Standing Down after Victory
213
Photo by Sgt Jose D. Trejo. Defense Imagery DA-ST-92-08032
Army Gen H. Norman Schwarzkopf (at left), commander in chief of U.S. Central Command, and LtGen Khalid bin Sultan bin Abdul Aziz, commander of Joint Forces in Saudi Arabia, sit across the table from an interpreter and (from left to right) Iraqi LtGens Muhammad Abdez Rahman Al-Dagitistani, Sabin Abdel-Aziz Al Douri, and Salah Aboud Mahmoud during cease-fire talks at Safwan, Iraq.
their firing positions during each attack. On 5 March, the last of the Iraqis were transferred ashore to the Army’s military police, joining the rest of the enemy prisoners of war.10 On 3 March, General Norman Schwarzkopf and General Khaled bin Sultan met with Sultan Hashim Ahmad, deputy chief of staff of the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, and Lieutenant General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, commander of the destroyed III Corps, at Safwan, Iraq, in order to formalize the cease-fire. In the short meeting they dictated the terms of ceasefire to the Iraqis, thus officially ending the major combat period of the Gulf War. During the talks, the Iraqis requested and received permission to fly helicopters over their own territory, the only concession they were granted.11
Leaving the Desert The formal cease-fire agreement made it clear that the United States was not going to continue to Baghdad and started the troops in the Persian Gulf thinking about when they could return to the United States. Moving hundreds of thousands of troops and their equipment to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf’s waters had taken months, and returning those troops
and supplies would take months as well. The equipment and supplies needed to be returned in good condition to avoid waste, and the territories of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait needed to be left in the condition in which they existed prior to the war, as much as possible. Additionally, although the cease-fire was signed, no formal peace agreement was reached, and Iraq remained a threat to peace and stability in the region after the war, albeit a greatly reduced one. Iraq’s ability to sow discord was reduced by the conflict, but this left a power vacuum in the region that could easily be filled by nations such as Iran or Syria. It was apparent even as the cease-fire was signed that an American presence in the region would be required for the foreseeable future. The primary consideration in the withdrawal was that the Marines maintain combat readiness while departing the area of operations, returning as “deployable air-ground task forces.” Marines would generally return to the United States with the same units with which they deployed to Southwest Asia. The priority would be “first in/first out” according to units. The initial I Marine Expeditionary Force units to depart the Gulf were those that deployed with the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade in Au-
