Hot Spots and Frameworks – Patterns, risks and causes of crime

Hot Spots and Frameworks –

Pa3erns, risks and causes of crime

Paul Ekblom

Discourses for talking about crime problem Wickedness, blame, criminal responsibility Offender pathology – not bad but sick or mad Societal pathology – blame social structure, parents Empirical – studying pa;erns in crime – to target ac<on • RaBonal – causes and risk factors • • • •

– Immediate and remote causes of criminal events – Offender-­‐oriented and situaBonal (the view of the offender v the view from the offender)

• Quality of life – percep<ons, amenity, community safety

Discourses for talking about crime problem • The raBonal discourse, & focus on immediate, situaBonal causes, is most aligned with those design solu<ons, which centre on reducBon of risk of criminal events and improving quality of life • Important therefore to understand pa3erns in crime, percepBons of crime and consequences of both; causes; risk

Pa;erns Â

Zooming in on crime • Crime preven<on research suggests it’s important to be problem-­‐specific and context-­‐specific in tackling crime – Not just crime but theK – … Not just theK but theK of luggage (target) at airports (place) – …. At Heathrow T5

• So we need to undertake data collecBon & analysis to discover what crimes occur, where

Problem space: a map of symptoms Place

Time Victim

Crime type Modus operandi

Crime target Offender

Zooming in on crime – concentra<ons and hot spots • Crimes don’t occur at random but cluster – At certain <mes of day, week, season – In certain places – On certain vic<ms (repeat vic<misa<on) – On certain products

• Makes sense to concentrate preven<ve efforts on these (80-­‐20 rule)

Crime concentra<on – Bag theK in bars

www.grippaclip.com/crime-­‐science-­‐ methodology/risk-­‐analysis-­‐forms/

Toronto – Assault

Toronto – Stolen vehicle

Toronto – Break and enter

www.cbc.ca/toronto/features/crimemap/

Hot Spots – more detail

Actual and Perceived theK risk in a bar

Hot property – bag theK

Understanding crime – risks and causes

What is crime risk?

Possibility – nature of criminal event Who does what illegal act to whom/what?

Probability of event Crime risk has

3 aspects

How likely is it to happen?

Harm from event What is the harm?

When does it happen –

To whom and/or to what?

immediate or knock-­‐on?

Causes of crime – offender Crimes happen when offenders • Present in crime situa<on • Alert to crime opportunity • Have the right resources (skills, tools, perpetrator techniques etc) to do the crime • Ready to offend – mo<va<on/emo<on • Lack the resources to avoid crime (self-­‐ control, employability for honest jobs) • Have a criminal predisposiBon

Causes of crime – Situa<on A range of theoreBcal approaches focusing on ‘the view from the offender’

• PragmaBcs – crimes happen when there is nothing to block

offender from taking or damaging something/ injuring someone – eg absence of walls, property vulnerable to damage

• RaBonal Choice Theory – psychological opportunity – crimes happen when offender perceives risk, effort sufficiently low and reward sufficiently high

• RouBne AcBviBes Theory – ecological opportunity – crimes

happen when likely offender encounters suitable target in absence of capable guardians – Offender could simply be colliding with opportunity (places as crime generators, eg more pickpocke<ng where more people happen to meet) – Or ac<vely seeking out favourable places for crime (crime a3ractors, eg places where surveillance is poor, guardianship low, escape easy)

Causes of crime – Situa<on A range of theoreBcal approaches focusing on ‘the view from the offender’

• Pa3ern Theory – ecological opportunity – understanding of nodes and paths in the environment that direct people’s movements and make these encounters happen

• Precipitators – crimes happen when human and physical

environment influences immediate offender emoBon and moBvaBon in situa<on – – Prompt, permit, pressure, provoke criminal behaviour – Once emo<on/mo<va<on aroused, opportunity factors influence realisa<on of crime

