Reflections

Defense Imagery DN-ST-91-08410 Barbed wire, mines, and other obstacles were erected along the shoreline during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait to prevent or slow attacks by sea.

was established under U.S. Central Command in August 1992 to enforce a no-fly zone over southern Iraq, which also lasted until Operation Iraqi Freedom began in 2003. Marine aircraft from land bases and aircraft carriers flew often in support of Operation Southern Watch.

In 1998, Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 312— commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Stephen M. Pomeroy and flying off the USS Enterprise (CVN 65)— flew strike missions into Iraq as part of Operation Desert Fox, a four-day bombing campaign conducted by the United States and Great Britain in response to Iraq’s defiance of the United Nation’s resolutions.

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Liberating Kuwait from the Iraqi forces occupying it was not a victory free from cost. During Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 383 American servicemembers lost their lives in the theater of war. Of those, 68 were Marines: 44 non-battle-related deaths and 24 battle-related deaths. A further 92 Marines were wounded in action. Five Marines, as mentioned above, were captured and repatriated following the conflict.

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There are no reliable estimates of Iraqi losses during the campaign. Iraqi records are unclear, for example, on exactly how many Iraqi troops were in Kuwait when the liberation began. Most estimates indicate that 20–30 percent of each Iraqi division had deserted or been given leave prior to the invasion; it is thus very difficult to determine how many Iraqis were slain in the fighting. Tens of thousands of Iraqis surrendered to Coalition forces, and thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, were slain resisting the liberation. And, of course, Iraqi casualties in the invasion of Kuwait are unclear, though they were not heavy. Saddam believed that if he could achieve a ratio of one American slain for every four Iraqis slain, he would win the war. He does not seem to have achieved that ratio, but he believed he won the war anyway.

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Indeed, Saddam was convinced that he won the Gulf War, that the tenacity and stubborn defense of Iraqi forces under fire persuaded the Americans to end the conflict earlier then they intended. As Kevin Woods notes in his examination of the Iraq side of the conflict, The Mother of All Battles, Saddam declared that

I am very sure the criminal Bush did not ex-

pedite the cease-fire until he realized that our armor was [resisting]. . . . He probably said to himself, “It is very apparent that he [Saddam] is going to cause us damage.” He worried that the so-called victory would take an unfavorable turn; therefore he rushed alone, before the [UN] Security Council discussed the situation with him and decided on a cease-fire, in order for him to control the cease-fire situation.

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Saddam’s primary criteria for victory was that he end the conflict alive and in command of Iraq. He began the war as a response to what he saw as an American conspiracy to destroy Saddam Hussein, and he saw no meaningful distinction between Iraq and himself. After the war, the Iraqi military undertook a series of studies and conferences devoted to learning the lessons of the Gulf War, lessons they put to immediate practical use against the ongoing Northern and Southern Watch air campaigns.

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The U.S. Army saw the Gulf War as a vindication of the training methods and doctrine developed in response to the crisis it experienced in the immediate aftermath of the Vietnam War. For the U.S. Navy, the war emphasized its ability to project power but highlighted its relative isolation from the post–GoldwaterNichols joint command environment. For the U.S. Air Force, the Gulf War was the culmination of its fervent belief in airpower’s ability to win wars.

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For their part, Marines began evaluating the Gulf War’s impact on international relations, military affairs, and interservice politics even before it ended. Brigadier General Granville Amos, assistant commander of the 3d Marine Aircraft Wing, had some prophetic words and an admonition for those historical writers who would inevitably follow this war: “We are going to discuss it for years. Books are going to be written. The Marines . . . will selfflagellate and point fingers. . . . But I think that we’ve got to be careful of, as we are writing things down, that we don’t lose sight of what our mission was and the fact that we did it.” His warning was echoed by Marine Aircraft Group 13 commander Colonel John Bioty, who later stated, “Things worked better over there than we made them out to be back here. The real war was fought when we started to write the books about Desert Storm.”

