Yossi Shavit - Trends in Intergenerational Educational Mobility

Trend in Intergenerational Educational Mobility: Nominal and Positional Perspectives Yossi Shavit Tel Aviv University and the Taub Center

with: A. Rotman, M. Shalev, H. v.d. Werfhorst, T. Tam and H. Park

Agenda • Study change over time in Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEO). • Compare change in IEO when education is defined in nominal terms, in positional terms and in terms of returns to qualifications.

On balance, does IEO persist?

Results • In nominal terms IEO is stable (in Israel) or declines (on average in other countries) across birth cohorts. • In positional terms and in terms of returns, it tends to be stable (in other countries) or to increase (in Israel).

Concepts • Inequality of Educational Opportunity (IEO) = Intergenerational Educational Immobility – Defined as the association between parents’ and offspring’s education.

Concepts • Positional Goods – A good is said to be positional if its relative value is negatively determined by its use (ownership) by others (Hirsch 1977).

• E.g., Honor, Power… even cars (Ultee 1981)

Educational Expansion in Israel Completion Rates of Educational Levels by Birth Cohort, Israel 1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0

1955-59

1960-64

Upper Sec BA

1965-69

Matriculation MA+

1970-74

Post-Sec

1975-81

Does expansion affect change in IEO? • Key Perspectives: – Expansion is an equalizer: it draws on the lower classes – Expansion perpetuates IEO (MMI, EMI, Alon, PMI)

The MMI Hypothesis Change in IEO

A. The affluent strata exploit expansion more effectively.

Upper classes reach saturation

B. The expansion of educational levels at which the affluent strata had reach saturation, reduces IEO. Attendance Rates Expand Bar Haim and Shavit (2013) find corroborating evidence for A in most of 24 countries.

Effectively Maintained Inequality (Tracking)

Expansion

E.g., Ayalon & Shavit 2004, Ayalon & Yogev 2005, Blank, Shavit & Yaish 2016

Stratified Differentiation

Persistent IEO in Valued Credentials

Less valued ‘tracks’ cater to lower strata

Adaptation and Exclusion (Alon) Family strategies: better preparation in privileged strata Persistent IEO in valued credentials

Expansion

Collective action: greater selection at elite institutions

In summary • Educational expansion can draw on children from weaker social strata, but…

• Equalization of educational opportunity is likely attenuated by: – Persistent relative advantages of the upper strata – Stratified differentiation of the expanded educational opportunities – Adaptation by the upper strata – Exclusion by prestige seeking institutions

Changes in the Socio-Economic Significance of Education • Most studies of change in IEO assume that educational categories are comparable over time.

• However, the significance of educational categories changes.

– Positionality – Credential inflation – Technological change

E.g., Educated Israeli workers settle for less prestigious occupations than previously.

Occupational SEI by education and period, adjusted for gender and social origins, 30-34 year olds in 1995 and 2008 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Primary

Sec

Mat

PS 1995

SOURCE: Blank, Bar Haim and Shavit 2013

2008

BA

MA

Education as a Positional Good • The value of an educational credential is attributable, in part, to its relative scarcity (its positionality) – Signaling Theory (Spence 1973); Labor Queue (Thurow 1975); Sørensen (1979); Bol (2015) – More recently - Shavit; Bol; v.d. Werfhorst and Andersen; Tam; RSSM Special Issue 2016; – Bol and v.d. Werfhorst (2011): “With expansion, the value of education grows increasingly positional.”

Education Indicated by Occupational/Economic Returns.

Goldthorpe (2009): “How far the finding of weakening IEO, based on nominal categories of education… indicate a reduction in IEO when education is indicated by occupational/economic returns. (p.19)?”

Research Questions • What are the inter-cohort trends in IEO – – In nominal terms, – In positional terms and – In terms of education’s economic or occulational returns?

Positionally Maintained Inequality (PMI) • Parents aim to preserve the rank-order position of their children in the class hierarchy (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997). • Educated parents are familiar with the intricacies of the school system (e.g., Lareau and Weininger, 2003) and are aware that, as education expands over time, maintaining a class position requires ever higher educational qualifications.