It’s all very complicated…

• Especially where offenders and preventers are engaged in an arms race eg over vehicle security, hacking • Designers don’t want to mess around with all these theories, which have different focus, different terminologies, different coverage of phenomena • But we can simplify the causes and put them in a single unified framework, which helps you to ‘think thief’ – ie to combine user-­‐centred with abuser-­‐centred approach and to be user-­‐friendly/abuser-­‐unfriendly

Map of causes of crime: the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity

CCO framework helps you flip between understanding causes and designing preven<ve interven<ons based on high-­‐level principles (hence design freedom)

Intervention in cause Disruption of Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity Decreased risk of crime events

A Crime PrevenBon/ Community Safety IntervenBon

Reduced crime Wider benefits

Map of Crime Prevention Principles â&#x20AC;&#x201C; from situational to offender-oriented intervention

Misdeeds and Security framework goes from crime in general to specific kinds of risk associated with some product, place or service

Misdeeds & Security framework – Types of criminal behaviour associated with some product, place or service Mistreatment (damage) Misappropria<on (theK) Mishandling (eg fraud, counterfeit) Misuse (eg as tool) Misbehaviour (nuisance, conflict) Mistake (false alarm)

‘Hot Products’ approach takes you from par<cular crime risks to the risk factors that underlie it

Zooming in on Misappropria<on – Targe<ng the targets of theK • Important to direct our preven<ve effort to where it makes most difference – cost effecBveness • Various approaches have been developed to forecast which types of product (for example) are at greatest risk of theK – then build in security into – Packaging and marking – Sales or user environment – Protec<ve behaviour and alertness of users – Product itself

Hot Products – Characteris<cs of TheK Prone Goods

• Concealable (no<ce if large items are being taken) • Removable (easy to remove) • Available (burglars do not spend much <me in a house) • Valuable (some targets are more valuable) • Enjoyable (burglars do not tend to steal kitchen items) • Disposable (sold or traded)

Risky facili<es • Documented examples of risky facili<es (from 60 Steps guide) – Convenience stores – US na<onal survey found 6.5 percent of convenience stores experience 65 percent of all robberies

– Gas StaBons – 10% of Aus<n, Texas gas sta<ons accounted for

more than 50% of calls for driveoffs and drug crimes in 1998-­‐1999.

– Banks – 4% of U.K. bank branches have rates of robbery four to six <mes higher than other banks

– Schools – 8% of Stockholm schools suffered 50 percent of the violent crimes reported in the 1993-­‐4 school year

– Bus stops – 9% of the shelters at bus stops in Liverpool

experienced more than 40 percent of the vandalism incidents

– Parking – in Nomngham, just one car park (The Royal Moat

House) accounted for about 25% of the 415 crimes reported for all 19 city centre car parks in 2001

Risky facili<es – why?

• • • • • • • •

Random Varia<on – fluke Repor<ng prac<ces – some places report oKen Many targets inside the facility May specialise in selling hot products – e.g.

Electronics store Loca<on – in high crime area Repeat vic<misa<on Crime a;ractors – favourable condi<ons for crime Poor management

Hot Services?

A bit more complicated...

• Legality of service • Access to customers • Ease of tracking offenders • Scale of opera<on

Mistreatment – Target buildings for Terrorism – Risk factors (Clarke and Newman 2006)

• Exposed • Vital • Iconic • Legi<mate • Destruc<ble • Occupied • Near • Easy

More Risk/Protec<ve Factor Acronyms – theK again • Criminogenic proper<es: Fast moving consumer goods • Expansion of ‘Disposable’ in CRAVED: AT CUT PRICES – – – – – – – – – – –

Affordable Transportable Concealable Untraceable Tradeable Profitable Reputable Imperishable Consumable Evaluable ShiKable

Gill and Clarke 2012

• Criminocclusive proper<es: Mobile phone design • IN SAFE HANDS – – – – – – – – – – –

Iden<fiable Neutral Seen A;ached Findable Executable Hidden Automa<c Necessary Detectable Secure

Whitehead et al. 2008

From describing risk to analysing it more systema<cally – Combining CCO and M&S

Every design is a bet on the future • Can product be made?

• Will it work?

