is true. Yes, absolutely. I don’t think the president today could send an envoy with the powers that I had. I had the right to settle it on my trip [to China]. That couldn’t be done. But the substance could still be achieved. When Ukraine wants to move with some diplomatic flexibility in the current situation, they have to get out of the nato framework to a limited extent. I believe they recognize it.

The Economist: Are you sure that Ukraine will give up on nato [membership]?

Henry Kissinger: It would be ironic if I became the defender of it. But I think the situation has changed. If I talked to Putin, I would tell him that he, too, is safer with Ukraine in nato. This is not about my legacy as such. But the idea is, I have tried to implement [my view] from the perspective of having seen the challenges of societies in Europe.

The Economist: Yesterday was like recreating the last chapter of Diplomacy for the present day.

Henry Kissinger: [Immanuel Kant] said peace would either occur through human understanding or some disaster. He thought that it would occur through reason, but he could not guarantee it. That is more or less what I think. It is the duty of the leaders that now exist. It is an unprecedented challenge and great opportunity. We are at the beginning of the challenge but are not living up to it right now. But I’ve seen leaders in my lifetime, and it is possible even in the United States.

@The Economist Newspaper Limited, London, 17th May 2023

Inflation and rising demands on governments are changing economic policy

It amounts to an upending of the previous regime, says Henry Curr.

In 2013 julio rotemberg, an economist, proposed a theory of what drove once-in-a-generation shifts at the Federal Reserve: penitence. Something deplorable would happen in the economy, like the Depression in the 1930s or the great inflation of the 1970s. The central bank would be blamed. Then it would absorb the criticisms and change course. Monetary policymakers were, in effect, engaged in a decades-long process of trial and error. A moment of penitence has struck again today—and not just in America. Global inflation has surged to 9.8%, catching policymakers, economists and investors by surprise. Central banks, having spent most of 2021 insisting that inflation was a post-pandemic aberration that would dissipate in a few months, have abruptly changed tack. Fully 33 of 38 central banks monitored by the Bank for International Settlements, the central bankers’ central bank, have raised interest rates in 2022. The Fed has tightened monetary policy more sharply than at any time since the 1980s. Andrew Bailey, governor of the Bank of England, has spoken of “the largest challenge to the monetarypolicy regime of inflation targeting” in its history. Like medieval medics preparing for bloodletting, many central bankers talk sternly about the pain that will be necessary to get inflation down. It is not just central bankers. Governments are repenting too. But even as monetary policy is on course to switch from stimulus to restraint, governments have moved in the opposite direction.

During 2020 and 2021 they spent 10% of gdp supporting their economies and provided another 6%-worth of loans. Whereas after the global financial crisis of 2007-09 many quickly turned to trying to balance budgets in the belief that their debts risked becoming unsustainable, today they are continuing to borrow and spend, on everything from tax cuts to subsidising energy bills. This special report will argue that a great policy reversal is under way in the rich world. The tight-fiscal, loose-monetary policy mix that defined much of the 2010s is being upended into a loosefiscal, tight-monetary policy one. The likely result is a tug-of-war between hawkish central banks and spendthrift governments that will make inflation harder to fight. It will lead to a reckoning about just how much short-term pain societies are willing to bear in the name of long-term economic stability. But it could, ultimately, help economic policy into a beneficial reboot.

Back to the future

The last time the world fought an inflation breakout, in the 1980s, monetary and fiscal policy worked in tandem to wring excessive spending out of the system. Between 1978 and 1984 Britain, Germany and Japan all dramatically cut their budget deficits; France and Canada did so at a gentler pace. The big exception was America, where Ronald Reagan’s unfunded tax cuts hit the economic accelerator even as Paul Volcker’s Fed was slamming

Mike Haddad

on the brakes. But although Volcker usually gets the credit for taming inflation, it was not fully vanquished until monetary and fiscal policy worked in tandem there as well. America’s taxes rose, and budget deficits fell, in the second half of the 1980s, stopping inflation from rebounding as it had done after the recessions of the 1970s. A number of economists argue that the change in fiscal policy was crucial to bringing inflation under control. Yet similar fiscal retrenchment looks highly unlikely today. In Britain Liz Truss, the new prime minister, has cast aside the fiscal austerity that her Conservative predecessors espoused in the 2010s. Her government is borrowing more to fund tax cuts, lambasting Britain’s economic “orthodoxy” of the past two decades. The European Union is doling out its €807bn ($782bn) “Next Generation” fund designed to underpin solidarity in the bloc, a level of fiscal integration and largesse that was unimaginable before the pandemic. The Japanese and South Korean governments are rhetorically committed to reducing borrowing but their actions speak louder than their words: Japan has stepped back from a target to balance its budget by 2025, and South Korea says it plans soon to cut corporate and income taxes. America has passed the Inflation Reduction Act, a climatechange law that will also reduce government borrowing. But the disinflationary effect is marginal, and President Joe Biden’s proposed cancellation of student debt will cost roughly twice as much as the act will save. On budget projections from May, before that policy was announced, America’s budget deficit was already projected to average nearly 5% of gdp over the rest of the decade, enough to push the public-debt to gdp ratio to 105%. Governments are spending freely to help households with soaring energy bills, especially in Europe, which is adapting to life with much less Russian gas. Protecting low-earners in 2022 would cost less than 1% of gdp, according to the imf. But governments are going much further. Germany has nationalised Uniper, its biggest gas importer, and is spending €200 billion (5.2% of gdp) on an “economic defence shield” including subsidies that will reduce gas prices. France is capping energy prices and has nationalised edf, an energy giant. Though windfall taxes on energy firms will

pay for some of Europe’s spending, deficits will rise, too. Britain could borrow as much as 6.5% of gdp to cap energy prices. Germany is circumventing its usual limits on debt accumulation.

A long list

The pressure on governments to spend will not abate much. Ageing populations push up outlays on health care and pensions. Governments want to decarbonise their economies, which will take significant public front-loaded investment. After Russia’s war on Ukraine, nato members are reiterating previously unmet promises to meet their target of spending 2% of gdp on defence. In isolation, many of these pressures may be manageable. In combination, they will place budgets under huge pressure. In theory, big-spending governments plus rising interest rates are a recipe for persistently high inflation and/or a bond-market rout. Investors have given Britain a stark reminder of this danger, reacting to Ms Truss’s largesse by selling British assets, especially government bonds. Yet for countries with more stable economic polices, long-term borrowing remains cheap by historical standards, especially once the possibility of higher inflation is taken into account. One consequence of ageing populations is a global glut of savings chasing scarce investment opportunities. There remains plenty of appetite for government debt. It would be foolish to forgo necessary spending on preventing climate change or securing peace in Europe when the world is awash with capital. Yet both short-term and long-term challenges lie ahead. The immediate difficulty is that big spending by governments will make it harder (and perhaps impossible) for central banks to hit their 2% inflation targets. Governments are unlikely to stand idly by as central bankers inflict pain on their economies in the name of getting inflation down. They could instead unleash fiscal stimulus before the disinflationary task is complete. The danger is even greater when economies are already buffeted by supply-side shocks, notably the energy crisis. Without fixing the underlying shortages, it is not within the gift of governments to stop the economic pain they cause—they can only redistribute to protect the poor. If politicians try to protect everyone’s living standards, they will cause prices to rise further. The long-term challenge is to avoid fiscal crises. Ageing societies are a challenge spanning the whole of the 21st century. If governments do not control their spending on the old, eventually they will run up against fiscal limits, whatever their cost of borrowing. It would be a mistake to accumulate debts simply in order to put off hard choices, using up fiscal space that may be needed in future crises—not just climate change, but also unforeseen disasters such as pandemics. Yet reining in pension and health-care spending is easier said than done.

@The Economist Newspaper Limited, London, 5th October 2022

O mundo por maus caminhos

The world on the wrong path

Uma nova ordem geopolítica e económica está a ser escrita com a emergência da China como superpotência económica, militar e diplomática, ameaçando o estatuto dos EUA. Caminhamos para um mundo multipolar em que a busca pela autonomia estratégica está a alterar, para pior, as dinâmicas do comércio internacional. Nada será mais determinante para o destino do mundo nos próximos anos do que relação entre Pequim e Washington. A Europa arrisca-se a ser um mero espetador.

A new geopolitical and economic order is being written through the emergence of China as an economic, military and diplomatic superpower and threatening the status of the United States. We are heading towards a multipolar world in which the search for strategic autonomy is changing the dynamics of international trade for the worse. Nothing will be more determinant to the world’s destiny over forthcoming years than the relationship between Beijing and Washington. Europe risks being a mere bystander.

ANDRÉ VERÍSSIMO

Dependendo das estimativas, o PIB chinês deverá ultrapassar o dos EUA entre 2030 e 2037, embora o valor ‘per capita’ norte-americano continue a ser muito superior. Um marco que cimentará ainda mais o caráter da China como parceiro comercial indispensável. O que por sua vez reforça o seu peso diplomático.

A iniciativa “Uma Faixa, Uma Rota”, lançada há uma década, serve esse duplo propósito de reforçar as ligações comerciais e políticas – criando simultaneamente corredores para o trânsito de mercadorias alternativos ao estreito de Malaca – através do apoio ao financiamento de grandes projetos de investimento em infraestruturas, numa soma estimada em um bilião de dólares. A “nova Rota da Seda”, como também é chamada, abrange perto de três quartos da população mundial e mais de metade do PIB mundial. Os financiamentos acabam por tornar os países “reféns” de Pequim. O Partido Comunista Chinês tem sido acusado de praticar uma diplomacia de armadilha da dívida, com empréstimos contendo cláusulas leoninas. A crise económica dos últimos anos fez disparar o incumprimento. O Financial Times noticiava em abril que mais de 78 mil milhões de dólares foram renegociados ou dados como perdidos nos últimos três anos. Este tem sido o principal caminho usado pela China para aumentar a sua influência na Ásia Ocidental e Central, no Pacífico, na América do Sul ou em África, muitas vezes a troco de licenças para ter acesso a recursos naturais de que não dispõe ou tem em quantidade escassa. Pequim aproveitou, em vários casos, o vazio deixado pela Europa, os EUA e até a Rússia. Depois da invasão da Ucrânia, o país de Putin será, cada vez mais, um satélite económico e político da China. A vertente militar tem vindo também a ser reforçada. Xi Jinping assegurou a sua entronização no poder ao ser reeleito para um terceiro mandato como líder do Partido Comunista Chinês em outubro passado. Já este ano, foi confirmado como Presidente na vigésima Assembleia Nacional. O discurso inaugural, de mais de hora e meia, conteve 73 referências ao termo “segurança”, contra 55 vezes em 2017, sinal de que o tema vem subindo de importância na agenda.

Xi deixou a promessa de “acelerar o processo de elevação das forças armadas populares a padrões de classe mundial” nos próximos cinco anos. Só em 2022, a China aumentou os gastos militares em 7%, um acréscimo equivalente a 16 mil milhões de dólares, o maior aumento nominal de sempre.

Depending on the estimates, Chinese GDP is forecast to overtake the United States between 2030 and 2037 even while the America’s ‘per capita’ output continues to be far superior. A landmark that shall further cement the character of China as an unavoidable trade partner. Which in turn strengthens its diplomatic weighting. The “One Belt, One Road” project, launched a decade ago, serves this dual purpose of strengthening the commercial and political ties –simultaneously establishing alternative corridors for the transit of goods other than through the Straits of Malacca – through financial support for major infrastructure investment projects with a total amount estimated to be one trillion dollars. The “new Silk Route”, as it is also called, spans around threequarters of the world’s population and over half of its GDP. Such financing turns recipient countries into “hostages” of Beijing. The Chinese Communist Party has been accused of engaging in debt-trap diplomacy, with the loans containing blatantly one-sided clauses. The economic crisis of recent years has driven a spike in non-compliance. The Financial Times reported in April that over 78 billion dollars of such loans had been renegotiated or written-off over the last three years. This has been the key approach deployed by China to raise its influence across Western and Central Asia, in the Pacific, in South America and Africa, very often in exchange for licences to access the natural resources that the country either lacks or produces only in small quantities. In various cases, Beijing effectively filled the gap left by Europe, the United States and even Russia. Following the invasion of Ukraine, Putin’s country is likely to be increasingly left behind as an economic and political satellite of China. The military dimension has also come in for major reinforcement. Xi Jinping ensured the continuity of his rule following his re-election by the Chinese Communist Party for a third mandate last October. Already this year, he was confirmed as President at the Twentieth National Assembly. His inaugural speech, lasting over an hour and a half, contained 73 references to the term “security”, against 55 occasions in 2017, reflecting its rise in importance on the state agenda. Xi made a promise to “accelerate the process of raising the popular armed forces to world class standards” in the next five years. In 2022 alone, China raised its military expenditure by 7%, an increase equivalent, however, to 16 billion dollars and the largest nominal rise ever. The forecast is for an identical increase this year.

Para este ano está previsto um incremento idêntico. A China, culturalmente orientada ao longo prazo, há muito que vem lançando pacientemente as bases para uma supremacia futura na economia, na política ou até militar.

Ambição que choca de frente com o detentor atual desse estatuto: os EUA. Só que enquanto a China é um sistema autocrático com um líder sem prazo para sair, os EUA são um país profundamente dividido politicamente.

“A República Popular da China é o único competidor com a intenção de redesenhar a ordem internacional e, de forma crescente, com o poder económico, diplomático, militar e tecnológico para o fazer. Pequim tem a ambição de criar uma esfera de influência no Indo-Pacífico e tornar-se a potência líder mundial”. O parágrafo consta do mais recente documento de Estratégia de Segurança Nacional dos EUA, datado de outubro de 2022.

A face mais visível do confronto diplomático continuará a ser uma ilha com cerca de um terço do território de Portugal. Xi não desiste do princípio de “uma só China” e quer a reunificação com Taiwan. Joe Biden tem insistido que as tropas americanas ajudariam a defender a ilha em caso de invasão. Se há algo que não deverá mudar caso mude o inquilino da Casa Branca nas presidências de 2024 é a posição sobre a China, tendo em conta a visão semelhante de Democratas e Republicanos.

China, culturally oriented towards the long term, has long been patiently building its bases for future economic, political and even military supremacy. Such ambition inevitably collides with the current holder of this statute: the United States. Indeed, at at time when, while China maintains an autocratic system with a leader who shows no signed of ever leaving, the United States is a politically profoundly divided country. “The People’s Republic of China is the only competitor with the intention of redesigning the international order, in a growing fashion, with the economic, diplomatic, military and technological power to achieve this. Beijing holds the ambition of establishing an Indo-Pacific sphere of influence and become a potential world leader”. The paragraph comes from the most recent United States National Security Strategy report dated October 2022. The most visible face in this diplomatic confrontation shall be an island containing around a third of the territory of Portugal. Xi is not giving up on his principle of “only one China” and wants reunification with Taiwan. Joe Biden has insisted that American troops would help defend the island in the event of any invasion. Whoever ends up residing in the White House after the presidential election of 2024, the position on China is unlikely to change given the similarities between the Democrats and Republicans on this issue.

