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Bending the Rules Is Not a Harmless Act

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The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army

ARMY

September 2017

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Five Gaps to Fill Within Ten Years

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ARMY

The Magazine of the Association of the United States Army September 2017

www.ausa.org

Vol. 67, No. 9

DEPARTMENTS

ON THE COVER

LETTERS ................................................... 3

Back on a War Footing: Five Capabilities the Army Must Have in a Decade

WASHINGTON REPORT .......................... 6

By Loren Thompson In the three-plus years since Russia invaded Ukraine, Army leaders have had to rethink what they will need to wage tomorrow’s wars successfully with a budget that amounts only to a dozen days’ worth of federal spending per year. The Army needs to prioritize its investments correctly. Five that must be made to give U.S. soldiers a fighting chance in 10 years include mobile command, electronic maneuver and rotorcraft engines. Page 36

FRONT & CENTER The Three Pillars of NATO, Then and Now

By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret. Page 7 U.S. Must Get It Right in Iraq This Time

By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret. Page 8 I Suffer the Cost of Modern War

By Daniel Dodge Page 10 A Seat at the Table for Honorary NCO

By Col. Paul Linzey, USA Ret.

Cover Photo: Members of the 1st Armored Brigade provide security in a Paladin howitzer during an exercise at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

U.S. Army/Sgt. Matthew Hulett

Page 12

FEATURES

Reserve Must Fix Training to

Critical Time in Korea: Eighth Army Adapts to Preserve Peace, Stability

Stay in Fight

By Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Vandal This year marks a critical period for U.S. soldiers, families and civilians in Korea. Eighth Army is undergoing massive change as it transform its units, installations and force posture. The key to a successful transition lies in maintaining readiness to deter North Korean aggression throughout the transformation. Page 20

By Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. Jacobs, USAR Ret. Page 13 The State of the Civil-Military Divide

By Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, USA Ret. Page 15 HE’S THE ARMY ..................................... 18 SEVEN QUESTIONS ............................... 52 THE OUTPOST ....................................... 53 SUSTAINING MEMBER PROFILE ........... 58 SOLDIER ARMED ................................... 59 NEWS CALL ............................................ 61 HISTORICALLY SPEAKING .................... 65 REVIEWS ................................................ 68 FINAL SHOT ........................................... 72

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Bending the Rules: Ambiguous Standards, Falsified Records Cause Ethical Harm

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By Lt. Col. Pete Kilner Standards enable the Army to function efficiently and ethically by creating shared expectations among soldiers. Uncertainty about standards is especially dangerous in the profession of arms.

Page 26

Future Vertical Lift Aircraft Needs An Aviator in the Cockpit

By Col. Stan Smith, USA Ret. Army Aviation is committed to the Future Vertical Lift aircraft even though the first one is more than 10 years away. To build teams of trusted professionals and optimize human performance, we must ensure the Army keeps the aviator in the cockpit during combat missions involving our troops. Page 28

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42 Putting the ‘Officer’ in Warrant Officer: New Training Redefines Their Professional Role

By Gina Cavallaro, Senior Staff Writer The days of marauding drill sergeants, overturned bunks and rote tasks are long gone for warrant officers in training.

Today’s emerging warrants are treated with the same respect and given the same educational opportunities afforded commissioned officers. Page 42

Women Vets and the VA: Programs Aim to Better Treat Growing Patient Segment

By Mike Richman The Department of Veterans Affairs is working hard to meet the needs of the fastest-growing segment of its population, one that has nearly doubled in the past decade: female veterans. Page 49

32 On Warfare and Watson: Invest Now To Win With Artificial Intelligence

By Brig. Gen.(P) James J. Mingus and Maj. David Dilly As in industry, defense is attempting to leverage artificial intelligence, machine learning and natural language processing to solve military problems. Page 32

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ARMY ■ September 2017

Letters There’s More to World War I ■ The July edition of ARMY magazine contains an article by retired Lt. Col. Edwin L. Kennedy Jr., an assistant professor in the Department of Command and Leadership at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College (“MassProducing Leaders: WWI Army Needed a Lot of Officers—Quickly”). This is an excellent beginning of an article to cover such an important and relevant subject.

What I find hard to believe is that this is all there is to say. I am sure Kennedy has a lot more to say on the subject, and he has all the right references. So, the shortness of this article must be the fault of ARMY editors wanting to cut articles down to mere blurbs to cram in more subjects.

Why don’t we decide which are informative articles, and which others are truly the grist needed by the leaders of today’s Army, and then let your authors go into some detail without making these attempts at addressing crucial subjects just teasers? There was even a letter in this edition from retired Col. Ray Bluhm that addressed the mentorship of Maj. Gen. Fox Conner. What a perfect opportunity to tie these writings together and teach a few officers and NCOs about those who succeeded in preparing future leaders, and why they succeeded.

Col. Clay Edwards, USA Ret. Chuluota, Fla. Back to Bremerhaven ■ I found it interesting that the opening photo in Maj. Andrew Rohrer’s July article, “Bulking Up in Europe: Heelto-Toe Armored Rotations Expand U.S. Footprint,” showed a Paladin being loaded in Bremerhaven, Germany. I began my military career as a signal officer in Bremerhaven in 1972.

Carl Schurz Kaserne was a vibrant community that supported U.S. and NATO forces throughout northern Germany and the Benelux. Much of the logistical support for the U.S. Army in Europe came through Bremerhaven and almost all personnel picked up their privately

owned vehicles there. With the end of the Cold War, the U.S. Army’s military presence ended with the closing of Carl Schurz Kaserne in 1993.

It is somewhat ironic that the Army is again using Bremerhaven to move equipment to Poland. Maybe the base realignment that closed Bremerhaven should not have happened; maybe the “peace dividend” of the 1990s was a delusion on the part of the Clinton administration. It is a pity that this strategic asset was lost to save dollars that are now being spent to again use the port.

Brig. Gen. Roger L. Ward, USA Ret. Grayson, Ga.

Soldiers Bogged Down By Gear ■ The July News Call item “Lightening the Load” described concerns regarding the weight of protective gear that soldiers wear. These items, when added to the other battle kit gear, can contribute to putting soldiers (and missions) at risk because of impeded performance. It was stated that although the Army and Marine Corps strive to lighten all gear, they are also looking at other options such as leaving the amount or level of protection to the discretion of commanders. It was implied that “must-wear” items are directed by higher commands or because of rigid adherence to standard operating procedures—perhaps regardless of actual mission and situation specifics—just to be on the safe side.

The commander’s willingness to take risks regarding what to take or not take is a crucial factor identified in soldiers’ load studies. Even with good training, a leader’s load decision will be complex, given the variables of mission, enemy situation, terrain, weather, weapons options and these days, the many electronic “advantage” devices (and their batteries)—all of this affected by the possibility of en route or objective area resupply … and it goes on and on. Soldier performance impediment is real. Combat lesson reports abound with examples of the mission impacts of totally exhausted,

ineffective soldiers due to heavy loads.

This concern is not new. It was addressed in a 1990s Natick Research, Development and Engineering Center project to develop a computer-based system that would assist unit commanders in determining appropriate (without significant performance degradation) combat loads for a range of conditions. It factored in water consumption needs and offered load options that would enable soldiers to arrive at a selected objective physically and mentally fit to fight. This project was later terminated and apparently never revisited.

After studying the soldiers’ load issue for decades, I am convinced that a computer decision aide is needed for leaders.

I submitted letters in 2015 and 2016 to the Army’s Program Executive Office Soldier and to the assistant commandant of the Marine Corps suggesting the former Natick project be reconsidered, modernized and fielded as a smartphone application equivalent. Although I have seen no evidence of a pending solution to the soldiers’ load problem, neither letter was acknowledged.

I resubmit that a load decision aid could and should be fielded. There is no present capability to quickly and analytically provide calculated best load options for a leader. In the final analysis, the “willingness to take risks” problem won’t be solved until a leader can be reasonably assured that they have considered the important mission-related factors and that their calculated load decision (take or don’t take) is a professionally sound choice that provides the best assurance of mission accomplishment with minimum casualties.

Col. William E. Florence, AUS Ret. Springfield, Va.

Commando Memories ■ I loved retired Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger’s column on Mark Burnett (“Legendary TV Producer Served in Falklands,” June). I attended the Royal Marines Commando course in Lympstone, England, in 1963. I was awarded September 2017 ■ ARMY

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Gen. Carter F. Ham, USA Ret. President and CEO, AUSA Lt. Gen. Guy C. Swan III, USA Ret.

Vice President, Education, AUSA Rick Maze Editor-in-Chief Liz Rathbun Managing Editor Joe Broderick Art Director Gina Cavallaro Senior Staff Writer Christopher Wright Production Artist Kevin Kaley Assistant Managing Editor Tom Spincic Assistant Editor Contributing Editors Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret.; Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret.; Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret.; and Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret. Contributing Writers Scott R. Gourley and Rebecca Alwine Desiree Hurlocker Advertising Production and Fulfillment Manager ARMY is a professional journal devoted to the advancement of the military arts and sciences and representing the interests of the U.S. Army. Copyright©2017, by the Association of ARTICLES appearing in the United States Army.

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ARMY ■ September 2017

the Commando Medal but acquired a greater dose of humility and wisdom than at any other time. I learned what Adolf Hitler, the Europeans and Argentine leaders did not learn until too late: Don’t mess with the Brits.

I loved training with the average Commando troopers. They could out-curse, outdrink and outwalk (not outrun) me!

Lt. Col. Jim Tucker, USA Ret. Fort Walton Beach, Fla.

Siberian Adventures ■ I read with great interest the July review by retired Col. Cole C. Kingseed of retired Col. John M. House’s recent book Wolfhounds and Polar Bears: The American Expeditionary Force in Siberia, 1918–1920 concerning the deployment of American soldiers to Siberia in the aftermath of World War I (“ ‘Impossible Task’ Makes for Exciting Read”).

I am the 88-year-old grandson of a veteran of that campaign who lived with my grandfather during the World War II years in San Francisco. My grandfather was a retired Army colonel who was a chaplain in the 27th Infantry Regiment at the time of the deployment. The regiment deployed from the Philippines to Vladivostok, and from there along the Trans-Siberian Railway as far inland as Irkutsk, which is near Lake Baikal. I remember my grandfather telling me stories of this adventure.

I spent about a month in Siberia in 1997 as part of an initiative to form Russian Rotary clubs in the Russian Far East. Apart from the overall Rotary mission, I was also interested in retracing my grandfather’s footsteps.

My quest in this regard was disappointing as few of my Russian Rotary friends knew much, if anything, about any American or allied intervention in Serbia after World War I. Since the “Reds” defeated the “Whites” so long ago, only a few patriotic statues of the Russian “Reds” exist, mainly of Vladimir Lenin, but in every city today there are many memorials commemorating the Siberian soldiers who never returned home from the Western Front in World War II. While politics were avoided during my brief Siberian visit, it was clear that my Russian contacts were proud Russians and were well-informed as to world affairs.

Thank you, Col. Kingseed, for your informative book review.

Col. George A. Grayeb Jr., USA Ret. Nevada City, Calif.

Conner: Get Some Shut-Eye ■ I’d like to add a tidbit to retired Col. Ray Bluhm’s July letter, “Remember Fox Conner.” In 1958, my father told me a story about Maj. Gen. Conner.

At the time, in the late 1920s, Dad was a young Signal Corps lieutenant posted to Fort Devens, Mass., to take part in a large field training exercise. Conner was there to observe and critique.

The commanders and staff officers worked hard to put on a top-notch exercise for the famous general; they worked round-the-clock for three days, with little if any sleep. When the exercise was finished, the commanders and staff officers assembled to hear Conner’s critique. Of course I can’t reproduce his exact words but from what Dad told me, I can imagine what he said: “Gentlemen, you’ve worked hard and you’ve put on a fine exercise. But, gentlemen, in real war, battles don’t usually last for only three days—they usually last for many more, sometimes weeks or months. You cannot function well, if at all, after that many days with hardly a bit of sleep. Therefore, in your training exercises, as in real war, you must plan on rotating personnel so that everybody can get enough sleep to function effectively.”

Those who participated in the exercise may have felt a bit crestfallen, but they had learned their lesson.

Karl G. Larew New Park, Pa. Joint Chiefs’ Hands Tied on Vietnam ■ As a contemporary of retired Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, I look forward to his articles with relish. He is inevitably current and right on the mark. His June Front & Center article, “Let Military Minds Accomplish the Mission,” is no exception. An analysis of successful campaigns proves this undeniably.

I am, however, compelled to take issue with my friend’s comments about the negative views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff expressed in Lt. Gen. H.R. McMaster’s book, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, The Joint

ARMY magazine welcomes letters to the editor. Short letters are more likely to be published, and all letters may be edited for reasons of style, accuracy or space limitations.

Letters should be exclusive to ARMY magazine. All letters must include the writer’s full name, address and daytime telephone number. The volume of letters we receive makes individual acknowledgment impossible. Please send letters to Editorin-Chief, ARMY magazine, AUSA, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201. Letters may also be faxed to 703-841-3505 or sent via email to armymag@ausa.org.

Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam. Actually, I believe the book depicts reality and provides solid support for the thesis of Kroesen’s article.

The book Our Vietnam: The War 1954– 1975 by A.J. Langguth allows the reader to form an opinion of the management of the Vietnam War by simply reporting what was written in dispatches and stated in meetings. This book corroborates the material in McMaster’s book.

President Johnson had a political agenda, and he did not want the Vietnam War to interfere with it. He and his nonuniformed compadres in the State Department really had the reins. The Joint Chiefs faced a vexing problem stemming from our protocol of civilian control of the military. Faced with what a military professional knows would not gain the desired results, does one acquiesce, argue with the president or fall on one’s sword? Under the circumstances in the Johnson administration, there was a lot of acquiescing in high places. So when the White House picked the bombing times and targets, the politically acceptable tactic of graduated response came into being.

Confusing things a little more, the chairman of the less-than-functional Joint Chiefs, Gen. Maxwell Taylor, became the ambassador to Vietnam. He was the mentor for his successor to the chief’s position and, I am told, Gen. William Westmoreland’s assignment to Vietnam. This did not turn the military loose to do their job. It added to the discord in the Vietnam that I saw early in

the war as the Military Assistance Advisory Group action officer.

My assignment later in the State Department and another tour in Vietnam, where I worked with Military Assistance Command, Vietnam; the Army headquarters; the embassy; and all the logistics commands give a basis to compliment McMaster on a well-researched and worthwhile book. It is also clear that no matter where the chips fall in the book, Kroesen’s point of letting the military minds accomplish the mission is profound.

Maj. Gen. C.M. McKeen Jr., USA Ret. Fort Worth, Texas

Command Post Article Muddled ■ This is the second paragraph of “A Smaller Footprint: Multidomain Battle Means Command Posts Must Evolve”

by Maj. Gen. Robert “Pat” White, Col. Charles Lombardo and Maj. Ken Selby in the June issue: “While the Iron Brigade has made great strides in developing expertise in integrating the network, it has been unable to make requisite progress in developing the entire Mission Command system, particularly the materiel aspects of the command post and a refinement to the doctrine that tactical echelons use to simultaneously command and control combined-arms maneuver and wide-area security in decisive action.”

There are 61 words. It is one sentence.

It is one paragraph.

From that point on, the article takes a literary nosedive. I read all the preceding articles without any problem. Then I came to a wall. It took me over an hour to get through it. I had to read and re-read to figure out what the authors were trying to convey—such as having current doctrine but needing to go to a 25-year-old manual to identify who should be in the command structure to implement that doctrine.

It took me two days to recover my senses so I could continue reading the rest of the issue. I would strongly urge the authors to read the articles and/or reviews by retired Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano; retired Cols. Stephen P. Perkins, Cole C. Kingseed and Paul T. DeVries; and retired Brig. Gen. John S. Brown to recognize good, clear writing.

Maj. Silvio Romero, USA Ret. San Antonio, Fla.

The AUSA Book Program offers quality military books about Army heritage, military theory and policy and military force in the modern world. This program permits AUSA members to purchase these and other books at a discount rate.

For more information, visit www.ausa.org/books.

Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory by LTG James M. Dubik, USA Ret. (University Press of Kentucky, August 2016) The Myth and Reality of German Warfare: Operational Thinking from Moltke the Elder to Heusinger by Gerhard P. Gross (University Press of Kentucky, September 2016)

The Origins of the Grand Alliance: AngloAmerican Military Collaboration from the Panay Incident to Pearl Harbor

by Professor William T. Johnsen, Ph.D. (University Press of Kentucky, September 2016) The Life and Work of General Andrew J. Goodpaster: Best Practices in National Security Affairs by LTC C. Richard Nelson, Ph.D., USA Ret. (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, September 2016) Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of Argonne by Douglas V. Mastriano (University Press of Kentucky, March 2014) Rollback: The Red Army’s Winter Offensive Along the Southwestern Strategic Division, 1942–43 edited and translated by Richard Harrison, Ph.D. (Helion and Company, January 2016) Prelude to Berlin: The Red Army’s Offensive Operations in Poland and Eastern Germany, 1945 edited and translated by Richard Harrison, Ph.D. (Helion and Company, February 2016) The Berlin Operation, 1945 edited and translated by Richard Harrison, Ph.D. (Helion and Company, August 2016)

September 2017 ■ ARMY

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Washington Report McCarthy ‘Uniquely Qualified’ to Manage Army

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ARMY ■ September 2017

in demand for its forces and has sustained, predictable and sufficient funds.

The Army needs more than improved readiness, he said.

“While clearly focused on near-term readiness, I will make it a priority to improve the modernization of the force in order to stay ahead of the capabilities of near-peer capabilities,” he told

Senate Armed Services Committee

The acting secretary of the Army considers himself to be “uniquely qualified” for the job as chief management officer.

“As a former Army officer and combat veteran, I understand how to build effective teams and that leadership is required to achieve desired results,” said Ryan McCarthy, a combat veteran who was part of the 75th Ranger Regiment during the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan. He left the Army in 2002 as a captain.

“I was privileged to serve as a close assistant to one of the most talented and reform-minded secretaries of defense, Robert Gates,” he said of a job he held as special assistant to Gates from 2006 to 2011.

“Outside of the military, I have served in the financial industry, as a professional staff member in the House of Representatives, and as a senior executive in the defense industry,” he said of jobs with the North American division of the Hongkong and Shanghai Bank Corp., as a member of the House International Relations Committee staff and after six years with Lockheed Martin Corp., a global defense, security, aerospace and advanced technology company.

“Having worked business processes from both Pentagon and civilian industry perspectives, I believe I am uniquely qualified to run the business end of the Army,” McCarthy told the Senate Armed Services Committee. He was sworn in Aug. 3 as undersecretary of the Army, and immediately appointed acting secretary until someone is confirmed for the top job.

The Army has struggled with modernization for two decades because of the need to address counterinsurgency and counterterrorism threats, but it has not been standing still because it has successfully improved many existing systems. “Based on my observations and understanding, I believe that the Army’s modernization investments have been insufficient to provide the capabilities needed to dominate near-peer global adversaries who have advanced their capabilities,” he said. “I believe more funding should be allocated to research and development efforts in addressing critical capability gaps.”

“Over the past 10 years, the Army appears to have taken significant risk in the modernization of its equipment while supporting the unique needs generated by the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and other global demands,” he said. “As a result, the Army now has capability shortfalls in critical areas that must be addressed to deter and defeat near-peer adversaries.”

Readiness, especially near-term readiness to take on a nearpeer competitor, is a high priority for McCarthy, who recognizes that the Army needs to have two-thirds of its brigade combat teams ready for decisive action rather than the onethird it now has. That won’t be easy, he acknowledged, citing the Army’s forecast that the Regular Army, Army National Guard and Army Reserve won’t meet readiness targets until 2021, at the earliest, and then only if the Army has no increase

Acting Army Secretary Ryan McCarthy

the Senate committee. “The Army must adopt a modernization strategy that ensures our continued overmatch of nearpeer capabilities and permits us to make difficult decisions on future capability requirements.”

The Army also needs to be bigger, he said, although not endorsing a specific size. Faced with two simultaneous or nearsimultaneous contingencies involving near-peer adversaries, “the Army does not have the capacity to respond effectively,” he said, warning “this would result in protracted conflict, higher casualties and a greater humanitarian crisis for the population in the conflict areas.”

Sharing the priorities of Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley, McCarthy said the first place to use additional soldiers is manning select combat units so they are fully manned. “The Army will also use added end strength to retain some units previously planned for inactivation, like 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry Division. Additionally, the Army will increase capacity in capabilities like air defense, long-range artillery, cyber and security force assistance.”

He does not want the Army to get too large, saying he recalls from his Army service that it can be harmful for the size of the Army to exceed the capability to recruit quality people.

“I am committed to ensuring the Army maintains the right balance of readiness, force structure and modernization to prevent growing a hollow force,” he said.

—Staff Report

Front & Center Commentaries From Around the Army

The Three Pillars of NATO, Then and Now

By Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, U.S. Army retired recent newspaper headline, “NATO’s Baltic Challenge,” is a reminder that concerns about the expansion of NATO, voiced back in the 1990s, have really not been resolved. The accompanying article identified two major concerns of those who were skeptical of the commitment of all parties to the obvious growth of responsibilities that would ensue. First, that NATO was overreaching in Eastern Europe, and second, that the loss of territory would be a festering sore in Russia and therefore a potential flashpoint for future trouble. That article, and numerous others, also referred to the underlying concern about the true commitment of every nation to NATO Pact Article 5 that requires acceptance of the provision that an attack on one ally is an attack on all allies.

My concerns back in the day were expressed in articles in ARMY. I did not agree that NATO was overreaching, but rather that it was considering only economic and political—not military— terms to justify the expansion. At the time, and still, NATO was considered the most successful military pact ever formed. However, its need was being questioned as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact coincided with demands for peace dividends among the NATO nations.

Three Pillars The success of NATO was built on three pillars, the first being acceptance of Article 5 by the signatories. At the time, the original 12 nations agreed unanimously.

The second pillar was the organization of a force, stationed in Western Europe, that was sufficient to provide a credible deterrent to a potential enemy.

The British, Canadian and U.S. longterm commitment added strength and permanence to the forces committed.

A consistent pattern of training exer-

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Steven M. Colvin

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2nd Cavalry Regiment soldiers train in Estonia.

cises demonstrated a readiness and capability to satisfy the requirements of a General Defense Plan designed to deny any incursion through NATO’s eastern borders.

The third pillar was the biennial REFORGER—“Return of Forces to Germany”—exercise that demonstrated the readiness and ability to reinforce forwardstationed forces with additional divisions and supporting forces required for sustained operations.

The training and exercises were of serious interest to Warsaw Pact intelligence. The Soviet Military Liaison Mission, stationed in Frankfurt, Germany, deployed monitoring teams to follow NATO contingents along their routes of march, positions occupied and preparedness activities. The deterrence effected by those pillars can never be established or measured, but years of no war in Europe are testimony that “peace

through strength” is a worthy policy.

NATO’s military capabilities today are not moribund, but the capability needed to guarantee their original purpose for the expanded area of the later joined nations is not universally accepted. Restoration and some rebuilding of the three pillars require attention. The threat is not the same, force requirements are not the same, capabilities require adjustment and new technologies have had major impacts on operational plans and capabilities.

