Iraq’s al-Khafji Plan

against Iraqi forces in Kuwait. The raids served multiple purposes. First, they were aimed at specific Iraqi artillery forces; second, they were designed to confuse and bewilder the Iraqis by making the ultimate Marine breaching points unclear; and third, they permitted Marine air to strike against the Iraqi artillery (considered Iraq’s most dangerous conventional asset), which inevitably replied with counterbattery fire.

Each raid followed the same basic pattern, with some variations. A Marine artillery battery would advance to the border and fire a carefully planned barrage. As soon as the shells cleared the barrels, they would limber the artillery pieces and drive away. Within minutes, the firing location would be empty desert. When Iraqi artillery attempted counterbattery fire, it would fall on the abandoned position, and then waiting Marine aircraft would pounce on the revealed Iraqi artillery and destroy it.

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The composition of the raid forces followed a pattern as well. The ground element consisted of a battery or two of artillery with a small security force and a company of light armored vehicles from one of the light armored infantry battalions. The 3d Marine Aircraft Wing would provide an aviation element: this usually comprised an OV-10 Bronco acting as an airborne forward air controller, a McDonnell Douglas F/A-18D Hornet

*

and two A-6E Intruders to strike the enemy artillery sites, an F/A-18D and two F/A-18s to suppress enemy air defenses, and an EA-6B Prowler to provide electronic countermeasures support.

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The first artillery raid (unprotected by a light armored infantry force) occurred on the night of 21 January and was fired from a location just north of al-Khafji against Iraqi artillery positions north of the border. The 1st Battalion, 12th Marines, part of Task Force Taro, launched the raid using two of its batteries of M198 155mm howitzers. The hope was to find an Iraqi rocket system, but none fired. Instead, 80 rounds of dual-purpose improved conventional munitions were fired at suspected Iraqi artillery positions, and Marine aircraft bombed the positions as well.

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The next raid was on 26 January near the elbow of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border at al-Jathathil. It was conducted by Batteries Q and S of 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, and screened by Company B, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion. The Iraqis attempted to counterbattery fire this time, but it was

*The F/A-18D was a two-seat version of the F/A-18. It was often used to perform coordination duties or to act as an airborne forward air controller. inaccurate. Marine artillery fired on three different targets, and Intruders and Hornets bombed and rocketed the Iraqi positions as well. While the artillery retired as planned, B Company destroyed an Iraqi vehicle on the Kuwaiti side of the border berm. Unfortunately, this raid was not without casualties. Two of the light armored vehicles of Company B collided as the company left the area. Three Marines were killed in the crash: Staff Sergeant Michael R. Connor Sr. and Lance Corporals Arthur O. Garza and Michael A. Noline.

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The 2d Marine Division conducted its first combat action of the conflict with an artillery raid on the night of 27–28 January. Security for this raid was provided by 2d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, and the raid was conducted by Battery Q and Battery R of the 5th Battalion, 10th Marines. The 5th Battalion’s commander, Lieutenant Colonel Andrew F. Mazzara, was the raid force commander. In support of the raid was Battery A, 92d Field Artillery Regiment of the U.S. Army, commanded by Captain Edward L. Hughes, USA. This multiple-launch rocket system battery was prepared to conduct counterbattery fire against Iraqi artillery fire. In the event, there was no return fire from the Iraqis. Battery Q, armed with M109A1 155mm self-propelled howitzers, fired 72 rounds, and Battery R, armed with M110A2 8-inch self-propelled howitzers, fired 36 rounds on their targets: a vehicle park and a logistics site. Then the raid force returned to its staging area.

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On the night of 28–29 January, Task Force Shepherd, made up of companies from the 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion and the 3d Light Armored Infantry Battalion, conducted a raid on the Kuwaiti police station at Umm Hujul, across the border from Observation Post 4. The light armored vehicles of Company A, 1st Light Armored Infantry Battalion, fired their 25mm cannon and Emerson 901A1 TOW 2 (tube-launched, optically tracked, wire-guided) antitank guided missiles at the police post. There was no Iraqi return fire, so the two batteries from 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, that had been assigned to conduct counterbattery fire withdrew without firing.