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Um mundo multipolar

Os EUA ainda levam vantagem. O domínio internacional do dólar, que a China também quer contrariar, é disso a expressão máxima. O modelo liberal americano poderá, além disso, proporcionar maior sucesso económico do que o crescente dirigismo central imposto pelo Partido Comunista Chinês. Ainda assim, é indiscutível que vivemos já num mundo multipolar, com a influência de Pequim a predominar sobre uma vasta parte do globo, impondo-se até como mediador para a resolução de conflitos e tensões diplomáticas, como aconteceu já este ano entre a Arábia Saudita e o Irão. Essa tendência irá crescer. Os próximos anos vão trazer também a afirmação de novos atores, musculados pela sua afirmação económica. Os países emergentes, em particular na Ásia, vão assumir um peso crescente no PIB mundial. O FMI prevê que a Índia, que este ano superou a população da China, reforce o terceiro lugar no ‘ranking’ das maiores economias, em paridade de poder de compra, aproximando-se dos EUA. A Indonésia deverá saltar para a sexta posição. As novas potencias regionais, essencialmente não alinhadas, deverão procurar manter uma autonomia estratégica, pautando o seu posicionamento internacional por um pragmatismo que lhes permita obter a satisfação dos seus

A multipolar world

The United States still holds advantages. The international domination of the dollar, which China also strives to counter, is the leading example. Furthermore, the liberal American model may generate greater economic success than the increasingly centralised approach imposed by the Chinese Communist Party. Furthermore, it is undeniable that we already live in a multipolar world, with the influence of Beijing prevailing over a vast section of the globe, imposing itself as a mediator for the resolution of diplomatic conflicts and tensions, as has already happened this year between Saudi Arabia and Iran. This trend is only set to grow.

Forthcoming years also provide for the emergence of other new actors, strengthened by their economic growth. The emerging economies, particularly in Asia, are going to assume a growing weight in world GDP. The IMF foresees that India, which this year overtook China in terms of population, strengthens its third place in the ranking of the largest economies on the planet, with its national purchasing power verging on that of the United States. Indonesia is forecast to leap into sixth position The new regional powers, essentially non-aligned, will seek to maintain their strategic autonomy, reflecting in an international positioning characterised by the pragmatism that enables them to satisfy their own interests

interesses sem entrar numa posição de dependência. Já a Europa perderá peso relativo. A Alemanha, que em 1992 era a terceira maior economia, deverá manter a atual quinta posição, enquanto França e Alemanha descem para as últimas duas posições do “top 10”. O poder de compra dos 447 milhões de consumidores da União Europeia (UE) e a capacidade industrial do bloco continuarão a garantir um papel relevante. Os 27 estão também na liderança da transição energética, cuja importância vai crescer nos próximos anos. Dará o processo de alargamento novos passos? Depois da grande vaga de 2004 para leste, os passos têm sido mais tímidos. A Croácia foi a última a entrar, em 2013. Há mais oito candidatos – Montenegro, Sérvia, Turquia, Macedónia do Norte, Albânia, Ucrânia, Moldávia e Bósnia-Herzegovina – e a Geórgia também já apresentou o pedido de adesão. O que prova que os valores, o modelo social e o modelo económico da UE continuam a ser um farol de desenvolvimento, mesmo a ameaça russa sendo, em alguns casos, também uma motivação.

Em busca da autonomia estratégica

A autonomia estratégica é, no entanto, um luxo a que a Europa não se pode dar. A invasão da Ucrânia expôs a dependência face aos Estados Unidos, que já hoje impede a EU de ter uma posição clara em relação à China. Se por um lado não quer fragilizar as relações comerciais com um dos seus principais parceiros, por outro não pode hostilizar o apoio norte-americano. Como alertou

without entering into a position of dependency.

In turn, Europe is losing its relative weighting. Germany, which was the world’s third largest economy in 1992, is forecast to hold onto its current fifth position while France and the UK drop down to the last two positions in the top 10. The purchasing power of the 447 million consumers in the European Union (EU) and the bloc’s industrial capacities shall continue to guarantee a relevant role. The 27 are also leading the way in the energy transition expected to be increasingly important over forthcoming years. Will there be further enlargement? After the great wave eastwards in 2004, countries have arrived at a slower pace. Croatia was the last new member state to join, in 2013. There are a further eight candidates – Montenegro, Serbia, Turkey, North Macedonia, Albania, Ukraine, Moldova and Bosnia-Herzegovina – and Georgia have already submitted accession requests. This does prove that the values, the social and economic models of the EU remain a beacon of development even while the Russian threat is, in some cases, also a motivation.

In search of strategic autonomy

Strategic autonomy is nevertheless a luxury that Europe cannot afford. The invasion of Ukraine exposed the continent’s dependence on the United States, which today blocks the EU from taking a clear stance in relation to China. If, on the one hand, there is no desire to weaken commercial relationships with one of its main partners, on the other hand, there is

recentemente o presidente francês, Emmanuel Macron, após um encontro com Xi Jinping, “o grande risco” da Europa é “ser apanhada em crises que não são nossas”. Como a tensão entre Pequim e Washington por causa de Taiwan. A capacidade militar da UE terá de ser reforçada nos próximos anos. A Alemanha deu já esse impulso com a criação de um fundo de 100 mil milhões para modernizar as forças armadas e ao anunciar que o orçamento da defesa subirá para 2% do PIB, o que por si só dará às ‘Bundeswehr’ um dos maiores envelopes financeiros do mundo. Outros países de leste responderam na mesma moeda à ameaça do Kremlin. Haverá sempre um óbice: o poder nuclear russo. A Defesa terá, além disso, que concorrer com as despesas públicas crescentes provocadas pela dinâmica desfavorável da demografia no Velho Continente.

A UE aprendeu da pior forma que tem de assegurar a autonomia noutros domínios, como a energia, a alimentação ou os materiais necessários para a transição energética.

A quota de mercado da China na produção de painéis solares e dos seus componentes ultrapassa os 80%.

Se um mercado único de 27 Estados-membros é uma força, o tempo que leva a construir consensos é uma fraqueza. O crescimento do populismo e do nacionalismo (quase sempre de mãos dadas) dentro da Europa significa ter de lidar não só com a polarização externa como também com a interna. Uma crise existencial parece, no entanto, afastada. Até o presidente húngaro, Viktor Orbán, ou a primeira-ministra italiana, Giogia Meloni, reconhecem as vantagens da pertença à UE.

A corrida à autonomia (ou mesmo à autossuficiência) é visível em algo tão ínfimo e fundamental no mundo atual como os semicondutores, de que Taiwan é, de longe, o maior produtor mundial. China, EUA e Europa estão a mobilizar somas colossais para desenvolver a sua própria capacidade industrial. Washington está, além disso, a impor sanções para travar o acesso chinês aos ‘chips’ mais avançados. Incluindo os feitos na pequena ilha no mar do Sul da China.

Distribuir os benefícios da Inteligência Artificial

A outra face deste processo é o crescente protecionismo, que a prazo significará menos crescimento para todos. Ao desvirtuar a concorrência, impede que os mercados funcionem de forma eficiente, criando custos que acabam por ser pagos por toda a economia. O incentivo à inovação degrada-se, porque deixa de ser tão decisiva como fator de diferenciação. Primeiro a pandemia, depois a guerra na Ucrânia e agora a crescente fratura geopolítica entre os EUA e a China estão também a redesenhar a globalização, com a diversificação e segurança das cadeias de abastecimento a saltarem para o topo das preocupações de Governos e empresas. Mais uma vez, com consequências perniciosas para a eficiência e o crescimento da economia global. Será isso assim tão relevante tendo em conta que nos próximos anos poderemos assistir a um choque de produtividade induzido pela inteligência artificial? Os grandes modelos de linguagem natural como o ChatGPT

no scope for alienating American support. As the French President, Emmanuel Macron, recently warned after meeting Xi Jinping, “the great risk” for Europe is “getting caught up in crises that are not our own”. For example, the tension between Beijing and Washington because of Taiwan. The EU military capacity will require strengthening over forthcoming years. Germany has already set out down this path with the launch of a 100 billion fund for modernising its armed forces coupled with announcing the defence budget is to rise to 2% of GDP, which will thereby endow the Bundeswehr with one of the largest budgets in the world. Other Eastern European countries have similarly responded to the threat posed by the Kremlin. There will always be a major impediment: Russian nuclear power. Furthermore, defence budgets will also have to compete with the rising public expenditure costs caused by the unfavourable demographic dynamics prevailing on the Old Continent. The EU learned the hard way that it needs to ensure its autonomy in other domains, such as energy, foodstuffs and the materials necessary for the energy transition. For example, China holds an 80% market share in solar panels and their respective components. While a single market spanning the 27 member states is a strength, the time it takes to build consensus is a weakness. The growth in populism and nationalism (almost always hand in hand) within Europe means having to deal not only with the external polarisation but also internal divides. Any existential crisis would, however, seem to have been dispelled. Even the Hungarian President, Viktor Orbán, or the Italian Prime Minister, Giogia Meloni, recognise the advantages of belonging to the EU. The race for autonomy (or even self-sufficiency) is visible in something as small and as fundamental to the contemporary world as semiconductors with Taiwan being by far the world’s largest producer. China, the United States and Europe are deploying colossal amounts of money to develop their own industrial capacity. Washington is, furthermore, placing sanctions to block access to the most advanced chips and including those made on the small island in the South China Sea.

Distributing the benefits of Artificial Intelligence

The other facet to this process is the rising level of protectionism which, over time, shall mean less growth for everybody. In undermining the competition, this prevents the markets from functioning efficiently, creating costs that end up being paid throughout the economy. The incentives for innovation deteriorate in keeping with how being a factor of differentiation declines in decisive importance. Firstly, the pandemic, then the war in Ukraine and now the growing geopolitical fracture between the United States and China are also redesigning globalisation with the diversification and security of supply chains now top of the list of concerns for both governments and companies. Once again, with pernicious consequences for global economic efficiency and growth. Will this all be so relevant when taking into account how forthcoming years may witness a productivity shock induced by the advent of artificial intelligence? The major natural language

ameaçam postos de trabalho, mas também vão tornar mais produtivos os que se mantêm, melhorando processos de negócio e a natureza do trabalho, como salienta o artigo “Machines of mind: The case for na AI-powered productivity boom”, publicado na Brookings Institution. O último salto de produtividade nos EUA aconteceu entre 1995 e 2005, com o investimento massivo nas tecnologias de informação. Desde então o ritmo de crescimento baixou para cerca de metade. O Goldman Sachs estima que o desenvolvimento da inteligência artificial (IA) generativa permitirá automatizar um quarto de todos os empregos nos EUA, percentagem que sobe para 46% no caso das tarefas de apoio administrativo. O que significa que para a maioria o impacto será o aumento da produtividade e novos tipos de emprego serão criados (60% dos atuais não existiam em 1940). O banco de investimento prevê que a IA possa acrescentar 7% ao PIB mundial ou quase 7 biliões de dólares no espaço de dez anos. Se formos capazes de aprender com os erros, evitando que o progresso tecnológico deixe um rasto de desfavorecidos e melhorando a redistribuição dos benefícios, talvez esta nova abundância ajude a amenizar a guerra cultural e política que cresce no interior de tantos países. A maior serenidade interna ajudaria certamente à externa.

Coexistência competitiva

Por ora, não é isso que se vislumbra no horizonte. Na última década, o mundo tem feito o caminho indesejável do crescimento do nacionalismo, do autoritarismo, do protecionismo, da conflitualidade económica e geopolítica. “Arriscamos o que chamei de ‘Grande Fratura’ – a dissociação das duas maiores economias do mundo. Uma falha tectónica que criaria dois conjuntos diferentes de regras comerciais, duas moedas dominantes, duas ‘internets’ e duas estratégias conflituantes na inteligência artificial”, alertou o secretário-geral das Nações Unidas no Fórum Económico de Davos, em janeiro. As relações comerciais entre os dois países podem funcionar como uma atenuante: a China é a principal origem das importações dos EUA (18% do total) e o terceiro maior destino das exportações (8,6%). Ainda assim, o melhor que o mundo pode esperar é a coexistência competitiva entre os EUA e a China, com o globo dividido uma duas zonas de influência numa espécie de Tratado de Tordesilhas. O clima de Guerra Fria deverá continuar a gelar as relações, espera-se que sem que se acenda um conflito explosivo de consequências desastrosas. Um clima geopolítico pouco ou nada propício ao multilateralismo que será necessário para fazer face a uma ameaça de consequências potencialmente mais drásticas, hoje já observáveis, que são as alterações climáticas. O caminho certo seria o regresso ao diálogo ao mais alto nível. Partir do que cada um considera serem os seus interesses legítimos e chegar a um compromisso. Evitar que erros ou precipitações de julgamento deitem tudo a perder. Como avisa o provérbio chinês: “Um momento de paciência pode evitar um grande desastre. Um momento de impaciência pode arruinar uma vida inteira”.

models, such as ChatGPT, threaten jobs while also making those who remain far more productive, improving business processes and the nature of employment, as highlighted by the article “Machines of mind: The case for an AI-powered productivity boom”, published by the Brookings Institution. The last leap in American productivity took place between 1995 and 2005, with massive investment in information technologies. Since then, the pace of growth has dropped to around a half. Goldman Sachs estimates that the development of generative artificial intelligence (AI) shall enable the automation of around a quarter of all jobs in the United States, a percentage that rises to 46% in the case of administrative support positions. What this means is that, for the majority, there will be an increase in productivity alongside the emergence of new types of job (60% of current positions did not exist in 1940). The investment bank predicts that AI will boost the global GDP by 7%, or almost 7 trillion dollars in the space of ten years. If we are able to learn from our errors and avoid technological progress leaving a trail of unfavourable outcomes and improving and redistributing the benefits, perhaps this new abundance will help in calming the culture and political wars that are arising within so many countries. Greater internal serenity would certainly foster external calm.

Competitive coexistence

For the meantime, this is not what is looming over the horizon. In the last decade, the world has headed along an undesirable path of nationalism, authoritarianism, protectionism and economic and geopolitical conflicts.