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Looking back at the conflict, the Marine commanders felt the role of the amphibious deception needed to be emphasized. Major General James Myatt, commander of the 1st Marine Division, recalled: “I think what we can’t dismiss is the level of effort put into the defenses along the beaches by the Iraqis. . . . Probably 40% to 50% of the Iraqi artillery pieces were pointed to the east in defense of this perceived real threat—an attack from the Gulf. There were literally hundreds of antiaircraft weapon systems laid in a direct-fire mode from Saudi Arabia all the way up way above Kuwait City to defend against the amphibious threat. . . . I think it [the amphibious feint] saved a lot of Marine lives.”

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Major General William Keys, commander of the 2d Marine Division, believed that the Marines erred in overestimating the Iraqis:

I guess that our biggest overall intelligence shortcoming was in building Saddam Hussein and his forces into a monster that just wasn’t there. Going into the battle, this made us more gun-shy than we should have been.

Certainly, the Iraqis had more equipment and capability than any force we’ve ever faced.

But the fighting spirit just was not there. The individual foot-soldiers were badly abused by their leaders—not necessarily their military leaders, but their government—and low morale was the result. I think their senior military leaders knew what they were doing.

After we seized Kuwait City, we uncovered several sand tables depicting their defenses that were incredibly detailed. They were fully prepared for us. They had thousands of weapons and millions of rounds of small-arms and tank ammunition—so they could have put up one hell of a fight if they had wanted to. Their defensive areas were well organized, and had they chosen to put their hearts into it, we would have had a real fight on our hands.

He concluded that “I guess it all boils down to the fact that the individual Iraqi soldier did not measure up to, say, the North Vietnamese soldier. The Iraqis were not ready to die for what they believed in—whatever that was. And that’s it in a nutshell.”

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Lieutenant General Walter Boomer noted particularly the important role that the relatively new light armored vehicle battalions had in the war:

The LAVs [light armored vehicles] performed extremely well, in some cases very courageously. A lesson that I learned as far as LAVs is concerned is that you’ve got to stress to them that they need to be careful about what they take on. Part of the problem is that

Photo by LtCol Charles H. Cureton A herd of camels continues across the desert, ignoring the military preparations around them during Operation Desert Shield.

you’ve got Marines manning them, and they don’t think anything can defeat them. They can’t go up against armor and they need to be really careful when they do. So, I think it’s just a matter of talking to them about their mission what you expect of them and what you don’t expect of them. In our case, it all turned out okay but on a couple of occasions I think it could have gotten a little dicey for them. It’s hard for me to fault Marines for being aggressive. So, you’ve just got to be careful. But, conceptually it worked well and the vehicle served us well.

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Brigadier General James Brabham, commander of the 1st Force Service Support Group, noted that logistically the Corps had sent two-thirds of its combat power overseas, fought a war, and returned successfully. He continued: “But the equipment is now back, and it’s ready to go, although residual cleanup efforts continue. Training has resumed at our bases, and we have no significant holes in our readiness or our capability to deploy again, when called. When you consider the hard, round-theclock use that much of the equipment got for eight months, including combat, that’s pretty phenomenal. And there are a lot of wonderful people out there in the logistics system who made that happen.”

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Lieutenant General Boomer felt that despite the needed process of institutional self-criticism, “the campaign was successful, and I wouldn’t do things much differently.” He attributed that success to his junior Marines:

The young lance corporal would take a look, see something 75 or 100 meters out in front that needed to be done, and go out and do it without being told. As I read through award citations from Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this theme reappears, time and time again.

That aggressive spirit comes from being welltrained, and confident in your professional knowledge. It is young Marines with that aggressive spirit who take their divisions ahead.

When you say that the division is moving forward, you are really saying that thousands of

Marines are forging ahead as individuals and in small units. They are the real heroes of any battle. You can have the best battle plan in the world, but without the right people to execute that plan it is no more than a pipe

dream. It’s the well-trained Marine who turns that plan into reality.41

The combined defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait was one of the most successful Marine operations in the twentieth century. One dead Marine is too many, but boldness, superior training, and superior technology made Desert Storm the least costly operation of its scale in Marine Corps history. It did not end conflict with Iraq, however: Marines returned to Kuwait several times in the following decade, and Saddam Hussein was not removed from power until 2003 by Operation Iraqi Freedom. Nevertheless, the Gulf War victory, while incomplete, still stands as a victory, one in which the Marine Corps played a significant part.