Hot Spots and Frameworks –
Pa3erns, risks and causes of crime
Paul Ekblom
Discourses for talking about crime problem Wickedness, blame, criminal responsibility Offender pathology – not bad but sick or mad Societal pathology – blame social structure, parents Empirical – studying pa;erns in crime – to target ac<on • RaBonal – causes and risk factors • • • •
– Immediate and remote causes of criminal events – Offender-‐oriented and situaBonal (the view of the offender v the view from the offender)
• Quality of life – percep<ons, amenity, community safety
Discourses for talking about crime problem • The raBonal discourse, & focus on immediate, situaBonal causes, is most aligned with those design solu<ons, which centre on reducBon of risk of criminal events and improving quality of life • Important therefore to understand pa3erns in crime, percepBons of crime and consequences of both; causes; risk
Pa;erns Â
Zooming in on crime • Crime preven<on research suggests it’s important to be problem-‐specific and context-‐specific in tackling crime – Not just crime but theK – … Not just theK but theK of luggage (target) at airports (place) – …. At Heathrow T5
• So we need to undertake data collecBon & analysis to discover what crimes occur, where
Problem space: a map of symptoms Place
Time Victim
Crime type Modus operandi
Crime target Offender
Zooming in on crime – concentra<ons and hot spots • Crimes don’t occur at random but cluster – At certain <mes of day, week, season – In certain places – On certain vic<ms (repeat vic<misa<on) – On certain products
• Makes sense to concentrate preven<ve efforts on these (80-‐20 rule)
Crime concentra<on – Bag theK in bars
www.grippaclip.com/crime-‐science-‐ methodology/risk-‐analysis-‐forms/
Toronto – Assault
Toronto – Stolen vehicle
Toronto – Break and enter
www.cbc.ca/toronto/features/crimemap/
Hot Spots – more detail
Actual and Perceived theK risk in a bar
Hot property – bag theK
Understanding crime – risks and causes
What is crime risk?
Possibility – nature of criminal event Who does what illegal act to whom/what?
Probability of event Crime risk has
3 aspects
How likely is it to happen?
Harm from event What is the harm? When does it happen – To whom and/or to what?
immediate or knock-‐on?
Causes of crime – offender Crimes happen when offenders • Present in crime situa<on • Alert to crime opportunity • Have the right resources (skills, tools, perpetrator techniques etc) to do the crime • Ready to offend – mo<va<on/emo<on • Lack the resources to avoid crime (self-‐ control, employability for honest jobs) • Have a criminal predisposiBon
Causes of crime – Situa<on A range of theoreBcal approaches focusing on ‘the view from the offender’
• PragmaBcs – crimes happen when there is nothing to block
offender from taking or damaging something/ injuring someone – eg absence of walls, property vulnerable to damage
• RaBonal Choice Theory – psychological opportunity – crimes happen when offender perceives risk, effort sufficiently low and reward sufficiently high
• RouBne AcBviBes Theory – ecological opportunity – crimes
happen when likely offender encounters suitable target in absence of capable guardians – Offender could simply be colliding with opportunity (places as crime generators, eg more pickpocke<ng where more people happen to meet) – Or ac<vely seeking out favourable places for crime (crime a3ractors, eg places where surveillance is poor, guardianship low, escape easy)
Causes of crime – Situa<on A range of theoreBcal approaches focusing on ‘the view from the offender’
• Pa3ern Theory – ecological opportunity – understanding of nodes and paths in the environment that direct people’s movements and make these encounters happen
• Precipitators – crimes happen when human and physical
environment influences immediate offender emoBon and moBvaBon in situa<on – – Prompt, permit, pressure, provoke criminal behaviour – Once emo<on/mo<va<on aroused, opportunity factors influence realisa<on of crime
It’s all very complicated… • Especially where offenders and preventers are engaged in an arms race eg over vehicle security, hacking • Designers don’t want to mess around with all these theories, which have different focus, different terminologies, different coverage of phenomena • But we can simplify the causes and put them in a single unified framework, which helps you to ‘think thief’ – ie to combine user-‐centred with abuser-‐centred approach and to be user-‐friendly/abuser-‐unfriendly
