Leaving the Desert

Photo by Sgt Jose D. Trejo. Defense Imagery DA-ST-92-08032 Army Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf (at left), commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, and LtGen Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, commander of Joint Forces in Saudi Arabia, sit across the table from an interpreter and (from left to right) Iraqi LtGens Muhammad Abdez Rahman Al-Dagitistani, Sabin Abdel-Aziz Al Douri, and Salah Aboud Mahmoud during cease-fire talks at Safwan, Iraq.

their firing positions during each attack. On 5 March, the last of the Iraqis were transferred ashore to the Army’s military police, joining the rest of the enemy prisoners of war.

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On 3 March, General Norman Schwarzkopf and General Khaled bin Sultan met with Sultan Hashim Ahmad, deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and Lieutenant General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, commander of the destroyed III Corps, at Safwan, Iraq, in order to formalize the cease-fire. In the short meeting they dictated the terms of ceasefire to the Iraqis, thus officially ending the major combat period of the Gulf War. During the talks, the Iraqis requested and received permission to fly helicopters over their own territory, the only concession they were granted.

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The formal cease-fire agreement made it clear that the United States was not going to continue to Baghdad and started the troops in the Persian Gulf thinking about when they could return to the United States. Moving hundreds of thousands of troops and their equipment to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf’s waters had taken months, and returning those troops and supplies would take months as well. The equipment and supplies needed to be returned in good condition to avoid waste, and the territories of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait needed to be left in the condition in which they existed prior to the war, as much as possible. Additionally, although the cease-fire was signed, no formal peace agreement was reached, and Iraq remained a threat to peace and stability in the region after the war, albeit a greatly reduced one. Iraq’s ability to sow discord was reduced by the conflict, but this left a power vacuum in the region that could easily be filled by nations such as Iran or Syria. It was apparent even as the cease-fire was signed that an American presence in the region would be required for the foreseeable future.

The primary consideration in the withdrawal was that the Marines maintain combat readiness while departing the area of operations, returning as “deployable air-ground task forces.” Marines would generally return to the United States with the same units with which they deployed to Southwest Asia. The priority would be “first in/first out” according to units. The initial I Marine Expeditionary Force units to depart the Gulf were those that deployed with the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Au-

gust; they began returning to the States on 8 March.12

General Walter Boomer established the basic priorities and guidelines for the retrograde movement in the first days after the cease-fire, warning his staff on 1 March that the “most dangerous part of the campaign, as it turns out, may still be ahead of us. That is moving all this stuff out without getting anybody hurt.” With the threat of war apparently ended, there was a real worry that Marines would lose focus, resulting in deadly accidents. Many hazardous tasks were required for the withdrawal—ammunition needed to be properly stored, for instance, and large, dangerous equipment needed to be operated—and these jobs required focus.

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Additionally, there was concern about the massive pile of weapons abandoned by the Iraqis in Kuwait. Marines were not permitted to bring back firearms, grenades, or other potentially dangerous war souvenirs. As for other types of souvenirs, General Boomer instructed that “as far as I’m concerned, what the troops find on the battlefield in terms of hats, belt buckles, that kind of thing they should be allowed to take home, and they are going to do it. They ought to have something to show their grandchildren in a few years.” Field historians working for the Marine Corps History and Museums Division chose pieces of captured Iraqi equipment for later museum exhibits, and major units were permitted to bring back a limited number of trophies (such as field guns and armor) for display at their command post.

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Another duty that needed to be accomplished before all the Marines involved returned to the States was convening the various awards boards to recognize those Marines who had performed exceptionally well during the conflict. General Boomer had specific guidance for the awards boards: “One of the things that I saw coming out of Vietnam that continued to disgust me, and has for the last 25 years, is the fact that most of our young Marines, time and time again, got screwed while senior offi-

A pile of captured Iraqi arms in Kuwait City. The Iraqis left weapons and equipment of all descriptions littering the battlefield.

Photo by Col John Shotwell. Marine Corps History Division Reference Branch photo files

Photo by PO1 Joe Gawlowicz, USN. Defense Imagery DN-ST-92-00829 An HY-2 Silkworm antiship missile left behind by retreating Iraqi troops sits on a flatbed trailer as captured equipment and ordnance are prepared for shipment following the Gulf War.

cers got awards. I promise you that will not happen, and those of you sitting on these awards boards pay attention to the youngsters, and if I catch you downgrading what a commander has recommended for a lance corporal in terms of heroic award, I’ll disband the board and start again.” In the event, 2 Navy Crosses, 15 Silver Stars, 22 Distinguished Flying Crosses, and 523 Bronze Stars as well as thousands of other awards were presented to Marines for meritorious actions during the Gulf War.

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While the withdrawal was taking place, the Marine Corps instituted a major effort to preserve the institutional lessons learned from the Gulf War. The Marine Corps Combat Development Command deployed a large battle assessment team under Colonel Clifford L. Stanley to gather postcombat data and interviews. This data was collated, analyzed, and published through the Marine Corps Lessons Learned System; it was eventually deposited in the General Alfred M. Gray Marine Corps Research Center’s Southwest Asia Archive in Quantico, Virginia.

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On 5 March, General Boomer reestablished the I Marine Expeditionary Force headquarters in alJubayl, Saudi Arabia, and reunited the separate command posts that had run the liberation. The combat replacement regiment was dissolved on 21 March, and on 26 March the first Marines from the expeditionary force’s headquarters began to return to the United States. General Boomer and most of his staff departed on 16 April. On 21 April, a new Marine command was instituted for the region: Marine Forces, Southwest Asia. Major General Norman E. Ehlert, former deputy commander of U.S. Marine Forces Central Command, was the first commander of this new organization.