Border defense is still the first requirement but now the Baltic and Balkan states must assume the task. Their initial reaction to any incursion must prove painful and costly for the enemy and sustainable by those states until reinforcement arrives. The total force available for immediate action must be credible and has to demonstrate its readiness by the same kinds of exercises previously conducted.

September 2017 ■ ARMY

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There are political and economic decisions affecting such restoration. Acceptance and determination to fulfill the guarantee of Article 5 of the NATO Charter should be publicly announced by every member nation and every nation that aspires to join. Budgetary decisions should not be too difficult. U.S. rebuilding is already underway and the general agreement that expenditures up to the 2 percent of gross domestic product is already an acceptable standard and not many costs require exceeding that number. Modernization and research and

development costs are required but not because of the restoration needs.

Recommitment of Forces A recommitment of British, Canadian and U.S. forces to a more stable on-theground second pillar would help restore credibility. Rotating brigades only provide a new organization that must study and learn the gross domestic product requirements, reconnoiter the terrain, accustom leaders to the NATO command and control systems and practice for its newly acquired role. Brigades and divi-

sions permanently stationed for that role are a much more credible asset than ones looking forward to returning to join their left-behind families.

NATO is capable of restoring its purpose and its capabilities but only if the political decisions to do so are made without delay.

Gen. Frederick J. Kroesen, USA Ret., served as vice chief of staff of the U.S. Army and commander in chief of U.S. Army Europe.

He is a senior fellow of the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare.

U.S. Must Get It Right in Iraq This Time

By Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, U.S. Army retired

I

raq was not desperate in 2009 and 2010.

The security situation was relatively in hand and improving. The political situation was touchy, but also progressing, even if glacially. The Iraqi budget was flush from high oil prices, and the economy looked like it could begin to get healthy. These were the conditions in which Washington, D.C., and Baghdad miscalculated: Seeing the fighting had lulled, both concluded the war was over. This conclusion could not have been more wrong.

In 2011, thinking the war was over, domestic political considerations in the U.S. and Iraq resulted in an American withdrawal—not just a military withdrawal, but more importantly, a political and diplomatic withdrawal. Such a complete withdrawal set the conditions for a set of bad political decisions in Baghdad.

From 2011 to 2013, then-Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki created more enemies by reacting heavy-handedly to protests, alienating the Sunni population, antagonizing the Kurds and increasing corruption. He put himself in the positions of minister of defense and interior, then gutted his own security forces, reversing the slow but steady progress being made by the Iraqi Security Forces, the ministries of defense and interior, as well as the Iraqi Joint Force Headquarters.

During the same period, al-Qaida in Iraq reconstituted itself. It conducted a series of campaigns first to re-establish its networks in the Euphrates River Valley, then renewed the system of caches and 8

ARMY ■ September 2017

bomb factories throughout the country and revitalized its leadership by conducting several prison breaks. The frequency, complexity and lethality of its attacks grew steadily in this period. By 2014, al-Qaida in Iraq had retaken all or major parts of Ramadi and Fallujah.

Al-Maliki came to the U. S. in late 2013 trying to convince American leaders of the serious security problem Iraq faced. He left relatively empty-handed.

Two developments followed: First, Iraq turned to an eager Iran for more assistance. Second, a rebranded Islamic State group seized Mosul, announced a caliphate, and threatened Baghdad itself.

In this same period, the U.S. watched in basically a “not our problem” mode. Of course, when we could not ignore it anymore, Iraq became—and still is—a problem requiring U.S. involvement.

A Two-Fight Matter The mistake Washington and Baghdad made in 2010 and 2011 was forgetting, or ignoring, that insurgencies are a twofight matter at the strategic level: a fight for control of the government, and a fight for legitimacy as seen through the eyes of citizens. By mid-2010, the shooting war lulled, but the strategic war was still raging. Al-Maliki won the fight for control of the government but lost the fight for legitimacy, thus fanning the embers of the insurgency. And American withdrawal became tinder for the reignited fire.

Will Washington and Baghdad make

the same mistake again? The jury is still out. The shooting war is ongoing but winding down. Ramadi and Fallujah are under government control; after nine months of hard fighting Mosul is as well.

Even as these successes are evident, the insurgency remains active, continuing to disrupt Iraqi daily life and seeking to reconstitute itself again.

Meanwhile, the two strategic fights are far from over. Fighting is an instrument, a supposed means toward helping achieve some strategic political aims. So far, the American strategic aim has been to defeat the Islamic State group in Iraq.

A wartime strategic aim, however, should answer the question, “What happens after the fighting?”—or, said another way, “What durable political solution will fighting help attain?”

Since America’s re-entry into Iraq, the focus has been to develop the proficiency of the Iraqi Security Forces necessary to defeat the Islamic State group. “Defeat,” however, has been defined as ejecting the group from Iraq’s key cities and attacking their terror-attack and support networks, but not ending the enemy’s ability to reconstitute.

This focus is too narrow. Even if the Islamic State group is ejected and its networks reduced, without ending its ability to reconstitute (and this applies to the Islamic State in Syria as well), it will not have been defeated in the full sense. And the current focus will not help Iraq win the twin strategic fights and create a durable political solution—the very things

Four Security Actions Necessary Iraqi leaders, of course, have some tough decisions to make themselves. Nation-to-nation discussions like these are the stuff of serious diplomacy mixed with military actions. Unfortunately, the light too often shines on military actions. As the bulk of fighting ends, the U.S. should be seen as a key leader committed to help Iraq win its twin strategic fights and establish a durable political solution. At least four security actions are necessary: ■ Professionalization of the Iraqi military. The Iraqi military will need help returning to the path they were on in 2009 and 2010: creating merit-based personnel selection and promotion systems, performance-based training and education systems, anticipatory maintenance and supply systems, and transparent budgeting and acquisition systems. The Ministry of Defense will need help developing a competent bureaucracy that is necessary to execute its basic functions. And the Iraqi military must subordinate to legitimate Iraqi political leadership and operate in ways that increase government control and legitimacy.

■ Professionalization of law enforcement, confinement and judicial organizations. The Iraqi police forces—local, regional and national—will need help returning to their 2009–10 path: becoming “protect and serve” police forces, developing transparent and accountable confinement systems, transforming themselves into evidence-based (not confessionbased) police and judicial systems, and preparing to assume internal security primacy from the military. The Ministry of Interior will also need help developing the competency of its bureaucracy so that it, with its operational forces and the Ministry of Justice’s legal and judicial forces, can also help increase governmental control and legitimacy.

■ Professionalization of Iraqi intel-

U.S. Army/Spc. William Gibson IV

necessary to prevent insurgent reconstitution. For the kind of strategic help the Iraq problem really needs, America must first convince itself that a long-term relationship with Iraq is in the U.S. national interest. Then it must convince Iraqi leaders that a long-term relationship with the U.S. is in their interest and that America can be trusted to follow through on such a commitment.

An Iraqi security forces soldier practices breaching an entry point with U.S. soldiers in Iraq.

ligence and counterterrorist forces. The embers of an insurgency will burn for a while longer. Together with Iraqi police forces, the Iraqi intelligence and counterterrorist forces must improve their collective capacity to detect and prevent major insurgent terror and organizational activities. Further, these internal counterinsurgency organizations must be controlled by a legal and transparent process. In the 2008–09 period, the Iraqi Council of Ministers established such a process. Some similar process must be re-established if these forces will also help increase legitimacy and control of the government of Iraq.

■ Creation of an adequate border security system. Iraq has not had adequate border security for some time. In many ways, the country must start from scratch. They do have a border security force, but the competency of that force is low and the technology it uses is out of date. Work had begun on improving the quality of the force and its equipment in 2008–10. That work was stopped.

While these four security-related ac-

tions are necessary, they are not sufficient.

The main effort must be at the political and economic levels. Unfortunately, the focus will likely be on the number of U.S. troops left in Iraq, as it was in 2011. But the real indicator as to whether the fighting of the past three years will accomplish anything lasting is the numbers and types of diplomats and the instructions they have from Washington.

Thus the main effort must be focused on at least the following areas: ■ Help the Iraqis create committed and proficient local, provincial and national political leaders who deliver goods and services to their citizens on an increasingly equitable basis to share actual power and resources in a fair and representative way.

■ Help Iraqi leaders—within the Council of Representatives and the executive branch, as well as provincial governors—establish a noncorrupt business environment that allows U.S. businesses to partner with Iraqi businesses in the reconstruction of Iraq and the revitalization of the Iraqi economy.

September 2017 ■ ARMY

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■ Help Iraq establish a transparent, law-based, corruption-resistant civil service that can stabilize the functioning of the institutions of Iraqi governance.

Each of these will require a long-term American commitment to Iraq. Each will progress in fitful, sometimes frustrating ways—but progress they must.

Otherwise the fighting and sacrifice of the past few years will result merely in a temporary disruption of the enemy and short-term lull in levels of violence—just as happened in 2011. Our strategic aim should be to help Iraq win its twin strategic fights and establish a durable political solution—that is, helping Iraq regain its territorial integrity and political sovereignty. Fighting to eject the Islamic State group and to prevent it, al-Qaida or any other insurgent group from reconstituting is a necessary means toward that end.

But success in those tasks is not sufficient. This strategic aim does not include creating another America. Rather, it includes only helping Iraq structure and emplace solutions that increase long-term governmental control and legitimacy.

Iran’s Vision The Iranians are allied and actively positioning themselves to play the dominant role in determining how Iraq approaches its fights for control and legitimacy. They have a vision for what happens after the fighting, and of this the U.S. can be sure: Their vision will be counter to the national interests of the U.S. Some tough diplomatic negotiations and discussions will be required. On one hand, Iran has legitimate historical, cultural, religious and economic ties with Iraq. On the other, Iran has worked to create a politically unstable Iraq so the instability keeps Iraq weak and dependent on Iranian assistance. Russian alignment with Iran will make the diplomatic task even harder.

The U.S. can, of course, withdraw with Mosul being secured, saying our job is done. Doing so will merely set the conditions for Round 3 in Iraq, as our withdrawal in 2011 set the conditions for Round 2. Committing to the long term in Iraq is a tall order, but doable and important.

Although the U.S. has been at war since 9/11, we seem not to have learned a central lesson of war: Battles and campaigns are won by fighting; wars are won by what 10

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happens after the fighting. Maybe we’ll learn and get it right this time. Or maybe we won’t and face an America that won’t

support a Round 3 and a resultant Iraq strategic environment even tougher than the one we’re in now.

Lt. Gen. James M. Dubik, USA Ret., a former commander of Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq, is a senior fellow of the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare. He is the author of Just War Reconsidered: Strategy, Ethics, and Theory.

I Suffer the Cost of Modern War

By Daniel Dodge

A

s an Afghanistan War veteran, I know well the cost of war, but this was not always the case. I never knew many veterans growing up, other than my grandfathers, Maj. Max Dodge (Korean War Air Force pilot), and Bob Harrell (Navy enlisted). After 9/11, I was only 14 and disillusioned with the idea of war. I was focused on being a teenager, listening to punk music and opposing war.

So how did I end up enlisting after high school? The major reasons were that I wanted to learn leadership qualities and get some help with college. I was not caught up in the ideology of the military or any sense of patriotism, but that changed after graduating from basic training.

I arrived in Afghanistan later than my unit, the 864th Engineer Battalion, because they were already deployed. I was there to conduct entry control point duties, searching locals and ensuring they did not transport IEDs, weapons, intel, etc., where they weren’t supposed to. I never experienced direct combat, but I did experience stressful, intense situations in which I had to lock and load and make quick decisions about whether to open fire.

I sustained a back injury from falling out of a “jingle truck.” As I was climbing out, there was a blast or something.

My memory of the incident is fuzzy. I fell on my back wearing full body armor and my head hit the cement. I did not lose consciousness, but it happened quickly and I was disoriented. I have not been the same since and honestly feel guilty about my experience in that I did not engage in combat. It is a sense of survivor’s guilt, if you will.

Reintegration Challenges Coming home in January 2011, I was unemployed for six months until I landed

a job as a lube technician. I applied everywhere, from management-level positions to hourly jobs. I am not sure if I was too qualified for some, not enough for others, or if they saw I was a veteran and were hesitant because they felt I was not mentally stable. I am currently a senior manager, have a wife and two children, and am only a few classes away from my MBA. Yet I still feel unsatisfied with my work, detached from everyday citizens, anxious all the time and yearning to go back to the fight. This is a common theme I find among veterans, but all we can associate it with is the comradery we once felt. This brings up the case for why our veterans feel as if they are anonymous to everyone when they once felt they had a purpose.

The Vietnam War was the end of the draft because of the low morale of Americans at the time and the overall dissatisfaction with the war. It was in 1973 that the all-volunteer force was reinstated and it has been that way since. Because of this, there has been a huge decline in the number of service members in our armed forces.

Sense of Pride Currently, fewer than 1 percent of the U.S. population has raised their right hand and promised to defend our country. But those who choose to serve feel a great sense of pride, like being part of an elite group, and this could be the cause for soldiers coming home and feeling alienated from civilians.

When I go to my local VA Medical Center, I rarely see veterans of my era.

What does this tell me? The Vietnamera veterans have a larger support system than an Iraq or Afghanistan war veteran.

This is not to say they did not gather a lot

of hate, because they experienced much more than we do currently, but there was a lot of attention to how bad war truly is.

The general populace’s current mindset during wartime seems to be, “I wonder what the Kardashians are up to?” Most people are so caught up in the culture of reality television, merely offering a sense of pseudo-support to our soldiers. I would bet most civilians feel modern veterans are well taken care of, have much better health care and receive a lot of support from all angles. And to an extent they are right, but they fail to understand the complexity of war.

They think we just go in there, kick ass, take names, and go home safe like nothing happened. Many Americans think they can just approach veterans with a handshake, say “thank you for your service—here’s a coffee,” and all wounds are healed. I am here to say no. Those gestures are nice, but they feel disingenuous if you were just on the verge of being another homeless veteran statistic because nobody would hire you for six months, you have a family to support, and the VA considers you only 10 percent disabled after having back surgery from an injury in Afghanistan. At least during Vietnam, the masses

were interested enough in war to fight to end the draft and end the war. Now, war is almost like a reality TV show to civilians with no real-life consequences.

Few Answer the Call The war in Vietnam had our brothers, sons, grandfathers, friends, lovers, etc., in the fight and families were desperately waiting back home hoping to see them again. Now there is such a level of detachment that when you see the news of a soldier dying, the thought is, “I didn’t know him.” Click. Because fewer than 1 percent of the population is serving, when a soldier dies, it would be rare if it was your brother, your son, friend or whomever. That’s why there is no real push to bring our soldiers home. There is no real sense of war or its consequences.

We need everyone to buy in. In World War II, there was a clear evil and because of that and the draft, everyone in America was affected, whereas now only a small minority is truly affected. This is the reason, I feel, that politicians are so quick to send our soldiers off to fight and possibly die for a certain cause.

According to VA researchers, roughly 20 veterans of all conflicts and ages across

the country kill themselves every day.

When civilians hear that, they tune out because it does not fit their idea of military service and the glories of war. I can tell you, and many veterans can tell you, war is not glorious nor did we like it, but we did it because, sometimes, it is necessary. I go through moments when even I wonder what the point of life is, but I assure you I am not suicidal.

Still, I can sympathize with those who find themselves in that dark place because I have been there before. Going from a brotherhood, having that close family bond with strangers, ready to die for them, and then coming home and finding out you’re just like everyone else and no one would die for you, is disconcerting at times. We are the most loving, loyal, smart, hard-working and reliable bunch, and all we want is to be treated as such.

Daniel Dodge left the Army as a specialist in the 864th Engineer Battalion at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. He worked for FedEx for eight years and is now a service center manager with Xpress Global Systems. He is pursuing an MBA through DeVry University’s Keller Graduate School of Management.

U.S. Army/1st Lt. Charles Morgan

A soldier with the 1st Infantry Division stands guard as Afghans leave Camp John Pratt in Balkh Province, Afghanistan, in 2013.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 11

A Seat at the Table for Honorary NCO

By Col. Paul Linzey, U.S. Army retired he Black Hawk ride from Camp Victory, located at Baghdad International Airport, down to Al-Diwaniyyah covered about 120 miles. Diwaniyyah was the Iraqi headquarters for militia leader Muqtada al-Sadr, and we got there just before Operation Black Eagle, meant to rein in militia violence, kicked off in 2007. Technically, my chaplain assistant and I were assigned to a military transition team, but for the past three years, Camp Echo, near Diwaniyyah, had no religious support team, so our job was to establish a religious program for the installation.

One day, after two weeks at Camp Echo, I got to the dining facility late.

There were several casualties that day, and I spent a lot of time in the medical clinic, along with two units that had lost some soldiers. I was tired and hungry, and finding an empty seat was difficult. Several units were at our forward operating base to assist with the operation, and many of the visiting soldiers were in the dining facility.

Locating a vacant spot, I placed my tray on a table, but before I had a chance to sit, a master sergeant next to the empty chair growled in my direction, “No officers welcome here.” I doubt that he noticed the cross on my uniform. He probably just saw the major’s insignia on my chest, but it might not have made a difference even if he had recognized that I was a chaplain. There were three possible courses of action, and I had to make a quick decision.

■ Look for a different chair.

■ Attempt to pull rank.

■ Tell him I am an honorary NCO. After a two-second strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats analysis, I came to attention, turned up my collar to reveal a sergeant E-5 insignia, and shouted as loud as I could, “Request permission to sit at your table, Master Sergeant,” then remained standing at attention and waited.

The growler did a double take, and his eyes got real big. “Have a seat, Sarge.”

The other NCOs at the table were howling with laughter. They knew the master sergeant, but they didn’t know me.

And they had never seen a major with an NCO’s rank under the collar. They found 12

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Courtesy photo

T

Then-Maj. Paul Linzey in Baghdad in 2007.

the whole encounter quite entertaining.

After the others at the table calmed down, the master sergeant said, “OK. Suppose you tell me why you’re wearing that rank.”

“Sure, Master Sergeant. When I was a rookie fresh out of officer basic, my first assignment was with an evacuation hospital in the California Army National Guard, where I had a great rapport with the NCOs. When they invited me to attend their dining-in, I thought it was because they wanted me to do the invocation, but that wasn’t it. During the program, the first sergeant pinned the NCO insignia on me and gave me a certificate appointing me to the honorary rank of sergeant, making me an ‘E-5 for Life.’ ” “Hmm. And you actually wear it?”

“Yes.” I wore the sergeant stripes invisibly throughout my career. When in the woodland Battle Dress Uniform, it was pinned under my collar. When we switched to the newer Army Combat Uniform, it was Velcroed under the collar. And when I wore the dress greens or dress blues, it was under the pocket flap beneath my name. Every time I went to a new unit, I met with the first sergeant or sergeant major, presented the documentation, and asked for permission to wear

the rank and be part of the NCO corps. I was always welcomed.

After eight years in the National Guard, I became an active-duty chaplain in the Army Reserve’s Active Guard Reserve program. These chaplains don’t usually deploy, since our role is administrative and training. But while stationed at Fort McPherson, Ga., in January 2007, I heard that the U.S. Army Forces Command wanted to send three chaplain teams to Iraq. There were some areas that needed religious support immediately, and Forces Command gave the task to the Army Reserve.

Strong Sense of Calling As part of the chaplain staff at the U.S. Army Reserve Command headquarters, I had trained many chaplains before they went overseas. But this time I wanted to go. We were running out of chaplains who hadn’t deployed. But more importantly, I felt a strong sense of calling. We had soldiers in dangerous places with no chaplain, and I wanted to be there with them, so I volunteered. It took a while, but I managed to talk my boss into letting me go.

Those sergeant stripes were under the collar when I went outside the wire with the military transition team. They accom-

panied me every time I visited wounded soldiers at the medical clinic. I wore them at each memorial ceremony or funeral. They were there for the worship services, the counseling appointments and the critical incident stress management sessions. Whenever we had incoming rockets or mortars and gathered in the bunkers—yep, still had them with me. One time I was eating lunch in the dining facility and the sirens started blaring. In a hurry to get out to the bunker, I forgot my helmet. My chaplain assistant grabbed me by the collar and pulled me back inside. “Chaplain, you forgot your Kevlar!” Just then a mortar landed right outside the door. It’s quite possible that

she saved my life or prevented injury. See why I love NCOs? The day after I met the master sergeant in the dining facility, he showed up in my office. The night before, he was feisty and energetic; now he seemed sad and tired.

Something had happened.

“Good afternoon, Master Sergeant.

What can I do for you?”

“This morning, I lost a soldier, a close friend. I wanted to know if you’d do a memorial ceremony tomorrow morning before we head out.”

“Of course I will.”

“And Chaps, I’m sorry about last night.”

“Not a problem, Master Sergeant. I understand.”

“You can sit at my table anytime.”

It meant a lot that this senior NCO welcomed me at his table, that he wanted me to be there to honor his friend and that we had overcome the invisible barrier between officer and NCO. In 2015, I retired as a colonel, but I’ll be an E-5 for life.

Col. Paul Linzey, USA Ret., retired from the Army in 2015. He served in the U.S. Army Reserve Command, U.S. Army Recruiting Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. Southern Command and the Office of the Chief of Chaplains. He holds a Doctor of Ministry degree from GordonConwell Theological Seminary, Mass.

Reserve Must Fix Training to Stay in Fight

By Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. Jacobs, U.S. Army Reserve retired

W

hen the Army Reserve mobilized in the wake of 9/11, reality hit it between the eyes. Its units were unready.

The primary reason was easily explained: too many of its soldiers were nondeployable.

To make these units deployable, the Army Reserve assigned soldiers from nonmobilizing units to replace nondeployable soldiers. This created a cycle of unreadiness. To make mobilizing units ready, the Army Reserve broke other units. Inevitably, when the broken units were mobilized, not only did those units have their own nondeployable soldiers, but many of their deployable soldiers were unavailable because they had been moved to other units. The Army Reserve ended up cobbling units together at mobilization stations.

The effort to break this cycle has led to a single-minded focus in the Army Reserve on personnel readiness. But that focus has come at the expense of the other pillars of readiness, especially training.

Although personnel readiness is a nonnegotiable prerequisite to unit readiness, it is not the only nonnegotiable prerequisite, and it is not sufficient. A ready unit is not merely a collection of deployable soldiers.

The U.S. Army Reserve Command’s mission is—or should be—to provide trained and ready units to the Army. The command does not exist to provide in-

dividual soldiers to the Army. Providing ready soldiers and leaders is an implied task inherent in and necessary to accomplish the command’s mission. But it is not the mission.

It is high time the Reserve Command refocused on its mission. If it is to be a true operational reserve, then the Army Reserve must focus on all aspects of unit readiness and not just on personnel readiness.

Staffing Reserve Units I am not minimizing the importance of personnel readiness. It is indeed a key component of unit readiness, and commanders must pay it heed. Without doubt, personnel readiness is a major challenge in the Army Reserve, one that few active component leaders fully appreciate.

Medical and dental issues are an active commander’s headache. But in contrast to the active component, Army Reserve commanders can’t just schedule appointments at treatment facilities on Army installations and have squad leaders escort soldiers to those appointments.