Map of causes of crime: the Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity
CCO framework helps you flip between understanding causes and designing preven<ve interven<ons based on high-‐level principles (hence design freedom)
Intervention in cause Disruption of Conjunction of Criminal Opportunity Decreased risk of crime events
A Crime PrevenBon/ Community Safety IntervenBon
Reduced crime Wider benefits
Map of Crime Prevention Principles â&#x20AC;&#x201C; from situational to offender-oriented intervention
Misdeeds and Security framework goes from crime in general to specific kinds of risk associated with some product, place or service
Misdeeds & Security framework – Types of criminal behaviour associated with some product, place or service Mistreatment (damage) Misappropria<on (theK) Mishandling (eg fraud, counterfeit) Misuse (eg as tool) Misbehaviour (nuisance, conflict) Mistake (false alarm)
‘Hot Products’ approach takes you from par<cular crime risks to the risk factors that underlie it
Zooming in on Misappropria<on – Targe<ng the targets of theK • Important to direct our preven<ve effort to where it makes most difference – cost effecBveness • Various approaches have been developed to forecast which types of product (for example) are at greatest risk of theK – then build in security into – Packaging and marking – Sales or user environment – Protec<ve behaviour and alertness of users – Product itself
Hot Products – Characteris<cs of TheK Prone Goods
• Concealable (no<ce if large items are being taken) • Removable (easy to remove) • Available (burglars do not spend much <me in a house) • Valuable (some targets are more valuable) • Enjoyable (burglars do not tend to steal kitchen items) • Disposable (sold or traded)
Risky facili<es • Documented examples of risky facili<es (from 60 Steps guide) – Convenience stores – US na<onal survey found 6.5 percent of convenience stores experience 65 percent of all robberies
– Gas StaBons – 10% of Aus<n, Texas gas sta<ons accounted for
more than 50% of calls for driveoffs and drug crimes in 1998-‐1999.
– Banks – 4% of U.K. bank branches have rates of robbery four to six <mes higher than other banks
– Schools – 8% of Stockholm schools suffered 50 percent of the violent crimes reported in the 1993-‐4 school year
– Bus stops – 9% of the shelters at bus stops in Liverpool
experienced more than 40 percent of the vandalism incidents
– Parking – in Nomngham, just one car park (The Royal Moat
House) accounted for about 25% of the 415 crimes reported for all 19 city centre car parks in 2001
Risky facili<es – why? • • • • • • • •
Random Varia<on – fluke Repor<ng prac<ces – some places report oKen Many targets inside the facility May specialise in selling hot products – e.g. Electronics store Loca<on – in high crime area Repeat vic<misa<on Crime a;ractors – favourable condi<ons for crime Poor management
Hot Services? A bit more complicated... • Legality of service • Access to customers • Ease of tracking offenders • Scale of opera<on
Mistreatment – Target buildings for Terrorism – Risk factors (Clarke and Newman 2006)
• Exposed • Vital • Iconic • Legi<mate • Destruc<ble • Occupied • Near • Easy
More Risk/Protec<ve Factor Acronyms – theK again • Criminogenic proper<es: Fast moving consumer goods • Expansion of ‘Disposable’ in CRAVED: AT CUT PRICES – – – – – – – – – – –
Affordable Transportable Concealable Untraceable Tradeable Profitable Reputable Imperishable Consumable Evaluable ShiKable
Gill and Clarke 2012
• Criminocclusive proper<es: Mobile phone design • IN SAFE HANDS – – – – – – – – – – –
Iden<fiable Neutral Seen A;ached Findable Executable Hidden Automa<c Necessary Detectable Secure
Whitehead et al. 2008
From describing risk to analysing it more systema<cally – Combining CCO and M&S
Every design is a bet on the future • Can product be made? • Will it work? • Will it last or fall to bits? • Will it sell at a profit – what’s the compe<<on? • Will people use it as intended? • Will it be involved in crime?