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With its diplomatic options exhausted, and enduring the effects of an air campaign much longer than anticipated, Iraq determined to launch a large spoiling attack centered on the Saudi town of al-Khafji. This attack signaled the beginning of the Battle of al-Khafji, the first major ground combat of the Gulf War.

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Official U.S. Marine Corps photo Marines of Task Force Shepherd plan their next operation. In addition to screening duties, the light armored infantry battalions also provided security for the Marine batteries conducting artillery raids on Iraqi forces in Kuwait.

Saddam expected the air campaign to last a week and then be followed by the ground war, what he claimed would be the “Mother of All Battles,” which would produce the desired massive American casualties. Instead, the bombing showed no sign of stopping and was inflicting serious damage on the Iraqi forces without any corresponding ability to produce the desired Coalition casualties. In the Iraqi view, something needed to be done in order to goad the United States into the planned Kuwaiti “meat grinder.”

An Iraqi War College study completed after the war highlighted the Iraqi understanding of the situation in late January 1991:

In military practice, there are principles. One of the important principles is that the attack is the best defense. In the Mother of Battles this principle is particularly important, because the enemy of Iraq and the Arab nation has deployed a large number of airplanes, rockets and modern equipment, from which it seems they are prepared for a total war.

They deployed the most modern equipment for their field forces, which consist of the armies of 28 nations totaling half a million

Marine Corps Art Collection Artillery Mission by Sgt Charles G. Grow

men. But for all this great power, they hesitate to attack the Iraqi field forces because they realize how well the Iraqi forces can defend against a ground attack. And, they know already, the military genius of Iraq’s leader, Saddam Hussein.

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The Iraqis believed they understood American intentions: “Like we say, they intend to destroy our

Harmony Document Folder ISGP-2003-00038521 An Iraqi Air Force reconnaissance aircraft photographed the Saudi port of al-Khafji in mid-August 1990. Al-Khafji’s oil refinery is visible in the upper left of the photograph.

forces and the infrastructure of our country through the air attack, by airplanes and long-range missiles. And they want to avoid the losses of a ground war as much as they can.” Moreover, they claimed, “George Bush will not be able to handle the heavy responsibility of heavy casualties in front of Congress and public opinion.” In this case, the Iraqis understood American intentions, although they underestimated American resolve, and they gravely overestimated the ability of the Iraqi military to inflict losses on the attacking Coalition forces.

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The al-Khafji operation was intended to spark the ground battle of the “Mother of All Battles,” which Saddam felt was the prerequisite for his eventual victory. It was intended as a provoking raid that would draw the Americans into a hasty and massive military response and result in significant American casualties. Despite his deficient military acumen, he correctly identified that the center of gravity in the Coalition war effort was the willingness of the American people to suffer casualties, and he designed his operational plans to strike directly at that willpower.

Saddam chose al-Khafji as the target of the attack for several reasons. The Iraqi War College analysis noted that the town had two harbors: one designed specifically for exporting oil, and the other believed by the Iraqis to be a base for Coalition forces. In Saddam’s view, an Iraqi force occupying the town would be able to threaten Coalition naval forces in the Gulf. Al-Khafji was also within range of Iraqi supporting artillery in Kuwait. The attack also would force the Saudis to respond; Saddam knew they could not permit him to hold any part of their kingdom for long. It seemed likely that the attack would force the Coalition into the bloody ground war that Saddam desperately wanted.

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The operational plan for implementing Iraq’s strategic goal was relatively straightforward. Five Iraqi infantry divisions defended the Saudi-Kuwaiti border from the coast to the elbow: from east to west, they were the 18th Infantry, 8th Infantry, 29th Infantry, 14th Infantry, and 7th Infantry Divisions. These commands would not take part in the offensive; instead they would continue to defend the fortifications along the border. These border fortifications, called the “Saddam Line” by U.S. forces, consisted of a belt of minefields, antitank

obstacles, and triangular brigade strongpoints. Iraqi engineers had designed and constructed the belt based on lessons learned in their 10-year war with Iran.