They must figure out how to get soldiers to appointments with civilian providers when those soldiers are not on duty at their units, or they must use one of their most precious resources—training time—for personnel readiness.

But personnel readiness in the Army

Reserve entails much more than medical and dental issues. Chief among the personnel readiness requirements that active component leaders don’t have to worry about is staffing their own units and ensuring that soldiers are qualified in their MOSs. To generate unit readiness, Army Reserve units must be staffed at a sufficient level at the beginning of the force generation process. No reserve component unit will be staffed at 100 percent throughout the force generation cycle, if for no other reason than the length of that cycle for the reserve components is longer than some soldiers’ enlistment terms.

Nonetheless, the Army Reserve can mitigate the staffing issue by doing what the Army has done forever: task-organizing. Commanders can fill squads, platoons and companies, and then task-organize companies, battalions and brigades by cross-attaching units. Geographic separation can be overcome by creating command relationships that allow gaining commanders to prescribe training guidance. Units should remain task-organized throughout the force generation process and, if necessary, through mobilization.

But fully staffed units are not ready unless they are trained. And the Army Reserve must fix training. The DoD Inspector General recently found that some Army National Guard units fail to comply with Army training doctrine, September 2017 ■ ARMY 13

U.S. Army Reserve soldiers maneuver at Fort Hunter Liggett, Calif.

Leaders Don’t Get It The Reserve’s seemingly exclusive focus on personnel readiness has spawned a generation, if not two, of leaders, including senior leaders, who do not understand training. I recently heard an Army Reserve brigade commander say his brigade had the “highest readiness” in his command—as measured solely by personnel readiness statistics. Then he talked of shifting his unit’s focus from readiness to training, as if training were not the most important part of readiness. When active component senior leaders talk readiness, they talk about combat training center rotations. When Reserve senior leaders talk readiness, they talk about dental screenings.

I once heard senior Reserve Command leaders gnash their teeth trying to solve the problem of understaffed units deploying to their combat support training exercise. The exercise is supposedly the culminating collective training event in a years-long force generation process, the Army Reserve’s equivalent of a combat training center rotation. After the exercise, a unit should be ready to mobilize.

The solution those senior leaders proposed to their staffing problem: crossleveling. The rationale? That’s the way the Army Reserve mobilized after 9/11.

Had this plan been implemented, perhaps one-third of soldiers in units deploying to the combat support training exercise would have been fillers assigned to other units. After the exercise, Reserve Command in effect would have disbanded the unit that was just trained by sending the fillers back to their home units. No commander who understands training would say that a unit with only two-thirds of the soldiers that underwent its culminating training event is trained and ready.

Training is the crucible that molds 14

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U.S. Army/Spc. Derek Cummings

and consequently do not have effective training programs to develop and maintain unit proficiency. If the inspector general’s office were to inspect the Army Reserve, it would likely find the same deficiencies.

ready units from collections of individual soldiers. What’s more, training attracts and retains soldiers, a perennial Reserve personnel readiness challenge.

To quote a prior active-duty soldier explaining on a military chat website why she left the Reserve: “The training was so [poor] it was not even worth my hourlong drive to come [to battle assembly] when I could be making money or doing things that needed to be done elsewhere.

It was a complete waste of time.”

Good Army Reserve commanders devote more attention to training programs than to the ubiquitous “recruiting and retention” programs. Well-planned, thoroughly prepared, solidly executed and critically assessed training begets personnel readiness. And failure to train destroys it.

Doctrine Not Understood Training doctrine is mostly sound, but it is written with an active component bent. Reserve leaders neither understand it nor execute it. Lack of access to local training areas, lack of immediate access to equipment, and mandatory training and other readiness activities that consume a much larger proportion of available training time are but a few of the issues. Even conducting the Army Physical Fitness Test is more challenging in the Army Reserve. Training must take its proper place as the top priority for Army Reserve leaders. The Reserve must demand that its leaders, from the most junior sergeant to the most senior general, read, comprehend, implement and enforce Army training doctrine.

If necessary, the Army Reserve should institute its own train-the-trainer programs (such as additional pre-command courses) to ensure its leaders can do this.

Commanders must develop and implement operational inspection programs to ensure that training is properly planned, prepared, executed and assessed. They, and their staffs, must get out of their Reserve centers and into their subordinate units’ centers to put their eyes on how their units are implementing their direction and to provide guidance, expertise and mentorship.

Active component battalion, brigade and division commanders can walk next door and say, “Let’s go check training, Sergeant Major,” and be in a vehicle doing it a moment later. Checking training for a Reserve commander often involves an airline trip. Nonetheless, effective commanders and command sergeants major check training. Army Reserve commanders must visit their units—frequently. And when they visit, they must do more than sit through personnel readiness briefings and dole out challenge coins. They must inspect training.

Commanders at every level must focus their subordinate leaders on key collective tasks. They must require coherent training plans that are driven by a mission-essential task list. They must require training briefings that focus exclusively on unit training—not on personnel readiness. Brigade commanders should review company training schedules critically to ensure that all training, even training in Reserve centers on weekends, is derived from unit mission-

essential task lists. Company commanders must know how to conduct effective training meetings—and they must do it.

Readiness is the Army’s top priority.

Unless the Army Reserve begins to understand training and realizes that unit readiness is more than personnel readi-

ness, it risks remaining just as unready as it was 16 years ago. The cold, hard fact is that the ultimate cost of unreadiness is soldiers’ lives.

Maj. Gen. Jeffrey A. Jacobs, USAR Ret., retired in 2014 after 35 years of active

and Reserve service. A 1979 West Point graduate, he commanded units at all levels from rifle company through two-star Army Reserve command. His final assignment was as commanding general of U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command (Airborne).

The State of the Civil-Military Divide

By Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, U.S. Army retired

T

he state of civil-military relations is a reliable thermometer for taking democracy’s temperature. Throughout America’s history, in sickness and in health, the status of this relationship reveals much of the character of the republic. Today, this thermometer registers, at worst, a slight fever. Further, if there is a chill pill for cooling off what ails us, it is not in the military’s medicine cabinet.

A recent report by Army Lt. Col. Heidi Urben, a visiting research fellow at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense University, offers a nice overview of contemporary debates

over civil-military relations. Scholars are squabbling over lots of issues. Some argue that American policy has become “militarized” through the appointment of active-duty and retired generals to senior policy positions.

Another concern is that regional combatant commanders are playing roles far bigger than the “soft power” exercised by the State Department. This is a resurgence of apprehensions raised during Bill Clinton’s presidency in the 1990s, articulated most clearly in Washington Post reporter Dana Priest’s 2003 book The Mission: Waging War and Keeping

Peace with America’s Military. Conversely, others have argued that past and present presidents have allowed political voices to overrule competent military advice for political ends.

Constant Friction Matters of high strategy and policy are without question an important aspect of understanding the civil-military divide.

It is a constant issue that will constantly produce friction. As Eliot A. Cohen articulates so well in Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime, at the highest levels, the Hunting-

ton model (described in Samuel Huntington’s The Soldier and the State) doesn’t work. Military and political spheres can’t be cleaved off into distinctly separate domains. Generals need to understand the political ramifications of the courses they recommend. Civilian leaders must know their military policies have to be not only politically acceptable, but also militarily suitable and feasible.

Here, as elsewhere, the Constitution puts equal priorities in constant tension. On the one hand, it places limits on the executive control over the military by assigning checking authorities to the other branches of government and through the Bill of Rights. On the other, it recognizes the importance of a democratic government operating with one voice on national security matters.

The Founding Fathers’ solution was to put the priorities of security and liberty in constant tension—and give neither precedence.

Intentional Tension The dynamic of intentional tension is nowhere more clear than in the field of American civil-military relations. This was an issue Alexis de Tocqueville addressed well in Democracy in America.

But despite Tocqueville’s fears that squabbling democracies weren’t up to the challenges of making war, the U.S. hasn’t done too badly.

Still, friction between civilian control, political interference, military competence and the delegation of authority is a persistent concern. A great example of the tender relationship between policymakers and war leaders was the Army’s development of the Victory Plan of 1941.

The document had to offer a realistic assessment of what needed to be done to fight and win a two-front war. Yet it also had to be crafted with sensitivity to the fact that, while it was being written, there was no national consensus to go to war.

The furor that erupted when the plan was leaked and published by the press only reinforced the fact that U.S. participation in the war was the most divisive political issue of the day.

President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew that even asking the military to undertake such planning, as well as participating in the U.S.-British Staff Conversations (Jan. 29–March 27, 1941) with the Brit16

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ish chiefs of staff, might engender serious political cost. Still, as the nation’s leader, he needed to understand the implications of U.S. participation in a global conflict, and if the armed forces could square the ends, ways and means required to secure America’s interests.

Matters of high policy and strategy still gather headlines—even in an age when the media obsess over tweets. Consider, for example, the Trump administration’s development of the plan for the next steps in Afghanistan, which broke through the incessant chatter for several days. Civilmilitary relations remain an issue that commands the attention of people on the street, as well as White House staffers.

Urben’s study, “Like, Comment, Retweet: The State of the Military’s Nonpartisan Ethic in the World of Social Media,” gets at the civil-military relations outside the halls of the West Wing and the Pentagon. She examines the results of a survey conducted about officer political behavior on digital social networks like Twitter.

“Like, Comment, Retweet” examines one long-standing concern in civil-military relations: that the ranks of the military might be captured by one end of the political spectrum, like Oliver Cromwell’s ranks of fundamentalists in the New Model Army who overthrew the British Parliament in 1653. Indeed, it was that concern that inspired President Thomas Jefferson to establish the military academy at West Point. He wanted a path to becoming an officer open to members of all political parties, classes and parts of the country. Jefferson wanted a safety valve to ensure the Army wasn’t dominated by the sons of his political opponents.

Jefferson might be a bit disappointed with the political composition of today’s officer corps. Urben points out that the results of the survey are consistent with what we know about the political orientation of the contemporary military from past studies. The officer corps is decidedly more Republican than Democrat (though the lopsided advantage to the red states is shrinking). Likewise, the enlisted ranks tend to be more conservative though again, there is a good deal of diversity.

Still, Urben points out that politics doesn’t equate to partisanship. Just because service members adopt a political

affiliation doesn’t necessarily mean they will let their politics influence how they perform their duties or use their military position to advance or advocate for a partisan agenda.

Urben does find that use of social networks blurs the divide between political affiliation and politics in part because of unclear and contradictory DoD policies over acceptable public expression of political views that don’t translate well to social networks on the internet. A tweet, for example, may not allow enough characters to fully express a thought, much less add a disclaimer.

In the end, however, Urben concludes the best way to keep the military out of politics online is more education and encouragement to military members to “think before they post.”

Not a Major Threat This study is a helpful reminder that the politics of America’s military aren’t a major threat to contemporary democracy.

The key to this aspect of healthy civil relations isn’t ensuring diversity in the political orientation of service members; it is in educating and inculcating into military culture that a service member’s politics are left at home.

What more deeply concerns many is a growing divide between those who serve and those who don’t—a perennial fear that America is disconnected from its armed forces.

Much of this concern is animated by the remembrance of World War II— as Studs Terkel called it, “the Good War”—when the home front and battlefront were bound together. That war, however, was an anomaly in American military history. It seemed most every American family had someone under arms. Half the productive capacity of the country was dedicated to the war effort. In no other war, let alone in times of peace, were the bonds between public life and military service so strong. And historically, in long periods of peacetime, our armed forces have been largely disconnected from the greater public— spread out in remote garrisons or at sea, out of sight and out of mind.

Ultimately, there is no “normal” level of connectedness—in peace or war.

There have been artificial efforts to bond Americans to the military. These

National Archives

A World War II poster promotes wartime agricultural production.

At that time, half the productive capacity of the U.S. was dedicated to the war effort.

include military education citizenship programs during World War II and the early Cold War, efforts to implement universal military conscription, and the draft. In each case, these efforts have produced meager bonding results. The Pentagon’s track record at closing the civilmilitary divide is sketchy at best.

In addition, there is a body of thought that the purpose of the reserve component, or citizen-soldiers, is to glue civilian communities to the military enterprise.

Supposedly, this was the notion behind the so-called Abrams Doctrine: One way to bind the nation to the war effort was to ensure the military didn’t have the capacity to go to war without calling up reserve components. (A number of scholars, including military historian Conrad Crane, have pretty well debunked the notion that former Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams actually tried to establish such a doctrine.) Legally, such a doctrine would stand on shaky ground. Moreover, there is scant proof that deployment of the reserve component significantly affects public attitudes toward military operations.

Today, there continue to be calls for national military or national service. They falter on practical grounds—cost and utility. But they also raise significant concerns about civil liberties and citizenship.

Though some individuals may learn the value of service and citizenship through military service, it is not the responsibility

of government to teach citizenship. Additionally, there are legitimate concerns that if government assumes the responsibility of teaching citizenship and service, it might hijack the process for political ends—indoctrination, not education.

A Healthy Time Indeed, there is an argument to be made that today we see one of the healthier periods of connectivity among the populace and those who served. Despite service members being such a small percentage of the population, respect for the military remains high. Veterans enjoy strong support from their fellow Americans.

This stands in sharp contrast, for example, with public attitudes during the Vietnam War, when many vilified military service. Even though Americans have been at war for far longer after 9/11 than during the Vietnam conflict, the popularity of the armed forces and veterans remains high.

A legitimate concern, however, is the increasing number of the military-age population that is unqualified for military service. This raises fears over the “quality” of American youth and the inequity of having an increasingly smaller portion of the population bear responsibility for defending the rest of us. This aspect of civilmilitary relations is less about demography or the nature of the military than it

is a question about the state of American society and politics.

Most young Americans don’t have the physical ability, moral character or education—let alone the propensity to serve—required to be an American warrior. And that is troubling. In a healthy society, the desire and competition to gain the honor of defending one’s country would be fierce. We don’t see much of that today.

The hollowing out of America’s military virtue is a problem that goes far beyond the capacity, expertise or the responsibility of the Pentagon to address.

Addressing the ills of society spans education, welfare reform, government spending and other programs. These are essentially political issues requiring political solutions—clearly beyond the purview of military leaders. It would be no more appropriate for them to opine on welfare reform than it is for them to suggest how to resolve the national debt. Further, even if we get federal, state and local governments delivering programs that build up American families (or at least get the government out of the way), it is still up to families and communities to build the citizens and soldiers of tomorrow.

When asked whether we had a republic or a monarchy at the close of the Constitutional Convention of 1787, Benjamin Franklin replied, “A republic, if you can keep it.”

Franklin’s answer remains applicable today. If Americans want healthy civilmilitary relations and a healthy republic, the responsibility ultimately resides not in the Pentagon, but with them.

Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, USA Ret., is a Heritage Foundation vice president in charge of the think tank’s policy research on defense and foreign affairs.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 17

He’s the Army Guard’s Top Logistician an Atypical Officer

T

U.S. Army/Staff Sgt. Michael J. Davis

he news that Maj. David Myones was named Army National Guard Logistician of the Year was greeted by his friends and family as cause for a grand celebration, one worthy of a big social media splash.

Myones, chief logistics officer for the New York National Guard’s 53rd Troop Command based in Cortlandt Manor, was happy and celebrated with them, though receiving the award, he said, “honored and humbled” him because the achievement is not his alone. In his mind, the back of the shiny award plaque that bears his name is plastered with the names of people who earned it with him—his peers, mentors and subordinates.

Then there’s this other thought that humbles him, the one that tells him he’s grateful for the opportunity he’s been given to thrive in the Army—despite a wild youth that could have ended differently. He hasn’t changed completely since those early days, but Myones considers himself an atypical officer.

“I always think the stereotypical officer is supposed to be quiet and reserved, in the background, always professional—not that I’m not professional,” Maj. David Myones he’s quick to add. Still, Myones believes he has a unique leadership style, and a special understanding of young soldiers that “ties back to that wild child in me when I went off to college at 18 and was always outgoing.”

Keeping the details of his first years at Boston University to himself, he alluded only to the sorts of poor choices made by a teenager away from home for the first time. But by his commissioning in 2008, after completing his last two years at BU as an ROTC cadet, he’d chosen a path that would turn his world around—and make him a standout in the Army National Guard.

When he “signed the dotted line,” he said, he put the crazy college years behind him and “became a different person in terms of my judgment, my choices.” Becoming an Army officer made clear to Myones that there was a higher code of discipline and behavior, and a community of people who would teach him, trust him and hold him accountable.

His youthful indiscretions have become part of the narrative when he mentors his troops, personal stories that lend a realworld tone for soldiers who need encouragement or a kick in the pants.

18

ARMY ■ September 2017

“I was given a second chance. I screwed up a little bit and I tell people, ‘Hey, the military was a second chance for me.

It helped straighten me out, put me on a career path where I’m successful,’ ” he said. “If they screw up, we’re willing to give them a second chance because we recognize that people change, people grow.”

Myones is only the fourth recipient of the Army National Guard Logistician of the Year honor, established in 2012 and awarded by the Army Guard G-4 and Executive Advisory Group for Logistics Excellence. Competition is among National Guard logisticians in the 54 U.S. states and territories.

Superlatives fill his award nomination packet with descriptions of barriers broken in leadership, skill and perseverance. One such example, a “culminating event” for Myones, according to the narrative, was when, because of his work, “New York achieved the highest grades in over 20 years” in an annual command evaluation of logistics functions in unit maintenance, food service, physical security and property accountability.

High praise was also doled out for his ability to meet impossible deployment deadlines, his adaptability to shifting situations, and for his talent as a leader.

As the narrative goes, Myones directed his battalions to conduct self-assessments before the command evaluation and then personally visited the lowest-rated companies in each battalion to find ways to correct the deficiencies. “He did this with a combination of teaching, mentoring and coaching,” the narrative says. “Myones is a premier logistician.”

Last year alone, he oversaw the deployment of a sustainment brigade, an engineer company, a finance detachment, two military police companies and a chaplain detachment.

Previously, for his own deployment to Afghanistan, Myones oversaw the coordination and movement of people, goods and equipment downrange and back again.

“I love it,” said Myones, a native of Bellmore, N.Y., with an uproariously contagious laugh. He oversees logistics operations for 4,100 soldiers in six battalions and two brigades across the state. “For me, logistics is problem-solving. It’s, hey, this is what we need to do. This is the end state. We have to move all this equipment from New York to Afghanistan. You go figure it out.”

—Gina Cavallaro

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Critical Time in Korea Eighth Army Adapts to Preserve Peace, Stability

E

ighth U.S. Army serves on freedom’s frontier in the Republic of Korea. Together with our South Korean counterparts, this historic organization maintains the Republic of Korea-U.S. alliance and deters North Korean aggression. Our soldiers and our allies have proudly preserved peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula since the signing of the Korean Armistice Agreement in 1953. Since July 1950, Eighth Army has served continuously on the peninsula for over 67 years in unwavering commitment to these goals.

This year marks a critical period for our soldiers, families and civilians in Korea. Eighth Army is undergoing massive change as we transform our units, installations and force posture. Eighth Army leads the way as the U.S. Army presence in Korea migrates from areas north of Seoul into two primary installations: one in Pyeongtaek and the other in the vicinity of Daegu. By the end of this transformation in 2020, Camp Humphreys in Pyeongtaek will be the largest contiguous overseas installation in the U.S. Army and contain the largest overseas DoD population.

U.S. Army Garrison Daegu, with major sites including Camps Walker, Henry, George and Carroll, has long been a destination assignment. Upgraded schools and family housing units highlight its strategic importance to combined and joint activities on the peninsula.

Daegu is an enduring presence as the home of the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command.

The key to a successful transition lies in maintaining our readiness to deter North Korean aggression throughout the transformation. We must maintain security and stability for our Republic of Korea (ROK) allies and the American people. To ensure this, Eighth Army will prioritize readiness and alliance teamwork.

Threat Environment Recently, North Korea has demonstrated a clear and present threat to regional and global stability. Their provocative actions, rhetoric, and pursuit of intercontinental ballistic missiles and nuclear capabilities present a growing danger not just to Northeast Asia but to the international community. This threat underscores the importance of a steadfast ROK-U.S. alliance. This year, including a recent missile launch, North Korea has conducted over 12 ballistic missile launches in direct violation of U.N. Security Council resolutions. As the Kim Jong-un regime continues the unabated development of its asymmetric military capabilities, Eighth Army continues to prepare to respond to any provocation.

Through continuous training, exercises and emergency 20

ARMY â– September 2017

By Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Vandal

U.S. Army

At the Rodriguez Live Fire Complex in South Korea, Republic of Korea troops train with U.S. soldiers.

September 2017 â– ARMY 21

U.S. Army/Sgt. Uriah Walker

Soldiers with the 11th Transportation Battalion, 7th Transportation Brigade (Expeditionary), emplace a Trident pier in Pohang, South Korea.

deployment readiness exercises, we have enhanced our ability to execute our combat mission. Civilians and families in country are also prepared for rapid evacuation off the Korean Peninsula thanks to biannual noncombatant evacuation exercises. This constant training ensures we are prepared for any contingency.

Due to the threat, maintaining readiness is Eighth Army’s No. 1 priority. Our ability to conduct combat missions as a joint team in the ROK-U.S. alliance is imperative. We must remain ready to deliver a full range of military capabilities on short notice in case of contingencies.

Everything Eighth Army does focuses on readiness.

Whether it is physical training, command post exercises or executing combined live-fires, every task supports this goal. We ensure that every soldier and unit maintains proficiency with weapon systems, lethality on combat platforms, and the ability to operate in a chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and explosive environment.

Constant Training Specifically, we train constantly for our unique mission portfolio that includes noncombatant evacuation exercises; the counter-fire task force for the 210th Field Artillery Brigade; the maritime counter-special operations forces for the 2nd Combat Aviation Brigade; ballistic missile defense for the 35th Air Defense Artillery Brigade; reception, staging, onward movement and integration for the 19th Expeditionary Sustainment Command; and counter-weapons of mass de22

ARMY ■ September 2017

struction training for the 2nd Infantry Division. Each of these missions responds directly to risks posed by North Korea and their real-world significance adds a sense of purpose and mission focus for every soldier assigned to Eighth Army.

Because of the evolving threat, we are constantly seeking new ways to increase readiness. One of the most recent improvements has been the introduction of rotational units to Korea since 2015. After training in the continental U.S. for the Korean mission sets, the U.S. Army rotates brigade- and battalion-sized units into the theater to train with our ROK allies. Participating units have included armored brigade combat teams, multiple launch rocket system battalions, heavy attack reconnaissance squadrons and expeditionary signal companies.

These rotations increase readiness in Korea and for our Army.

They also provide the rotational units with valuable opportunities to train in a challenging operating environment alongside our professional ROK allies.

Over the past year, rotational units have included the 1st Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Infantry Division “Devil Brigade” from Fort Riley, Kan., the 2nd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 1st Cavalry Division “Black Jack Brigade” from Fort Hood, Texas, as the maneuver brigade under the 2nd Infantry Division/ROK-U.S. Combined Division, as well as the 2nd Battalion, 18th Field Artillery Regiment and the 2nd Battalion, 4th Field Artillery Regiment from Fort Sill, Okla., as part of the counterfire task force under the 2nd Infantry Division/ROKU.S. Combined Division’s 210th Field Artillery Brigade. It also

has included the 1st Squadron, 6th Cavalry Regiment Heavy Attack Reconnaissance Squadron from the 1st Infantry Division. These units undertake some of the Army’s most challenging training to ensure they sustain the highest readiness levels throughout their deployment to the Korean Peninsula.