“We risk what I have called the ‘Great Fracture’ – the breakup of the two largest economies in the world. A tectonic failing that shall lead to two different sets of commercial rules, two dominant currencies, two ‘Internets’ and two conflicting strategies for artificial intelligence”, warned the Secretary-General of the United Nations at the Davos Economic Forum in January. Commercial relations between the two countries may function as a mitigator: China is the main source of US imports (18% of the total) and the third largest destination for its exports (8.6%). Furthermore, the best that the world might expect is competitive coexistence between the United States and China, with the global divide into zones of influence representing a type of Treaty of Tordesillas. This Cold War style climate shall continue to chill relations and it has to be hoped without triggering an explosive conflict with disastrous consequences. A geopolitical climate that does little or nothing to nurture the multilateralism that is needed to cope with the threat of consequences potentially more drastic, and already observable today, which derive from climate change. The right path will be a return to dialogue at the highest level. Based on what each might consider to be in their own best legitimate interests and reach compromises. This would avoid the errors or rushed judgements that might cause everything to be lost. As the Chinese proverb warns: “One moment of patience may avoid a great disaster. One moment of impatience may ruin an entire life”.

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Um país na flor da idade

A young but swiftly maturing country

Nos últimos 20 anos Angola sofreu inúmeras transformações, desde a mais simples até à mais complexa. Realizou quatro eleições legislativas, participou pela primeira vez numa fase final de um campeonato do mundo, realizou o CAN e colocou um satélite em órbita.

Over the last two decades, Angola has undergone countless transformations, from the simplest through to the most complex. There have been four legislative election cycles, participation for the first time in the final phase of a world championship, hosted CAN - the African Football Championship and put a satellite up into orbit.

história de Angola dos últimos 20 anos começou a ser escrita em 2002, com a assinatura do acordo de paz, a 4 de Abril daquele ano. O país estava mergulhado num conflito armado que durou 27 anos. A actividade económica era maioritariamente de subsistência, assente, sobretudo, no comércio informal. O conflito armado fez surgir na capital angolana, Luanda, o maior mercado a céu aberto, que ficou conhecido como Roque Santeiro, onde se podia comprar quase tudo. As políticas públicas eram quase inexistentes. Há 20 anos, o principal produto de exportação de Angola era, e até hoje continua a ser, o petróleo. Estradas, pontes, escolas e hospitais eram quase inexistentes, e as que existiam encontravam-se em condições precárias. As poucas infra-estruturas começaram a ser construídas justamente no ano em que foi fundada a Cunha Vaz & Associados (CV&A), isto é, no ano de 2003. Seis anos após a assinatura do acordo de paz, Angola realizou as primeiras eleições, das quais o MPLA saiu vencedor, com 81,64% dos votos. Participaram nessas eleições 14 partidos reconhecidos pelo Tribunal Constitucional. Em linhas gerais, no capítulo político, o Programa de Governo 2009-2012 visava a continuidade da consolidação da paz. No sector social, o Governo, então liderado por José Eduardo dos Santos, prometeu melhorar as condições de vida da população com a construção e reconstrução de infra-estruturas cruciais para a mobilidade de pessoas e bens e a dinamização da actividade económica.

Após vencer as eleições de 2008, o Governo continuou com os trabalhos de construção de estradas, pontes e barragens que tinham sido destruídas parcial ou totalmente durante a guerra. Destas infra-estruturas resultaram a Marginal de Luanda, que

he history of Angola over the last two decades started out in 2002 with the signing of the peace agreement on 4 April. The country had been afflicted by armed conflict throughout the previous 27 years. Economic activities were mostly subsistence based, above all relying on the informal economy. The armed conflict turned the Angolan capital, Luanda, into a huge open-air market that became known as Roque Santeiro, where it was nevertheless possible to purchase pretty much anything. Public policies were almost non-existent.

Two decades ago, the country’s main export product was, as it still is today, oil. Highways, bridges, schools and hospitals were either absent or existing only extremely precariously. Infrastructures gradually began to get built as from the year Cunha Vaz & Associados (CV&A) was founded, thus, in 2003.

Six years on from signing the peace agreement, Angola held its first elections with the MPLA emerging as the clear winner on 81.64% of the votes. A total of 14 parties participated in this election following their respective recognition by the Constitutional Court. In general terms, on the political front, the 2009-2012 Government Program sought to endow continuity to the consolidation of peace. In the social sector, the government, then led by José Eduardo dos Santos, promised to improve the living conditions of the population by the construction and reconstruction of infrastructures essential to the mobility of people and goods and thus boosting economic activities. After winning the elections in 2008, the government advanced further with its building program, repairing the roads, bridges and dams that had been totally or partially destroyed during the war. Among these was the

Mercado Roque Santeiro

se tornou no cartão-postal do país, e a Fortaleza de São Miguel, que foi transformada em Museu Militar aberto ao público. O país passou a viver um processo de desenvolvimento em que era visível a consolidação da estabilidade macro económica, com reflexos positivos na estabilidade cambial, a reabilitação e modernização das principais infra-estruturas produtivas e sociais e o início de uma trajectória de crescimento vigoroso da economia, condição ‘sine qua non’ para a diminuição da fome e da pobreza e da promoção da estabilidade social. Naquela altura, o preço do principal produto de exportação de Angola (petróleo) estava em alta. A inflação passou a seguir uma trajectória nitidamente decrescente, fundamentalmente a partir de 2003. Caiu de uma taxa anual de 105,6% em 2002 para 11,38% em 2011. Angola passou a experimentar taxas de crescimento de dois dígitos, situando se entre as economias mais dinâmicas do mundo naquele ano. Os dados do Governo indicam que o crescimento económico que o país conheceu naquele período, associado às políticas sociais que foram implementadas, levaram a que os níveis de incidência da pobreza em Angola tivessem experimentado uma queda drástica, tendo passado de 68% em 2002 para 36,6% em 2009.

Potência africana

Em 2006, o país ficou conhecido mundialmente quando participou da fase final do Campeonato do Mundo de Futebol. Embora a Selecção angolana tenha sido eliminada logo na primeira fase, depois do campeonato o país começou a atrair mais turistas e mais investimento estrangeiro. Quatro anos depois, em 2010, o país acolheu o Campeonato Africano de

Luanda Marginal, a coastal road that is the capital’s picture postcard highlight, and the São Miguel Fortress, which was converted into a Military Museum and opened to the public. The country went through a phase of development with visible consolidation in terms of macroeconomic stability, with positive reflections on the exchange rate and the rehabilitation and modernisation of the main productive and social infrastructures and embarking on a trajectory of robust economic growth, an essential condition to reducing hunger and poverty and fostering social stability. This was also a period when Angola’s main export (oil) was registering high prices. Inflation also embarked on a clearly downwards trend, especially as from 2003. The annual rate fell from 105.6% in 2002 to 11.38% in 2011.

Angola entered into a phase of double digit growth and was positioned as one of the most dynamic markets worldwide in the latter year.

Government figures report that the economic growth that the country registered in this period, in conjunction with the social policies put into practice, produced sharp declines in the incidence of poverty in Angola, plunging from 68% of the population in 2002 to 36.6% in 2009.

African potential

In 2006, the country boosted its global profile by reaching the finals of the FIFA World Cup. Although the team got knocked out in the group phase, the country began to attract more tourists and foreign direct investment. Four years later, in 2010, the country welcomed the African Football Championships. Thirty-two of the 54 countries making up

Petróleo, a riqueza do país

Futebol. Trinta e duas nações das 54 que formam o continente africano estiveram reunidas em Angola, um evento que contou com a CV&A na sua organização, que, entretanto, também tinha aberto o seu escritório em Luanda um ano antes. Mas se no futebol o país sempre teve uma tímida prestação, já no basquetebol a história é bem diferente. A Seleccção angolana masculina tornou-se invencível, tendo conquistado 12 vezes consecutivas o campeonato africano. No Andebol igualmente. As atletas da Selecção feminina ganharam até a alcunha de “pérolas angolanas” devido à sua invencibilidade. Mas não era só no desporto que o país dava que falar. Angola tornou-se na terceira maior economia do continente, assumindo-se como uma potência africana. Grandes empresas como a Omatapalo e a MCA passaram a investir no mercado angolano. A Omatapalo, por exemplo, foi a empresa que construiu em tempo recorde a Arena do Kilamba, que recebeu o Mundial de Hóquei em Patins, em 2013. A Cultura e o Turismo foram duas vertentes do país que também viram progressos nos últimos 20 anos, tendo andado de mãos dadas para atrair visitantes. Aliás, Angola conquistou um carimbo que é, precisamente, um dos maiores factores de atracção de turistas: na província do Zaire, a sua capital, Mbanza Congo, antiga capital do Reino do Congo, foi classificada como Património Cultural da Humanidade pela UNESCO. O país realizou também um concurso para eleger as suas belezas naturais, que ficaram conhecidas como “As 7 Maravilhas de Angola”. E acolheu ainda o Fórum Mundial do Turismo. Angola passou a assumir-se como um país aberto ao mundo. Este foi também um período em que artistas angolanos, desde a música às artes plásticas, ganharam notoriedade internacional. O estilo musical Kuduro, cantado e dançado por jovens da periferia de Luanda, passou a ser dançado também além-fronteiras, e a

the African continent qualified for Angola, an event that counted on CV&A for its organisation after the latter had moved to open an office in Luanda in the preceding year. However, while the country’s results in football have always been modest, the history of basketball is rather different. The Angola male national team has been unstoppable and picking up 12 consecutive African championships. It is a similar story in handball where the female national team earned the nickname “Angolan pearls” due to their relentless winning. However, it was not only in sport that got the country into the spotlight. Angola became the third largest economy on the continent, taking a role as an African powerhouse. Major companies such as Omatapalo and MCA began investing in the Angolan market. For example, Omatapalo was responsible for building the Kilamba Arena in record time to host the World Roller Hockey Championship in 2013. Culture and Tourism represent another two facets that have interlinked to attract visitors over these last 20 years. Indeed, Angola picked up the stamp of what has become one of the major factors of tourism attraction: in the capital of Zaire Province, Mbanza Congo, the former centre of the Kingdom of Congo, was classified as UNESCO World Cultural Heritage. The country also staged a competition to select its own natural beauties, which became known as “The 7 Wonders of Angola”. And, alongside the hosting of the World Tourism Forum, Angola began perceiving itself as a country open to the world. This was also a period in which Angolan artists, ranging from music to the fine arts, strode onto international stages. The musical style of Kuduro, sung and danced by the youth in the peripheries of Luanda, became a fashion that went global and with more romantic music winning fans in other markets with Anselmo Ralph singing “Então agora não me

Fortaleza S. Miguel

música romântica ganhava fãs fora de portas, com Anselmo Ralph a cantar “Então agora não me toca…”. Era a ginga do Kizomba a conquistar novos públicos. O país parecia estar num bom rumo.

Transição política

Angola foi governada pelo mesmo homem durante 40 anos, que ganhou a alcunha de “Arquitecto da Paz”. José Eduardo dos Santos (JES) assumiu os destinos do país quatro anos depois de se tornar independente, em 1979, e deixou o poder em Agosto de 2017. Nos últimos cincos anos da sua governação, a situação do país deteriorou-se. José Eduardo dos Santos era contestado, mas antes disso foi o impulsionador da aposta aeroespacial. Em 2017, ainda com o JES no comando, Angola lançou o seu primeiro satélite em órbita, mas oito dias depois deixou de comunicar. Esse incidente aumentou ainda mais a onda de contestações, que já se registavam desde 2015. A economia tinha parado de crescer, tornou-se hiperinflacionária, as pessoas perderam poder de compra e, como consequência, as condições de vida da população degradaram-se e os jovens, desempregados e sem esperança no futuro, exigiam a mudança de Governo. A onda de contestações contribuiu, em grande medida, para que houvesse, finalmente, a mudança de presidente. Assim, a 23 de Agosto de 2017, João Lourenço, cabeça de lista do MPLA, ganhou as eleições e foi empossado como Presidente de Angola, tornando-se o terceiro presidente na história do país, o segundo eleito pelo voto democrático. O novo presidente de Angola encontrou o país numa situação complexa. Aliás, o período de 2012 até 2017 foi bastante desafiante, na medida em que a situação económica colocou muitos cidadãos em condições precárias. No seu discurso sobre o Estado da Nação, poucos meses depois de ser eleito, o Presidente João Lourenço reconheceu que o país se encontrava numa situação económica e financeira difícil resultante da queda dos preços do petróleo no mercado internacional e da consequente diminuição da liquidez em moeda externa, uma situação que já durava desde finais de 2014.

Medidas correctivas

É senso comum que as dificuldades económicas se repercutem em todas as esferas sociais, provocando dificuldades de acesso à educação, à saúde, ao saneamento básico e ao emprego. Diante das dificuldades económicas que o país enfrentava, o Governo adoptou medidas correctivas desde 2018, com a implementação do Programa de Estabilização Macroeconómica. Na sequência deste programa, iniciado logo em Janeiro, nesse mesmo ano, e pela primeira vez em três anos, o país registou um saldo orçamental. Foram eliminados os atrasados cambiais vindos de 2015 a 2017 e que se encontravam na posse dos bancos comerciais e pôs-se fim às listas de empresas e agentes com acesso privilegiado ao mercado cambial, na base de critérios subjectivos. A diferença entre o mercado informal e o paralelo de divisas, que em Dezembro de 2017 atingia 150%, foi reduzida para cerca de 35%. Esse processo permitiu devolver ao circuito formal da economia as transacções realizadas com o mercado externo. A Lei de Bases das Instituições Financeiras, do Combate ao Branqueamento de Capitais e do Financiamento ao Terrorismo,

toca…”. Then there was the spice of Kizomba to win over new publics and the country seemed set on the right track.

Political transition

Angola had been governed by the same man throughout 40 years, picking up the title of “Architect of Peace”. José Eduardo dos Santos (JES) took over the country’s destiny four years after it became independent in 1979 and left power in August 2017. In the last five years of his rule, the national situation deteriorated. José Eduardo dos Santos faced protests even while driving ahead with an aerospace program. In 2017, with JES still at the helm, Angola launched its first satellite into orbit but which stopped functioning eight days later. This incident served to feed the wave of protests that had already been ongoing since 2015. The economy had stopped growing, with hyperinflation prevailing, people lost their purchasing power and, correspondingly, the standards of living among the population plummeted with young persons, unemployed and without hope for the future, protesting to demand a change in government. To a large extent, this wave of protests finally led to a change in president. Thus, on 23 August 2017, João Lourenço, leader of the MPLA, won the elections and was sworn in as President of Angola, becoming the third president in the national history of Angola and the second to be democratically elected. The new president faced a country in a complex situation. Indeed, while the period between 2012 and 2017 was fairly challenging to the extent that the economic situation placed many citizens in precarious conditions. In his State of the Nation speech, a couple of months after the election, President João Lourenço recognised that the country was in a difficult economic and financial position following the collapse in the international oil price and the consequent lack of foreign exchange liquidity, a situation already existing since late 2014.

