Kuwait Invaded of the sun. I had only to look at the artillerymen clustered around the trees to see that. Forget tactical considerations; these guys were going to be comfortable if they had to sit outside in the heat all day.” He noted, “About the only thing the Iraqis seemed to be enthusiastic about was looting. They broke into food stores and at first took water, bread, meats, and fresh fruit; the latter seemed to be a particular favorite.”31 The Iraqi Air Force struck Kuwaiti airfields again at 1220 and 1600, but the Kuwaiti Air Force continued to operate with some success by taking off from neighboring highways. The al-Jaber Air Base, according to Republican Guard officers, maintained Kuwaiti aircraft operations until the Republican Guard arrived there to shut the base down.32 The first of the two Iraqi naval forces, consisting of two missile boats carrying 160 troopers of the 440th Naval Infantry Brigade, sailed at 2330 on 1 August, rendezvousing at the al-Bakr tanker platform in the northern Persian Gulf. This took longer than expected, pushing the assault on Kuwait’s Ras al-Qulayah Naval Base until after daybreak. The vessels had numerous mechanical difficulties, and according to their commander, Naval Colonel Muzahim Mustafa, only overcame them due to “Russian experts on board for the purpose of training the crews.”33 The two missile boats encountered a pair of Kuwaiti patrol boats as they neared al-Qulayah. Neither Iraqi missile boat had working weapons, and the Kuwaiti boats fired effectively, damaging the bridge of one of the boats, which subsequently ran aground and was unable to continue with the mission. Despite the setback Colonel Mustafa continued the amphibious assault with the remaining missile boat, landing the 75 men left to him at Ras al-Qulayah Naval Base. The naval infantry secured the base against confused Kuwaiti resistance; by 0830 on 2 August, the base was secured. The second Iraqi naval force was commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Saed Jalio and arrived off its target, Faylakah Island, late in the day on 2 August. The island was bombarded for six hours by the Iraqi boats, and the naval infantry subsequently landed in rubber boats. The Iraqi troops scoured the island but encountered no significant resistance, declaring the island secure at 1900 on 3 August.34 Early in the morning on 3 August the Republican Guard arrived at Ras al-Qulayah, a day later than expected and apparently unaware the base was held by Iraqi naval infantry. A friendly fire incident was avoided when the naval infantry raised the
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Iraqi flag over their prize. Over the next week the Iraqi Navy occupied the remaining Kuwaiti naval installations and the various small islands and oil platforms, and secured the captured Kuwaiti naval vessels.35 Faced with stiff Kuwaiti resistance, the Medina Armored Division did not reach al-Ahmadi until 3 August. Hit and run attacks by Kuwaiti forces operating in the southern desert would continue for two more days, but from this point Iraq completely controlled Kuwait. With their nation overrun, a significant proportion of Kuwait’s military retreated across the border into Saudi Arabia in order to continue the fight against the Iraqi aggression. In the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Republican Guard divisions suffered 100 or so casualties each in addition to the Iraqi Air Force and Navy casualties, but this was a practically bloodless operation by the standards of the Iran-Iraq War.36
Marines in the Iraqi and Kuwaiti Embassies The first U.S. Marines involved in the Gulf War were the guards from the Marine Security Guard Battalion assigned to the embassies in Baghdad and Kuwait City. Ambassador April Glaspie had returned to the United States on 31 July, leaving Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph C. Wilson IV as the senior American official in the Baghdad embassy. The Baghdad Marines* stood security posts and destroyed classified documents during the early days of the crisis; they also helped collect Americans stranded in Iraq by the invasion.37 Of the Marines, Wilson later said: Their role was to protect classified material from falling into the hands of potential intruders and did not normally extend to protecting embassy personnel, except as directed by the chief of mission in the event of a riot or attack. I had already issued orders to the Marines that they were not to use their weapons to resist unless they felt their lives were threatened. I would have forbidden use of weapons even then, but the Marine Corps standard operating procedure was that they *
According to the Marine Security Guard Battalion (State Department) command chronology from January through December 1990 (on file at Gray Research Center, Quantico, VA), the following Marines were serving in the Baghdad security detachment in August 1990: SSgt G. E. Cudjoe (detachment commander); Sgt P. A. Lewis (assistant detachment commander); and Sgt H. L. Jones and Cpls P. C. Carver, T. D. Larson, and V. D. McMullan (security guards).