U.S. Army/Chin-U Pak

Exercise Warrior Strike In May, the Devil Brigade conducted Exercise Warrior Strike, a counter-weapons of mass destruction exercise that integrated U.S. and ROK naval, ground and air components.

Our soldiers established a WMD elimination task force with the training and expertise to clear, exploit and secure WMD sites. They conducted an air assault from a Korean amphibious carrier, the Dokdo, with CH-47 Chinooks and UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters, then air-assaulted to clear suspected WMD facilities, including an underground site, with their ROK Army partners. This kind of training with our rotational units adds tremendous combat capability to Eighth Army. It also ensures the whole force can operate seamlessly as part of a combined, joint, interorganizational and multinational force in a multidomain battlespace during times of crisis.

Of course, an army cannot fight and win without a strong supply network. To this end, we consistently practice our logistical operations in Korea. In April, the ROK-U.S. Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps came together for Operation Pacific Reach to test our combined logistics over-the-

shore, area distribution center and air terminal supply point capabilities. Our ability to execute combined joint logistics ensures we can succeed in combat operations, humanitarian assistance and disaster-relief efforts.

Training we execute throughout the year comes together during two major training exercises: Key Resolve and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Led by ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command, these exercises train our combined military forces and the whole of ROK government. These are some of the largest exercises in DoD and involve nearly 40,000 U.S. military participants and 400,000 ROK government and military personnel. These successful exercises prove our responsiveness and demonstrate to the world that we are ready to fight tonight.

Fostering Trust In addition to our rigorous training, relationships and teambuilding are critical in every facet of the ROK-U.S. alliance.

Interpersonal relationships are the center of gravity for the alliance, and we encourage every soldier to develop a bond with our ROK partners. The relationships built at every level foster trust between those in the alliance and ensure we can operate seamlessly when called upon.

Eighth Army actively trains combined operations. We integrate ROK and U.S. service members at the headquarters level down to the tactical units to increase cooperation, understanding and interoperability. Some of the best examples of this are the new command structures established in the past two years, including the 2nd Infantry Division/ROKU.S. Combined Division and the Combined Ground Component Command (CGCC).

The combined division and CGCC are examples of how Eighth Army enhances the alliance. The 2nd Infantry Division/ ROK-U.S. Combined Division provides the template for combined organizational structures as the U.S. Army’s only combined division. Activated in 2015, ROK and U.S. officers work side by side as members of the division staff. As a result, the 2nd Infantry Division has a stronger relationship with its respective ROK units. The CGCC is a centralized four-star command for ground forces on

U.S. and South Korean air and ground forces join for a live-fire exercise at Nightmare Range, South Korea.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 23

U.S. Army

Soldiers train to counter weapons of mass destruction in South Korea.

the peninsula that includes Eighth Army staff members and the Eighth Army commander as the deputy commander for CGCC as part of our ongoing transformation.

We have seen that the alliance’s most effective response to the threat presented by North Korea is for our militaries to remain combined, highly capable and ready. Our continued commitment to the alliance sends a deterrent message to North Korea and reassures our allies globally of our committed presence.

A Great Transformation At a time when Eighth Army maintains unparalleled readiness and enhances integration with our Korean allies, we are simultaneously engaged in transformation and relocation. This is the greatest transformation in Eighth Army’s history as soldiers, Army civilians, contractors and families from 120 installations throughout Korea converge at U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys in Pyeongtaek. This project has been more than a decade in the making.

The transformation and relocation plans began in 2004 with an agreement between the ROK and U.S. governments. After a decade of planning and construction, we are excited to be in the movement phase. Eighth Army headquarters completed its move this summer with U.S. Forces Korea and the 2nd Infantry Division to follow in 2018.

The transformation is an enormous undertaking and will cost approximately $10.7 billion, with 92 percent of the costs paid by the ROK government. We have tripled the size of the original Camp Humphreys and have built state-of-the-art facilities and infrastructure with first-class support and quality of life.

Not only will the transformation enhance our readiness with ranges and a simulation center, it will also provide the best 24

ARMY ■ September 2017

quality of life for our soldiers, civilians and families. It is home to a 110,000-square-foot fitness center, one of the largest post exchanges overseas, and a new commissary. Additionally, the new hospital will support over 200,000 annual patient visits and the largest dental clinic in the Army. Our children receive world-class grades K-12 education from the DoD Education Activity and take part in an exciting blend of academic, social, cultural and extracurricular activities. The high school, two middle schools and two elementary schools can support over 3,800 students within a close-knit overseas military community. On-post residents live in an Army community with modern accommodations, while off-post housing offers a wide array of Western-style homes.

U.S. Army Garrison Humphreys will be the Army’s crown jewel of overseas installations. As we integrate all Eighth Army forces onto two main installations, we will improve force protection and enhance our ability to respond to contingencies.

While the threat continues to evolve, Eighth Army stands vigilant with our Korean allies to respond to any North Korean aggression. As we undertake this transformation to improve our readiness and the alliance, we continue to focus on intensive, combined and joint training to strengthen our combined capabilities. ✭ Lt. Gen. Thomas S. Vandal assumed command of Eighth U.S. Army in February 2016. He has served continuously in Korea for more than four years, including previous duties as assistant chief of staff, C3/J3, U.N. Command, Combined Forces Command and U.S. Forces Korea and as commanding general, 2nd Infantry Division/Republic of Korea-U.S. Combined Division. He is a 1982 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy.

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Bending the Rules Ambiguous Standards, Falsified Records Cause Ethical Harm

By Lt. Col. Pete Kilner

S

tandards enable the Army to function efficiently and other purposes. In military jargon, the money was “the wrong ethically by creating shared expectations among sol- color.” So to accomplish their mission, leaders routinely signed diers, which is why Army leaders are charged with es- documents stating the funds would be used to purchase firetablishing, embodying and enforcing standards. wood, which was permitted, when in fact the funds were used In high-performing units, leaders vigilantly enforce estab- to purchase concrete and other materials to build fortifications. lished standards. However, in units where explicitly stated stanThe leaders understood the justification for their actions. dards are not enforced, a lower standard implicitly takes hold. “You gotta do what you gotta do to accomplish the mission,” After all, the true measure of any standard is its enforcement. one captain said. “You cannot allow the bureaucracy to cause When leaders proclaim one standard but their units practice mission failure.” a different standard, shared understanding breaks down. SolRemarkably, though, the leaders did not speak with one andiers do not know which standard to follow; subordinate lead- other or their chain of command about what they were doing. ers do not know which standard to enforce. Moreover, a unit’s The routine falsification of purchase orders was an open secret. failure to enforce one of its stated standards undermines the To borrow a phrase, they adopted a “don’t ask, don’t tell” apauthority of all its standards, as soldiers proach to their violation of an important no longer trust their leaders’ words and ethical standard. instead wait to observe their deeds. The The classroom solution to their predicaresulting uncertainty about standards is ment seems obvious. The leaders should especially dangerous in the profession of not have falsified any documents. Instead, arms, where adherence to ethical stanthey should have reported the problem dards is the firewall between justified up the chain of command until someone and unjustified violence. with appropriate authority either provided Unreasonable standards and limited them the right color funds or authorized resources are among the factors that imthem an exception to use the wrong color pact adherence to published standards in funds to purchase fortifications.

Army units. For example, Army safety The leaders unanimously rejected the standards require soldiers to have their schoolhouse solution. They reasoned that privately owned vehicles inspected by their mission demanded immediate extheir chain of command and to complete ecution, so they didn’t have time to wait online training before departing on perfor higher headquarters to receive, undersonal leave. These are the same soldiers stand and address their problem. They the Army trusts to drive multimillionalso feared that even if their request were dollar government vehicles across treach- Professional Ethics Development Series heard sympathetically, it would still be reerous terrain in limited visibility while jected on legal grounds by those who felt being shot at. Making matters worse, units often do not allo- no responsibility for their mission. Were that to happen, they cate sufficient time for soldiers to accomplish these demean- would lose all freedom of ethical maneuver and be left unable ing tasks in the hectic days before taking leave. Consequently, to purchase the supplies they needed for their mission. Even soldiers and subordinate leaders not infrequently “pencil whip” worse, their efforts to address the problem aboveboard would the pages of required documentation, violating their most basic likely draw high-level attention to their dilemma, inviting an audit of their previous purchases. ethical duty to be truthful.

“Don’t ask a question unless you’re willing to accept the anI witnessed a similar phenomenon occur in a deployed unit swer,” one leader said. “Sometimes, it’s better to let a sleeping during the Afghanistan Surge in 2009.

Leaders there were aware that falsifying documents violates dog lie,” said another.

I did not observe a decline in other ethical standards in that a fundamental ethical standard. They felt justified in doing so, however, because their mission was to rapidly build the fight- unit, perhaps because the unspoken practice of falsifying docuing capacity of the Afghan National Security Forces, which re- ments was mission-focused and widely recognized as a necesquired them to literally build combat outposts for the Afghans. sary exception. Still, the unwillingness of senior commanders to However, the only funding available had been allocated for take ownership of the situation by explicitly authorizing the new

STRONG to the CORE

26

ARMY ■ September 2017

ate and justified for soldiers to adjust existing ethical standards. When these situations occur, however, it is imperative that leaders explicitly acknowledge the changes and explain the new standards to their soldiers. When leaders permit the changes to occur simply by implicit agreement, their soldiers are likely to become uncertain about which ethical standards are still in force.

Ethical ambiguity leads to ethical confusion, and ethical confusion sets conditions in which there is greater risk that unethical behavior will spin out of control. That is unfair to soldiers and dangerous for everyone involved.

Leaders can foster ethical climates by encouraging their soldiers to identify and bring to their attention any gaps between stated standards and enforced standards. Leaders and their soldiers should discuss any gaps as professionals to make a good determination about which standard—the stated one or the practiced and enforced one—ought to be adjusted.

Leaders should never abdicate their duty to explicitly state and take responsibility for their units’ actual standards—particularly when changes are needed—because soldiers deserve to know unequivocally what is expected of them, especially ethically. Soldiers have volunteered to fight, kill and even die for what is right, so they deserve to know with certainty what is right. ✭ Lt. Col. Pete Kilner has served more than 28 years in the Army as an enlisted infantryman, infantry officer and professor at the U.S. Military Academy. He deployed multiple times to Iraq and Afghanistan to conduct research on company-level combat leadership. He holds a doctorate from Penn State.

U.S. Army/Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod

standard imposed significant risk on their subordinate leaders.

One captain conceded, “If we ever get audited, I’ll be screwed.”

Not all units can keep their justified unspoken exceptions to ethical standards from spiraling out of control. During the Iraq Surge in 2007, for example, a second lieutenant who had joined his unit mid-tour three weeks earlier mentioned to me a “platoon detention cell.” I asked how he could have a platoon detention cell when regulations permitted no detention areas below the brigade level, and even the brigade holding area could hold detainees for only 48 hours before turning them over to the Iraqi government. He explained to me what his platoon’s NCOs had explained to him upon his arrival at the platoon’s combat outpost—that the standards he’d been taught at Fort Benning, Ga., did not apply in Iraq. The inexperienced leader provided examples of unofficial differences in tactical standards, uniform standards and minor ethical standards to buttress his point. “Besides,” he said, “everyone is doing it.”

Isolated from peers and his commander, intimidated by his experienced subordinate leaders and unsure of which standards had been implicitly adjusted on that combat deployment, the lieutenant was failing in his duty to enforce a significant ethical standard.

When I informed him I had not seen or heard any indication that any other platoon in Iraq had its own detention cell—including the other platoons in his company—he became concerned and immediately resolved to correct the situation.

Unfortunately, it’s likely the platoon’s illicit detention cell already had produced significant harm to Iraqis, to the American soldiers involved and to the allied coalition’s war effort.

War sometimes creates situations in which it is appropri-

U.S. soldiers patrol in Ghazni Province, Afghanistan, in 2012.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 27

Pilot or Not

U.S. Army/Andrew T. Gallaher

Future Vertical Lift Aircraft Needs an Aviator in the Cockpit

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By Col. Stan Smith, U.S. Army retired

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he U.S. Army Human Dimension Strategy informs the Army’s approach to the joint acquisition process for programs such as the Future Vertical Lift aircraft. There is a potential that the requirement developers or the aircraft’s designers may attempt to replace the aviator in the new cockpit with remotely manned or even automated piloting systems. To follow the Army’s strategy, it is imperative to keep an aviator in the cockpit.

The Army’s latest tactical helicopter program of record began more than 30 years ago, before aviation became an Army branch. While the Army’s current generation of aircraft has served admirably in multiple conflicts over the past three decades, it is nearing its evolutionary end of feasible technological improvements. Our current aircraft designed decades ago will not meet the requirements predicted in the U.S. Army Operating Concept: Win in a Complex World.

The Army Operating Concept anticipates a complex environment in which our forces must operate across multiple contested domains—a task that will require capabilities beyond those of our current fleet. To win in a complex world, the aviation branch’s aircraft must increase range to span operational and strategic distances, increase payload capacity in high altitude and hot climates, and increase agility after reaching the objective to improve survivability. The aviation branch is committed to development of a family of Future Vertical Lift aircraft with a menu of five capability sets using the latest technology to meet these critical requirements.

Requirements for the five capability sets include speeds from 170 to 350 knots, ranges up to 1,200 nautical miles, and endurances up to 4.5 hours, all with selfdeployment capabilities. The current acquisition process will only allow the Army to

This conceptual rendering depicts Future Vertical Lift aircraft.

the need for user training or instruction. The new aircraft’s designers should follow this example. Technology should help the aviator stay within aircraft limitations without the need to memorize a plethora of numbers. To optimize an aviator’s performance, technology should assist or conduct aircraft startup, cockpit management, situational awareness, Mission Command, emergency response and shutdown.

begin fielding the Future Vertical Lift aircraft near the end of the next decade. Within this time frame, we can expect leaps in technological advances incorporated in the aircraft to help the aviator manage these new capabilities.

Due to the complexity of the operating environment the Army Operating Concept portends, aviators will need decision-aiding technology and flying assistance in the Future Vertical Lift cockpit. Recent technological trends increase capabilities to our aircraft but add complexity inside the cockpit to handle the new technologies. Over the past two decades, this complexity tended to lengthen training time for aircraft qualifications, added time for aircraft startup procedures and increased the number of perishable skills such as finding the proper page on a multifunction display.

We must reverse the trend in which new technology adds cockpit complexity. New technologies used in Future Vertical Lift must lighten the workload of the crew to allow the aviator to focus on the mission and make critical and timely tactical decisions required to accomplish the commander’s intent.

Smartphones are faster and have more technological capability than home computers did a decade ago, yet they do not come with an instruction book; they are intuitive to operate. Developers build Amazon and eBay websites for easy use without

Human Dimension Strategy Capability developers must consider the human dimension when writing requirements for Future Vertical Lift. The Army published its Human Dimension Strategy in 2015. The strategy has a two-part vision for years 2025 and beyond, the time frame for fielding the new aircraft. The vision focuses on building cohesive teams of trusted professionals and optimizing the human performance of every soldier—including the aviators flying Future Vertical Lift. The Human Dimension Strategy, along with the Army Operating Concept, reinforces the necessity to invest resources in our most valuable asset: the soldier. We must build teams and optimize their performance to win our future wars.

To build trusted teams and optimize performance, the Army must develop its leaders. We develop our leaders through training, education and experience. The leader development process focuses on developing leaders able to outthink our adversaries through realistic training that builds cohesive teams.

These same strategies apply to our aviator development efforts; our aviators must be part of a trusted team, and we must optimize their performance.

As technology advances, we must embrace it, train our soldiers to use it and develop our leaders to have the skills to implement it to our advantage. We must use new technology not only in equipment modernization but also in optimizing our aviators’ performance.

Trust Must Be Earned In today’s commercial passenger planes, the aircraft system does more flying than the pilots do. Computer algorithms can replace a pilot’s checklist during startups, shutdowns and emergencies. A correctly written algorithm can reduce the pilot errors made during emergency diagnosis while flying. An autopilot system flies the aircraft from one waypoint or airport to another. FedEx, Amazon and UPS Inc. continue to pursue a fleet of unmanned cargo delivery aircraft. Unmanned technolSeptember 2017 ■ ARMY 29

U.S. Army/Andrew T. Gallaher

ogy exists, but aircraft designers, manufacturers and operators still must earn the trust and confidence of the Federal Aviation Administration and the American public before they begin to deliver packages in the safety of our regulated national airspace before advancing to flying in a combat zone with enemy fire.

Within the 10- to 20-year time frame it will likely take the military to tread through the joint acquisition process to take delivery of the first Future Vertical Lift aircraft, unmanned technology will improve. With these improvements, there are no technological or physical reasons the new aircraft cannot deliver cargo or self-deploy in an unmanned mode. However, some tasks are too critical to relegate to automation—these tasks require human judgment and the investment of human capital at the decisive point in time and space. Transporting soldiers or conducting air-assault missions in an unmanned mode are incompatible with the Army Human Dimension Strategy. Automation will not soon replace the skill of a trained pilot using judgment and intuition to provide critical information about terrain or the enemy to ground commanders.

The vision in the Army Human Dimension Strategy is to build cohesive teams of trusted professionals through realistic training. Realistic training is rigorous training that replicates the complexity of multidomain battle. The authors of the Army Human Dimension Strategy, soldiers and aviators all know that bonds of friendship and trust develop through trials of hard work and training. Aviators have supported sol-

Future Vertical Lift aircraft fly in formation in this rendering.

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diers during training and recent deployments to build this trust. Soldiers trust that aviators will be there when needed to provide situational awareness, decisive fires, extractions from dangerous situations, medical evacuation, air movements, and critical mobility of personnel and equipment.

The Army aviation branch’s vision is a professional, modernized aviation force focused on our ground forces while generating options for the combatant commander in any condition through increased reach, protection and lethality—adept at developing situational understanding to win in an ever-increasingly complex world. The aviation branch instills the importance of supporting the ground forces from the first aviation course to the last, the Pre-Command Course for battalion and brigade commanders. Aviators practice and reinforce this philosophy during training and deployments.

When troops are in the back of the Future Vertical Lift, the Army cannot build the cohesive teams the Human Dimension Strategy requires without an aviator in the cockpit to share risk, keep a sense of urgency and demonstrate commitment to make that team complete. An unmanned aircraft can aid in accomplishing a mission for the soldier but is not able to form that special bond required for combat. Soldiers serve the nation, its cause and the Constitution, but in the heat of combat, they fight for the other soldiers on their team. Technology flying a machine cannot replace this loyalty of one soldier for another. There cannot be a cohesive team between the soldier

U.S. Army/Capt. Brian Harris

The Army is looking ahead to when it must replace aging helicopter platforms such as this UH-60 Black Hawk.

and the aviator without a person in the aircraft cockpit to form that cohesive and trusted team.

Reduce Pilot’s Workload In accordance with the Human Dimension Strategy, the Army must optimize the human performance of every soldier.

New aircraft using the latest technology and software must reduce the workload of the pilot in the cockpit to optimize the aviator’s performance in the myriad of tasks required to perform a mission. A reduced workload allows aviators at decisive points to employ all five senses and experience to make timely and critical decisions to ensure success of our ground forces, something a computer algorithm or even a human operator at a remote terminal cannot do.

Machines are useful for repetitive and predictable type functions; one can easily foresee an unmanned aircraft performing routine duties such as cargo delivery. Machines guided by software provide precision and accuracy that exceed human limitations. Software writers can write algorithms that can diagnose aircraft problems and implement the best procedures to solve those problems faster than an aviator can follow a checklist.

The Army has a definite need for these automated capabilities in such an environment.

The Army Operating Concept describes a dynamic environment, one that is not amenable to repetitive and predictable functions where designers and users can optimize a machine to perform such tasks. Our adversaries watch our routines and devise detailed plans to counter predictable missions.

A tactical aviation mission supporting troops on the ground or

carrying troops involves detailed planning on the ground and quick decision-making throughout the mission. A dynamic environment requires aviators to exercise Mission Command— understanding the commander’s intent and using disciplined initiative to accomplish the mission even when it is necessary to deviate from the written plan. Understanding the commander’s intent and using disciplined initiative in a fluid environment are not programmable functions. New aircraft must reduce the aviator’s workload to optimize the decision-making required to execute Mission Command.

Army Aviation is committed to the Future Vertical Lift aircraft even though the first one is more than 10 years away. The requirements’ developers and the aircraft’s designers must ensure the Army keeps the aviator in the cockpit during combat missions involving our troops. To implement the Human Dimension Strategy, we must build teams of trusted professionals and optimize human performance. Aviators cannot build a team when absent from the aircraft. To form this team, they must share the same risks as soldiers on the ground or in the back of the aircraft. To optimize the aviator’s performance, engineers must use technology to reduce pilot workload and assist the decision-making of the aviator, not replace the aviator when transporting our most precious cargo—the soldier.

Only when we unman ground forces can we unman the aviation force that supports them. ✭ Col. Stan Smith, USA Ret., served in the Army Aviation branch for 29 years on active duty and for the past two years as a contractor on the U.S. Army Aviation Center of Excellence staff at Fort Rucker, Ala. September 2017 ■ ARMY 31

iStock; photo: U.S. Army/Sgt. 1st Class Ben K. Navratil

On Warfare and Watson Invest Now to Win With Artificial Intelligence

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By Brig. Gen.(P) James J. Mingus and Maj. David Dilly

he world is alive with artificial intelligence, machine learning and natural language processing. IBM’s Watson made headlines by besting Jeopardy champions while more recently, Google’s AlphaGo defeated several acknowledged champions in the board game Go. Companies pursue numerous solutions to apply the latest technologies and add to their product lines: Amazon uses its algorithms to give better product recommendations; Facebook is looking to establish (and now create) even more connections among social media users; meanwhile, IBM is advertising Watson as an analyst who ostensibly brings productivity and efficiency to companies that use it.

As in industry, defense is attempting to leverage these same technologies to solve military problems. Computer vision helps imagery analysts recognize potential targets faster; sustainers can project Stryker maintenance needs with machine learning; and the intelligence community uses deep learning to conduct pattern analysis to discover unseen linkages in threat activity. Unfortunately, these efforts fall short of the goal the Mission Command Center of Excellence has in mind when thinking of artificial intelligence (AI)—a true assistant that aids in understanding the operational environment while supporting the operations process.

To achieve this goal, the Army must look further out and attempt to simultaneously unify and integrate multiple disparate tools under the banner of general artificial intelligence.

Cautionary Tales Over the decades, movies have provided several prominent examples of general AI: HAL 9000 from 2001: A Space Odyssey, Joshua from WarGames and Skynet 32

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from the Terminator series. While science fiction, these popular movies offer cautionary tales of AI gone wrong, providing real-world boundaries in AI creation.

Spurred by Deputy Defense Secretary Robert Work’s publication of the Third Offset Strategy, DoD is undergoing multiple concerted AI efforts. Work recently commissioned the Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team to find and field additional AI applications. However, these limited solutions risk being stovepiped as they solve relatively small problem sets and have narrow goals.