Corrective measures

Clearly, economic hardship bears repercussions throughout every social sphere, triggering difficulties in accessing education, health, basic sanitation and employment. Faced by the scale of national economic difficulties, in 2018, the government advanced with corrective measures through the implementation of the Macroeconomic Stability Program. In the wake of this program, beginning in January of this same year, and for the first time in three years, the country registered a positive budgetary balance. The exchange rate delays stretching from 2015 to 2017 disappeared and with financing in the hands of commercial banks bringing to an end the lists of companies and actors with privileged access to foreign exchange in keeping with subjective criteria. The difference between the informal and parallel exchange rate, which hit 150% in December 2017, fell back to around 35%. This process enabled the return of the formal economic circuit for transactions made with external markets. The Foundation Law for Financial Institutions, Combat of Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism, the Payment System of Angola and the Law establishing the BNA – the Bank of Angola were all subject to review. In the case of

do Sistema de Pagamentos de Angola e a Lei do Banco Nacional de Angola (BNA) foram revistas. No caso do BNA, ganhou independência do poder político permitindo, assim, desempenhar o seu real papel de garante da estabilidade do sector financeiro. Com vista ao relançamento económico e ao aumento do número de empregos, o Governo centrou a sua acção governativa na revitalização da base produtiva do país. O Estado apostou no apoio aos empresários, com vista a tornarem-se mais competitivos e fortes. Criou o Programa de Apoio à Produção, Diversificação das Exportações e Substituição das Importações (PRODESI) e elencou 54 produtos para que a produção nacional dos mesmos alcançasse níveis de auto-suficiência em relação ao consumo interno, diminuindo ou eliminando a sua importação. Ao mesmo tempo, implementou o Programa de Apoio ao Crédito (PAC), associado ao PRODESI, tendo sido assinados com oito bancos comerciais, com o Banco de Desenvolvimento de Angola e com o Fundo de Garantia de Crédito, memorandos para a operacionalização de uma linha de crédito com juros bonificados no montante de 141 mil milhões de kwanzas (cerca de 250 milhões de euros) para o ano de 2019. No mesmo sentido, o BNA publicou um normativo que estabeleceu a obrigatoriedade de os bancos comerciais aplicarem pelo menos 2% do seu activo à concessão de crédito à economia real, para a produção de parte dos produtos seleccionados pelo PRODESI que apresentam déficit na oferta interna, bem como de produtos para apoiar as exportações fora do sector petrolífero, como as rochas ornamentais, o café, a madeira, o peixe e marisco, os frutos tropicais, entre outros. O Governo fez também alterações profundas na pauta aduaneira de modo a estabelecer o necessário alinhamento entre a importação dos produtos da cesta básica e de outros produtos prioritários e a produção nacional destes mesmos produtos, convertendo-a num instrumento para apoiar o aumento da produção nacional. Também em 2017, o Governo deu início - e em 2018 concluiu - à

the BNA, the institution gained political independence and thus became able to perform its role in effectively guaranteeing the stability of the financial sector. Within the scope of efforts to relaunch the economy and boost the level of employment, the government focused its policies on revitalising the productive bases of the company. The state thus invested in supporting the private sector, to improve the competitiveness and capacities of companies. This led to the launching of PRODESI - the Support Program for the Production, Diversification of Exports and Substitution of Imports and identified 54 products where national production may reach self-sufficiency in terms of national consumption and thus eliminating the need for any imports. There was also the simultaneous implementation of PAC – the Credit Support Program signed with eight commercial banks, the Development Bank of Angola and the Credit Guarantee Fund, memoranda for the operational implementation of a credit line with favourable interest rates and totalling 141 billion kwanzas (around 250 million euros) in 2019. Within this framework, the BNA issued a ruling that stipulated commercial banks had to apply at least 2% of their assets to granting credits to the real economy for the production of the products selected under PRODESI that fail to meet internal levels of demand as well as support for non-oil sector export products, including ornamental rocks, coffee, wood, fish and shellfish, tropical fruits, among others. The government also carried out widespread changes to customs duties in order to establish the necessary alignment between the import of stable goods and other priority products and the national production of these same products, thereby converting them into a tool for supporting the growth in national output. In 2017, the government also advanced – before concluding in 2018 – with the settlement of debts to several oil companies that had been accumulating

João Lourenço, cabeça de lista do MPLA, ganhou as eleições e foi empossado como Presidente de Angola em 2017

regularização das dívidas de algumas companhias petrolíferas acumuladas desde 2002, no valor de mil e 500 milhões de dólares. No final de 2018, foi estabelecido um acordo com o FMI para um Programa de Financiamento Ampliado para o período 2018-2021, com o valor de 3 mil e 700 milhões de dólares. Com o Banco Mundial foram assinados três acordos de financiamento que totalizaram mil e 320 milhões de dólares.

Em 2019, o Governo lançou o Programa das Privatizações que previa passar para as mãos de privados 195 empresas ou activos do Estado, sendo 32 classificadas como empresas de referência. Até 2022, foram privatizadas 94 empresas e activos e o Estado facturou 566,33 mil milhões de kwanzas (cerca de 1 mil milhão de euros). Os concursos públicos para empregar novos trabalhadores, que tinham sido interrompidos em 2014 devido à crise, voltaram a ser realizados em 2018 e 2019, particularmente nos sectores da saúde e da educação, tendo sido admitidos 31.875 novos funcionários públicos nestes dois sectores.

Em Junho de 2019, o Governo lançou o Programa Integrado de Intervenção no Municípios (PIIM). O Executivo retirou dois mil milhões de dólares do Fundo Soberano para construir infraestruturas nos municípios e gerar empregos, sobretudos para os jovens. A implementação do PIIM, que ainda está em curso, visa executar 1700 projectos em todo o território nacional. Foi também elaborada uma nova lei do Investimento Privado, que permitiu, entre outras medidas, a realização em Angola de investimento directo estrangeiro de qualquer montante sem a obrigatoriedade de ter na estrutura accionista um sócio angolano. A Agência de Investimento Privado e Promoção das Exportações de Angola (AIPEX) passou a ser a janela única de promoção e captação de investimento privado e de apoio ao fomento das exportações. Até finais de Agosto de 2019, a AIPEX registou um total de 178 intenções de investimento, num valor aproximado de mil e 650 milhões de dólares, com a possibilidade de gerar 13.900 postos de trabalho directos. Boa parte das medidas correctivas foram implementadas em 2018 e 2019. Como resultado, registou-se a subida de Angola em duas posições no índice mundial de avaliação

since 2002, for the amount of 1.5 billion dollars.

In late 2018, agreement was reached with the IMF for an Extended Financing Program for the 2018-2021 period for a total amount of $3.7 billion. Furthermore, three financing agreements were reached with the World Bank for the total of $1.32 billion.

In 2019, the Government launched the Privatisations Program that planned to dispose of 195 state companies or other assets, with 32 classified as benchmark companies. Through to 2022, 94 state companies and assets were sold off and the state registered 566.33 billion kwanzas (around €1 billion). Public tenders to employ new state employees, which had been halted due to the crisis in in 2014, were again restarted in 2018 and 2019, particularly for the health and education sectors and thereby recruiting 31,875 new members of staff for these two sectors.

In June 2019, the Government launched PIIM – the Integrated Municipality Intervention Program. The Executive sourced two billion dollars from the Sovereign Fund to build municipal level infrastructures and generate employment, especially for young persons. The implementation of PIIM, which remains ongoing, seeks to undertake 1,700 projects across the entire country. There was also the enactment of a new Private Investment Law that, among other measures, enabled foreign direct investment in Angola of any amount and without the requirement of incorporating an Angolan partner into the shareholding structure.

AIPEX – the Private Investment and Export Promotion Agency of Angola became a single window for promoting and attracting private investment and providing support for exports. Through to the end of August 2019, AIPEX registered a total of 178 investment intentions with a potential total of around $1.65 billion and the capacity to produce 13,900 direct employment positions.

A large part of these corrective measures underwent implementation in 2018 and 2019. This resulted in Angola rising two places in the global index evaluating

Arena de Kilamba

do Ambiente de Negócios do ano de 2018. Em 2022, o novo Governo corrigiu também o lançamento em órbita do primeiro satélite angolano. Angola conta, doravante, com um satélite no espaço.

Holofotes na PGR

A Procuradoria-Geral da República (PGR) era uma figura quase desconhecida na justiça angolana. De 2012 a 2017, a PGR de Angola tinha instaurado apenas 18 processos, num país que registava acentuados níveis de corrupção. Em 2018 foi reestruturada e redinamizada a Direcção Nacional de Prevenção e Combate à Corrupção que, em comparação com os 18 processos instaurados de 2012 a 2017, instaurou 192 processos de inquérito de 2017 a 2019, ou seja, em dois anos instaurou dez vezes mais inquéritos do que nos cinco anos anteriores. Entre estes processos estava aquele que viria a correr o mundo e que deu origem até a um dossiê internacional, o Luanda Leaks. Revelações de um consórcio de jornalistas mostravam como a empresária Isabel dos Santos e Sindika Dokolo, o seu falecido marido, teriam desviado uma fortuna do Estado angolano. Iniciou-se, nessa altura, uma batalha judicial e política entre a filha primogénita do ex-Presidente José Eduardo dos Santos e o Estado angolano, que dura até hoje. De igual modo, o filho varão do ex-Presidente, Zenu dos Santos, foi julgado e condenado pelos crimes de burla e tráfico de influência, no processo que ficou conhecido por “caso 500 milhões”.

Também o ex-ministro dos transportes, Augusto da Silva Tomás, outra importante figura da política angolana dos últimos 20 anos, foi julgado e condenado. Estes, e outros, processos judiciais marcaram uma viragem na justiça angolana. O clima de impunidade que pairava na política angolana aos poucos começou a desaparecer.

Em Dezembro de 2018, foi criado o Serviço Nacional de Recuperação de Activos (SENRA), um órgão tutelado pela PGR, que desempenhou um papel importante nas diligências que culminaram com a celebração de um acordo entre o Fundo Soberano de Angola e a entidade que procedia à gestão dos seus activos, tendo passado para a esfera e disponibilidade directa do Fundo Soberano o capital de 2.350 milhões de dólares, bem como património imobiliário domiciliado no exterior avaliado em mil milhões de dólares americanos. Com estas restruturações e actuações, a Procuradoria-Geral da República deu sinais da sua existência e passou, finalmente, a ser conhecida dentro e fora de portas.

Vida à população

A qualidade de vida da população angolana registou melhorias significativas nos últimos 20 anos. Formou-se uma classe média considerável que também se tornou mais exigente quanto às políticas públicas que são criadas e implementadas. Apesar da significativa melhoria desde o primeiro ano de paz, persistem problemas no sector da habitação, saneamento básico, educação e saúde. Desde

national Business Environments in 2018.

In 2022, the new government moved to correct the launch of the first Angolan satellite with the country henceforth counting on its own space satellite.

Spotlight on the PGR

The PGR – the Attorney-General of the Republic used to be a practically unknown figure in the Angolan justice system. Between 2012 and 2017, the Angolan PGR had opened only 18 cases in a country experiencing rampant corruption. In 2018, there was the restructuring and relaunch of the National Directorate of Prevention and Combat of Corruption which, in comparison with the 18 PGR cases prosecuted between 2012 and 2017, advanced with 192 inquiry processes between 2017 and 2019, thus, in two years, there were ten times the cases than in the five preceding years. Among these processes were those that grabbed headlines worldwide and even came with its own international dossier, Luanda Leaks. The revelations of a consortium of journalists portrayed how the business empire of Isabel dos Santos and Sindika Dokolo, her recently deceased husband, had syphoned off fortunes from the Angolan state. This triggered a judicial and political battle between the first-born daughter of former President José Eduardo dos Santos and the Angolan state that remains ongoing. Equally, the eldest son of the ex-president, Zenu dos Santos, was found guilty of the crimes of fraud and the trafficking of influence in a process that became known as the “500 million case”.

In addition, the former Minister of Transport, Augusto da Silva Tomás, another prominent figure in Angolan politics this century, was tried and found guilty. These legal cases, and others, reflect a turning point in the Angolan justice system. The climate of impunity that had shrouded Angolan politics has begun to slowly dissipate.

In December 2018, there was the launch of SENRA – the National Asset Recovery Service, an entity under the auspices of the PGR that played an important role in the investigations that led to the reaching of an agreement between the Sovereign Fund of Angola and the entity undertaking its asset management, with the former receiving capital of $2.35 billion as well as property assets owned internationally with a total value in the vicinity of $1 billion. Through these restructurings and actions, the Attorney-General of the Republic demonstrated signs of its existence and finally established its reputation both nationally and internationally.

The people’s lives

The quality of life of the Angolan population has registered significant improvements over the last two decades. A considerable middle class has emerged who are also more demanding as regards the design and implementation of the public policies in effect. Despite the significant progress made since the first year of peace, there remain problems across the housing, sanitation, education and

2014, de acordo com o INE, a população cresce a uma taxa acima de 3%, mas o crescimento da economia, bem como das políticas públicas que visam a melhoria das condições de vida dos angolanos, não têm aumentado ao mesmo ritmo. No sector da educação, com o alcance da paz, Angola conheceu uma verdadeira revolução. O número de alunos matriculados nos ensinos primário e secundário triplicou e no ensino universitário aumentou em quase dez vezes até 2012. Porém, persiste até hoje o desafio da melhoria da qualidade do ensino, o que, grosso modo, compromete também a qualidade da mão-de-obra ‘made in’ Angola. No seu discurso sobre o Estado da Nação, em Outubro de 2018, o Presidente João Lourenço reconheceu que a luta pela redução da taxa de desemprego, através da criação de novos postos de trabalho, deve ser permanente e não deve ser só acção do Governo, mas também do sector empresarial privado. Dois anos depois, isto é, em Outubro de 2022, também no balanço do Estado da Nação, o Presidente avançou que no período de 2018-2022 foram gerados 491 mil postos de trabalho. Para minimizar as necessidades da população mais vulnerável, aquela que sobrevive com menos de um dólar por dia, o Governo criou e implementou um programa de transferências directas de rendimentos: o Programa Kwenda tem dado apoio às famílias em situação de pobreza extrema e de grande vulnerabilidade. Até Outubro de 2022, mais de 800 mil famílias estavam registadas e quase 600 mil já recebiam uma pensão mensal de 8 mil kwanzas (cerca de 15 euros). Olhando para o sucesso deste programa, o Governo estuda agora a possibilidade de abranger mais famílias e aumentar o valor de 8 mil para 11 mil kwanzas (cerca de 20 euros).