The actual raid forces would be drawn from the 3d Armored and 5th Mechanized Divisions of III Corps, under General Salah Aboud Mahmoud, and the 1st Mechanized Division of IV Corps, under Major General Yaiyd Khalel Zaki. Major General Salah Aboud had overall command of the operation; III Corps, considered one of the better organizations in the Iraqi Army, had successfully conducted similar operations during the Iran-Iraq War, as well as performed successfully while defending the Iraqi city of Basrah.

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The armored battalions of these divisions were equipped with a combination of T-54/55 and T-62 main battle tanks, while their mechanized infantry battalions were equipped with BMP-1 armored personnel carriers supported by BRDM-2 scout vehicles. Their divisional artillery was lavishly equipped with various models of 152mm and 155mm howitzers.

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The plan called for the 1st Mechanized Division to pass through the lines of the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions between the border’s “heel” just south of Umm Hajul and the elbow at al-Manaqish. This maneuver was intended to protect the flank of Brigadier General Hussan Zedin’s 3d Armored Division as it traversed the al-Wafrah oil fields and the lines of the 8th and 29th Infantry Divisions. The 3d Armored Division would then take up a blocking position to the west of al-Khafji. Al-Khafji itself was the target of the 5th Mechanized Division, which was to seize and fortify the town. Once the 5th Mechanized Division had secured al-Khafji, the 1st Mechanized and 3d Armored Divisions would withdraw back into Kuwait. In theory, after the Coalition ground response was provoked, the 5th Mechanized Division would retire from al-Khafji and move safely behind the massive fortifications along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border. The attack was set to be launched at 2000 on 29 January 1991, and al-Khafji was to be occupied by 0100 on 30 January.

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General Salah Aboud ordered that the forces be “dug in” and “hidden underground” by the morning of 30 January. He provided some insightful tactical advice as well: “I emphasized the use, and the im-

Part of the Iraqi plan for the Battle of al-Khafji, as shown in an official Iraqi history of the battle. This sketch indicates that 6th Armored Brigade’s attack on Observation Post 4 at the “heel” of the Kuwaiti–Saudi border was not intended as the main Iraqi effort.

Harmony Document Folder ISGQ-2003-00054592

Iraqi Armored Vehicles

Vehicle Type Armament Crew Top Speed Weight

T-54/55 •1 x 100mm D10T2S gun w/43 rounds •1 x 7.62mm SMGT coaxial machine gun w/3,500 rounds •1 x 12.7mm DShK or NSVT antiaircraft w/500 rounds 4

50 km/h

T-62

T-72 •1 x 115mm 2A20 gun w/40 rounds •1 x 7.62mm PKT coaxial machine gun w/2,500 rounds •1 x 125mm 2A46 gun w/45 rounds and 6 ATGW •1 x 7.62mm PKT coaxial machine gun w/2,000 rounds 4 45.5 km/h

3

60 km/h

BMP-1 •1 x 73mm 2A28 low velocity gun w/40 rounds •1 x 7.62mm PKT coaxial machine gun w/2,000 rounds •5 x Sagger ATGM 3 to 8

65 km/h

BMP-2

BRDM-2 •1 x 30mm 2A42 gun w/500 rounds •1 x 7.62mm PKT coaxial machine gun w/2,000 rounds •1 x 30mm AG-17 grenade launcher w/350 rounds •1 x AT5 launcher w/4 rounds •1 x 14.5mm KPVT w/500 rounds •1 x 7.62mm PKT coaxial machine gun w/2,000 rounds 3 to 7

65 km/h

4 100 km/h 36,000 kg

40,000 kg

44.500 kg

13,500 kg

14,300 kg

N/A