The Plan to Invade Kuwait

because of the muted response to the Iraqi Exocet missile attack on the USS Stark in 1987 but also due to the American withdrawal from Lebanon following the Beirut bombing. Moreover, even if the United States desired military confrontation, the Soviet Union would intervene to prevent it, despite its reduced global influence.

If an attack did occur, Saddam was reportedly convinced that his massive military could inflict sufficient losses on the Americans to force them to abandon the struggle. He considered the 1975 withdrawal from Vietnam indicative of America’s lack of resolve. The United States suffered over 58,000 dead in the Vietnam War; in comparison Iraq had lost 51,000 in a single battle with the Iranians on the al-Faw Peninsula in 1986. He believed then, as he stated after the war, “America is not in the prime of youth. America is in the last stage of elderliness and the beginning of the first stage of old age.”

11

Iraq had survived the long, eight-year slaughter of the “Khadisya Saddam,” as the Iraqis termed the IranIraq War, and Saddam believed that the conflict over Kuwait, if it came to blows, would follow a similar pattern. Airpower would be relatively ineffective; the main conflict would be a set piece battle as American forces impotently tried to breach the defenses built along the Kuwaiti-Saudi border. American losses would be severe; the American people would demand an end to the bloodshed; and the American government would then negotiate a peace. In the aftermath Iraq would become the undisputed regional power, while American and Western influence in the Middle East would suffer a near fatal blow.

12

Convinced that the United States and Israel were engaged in a conspiracy against Iraq, and that they were using Kuwait as one of their tools in this conspiracy, Saddam had apparently decided by July 1990 to invade and annex Kuwait. While military preparations for the invasion were underway, Saddam laid the diplomatic groundwork as well.

On 25 July 1990, Saddam unexpectedly met with April C. Glaspie, the U.S. ambassador to Iraq. Though Glaspie had been ambassador for two years, this was the first time Saddam had personally met with her; the meeting was arranged quickly and obviously stage managed (at one point, Saddam’s interpreters burst into tears as Saddam described Iraq’s poor financial state). Saddam repeated his claims that Kuwait was waging economic war against Iraq, and implied that the United States was behind this, but promised that nothing would occur until after a meeting with Kuwait arranged by Egyptian leader Hosni Mubarak.

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The promised meeting with Kuwait occurred on 31 July 1990 in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. Iraq’s demands were extreme: “$2.4 billion in compensation for the disputed Ramalia [Rumaylah] oil field; $12 billion for Kuwait’s role in depressing oil prices in general; forgiveness of Iraq’s $10 billion war debt; and a long-term lease on Bubiyan Island.” When the Kuwaitis refused these demands, the Iraqi response was ominous. Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, Iraq’s representative, told Kuwait’s Crown Prince Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah as Salim that “you are driving me to kill you.”

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The Iraqi military in the summer of 1990 appeared large and powerful. It boasted roughly 1 million troops; 5,000-plus main battle tanks; 3,500 or more artillery tubes; an estimated 6,000 armored personnel carriers; 600 or so surface-to-air missile launchers; some 500 aircraft; 500 helicopters; and 44 naval vessels. As the apparent victor of the eight-year-long Iran-Iraq War, many observers assumed that the Iraqi Army was battle tested and experienced, an impression the Saddam regime worked to maintain. The war forced the regime to promote officers more often for military competence than political loyalty, and there was a corresponding increase in professionalism and effectiveness. In fact, however, the Iraqi military was exhausted, its morale was questionable, and its training insufficient. The invasion of Kuwait would highlight the strengths and the weaknesses of the Iraqi military to the astute observer.

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Saddam Hussein continued to view the regular Iraqi Army with suspicion, so the Republican Guard had received the lion’s share of the training and equipment. The Republican Guard was thus entrusted with the invasion of Kuwait, and planning was limited to its highest officers. Senior regular army officers were not even informed of the offensive until mere hours before it was launched. Throughout July 1990, the Iraqi Directorate of General Military Intelligence provided the Republican Guard commanders with reports on Kuwait, its armed forces, and its political leadership. The same reports indicated that Kuwait was likely to look for international support against an invasion and that the United States would help Kuwait.

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In mid-July, the Republican Guard forces chosen for the invasion began moving south in preparation for the assault. The units’ officers were informed of the upcoming mission at this time, although regular military commanders continued to be kept in the dark.

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Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 68 In July 1990, the Iraqi Air Force conducted several reconnaissance flights over Kuwait. In this photograph, military objectives in Kuwait City are noted.

Despite the Iraqi security precautions, its preparations were not unnoticed. As early as 21 July, American intelligence began to detect signs of the impending Iraqi attack on Kuwait. As the days passed, American staff officers at U.S. Central Command were astounded to see Iraq virtually mirroring the moves predicted in a training exercise, Internal Look 90. That exercise tested Central Command’s Operations Plan 1002-90, the plan to defend the Arabian Peninsula from an Iraqi attack.

18

On 31 July, the Republican Guard division and brigade commanders were informed that 2 August would be the date of the attack. The Iraqi plan for the invasion of Kuwait called for the Republican Guard to invade in four columns, one from the west and three from the north. Kuwait City and the various civilian and military airports were the initial targets, followed by a sweep to the southern coast. Large helicopterborne commando raids would secure the Mutla Ridge choke point ahead of the advance and a raid on the palace would secure the Kuwaiti royal family.

19 Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 85 This Iraqi aerial reconnaissance photograph from July 1990 clearly shows Kuwait International Airport, the major roads leading to and from it, and the shore south of Kuwait City. The airport was a major Iraqi objective.

Brigadier General Ra’ad Hamdani, commanding general of the 17th Armored Brigade of the Republican Guard’s Hammurabi Armored Division, later said that “speed was the most important factor to achieving surprise and surprise was the most important factor in achieving mission success.” The Republican Guard planned to seize needed food and supplies en route in order to achieve the required speed. There was also a desire to keep Kuwaiti casualties, especially civilians, to a minimum, and so in a departure from the Iraqi military’s usual style, the invasion of Iraq was conducted without artillery support. The lack of artillery in Iraq’s military buildup of late July was noted by American intelligence and introduced some doubt about Iraqi intentions.

20

The Iraqi Air Force conducted several reconnaissance missions over Kuwait in late July, producing photographs that, in conjunction with commercial

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division tourist maps, allowed the Republican Guard to locate its assigned targets. Once the attack was underway, the air force’s mission was to establish air superiority, allowing the helicopterborne commando raids to proceed safely and to prevent the Kuwaiti Air Force from interfering with the invasion. Strikes on Kuwait’s air bases and Raytheon Hawk (Homing All the Way Killer) MIM-23B surface-to-air missiles were intended to accomplish this.21 The smallest of the Iraqi military services was the navy, but Kuwait’s coastal nature and extensive port facilities required a relatively robust naval component to the invasion plan. The commander of the Iraqi Navy, Staff Rear Admiral Gha’ib Hassan, was not informed of the invasion until a mere 36 hours