Positionally Maintained Inequality (PMI) • Less educated parents are: – short on cultural and economic resources – more averse to the risks that are involved in aiming towards the highest qualifications (Breen and Goldthorpe 1997), – satisficed that their children’s education is floated up by the tide of expansion.

• Thus, although inter-generationally all educational strata are upwardly mobile, the privileged strata make an extra effort to reach the top rungs of the educational hierarchy.

Papers and Special Issue • Shavit, Y. 2011 [forthcoming]. “Another look at persistent inequality in education".

• Rotman, Assaf, Y. Shavit and Michael Shalev. 2016. “Nominal and positional perspectives on educational stratification in Israel." RSSM. • Herman G. Van De Werfhorst, Tony Tam, Y. Shavit and Hyunjoon Park. In progress. “Positionally maintained inequality of education: trends in intergenerational educational mobility in 35 countries.”

RSSM Special Issue (2016)

Nominal and Positional Perspectives on Educational Stratification in Israel Assaf Rotman1, Yossi Shavit1 & Michael Shalev2

1

Tel Aviv University,

2

Hebrew University

Data • Israeli born respondents to the 1995 and 2008 censuses.

• Ages 30-34 • Years of birth: 1961-65 and 1974-78. [A short time interval] • Respondents’ records were merged with their parents’ records in the preceding censuses (1983 and 1995).

• Sample sizes: 6,929 (1995) and 12,126 (2008)

Universities Colleges Other Military Service (about 50% serve in ages 18-21) Matriculation (50%) Academic Secondary School 65%

Vocational Secondary

Grades 10-12

35%

Middle School Grades 7-9 Primary School Grades 1-6

26

Pre School, ages 3-6

Gini

Variables • Respondents’ and parents’ ordinal measures of education • Respondents’ years of education • Respondents’ and parents’ positional education (PSI) • Parents’ HH income in the previous census (fixed NIS, adjusted for HH size).

• Gender • Ethnicity

Distribution of Respondents’ Education by Year

Distribution of Parents’ Education by Year

Positional Measure of Education • Tony Tam’s Positional Status Index (PSI):

– Log ratio of the cohort proportion below and above a given score.

– Interval regression of PSI of bottom and top of each educational category.

Economic Returns to Credentials • Each level of education was recoded to the mean earnings of 30-34 year old workers in the labor market (35+ hours/week; fixed 2008 Shekels; adjusted to family size). • (OLS)

Nominal and positional models of educational attainment, 30-34 year old Israeli born men and women (n=10,034)

Nominal and positional models of educational attainment, 30-34 year old Israeli born men and women (n=10,034)

• Nominal and positional modes yield different results. • The results of the positional analysis are less optimistic: IEO increased over time.

Main Results of Israeli study • In nominal terms, intergenerational educational mobility was stable between the two censuses.

• In positional terms, and in terms of economic returns, intergenerational educational mobility declined (IEO increased) between the two censuses.

• These results are consistent with PMI (or worse).

Positionally Maintained Inequality in Education: a Study of 35 Countries Herman van de Werfhorst University of Amsterdam Tony Tam Chinese University of Hong Kong Yossi Shavit Tel Aviv University Hyunjoon Park University of Pennsylvania

Data • • • •

Respondents aged 25 and older In 35 countries Birth cohorts 1945-1985.

Data files: – European Social Surveys 2002-2012 – U.S. General Social Surveys 2002-2012 – Korean General Social Surveys 2006-2010 – Taiwan Social Change Surveys 1997-2003 37

Measuring education (both children and parents) • Nominal education is coded in five levels (highest completed): – less than lower secondary education, – lower secondary education, – upper secondary education, – some post-secondary education, – tertiary degree.

Measuring education in nominal and positional terms • Highest education of either parent.