Indeed, the Army envisions a much broader application for AI. The Army Operating Concept describes AI that will “enable the deployment of autonomous and semi-autonomous systems with the ability to learn.” The Robotics and Autonomous Systems Strategy describes applications for indications and warnings, counter-messaging and cyber defense, among other uses. However, a key assumption is that the AI in question has been trained to understand the operational environment so that it can defend a network or give recommendations. Yet there is no effort to help nascent AI understand what we do much less how we do it.

For AI to be useful and effective, it must discriminate what information means in various contexts. For example, if you ask for “ISIS,” it does not know if one is looking for terrorists, a

pharmaceutical company or an Egyptian goddess. However, if one asked the question while in a world history class, the most likely answer is Isis, the Egyptian goddess. The world history class adds the necessary context to vector the artificial intelligence to give the best, most probable answer. This is similar to how Amazon recommends books by different authors, but under the same subject or genre. Their curated algorithm takes a search history and matches it with similar users or relative products. Creating and managing these algorithms with relationships of people and products are closely guarded trade secrets.

Realizing the Vision Through research, teaming and experimentation, Mission Command Battle Lab is helping the Army aggregate its base layer of data so it can also create the algorithms and data structures needed to support decision-making. Both must occur if the Army is to realize its vision of a learning machine to inform or recommend actions to future unseen circumstances.

A first component is training an AI program how operational units perform missions across the range of military operations by echelon. The military decision-making process, for example, is a good start in that there are defined inputs and outputs. Further along, it could learn to disseminate an imagery report of vehicle X (exploited through computer viSeptember 2017 ■ ARMY 33

sion) to S3 plans, targeting, operations and S2 personnel for situational awareness and staff estimates. This logic of how we manage information and distribute knowledge products is essential to the algorithm. Much like commercial counterparts, this allows the computer to offer valid recommendations such as “people who looked for vehicle X also searched for …”

The basis for this future general AI must be grounded with four basic items: history, doctrine, theory and lessons learned.

While all this may sound mundane, it is the foundation by which all other forms of Army AI must be applied.

After creating a foundational set of Army knowledge, experts of all types in various AI disciplines will be able to add context and knowledge to the algorithm. Much like we must train people to understand military jargon, so too we must assist machines to understand the relative value of words in each context. It is here where humans add value to various forms of AI to bring about a more useful general AI. This is an opportunity to crowdsource algorithm additions or development— where users contribute best practices or location-specific data to the algorithm. But to truly achieve value across the Army, a holistic approach is needed where the AI is trained at multiple echelons and across warfighting functions.

A Look Ahead As technology evolves and becomes more economical and prolific, the number of sensors and data inputs to processes

and activities will continue to grow. As data from these sensors and inputs accumulates, existing staff tools are ineffective to analyze the thousands, even millions, of collected data points. AI that collates and synthesizes the various forms of AI techniques can enable staff to process data into information and knowledge, enabling commanders to maintain situational awareness and enhance effective decision-making.

At present, these tools require large amounts of processing power and memory, placing this capability out of reach for small tactical units. However, the necessary computing horsepower is present at division, corps and theater Army elements. It is likely these echelons have the resources to field some form of general AI where data and algorithm management will occur. Such an approach parallels industry practices with tiers where subordinate units are subscribers to portions or clusters of AI located at different locations. In this way, if one node fails or is destroyed, it fails over to other nodes—similar to the concept of “graceful degradation.” The algorithm could also “slice off” relevant portions of data to be assigned and reassigned to units based on changing mission sets, or to support disconnected operations.

Invest Today To achieve the vision of more general AI for Armywide application, it is necessary to invest today. The Army must conduct research and experimentation to understand how these new technologies will affect the force from a holistic doctrine,

IBM

IBM’s artificial intelligence technology, called Watson, achieved notoriety for besting Jeopardy champions and is now offered as an analytical tool for businesses.

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U.S. Army Reserve/Lt. Col. Gregg Moore

Army Reserve Sgt. Jon Findley briefs a soldier on the proper use of a Command Post of the Future computer system during an exercise at Camp Parks, Calif.

organization, training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel, facilities and policy perspective. The pieces and parts of AI are not set, providing an opportunity to shape the future by experimenting with the tools available now. This will take time and commitment. For example, it took IBM’s Watson and the Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center three years to start making accurate cancer treatment recommendations.

As AI technologies improve, it is possible to reduce this time.

To speed the process, the Army should continue adhering to standards as set out in the joint information and common operating environments. But these standards must extend to the various forms of AI and machine learning, plus be compatible with other efforts, such as the newly formed Algorithmic Warfare Cross-Functional Team. These linkages are where the Mission Command Battle Lab will focus its early research and experimentation. With all this innovation and creation, it is likely there will be data fratricide, and some sort of governance will need to be established. Indeed, the Defense Innovation Board recommended establishing an AI Center of Excellence to help ensure AI and machine learning address impacts across formations.

The past 100 years may have been about oil, but the next 50 will be about big data. To effectively manage and wield big data, the Army needs AI to support autonomous systems,

intelligence analysis, logistics management and the decisionmaking process. However, the Army must invest the time and resources now to produce this future tool. Army general AI must be trained properly with doctrine, history, theory and lessons learned to help leaders reduce the time necessary to translate data to information.

An effective future AI will give humans back the time to conduct higher cognitive load functions of gaining understanding and applying knowledge to problem solving. Initially, it is probable that this capability will reside at echelons above brigade; placing the Mission Command Center of Excellence, specifically Mission Command Battle Lab, supported by the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., in the right place at the right time to lead the integration of AI into Mission Command systems and the common operating environment. ✭ Brig. Gen.(P) James J. Mingus is director of the Mission Command Center of Excellence, Fort Leavenworth, Kan. Previously, he was the deputy commanding general (maneuver) of the 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo.

Maj. David Dilly is the science and technology branch chief within the Mission Command Battle Lab at the Mission Command Center of Excellence, Fort Leavenworth.

September 2017 â– ARMY 35

Cover Story

U.S. Army Reserve/Staff Sgt. Debralee Best

Back on a War Five Capabilities the Army Must Have

An Army Reserve soldier checks his thermal weapon sight before live-fire qualification at Fort McCoy, Wis.

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Footing in a Decade

By Loren Thompson

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he future is not what it used to be. Not, at least, for the U.S. Army. In the three-plus years since Russia invaded Ukraine, Army leaders have had to rethink what they will need to wage tomorrow’s wars successfully. Nearpeer, state-based threats such as the Russian military are a different kind of challenge than the Taliban.

Somehow, the Army will need to prepare for fighting both kinds of enemies, and a diverse range of other adversaries, with a budget that amounts only to a dozen days’ worth of federal spending per year. Personnel and readiness will have to come first, leaving relatively little money for modernization. So, Army leaders are struggling to prioritize which investments matter most.

The Army must have new items to fight and win in the medium term, meaning 10 years in the future. Much of the commentary about future land warfare technology focuses on ideas that won’t come to fruition for 15–20 years. For instance, the Army’s Future Force Development Strategy warns that even if development of a next-generation combat vehicle were to begin today, system fielding would likely not begin until the early to mid-2030s.

A lot could happen between now and then. In the near term, any war will be a come-as-you-are campaign. Other than filling munition stocks, up-gunning some Strykers and fielding better radios, there isn’t much the Army can do in the way of investments to shape the outcome of a European war during this decade. Rotational deployments to bolster forward-based forces will certainly help, but then-Army Vice Chief of Staff Daniel B. Allyn got it right when he told Congress earlier this year that the Army is “outranged, outgunned and outdated.”

Fixing Most Serious Gaps While the Army can’t do much to change that in the near term, it can fix the most serious capability gaps by the second half of the next decade. Furthermore, it can make the most important fixes without a big infusion of new money—which is a good thing, because Army leaders believe the fiscal picture is not likely to brighten anytime soon. The Army just needs to prioritize its investments correctly.

Five of the most critical items follow.

First, though, a bit of good news. The U.S. military is not going to lose air dominance in Europe or anywhere else over the next 30 years, thanks to the F-35 fighter. One reason Army leaders think they need better air defenses, longer-range fires and enhanced electronic warfare capabilities in places like Eastern Europe is because increasingly lethal enemy defenses may deny air cover to September 2017 ■ ARMY 37

U.S. Army/Edric Thompson

1

Mobile command

Army commanders at the company, battalion and brigade level are equipped with networking equipment that cannot communicate on the move. When they want to network on the battlefield, they must set up fixed command posts, which as Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley has repeatedly warned, is a prescription for being killed during the early days of combat. The latest version of the Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is the only system that can solve this problem anytime soon.

The mobile variant of WIN-T got a mixed reception when it was first fielded because it was installed on 5-ton trucks that could not be airdropped. However, the weight and volume of the equipment has been reduced by half, and can be carried on Humvees. Without the satellite links and line-of-sight radios in the latest version of WIN-T, mobile command will not be 38

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available to most companies or battalions for a long time. They need it soon if they are to sustain coordinated operations against a near-peer adversary.

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Electronic maneuver

In a fight against countries like Russia or China, agility on the ground and in the air won’t be enough to prevail. The Army must also be able to maneuver in

U.S. Army

friendly ground forces—something they have depended on for generations.

However, the F-35 is essentially invisible to Russian or Chinese radar and incorporates an array of technologies for suppressing hostile defenses, fires and maneuver forces. All three variants of the F-35 meet their stealth specifications, and over 1,000 will be available for combat 10 years hence (200 have been delivered already, 600 will be by 2020; 400 pilots and 4,000 maintainers have been trained). Despite all its bad press, the F-35 works as advertised and will assure U.S. air dominance in overseas theaters during the next decade.

So, the situation isn’t quite as bad as Army planners fear.

But it’s bad enough. Despite chronic budget problems, the Russian military has matched or surpassed America’s Army in several areas crucial to effective combat.

Here are five investments that must be made to give U.S. soldiers a fighting chance in 10 years:

the electromagnetic spectrum, denying adversaries access to key frequencies while assuring the ability of friendly forces to function. Not only will electronic warfare capabilities be crucial to suppressing enemy sensors, communications and drones, but soldiers must be able to counter enemy efforts at degrading GPS signals, command links and the like.

The Army largely divested its electronic warfare capabilities after the Cold War, relying heavily on the jamming aircraft of other services to address threats like improvised explosive devices. It needs to invest in a new generation of organic systems and operators to cope with electronic threats likely to be posed by high-end adversaries. That process has begun with programs like the Electronic Warfare Planning and Management Tool, but the current level of research and development spending ($70 million–80 million per year) probably is too modest to get ahead of the threat.

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Clockwise from upper left: A Humvee and tent are part of the Army’s push to explore quick-to-deploy command post designs; the Improved Turbine Engine Program is developing stronger engines for helicopters such as these Black Hawks; a soldier with the 780th Military Intelligence Brigade prepares cyber equipment at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.

The Army has a grand plan for replacing its Cold War helicopters called Future Vertical Lift. Some observers think that plan sounds too much like the Future Combat Systems and Joint Tactical Radio System for comfort. Like those failed efforts, Future Vertical Lift has many moving pieces and requires generous annual appropriations in a time frame when federal budget deficits are expected to approach a trillion dollars annually. Even if it stays on track, the program will not field new rotorcraft for a long time.

With Apache and Black Hawk helicopters likely to stay in the force through the middle of the century, the Army needs to restore power margins lost as a result of increasing weight by developing a better engine. The Improved Turbine Engine Program is the only effort underway that has any hope of boosting the combat performance of the current fleet in a time frame relevant to the medium-term fight. It also could power a next-generation replacement of the Kiowa scout helicopter. Without this investment, Army aviation will be hobbled in high-end fights 10 years from now.

4 U.S. Army/Bill Roche

Rotorcraft engines

Active protection

The U.S. Army has lagged behind Russia in providing active defenses to its front-line combat vehicles. Active defenses are automated sensor/interceptor systems that defeat incoming anti-tank rounds before they can reach their intended targets. The most capable systems, such as Raytheon’s Quick Kill, provide 360-degree hemispheric protection of vehicles against simultaneous threats while minimizing fratricidal effects on dismounted soldiers nearby.

The Army is already installing interim active defense solutions on Abrams tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, but September 2017 ■ ARMY 39

Bradley Fighting Vehicles such as this one maneuvering at Fort Stewart, Ga., are getting interim active defense systems.

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U.S. Army/Maj. Randy Ready

to defeat anti-armor threats 10 years from now, it must field an integrated architecture providing common standards and interfaces for all vehicles.

The Modular Active Protection System provides that framework, and is potentially applicable to kinetic and nonkinetic methods of defense. It needs to be accelerated, otherwise Army vehicles will be too vulnerable to survive future conflicts.

Indirect fires

The area where today’s Army is most decisively “outranged, outgunned and outdated” is longrange fires. Not only have prospective adversaries such as Russia and North Korea deployed much greater artillery and missile assets in key theaters than the U.S. has, but Washington has limited the Army’s future warfighting options by signing on to a cluster munitions ban that takes effect in 2019. Deployment of the F-35 will mitigate this challenge, but the Army needs to bolster its organic fires for the midterm fight.

The Army’s Long Range Precision Fires program is the most important effort aimed at closing this capability gap. It was conceived to replace the longer-range missiles currently fired by the Multiple Launch Rocket System with new missiles delivering the maximum range permissible under arms control agreements—about 300 miles in Europe—but also compact

enough to fit two missiles rather than one in a launcher. Thus, it would double the firepower and triple the reach of launchers.

It needs to be kept on track and fielded expeditiously.

There are other capability gaps that need to be dealt with in areas like missile defense and cyber protection, but these five are the ones that will make the most difference in 10 years. If the Army does not address all five in its near-term spending plans, its ability to deter and/or defeat near-peer adversaries a decade from now will be in doubt. ✭ Loren Thompson is chief operating officer at the Lexington Institute, a nonprofit public-policy think tank in Arlington, Va. He taught military affairs at Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.

Raytheon Co.

Raytheon Co.’s new Deep Strike missile, deployed from a mobile launcher in this artist’s rendering, would allow the Army to fire two munitions from a single weapons pod.

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Putting the ‘Officer’ In Warrant Officer New Training Redefines Their Professional Role

By Gina Cavallaro, Senior Staff Writer

he days of marauding drill sergeants, overturned bunks and rote tasks are long gone for warrant officers in training.

Today’s emerging warrants are treated with the same respect and given the same educational opportunities afforded commissioned officers.

It began about two years ago, as Army leadership rolled out their redesigned method for training and educating soldiers. They called it the Army Learning Model and the top concept was to take the focus from the instructor and place it on the student.

A reduction in instructor-led slideshows, static presentations and lectures, it was reasoned, would give students the chance to construct knowledge together in small groups by studying lessons and then teaching blocks of instruction with the guidance of a facilitator.

For the Warrant Officer Career College at Fort Rucker, Ala., the new model was a significant game-changer. Leaders took the Army’s idea and ran fast, turning around an environment of basic training and eight-hour school days into one of critical thinking, professionalism and, well, conduct more becoming an officer.

Today, rather than leaving Rucker with an understanding only of what a warrant officer is and does, new warrants and those progressing in their careers are speaking the language of command with a deeper understanding of how the Army works at the top.

More than 6,700 students will have completed the three courses offered at the Warrant Officer Career College—the Warrant Officer Candidate Course, Warrant Officer Intermediate Level Education and Warrant Officer Senior Service Education—by the end of fiscal 2017, either on campus, online or at regional training centers. Each will have studied more in-depth aspects of leadership, communications, management, strategy and joint multinational operations at their respective levels, mirroring curricula once reserved for the officer corps.

Instructors are now called facilitators, and small group projects break a traditional eight-hour day of lectures into a more interactive learning environment which, faculty members say, helps them gain a better appreciation for the skills, talents and capabilities of the student body.

“It’s a joy having the freedom to use your experience to enhance your instruction and also draw experience from the class,” said retired Chief Warrant Officer 3 Jonathan Carmichael, an instructor in project management, who pointed out that in Warrant Officer Career College courses, he and his fellow faculty members often have high school graduates and Ph.D.s collaborating in the same class. “The journey is deeper.”

Energized by the refreshed approach, the Warrant Officer Career College also established a lecture series under a new guest speaker program, and has spearheaded the addition of degree programs with accredited universities.

But the feel-good initiatives and changes have not been met with universal acceptance.

“Changing it was criticized by others on the outside,” said Col. Garry Thomp-

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Virginia National Guard/Staff Sgt. Terra C. Gatti

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son, commandant of the Warrant Officer Career College, who marched ahead with the expanded curriculum and cultural transformation despite grumbling from some in the commissioned and warrant officer corps.

Thompson and Deputy Commandant Chief Warrant Officer 5 John Howze chalked up the resistance to a small band of warrant-culture watchdogs, those senior or retired warrant officers who have a proprietary interest in keeping their slice of the Army intact.

Change is hard, Howze said, but now more than ever, it’s needed.

“Warrant officers are being called upon to assume many roles and many of those require advanced education,” he said, adding: “I’m not saying we’d lose our technical expertise, but when we go into those environments with officers, we need to be able to speak the language, we need to be able to write the

language, to form a complete sentence.”

Among the officer corps, Howze suggested, an educational expansion for warrants has been greeted with approval—as long as warrants stay in their lane of expertise. Concurrently, he said, there are some senior warrants who believe they should be on par with colonels or general officers.

His response: It’s not the way the Army is set up. “You’re still going to have to salute that second lieutenant.”

The Chameleons As a cohort, warrant officers comprise less than 3 percent of the Army, and work in only 17 branches. They are known best for their mastery in their respective areas of technical expertise, but they are also expected to be on point with advice and counsel for commanders, regardless of branch.

The role of the warrant officer, as with the rest of the Army’s

Virginia Army National Guard soldiers attend Pre-Warrant Officer Candidate School at Fort Pickett, Va.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 43

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troops and leaders, is likely to expand as contractors disappear from the battlefield and readiness is back in the hands of soldiers. At the Warrant Officer Career College, that means grooming new candidates, mid-career warrants and senior warrants for more than the technical expertise they provide.

“We didn’t used to prepare them for the operational environment,” Howze said, noting that with the Army on a fast track to modernization and the prospect of a more dispersed battlefield, warrants will be called upon more than ever to make critical decisions in smaller units.

Unlike officers—generalists who move from post to post as they progress in their careers—warrants don’t command troops or units, with the exception of band commanders and two company command positions at the Warrant Officer Career College. Straddling the worlds of leading troops and providing expertise, Howze said, will be a given in the future.

“You have to be a chameleon, you have to be able to be down and dirty and talk the lingo of your technical expertise, but you also have to be polished when it’s time to be polished, when you’re briefing your general officers or recruiting for the cohort,” Howze said.

Reminiscing about his own training to become a warrant officer, he recalled the “draconian” approach with some amusement and said he was “excited” that things had become more professional.

AUSA/Gina Cavallaro

Clockwise from above: Chief Warrant Officer 2 Charita Mixon; Reserve Warrant Officer Justin Kappelman; Warrant Officer Nicholas James West.

In his executive office at Swartworth Hall, he reached behind his desk for an old-school photo album, and, handing it over carefully, chuckled as visitors reacted to the fading images of ransacked bays and soldiers hanging around the barracks like privates.

That was in 1996, when, as a seasoned sergeant first class with proven leadership skills, he endured belittling trainers “in my face screaming at me, telling me I wasn’t going to make it. There’s still some screaming going on when there’s a clear violation, but for the most part we treat them like officers.”

The memory of those younger days makes him smile, but for Howze and the course at the Warrant Officer Candidate School, there’s no turning back.

In the near future, he predicted, “there’s a high likelihood a warrant officer could find himself in charge downrange, and we have to make sure they are able to adapt and step up to that plate.”

Teachable Moments Warrant officer candidates begin their passage in a version of basic training designed to push them to their physical and mental limits—while they simultaneously make the transition from enlisted soldiers to officers. They come from all over the Army with differing levels of fitness, knowledge, education and motivation. Many of them are not prepared for the 4:30 a.m. start time, late-night cramming, long foot marches with 48-pound packs, or the brain drain that comes with working to think like an officer overnight.

Candidates coming in from the NCO ranks attend a five-week course; enlisted soldiers who haven’t completed NCO education, high school graduates going to flight school and those switching to the Army from other military branches attend a seven-week course. Attrition is low. In a class that begins with 96 candidates, Howze said, “we might lose between five and 10.”

Instead of drill sergeants, the candidates work with a training, advising and counseling (TAC) officer, whose job is not to bark and break but to coach, mentor, guide and, above all, assess a candidate’s potential to meet the standards expected of a warrant officer. TAC officers look for character, discipline, critical thinking and leadership qualities through a combination of mental and physical exercises and by continually bending the enlisted frame of mind into that of a decision-making officer.

Chief Warrant Officer 2 Charita Mixon, a TAC officer who once was a drill sergeant, explained that the candidates are given missions with operational orders to execute rather than tasks with step-by-step instructions. They are encouraged to use their own thought September 2017 ■ ARMY 45

U.S. Army/Sgt. Russell Toof

A soldier attending the Warrant Officer Candidate Course goes on a ruck march at Fort Indiantown Gap, Pa.

process and creativity and sometimes, while they’re executing a mission, the order will be modified or “fragged,” a dose of reality that further complicates the process.

“This begins a culture, a transition,” said Mixon, who was a staff sergeant with 10 years in when she decided to become a warrant officer. “There are teachable moments where we want to know: ‘Candidate, how did you come to that decision?’ and that gives me a chance to reframe their mind, to get them to see a different perspective. We are inculcating a warrant officer culture.”

Unexpectedly, the TACs said, they have found themselves enjoying the new, more thoughtful approach to making officers because it also challenges them to stay a step or two ahead of candidates, some of whom are natural leaders with bright ideas.

“People who are smart candidates bring really good ideas, and I’m able to glean that information and knowledge from them and pass that on to candidates in other classes,” said Chief Warrant Officer 3 Kelvie Fore, who became a warrant after 17 years as an NCO in the Virginia National Guard.

Going Warrant Reserve Warrant Officer Justin Kappelman apologized for slurring his words at 10 a.m.

“I’m sorry ma’am, my brain is so fried,” said Kappelman, a new food safety officer in the Veterinary Corps branch who spoke to a reporter following graduation from Warrant Officer Candidate School.

He had learned from others that it would be challenging, but

saw it as a potential respite from his busy life as a business owner in Indianola, Iowa, where he sells and recycles appliances.

“I thought coming here would give me a break, but this course does exactly what they say it’s going to do.”

Kappelman and his classmates were satisfied, but smoked, having just come off their one-week capstone event in the field.

A new class of warrant recruits begins every two weeks, but recruiting for the warrant officer corps has always been a challenge as soldiers are not as familiar with what warrant officers do because there are so few of them.

Another new warrant officer, that class’s honor graduate, said he decided to become a warrant officer when, at the rank of sergeant first class, he felt he had reached the point where his experience could only take him so far.

“I knew I could best serve the Army if I were a warrant officer. They are so specialized in what they do, a commander usually turns to a warrant officer to decide what to do,” said Warrant Officer Nicholas James West, who started his military career in the Marine Corps, then switched to the Army where as a military intelligence analyst in the 101st Airborne Division and later with special operations units, he deployed to operations in multiple areas of the world.