The Marine forces afloat, which fell under the control of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, were already embarked for the most part and could depart Southwest Asia relatively quickly. The 13th Marine Expeditionary Force (Special Operations Capable) was the first to depart, leaving the Persian Gulf proper on 11 March. The unit sailed back to San Diego, California, making stops in the Philippines and Hawaii before arriving on 16 April. The 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was the next amphibious landing force to leave the Gulf, departing on 4 March. Returning to the United States in two transit groups, the brigade returned via the Suez Canal and the Mediterranean. The groups reached the States and unloaded from 17 to 19 April.

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When the 4th Marine Expeditionary Brigade departed the region, Brigadier General Peter Rowe’s 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade became Central Command’s landing force and its strategic reserve

as well. It faced two difficulties right away. First, the USS Tripoli was badly damaged and unavailable due to the mine it struck on 17 February. Second, USS New Orleans had replaced the Tripoli with the mine countermeasures force and was still involved in mine clearing operations, and thus unavailable. Amphibious Group 3 had lacked sufficient shipping space from the beginning, and losing both of these large amphibious vessels made reloading the brigade difficult. The brigade nonetheless began reloading after its stint ashore, and by 10 March the entire brigade, aside from those units awaiting the return of the New Orleans,was reembarked.18

On 17 March, Colonel Robert Garner’s 11th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable) separated from the 5th Marine Expeditionary Force and departed the Gulf. As originally intended, it comprised Battalion Landing Team 3/1, Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron (Composite) 268, and Marine Expeditionary Unit Service Support Group 11 and was embarked on Amphibious Squadron 1, commanded by Captain Michael Barker, USN. Captain Barker’s squadron included the USS New Orleans (finally returned from mine-clearing duties), USS Denver, USS Germantown, USS Peoria, and USS Mobile. Colonel Garner and Captain Barker’s force remained in the Gulf as Central Command’s afloat reserve until July, training with local forces and planning contingency operations for the unrest in Ethiopia (these never came to pass, as the Ethiopian crisis stabilized).

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On 7 May, the 5th Marine Expeditionary Brigade and Amphibious Group 3 departed the Persian Gulf on their homeward journey. It was not a direct journey, however. In April, Cyclone Marian had devastated Bangladesh, and the brigade and amphibious group were ordered to undertake a humanitarian relief effort. On 17 May, the force arrived off Bangladesh and began relief operations. After two weeks of successful operations, their mission ended

Aircraft Losses due to Enemy Action in the 1990–91 Gulf War

Dates: 1991 Aircraft Type Squadron Cause

Result

18 January OV-10 VMO-2 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot and observer captured

28 January AV-8B VMA-311 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot captured

9 February F/A-18 VMFA-451 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

9 February AV-8B VMA-231 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot captured

12 February AV-8B VMA-542 antiaircraft artillery aircraft damaged

21 February F/A-18 VMFA-314 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

21 February F/A-18 VMFA-121 surface-to-air missile

21 February A-6E VMA-224 antiaircraft artillery aircraft damaged

aircraft damaged

21 February F/A-18 VMFA-333 surface-to-air missile

23 February F/A-18 VMFA-451 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

aircraft damaged

23 February AV-8B VMA-542 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot killed in action

23 February AV-8B VMA-311 antiaircraft artillery aircraft damaged

24 February F/A-18 VMFA-314 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged

24 February F/A-18 VMFA-314 surface-to-air missile aircraft damaged 25 February OV-10 VMO-1 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot captured, observer killed in action 25 February AV-8B VMA-542 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot parachuted to friendly hands

27 February AV-8B VMA-331 surface-to-air missile aircraft lost, pilot killed in action

Photo by Sgt Rodney Jones. Defense Imagery DF-ST-92-08163 LtCol Clifford M. Acree clasps his young daughter as former American POWs are greeted by their families on arrival at Andrews Air Force Base, Maryland, on 10 March 1991.

on 29 May when the ships departed Bangladesh and continued back to the United States. The brigade finally completed its deployment when it disembarked in San Diego on 29 June.

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As the Marines in the amphibious task forces were sailing home, the Marines who had deployed via airlift and Maritime Prepositioning Ships were reloading those squadrons and preparing to return home as well. The 1st Marine Division returned to Saudi Arabia from Kuwait on 5–6 March, and the division’s first units into Saudi Arabia began redeploying home right away. By the end of March, over half of the division had returned, and the entire division was back in the United States by 24 April.

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The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing nearly ended the war with a tragedy when two Marine F/A-18 Hornets collided while conducting air-to-air combat training on 8 March. The pilots, both from Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 212, parachuted to safety following the collision. No Marine F/A-18s had been lost to Iraqi antiaircraft gunnery or missiles in six weeks of air combat; now two were lost in a training accident only a week after the war ended. Squadrons from the wing began returning to the United States during the spring: eight left in March, several others in April, and the final two squadrons of the wing departed on 17 May.

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The 2d Marine Division remained in Kuwait, establishing a forward defense as the Kuwaiti and Coalition forces began the extensive effort required to clean and reconstruct Kuwait. The Tiger Brigade separated from the division on 23 March, and the division, minus the 8th Marines, returned to Saudi Arabia on 30 March. The 8th Marines remained in Kuwait providing an American presence until midMay, when the last of the 2d Marine Division’s troops returned to the United States.

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The 1st Force Service Support Group’s job before leaving Southwest Asia was just as large, and just as critical, as its job had been when arriving. Three squadrons of Maritime Prepositioning Ships had to be reloaded, and reloaded so that their stores and equipment would be in excellent shape if they were called on for another emergency. Large amounts of unused stores and equipment had to be safely and economically returned to the United States. For example, when the conflict ended, over 60 percent of the Marine Corps’ ammunition stocks were in the Persian Gulf region. Cleaning and restoring the equipment was a major effort, and the