7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

Birth of the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons

In 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown put the Prepositioning Program into place. General Robert H. Barrow, 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps, later recalled how Dr. Brown first brought the concept up to him:

I think it was at an Armed Forces Policy

Council meeting. That would be on Monday morning at eleven o’clock. Harold Brown said to me, “Bob, could I see you for a minute?” I’ve already described Hal Brown.

I like him very much, but he’s not given to small talk so I knew it was something apart.

He got me aside, and he said, and I’m paraphrasing obviously, “Do Marines always have to storm a shore?” Isn’t that a strange question? He’s not given to such small talk.

I read a lot into it.

So, I fired back. I said, “No, sir. They surely do not. An amphibious operation is but a means to an end. Marines do most of their fighting after they have gotten ashore.

Getting ashore—we want that to be as little fighting as we can possibly make it, but knowing that you cannot always expect to go for some undefended place, somebody has to know how to do it, and we call that amphibious warfare, but it’s a mean to an end. So, to answer your question, no, sir, we don’t.”

He said, “In other words, Marines, if you had their equipment aboard some other kind of ship that could be brought into a port or somehow moved over to the shore in an environment that was not threatening, the Marines would do that, do you think?” I said, “We would do that extremely well because it still has a maritime character about it, and we’re accustomed to having one foot on the beach and one foot in the sea.” He said, “Well, that’s very interesting.”

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The Prepositioning Program was a response to a perceived weakness in America’s strategic posture; the Iran hostage crisis put a spotlight on America’s inability to project power into the Persian Gulf region, despite the region’s relative importance. In Europe and the Pacific, the United States maintained large bases on the territory of allies, but this was neither practical nor feasible in the Middle East (see chapter 1).

The new program was tied into the creation of the Rapid Joint Deployment Task Force. The Prepositioning Program put all of the equipment for a Marine expeditionary brigade as well as enough supplies for the brigade to fight for 30 days on a squadron of purpose-built vessels of the U.S. Military Sealift Command. The personnel and personal equipment of the brigade would be deployed by the Military Airlift Command to the region where it could rendezvous with a Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron. The concept required a friendly host nation with welldeveloped airfields and ports; a great deal of aid was given to the various Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to build up the infrastructure required to support a rapid military deployment in the region if required.

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the same day that aviation and ground forces are loaded into a theater; that naval ships, MPS [Maritime Prepositioning Ships], can be moved before the decision is made. And it is a very prudent decision, in our belief, to move those forces earlier so they are available to the National Command when the time comes. We believe that we would have been better positioned to have operated had those ships been moved, say, on the second or third day of August.”

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Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, commanded by Major General John I. Hopkins, arrived in Saudi Arabia in mid-August, where they joined with the equipment from Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two.

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General Hoar later noted:

The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was the first ground element that had tanks and armored personnel carriers. It was the first element that was capable of meeting the threat that existed in Kuwait. But it was more than that; it was an air-ground team as we all know, that had fixed wing, rotary wing . . . had an air-ground task force headquarters. It had its full suite of logistics for 30 days, so it was self-sustaining for 30 days. . . . Marine forces were arriving not only with that combat

power, ready to be put into operation, but in addition to that brought [their] logistics as well.8

The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, like all Marine air-ground task forces, was a tripartite formation, with a ground, air, and logistics component. Logistical support for the brigade was provided by Colonel Alexander W. Powell’s Brigade Service Support Group 7, comprising Combat Service Support Detachments 71, 72, and 73. The ground component was the 7th Marines (Reinforced) under the command of Colonel Carlton W. Fulford Jr. This regimental combat team contained four infantry battalions (1st Battalion, 7th Marines; 2d Battalion, 7th Marines; 3d Battalion, 9th Marines; and 1st Battalion, 5th Marines); the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion; the 3d Amphibious Assault Battalion; the 3d Tank Battalion; and artillery of the 3d Battalion, 11th Marines (Reinforced), as well as other, smaller associated units. The 7th Marines was well trained in desert warfare; it served as part of the garrison of the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms in the Mojave Desert of southern California.