His career had been packed with everything he wanted to do, so he set his sights on becoming a warrant.

Senior NCOs, he said “should take an honest assessment. If that’s where they want to be, no problem, but if they’re looking for the next echelon, going warrant could be the right thing. It was right for me.” ✭ September 2017 ■ ARMY 47

2017 ARMY Magazine

SFC Dennis Steele Photo Contest Sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army The Association of the U.S. Army is pleased to announce our annual photo contest, named to honor the memory of ARMY senior staff writer and photographer Dennis Steele. Amateur and professional photographers are invited to enter.

The winning photographs will be published in ARMY magazine, and the photographers will be awarded cash prizes. First prize is $500; second prize is $300; third prize is $200.

Those who are awarded an honorable mention will each receive $100.

‘Sunset Over Puget Sound’ by Capt. Brian Harris was the 2016 SFC Dennis Steele

Photo Contest first-place winner.

Entry Rules: 1. Each photograph must have a U.S. Army-related subject and must have been taken on or after July 1, 2016.

2. Entries must not have been published elsewhere.

3. Each contestant is limited to three entries.

4. Entries may be 300-dpi digital photos, black-andwhite prints or color prints. Photographs must not be tinted or altered or have watermarks.

5. The minimum size for prints is 5 x 7 inches; the maximum is 8 x 10 inches (no mats or frames).

6. The following information must be provided with each photograph: the photographer’s name, address and telephone number, and a brief description of the photograph.

For more information, contact armymag@ausa.org

●

7. Entries may be mailed to: Editor-in-Chief, ARMY magazine, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201, ATTN: Photo Contest. Send digital photos to armymag@ausa.org.

8. Entries must be postmarked by Sept. 15, 2017.

Winners will be notified by mail in October.

9. Entries will not be returned.

10. Employees of AUSA and their family members are not eligible to participate.

11. Prize-winning photographs may be published in ARMY magazine and other AUSA publications up to three times.

12. Photographic quality and subject matter will be the primary considerations in judging.

ARMY magazine, 2425 Wilson Blvd., Arlington, VA 22201

Women Vets and the VA

Jeffery D. Russell

Programs Aim to Better Treat Growing Patient Segment

Army veteran and VA patient service assistant Sherleen Hudson is examined by Dr. Fatma Batuman, medical director of the women’s health program at the VA Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System.

T

By Mike Richman

he Department of Veterans Affairs is working hard to meet the needs of the fastest-growing segment of its population, one that has nearly doubled in the past decade: female veterans.

Not every woman veteran uses VA facilities, but the number enrolled for VA care has nearly tripled from 233,000 in 2000 to more than 677,000 in 2015. That figure is expected to continue to grow at an annual rate of 9 percent in the coming years.

Samantha Carrera, a sergeant in the Maryland Army National Guard, was deployed once to Afghanistan and has veteran status. At 29 years old, the VA considers her young and healthy.

She uses the VA’s system mostly for annual physicals, which have been performed at medical centers in Baltimore and Columbus, Ohio. She also had prenatal screenings at a VA facility during her second pregnancy but not labor and delivery care, services the VA is not able to provide.

Joy Ilem’s needs are more extensive. The 57-year-old former Army specialist uses the VA for most of her health care visits, including primary care, specialty care and gender-specific services such as cervical screening and mammograms. She’s also treated for a back injury suffered decades ago while in the military.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 49

Ilem, national legislative director for the organization Disabled American Veterans, has used the Washington, D.C., VA Medical Center for the past two decades. She previously went to the VA hospital in Phoenix.

Carrera and Ilem said they are satisfied with their VA health care.

Mitch Mirkin

Shortcomings Must Be Addressed Patty Hayes, chief consultant for VA Women’s Health Services, said the VA has made major progress in serving women veterans but still has shortcomings that must be addressed.

“We have a lot of evidence to show us we’ve made tremendous gains in providing the right high-quality services by the right providers,” Hayes said. “We’ve certainly seen that reflected not only in the increase in the number of women veterans, which is partly the natural population process, but also in looking at the number of women that stay with us and have continued to receive their care over a number of years. Women veterans tell us they’re much more satisfied with their care.”

There are 2 million female veterans, comprising nearly 9.4

percent of the veteran population. That figure is expected to grow to 10 percent by 2018 and 15 percent by 2035.

The rise in female veterans comes amid a dramatic increase in the number of women who have entered the U.S. military in recent decades. Almost half of all women veterans have served from the First Gulf War starting in August 1990 to the present. Female veterans from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan represent the largest cohort of women in U.S. history who were involved extensively and actively in combat operations.

“A lot more people know that women veterans exist and that VA’s a place for women veterans,” Hayes said. “But that being said, we still know [about] and continue to evaluate for gaps in our system where we haven’t ramped up to meet the needs at the rate of change in the number of women veterans.”

One of the most glaring gaps, Hayes said, is a lack of designated doctors and other medical professionals who are assigned to a veteran and provide comprehensive and gender-specific care. Of the women veterans who use the VA’s system, 72.5 percent are assigned to such a provider, up from about 50 percent a few years ago but short of the VA’s goal of 85 percent.

Maryland Army National Guard Sgt. Samantha Carrera is enrolled in VA health care. She works as an information system supervisor with the Maryland National Guard.

50

ARMY ■ September 2017

Playing Catch-up “Years ago, I started telling facilities, directors, leaders and everyone else that we needed to continue to get ready,” Hayes said. “We’ve sort of been more reactive and haven’t added providers until facilities are overbooked. In some areas, there aren’t enough women’s health providers. So we’re kind of playing catchup. But we’re a lot closer than we were.”

When it comes to meeting women veterans’ needs, there has been a huge effort to better understand those needs.

The number of studies on the subject has multiplied in recent years.

Many of those initiatives have been led by Elizabeth Yano, director of the VA’s Women’s Health Research Network. Launched in 2010, the network is among the programs funded by VA Health Services Research and Development (HSR&D) to transform the agency’s capacity to reduce gender disparities in health care and use research to increase delivery of evidence-based care for women.

The Women’s Health Research Network oversees the research agenda for women veterans’ health and works, in part, to increase knowledge of gender differences in VA health care. It developed a national consortium that provides education, training, technical support, mentorship and collaborative research assistance to more than 300 researchers and clinician educators.

The network led to the creation of the

‘We Know a Lot More’ “We know a lot more about women veterans’ needs than we used to,” said Yano, director of the HSR&D Center for the Study of Healthcare Innovation, Implementation, and Policy at the VA Greater Los Angeles Healthcare System. “My research focus has been to take that knowledge and make sure it goes into what we know about primary care, what we know about reproductive health, what we know about post-deployment health, and what we know about complex chronic conditions and long-term care in aging.”

Until last year, there were no VA studies on older women veterans, Yano said. But that changed after the Women’s Health Practice Based Research Network brought the issue forward, encouraging HSR&D to fund a team at the VA Puget Sound Health Care System in Seattle to analyze data on Elizabeth Yano, a health services researcher at the VA Greater Los Angeles Healthcare more than 3,700 veterans. The effort resulted in 14 System, works to turn research knowledge into improved care for women. articles that ran in The Gerontologist on issues relevant to older women veterans.

The critical aspect of these collaborative endeavors, Yano Ilem, a disabled veteran, has been treated for more than two said, is “ensuring that women are included in enough numbers decades by the VA for a back injury she suffered in the 1980s in VA research so we can look at gender differences in differ- while lifting a patient at a U.S. combat support hospital in ent kinds of interventions, as well as how women respond to Germany. primary care and specialty care programs. We couldn’t do that About a decade ago, Ilem had trouble getting timely care before.” Interventions such as post-traumatic stress disorder from the VA for her back condition when she experienced treatment, diabetes prevention and cardiovascular risk reduc- a bulging disc and sciatica. “VA, at that time, had difficulty tion may need to be gender-tailored, she said. getting you seen for physical therapy during the acute pain phase,” she recalled.

Prone to Joint Injuries Since then, she’s seen a stark improvement in the VA’s According to VA statistics from 2003 to 2012, the No. 1 health care system. condition the VA treated women for was musculoskeletal in“I find VA is getting better accommodating same-day serjuries such as joint and spine disorders, as well as chronic vices when needed, and I love the ability to do secure mespain, with 55.9 percent of women experiencing that versus saging with my doctor,” she said. “It saves lots of trips to VA, men at 48.5. which is an hour drive for me, and I get medication updates “Men absolutely get foot, knee, and back injuries, but be- and info on things that need attention right away. I get calls cause of the way the knee and hip in women are aligned and back from my doctor on lab tests when they are abnormal and rotate, women are slightly more prone to getting those inju- quick ordering of MRIs [and] CT scans.” ries,” Hayes said.

Her grade for VA health care: A-plus.

The same set of statistics showed that the No. 2 condition feThe VA is hoping that as the female veteran population male veterans were treated for was in the endocrine-metabolic- continues to grow, more women who once served in the milinutritional domain (50.6 percent), followed by mental health and tary will come to feel the same way. ✭ substance use disorders (44.5 percent), cardiovascular issues (37.3 percent) and reproductive health (31.2 percent). In addition, the Mike Richman is a writer-editor in the VA’s Office of Research number of female veterans with a service-connected disability ratand Development, Baltimore. Previously, he worked as an ining increased over the decade-long period to 57 percent in 2012. ternational multimedia journalist at Voice of America.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 51

Jeffery D. Russell

VA Women’s Health Practice Based Research Network, which facilitates recruitment of women veterans in VA research by establishing an infrastructure of partnered VA facilities. The network includes 60 VA medical centers and more than 300 outpatient clinics. Women veterans are recruited from those facilities.

Together, the consortium and research network help researchers conduct high-priority studies on gender differences and female veteran-specific issues.

Seven Questions NCO Dives Into Elite Job, Close-Knit Community

U.S. Navy/Lt. Max Cutchen

1. Why become a diver?

I always wanted to be a diver because it seems like an awesome job, and it has been so far. Also, going to a small community that was somewhat elite was a drive for me to want to do it. Our skill set is huge.

2. How long is the training?

Six months. It’s one of the longest courses in the Army, and the instructors and the students get to know each other really well. It becomes a kind of kinship thing. Students have to be able to trust each other and trust the instructors. There’s a lot at stake so we have a lot of instructors, Army and Navy, all looking over the students’ shoulders making sure they don’t screw something up. Forty-five percent of soldiers who start don’t make the cut.

3. Does diving take physical strength?

Yes, but more importantly, it requires you be low in body fat to reduce the risk of decompression sickness.

That is why we put so much emphasis on training our guys hard.

4. What sorts of combat missions do Army divers get?

Our mission doesn’t have much to do with combat operations, more of port-opening and harbor clearance to make sure mission commanders can do their mission in the aquatic environment. We also have divers at work in Hawaii with the [Defense POW/ MIA Accounting Agency] which recovers the remains of missing military personnel. I haven’t had any personal experience [recovering remains], that would be more one of our senior guys who were in Iraq a lot and not so 52

ARMY ■ September 2017

much these days. It’s been done quite a bit more on foreign soil.

5. How is an Army diver different from a Navy diver?

Navy divers focus mostly on open ocean and coastal areas.

Army divers focus mostly on inland waterways. It’s a shared culture. Army divers train together with Navy, Marines, Air Force and Coast Guard divers. The Navy Seabees [construction forces] are closest to what the Army skill set is.

6. What’s it like being in such a small Army community?

It’s different than anything else in the Army—small numbers, big on community. Everybody knows everybody else. A commander in a unit of 100 people is going to treat you a lot different than a unit of 25 people. We have a lot more leeway to get to know the soldiers better. Our detachments are structured like a normal company, but with 25 soldiers, and we get attached to engineer regiments. Our highest-ranked officer is a captain. We have no warrant officers. Some divers make it to sergeant major, but there are no sergeant major slots.

7. What do you miss most about being an artilleryman?

I miss shooting big guns.

—Gina Cavallaro

Courtesy photo

Staff Sgt. Logan Forbing is an Army diver, one of only about 150 active-duty soldiers in the field, and he trains other soldiers to be divers as an instructor with Company A, 169th Engineer Battalion, at the U.S. Army Engineer Dive School in Panama City, Fla. Leaving behind his job as a field artillery forward observer for a world of underwater construction, demolition, recovery and a boatload of port operations—all of which take enormous mental and physical strength—Forbing joined the ranks of some of the Army’s happiest soldiers in a close-knit community that knows a lot about wrinkly fingertips.

Above: Staff Sgt. Logan Forbing; left: A student at the U.S. Army Engineer Dive School secures his dive helmet.

The Outpost Soldiers Fought Hard for ‘Halls of Montezuma’

By Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, U.S. Army retired

I

t’s the most famous opening line in the U.S. military songbook: “From the halls of Montezuma … “ So begins the stirring Marines’ Hymn, the oldest service tune in our armed forces. The music was borrowed from a popular 1867 revision of a French operetta by Jacques Offenbach. That’s certain. Nobody’s sure who wrote the lyrics. But we know what that lead-off phrase means. It refers to the storming of the fortress Chapultepec outside Mexico City 170 years ago in September 1847. The Marine battalion did its part, and the Marine Corps remembers.

The Marines attacked the Halls of Montezuma as a small battalion, 314 men at full strength. The great bulk of the more than 7,100 American troops at Chapultepec were Army soldiers. All the troops were a long way from home, deep in central Mexico. Taking the formidable heights of Chapultepec promised to end the Mexican-American War. It also represented the culmination of a bold campaign led

by Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott, “Old Fuss and Feathers,” a veteran of the War of 1812, the campaign against the Black Hawk Indians, and the inconclusive fighting against the Seminole Indians. Six feet 5 inches tall and barrel-chested, Scott impressed all who saw him. He’d served in the cavalry, the artillery and the infantry, and had been a general since 1814.

Scott knew his business.

When war with Mexico erupted in 1846 over competing claims to Texas, Scott was in Washington, D.C., serving as the U.S. Army commanding general, a position akin to today’s chief of staff. President James Polk disliked Scott, whom he rightly saw as a political rival. When the first half-year of fighting in Texas, California and New Mexico did not end the war, Polk agreed to let Scott take charge.

Scott didn’t want to trudge south through the Chihuahua badlands, scraping his way past Mexican detachments. Rather, the general wanted to go right for the throat. Scott proposed a major amphibious landing at Veracruz and an overland advance to Mexico City, 200 miles inland. It was a high-risk, high-payoff operation. The landing of some 12,000 American troops went surprisingly well, but when the Americans left the coast behind, the elderly Duke of Wellington, observing things from London, opined “Scott is lost.” The Mexican opposition thought so, too.

The Mexican army, under Gen. Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna, figured on drawing the Americans into the heart of Mexico, stringing them out, cutting their supply line, and then finishing off the hated gringos. Santa Anna, the victor of the Alamo in 1836, styled himself “the Napoleon of the West.”

He didn’t live up to his press releases.

University of Texas at Arlington Library

The U.S. advance to Mexico City during the Mexican-American War began with a major amphibious landing at Veracruz.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 53

Scott’s small force, down to about 9,000 men, advanced with confidence. The general had thought out his tactics. He counted on a hand-picked team of young, smart West Pointers, led by engineer Capt. Robert E. Lee and Lt. P.G.T Beauregard. The engineers scouted routes and gathered intelligence on the terrain and the enemy. Scott trusted them. As a result, the Americans went into each engagement with a pretty clear picture of the ground and the opposing force.

In battle, Scott depended on his excellent field artillery.

Well-trained and ably led, the American gunners flayed the Mexicans in earlier battles in the Texas border region. Scott’s tactics relied on getting his killing firepower up against the enemy. The American infantry was steady and shot well enough.

They’d take and hold key real estate. The single brigade of Dragoons was greatly outnumbered by their Mexican counterparts, but the American horsemen never backed down from a fight, and proved good as an advance guard. Still, the Americans relied on the peerless U.S. Army gunners—they were Scott’s Sunday punch. Scott was all about getting his lethal batteries to the killing ground.

S

E

ven so, Scott knew he had to finish the campaign. On Aug. 7, the Americans marched for Mexico City. From Aug. 18–20, Scott’s troops again thrashed the Mexicans in the twin battles of Contreras and Churubusco. Once more, Lee found a way across unwatched waste ground to get the deadly U.S. artillery into position. After these triumphs, the Americans were only 5 miles southeast of Mexico City.

Scott halted for three weeks to allow a negotiated settlement. The Mexicans temporized. It became evident there would be no settlement. The Americans had to take the city.

Scott’s troops already owned the southern avenues of advance.

On Sept. 8, after a bloody smashup at El Molino del Rey, the Americans held the western approaches as well.

In planning the final attack, Scott followed his usual method of sending out reconnaissance and preparing to rely on his powerful artillery. The engineers, led by Lee, recommended advancing from the south. So did all four of Scott’s division commanders. But Beauregard argued forcefully for following up on the costly Molino del Rey success. Come from the west and seize Chapultepec, the strongest height. Beauregard believed that because they’d lost battle after battle, the Mexican rank and file feared the American guns and close combat with the relentless U.S. infantry. Press the advantage.

Scott agreed and directed a one-day bombardment of the Chapultepec citadel, a masonry fortification that reared some 200 feet above the surrounding plain. On Sept. 13, the American gunners opened fire.

Adolphe Jean-Baptiste Bayot

anta Anna tried to stop Scott’s steady advance. At Cerro Gordo on April 18, 1847, the Mexicans set an ambush on the main road. But guided by Lee’s reconnaissance, the Americans swung to the north through an allegedly impassable area.

Then the American artillerists went to work. The Mexicans broke and Scott’s advance continued.

By May, the Americans reached Puebla, then Mexico’s second-largest city, 66 miles east of the capital. The populace surrendered without a fight. Scott halted there for more than three months. He sent home volunteers whose enlistments had expired. He brought in reinforcements, including the Ma-

rine battalion. He gathered supplies. In all of this, at Scott’s direction, the Americans treated the locals fairly. There was not much guerrilla sniping. That reflected well on American discipline.

This 1851 lithograph depicts the bombardment of Veracruz, Mexico, during the Mexican-American War. 54

ARMY ■ September 2017

Library of Congress/Sarony & Major

U.S. troops storm the fortress Chapultepec in September 1847, leading to the capture of Mexico City.

Inside Chapultepec, a mixed force of about 880 Mexicans took shelter as the stone walls shook and shattered. Among the defenders were about 200 military academy cadets, a few 13-year-olds among them. The extended U.S. bombardment demoralized the Mexicans. They knew what would come next.

At 8 a.m. the next day, the cannonade ceased. Three assault columns advanced against the south face of the hill. To the west were the 11th and 14th Infantry regiments. In the center marched the 9th and 15th Infantry. From the east came a selected light infantry detachment, the Voltiguers. The Americans moved with a purpose, running to get to the base of the slope to move below the effective arcs of Mexican gunfire. The first wave took the lower hillside.

N

ext came the storming parties. Chosen men carried scaling ladders to get over the high walls. The 2nd New York Infantry, the 2nd Pennsylvania Infantry, the South Carolina Palmetto Infantry and the Marines pushed forward. Mexican defenders shot well, but the Americans swarmed up the ladders.

A Voltiguer team got atop the parapet. Mexican infantrymen shot the American pair. But more Americans followed.

A second ladder slammed into the wall top. Another team got over the top. Then a third duo clambered into the fort. That did it. The Mexican defenders broke.

By 9 in the morning, an hour into the assault, an American flag flew over the battlements. The Mexican general surrendered.

More than 600 Mexicans died in the bombardment and the assault. About 200 surrendered. Many of them were wounded.

Among the dead, six military academy cadets—los niños héroes—fought to the end. According to legend, Cadet Juan Escutia wrapped himself in the Mexican flag and leapt from the wall

rather than give up. It may have happened just that way. What definitely occurred was 15 minutes of ugly close-quarters combat.

After the fortress changed hands, Mexican troops lacked the heart to hold their capital. American units pushed onto key causeways that spanned the canals circling Mexico City. One U.S. column secured the Belén Gate. There, the Mounted Rifles—today’s 3rd Cavalry Regiment—fought on foot and earned their nickname “Brave Rifles,” bestowed by Scott himself. The struggle for San Cosmé gate ended when thenLt. Ulysses S. Grant and his 4th Infantry soldiers wrestled a mountain howitzer onto a church bell tower. A Marine element then advanced under covering fire to take the entryway from stunned Mexican troops.

By the next day, Scott accepted the capitulation of Mexico City. He established headquarters in the National Palace, site of the original “Halls of Montezuma,” although the actual Aztec structures were long gone. Not that it mattered—the Marine sentries liked the name. And now we all know it.

American casualties at Chapultepec gave evidence of the vicious struggle. The U.S. Army suffered 860 soldiers killed and 703 wounded. The Marine battalion lost seven killed and 24 wounded. From that day onward, Marines of the rank corporal and above wear the bright red “blood stripe” on their trousers to honor those who fell at Chapultepec. That visible symbol and the first words of the Marines’ Hymn combine to ensure that every Marine from private to general knows the story of Chapultepec. Soldiers should, too. ✭ Lt. Gen. Daniel P. Bolger, USA Ret., commanded soldiers in Iraq and Afghanistan. He is a senior fellow of the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 55

2017AUSA A Professional Development Forum 9-11 October 2017 | Walter E. Washington Convention Center | Washington, D.C.

SPECIAL EVENT TICKET ORDER FORM ORDERS MUST BE RECEIVED BY 20 SEPTEMBER 2017

Join today for discounted membership rates: ausa.org/join Function Guard/Reserve Breakfast (9 Oct.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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AUSA Sustaining Member Profile

Cera Products Inc. Corporate Structure—President: Jennifer Rapp Gurrola.

Headquarters: 88 Main St., Suite D1, Hilton Head Island, SC 29926. Telephone: 843-842-2600. Website: www.ceraproductsinc.com.

The story begins in Bangladesh, where Cera Products Inc. founder Charlene Riikonen saw firsthand how dehydration can cause severe illness and death. Riikonen, then Charlene Dale, was working at the International Centre for Diarrhoeal Disease Research in Dhaka. There, researchers discovered oral rehydration therapy. The researchers included Dr. Norbert Hirschhorn and a team of physicians and collaborators from Calcutta (now known as Kolkata).

This research center is home to an international organization established by the U.S. government and others in 1960 as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization-Pakistan Research Lab. It included researchers and physicians from the U.S. Navy; Johns Hopkins University, Md.; Harvard University, Mass.; and other institutions. Oral rehydration solutions (ORS) are scientifically formulated combinations of glucose, carbohydrates, certain salts and water. ORS were developed to prevent and correct dehydration due to diarrhea.

The discovery of ORS was hailed by the renowned British medical journal The Lancet as the most important medical advance of the 20th century. This claim was authenticated after they were used by physicians at the center to bring down the death rate from a cholera outbreak from the usual 50 percent to less than 3 percent.

Nearly 10 years later, while learning and being involved in the research and educational side, Riikonen formed Cera Products in 1993. The company’s goal was to develop an advanced solution that would work better and more efficiently than the standard glucose-based solution developed in the 1960s and 1970s.

