Operation Desert Sting

launcher and a thermal imaging system, and was manned by a crew of four. They were the company’s primary antitank asset.

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At 1200, Company D was ordered to move to Observation Post 4 and act as a screen for the evening. Captain Pollard conducted a reconnaissance and established his company and its attached LAV-AT section northwest of Observation Post 4 at around 1500. He created his fire plan, used a global positioning satellite device to precisely note his unit’s locations, and met with Lieutenant Ross. The liaison with Lieutenant Ross was incomplete, as Captain Pollard did not know that 2d Platoon had its own vehicles. This oversight would lead to misunderstandings during the engagement.

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During the Gulf War of 1991, the Navy–Marine Corps team was charged with creating a credible amphibious feint in the Persian Gulf, drawing Iraqi forces away from the Iraq–Kuwait–Saudi Arabia frontier. When the Allied air attacks against Iraq began on 17 January 1991, the seaborne feint needed reinforcement in order to remain credible. Amphibious raids were one method of reinforcing that threat.

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On 23 January 1991, Captain Thomas L. McClelland, USN, commanding Amphibious Squadron 5, and Colonel John Rhodes, commander of the 13th Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable), were ordered to plan for an amphibious raid on several Iraqi-held Kuwaiti islands; this raid was code named Operation Desert Sting. Iraqis on one of the targeted islands, Qaruh, surrendered on 25 January to the USS Curts (FFG 38). On 26 January, the Iraqis garrison on another of the targeted islands, Umm al-Maradim, created a sign indicating they wished to surrender to U.S. Navy reconnaissance aircraft that photographed the island. The plan for Operation Desert Sting was modified accordingly.

Heavily supported by Navy aircraft, Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/4 (Reinforced), landed on the north end of Umm al-Maradim Island at noon on 29 January. They encountered no enemy fire or other resistance and found the island had been deserted by its garrison. The Marines captured or destroyed a large quantity of small arms, machine guns, and mortars as well as several Iraqi antiaircraft guns and missiles. After three hours on the island the raid force departed, leaving a Kuwaiti flag raised over the island and the words “Free Kuwait” and “USMC” on several of the buildings.

Meanwhile, the Iraqis dispatched 15 fast patrol boats from Ras al-Qulayah, apparently intending to land commandos at al-Khafji in support of the Iraqi 5th Mechanized Division, but Allied commanders misinterpreted the movement as an attempt to retake Umm al-Maradim. Despite this, the Iraqi boats were intercepted by Royal Air Force SEPECAT GR1A Jaguar fixed-wing aircraft and Royal Navy Westland HMA.8 Lynx helicopters from HMS Brazen (F91), Cardiff (D108),and Gloucester (D96). Other Coalition aircraft then continued the attack, destroying or severely damaging all of the Iraqi vessels and landing forces.

With a Cobra attack helicopter hovering protectively nearby, a Marine from Company A, Battalion Landing Team 1/4, takes cover behind an abandoned Iraqi fighting position on Umm al-Maradim during Operation Desert Sting. Despite prepared fighting positions and large amounts of ammunition, the Iraqis had deserted the island prior to the Marine landing on 29 January 1991.

Photo courtesy of LtGen John E. Rhodes