Analysing risk to/from products – eg caMden bike stand (Adam Thorpe)
Crime risks to designed object – bike stand Designed object – bike stand/ s
Wrecking Mistreatment
Defacement by ink, paint or s<cker Defacement by scratching/ abrasion
Increased crime risks to object – as target
MisappropriaBon
Stolen for resale/scrap
Mishandling
Counterfeit for sale
Mistake
False alarm from any security sensors fi;ed Accidental damage mistaken for tampering
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Crime risks from designed object – bike stand Designed object – bike stand
Misuse
Climbing aid for burglary or escaping pursuing police Decep<ve placing of bomb
Increased crime risks from object – as resource for offender
Climbing onto; simng on
Misbehaviour Bashing to make noise
Mistake
False alarm of terrorism (suspicious object leaning / hanging on stand) 39
The difficulty of forecas<ng • Non-‐linear futures
• Crime-‐proofing – domes<c electronics – In prac<cal predic<on of which new products will be at high risk of theK, it’s hard to reliably operaBonalise the proper<es/ features which will make them hot (Project Marc, crime proofing of domes<c electronic products, Armitage 2012)
The difficulty of forecas<ng
41
Next <me – From products, places and services to people
References •
Armitage, R (2012) ‘Let’s be brave! Making the transi<on from research to reality’. In: Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers
•
Clarke, R. V. (1999) Hot Products: understanding, anCcipaCng and reducing demand for stolen goods. Police Research Series, 112, Home Office
•
Clarke, R. and Newman, G. (2006) OutsmarCng the Terrorists. London: Praeger Security Interna<onal
•
Cornish, D (1994) ‘The Procedural Analysis of Offending and its Relevance for SituaConal PrevenCon’, in R. Clarke (ed), Crime Preven<on Studies, 3 151-‐196. Monsey, NY:Criminal Jus<ce Press
•
Eck, J., R.V. Clarke and R.T. Guere;e (2007). ‘Risky Facili<es: Crime Concentra<on in Homogeneous Sets of Establishments and Facili<es.’ In G. Farrell, K.J. Bowers, S.D. Johnson & M. Townsley (eds.), ImaginaCon for Crime PrevenCon: Essays in Honour of Ken Pease. Crime PrevenCon Studies, Vol. 21, pp. 225-‐264. Monsey, N.Y.: Criminal Jus<ce Press
•
Ekblom, P (2005) ‘How to Police the Future: Scanning for Scien<fic and Technological Innova<ons which Generate Poten<al Threats and Opportuni<es in Crime, Policing and Crime Reduc<on’, in M. Smith and N. Tilley (eds.), Crime Science: New Approaches to PrevenCng and DetecCng Crime. Cullompton: Willan
•
Ekblom, P and Sidebo;om, A. (2007). ‘What do you mean, ‘Is it secure?’ Redesigning language to be fit for the task of assessing the security of domes<c and personal electronic goods.’ European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research, Vol. 14, pp. 61–87
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Gill, M. and Clarke, R. (2012) ‘Slowing TheKs of Fast-‐moving Goods’ in P. Ekblom (Ed.), Design Against Crime: Crime Proofing Everyday Products. Crime Preven<on Studies 27. Boulder, Col.: Lynne Rienner.
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Su;on, M. (1998) Handling stolen Goods and theQ: a market reducCon approach. Home Office Research Study 178, London: Home Office
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Harris, C., C. Hale and S Uglow (2003) Theory into PracCce: implemenCng a market reducCon approach to property crime In Bullock K. and N Tilley (eds) Crime ReducCon and Problem-‐oriented Policing Willan
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Wellsmith, M. and A. Burrell (2005) The Influence of Purchase Price and Ownership Levels on TheQ Targets Bri<sh Journal of Criminology, 45, 741-‐764
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Whitehead, S., Mailley, J., Storer, I., McCardle, J., Torrens, G. and Farrell, G. (2008). “IN SAFE HANDS: A Review of Mobile Phone An<-‐theK Designs.” European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 14(1): 39–60