Riikonen, along with a hand-picked team of experts, began developing advanced hydration products. This womanowned small business decided to focus on rice-based oral rehydration solutions with the goal of improving health care and saving lives.

First, the science and clinical studies done in Dhaka and elsewhere indicated that rice was the best choice over other carbohydrate substrates like wheat, corn or sorghum. Secondly, unlike glucose, which is a single-chain carbohydrate, rice is a larger chain and has more carrying power than glucose. In addition, Cera’s rice-based formulations contain a variety of carbohydrate chain lengths (short, medium and long) and preserve much of the glutamine and other attributes inherent in rice. Because it is gluten-free, it is less of a problem for people with certain allergies.

Cera developed four products: ceralyte, for extreme dehydration; cerasport, for sports-related hydration; ceravacx, for vaccine delivery; and ceravet, for small-animal hydration.

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Repeated research has shown that Cera’s rice-based ORS perform better than glucose-based ORS in providing a timerelease effect while attaining electrolyte balance.

The ceralyte formula can reduce symptoms and quicken recovery of individuals suffering from diarrhea caused by Crohn’s disease, ulcerative colitis, short gut, traveler’s diarrhea or from fluid losses caused by medications (such as for cancer or HIV/AIDS treatment). By providing quick and sustained delivery of carbohydrates and electrolytes, it helps reduce stool output by 20 to 50 percent over glucose ORS. This helps prevent the need for an IV drip.

Cera Products Inc. President Jennifer Rapp Gurrola, front, with her mother, CEO and founder Charlene Riikonen.

Cerasport works better than popular sugar-based drinks because it’s absorbed differently. Necessary electrolytes are transported through all three portions of the small intestine, with key transporters in the ileum. Other sports drinks are composed of simple sugars, and the necessary electrolytes never reach the ileum to be absorbed. With cerasport, users become hydrated more quickly and for longer durations, while maintaining blood sugar levels for extended time periods. The formula is effective for prevention of heat casualties for the military, those in rigorous schools or for individuals not acclimated to hot, humid climates.

Nearly nine years ago, Riikonen brought in her daughter, Jennifer Rapp Gurrola, to help shape and grow the company.

Today, Cera’s products are used in every branch of the U.S. military, including Air Force medical kits and flight jackets and military hospitals, and are used in training for special operations troops. In addition to DoD and government, Cera products are used in national travel clinics, major university medical centers, and major medical centers and hospitals across the country.

Soldier Armed UH-60V Black Hawk: The Army Gets Creative

By Scott R. Gourley, Contributing Writer

I

n an era when the military services will likely be called upon to do more with less, the Army is demonstrating that difficult task through the new UH-60 Victor model of the Black Hawk helicopter.

The Army has several models of the UH-60, including Alpha, Lima and Mike. The Mike model is the newest with upgrades that include a modernized digital cockpit featuring multiple multifunctional displays that reduce aviator workload and enhance mission effectiveness.

However, funding has not been available to field the Mike model across the fleet. In fact, a significant slice of the Army Black Hawk fleet had been destined to remain in an old analog configuration.

Speaking to a recent industry gathering, Brig. Gen. Thomas H. Todd III, U.S. Army program executive officer for aviation, acknowledged, “To be quite honest with you, one-third of our Black Hawk fleet was destined to remain analog if we didn’t get creative with very few dollars on hand.”

Fortunately, the Army did get creative. There was a teaming effort across multiple Army organizations, including the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center and the Utility Helicopter Project Office, both in Alabama; Corpus Christi Army Depot, Texas; and their industry partners to develop the UH-60 Victor program.

Through this effort, earlier-model Black Hawks will receive a digital cockpit upgrade during scheduled reset activities at Corpus Christi Army Depot.

Under a contract awarded in the third quarter of 2014, Northrop Grumman Corp. is supplying a mission equipment package for the digital cockpit upgrade. The scalable, fully in-

tegrated and open architecture-based cockpit design will replace older analog gauges with digital electronic instrument displays in the redesignated UH-60V. The Victor program focus is on the digital cockpit and lacks some other significant enhancements present in the Mike model.

The UH-60V Critical Design Review was completed in early 2016 with the Aviation and Missile Research, Development and Engineering Center’s Prototype Integration Facility used to design and develop three engineering development models and a corresponding technical data package.

The initial test flight of the first of those aircraft took place in mid-January.

The data package highlights another unique aspect of the Victor program. Speaking to the same gathering as Todd, Maj. Gen. Douglas M. Gabram, commander of the U.S. Army Aviation and Missile Command, characterized the effort as “different” because it represents a program that is government designed, integrated and produced.

“The government, essentially, is the OEM [original equipment manufacturer],” he said. “We think it is an acquisition game-changer because we can reduce costs. We can reduce timelines. And we will own most of the general-purpose data rights, which equates to the tech data package. We think this is a good thing.”

Kits to produce two additional engineering development model aircraft will be furnished to Corpus Christi Army Depot in preparation for low-rate initial production. These two additional engineering development models will supplement the first three for Initial Operational Test and Evaluation in 2019. The Army acquisition objective for the program is 760

U.S. Army/Shannon L. Kirkpatrick

The engineering development model UH-60V Black Hawk hovers during its initial test flight in Meridianville, Ala.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 59

U.S. Army/Spc. Antonio Ramirez

In Black Hawk helicopters, members of the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade train to slingload howitzers at the Joint Multinational Readiness Center, Hohenfels, Germany.

aircraft, which are to be manufactured at Corpus Christi as part of resetting the older aircraft.

“The Victor will have a brand-new cockpit,” said depot commander Col. Allan Lanceta. “If you look at the old cockpits, which are ’70s- or ’80s-type technology, they have gas gauges with needles. But the new Victor will be all digital, modern technology. Again, that reduces the workload and gives the aviators a lot more options than they would have in the old Lima model cockpit.”

I

n addition to reducing workload and expanding operational capabilities, the new Victor program will provide advantages in terms of reduced training requirements since the pilotvehicle interface will be “nearly identical” between Mike and Victor models.

“The Victor model will standardize training across the aviation enterprise,” Lanceta said. “Right now, if you go from a Lima model [analog cockpit] aircraft to a Mike model, you have to go back to Fort Rucker, [Ala.], for what we call transition training to the Mike model [digital cockpit] aircraft.

Now, once we get the digital [Victor] across the fleet, that reduces the training requirement and will certainly cause some efficiencies within the budget so that we’re not having to go and spend thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of dollars, on training new aviators into a brand-new cockpit. They go from one into another, and pretty much, other than those specific units-type standard operating procedures, the cockpit is virtually the same.”

Lanceta said the depot is preparing to receive the Victor model recap line in about fiscal 2019 and introducing related efficiencies across the facility.

“Speed, accuracy and quality is what our goal is so that

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we can produce and give those cockpits and those whole brand-new aircraft back out to the warfighter faster and with just as high levels of quality as we have seen in the past,” he said.

Part of the transition planning will involve the ongoing reset of Alpha and Lima Black Hawks to incorporate the new Victor cockpit designs.

“I can’t disclose the specific numbers, but we are constantly in production resetting a certain number of aircraft,” Lanceta said, noting that the Alpha models will “go away” in the process.

“We’re already doing the Alpha to Lima conversion, or recap,” he added. “Then we will be doing Lima to Lima recap with the old Lima aircraft and eventually introduce Lima to Victor around [fiscal 2019].”

Because the Mike models are the newest aircraft, Lanceta said it likely will be quite a few years before they enter the depot, with some estimates in the 2030–32 time frame, but there is no firm plan at this time.

Asked to summarize the significance of the Victor program to the warfighter, Lanceta said, “Again, it’s a more modern aircraft. It gives them a lot more options than they currently have.

It’s a very viable or very user-friendly cockpit for the aviator.

So, I think it lessens the workload for the aviator. And it really moves forward into the modernization of the U.S. Army aviation fleet.

“The Army is doing more with less,” he continued. “We know this is a limited and fiscally constricted environment.

So we are not only trying to find ways to create efficiencies fiscally, but also through the recap program, use what we already have, sweetening it, adjusting things so that we still have a modern fleet, and a better product coming out from [Corpus Christi Army Depot] and really across the Army.” ✭

News Call Study Warns Job Hunting Is Humbling for Some There are many things about soldiering that civilian employers find appealing and one thing that isn’t, according to the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, which wants to help separating and retiring service members find post-service jobs.

Soldiers are experienced leaders because responsibility is given to them early in their careers. They are used to working under pressure, so they don’t wilt under deadlines. Soldiers understand the importance of goals because the Army is big on setting and meeting objectives, in war and peace. Soldiers work and play well with others because the Army is about team and teamwork.

But they swear a lot. And they shouldn’t in most civilian workplaces. In a news release about transitioning from military life to a civilian workplace, Human Resources Command warns that casual cursing can get a worker in trouble in many businesses and swearing at someone can lead to disciplinary action. “Understand the environment being worked

in, the personality of co-workers and the culture of the organization before using certain language. It is always wise to keep all conversations professional,” the Army guidance says.

The advice comes as a study done by one of the most pro-military towns in the U.S., Clarksville, Tenn., finds that veterans have high expectations for postservice jobs that are often dashed. The report says soldiers can face “soul-crushing” realities after interviewing for jobs when they aren’t hired or the offered salary is far less than expected.

“Veterans who thought that they were capable of doing anything and would be in high demand for significant, sixfigure positions learned that they had to lower their expectations and take lower positions,” the report says, citing weak résumés, poor skills at job interviews and trouble explaining their military experience to a nonmilitary interviewer as contributing factors.

The study is based on interviews with Tennessee veterans and hiring manag-

ers, focusing on how to help place qualified veterans in good jobs.

Human Resources Command acknowledges the basic problem of translating military experience into a civilian workplace, and the larger issue of differences between military and civilian culture.

Job interviewing is a skill provided in Soldier for Life-Transition Assistance Program courses. For example, soldiers at Fort Rucker, Ala., are advised to think about a 30-second summary they’d give to sell themselves, something about the length of a television commercial. Rehearsing a job interview is important but rehearsing with someone who doesn’t speak military jargon could be important to getting a job, the Fort Rucker center advises. It also warns about overrehearsing: “You certainly don’t want to memorize answers to certain questions, but you do want to rehearse answers to questions that are frequently asked.”

Like what? Some soldiers stumble for answers to simple questions about life goals or their best traits. Practice an-

U.S. Army/Sgt. Christopher Bigelow

Iraq Engagement Paratroopers with the 2nd Battalion, 319th Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, fire on Islamic State group militants in Mosul, Iraq.

September 2017 ■ ARMY 61

swers to these in front of a mirror so you look comfortable, confident and honest.

Brief answers also help, Fort Rucker’s program advises. “Hiring officials are normally busy people with very little time to devote to interviewing people for jobs. They don’t want to be bored with long-winded speeches about your life.

They want to know quickly what you can do for their company’s bottom line.”

The Virtual Center at the Army’s official transition website, www.sfl-tap. army.mil, offers practice interviews with standard questions. The practice is available to soldiers who have received preseparation counseling and have completed DD Form 2648.

Being overconfident also can hurt, the Tennessee study found. Some veterans interviewing for state and local jobs, where veterans’ hiring preferences helped their chances, showed a “sense of entitlement” that they deserved to be on the payroll even if they weren’t qualified for the opening. Some may have been qualified, but were unable to explain the relevance of their military training and experience to the position.

Army Lab Discovers Energy Source A new source of energy bubbled up during a routine experiment at the U.S. Army Research Laboratory, and the discovery could give soldiers an alternate recharging capability in the field.

Scientists and engineers at the Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., lab were thrilled when a bubbling reaction was produced by adding water to a nanogalvanic aluminum-based powder they designed. The discovery, they said, produces high amounts of energy.

“We all as a team were very excited and ecstatic that something good had happened,” physicist Anit Giri with the lab’s Weapons and Materials Research Directorate said in an Army article.

Scientists have known for a long time that hydrogen can be produced by adding a catalyst to aluminum that increases a chemical reaction rate—and that these methods take time and other special conditions.

But in this case, Giri said, “it does not need a catalyst, also, it is very fast. For example, we have calculated that 1 kilogram of aluminum powder can produce 220 kilowatts of energy in just three minutes.”

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SoldierSpeak On Jungle Training “If you get wet the first day, you’ll be wet for the next five days,” said Capt.

Matthew Jones, commander of the 25th Infantry Division’s three-week Jungle Operations Training Course in Hawaii.

On Being First at the Scene “It was kind of surreal. The tires were still moving, and there was smoke [coming from the vehicle]. That’s when I realized: This just happened,” said Master Sgt. Michael Huson, a guidance counselor at the Military Entrance Processing Center, Fort Hamilton, N.Y., recalling the scene of a truck wreck.

He received the Soldier’s Medal for helping pull two victims to safety.

On National Guard Snipers “Other than in competitions, I haven’t seen this many snipers, active or Guard, on the same range,” said Staff Sgt. John Brady, sniper instructor at 10th Mountain Division’s Light Fighter School, Fort Drum, N.Y., on training National Guard snipers at Fort McCoy, Ark.

On Dealing With Sand “The sand has been frustrating, but we’re soldiers, and we came prepared to train in real-world field conditions,” Sgt. Maj. Eduardo Amesquita, logistics sergeant major for the 420th Engineer Brigade, said about training at Camp Arifjan, Kuwait.

On Jumping With Special Ops “I literally jumped at the opening,” said Sgt. 1st Class Christopher Malone, NCO in charge of the Civil Military Operations Center at Company C, 97th Civil Affairs Battalion (Airborne), Fort Bragg, N.C., upon learning of the opportunity to try out for the Black Daggers, the U.S. Army Special Operations Command parachute demonstration team.

On Taking the Last Flight “To be perfectly honest, it’s a bittersweet type of thing. I love what I do.

I love wearing the uniform,” said Chief Warrant Officer 5 Chuck Rodda after completing the final military flight of his career with his last unit, the 1st Battalion, 142nd Aviation Regiment, of the New York Army National Guard’s 42nd Combat Aviation Brigade.

On Honing Your 92 Whiskey Skills “We don’t usually get the chance to extract and purify salt water, so this was a really great exercise for us,” Spc. Donovan Stutts of the 40th Composite Supply Company in the 25th Infantry Division’s 524th Combat Sustainment Support Battalion said about his participation in the 2017 Reverse Osmosis Water Purification Rodeo at Fort Story, Va.

Army Fatalities The following U.S. Army soldiers died supporting Operation Freedom’s Sentinel in Afghanistan.

Spc. Christopher Michael Harris, 25 Sgt. Jonathon Michael Hunter, 23 Pfc. Hansen B. Kirkpatrick, 19 “The hydrogen that is given off can be used as a fuel in a fuel cell,” said Scott Grendahl, a materials engineer and team leader. “What we discovered is a mechanism for a rapid and spontaneous hydrolysis of water.”

The team demonstrated with a small radio-controlled tank powered by the powder and water reaction. The little tank zoomed around the lab moments after the powder was mixed with a small amount of water, creating the bubbling reaction that produced the hydrogen to power the model.

“We just take our material, put it in the water and the water splits down into hydrogen and oxygen,” Grendahl said,

adding that the discovery is dramatic in terms of its future potential.

Briefs New Pistol to Be Fielded to 101st The first of the Army’s new M17 modular handguns will be fielded in November to soldiers with the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) at Fort Campbell, Ky. The “Screaming Eagles” will receive the first 2,000 pistols, then starting this November through September 2018, the Army will field the new handguns at a different post each month, except for March and April. After the first year, the Army will distribute the weapons to all units over a 10-year period, according to an Army article. They replace the M9 Beretta, which is nearing the end of its serviceability.

Testing of the modular handgun system this spring by soldiers at Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., resulted in overwhelmingly positive feedback, and 100 percent concurrence that the M17 was

GENERAL OFFICER CHANGES* Major Generals: Brian J. McKiernan from commanding general, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill, Okla., to deputy commanding general, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C. Michael C. O’Guinn, U.S. Army Reserve, from commanding general (Troop Program Unit), Medical Readiness and Training Command, San Antonio, to deputy surgeon general for mobilization and reserve affairs (Individual Mobilization Augmentee), Office of the Surgeon General, Falls Church, Va. Wilson A. Shoffner Jr. from director of operations and director, Rapid Equipment Fielding, Army Rapid Capabilities Office, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), Washington, D.C., to commanding general, U.S. Army Fires Center of Excellence and Fort Sill.

John C. Thomson III from commanding general, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, to deputy commanding general, III Corps, Fort Hood.

Brigadier Generals: Steven W. Ainsworth (Promotable), U.S. Army Reserve, from commander (Troop Program Unit), 7th Mission Support Command and deputy commanding general, 21st Theater Support Command, Germany, to commander (Troop Program Unit), 377th Theater Sustainment Command, Belle Chasse, La. Paul T. Calvert (Promotable) from deputy commanding general (maneuver), 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, to commanding general, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood.

Paul H. Fredenburgh III from commandant, Dwight D. Eisenhower School for National Security and Resource Strategy, National Defense University, Washington, D.C., to director for command, control, communications and cyber, U.S. Pacific Command, Camp Smith, Hawaii.

Bruce E. Hackett (Promotable), U.S. Army Reserve, from commander (Troop Program Unit), 451st Sustainment Command (Expeditionary), Wichita, Kan., to commanding general (Troop Program Unit), 80th Training Command (Army School System), Richmond, Va. James B. Jarrard (Promotable) from director, Pakistan and Afghanistan Coordination Cell, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., to commander, Special Operations Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, Kuwait.

Matthew W. McFarlane from deputy commanding general (operations), 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, to senior military assistant to Deputy Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C. Andrew M. Rohling from deputy commanding general (support), 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, N.Y., to deputy chief of staff for operations, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, NATO, U.K. Miyako N. Schanely (Promotable), U.S. Army Reserve, from commanding general (Troop Program Unit), 102nd Training Division (Maneuver Support) and deputy commanding general for mobilization and training (Individual Mobilization Augmentee), U.S. Army Maneuver Support Center, Fort Leonard Wood, Mo., to commander (Troop Program Unit), 416th Engineer Command, Darien, Ill. *Assignments to general officer slots announced by the General Officer Management Office, Department of the Army. Some officers are listed at the grade to which they are nominated, promotable, or eligible to be frocked. The reporting dates for some officers may not yet be determined.

an upgrade over the M9, said Lt. Col. Steven Power, product manager of soldier weapons, adding that improved durability and adjustability over the M9, along with interchangeable grips that fit comfortably, are among the features of the new pistol.

“A big reason why the modular handgun system is such a leap ahead in ergonomics is because of the modular hand grips, instead of just making a one-size-fits-all,” Power said. The new handguns also have an external safety and self-illuminating sights for lowlight conditions.

Watch for Changes to GI Bill Changes to post-service education benefits could be in store for future veterans under a new education measure.

Named for a World War I Army Air Service instructor and pilot, the Harry W. Colmery Veterans Educational Assistance Act of 2017 builds on the Post9/11 GI Bill, but drops a requirement for benefits to be used within 15 years of leaving the service. This bipartisan legislation’s new provision is why the Colmery Act is being called the “Forever GI Bill.”

The change applies only to people who enter the military after the bill becomes law.

Colmery is credited with drafting the GI Bill of Rights at the end of World War II, creating not just the benefit that allowed a generation of veterans to attend college but also establishing onthe-job and vocational training benefits and the VA home loan guaranty program. Colmery, who rose to the rank of captain, was a Kansas attorney and former national commander of the American Legion when he wrote the first draft of the post-war benefits bill. He died in 1979.

The new bill also significantly increases education benefits for Army National Guard and Army Reserve members, and for dependents, surviving spouses and surviving dependents.

Murphy Named ILW Senior Fellow Former Undersecretary of the Army Patrick J. Murphy has joined the Association of the U.S. Army as a senior fellow with the Institute of Land Warfare.

The 43-year-old is a third-generation veteran who deployed to Bosnia in 2002 September 2017 ■ ARMY 63

Patrick J. Murphy

DoD

COMMAND SERGEANTS MAJOR and SERGEANTS MAJOR CHANGES*

and to Iraq in 2003 as part of the 82nd Airborne Division. Murphy was also a U.S. Military Academy constitutional law professor. He served for five months in 2016 as acting secretary of the Army.

“I’m proud to join my fellow soldiers for life to ensure our nation is doing all it can to keep our families safe here at home,” Murphy said. “It is critical during these defining moments that our troops have the technical and tactical advantage over our enemies.”

As undersecretary, Murphy was the Army’s chief management officer overseeing a $148 billion annual budget with a workforce of 1.3 million. His major initiatives included recruiting more than 130,000 millennials as soldiers and civilian workers, expanding Soldier for Life initiatives, and boosting the Army’s social media presence, working closely with Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark A. Milley.

Hodges: War With Russia Unlikely But Army, Allies Stand Ready The U.S. Army and its European allies stand at the highest levels of readiness as Russia prepares for a large-scale military exercise, even though war is thought to be unlikely, the commander of U.S. Army Europe says.

Zapad 2017—as the Russian military exercise is known—will take place in mid-September in Belarus near the borders of Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine, a proximity that has some U.S. allies feeling understandably nervous, Lt. Gen. Ben Hodges said.

“The closer you live to Russia, you absolutely believe [war] is possible. They take it very serious,” Hodges said of U.S. European allies. His remarks came during a forum sponsored by the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare.

While the U.S. Army will remain at the highest state of readiness, he empha64

ARMY ■ September 2017

Command Sgt. Maj. Charles W. Albertson from 10th Mountain Division, Fort Drum, N.Y., to XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg, N.C. Command Sgt. Maj. Martin S. Celestine Jr. from 5th Armored Brigade, Fort Bliss, Texas, to U.S. Army Infantry School, Fort Benning, Ga. Command Sgt. Maj. Michael A. Ferrusi from U.S. Army Alaska, Joint Base Elmendorf-Richardson, Alaska, to 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg.

Command Sgt. Maj. Michael A. Gragg from U.S. Army Center for Initial Military Training, Fort Eustis, Va., to U.S. Army Medical Command, Falls Church, Va. Command Sgt. Maj. Michael D. Green from 82nd Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, to Sgt. Maj., Joint Improvised Threat Defeat Organization, Washington, D.C. Sgt. Maj. Eric M. Schmitz from U.S. Army Forces Command G-2, Fort Bragg, to Command Sgt. Maj., U.S. Army Intelligence Security Command, Fort Belvoir, Va. *Command sergeants major and sergeants major positions assigned to general officer commands.

sized that “this is normal, routine military business for us.” Four combat formations are in place in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland, “each one capable of defeating a Russian brigade,” Hodges said.

Computers Can Hurt Leaders Company commanders who are locked to their computers are failing their soldiers, said Maj. Gen. Paul J. LaCamera, XVIII Airborne Corps deputy commanding general. “Every minute they are staring at a computer screen, they are not talking to a soldier,” LaCamera said during a panel discussion about readiness at the Army Medical Symposium and Exposition hosted by the Association of the U.S. Army’s Institute of Land Warfare in San Antonio.

“You cannot know your soldiers while filling out forms,” LaCamera said, suggesting company commanders need to think about the last time they had an engaging conversation with their soldiers.

He complained that the forms taking up time for company commanders are largely reports to higher headquarters that take away from a company commander’s mission.