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The aviation combat element was Marine Aircraft Group 70, commanded by Colonel Manfred A. Rietsch. This composite air group included fixedwing, helicopter, and air-defense missile squadrons in addition to its supporting units. Fixed-wing aircraft included McDonnell Douglas F/A-18A and F/A18C Hornets in Marine Fighter Attack Squadrons 314, 235, 333, and 451. A-6E Intruders came with Marine All-Weather Attack Squadron 224. McDonnell Douglas AV-8B Harrier IIs from Marine Attack Squadrons 311 and 542 rounded out the complement of strike aircraft. Helicopter transport was provided by Boeing Vertol CH-46E Sea Knight medium-lift helicopters of Marine Medium Helicopter Squadron 161 and Sikorsky CH-53D Sea Stallion and CH-53E Super Stallion heavy-lift helicopters of Marine Heavy Helicopter Squadrons 462, 465, and 466. Bell-Textron AH-1W Super Cobras and UH-1N Iroquois (more commonly known as “Hueys”) were provided by Marine Light Attack Helicopter Squadrons 367 and 369.10

The brigade deployed very quickly; the first Marines debarked from their military airlift flights in Saudi Arabia on 14 August. After the long transoceanic air flight, arrival in Saudi Arabia was memorable for most Marines. Sergeant James I. Mabus of Marine Aircraft Control Group 38 described “the back hatch of the plane opening . . . and the hot air shooting into

M60A1 tanks from the 1st Tank Battalion fire rounds on 11 September 1990 as the battalion conducts live-fire training during Operation Desert Shield in Saudi Arabia. Finding time and space to conduct needed training on ranges was difficult throughout the deployment.

Defense Imagery DM-SN-92-01310

Photo courtesy of Maj Thomas P. Simon Warehouses provided temporary billeting for Marines newly arrived in Saudi Arabia during the early days of Operation Desert Shield. These quarters were hot and uncomfortable, and consequently most Marines were glad when they deployed to defensive positions in the desert.

the aircraft, stifling with the strong scent of jet fumes. Someone in the plane said, ‘This might not be hell, but we can see it from here.’ . . . It took a while for the mind to accept . . . that you are now in a truly foreign place that remains this hot all day long.”

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General Hopkins’s brigade was the first to use the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons as intended. Three of the ships of Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two were present at Diego Garcia when the order to move arrived: MV Cpl Louis J. Hauge Jr. (T-AK 3000), MV 1stLt Alexander Bonnyman Jr. (T-AK 3003), and MV PFC James Anderson Jr. (T-AK 3002). These three set sail at once for al-Jubayl, Saudi Arabia, which they reached on 15 August. MV Pvt Harry Fisher (T-AK 3004) was rerouted to Florida for scheduled maintenance when the call came; it changed course for Saudi Arabia as well, arriving on 24 August. MV PFC William B. Baugh (T-AK 3001) was already in Florida undergoing scheduled maintenance; it departed Florida and arrived in Saudi Arabia on 5 September. In addition the aircraft maintenance ship USNS Curtiss (T-AVB 4) deployed to support Marine Aircraft Group 70, but unexpected engine problems en route delayed the Curtiss and it did not arrive in Saudi Arabia until 30 September.

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Conditions in al-Jubayl remained harsh for the Marines of the brigade. Billeting was limited to four warehouses with inadequate sanitation facilities, and the Saudis were reluctant to allow the Marines the spaces needed for ranges and training—all of the large caliber weapons coming out of storage on the ships needed to be bore-sighted before deploying to the field. The Saudis were uncomfortable with the large American military force descending on their nation and strove to minimize the impact by restricting training areas and troop movements as much as possible.

Unloading proceeded briskly, but it was not a flawless process. In some cases the proper maintenance had not been performed regularly on the equipment stored on the ships, and some spare parts or required tools were missing as well. The Iraqi Army in Kuwait was only 150 or so miles from al-Jubayl along the coast road, and aside from light Saudi units stationed at the border, al-Jubayl was undefended until the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade unloaded its heavy equipment. In order to present a credible deterrent, combat units arrived prior to logistics units, and this further slowed unloading and distribution of equipment. In the initial rush to get their units ready for combat and deployed to the field, many employed the traditional Marine Corps art of scrounging, creating a somewhat chaotic situation.