Ainda para melhorar o nível de vida da população que vive em condições de pobreza extrema, está em curso o Programa Integrado de Desenvolvimento Local e Combate à Pobreza, um programa nacional e multissectorial que procura a inclusão socio-económica do país e que consiste em providenciar, por exemplo, cuidados primários de saúde, água para todos, merenda escolar, ou ainda providenciar ajuda para o trabalho.

Vinte anos com mais energia

Quem viveu em Luanda no período entre 2003 e 2015 nunca se esquecerá do barulho ensurdecedor dos geradores a trabalhar, muitos deles horas a fio. Para mudar este cenário, desde 2012, o Governo tem vindo a recuperar e a ampliar as principais barragens do país, nomeadamente Cambambe, Laúca e Caculo Cabaça cujas obras estão ainda a decorrer. Nos últimos 20 anos, o Governo percebeu que, de facto, o sector da energia é fundamental para o desenvolvimento da indústria transformadora no país. É o sector que tem canalizado mais investimentos públicos e o que também tem dado maiores resultados. Actualmente, os ‘blackouts’ em Luanda reduziram consideravelmente. O país hoje conta com uma taxa de electrificação acima de 40% contra uma taxa de 36% que tinha em 2017. A potência instalada passou de 2,4 Gigawatts em 2017 para quase 6 Gigawatts no início de 2022 e o número de ligações domiciliares aumentou de 1,27

healthcare sectors. According to the national statistics institute, the INE, since 2014, the population has grown by a rate of 3% even while growth in the economy and in public policy expenditure designed to improve the standards of living of Angolans, has not been able to keep pace.

In the education sector, following the advent of peace, Angola underwent a genuine revolution. The number of students registered in primary and secondary schools tripled while university students boomed almost tenfold through to 2012. Nevertheless, there still remains the challenge of improving the quality of teaching which, in broad brush terms, also undermines the quality of the ‘made in’ Angola labour.

In his State of the Nation speech in October 2018, President João Lourenço recognised that the campaign to cut the unemployment rate, through the creation of new jobs, should be constant and not only the responsibility of the government but also involving the private sector.

Two years later, in October 2022, and making the same speech, the President reported that a total of 491,000 new jobs had been created in the 2018-2022 period.

In order to minimise the needs of the most vulnerable members of society, those living on less than a dollar per day, the government designed and implemented a direct transfer payment system: the Kwenda Program that gives support to families facing extreme poverty and great vulnerability. Through to October 2022, over 800,000 persons had been registered and almost 600,000 were already in receipt of a monthly pension of 8,000 kwanzas (around 15 euros). Following the success of this program, the government is now studying the scope for broadening the scope to more households while raising the amount from 8,000 to 11,000 kwanzas (around 20 euros). In addition to improving the living standards of those facing extreme poverty, there is also the ongoing Integrated Local Development and Combat of Poverty Program, national and multi-sectoral in scope, this seeks to foster socioeconomic inclusion and involves initiatives designed to provide primary healthcare, access to water and sanitation, schools meals, as well as employment assistance, among other measures.

Twenty years with more energy

Anyone living in Luanda between 2003 and 2015 will never forget the deafening sound of generators working, many for hours on end. To change this scenario, the government has been working since 2012 to restore and expand the main national dams, especially Cambambe, Laúca and Caculo Cabaça, where construction still remains ongoing. In the last two decades, the government acted in reflection of its understanding of the energy sector as fundamental to the development of national manufacturing. This sector has been the recipient of the greatest public investment and has turned in the best results. Nowadays, blackouts in Luanda have dropped significantly. The country now has an electrification rate of over 40% against the 36% level in 2017. The capacity of the national grid rose from 2.4 gigawatts in 2017 to almost 6 gigawatts in early 2022 and the number of household connections surged

milhão em 2017 para 1,78 milhão no mesmo período. Olhando para a dimensão do território angolano, ainda há muito por fazer para garantir energia para todos. Tudo indica que o Governo tem consciência disso e, por isso, apostou na diversificação da matriz energética, construindo parques fotovoltaicos para atender às populações das zonas rurais, onde a rede de transporte de energia hídrica não chega.

Implementação de hospitais de referência

O sector da saúde é até hoje o elo mais fraco das políticas públicas em Angola. Melhorou consideravelmente a quantidade de hospitais, mas os utentes reclamam constantemente da falta de medicamentos nos hospitais e falta de humanismo no atendimento do pessoal médico. Os técnicos da saúde reclamam por melhores condições de trabalho e melhores salários. As mudanças assinaláveis neste sector é que, nos últimos 20 anos, o Governo compreendeu a necessidade de construir unidades sanitárias de proximidade e de ter grandes hospitais de referência. A estratégia do Governo é ter em todas as capitais de província hospitais com capacidade para resolver problemas de média e alta complexidade, para conseguir reduzir o número de evacuações de doentes para a capital Luanda e para o exterior do país, passando o cidadão a resolver os seus problemas de saúde próximo da sua zona de residência. Neste domínio, embora ainda se registe um grande défice, foram inauguradas entre 2020 e 2021 várias unidades sanitárias de cuidados primários. Com as novas unidades hospitalares, o Estado reduziu as despesas com 286 doentes em junta médica em Portugal, dos quais 48 insuficientes renais, parte deles transplantados, e mais 152 acompanhantes. O sector social, com incidência na saúde e na educação, foram os grandes desafios das duas últimas décadas, e continuam ainda hoje na lista das maiores preocupações do país, apesar das significativas melhorias, sobretudo nos últimos quatro anos.

from 1.27 million to 1.78 million over the same period. Considering the scale of the Angolan territory, there is still much to do to guarantee energy for all. Everything suggests that the authorities are aware of this as they have already targeted the diversification of the energy mix, building solar powered facilities for rural regions where the hydro-generated energy network does not reach.

Implementation of central hospitals

The health sector has hitherto been the weakest link in public policies in Angola. There has been considerable improvement in the quantity of hospitals but patients constantly complain about the lack of both medication and specialist staff for their care. In turn, health professionals demand better working conditions and higher salaries. Following the noticeable changes in this sector over these two decades, the government has now perceived the need to build community healthcare units and central hospitals. The government strategy involves endowing every provincial capital with a hospital capable of resolving problems with medium and high complexity, thereby reducing the incidence of the emergency transport of patients to Luanda or to outside the country with citizens able to resolve their health problems close to their place of residence. Within this scope, while there still remain major shortcomings, 2020 and 2021 saw the inauguration of various primary health posts. With new hospital facilities, the state also cut the costs of 286 patients receiving medical care in Portugal, of which 48 had renal problems with a proportion having now received transplants, as well as 152 accompanying carers. The social sector, with a particular incidence on health and education, was the major challenge of the last two decades and still remains at the top of the list of national concerns despite the significant improvements made, especially in the last four years.

Mbanza Congo, antiga capital do Reino do Congo, foi classificada como Património Cultural da Humanidade pela UNESCO

Uma evolução notável e potencial ainda por concretizar

Notable growth and still with potential to achieve

JOÃO ALMADA

Moçambique há 20 anos, em 2003, era um país bem diferente do de hoje. A população pouco passava dos 19 milhões, hoje situa-se em 34 milhões, o que corresponde a um aumento relativo de praticamente 79%, uma explosão que, a manter-se esta tendência será, sem dúvida, um factor muito relevante a ter em consideração neste país.

Há 20 anos, o país colhia ainda os louros de “aluno exemplar”, epíteto atribuído pela Comunidade Internacional face a estabilidade política e, sobretudo, ao desenvolvimento económico – o país chegou a atingir um crescimento de dois dígitos –observado na segunda metade da década de 90. No plano político, a situação era razoavelmente estável, depois do turbilhão de acusações da Renamo, o principal partido da oposição, sobre eventuais fraudes em relação ao processo eleitoral de Dezembro de 1999. Eram os últimos tempos de Joaquim Chissano na presidência da República. A sucessão na Frelimo, o partido no poder, faz-se de forma tranquila. Armando Guebuza ascende à presidência do partido e depois à da República, nas eleições de 2004. O seu primeiro mandato (2005/9) é

Mozambique two decades ago was a very different country than it is today. The population in 2003 had just broken 19 million, today it totals 34 million, which corresponds to an increase of practically 79%, an explosion in growth in a continuing trend that undoubtedly reflects a very relevant factor to take into account as regards this country. 20 years ago, the country was still basking in the praises of an “exemplary student”, a label handed down by the international community in keeping with the political stability and, above all, for its economic growth and development – Mozambique turned in double digit growth in the second half of the 1990s. On the political level, the situation was reasonably stable following the whirlwind of accusations by Renamo, the main opposition party, as regards eventual fraud in relation to the December 1999 elections. These were the final times of Joaquim Chissano as President of the Republic. Succession in Frelimo, the ruling party, took place smoothly. Armando Guebuza rose to the presidency of the party and the Republic in the election of 2004. His first mandate (2005/9) was

marcado por uma energia renovada, bem expressa no uso da expressão “decisão tomada, decisão cumprida” no fecho da correspondência oficial no Estado. Guebuza dava assim o mote do que iria ser o seu consulado.

No início do seu mandato, Guebuza tem um lema: acabar com a pobreza absoluta, ou seja, com aqueles que vivem com menos de 1 dólar/dia, ainda uma larga franja dos moçambicanos. É essa a principal mensagem que vai passando nas suas presidências abertas, uma novidade que a ele se deve também. Com elas a palavra inclusão é utilizada à exaustão, o que contribuiu também a projecto dos 7 milhões de meticais – à época o equivalente a 210 mil USD - direccionados aos distritos, gerando milhares de postos de trabalho em diversas áreas, mas cuja implementação ficou aquém do esperado.

Em 2007, Moçambique e os moçambicanos conhecem um dos maiores marcos do seu orgulho nacional do século XXI, quando Armando Guebuza pronuncia “Cahora Bassa é Nossa!”, após Moçambique acordar a reversão de 85% da Barragem de Cahora Bassa a Portugal.

marked by renewed energy as well expressed in his adoption of the slogan “decision taken, decision complied with” at the end of his official state correspondence. Guebuza was setting out the style of government for his period in office. At the beginning of his mandate, Guebuza set a goal: to bring an end to absolute poverty, thus, those living on less than 1 dollar/ day, still then representing a large proportion of Mozambicans. This is the key message he would convey during his open presidency tours, a new initiative that also started out with his time in office. In this period, the word inclusion was used exhaustively, which also contributed to the 7 million meticais – at the time equivalent to US$ 210,000 – directed to the districts, generating thousands of jobs across diverse areas but with the results of implementation failing to meet expectations. In 2007, Mozambique and the Mozambicans experienced one of the peaks in their 21st century national pride when Armando Guebuza announced “Cahora Bassa is Ours!”, following Mozambique agreeing to the reversion of 85% of the Cahora Bassa Dam from Portugal.

Outro momento de orgulho foi quando, nesse mesmo ano, os leões voltam a habitar o Parque Nacional da Gorongosa, o qual começou a encetar uma recuperação, após décadas de guerra, liderada pelo filantropo norte-americano Gregory Carr, envolvendo o Governo de Moçambique e as comunidades locais Esta presidência fica marcada ainda pela edificação de várias obras públicas consideradas estruturantes para o desenvolvimento de Moçambique. As pontes Armando Guebuza (sobre o Zambeze); e a Maputo-Catembe; a estrada circular de Maputo; a base logística de Pemba; e o aeroporto de Nacala, não esquecendo o novo aeroporto de Maputo.

A partir de 2010, o país conhece um dinamismo económico sem precedentes desde a independência, impulsionado pela indústria mineira de carvão, no distrito de Moatize, província de Tete, que começa a ser explorado pelas grandes multinacionais com ‘know how’ na matéria. Tete é o novo “el dorado”, levando a uma profunda transformação social e económica da região, com fortes impactos nacionais.

Mas o ponto de viragem deu-se em Fevereiro de 2010. Nesse mês, após aturadas pesquisas, foi anunciado que a bacia do rio Rovuma, na província de Cabo Delgado, extremo norte do país, albergava reservas de gás natural que se vieram a provar estar na ordem dos 180 triliões de pés cúbicos, números que fazem do

Another moment of pride came in this same year when lions returned to the National Gorongosa Park, which began to stage a recovery following decades of war, led by the American philanthropist Gregory Carr and involving both the national government and local communities. This presidency was also marked by the completion of various public works deemed structural to the future development of Mozambique: the Armando Guebuza (over the Zambezi), and Maputo-Catembe bridges; the Maputo ring road; the Pemba logistics centre and the Nacala airport as well as the new airport for the capital, Maputo. As from 2010, the country experienced a level of economic dynamism unprecedented since independence, driven by the coal mining industry in the district of Moatize, Tete province, which began to be operated by major multinationals with expertise. Tete became the new “El dorado”, leading to a profound social and economic transformation with major national impacts. However, the turning point, came in February 2010. In this month, research concluded that the Rovuma river basin, in the province of Cabo Delgado, in the extreme north of the country, hosted natural gas reserves that turned out to be in the region of 180 trillion cubic feet, turning the country

país o Qatar de África. O investimento, após o anúncio da chamada Decisão Final de Investimento, é de 50 mil milhões de dólares, a ser efectuado por um consórcio liderado pela francesa Total, o maior investimento alguma vez realizado em Moçambique. De acordo com especialistas do Banco Mundial (BM) o estado irá arrecadar, a partir do início da década de 2030, mais de 2,6 mil milhões de euros por ano. Por esta altura, já a CV&A actuava em Moçambique, apoiando

into the Qatar of Africa. In investment, according to the announcement termed the Final Investment Decision, this accounts for 50 billion dollars from a consortium led by the French multinational Total, by far the largest investment ever made in Mozambique. According to the specialists at the World Bank, the state will begin racking up over 2.6 billion euros per year as from the beginning of the 2030s. Around this time, CV&A was already active in Mozambique,

Barragem de Cahora Bassa

clientes como o Millennium bim, a Mota-Engil e a Visabeira, mas também sendo consultor em projectos estruturantes no país, como o da construção da Hidroeléctrica de Mphanda Nkuwa ou o apoio à comunicação internacional do Instituto Nacional do Turismo (INATUR).

Em Setembro de 2012, a CV&A, reforçando a sua vocação para estar presente nos países da CPLP, irá abrir o seu escritório em Moçambique, criando uma empresa de direito moçambicano.

supporting clients including Millennium bim, Mota-Engil and Visabeira, but also serving as consultant on the national structural projects, such as the construction of the Mphanda Nkuwa Hydroelectric Dam and support for the international communications campaigns undertaken by INATUR – the National Tourism Institute.