Belated Award for WWI Aviator The first Army aviator killed in World War I was posthumously awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross more than 99 years after his 1918 death in a Laon, France, hospital run by the German military.

Capt. James Ely Miller, who had organized the New York National Guard’s first aviation company in 1915, arrived in France in July 1917 to head a U.S. Army flight school. In 1918, he became part of the U.S. Army Air Services Combat Patrol in France. Miller was shot down in a dogfight with two German biplanes, and was taken to a hospital behind German lines where he died.

Miller Field on Staten Island, N.Y., was named for the pilot in 1921. The Distinguished Flying Cross was not established until 1926 to recognize the heroism of American pilots in World War I, but Miller is the first pilot from the war to receive the award. His greatgrandson, Byron Derringer, was presented with the award during a June ceremony at Joint Base Myer-Henderson Hall, Va.

SENIOR EXECUTIVE SERVICE ANNOUNCEMENTS Tier 3: Raymond Horoho to principal deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs.

Joseph L’Etoile to senior adviser to assistant secretary of defense for Readiness.

Michael Powers to principal deputy assistant secretary of the Army for Financial Management and Comptroller.

Tier 2: Suzanne S. Milchling from technical director, U.S. Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity, U.S. Army Materiel Command, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Md., to program executive officer, Assembled Chemical Weapons Alternatives, Office of Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), Aberdeen Proving Ground.

Alexander Raulerson from director, Logistics Information Management, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Washington, D.C., to assistant deputy chief of staff, G-4, U.S. Army Forces Command, Fort Bragg, N.C. Tier 1: Michael T. Mahoney to deputy director, Training and Training Program Evaluation Group Co-Chair, Office of Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Washington, D.C. Michael Matthews to deputy chief of staff, G-1, U.S. Army Europe, Wiesbaden, Germany.

James E. Moyer Jr. to deputy chief of staff, G-8, U.S. Army Europe, Wiesbaden.

Thomas P. Smith from director, Plans Division, Department of Homeland Security, Washington, D.C., to chief, Operations and Regulatory Community of Practice, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Washington, D.C.

Historically Speaking Cyberwar Isn’t So New—It Began in 1967

By Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, U.S. Army retired

C

yberwarfare is often presented as if it is a new thing. Much of the technology is certainly new, but many underlying concepts are timeless. If we become so preoccupied with cyberwarfare’s technical aspects that we fail to consider it in the context of traditional principles of war, we risk substituting procedures for strategy.

Cyberwarfare arguably began in 1967 with the advent of the Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET).

As with other technological leaps, there has been lag time between innovation, strategic conceptualization and relevance.

The first practical matchlock arquebus appeared in 1475, but it was more than a century before masses of musketeers dominated the battlefield. A workable steam locomotive appeared in 1811. Such demigods as Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Prussian Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke the Elder first rendered operational use of railroads strategically decisive in the 1860s. The modern internal combustion engine dates from 1876. Blitzkrieg, a method of warfare that fully exploited it, reached maturation during World War II. In 1967, the Advanced Research Projects Agency committed to pulling together a fistful of bilateral computer connections with various contractors into a single “intervisible” network. We have not yet seen the cyber equivalent of the battles of Blenheim in

1704, Koniggratz in 1866 or France in 1940, although perhaps we have had glimpses.

Also in 1967, a computer pioneer named Willis Ware authored a prescient paper entitled “Security and Privacy in Computer Systems.” Anticipating ARPANET and systems like it, he envisioned unwelcome visitors hacking into them. Once these visitors penetrated, they could roam at will through the system. Sabotage was possible, but espionage was more likely.

ARPANET carried much that was classified, and subsequent civilian counterparts carried much that was proprietary. Cyberespionage emerged almost as quickly as cybernetworks, the modern equivalent of reading other people’s mail. The difference was that a successful hacker could siphon information far more quickly and in far greater volume than ever.

For 20 years, hackers and what passed for network security at the time played cat-and-mouse games of intrusion and countermeasure. Networks were of modest size and largely hardwired. Then Tim Berners-Lee developed the Hypertext Markup Language and Hypertext Transfer Protocol between 1989 and 1991, and Marc Andreessen and Eric Bina developed the first practical browser at about the same time. These enabled the internet as we define it. Within a dozen years, 665 million users surfed 40 million websites worldwide. Security

RAND Corp.

Computer pioneer Willis Ware wrote in 1967 about the dangers of hacking.

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had trouble keeping up as applications morphed from exchanging information into retail, wholesale, design, management, banking and other activities. Now an estimated 3½ billion people, half the world’s population, use the internet.

As internet use exploded, vast vistas opened for cybercrime and cyberespionage. Options for information warfare experienced qualitative changes as well. Propaganda, spin and untruth had long been staples of efforts to influence the hearts, minds and willpower of others. With the internet, the capacity for promulgation was at least an order of magnitude greater.

Perhaps more important, messages could be more artfully tailored for specific audiences and tastes. “Echo chambers” developed to superheat the fanaticism of those already committed to particular points of view. Others could be nudged along more gently, with messages that gradually eroded existing understandings and advanced contrary points of view. Timeless information warfare was on steroids.

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eliance on digital applications and communications quickly permeated the military. Operation Desert Storm’s deep hook in 1991 was greatly enabled by GPS. NATO’s Kosovo Campaign in 1998–99 was supervised by video teleconferencing. Throughout the 1990s, accelerating deployments were managed and sustained by ever more tightly knit networks of cellular communications, email and other digital means. Allies and real or potential adversaries followed suit. Cyberwarfare graduated from espionage and propagandization to acquire more dynamic traits. Email could be hijacked to bring adversaries to the wrong place at the wrong time. Cellphones could be detected and bombed, or used as detonators. GPS and digital communications could be interrupted, spoofed or blocked.

Generally, the U.S. came first to each new cyber tactic, technique or procedure, but others were learning fast.

Brig. Gen. John S. Brown, USA Ret., served 33 years in the Army, with his last assignment as chief of military history at the U.S. Army Center of Military History. The author of Kevlar Legions: The Transformation of the United States Army, 1989–2005, he holds a doctorate in history from Indiana University.

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Andrew ‘FastLizard4’ Adams

This device was used at a UCLA lab to transmit the first message on the internet.

Not later than 2007, an important milestone was crossed.

That year, Israeli planes demolished an uncompleted Syrian nuclear reactor after hacking into the Syrian air-defense radar system. Rather than simply disabling the radar, a hallowed electronic warfare technique that would have been detected, the Israelis took over the system in such a manner that the Syrian operators were presented with benign images of halcyon skies throughout the operation. Confusion reigned; the Syrians did not know they had been attacked until the Israeli planes returned to their bases.

Also in 2007, the Russians got in a snit with the Estonians over plans to remove from Tallinn a bronze statue of a Soviet soldier. Someone hit the Estonians with a cyberattack so massive it virtually paralyzed the digitally advanced country for three weeks. The following year, the Russians used cyberattacks to smother Georgian command and control when intervening on behalf of breakaway Ossetia and Abkhazia. Their campaign artfully combined cyber and traditionally kinetic attacks. Clearly, cyber techniques were now amidst the portfolio of combined-arms warfare.

In 2009, cyberwarfare crossed yet another watershed. Someone infected computers supporting the Iranian nuclear weapons program with a computer worm eventually known as Stuxnet.

It caused centrifuges to spin out of control, destroying them. It also avoided detection by acting gradually, prompting the Iranians to blame their suppliers, their equipment and even their own scientists before they recognized the actual source of their crippling problem. This attack brought to fruition the possibilities of the 2007 Aurora Generator Test, wherein American technicians used remote means to persuade a 27-ton generator to destroy itself. Cyberwarfare had achieved kinetic results in its own right. The cyber means to turn out lights, bring down planes, destroy critical infrastructure or disable cities seemed within its reach.

How well does our current conceptualization of cyberwar-

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U.S. government

fare crosswalk with the basic principles of war: objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise and simplicity?

All parties involved seem to be acutely aware of security, and have refined their means through a never-ending battle against cybercrime that parallels their expectations of cyberwarfare. In part this is because they fully recognize the value of surprise, intending their own cyberattacks to be immediately debilitating while attempting to neutralize those of others. International competitors eagerly plant “trapdoors” and “logic bombs” in the networks of rivals, aspiring to keep them secret in anticipation of their potential use. This has led to an almost scary commitment to the offensive, a determination to do damage to “them” before they do it to us.

Conceptualization seems less clear with Before-and-after shots show an uncompleted Syrian nuclear reactor destroyed by Israeli airstrikes respect to objective. What do participants during which a cyberattack blinded Syrian radar. intend cyber operations to achieve? To this point they have been ancillary or annoying rather than de- structure is kept offline, state-imposed firewalls dominate imcisive. Operators also have been reticent to truly mass cyber ef- portant interfaces, and vast domains or even the nation as a fects. In part, this has been because of a preference for ambigu- whole can be isolated from the internet on short notice. In ity, masking where cyberattacks are coming from or whether an era of “back doors,” thumb drives and relentless hacking, they are occurring at all. Comments concerning “patriotic hack- no system is totally secure, but the odds considerably increase tivists” rather than state agents come to mind. If maneuver is with foresight and planning. In a dozen years, cyberwarfare the flexible application of all means of combat power, perfor- with China or Russia might be akin to the administrative mance has been spotty. Cyber operations are generally isolated, chaos of the Holy Roman Empire facing tightly organized Napoleonic France. In such circumstances, the biggest risk although there have been, as we have seen, notable exceptions. may be choosing to escalate too quickly out of cyberwarfare merica’s greatest deficiency with respect to cyberwarfare since we can’t compete within it. is its lack of unity of command. The military has made Understandably, we have not yet come fully to grips with reasonable efforts to achieve coherence of effort, but the na- the threats and potential of cyberwarfare. Like advocates of tion it is committed to defend has not. The civilian side of our railroads in the 1830s and blitzkrieg in the 1920s, we have government is vulnerable, and the civilian sector hopelessly glimmerings without a fullness of understanding. Further so. Our economy has lashed itself to the advantages of com- thought is necessary. Cyberwarfare is real, and it is here to puterization with too little consciousness of resultant vulner- stay. Hopefully we can forestall its worst effects through apabilities. Resistance to regulation, distrust of Big Brother and propriate international conventions. If not, hopefully we can guidance from the federal government has doomed efforts to rally our countrymen to an approach that reconciles our demoorganize. Americans are not sufficiently aware of the threat to cratic values to the challenges of a new existential threat. We submit to such discipline as that of a War Industries Board or have done so before. ✭ a War Production Board.

Lack of command unity has led to lapses with respect to Additional Reading economy of force. The U.S. has considerably more cyber talent and potential cyberwarriors than any other nation, but these Clarke, Richard A., Cyber War: The Next Threat to are scattered in penny packets serving individual enterprises.

National Security and What to do About It (New York: Industries, banks and corporations zealously protect data and Harper Collins, 2010) proprietary information from each other as well as from exterKaplan, Fred, Dark Territory: The Secret History of Cyber nal actors. Carriers are assiduous about protecting the confiWarfare (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2016) dentiality of their clients, but not about coordinating the netManess, Ryan C. and Valeriano, Brandon, Cyber War work overall. Needless to say, the resultant patchwork stands versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the International in opposition to the principle of simplicity.

System (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) China and Russia are preparing for potential cyberwarfare with far less deference to domestic sensibilities. Vital infra-

Reviews Joint Ops Key to Central Pacific Campaign The Fleet at Flood Tide: America at Total War in the Pacific, 1944–1945.

James D. Hornfischer. Bantam Books.

640 pages. $35

By Col. Gregory Fontenot

at Midway, ably led the enormous U.S. Fifth Fleet in the sea, land and air operations necessary to take the Mariana and Palau islands. The Fifth Fleet’s resources included Marine Lt. Gen. Holland M. Smith’s expeditionary troops, composed

U.S. Army retired

N

ew York Times bestselling author James D. Hornfischer’s aptly named The Fleet at Flood Tide examines joint U.S. operations during the Central Pacific campaign to seize the Mariana and Palau islands. In and of themselves, these islands were not vital. But the U.S. had long thought about what Hornfischer calls a “transoceanic” operation across the Central Pacific.

The islands would serve as steppingstones toward Japan and afford the U.S. Army bases from which its air forces could mount a strategic bombing campaign of Japan. Equally important, the island groups lay within Japan’s defensive perimeter. Thus, it would fight to defend them.

Hornfischer argues that the battle for Saipan in the Marianas tipped the scales toward total war against Japan. It played out in bitter fighting in the Mariana and Palau islands, Okinawa and the Philippines. This story warrants reading by all who serve, as it illustrates the advantages and obstacles to joint operations. In the Pacific, the U.S. had no need to designate and sustain a main effort. The Pacific Theater had done without through the early years of the war. Too few amphibious craft restricted timing and capacity at Normandy, but not in the Central Pacific.

Adm. Chester Nimitz and Gen. Douglas MacArthur could advance along their separate axis because the Navy’s capacity had become overwhelming. At Midway, Adm. Raymond Spruance fought outnumbered with little in reserve. The tables had turned by 1944.

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of two amphibious corps. The Third and Fifth Amphibious included three Marine divisions, a separate brigade, two Army infantry divisions and corps troops, many of whom were Army.

The campaigns to take the islands paid off, providing the B-29 bomber air armada bases and an emergency airfield for damaged aircraft. This was an example of the benefit of joint operations. The Navy and Marine Corps paid in blood for these bases. At the same time, these campaigns reveal the dark side of service parochialism and culture. Hornfischer acknowledges the depth of Navy and Marine parochialism, but he fails to examine closely what this may have cost in World War II and since. To do that, he would have to more carefully study Army operations in the Pacific.

This is not serious criticism, as he

makes the mean-spirited parochialism of Smith and Adm. Richmond Kelly Turner apparent. Turner was, to say the least, acerbic in his dealings with others.

Hornfischer asserts that one of Turner’s peers thought that he made the “violent friction” between the Army and Navy even worse. Turner had little use for soldiers and less use for their opinions. Arguably, only Smith was a bigger blowhard and more small-minded than Turner.

One of the irritants between the Army and Marine Corps that continues to affect relations between the two took place on Saipan. Holland Smith asked Turner to relieve Maj. Gen. Ralph Smith, commanding general of the 27th Infantry Division, because Ralph Smith was insufficiently aggressive. A more careful analysis would suggest that the differing tactical approach, Holland Smith’s prejudice and the 27th Division’s fighting in rough terrain with the enemy threatening its flanks may have accounted for rates of advance differing. Certainly, Turner had the authority to relieve Ralph Smith, but ultimately Holland Smith’s request was kicked up the chain of command and Ralph Smith was relieved of command.

Personality and attitude matter in commanding joint operations.

The Fleet at Flood Tide is well-written and offers insights into large-scale operations, obstacles to joint integration and, most importantly, the benefits of joint operations.

Col. Gregory Fontenot, USA Ret., commanded a tank battalion in Operation Desert Storm and an armor brigade in Bosnia. A former director of the School of Advanced Military Studies and the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, he is co-author of On Point: The United States Army in Operation Iraqi Freedom and author of The 1st Division and the US Army Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm 1970–1991.

fort), Jones provides a useful primer for understanding this kind of war.

What is particularly refreshing about Waging Insurgent Warfare is Jones’ dispassionate approach. Much of the contemporary writing on the topic carries the weight of opinions about how the U.S. has prosecuted the Long War against transnational militant terrorism. Jones tries to not pick winners and losers. Rather, he wants readers to get the dynamics that drive the disparate conflicts that get labeled as small wars.

For starters, those interested in the

topic—while they might start with this book—ought to sample the rich body of work out there that takes up all sides of the argument and make up their minds for themselves. Recommendations include now-retired Lt. Col. John A. Nagl’s Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam, retired Col. Gian Gentile’s Wrong Turn: America’s Deadly Embrace of Counterinsurgency and retired Lt. Col. Conrad C. Crane’s Cassandra in Oz: Counterinsurgency and Future War.

As America builds its Army for the 21st century, thinking long and hard about what roles it could and should play in small wars is important. The War of the Flea, to borrow the title of Robert Taber’s book on guerrilla warfare, won’t be finished when the last Americans leave Iraq and Afghanistan.

Lt. Col. James Jay Carafano, USA Ret., is a Heritage Foundation vice president in charge of the think tank’s policy research on defense and foreign affairs.

79th Battles Its Way Through World War I With Their Bare Hands: General Pershing, the 79th Division, and the Battle for Montfaucon. Gene Fax. Osprey Publishing. 496 pages. $32

By Col. Douglas Mastriano

reasons noted above, the American experience in the Meuse-Argonne was far from ideal. Suffering more than 20,000 casualties, the Americans attempted to use overwhelming numbers and brute force to break the German defenses. Of-

ene Fax’s With Their Bare Hands: General Pershing, the 79th Division, and the Battle for Montfaucon is the definitive word on the 79th Division in World War I. Fax traces every aspect of the unit including recruitment, training, turbulent operations in France, and return to the U.S. at war’s end.

Fax, a military historian, has the credentials to write such a book: He is a member of the Society for Military History, the Western Front Association, the National World War I Museum and Memorial, and the Army Historical Foundation. In preparation for writing this book, he spent 17 years collecting archival sources in Washington, D.C.; Baltimore; Paris; West Point, N.Y.; and Carlisle, Pa., even visiting the Montfaucon battlefield in France.

The experience of the 79th Division was not an easy one. Cobbled together in mid- to late 1917, the unit suffered from incomplete military training, poor leadership and hastily assembled units not ready for modern combat. These challenges were exacerbated by lack of a coherent American strategy before the country was drawn into the war.

The Meuse-Argonne Offensive remains the largest attack in American history, with more than 1.2 million men participating. However, largely due to the

ten this meant using frontal assaults into the teeth of concealed German machinegun emplacements.

Thus was the experience for the 79th, a green division assigned one of the most important missions of the campaign: seizing the key terrain of Montfaucon. Situated just a few kilometers behind the front line, Montfaucon is a large hill that offered the Germans an expansive view and control of everything from the Argonne to Verdun. Fax recounts in brilliant color the travails of the 79th’s men endeavoring to

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fulfill their mission in the face of a dug-in and better-trained adversary. As one may expect, the attack of the 79th Division did not go according to plan, and the capture of Montfaucon took longer than Gen. John J. Pershing required. In the end, the 79th took the hill, albeit at great cost in lives and treasure. Fax does an excellent job telling the story of this division in the Meuse-Argonne, its remaining days on the line and its eventual journey back to the U.S. in 1919.

The title of the book led me to believe it would largely tell the story of the 79th Division and its experience in the Meuse-Argonne campaign. However, it tells the story of the 79th Division from the beginning to the end of the war. The reader may become a bit impatient with the telling of the complete saga of the division as Fax goes into great detail about recruitment and training. However, he ably describes its combat experience in the Meuse-Argonne.

One of the best aspects of this book is the extensive use of German unit histories. This is not just another one-sided story, so common in American books on World War I. The scholarship and depth of sources from both sides of the Atlantic are impressive. Additionally, Fax did not fall prey to the naive view popular today that there was some sort of conspiracy that prevented the 79th from taking the hill on the first day of the attack. His telling the story without fabricating a tale of betrayal and intrigue is a refreshing approach.

The book is well-written, a good read and a fine addition to the World War I

centennial commemorations. I recommend it as one of those few studies that tells not just the story of the Americans in the Meuse-Argonne, but also that of the Germans.

Col. Douglas Mastriano teaches strategy at the U.S. Army War College. He is a veteran of Iraq and Afghanistan who has served at tactical, operational and strategic levels of command. He holds a doctorate from the University of New Brunswick, Canada, and is the author of Alvin York: A New Biography of the Hero of the Argonne.

A Timely View of First Commander in Chief Fatal Sunday: George Washington, the Monmouth Campaign, and the Politics of Battle. Mark Edward Lender and Garry Wheeler Stone. University of Oklahoma Press. 600 pages. $34.95

U.S. Army retired

was the man to achieve that success.

There were other potential commanders—Maj. Gens. Gates and Charles Lee, both with more regular military experience than Washington and with political connections.

Fatal Sunday covers not just the fighting (it does this very well) but also the

efore his elevation to divine status, George Washington was a man given the awesome responsibility of leading an amateur Army against the world’s most powerful and successful professional army. His success seems a foregone conclusion in hindsight, but at the time it was far from assured. There were powerful men who doubted Washington’s capabilities, who disagreed with his plans for a strong Continental Army, who believed no Colonial army could defeat the British Army on equal terms on the battlefield. In 1778, Washington not only fought a political-military campaign against the British, but he also waged a political campaign in Congress and within his Army to secure his command.

Fatal Sunday authors Mark Edward Lender and Garry Wheeler Stone are historians with impressive résumés.

Lender is professor emeritus of history at Kean University, N.J., and has authored or contributed to more than 10 other works on the Revolutionary War. Stone is a retired archaeological historian and former president of the Society for Historical Archaeology.

The authors provide a timely reminder of America’s situation in 1778 when American independence was a questionable proposition. Washington had lost more often than he had won. American Maj. Gen. Horatio Gates had scored a significant victory at Saratoga, N.Y. Congress and the public demanded a success from the commander in chief in the main theater of war. More than a few questioned whether Washington

politics of high command, which in this case includes how Washington and his adherents in the Army and in the political realm dealt with his potential rivals.

Today, the Battle of Monmouth, N.J., is seen as a great victory by a renewed American Army over the vaunted British Regulars. The authors show that while American forces performed well, the British were not defeated—they continued their successful withdrawal from Philadelphia to New York with Lt. Gen. Sir Henry Clinton fighting only to protect his sizeable baggage train.

Washington, however, could not allow the British to move through New Jersey unhindered. He needed to attack and secure a significant victory.

By Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy

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The battle was a draw, but Lender and Stone illustrate how Washington’s adherents successfully portrayed this draw as a great victory, the victory Washington needed to secure his command of the Continental forces. They also effectively scapegoated Lee for his supposed mishandling of the American advance force and eliminated him as a potential replacement for Washington.

The authors point out serious shortcomings in Washington’s command of the battle, the most serious being his failure to ensure Lee and other senior commanders understood his intent. He failed to ensure the main body of the American Army was within supporting distance of Lee’s advance force, placing Lee’s force in danger and risking defeat in detail should Clinton attack.

They also provide excellent overviews of Washington’s and Clinton’s subordinates and their important roles.

Most salient to their review of the politics of battle is their analysis of Lee’s character, his military abilities, his political missteps, the difficult tactical situation he encountered upon taking command of the advance guard, and the disastrous (for Lee) aftermath of the battle, which led to his court-martial and subsequent historical villainization. Their review leads to the conclusion that Lee was a better commander than subsequent generations have been led to believe, and it was more his acid character and problematic personality than his battlefield performance that led to his fall.

Fatal Sunday is an excellent and timely book covering an important formative period in our Army’s history with lessons still applicable to senior battlefield commanders.

Lt. Col. Timothy R. Stoy, USA Ret., is the historian for the 15th Infantry Regiment Association and the Society of the 3rd Infantry Division.

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U.S. Army/2nd Lt. Kenneth Herron

Final Shot

Final Prep 1st Sgt. Andre Bland of the 82nd Airborne Division gets a parachute inspection before a jump at Fort Bragg, N.C.

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