The Tanker War

Khuzestan along Iraq’s southeastern border, but it did not push to take large swaths of Iranian territory.51

Iraq’s ground offensives in 1988 were matched by a renewal of the so-called War of the Cities, utilizing Scud surface-to-surface missiles the Iraqis had reengineered in order to dramatically increase their range. Over the next several months, Iraq launched over 200 missiles against a variety of civilian targets in Iran, bringing the Iran-Iraq War home to parts of Iran that had not previously experienced the war directly. Iran’s response was weak because it now lacked the number of missiles required to retaliate fully against Iraq.

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As noted earlier, the Iraqis responded to the stalemate of the early 1980s by striking at Iran’s oil industry through air strikes on oil production facilities and ships. These attacks were not effective, but Iran retaliated against shipping heading for Iraqi ports with its own relatively ineffective attacks. As the stalemate lengthened, the intensity of the war over each nation’s oil lifeline increased, although neither state could effectively strike at the other. Iraq’s air force lacked the capability to effectively strike the distant Iranian targets, yet much of Iraq’s oil flowed through pipelines out of Iran’s reach or passed through nonbelligerent Kuwait and sailed through the Persian Gulf in neutral tankers. Kuwait and other Gulf states provided extensive financial support to Iraq’s war effort and provided neutral ports for war material bound for Iraq.

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Throughout 1986 Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti vessels increased, and the Iranians took the al-Faw Peninsula. The Kuwaitis responded in December 1986 by asking the United States if some Kuwaiti tankers could be reflagged as American vessels and escorted safely through the Persian Gulf by the U.S. Navy. In February 1987 the Iranians installed HY-2 Hai Ying “Silkworm” antiship missiles along the Strait of Hormuz, and in March President Ronald W. Rea-

Reprinted from Edward J. Marolda and Robert J. Schneller Jr., Shield and Sword: The United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (Washington, DC: Naval Historical Center, Department of the Navy, 1998), p. 34

Photo by PO3 Henry Cleveland, USN. Defense Imagery DN-SC-87-12584 Naval contact mines aboard the captured Iranian minelayer, Iran Ajr. Iran used mines extensively in the Iran-Iraq War. Iraq employed the same tactic during the Gulf War.

gan decided to go forward with the reflagging operation. However, this was not publically announced until May, soon after the Iraqi attack on the USS Stark. 54

In July 1987, the United States began the reflagging operation, which was designated Operation Earnest Will and later known as the Tanker War; it had an inauspicious start with one of the reflagged tankers, the Bridgetown, hitting an Iranian mine. The United States responded by rushing military forces to the theater. The threat to neutral shipping in the Persian Gulf was quite varied; it came from Iraqi aircraft, Iranian aircraft, Iranian mines, Iranian motor boats, Iranian surface-to-surface missiles, and Iranian naval vessels. The United States countered these diverse threats with an equally diverse combination of forces, including naval surface action groups, contingency Marine air-ground task forces, and special operations forces. In August, these forces were designated Joint Task Force Middle East under Rear Admiral Dennis M. Brooks, USN, under General Crist’s U.S. Central Command. Operation Earnest Will would be Central Command’s first combat operation, and the first combat operation run by a theater combatant command under a Marine commander in chief.55

The first Marine unit to deploy for Operation Earnest Will was Detachment 2 from the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit on board the USS Guadalcanal (LPH 7); the detachment consisted of a composite helicopter squadron, a force reconnaissance platoon, and supporting attachments, as well as an infantry company that was off-loaded on Diego Garcia before deploying to the Gulf. Detachment 2 was replaced in November 1987 by Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 1-88 on board the USS Okinawa (LPH 3); this task force comprised a composite helicopter squadron and an infantry company with supporting attachments. Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 1-88 was in turn replaced in February 1988 by Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2-88 from the USS Trenton (LPD 14). It consisted of a composite helicopter squadron and an infantry company—Company B, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines—the same company left in Diego Garcia by Detachment 2 the previous year. Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 2-88 was relieved by Contingency Marine Air-Ground Task Force 3-88 in June 1988.

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In order to better protect the northern sea lanes near Farsi Island, two barges (the Hercules and Wimbrown VII) were leased and used as semimobile bases from which special operations helicopters and patrol boats could counter the Iranian small craft threatening shipping and oil platforms in the northern Persian Gulf. Each of these bases embarked a small Marine security force from the rotating Marine air-ground task forces, in addition to U.S. Army and U.S. Navy special operations forces. The barges and their patrol craft were soon successful. On 21 September, Marines provided cover and support as U.S. special operations forces captured the Iranian vessel Iran Ajr engaged in clandestine mining in the Gulf. And on 8 October, the Marines provided the same support and cover as U.S. forces engaged four Iranian speedboats near Farsi Island.

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Operation Earnest Will continued throughout 1988 with U.S. Navy vessels escorting tanker convoys through the Gulf as other forces secured the passage from Iranian or Iraqi mines, air strikes, and missiles. For the Marines, the routine involved long days standing watch on the barges or the various Navy amphibious vessels on which they were deployed; Marine helicopter crews also flew patrols, transferred supplies, and escorted convoys while conducting visual searches for mines. Some 127 escort missions were completed during the operation,

Defense Imagery DN-ST-89-01414 An aerial view of the Dutch heavy lift ship Mighty Servant II transporting the guided missile frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58). The frigate was damaged when it struck an Iranian mine while on patrol in the Persian Gulf.

