Liberating Kuwait

Page 49

Desert Shield

37

Birth of the Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadrons

I

n 1979, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown put the Prepositioning Program into place. General Robert H. Barrow, 27th Commandant of the Marine Corps, later recalled how Dr. Brown first brought the concept up to him: I think it was at an Armed Forces Policy Council meeting. That would be on Monday morning at eleven o’clock. Harold Brown said to me, “Bob, could I see you for a minute?” I’ve already described Hal Brown. I like him very much, but he’s not given to small talk so I knew it was something apart. He got me aside, and he said, and I’m paraphrasing obviously, “Do Marines always have to storm a shore?” Isn’t that a strange question? He’s not given to such small talk. I read a lot into it. So, I fired back. I said, “No, sir. They surely do not. An amphibious operation is but a means to an end. Marines do most of their fighting after they have gotten ashore. Getting ashore—we want that to be as little fighting as we can possibly make it, but knowing that you cannot always expect to go for some undefended place, somebody has to know how to do it, and we call that amphibious warfare, but it’s a mean to an end. So, to answer your question, no, sir, we don’t.” He said, “In other words, Marines, if you had their equipment aboard some other kind of ship that could be brought into a port or somehow moved over to the shore

the same day that aviation and ground forces are loaded into a theater; that naval ships, MPS [Maritime Prepositioning Ships], can be moved before the decision is made. And it is a very prudent decision, in our belief, to move those forces earlier so they are available to the National Command when the time comes. We believe that we would have been better positioned to have operated had those ships been moved, say, on the second or third day of August.”6

7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade Marines of the 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade, commanded by Major General John I. Hopkins, arrived in Saudi Arabia in mid-August, where they

in an environment that was not threatening, the Marines would do that, do you think?” I said, “We would do that extremely well because it still has a maritime character about it, and we’re accustomed to having one foot on the beach and one foot in the sea.” He said, “Well, that’s very interesting.”4 The Prepositioning Program was a response to a perceived weakness in America’s strategic posture; the Iran hostage crisis put a spotlight on America’s inability to project power into the Persian Gulf region, despite the region’s relative importance. In Europe and the Pacific, the United States maintained large bases on the territory of allies, but this was neither practical nor feasible in the Middle East (see chapter 1). The new program was tied into the creation of the Rapid Joint Deployment Task Force. The Prepositioning Program put all of the equipment for a Marine expeditionary brigade as well as enough supplies for the brigade to fight for 30 days on a squadron of purpose-built vessels of the U.S. Military Sealift Command. The personnel and personal equipment of the brigade would be deployed by the Military Airlift Command to the region where it could rendezvous with a Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron. The concept required a friendly host nation with welldeveloped airfields and ports; a great deal of aid was given to the various Gulf states and Saudi Arabia to build up the infrastructure required to support a rapid military deployment in the region if required.5 joined with the equipment from Maritime Prepositioning Ship Squadron Two.7 General Hoar later noted: The 7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade was the first ground element that had tanks and armored personnel carriers. It was the first element that was capable of meeting the threat that existed in Kuwait. But it was more than that; it was an air-ground team as we all know, that had fixed wing, rotary wing . . . had an air-ground task force headquarters. It had its full suite of logistics for 30 days, so it was self-sustaining for 30 days. . . . Marine forces were arriving not only with that combat


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Articles inside

Index

1hr
pages 307-336

Appendix H Brief on Iraqi Forces

47min
pages 293-304

Appendix I List of Reviewers

0
pages 305-306

Desert Storm

7min
pages 263-268

Appendix F Marine Corps Uniforms in the Gulf War

15min
pages 283-290

Appendix C Chronology of Significant Events

13min
pages 269-276

Notes

49min
pages 237-252

Leaving the Desert

11min
pages 225-229

A Triumphant Return Postwar Iraq: Operations Provide Comfort, Northern Watch,

2min
page 230

and Southern Watch

4min
pages 231-232

Reflections

8min
pages 233-236

Al-Wafrah Forest and Faylakah Island

4min
pages 223-224

27 February

18min
pages 212-220

25 February

25min
pages 190-200

The Battles of 19–23 February

18min
pages 166-174

Artillery Raids, Skirmishes, and Patrols

6min
pages 153-154

The “Miracle Well” of Khanjar

4min
pages 151-152

Harriers Afloat

2min
page 161

Marine Air Prepares the Battlefield

15min
pages 155-160

Considerations

6min
pages 144-146

31 January

5min
pages 141-143

30 January

17min
pages 135-140

Operation Desert Sting

2min
page 122

Outposts

4min
pages 120-121

27 to 28 January

2min
page 117

Coalition Dispositions

6min
pages 114-116

Iraq’s al-Khafji Plan

11min
pages 108-112

Artillery Raids and Reconnaissance Patrols

2min
page 107

Marines and the Air Tasking Order

6min
pages 99-100

28 to 31 January

8min
pages 101-104

19 to 27 January

8min
pages 95-98

18 January: The Scuds

4min
page 94

Trading Desert Rats for Tigers

10min
pages 84-88

Planning a Storm

7min
pages 80-83

Iraq’s Defenses

12min
pages 76-79

A Line in the Sand: Planning to Defend Saudi Arabia

8min
pages 57-59

Happy Holidays from Saudi Arabia

5min
pages 70-71

Marines Afloat

13min
pages 52-56

Meeting of Cultures: Marines and Saudis

14min
pages 60-66

7th Marine Expeditionary Brigade

8min
pages 49-51

Marines and Maritime Prepositioning

2min
page 48

Chapter 3 Desert Shield

2min
page 47

The Plan to Invade Kuwait

6min
pages 33-35

The Iran-Iraq War

10min
pages 22-25

The American Military Response

8min
pages 43-46

The Invasion of Kuwait

4min
page 36

The World’s Response

7min
pages 41-42

Marines in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Embassies

10min
pages 37-40

The Tanker War

9min
pages 26-30
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