• Educational attainment of respondent Child’s education Nominal Education in five categories (Ologit and OLS) Positional Ridit of educational attainment within country-cohort (OLS) Log Positional Status Index of these ridits Log Positional Status Index of ridits of upper and lower bound of educational categories, by country-cohort (interval regression) Education scaled on predicted occupational status ISEI

Parents’ education Nominal Education in five categories Positional Ridit of educational attainment within country-cohort (OLS) Log Positional Status Index of these ridits Log Positional Status Index of abovementioned ridits Log Positional Status Index of abovementioned ridits

39

40

(1) (2) Nominal education

(3)

Nominal Ridit of education Nominal education Men o-logit OLS OLS Parents' education (a) 0.892*** 0.475*** 0.394*** (16.40) (16.05) (20.36) Birth cohort 0.210*** 0.107*** -0.006*** (4.74) (4.12) (-3.62) Parents' education x cohort -0.064*** -0.031*** -0.002 (-5.50) (-4.83) (-0.52) Constant 0.002 1.762*** 0.328*** (0.01) (17.34) (35.84) 1.330*** (7.19) 3.673*** (18.27) 3.983*** (17.09) Country fixed effects yes yes yes Observations 87363 87363 87363 Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.112 0.254 0.158 t statistics in parentheses (robust s.e.'s clustered at country level) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (a) Parents' education is entered in the same form as the children's education (in model 5 the log-PSI score is taken just like in models 4 and 6)

(4) (5) Positional education log PSI of lower and upper Log PSI of bound of education education OLS INTREG 0.397*** 0.518*** (20.07) (27.90) -0.037*** -0.043*** (-7.38) (-6.47) -0.003 -0.000 (-0.72) (-0.03) 0.132*** 0.178*** (8.86) (4.18)

Education scaled on predicted ISEI 2.767*** (16.95) 0.371*** (5.51) -0.014 (-0.51) 43.190*** (217.75)

yes 87363 0.165

yes 70417 0.216

no 87363

(6)

41

(1) (2) Nominal education

(3)

Nominal Ridit of education Nominal education Women o-logit OLS OLS Parents' education 0.949*** 0.499*** 0.417*** (14.09) (13.85) (20.87) Birth cohort 0.333*** 0.172*** 0.007** (5.65) (5.36) (3.38) Parents' education x cohort -0.077*** -0.037*** -0.004 (-5.17) (-4.97) (-1.33) Constant 0.488 1.525*** 0.276*** (1.60) (11.86) (24.65) 1.828*** (8.24) 4.078*** (16.41) 4.372*** (15.17) Country fixed effects yes yes yes Observations 100403 100403 100403 Pseudo/Adjusted R-squared 0.146 0.319 0.168 t statistics in parentheses (robus s.e.'s clustered at country level) * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 (a) Parents' education is entered in the same form as the children's education (in model 5 the log-PSI score is taken just like in models 4 and 6)

(4) (5) Positional education log PSI of lower and upper Log PSI of bound of education education OLS INTREG 0.423*** 0.548*** (24.68) (37.19) 0.022*** 0.041*** (6.83) (6.68) -0.005 -0.001 (-2.02) (-0.46) -0.083*** -0.107* (-8.54) (-2.04)

Education scaled on predicted ISEI 2.855*** (17.44) 0.786*** (11.64) -0.024 (-1.11) 41.708*** (206.00)

yes 100403 0.170

yes 78567 0.219

no 100403

(6)

42

Summary • The international study shows substantial increase in mobility between nominal educational categories.

– Due to upwards mobility from the bottom of the educational hierarchy.

• No trend in intergenerational mobility between positional educational categories.

• No trend in mobility when education is scaled to occupational scores.

• In Israel, the results are less optimistic: – In nominal terms, there was no educational mobility.

– In relative terms, there was a significant decline in educational mobility.

Policy Implications • The distinction between nominal and positional conceptions of education has important policy implications.

• Educational expansion may contribute to skill and growth, • It does not seem to enhance ‘real’ educational mobility.

Future Research • Qualitative distinctions in education (e.g., fields of study, type of institution) • Institutional/contextual factors that affect positionality of education (e.g., Gini, scope of VET, educational reforms) • Extend the Israeli study to earlier and later cohorts.

Thank You