Artillery Raids, Skirmishes, and Patrols

different countries. Every truck that was sent north to supply Kibrit and Khanjar was also manned by at least one military member of the battalion. In order to supply Khanjar with the stated requirement, approximately 100 truckloads per day were dispatched north by the [6th Motor Transport] Battalion. The length of the trip required establishment of transfer sites to replace drivers and rest them for the next leg of the trip. The trucks rolled 24 hours a day. It was a magnificent effort that provided the foundation of supply support for the [I Marine Expeditionary] Force.”

14

In the wake of the Battle of al-Khafji, raids and skirmishes along the Kuwaiti–Saudi Arabian border increased in number and intensity in a crescendo leading up to the anticipated liberation of Kuwait. The artillery raids served the same purposes they did prior to al-Khafji—they confused and bewildered the Iraqis concerning the breaching points, and they reduced the Iraqi artillery, still considered Iraq’s most dangerous conventional asset despite its poor showing during Khafji. Raids by reconnaissance and light armored infantry units were focused more on acquiring prisoners. All of these raids took place well within the fire support coordination line, inside airspace controlled by I Marine Expeditionary Force. Unfortunately, this did not prevent friendly fire incidents between Coalition aircraft and Marines on the ground.

15

From 30 January to 1 February, elements of Task Force Shepherd and 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, near Observation Post 6 conducted various artillery missions. On the evening of 30 January, they closed a gap in the berm by firing field artillery scatterable mines. The next night, an artillery barrage in support of Task Force Shepherd was credited with destroying two or three Iraqi tanks.

16

The next raid, on the evening of 1–2 February, was aimed at Iraqi electronic warfare units at the Umm Gudair oil field. It was conducted by S Battery of the 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, which was equipped with the M109A3 155mm self-propelled howitzer, and Battery T, equipped with the M110A2 8-inch self-propelled howitzer, with Task Force Shepherd again providing security. Lieutenant Colonel James L. Sachtleben, 5th Battalion’s commander, later commented:

I was a little concerned about the M110A2 as a raiding piece. Its slower rate of fire and longer emplacement times meant the battery would be in position longer and thus at a greater risk from counterfire. However, the larger payload of the 8-inch as compared to the 155mm DPICM [dual-purpose improved conventional munitions] meant the battery could fire fewer rounds and achieve equal or greater effects. Also, by this time, we [had] started to question the Iraqi counterfire capability. We had taken mortar rounds on the first raid, but there was no evidence the Iraqis could find us with anything other than forward observers in frontline infantry units who could spot our muzzle flashes. We trusted the EA-6Bs to handle the Iraqi ground surveillance and counterbattery radars, and they obviously did. But why were the Iraqis so ineffective with the sound-ranging systems that were supposed to be so good? We weren’t sure, but our confidence was growing. We decided to fight the urge to stay and shoot all night and continued to “shoot and scoot.” The real ground war was still days away, and we couldn’t afford to risk assets needed later.

17

Unfortunately, as the raid force retired south it was mistaken for an Iraqi column by a Marine Corps A-6E Intruder, call sign “Blaze 65.” The Intruder’s crew believed they were still flying over Iraq and bombed the artillery convoy several times. Lance Corporal Eliseo C. Felix was killed, and three Marines—Staff Sergeant Michael V. Almanza and Corporals Michael D. Sanders and Rick A. Ramirez— were wounded. One of Battery S’s M109A3 howitzers was damaged as well.

18

On 4 February, 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, and Task Force Shepherd conducted another artillery raid; executed without any American casualties, this raid targeted Iraqi multiple rocket launcher batteries. The Iraqis responded with counterbattery fire and were in turn struck by F-18 Hornets flying close air support for the raid.

19

From 3 February to 9 February, American battleships fired their 16-inch guns in support of U.S. Marines ashore as the USS Missouri (BB 63) and USS Wisconsin (BB 64) moved inshore to fire naval gunfire missions into Kuwait. Starting with the Missouri, the battleships rotated the fire support duties, and Wisconsin began firing on 6 February. Spotting was conducted by OV-10s, Marine fire control teams, and the battleships’ own unmanned aerial vehicles. The massive shells struck Iraqi artillery batteries, bunkers, communications sites, patrol boats,

missile batteries, and radar sites. This continual bombardment by naval gunfire destroyed Iraqi forces that threatened the Marine and Saudi lines, but it also reinforced the threat of an amphibious attack on Kuwait.

20

The month of February saw a small but steady stream of Iraqi soldiers crossing the border to surrender. They were usually taken into custody by Marines in the light armored infantry and reconnaissance teams that patrolled the border. The night of 6 February provides a typical example, as described the next morning in the daily briefing General Boomer received: “Last night LAVs [light armored vehicles] operating in OP-6 [Observation Post 6] saw some activity. They had some loudspeaker teams with them—they have been attached as part of that task force up there. They ran the preprogrammed surrender tape that was pre-recorded, and two people came forward across the berm and said they were hungry and wanted to surrender, and so they took their arms away from them and gave them MREs [meals, ready-to-eat].” The Marines transported these prisoners to the rear, conducted short interrogations, and eventually handed them over to U.S. Army control. The relatively small numbers of prisoners in this period were far easier to handle than the masses that would come later, but they indicated the poor morale of the Iraqi Army in Kuwait.

21

On the evenings of 8 and 9 February, Task Force Shepherd and 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, with supporting Marine Corps air, conducted two more successful artillery raids along the border. They believed that the raids “destroyed numerous vehicles in target area,” but it is difficult to determine how successful they were because the Iraqis deployed many decoys in Kuwait.

22

From 10 to 12 February, Captain Rory E. Talkington’s Company A, 1st Reconnaissance Battalion, conducted a raid on Markaz as Sur. The location was unoccupied but the raid force captured equipment, documents, and ordnance from the facility.

23

On the evening of 11 February, elements of 3d Battalion, 12th Marines, and 5th Battalion, 11th Marines, supported by Task Force Shepherd, conducted an “illumination” raid. Illumination rounds were fired over suspected Iraqi antiaircraft artillery sites, hoping to goad them into opening fire, thus revealing them to waiting F/A-18 Hornets. In this case, the Iraqis did not take the bait, and the antiaircraft artillery remained silent.

24

Not to be left out,2d Marine Division’s 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, conducted an artillery raid on the

A Pioneer remotely piloted vehicle (RPV) is catapulted from a launching rail set up atop an M-814 5-ton cargo truck. The RPV was first used by the Marines extensively during the Gulf War.

Defense Imagery DN-SC-91-05049