• Will it last or fall to bits?

• Will it sell at a profit – what’s the compe<<on?

• Will people use it as intended?

• Will it be involved in crime?

Analysing risk to/from products – eg caMden bike stand (Adam Thorpe)

Crime risks to designed object – bike stand Designed object – bike stand/ s

Wrecking Mistreatment

Defacement by ink, paint or s<cker Defacement by scratching/ abrasion

Increased crime risks to object – as target

MisappropriaBon

Stolen for resale/scrap

Mishandling

Counterfeit for sale

Mistake

False alarm from any security sensors fi;ed Accidental damage mistaken for tampering

38

Crime risks from designed object – bike stand Designed object – bike stand

Misuse

Climbing aid for burglary or escaping pursuing police Decep<ve placing of bomb

Increased crime risks from object – as resource for offender

Climbing onto; simng on

Misbehaviour Bashing to make noise

Mistake

False alarm of terrorism (suspicious object leaning / hanging on stand) 39

The difficulty of forecas<ng • Non-­‐linear futures

• Crime-­‐proofing – domes<c electronics – In prac<cal predic<on of which new products will be at high risk of theK, it’s hard to reliably operaBonalise the proper<es/ features which will make them hot (Project Marc, crime proofing of domes<c electronic products, Armitage 2012)

The difficulty of forecas<ng

41

Next <me – From products, places and services to people

References •

Armitage, R (2012) ‘Let’s be brave! Making the transi<on from research to reality’. In: Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers

•

Clarke, R. V. (1999) Hot Products: understanding, anCcipaCng and reducing demand for stolen goods. Police Research Series, 112, Home Office

•

Clarke, R. and Newman, G. (2006) OutsmarCng the Terrorists. London: Praeger Security Interna<onal

•

Cornish, D (1994) ‘The Procedural Analysis of Offending and its Relevance for SituaConal PrevenCon’, in R. Clarke (ed), Crime Preven<on Studies, 3 151-­‐196. Monsey, NY:Criminal Jus<ce Press

•

Eck, J., R.V. Clarke and R.T. Guere;e (2007). ‘Risky Facili<es: Crime Concentra<on in Homogeneous Sets of Establishments and Facili<es.’ In G. Farrell, K.J. Bowers, S.D. Johnson & M. Townsley (eds.), ImaginaCon for Crime PrevenCon: Essays in Honour of Ken Pease. Crime PrevenCon Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 225-­‐264. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Jus<ce Press

•

Ekblom, P (2005) ‘How to Police the Future: Scanning for Scien<fic and Technological Innova<ons which Generate Poten<al Threats and Opportuni<es in Crime, Policing and Crime Reduc<on’, in M. Smith and N. Tilley (eds.), Crime Science: New Approaches to PrevenCng and DetecCng Crime. Cullompton: Willan

•

Ekblom, P and Sidebo;om, A. (2007). ‘What do you mean, ‘Is it secure?’ Redesigning language to be fit for the task of assessing the security of domes<c and personal electronic goods.’ European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 14, pp. 61–87

•

Gill, M. and Clarke, R. (2012) ‘Slowing TheKs of Fast-­‐moving Goods’ in P. Ekblom (Ed.), Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Crime Preven<on Studies 27. Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner.

•

Su;on, M. (1998) Handling stolen Goods and theQ: a market reducCon approach. Home Office Research Study 178, London: Home Office

•

Harris, C., C. Hale and S Uglow (2003) Theory into PracCce: implemenCng a market reducCon approach to property crime In Bullock K. and N Tilley (eds) Crime ReducCon and Problem-­‐oriented Policing Willan

•

Wellsmith, M. and A. Burrell (2005) The Influence of Purchase Price and Ownership Levels on TheQ Targets Bri<sh Journal of Criminology, 45, 741-­‐764

•

Whitehead, S., Mailley, J., Storer, I., McCardle, J., Torrens, G. and Farrell, G. (2008). “IN SAFE HANDS: A Review of Mobile Phone An<-­‐theK Designs.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 14(1): 39–60