Marines in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Embassies

of the sun. I had only to look at the artillerymen clustered around the trees to see that. Forget tactical considerations; these guys were going to be comfortable if they had to sit outside in the heat all day.” He noted, “About the only thing the Iraqis seemed to be enthusiastic about was looting. They broke into food stores and at first took water, bread, meats, and fresh fruit; the latter seemed to be a particular favorite.”

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The Iraqi Air Force struck Kuwaiti airfields again at 1220 and 1600, but the Kuwaiti Air Force continued to operate with some success by taking off from neighboring highways. The al-Jaber Air Base, according to Republican Guard officers, maintained Kuwaiti aircraft operations until the Republican Guard arrived there to shut the base down.32

The first of the two Iraqi naval forces, consisting of two missile boats carrying 160 troopers of the 440th Naval Infantry Brigade, sailed at 2330 on 1 August, rendezvousing at the al-Bakr tanker platform in the northern Persian Gulf. This took longer than expected, pushing the assault on Kuwait’s Ras al-Qulayah Naval Base until after daybreak. The vessels had numerous mechanical difficulties, and according to their commander, Naval Colonel Muzahim Mustafa, only overcame them due to “Russian experts on board for the purpose of training the crews.”

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The two missile boats encountered a pair of Kuwaiti patrol boats as they neared al-Qulayah. Neither Iraqi missile boat had working weapons, and the Kuwaiti boats fired effectively, damaging the bridge of one of the boats, which subsequently ran aground and was unable to continue with the mission. Despite the setback Colonel Mustafa continued the amphibious assault with the remaining missile boat, landing the 75 men left to him at Ras al-Qulayah Naval Base. The naval infantry secured the base against confused Kuwaiti resistance; by 0830 on 2 August, the base was secured.The second Iraqi naval force was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Saed Jalio and arrived off its target, Faylakah Island, late in the day on 2 August. The island was bombarded for six hours by the Iraqi boats, and the naval infantry subsequently landed in rubber boats. The Iraqi troops scoured the island but encountered no significant resistance, declaring the island secure at 1900 on 3 August.

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Early in the morning on 3 August the Republican Guard arrived at Ras al-Qulayah, a day later than expected and apparently unaware the base was held by Iraqi naval infantry. A friendly fire incident was avoided when the naval infantry raised the Iraqi flag over their prize.Over the next week the Iraqi Navy occupied the remaining Kuwaiti naval installations and the various small islands and oil platforms, and secured the captured Kuwaiti naval vessels.

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Faced with stiff Kuwaiti resistance, the Medina Armored Division did not reach al-Ahmadi until 3 August. Hit and run attacks by Kuwaiti forces operating in the southern desert would continue for two more days, but from this point Iraq completely controlled Kuwait. With their nation overrun, a significant proportion of Kuwait’s military retreated across the border into Saudi Arabia in order to continue the fight against the Iraqi aggression. In the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Republican Guard divisions suffered 100 or so casualties each in addition to the Iraqi Air Force and Navy casualties, but this was a practically bloodless operation by the standards of the Iran-Iraq War.

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The first U.S. Marines involved in the Gulf War were the guards from the Marine Security Guard Battalion assigned to the embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait City. Ambassador April Glaspie had returned to the United States on 31 July, leaving Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph C. Wilson IV as the senior American official in the Baghdad embassy. The Baghdad Marines

*

stood security posts and destroyed classified documents during the early days of the crisis; they also helped collect Americans stranded in Iraq by the invasion.

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Of the Marines, Wilson later said:

Their role was to protect classified material from falling into the hands of potential intruders and did not normally extend to protecting embassy personnel, except as directed by the chief of mission in the event of a riot or attack. I had already issued orders to the Marines that they were not to use their weapons to resist unless they felt their lives were threatened. I would have forbidden use of weapons even then, but the Marine Corps standard operating procedure was that they

*According to the Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) command chronology from January through December 1990 (on file at Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), the following Marines were serving in the Baghdad security detachment in August 1990: SSgt G. E. Cudjoe (detachment commander); Sgt P. A. Lewis (assistant detachment commander); and Sgt H. L. Jones and Cpls P. C. Carver, T. D. Larson, and V. D. McMullan (security guards).

Adapted from a Central Intelligence Agency map by Marine Corps History Division must always have the option to use their weapons in self-defense. My rationale was that if a breach of embassy security were to take place as a result of an extremely determined demonstration, the use of force by the one Marine normally on duty would be of limited effectiveness and would only further enrage the survivors of any armed confrontation. Our chances of survival would be better if we were taken hostage than if an enraged crowd fought to avenge fallen comrades.

Wilson felt that once the vast majority of the classified material had been destroyed, there was little reason for the Marines to remain. But “it was all but impossible to convince these young patriots, whose

Reprinted from Kevin M. Woods, The Mother of All Battles, p. 95 U.S. Chargé d'Affaires Joseph C. Wilson IV meets with Saddam Hussein on 6 August 1990. A career diplomat, Wilson led the U.S. State Department and embassy personnel remaining in Iraq until Saddam released the foreign hostages in December 1990.

loyalty to the mission was paramount, that their services were no longer required and they could leave. So long as any American official was in Baghdad, they wanted to stay to defend him.”