In September 2012, CV&A, strengthening its vocation for Portuguese Language countries, opened

Logo nos primeiros anos, foi consultora de clientes com projectos que contribuíram para repensar e a transformar Moçambique: ProSavana, o projecto agrícola de cooperação trilateral Moçambique-Brasil-Japão; JICA - Agência Internacional de Cooperação Japonesa; Montepuez Ruby Mining, a maior reserva de rubis descoberta no Mundo este século; a Portucel Moçambique; ou a definição da estratégia para o PEDEC-Nacala, o projecto de desenvolvimento económico para o centro e norte do país, entre outros.

Entretanto, no país, o início de 2015 gerou grandes expectativas com a tomada de posse do presidente Filipe Nyusi, o quarto desde a independência. O seu discurso foi perfeito, destacando-se a enorme humildade indo ao ponto de afirmar que o povo seria o seu patrão.

Contudo, a realidade mostrou-se bem mais complexa e o desafio do novo Presidente e dos seus Governos para o seu mandato alterou-se por completo, quando o país entra numa crise financeira, económica e social, motivada por diversos factores internos e externos, onde se destaca a crise das dívidas ocultas, que levou ao julgamento mais mediático da história da justiça moçambicana, e ao eclodir dos ataques atribuídos ao extremismo islâmico em Cabo Delgado, a partir de Outubro de 2017. Mas mesmo em ambiente desafiante fazem-se conquistas e o

its office in Mozambique and correspondingly established a Mozambican subsidiary.

In these early years, there was consultation for clients on projects striving to rethink and transform Mozambique: ProSavana, the trilateral Mozambique-Brazil-Japan agricultural cooperation project; JICA – the Japanese International Cooperation Agency; Montepuez Ruby Mining exploiting the largest ruby reserves discovered anywhere in the world this century; Portucel Moçambique; and the definition of the strategy for PEDEC-Nacala, the economic development project for the centre and north of Mozambique, among others.

In the meantime, at the beginning of 2015, the country held great expectations as regards the taking office of President Filipe Nyusi, the fourth incumbent since independence. His inaugural speech was perfect, highlighting his enormous humility to the point of affirming that the people were his boss. However, the reality proved to be far more complex and the challenges facing the new President and his Governments during the mandate completely changed when the country ran into a financial, economic and social crisis caused by diverse internal and external factors, including the hidden debt crisis, which led to the most high profile trial in the history of Mozambican justice, and the outbreak of the attacks attributed

A partir de 2010, o país conhece um dinamismo económico sem precedentes desde a independência, impulsionado pela indústria mineira de carvão, no distrito de Moatize, província de Tete

amadurecimento de alguns dos projectos mineiros, agrícolas e turísticos iniciados na década anterior começaram a trazer alguns benefícios.

A CV&A, em particular, esteve envolvida num marco financeiro de Moçambique, quando foi a consultora moçambicana seleccionada para fazer a comunicação da maior operação bolsista jamais efectuada em Moçambique, quando a Hidroeléctrica de Cahora Bassa (HCB) entrou em Bolsa e realizou a maior operação pública de venda de acções a empresas e investidores particulares da história do país. A empresa passou de três accionistas para 17 mil! Um sucesso a todos os níveis que orgulhou muito a CV&A.

Mais recentemente, com o auxílio de tropas ruandesas e da SADC, as Forças de Defesa e Segurança (FDS) moçambicanas conseguiram diminuir a forte presença que o grupo extremista tinha vindo a conseguir, reconquistando importantes localidades como as vilas de Mocímboa da Praia e Palma. Assim, recentemente, Filipe Nyusi fez saber que já estão reunidas as condições de segurança para o regresso das operações de LNG a território nacional. Enquanto isso, em Novembro de 2022, o primeiro navio com LNG moçambicano saiu para a Europa, um marco relevante para o país, que continua a encetar os esforços para acelerar o processo de instalação de uma plataforma de LNG em terra, que possa multiplicar estes esforços.

Presentemente, o Governo enfrenta três grandes desafios prementes: a gestão transparente dos recursos provenientes do gás; a criação de um Fundo Soberano credível, garantindo que estas receitas não beneficiem apenas as populações locais, mas também as futuras gerações; e, por último, que esses recursos sirvam para a diversificação da economia do país.

Moçambique tem todas as condições naturais, em termos de recursos, para “dar certo”. Mas deverá apostar fortemente na elevação do nível de educação e de capacitação da sua população, muito jovem e em forte crescimento; no reforço das instituições; e da sociedade civil. Conseguido estes desafios está definitivamente aberto o caminho para um desenvolvimento sustentável e equilibrado. Assim todos esperamos!

to Islamic extremists in Cabo Delgado as from October 2017. However, even in this challenging environment, there were still advances with the maturing and success of some of the mining, agricultural and tourism projects begun in the previous decade.

CV&A, in particular, was involved in a financial landmark in Mozambique when its subsidiary consultancy was selected to publicise and communicate the largest stock market launch in the nation’s history, when HCB – the Cahora Bassa Hydroelectric Dam (HCB) entered with an initial public operation that saw shares sold to companies and private investors. The company went from three shareholders to 17,000! An all-round success and a source of great pride to CV&A.

More recently with assistance from Rwandan and Southern African Defence Forces, alongside the national military, the presence established by extremist groups has been shrunk, regaining important locations such as the towns of Mocímboa da Praia and Palma. Thus, just recently, Filipe Nyusi publicly stated that the security conditions necessary for the return of the LNG operations to the country were now in place. Furthermore, in November 2022, the first vessel carrying Mozambican LNG left for Europe, a relevant landmark for the country that continues to strive to accelerate the installation of an onshore LNG platform in order to multiply the levels of output. Currently, the government faces three overriding challenges: the transparent management of the gas produced resources; setting up a credible Sovereign Fund, guaranteeing that these revenues benefit not only the local populations but also future generations; and, finally, that these resources are able to drive the diversification of the national economy. Mozambique holds all of the natural conditions, in terms of resources, to “get it right”. However, there needs to be heavy investment in the level of education and empowerment of the population, itself very young and expanding rapidly; strengthening institutions and civil society. Should these challenges be met, the path is certainly open to sustainable and balanced development. As we all so hope and expect!

Presidente Filipe Nyusi

As idas e vindas da economia brasileira nos últimos 20 anos

The comings and goings of the brazilian economy over the last two decades

BRUNO ROSA, PRÉMIO

Há 20 anos, o Brasil tinha pela primeira vez um presidente alinhado aos ideais da esquerda. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva chegava ao poder como representante máximo do Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT). Era um momento histórico para o país, marcado por otimismo e simbolismo. Lula, que disputava a presidência desde 1989, com a redemocratização, só colecionava derrotas. Venceu, mas a vitória, como se viu nos anos seguintes, ainda não se mostrou definitiva com idas e vindas, altos e baixos recheados com doses de incertezas.

Lembro-me bem da atmosfera em 2003, ano em que, assim como a Cunha Vaz & Associados iniciou a sua atividade, iniciava também a minha jornada profissional no jornalismo.

Na redação do histórico “Jornal do Brasil”, era comum ouvir dos editores-chefes as queixas de como a economia brasileira tinha dificuldade de crescer de forma consistente. O uso de expressões como “cavalo de pau” era comum na imprensa brasileira: o PIB (soma de todos os bens e serviços produzidos no país) não conseguia manter sua trajetória constante de alta, sempre afetada pelas exorbitantes taxas de juros.

Na ocasião já havia começado os preparativos para celebrar os dez anos da criação do Plano Real, lançado em 1994 e que trouxe a tão esperada estabilidade econômica ao país com o fim da inflação galopante, quando os preços dos alimentos e todos os serviços começavam o dia a um valor e terminavam a noite em patamar superior.

Cenário impensável para quem mora na Europa e nos

0 years ago, Brazil, for the first time ever, had a president aligned with left-wing ideals. Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva arrived in power as the leader of the PT – the Brazilian Labour Party. This was a historical moment for the country, defined by optimism and symbolism. Lula, who had run for the presidency every time since the return of democracy in 1989 but had only picked up defeats. He finally won but that victory, as would be seen in the years to come, was no definitive change as reflected in the comings and goings, the highs and lows and always shrouded in thick mists of uncertainty. I recall well the atmosphere in 2003, the year when, just like Cunha Vaz & Associados started its activity, I started out on my professional career in journalism. In the newsroom of the historical “Jornal do Brasil” newspaper, it was common to hear the then senior editors complain about how difficult it was for the Brazilian economy to grow consistently. The usage of expressions such as “Trojan horse” was common in the Brazilian press: GDP (the sum of all goods and services produced nationally) was not able to maintain any steadily upwards trend and was always dragged back down by exorbitant interest rates. At that time, the plans to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Real Plan were already underway after its launch in 1994 and that brought about the expected stability for the national economy and slayed the rampant inflation when the prices of foodstuffs and services would begin the day

Estados Unidos. Mas não no Brasil, onde os preços se transformaram em um verdadeiro trauma. Nas páginas dos jornais, as crianças davam novo significado à inflação. Em Brasília, com a chegada de Lula no poder, era a hora de falar da criação de ministérios e das novas políticas econômicas para manter a inflação sob controle. Para se ter uma ideia, em 2002, o IPCA, o índice oficial de inflação do país, chegava a 12,53% ao ano. Era um patamar menor que os 22,41% de 1995, mas o maior índice em dez anos. O custo do dinheiro era tão elevado que minava qualquer tentativa de crescimento econômico. Mas Lula prometia reduzir a inflação e colocar o país em rota de crescimento constante com um discurso político mais ameno e ao centro. O ambiente de otimismo ganhava cada vez mais espaço. Para isso, o novo governo buscou inspiração nos ideais de John Maynard Keynes, reforçando o papel do Estado como instrumento de política econômica. Para induzir o crescimento e planejar os próximos passos, passou a reforçar a atuação das estatais como indutores da economia. Entre os bancos públicos, usou a concessão de crédito para o agronegócio e famílias que dependiam do campo através de linhas subsidiadas do Banco do Brasil. Para a classe média, a Caixa Econômica Federal passou a ser o impulsionador da casa própria. E nunca na “história desse país”, expressão famosa de Lula no início dos anos 2000, tantos brasileiros conseguiram, enfim, comprar sua primeira casa, ajudando a reduzir o déficit habitacional, um problema crônico do país desde os tempos do Brasil Colônia. Para as empresas, o governo também impulsionou as atividades do BNDES, o Banco Nacional do Desenvolvimento Econômico. Criou linhas de juros mais baixas de forma a impulsionar o crédito para as corporações. Pouco a pouco, os desembolsos foram aumentando, ajudando a impulsionar os investimentos. Em outro momento importante, decidiu-se criar a política de campeões nacionais, A ideia era simples: estimular

with one value and end the day costing more. Such a scenario would be unthinkable to residents of Europe and the United States. But not in Brazil where the prices turned into a genuine trauma. In the newspaper pages, the children attributed new meanings to inflation. In Brasília, with the arrival of Lula in power, it was the time to talk of launching ministries and new economic policies to keep inflation in check. To convey an idea of this, in 2002, the IPCA, the official national inflation index, stood at 12.53% per year. This was a lower level than the 22.41% of 1995 but was still the highest rate in ten years. The cost of money was so high that this was undermining any attempt at economic growth. However, Lula promised to both reduce inflation and foster constant growth in a more amenable and centrist focused political discourse. The optimistic ambience seemed to grow ever brighter. The new government took its inspiration from the ideas of John Maynard Keynes, strengthening the role of the state as a tool of economic policy. To induce growth and plan the next steps, measures were taken to boost the state’s capacity to serve as a driver of economic growth. At public banks, credit lines were extended to agro-businesses and subsistence households through subsidies from the Bank of Brazil. For the middle class, the Federal Housing Society became the means of getting onto the property ladder. And never in “the history of this country”, a famous expression from Lula in the early 2000s, did so many Brazilians finally manage to purchase their first home, helping to reduce the housing shortage, a chronic national problem that stretched back to colonial times. For companies, the government also launched activities under BNDES – the National Economic Development Bank. This entity provided cheaper credit lines to drive funding for corporations. Gradually, the amounts began rising and helping to drive investments. Another important facet came with the national champions policy. The idea was simple: stimulate Brazilian companies capable of competing internationally. And Portugal entered

Lula com Obama

Dilma e Lula com Angela Merkel

companhias brasileiras capazes de competir no cenário internacional. E Portugal entrou nessa rota. A Oi se juntou com a Portugal Telecom para criar a “supertele nacional”, com a ajuda do BNDES. Para isso, a Portugal Telecom vendeu sua fatia na Vivo para os espa nhóis da Telefónica, em uma das maiores operações do mercado português. Nessa mesma linha se tentou criar gigantes verde-e-amarela nos setores petroquímico, de proteína animal, farmacêutica e semicondutores. Na área de energia, o Brasil despontava com a descoberta do pré-sal e a chegada dos novos barões do petróleo como Eike Batista, que fez fortuna e colecionou prestígio entrando para a seleta lista dos bilionários da “Forbes”. O país passou a ser o centro das atenções internacionais. Ao mesmo tempo, o Brasil surfou nos ventos favoráveis do crescimento internacional embalados pelo tal crescimento chinês. Lula era “o cara”, como disse Barack Obama, presidente dos Estados Unidos. Mas veio a crise das hipotecas imobiliárias dos Estados Unidos e o jogo começou a virar. Lula não queria perder o ufanismo sempre presente em momentos de crescimento desde o Brasil República. Em outra frase famosa, disse que a crise internacional causaria apenas uma “marolinha”. Foi o suficiente para as críticas ganharem espaço na imprensa brasileira. Em 2009, a economia caiu 0,91%. Mas conseguiu manter o ritmo de crescimento no ano seguinte. Lembro-me de entrevistar CEOs de empresas da Europa e dos Estados Unidos que estavam ampliando os investimentos no Brasil por conta da perspectiva de crescimento no chamado primeiro mundo. E esse otimismo de Lula conseguiu eleger, depois de dois mandatos, sua sucessora, Dilma Rousseff. E mais uma vez o simbolismo da vitória tomou conta do noticiário. Era a primeira mulher a comandar o Brasil e, assim como Lula era o primeiro sindicalista, Dilma era uma ex-presa política, torturada na Ditadura Militar. Mas, embora o otimismo tenha sido renovado, a história começou a se inverter. E o sentimento dos

onto this horizon. Oi merged with Portugal Telecom to create a “national super-telecom”, with the assistance of BNDES. To this end, Portugal Telecom sold its stake in Vivo to the Spanish Telefónica, one of the largest operators in the Portuguese market. The same policy sought to establish Brazilian champions in the petrochemical, animal protein, pharmaceutical and semiconductor sectors. In the energy sector, Brazil was waking up to the discovery of pre-salt crude oil deposits and the emergence of new oil barons , such as Eike Batista, who made a fortune and gained prestige in making it onto the select list of Forbes billionaires. The country became a focal point of international attention. Brazil simultaneously surfed the favourable wave of international growth off the back of the Chinese expansion. Lula was “the face” as United States President Barack Obama put it. However, then came the US financial crisis and the game began to turn. Lula did not want to lose the sense of euphoria that is always present in the growth periods of the Republic of Brazil. In another famous phrase, he said the international crisis would only cause a “ripple” domestically. This was sufficient for criticism to begin surging in the Brazilian press. In 2009, the economy fell back 0.91%. However, there was a return to growth in the following year. I remember interviewing the CEOs of European and American corporations expanding their investments to Brazil due to the lack of prospects for growth in that referred to as the first world. This optimism enabled Lula, after his own two mandates, to steer his successor, Dilma Rousseff, into office. Once again, the symbolism of this victory grabbed the headlines. This was the first woman to lead Brazil and, like Lula, emerged out of the trade union movement, Dilma was also a former political prisoner, tortured under the military dictatorship. However, even while the optimism was renewed, the tables were beginning to turn. And the feelings of the business sector about such sustainability began gaining space in the news. Dilma accelerated the state’s interventions and further