Photo by Cpl John Hyp. Defense Imagery DM-SN-93-00987 The main building of the Iranian Sassan oil platform burns after being hit by a BGM-71 tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided (TOW) missile fired from a Marine AH-1 Cobra helicopter as part of Operation Praying Mantis.

securing the sea lanes through the Persian Gulf for all the nonbelligerents along its coast during the vicious regional conflict. Despite the routine, the danger was real: on 12 February 1988, the Iraqis again mistakenly attacked a U.S. vessel, the USS Chandler (DDG 996), but this time the attack missed.

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On 14 April 1988, the frigate USS Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) found itself amidst several Iranian mines off the Qatar Peninsula. While attempting to avoid these mines, the ship struck an unobserved mine and suffered extensive damage below the waterline; 10 sailors were wounded. Over the next 10 days, eight more Iranian mines were discovered, and President Reagan ordered General Crist to retaliate. Two Iranian oil platforms, Sassan and Sirri, were to be destroyed, and an Iranian naval vessel

was targeted. The retaliation strikes were named Operation Praying Mantis.

On 18 April 1988, Operation Praying Mantis began with U.S. Navy destroyers opening fire on the Sassan platform after repeated warnings to the Iranian crew to evacuate. The Iranians returned fire ineffectively but were suppressed, and they fled the platform. Marines of Company B, 1st Battalion, 2d Marines, and force reconnaissance boarded and secured the platform. After searching the platform, the Marines evacuated, and the platform was destroyed by explosive charges. Other U.S. Navy vessels bombarded and destroyed the Sirri oil platform.

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As the Iranian oil platforms burned, the U.S. Navy began its largest surface warfare action since World War II. The Iranian frigates Sabalan and Sahand stayed away from the battle at first, but Iranian speedboats attacked several neutral ships traversing the Gulf. U.S. Navy aircraft responded, sinking one speedboat and damaging several others. The Iranian Combattante II fast-attack ship Joshan unsuccessfully attacked U.S. naval vessels with a guided missile and was itself sunk in response. The Iranian frigate Sahand sortied out soon after and fired on U.S. Navy aircraft. Grumman A6E Intruders and the destroyer USS Joseph Strauss (DDG 16) returned fire. The Sahand was stopped dead in the water and then sunk by an explosion when her magazines blew. Her sister ship, Sabalan, sailed out into the Strait of Hormuz and engaged American aircraft as well. A-6 Intruders from the USS Enterprise (CVN 65) bombed the Sabalan, which had a reputation for targeting the crew quarters of neutral merchantmen with concentrated machine-gun fire, leaving the Iranian frigate dead in the water and clearly taking on water. Iranian tugboats were allowed to tow her back to port.

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Operation Praying Mantis was not without cost for the United States, however. A Bell AH-1T Sea Cobra from Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadron 167, flown by Captain Stephen C. Leslie and Captain Kenneth W. Hill, crashed during the afternoon while avoiding Iranian antiaircraft defenses. Both pilots perished in the crash and were awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross posthumously. Despite this loss, Operation Praying Mantis was a success, its impact magnified by the simultaneous successful Iraqi land offensive on the al-Faw Peninsula. As described above, Iraqi offensives continued through the spring and into the summer, as did the War of the Cities. From the Iranian perspective, the Iraqi offensives and the American naval operations appeared coordinated.

61 http://www.imam-khomeini.com Ayatollah Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of Iran from the 1979 revolution until his death in 1989. Upon accepting the end of the Iran-Iraq War, he said, “We must choose one of two alternatives—either martyrdom or victory, which we both regard as victory. . . . Happy are the disabled, the prisoners of war and those missing in action and the great families of the martyrs. And how unhappy I am because I have survived and have drunk the poisonous chalice of accepting the resolution, and feel ashamed in front of the greatness and sacrifices of this great nation.”

Operation Earnest Will’s closing act was a tragedy, and the final nudge toward peace that the Iran-Iraq War needed. On 3 July 1988, the cruiser USS Vincennes (CG 49) shot down Iran Air Flight 655, a civilian Airbus A300B2 passenger aircraft. All 290 passengers on board the flight were killed. The crew of the Vincennes mistakenly believed that they were firing on an Iranian Grumman F-14 Tomcat. Despite U.S. assurances that the attack on the civilian airliner was a tragic error, the Iranian government appears to have believed it was intentional, part of a pattern that included successful Iraqi land offensives, the increased intensity of the War of the Cities, and the destruction of much of the Iranian navy in Operation Praying Mantis. On 18 July 1988, the Iranians accepted a United Nations cease-fire resolution, ending the IranIraq War and the Tanker War.

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Iraq ended the Iran-Iraq War in a seemingly strong position. Iran had been defeated after eight grueling years, and the Iraqi military was considered a powerful regional threat. Under Saddam Hussein’s leadership, the Iraqis looked forward to increased leadership within the Arab and Islamic worlds as well as to economic growth. Iraq’s considerable foreign debt and hostility toward the Western powers as well as Saddam’s ambitions and paranoia now set the stage for the next large Persian Gulf conflict.

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