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The decision to evacuate most of the families and nonessential embassy personnel provided his solution. Wilson ordered the Marines to accompany the first evacuation convoy from Baghdad across the western Iraqi desert to Jordan. The convoy crossed the desert to Jordan on 21 August with minimal problems, and the Baghdad Marines subsequently returned to the Marine Security Guard Battalion at Marine Corps Base Quantico on 23 August.

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The Marines of the Kuwaiti embassy

*

experienced a longer odyssey. In the early morning hours of 2 August, word of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait reached the embassy. At 0520, the Marines were called to duty, and within 10 minutes they were all armed and at their posts. Small-arms fire could be heard in the distance, and calls from frightened Americans

*According to the Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) command chronology, the following Marines were serving in the Kuwait guard detachment in August 1990: SSgt J. B. Smith (detachment commander); Sgt Gerald W. Andre (assistant detachment commander); and Sgts Mark T. Ward, David K. Hudson, and Paul G. Rodriguez and Cpl Mark E. Royer (security guards). stranded within Kuwait City began to come in. Sergeant Paul G. Rodriguez later reported, “One of the calls I took was from a woman who was staying in a hotel in Kuwait City. She reported to me that something hit the ground in the cemetery which was next to the hotel. I asked her to describe it and all she could say was that it made a small cloud of dust. She reported a second impact and by then I knew they were mortars coming down range.” In addition to their other duties, the Marines notified U.S. Army Major John F. Feeley Jr., an officer from U.S. Central Command in Kuwait, to brief the ambassador on the invasion, and they worked closely with Feeley to report on Iraqi movements within Kuwait.

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The primary duty of the Marines was the destruction of classified material; the task was complicated because the burn barrels were outside the embassy walls, and the civilian personnel would not leave the embassy to enter the chaos of Kuwait City on 2 August. Staff Sergeant J. B. Smith, the detachment commander, and two of his Marines carried out the destruction of the classified information. Smith recalled, “One Marine covered the other two. Post 1 also had a camera mounted on the outside of the wall to help with the monitoring of possible dangers to the Marines outside. The use of the burn barrels lasted approximately two hours.” It took a

total of six hours for all of the classified material to be properly destroyed (material not burned was shredded and disintegrated); when the burning was complete, the Marines returned to defensive positions around the embassy.

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The violence of the invasion raged around the embassy all day on 2 August. Iraqi tanks fired on buildings near the embassy, and Sergeant Rodriquez reported that

Kuwait National Guard forces still stood their ground outside the compound. Some firefights broke out the back gate with the Kuwaiti forces taking cover behind their vehicle barriers. Iraqi forces were stopping cars and taking them for “joy” rides. Once the Kuwaitis found out at the back gate, they began to check all the cars going by. The back gate local guards reported that the Kuwaitis found two Iraqi troops in a car and pulled them out and reported that they were going to take the Iraqis away from the embassy area. So the report we got later was that the Kuwaitis took them somewhere else and shot them.

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The chaos continued on the second day; a burned-out Kuwaiti tank stood at the back gate, and Americans stranded and scattered throughout the city called the embassy for aid and advice. With little sleep, the Marines stood watches and responded to occasional alerts concerning potential Iraqi attacks on the compound. Rumors of these attacks swept through the disorganized city. On 4 August, approximately 50 Iraqi soldiers were dropped off behind the embassy by trucks. The Kuwaiti National Guard troops that had been positioned around the embassy had disappeared.

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Major Feeley later remembered that the Iraqis were expected to assault the embassy on the fourth night after the invasion: “And so we were all set up, as the Marines said, to rock ‘n’ roll. We hadn’t had any sleep, and we pretty much thought that the majority of the military folks weren’t going to make it through the night.” The Marines were expected to defend the embassy with small arms and tear gas while the civilians were barricaded behind a steel door. In the end, however, the Iraqis never attacked the compound.

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Throughout their remaining time in Kuwait, the Marines continued to man defensive positions and otherwise assist the embassy staff by finding Americans lost in the city and relaying intelligence reports on Iraqi activities through Major Feeley to U.S. Central Command. Staff Sergeant Smith noted in his after action report that “this was vital information that CentCom [Central Command] relied upon for its intelligence on Iraqi forces that were heading south to the Kuwait/Saudi Arabian border along [the] Arabian Gulf Road, which passes between the embassy and the Persian Gulf.”

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On 7 August, the Marines were ordered out of their uniforms and into civilian clothing, and on 8 August garbled orders had them mistakenly destroy their weaponry. Both events had a demoralizing effect, but the Marines were permitted back into uniform on 10 August and they acquired some pistols from various sources to replace the destroyed weapons.

Staff Sergeant Smith summarized the Marine embassy guards’ time in Kuwait during the invasion in the following manner:

The embassy walls were never breeched while

Marines of the Kuwait embassy security detachment form a color guard in July 1990. From left to right, then-Cpl Paul G. Rodriguez, Sgt Gerald W. Andre, then-Cpl David K. Hudson, and Cpl Mark E. Royer. These Marines escorted embassy personnel and civilians from Kuwait following the invasion but were then trapped in Iraq until December 1990.

Photo courtesy of Sgt Gerald. W. Andre and the Marine Embassy Guard Association