Lula com José Alencar

Michel Temer durante a cerimônia de autorização do processo licitatório para implantação do sistema de captação de água do lago Paranoá em Brasília

empresários sobre a tal sustentabilidade começou novamente a ganhar espaço no noticiário. Dilma acelerou a onda estadista e aumentou o poder do Estado na economia. Baixou os juros básicos da economia, controlou com mão de ferro o preço dos combustíveis pela Petrobras e reduziu artificialmente as tarifas de energia elétrica. Mas ela só não contava com a falta de chuvas. Sem a ajuda de São Pedro, as hidrelétricas começaram a ficar vazias, o país entrou em uma grave crise energética, lembrando a época de racionamento no final dos anos 2000. O otimismo começava a perder fôlego. Mas era ano de Copa do Mundo. E a alegria invadiu o país, deixando os problemas de lado. Obras foram feitas em estádios e novos investidores estrangeiros chegaram aos aeroportos, que foram ampliados. Mas a alegria durou pouco. O Brasil perdeu o campeonato e quem entrou em campo foi a Operação Lava-Jato, da Polícia Federal. O mega esquema de corrupção foi ano a ano ganhando o noticiário e revelando fraudes em estatais como a Petrobras, Eletrobras, fundos de pensão, construtoras e partidos políticos. Dilma, ainda sim, com o apoio de Lula, conseguiu se reeleger, mas agora o clima não era mais de tanto otimismo. E as pautas das reportagens se voltaram para a corrupção, revelando os primeiros sinais de um país que mais tarde iria se mostrar completamente dividido.

Foi nesse ambiente que muitos empresários, em dezenas de entrevistas, questionavam se o avanço da economia nos últimos anos era “real” ou peça de ficção criada pelo

PT. Nas ruas, protestos inundaram as capitais e em Brasília a oposição iniciou o processo de ‘impeachment’ de Dilma. Era hora de mais uma vez arrumar o país. Nas redações dos jornais, em meio às expectativas dos Jogos Olímpicos no Rio em 2016, a pauta agora era

boosted its power in the economy. The basic economic interest rate was lowered, there was tight control on the fuel prices at Petrobras and artificial reductions in electricity tariffs. However, she also had to contend with the lack of rain. Without feeding from above, the hydroelectricity supply began to fail and the country entered into a serious energy crisis, recalling the period of rationing in the late 2000s. Optimism began to wane but this was also World Cup year and the country was swept with joy and expectation, setting all other problems to one side. Construction work was carried out on stadiums and new investors came through the also expanded airports. But the happiness was to be short-lived. Brazil did not win the World Cup they hosted and the Federal Police advanced with Operation Car Wash. This mega-corruption scheme took many headlines in revealing fraud in the state dealings with Petrobras, Eletrobras, pension funds, construction firms and political parties. Nevertheless Dilma, with support from Lula, managed to get re-elected but against a backdrop of fading optimism. The notebooks of journalists were again covered with corruption stories, revealing the first signs of a country that would later end up completely divided. This was the ambience in which many business figures, across dozens of interviews, questioned whether the economic progress achieved in recent years was “real” or a piece of fiction created by the PT. On the streets, protests flooded the regional capitals and, in Brasilia, the opposition set out on impeaching Dilma. It was once again time to tidy up the country. In the newspaper columns, amongst the expectations in the run up to the Rio

2016 Olympic Games, there were also efforts to understand what would be the outcome of Michel Temer, who set about privatising and liberalising. Out went Keynes and in came an Adam Smith inspired macroeconomic agenda, a trend reinforced two years

Presidenta Dilma Rousseff recebe cumprimentos do Vice-Presidente dos Estados Unidos da América, Joe Biden durante cerimônia de posse do segundo mandato da Presidenta da República Dilma Rousseff e do Vice-Presidente da República Michel Temer

O presidente Jair Bolsonaro participa de ato alusivo ao aniversário de 127 anos da cidade de Jataí e à entrega da 1ª etapa Complexo Esportivo JK

entender o que faria Michel Temer, que colocou em curso uma onda privatizante e liberal. Sai de cena Keynes e entrava de vez na agenda macroeconômica Adam Smith, corrente reforçada dois anos depois por Jair Bolsonaro. Foi feita uma reforma trabalhista, a liberação da terceirização em algumas áreas e outras medidas impensáveis para os dois governos anteriores. A Petrobras, maior símbolo da Lava-Jato, passou a vender seus ativos. Se antes os preços eram controlados, agora a ideia era que o valor da gasolina e do diesel fosse guiado pelas cotações internacionais. Não deu certo. Os caminhoneiros entraram em greve, paralisando o país. O governo Temer acabou mais fraco do que começou. E, novamente, a economia brasileira se via em meio a um fraco crescimento e novas incertezas. O país seguia cada vez mais dividido. A taxa de desemprego avançava. Foi dessa forma que aparece um dos personagens mais controversos da história recente do Brasil: Jair Bolsonaro. Ele conseguiu usar essa atmosfera para se eleger com um discurso antipetismo com Lula fora do páreo na disputa eleitoral por conta das investigações envolvendo os casos de corrupção revelados pela Operação Lava-Jato. Ao longo de seu mandato, Bolsonaro, com a ajuda de Paulo Guedes, como ministro da Economia, vendeu o que conseguiu: reduziu ainda mais o tamanho da Petrobras, privatizou a Eletrobras e acelerou a atração de investimentos internacionais através de leilões em rodovias, ferrovias, portos e aeroportos. Se a economia seguia um caminho cada vez mais liberal, decidiu ir no sentido contrário quando o assunto era democracia. Com a pandemia da Covid-19, Bolsonaro foi contra o fechamento do comércio. Não queria que a tal “gripezinha” afetasse seu mandato. Em meio a críticas da imprensa, passou a ofender qualquer voz contrária. Foi, assim, cada vez mais flertando com o fim das liberdades de expressão. Ao longo dos primeiros anos de seu mandato, o extremismo já havia ganho espaço entre parte dos eleitores, dando combustível a Bolsonaro. E nesses últimos 20 anos, as discussões sobre o crescimento econômico cederam espaço para a (impensável) luta pela democracia. Bolsonaro, como demonstrou a maior parcela da população brasileira, perdeu a eleição não só para Lula e o PT, mas para o autoritarismo, a falta de preocupação com a agenda sustentável e as mais de 600 mil mortes de brasileiros para a Covid-19. Com Lula de volta ao poder, voltamos para a velha preocupação no ‘front’ econômico. Duas décadas depois, ainda falamos de inflação alta e o baixo crescimento do país. Avançamos em diferentes áreas, mas quem olha de fora pode ter a sensação de que o país anda em círculos entre idas e vindas, altos e baixos, recheados, agora, de novas incertezas e novamente uma interminável luta para reduzir os juros básicos da economia no país, hoje um dos maiores do mundo.

later by Jair Bolsonaro. Labour reforms took place, the legalisation of outsourcing in some sectors and other measures unthinkable to the previous two governments. Petrobras, the greatest symbol of the Car Wash corruption scandal, had its assets sold off. While fuel prices were previously controlled, now the idea was to allow the price of petrol and diesel to fluctuate in accordance with the international markets. This did not work out. The truckers went on strike and paralysed the country. The Temer government ended up weaker than when it started. And, once again, the Brazilian economy was facing weak growth and renewed uncertainties. The country was increasingly divided. The unemployment rate began rising. Against this background there emerged once of the most controversial figures in recent Brazilian history: Jair Bolsonaro. He managed to turn around this atmosphere to get elected on an anti-PT discourse with Lula out of the scene on account of investigations involving the corruption cases unveiled by Operation Car Wash. Throughout his mandate, Bolsonaro, with the assistance of his Minister of the Economy Paulo Guedes, sold off whatever he could: further slimming the size of Petrobras, privatising Eletrobras and accelerating the attraction of international investment through auctions for highways, railways, ports and airports. While the economy was following an increasingly liberal path, he opted to head in the opposite direction in relation to democracy. During the Covid-19 pandemic, Bolsonaro opposed the closure of trade and commerce. He did not want the “baby flu” to affect his mandate. In the midst of press criticism, he took to offending any contrary opinion. Thus, he flirted increasingly closely with restrictions on the freedom of expression. Throughout the first years of his mandate, extremism had already taken root among the electorate further spurring Bolsonaro onwards. And over these last 20 years, the discussions over economic growth gave ground to the (essential) struggle for democracy. Bolsonaro, as demonstrated by a clear majority of the Brazilian population, lost the election not only to Lula and PT but also due to his authoritarianism, the lack of concern over either any sustainable agenda or the over 600,000 Brazilians who lost their lives to Covid-19. With Lula back in power, we again return to the old concern over the economic front. Two decades later, we are still talking high inflation and low growth in the country. We have advanced across different areas but anybody looking in from outside might have the sensation that the country turns in circles, between comings and goings, highs and lows, now compounded by new uncertainties and once again engaged in an interminable struggle to get the basic interest rate down to assist an economy, today one of the largest in the world.

FRANCK MULLER CURVEX CX

TEMPO DE RENOVAÇÃO.

Tokyo connection

Na época das cerejeiras em flor, quando Tóquio se pavoneia com rendas floridas, deixando residentes e turistas comovidos com tanta beleza e lacrimejantes de tanto pólen, Nakameguro é um dos lugares que tem de se visitar. Do dia para a noite, numa manhã de março, o rio que lhe dá nome fica abobadado pelos ramos floridos que crescem em ambas as margens. É um iman de Instagram, com milhares que se acotovelam nas pontes sobre o rio Meguro para tirar selfies em comunhão com a beleza singela das sakuras, em ângulos inventivos que favorecem o fotografado e escondem a multidão em volta. Quem se disponha a esperar entre 3 e 4 horas para entrar no colossal Starbucks de Nakameguro talvez consiga um lugar na esplanada, com vista para o algodão doce que cobre o rio. Este Staba (shortname para Starbucks, pois os japoneses abreviam os nomes de tudo) é um lugar onde conflui o amor dos japoneses pelo sublime da natureza e pelo frenesi do consumismo. Cinco andares de excesso e preços inflacionados, que são um microcosmos da Tóquio cosmopolita e aberta ao mundo. Há cafés de mais de 20 proveniências, pizzas italianas e pastelaria francesa. Consta que a capital japonesa é o melhor lugar do mundo fora de Itália para se comer pizza, e já ouvi franceses, parisienses de gema, com tudo o que isso implica, admitir que se comem melhores macarrons e baguetes em Tóquio do que em Paris. Até há bifanas melhores do que muitas que se comem em Portugal. Mas não no Staba. Para isso, tem de se andar umas centenas de metros até Meguro Ginza Shotengai. É a principal rua comercial de Nakameguro, onde melhor se sente o pulsar do bairro nas 49 semanas do ano em que as cerejeiras não estão a roubar a cena. O café Y2T anuncia como especialidade “sandes de porco de Lisboa”. Dito assim parece estranho, mas é aquilo a que um português chama bifana. Uma das melhores bifanas que comi na vida. Simplesmente deram-lhe o nome errado, pois não é daquelas bifanas solitárias e tristes de Lisboa, mas

During cherry blossom season, when Tokyo explodes with all the beauty of these interlaced flowers, leaving residents and tourists moved by such beauty and tearful with so much pollen, Nakameguro is one of the places that must be visited. From daybreak to nightfall, in on any day of March, the river is framed by interweaving blossoming branches of trees growing on either bank. This is an Instagram paradise, with thousands elbowing their way to the bridges over the river Meguro to take selfies in communion with the unique beauty of the sakuras at those inventive angles that most favour those photographed and hide away the surrounding crowds. Whoever is prepared to await three to four hours to get into the colossal Nakameguro Starbucks may perhaps get a place on the terrace overlooking the cotton candy effect covering the river. This Staba (an abbreviation for Starbucks as the Japanese shorten the names of everything) is a place through which the Japanese love of the sublime of nature flows in parallel with their frenetic consumerism. Five storeys of excess and inflated prices, which are a microcosm of the cosmopolitan and open to the world Tokyo. There are cafés from over 20 different origins, Italian pizzas and French pastries. It is stated that the Japanese capital is the best place in the world outside of Italy to eat pizza, and I have heard French persons, even those Parisian by birth, with everything such implies, accept that they eat better macaroons and baguettes in Tokyo than in Paris. There are also Portuguese bifanas better than many you will ever eat in Portugal. However, not at Staba. To this end, you need to walk the few hundred metres to Meguro Ginza Shotengai. This is the main retail street in Nakameguro, where they do this job in great style. At Y2T, there is also Portuguese wine, both verdes and others from the Dão, and the wifi password is 2014cabriz, the year the establishment opened and the name of the first Portuguese wine producer with

FILIPE SANTOS COSTA, JORNALISTA JOURNALIST

uma bifana à portuense, com muitas fatiazinhas sobrepostas e a desfazerem-se, e molhanga de sobra, num pão que, não sendo papo-seco, faz as vezes com galhardia. No Y2T também há vinho português, verde e do Dão, e a password do wifi é 2014cabriz, o ano de abertura do estabelecimento e o nome do primeiro produtor de vinho português com quem o proprietário, Tomohiro-san, fez negócio.

Nada liga Tomohiro a Portugal a não ser ter-se apaixonado por vinho verde. Quando visitou Portugal, para conhecer as origens da sua paixão, descobriu outras razões para gostar do país, incluindo bifanas e outras iguarias, e mais vinho para além do verde. Até essa epifania, Tomohiro tinha com Portugal a mesma relação que a generalidade dos seus 128 milhões de compatriotas: é a pátria do Cristiano Ronaldo e o primeiro país ocidental referido nos manuais de História do Japão. No 5.º ano de escolaridade os japoneses aprendem que três navegadores portugueses aportaram em Tanegashima em 1543. Foi um acidente: era a estação dos tufões, e o junco chinês que devia levá-los para Macau foi arrastado até esta pequena ilha no sul do Japão. Nas escolas não há mais do que uma ou duas aulas sobre a chegada dos portugueses ao Japão. Mas, como tantos acasos, esse mudou a História. Com os portugueses, também chegaram ao arquipélago a cultura e a ciência europeias do Renascimento, o cristianismo e o comércio de bens com o Ocidente. E as espingardas. “Aliás, a ordem de referência é precisamente a inversa” – como nota Eduardo Kol de Carvalho no livro “Nós e os Japoneses”: a chegada dos portugueses é referida, antes de mais, porque levaram o arcabuz, a primeira arma de fogo vista no Japão, “o que pode chocar-nos à primeira vista se não soubermos que foi graças à espingarda introduzida no Japão pelos portugueses que os chefes militares puderam restaurar o poder central e terminar com guerras que opunham os senhores feudais e dilaceraram o país.” Da chegada de dois Antónios e um Francisco ao Japão resultaram outros factos que merecem menção: 1) a espingarda foi a primeira invenção ocidental adotada pelos japoneses: desmontaram-na, examinaram-na, e

whom the owner, Tomohiro-san, did business. Nothing connected Tomohiro to Portugal other than a passion for vinho verde. On visiting Portugal, to find out about the origins of this pleasure, he discovered other reasons to like the place, including bifanas and other specialities, and other wines beyond the verdes. Through to this epiphany, Tomohiro perceived Portugal pretty much like his 128 million of his compatriots: the birthplace of Cristiano Ronaldo and the first western country to get referenced in Japanese history manuals. In the 5th year of the Japanese education system, students learn that three Portuguese vessels anchored off Tanegashima in 1543. This was an accident: it was typhoon season and the Chinese junk that should have led them to Macau had been blown off course as far as this small island in the south of Japan. There are not more than one or two classes covering the misfortunate arrival of the Portuguese in Japan. However, as with so many other random events, this changed history. Along with the Portuguese, the archipelago also saw the arrival of the European culture and science of the Renaissance, Christianity and the beginnings of trade with the West. And firepower. “Indeed, the order of reference is precisely the opposite” – as Eduardo Kol de Carvalho notes in his book “Nós e os Japoneses”: the arrival of the Portuguese gets mentioned, first and foremost, because they brought an arquebus, the first firearm seen in Japan, “which may appear to shock us on first sight until realising that it was thanks to the rifles introduced to Japan by the Portuguese that the military leaders were able to restore central power and end the constant warfare among the feudal warlords that had ripped the country apart.”

The arrival of two Antónios and one Francisco in Japan generated other consequences worthy of mention: 1) the rifle was the first western invention adopted by the Japanese: they dismantled it, examined it and decided to remake it themselves, but better as has since happened with everything arriving from the exterior that impresses

A obra de Vhils, oferecida pela CV&A, na embaixada de Portugal no Japão

decidiram-se a refazê-la à sua maneira, em melhor, como aconteceu com tudo o que lhes interessou vindo do exterior, fossem armas, caminhos de ferro ou pizzas; 2) Nagasaki, uma vilória de pescadores, passou a ser o principal porto do Japão, recebendo a Nau do Trato, uma das rotas mais lucrativas para os portugueses da Ásia, a que os japoneses tanto chamavam kurofune (navio negro) como takarabune (navio do tesouro); 3) os jesuítas receberam a missão de converter o Japão e foram tão eficazes (a certo ponto, tendo convertido mais de 150 mil almas, incluindo grandes senhores feudais) que passaram a ser olhados como uma ameaça ao poder central do xogun –tanto que portugueses e espanhóis acabaram perseguidos e expulsos (não apenas os missionários, mas também os comerciantes); 4) a partir dessa expulsão, os japoneses voltaram a fechar-se ao mundo com os éditos de sakoku (significa, literalmente, “país fechado”). Foram dois séculos de isolamento, quando o resto do mundo fazia o oposto. À porta do Café Y2T há um mapa de Portugal e um cartaz que anuncia a principal iguaria da casa: ビファナ – bifana escrito em katakana, o alfabeto criado pelos japoneses para palavras estrangeiras. A língua japonesa tem três alfabetos: kanji, adaptação dos caracteres chineses, primeira escrita utilizada no Japão; hiragana, alfabeto mais simples, criado para os não letrados; e katakana, específico para palavras estrangeiras, cuja necessidade surgiu quando os portugueses introduziram conceitos e objetos até então desconhecidos dos “japões”. Atualmente o katakana serve sobretudo para o japenglish, uma mixórdia linguística que adapta o inglês à pronúncia local, em palavras tão comuns como ‘depato’ (department store), ‘erebeta’ (elevator) ou ‘biru’ (beer). Mas começou com palavras nossas, relativas a coisas banais para nós, mas desconhecidas para eles, e que persistem até hoje com a designação luso-japonesa, como パン (pan/pão), ボタン (botan/botão), かるた (karuta/cartas de jogar), ビードロ (bidoro/vidro). Ou キリシタン (kirishitan/ cristão). Os manuais de História costumam referir a presença portuguesa no Japão como “o século cristão”, mas não acabou bem: a perseguição aos missionários jesuítas e aos cristãos japoneses incluiu decapitações, crucificações, apostasia e outros requintes de malvadez. O cristianismo só não foi totalmente erradicado do Japão porque algumas comunidades mantiveram clandestinamente o culto –ainda hoje há descendentes desses cristãos escondidos, e diversos vestígios desse culto secreto são património da humanidade classificado pela Unesco. Também o ‘matsuri’ (festa de rua) O-kunshi é uma reminiscência da Nagasaki cristã – com a expulsão dos portugueses e perseguição aos cristãos, a festa católica anual, com a sua sorumbática procissão, transformou-se num festival popular, celebrando as colheitas e uma divindade xintoísta. Perdeu-se em avé-marias o que se ganhou em folia. O prémio de consolação, para o catolicismo, é a popularidade de que gozam atualmente dos casamentos em estilo ocidental: as noivas adoram os vestidos brancos e o ritual, e aos domingos à tarde a promenade em frente à Estação de Tóquio parece a Exponoivas,

them, whether weapons, railways or pizzas; 2) Nagasaki, a fishing town, became the main port of Japan, the arrival point of the Nau do Trato trade vessel plying the route via Macau, one of the most lucrative for the Portuguese in Asia, which the Japanese named both kurofune (black ship) and takarabune (treasure ship); 3) the Jesuits took on the mission to convert Japan and were so efficient and effective (at one stage, having converted over 150,000 souls, including major feudal lords) that they became perceived as a threat to the central power of the shogun – to such an extent that the Portuguese and Spanish were then subject to persecution and expulsion (and not only the missionaries but also the traders); 4) following this expulsion, the Japanese then again shut themselves off from the world in accordance with the sakoku edits (literally meaning “country closed”). There then came two centuries of isolation when the rest of the world was doing exactly the opposite.

At the entrance to Y2T, there is a map of Portugal and a menu announcing the house speciality: ビファナ – bifana written in katakana, the alphabet the Japanese established for foreign words. The Japanese language incorporates three alphabets: kanji, an adaptation of Chinese characters, the first form of writing introduced to Japan; hiragana, a simpler alphabet created for the illiterate; and katakana, specifically for foreign words with this need arising when the Portuguese introduced concepts and objects hitherto unknown to the Japanese.

Currently, katakana serves above all for japenglish, a linguistic mixture that adapts English to the local pronunciation for words as common as ‘depato’ (department store), ‘erebeta’ (elevator) or ‘biru’ (beer). However, this all began with Portuguese words relating to what were then common objects but unknown in Japan and that remain today with this Portuguese-Japanese designation, including パン (pan/ pão/bread), ボタン (botan/botão/button), かるた (karuta/cartas de jogar/playing cards), ビードロ (bidoro/ vidro/glass). Ou キリシタン (kirishitan/cristão/Christian). The history textbooks commonly refer to the Portuguese presence in Japan as “the Christian century” but which did not end well: the persecution of the Jesuit missionaries and Japanese Christians included apostasy or decapitation, crucifixion or other more refined forms of cruelty. Christianism was only not totally eradicated from Japan because some communities clandestinely continued with their worship practices – there are today descendants of these hidden Christians and the various remnants of this secret worship are now Unesco World Heritage. Furthermore, the O-kunshi ‘matsuri’ (street festival) is a legacy of Christian Nagasaki – following the expulsion of the Portuguese and the persecution of the Christians, the annual Catholic festival, with its solemn procession, underwent transformation int a popular street festival, celebrating the harvest and a Shinto divinity. A few Hail Marys got lost but a party was gained. The consolation prize for Catholicism is the current popularity of Western style white weddings: the brides love the dresses and the ritual and, on Sunday afternoons, the promenade in front of Tokyo Station looks like a wedding fair with all the

cheia de recém-casados em sessões fotográficas. Depois da expulsão dos missionários e comerciantes portugueses, só em 1903 Portugal retomou relações diplomáticas com o Japão. O arquipélago preparava-se para um extraordinário desenvolvimento, que lhe desenfreou a ambição e conduziu ao desastre da II Guerra Mundial. Portugal, a antiga potência global, vivia a decadência da nobreza arruinada. O Japão reergueu-se sempre; Portugal nem por isso. Há bibliotecas inteiras sobre “o milagre japonês”, que na verdade são vários: a explosão industrial da transição para o século XX; a reconstrução do único país dizimado por bombas atómicas até se afirmar como segunda maior economia do mundo; a capacidade de superar sempre as condicionantes da natureza – terramotos, tsunamis, tufões, vulcões ativos, clima extremo, pouca terra arável, reduzido território habitável… Sem lamúrias nem autoindulgência, mas com estoicismo e sentido de comunidade, características que tanto erguem uma nação como ajudam a suportar os apertos do metro em hora de ponta na estação de Shinjuku. Em março deste ano a representação diplomática de Portugal no Japão passou para novas instalações, finalmente à altura dos quase 500 anos que passaram desde o primeiro encontro. Quando lhe pediram uma obra para a nova embaixada, Alexandre Farto – a.k.a. Vhils – colocou Camões no centro da imagem, onde também se destacam o Monte Fuji e um pagode. Na inauguração da embaixada e da obra (oferecida pela Cunha Vaz & Associados), Vhils falou da arte como lugar de mediação. “A obra procura estabelecer um diálogo intercultural, explorando a riqueza simbólica e história partilhada entre Portugal e o Japão. A seleção de elementos como Camões, Monte Fuji, glimpses de olhares, palavras comuns entre os dois países, e templos japoneses, visa ilustrar pontos de encontro e convergência entre as duas culturas, enfatizando a importância do intercâmbio e da compreensão mútua. Visualmente, a obra incorpora tipografias e padrões específicos de cada país, como a caligrafia japonesa e os tradicionais azulejos portugueses, enfatizando a singularidade e a riqueza de cada tradição cultural. Ao utilizar a técnica de colagem de cartazes japoneses e subsequente pintura em branco, pretendo questionar a percepção das fronteiras culturais e destacar a fluidez e a permeabilidade das identidades”, explicou-me Vhils, entre viagens por outras paragens do globo. Fronteiras e permeabilidade, fluidez e convergência, intercâmbio e compreensão. Os conceitos por detrás da obra de Vhils em Tóquio são a essência daquilo que fez a história comum dos dois países. Com altos e baixos, com intencionalidade ou acaso, há uma ligação que não se quebra. Vhils fala de uma “conexão intrínseca entre culturas distintas, transcendendo as diferenças superficiais e revelando a universalidade da experiência humana”. Mesmo quando a distância não ajuda, a política não entende e os negócios não investem, pode ser essa a chave para entender a conexão entre Portugal e Japão.

newlyweds out in large numbers for photographic sessions. Following the expulsion of the Portuguese missionaries and traders, only in 1903 did Portugal resume diplomatic relations with Japan. The archipelago was then preparing for the extraordinary development that would unleash the global ambitions that burst in the disaster of World War Two. Portugal, the former global power, was living through the decadence of its bankrupt nobility. Japan has always re-emerged; Portugal not so much. There are entire libraries on the “Japanese miracle” while, in fact, there are various: the industrial boom in the dawn of the 20th century; the reconstruction of the only country decimated by atomic bombs and that stands proud as the world’s second largest economy; the resilience needed to always overcome its exposure to the extremes of natures – earthquakes, tsunamis, typhoons, erupting volcanoes, extreme climate conditions, a lack of arable land, limited living space… Without moaning or any self-indulgence but with stoicism and a sense of community, characteristics that both raised a nation and help cope with the overcrowding on the underground system in Shinjuku station at rush hour. In March of this year, the diplomatic mission of Portugal to Japan moved into new installations, finally and, at the time, almost 500 years after the first meeting. When commissioning a work for the new embassy, Alexandre Farto – a.k.a. Vhils – placed Camões at the centre of the work that also highlights Mount Fuji and a pagoda. At the inauguration of the embassy and the work (donated by Cunha Vaz & Associados), Vhils spoke of art as a place for mediation. “The work sets out to establish an intercultural dialogue, exploring the symbolic richness and shared history between Portugal and Japan. The selection of features such as Camões, Mount Fuji, glimpses the gazes, the common words shared by the two countries, Japanese temples, seeks to illustrate the points of meeting and convergence between the two cultures, emphasising the importance of mutual exchanges and comprehension. Visually, the work incorporates the typographies and patterns specific to each country, such as Japanese calligraphy and Portuguese tiles, highlighting the uniqueness and depth of each cultural tradition. In applying the collage techniques of Japanese posters and subsequent white painting, I seek to question the perceptions of cultural borders and stress the fluidity and permeability of identities”, Vhils explained to me on his travels between other parts of this globe. Boundaries and permeability, fluidity and convergence, exchange and understanding. The concepts behind the work of Vhils in Tokyo constitute the essence of that which makes the joint history of the two countries. With highs and lows, by intention or by chance, there is a connection that does not get broken. Vhils speaks of an “intrinsic connection between distinctive cultures, transcending the superficial differences and revealing the universality of human experience”. Even when distance does not help, the politicians do not understand each other and businesses are not investing, this may be the key to understanding the interlinkage between Portugal and Japan.