Issue4 Article3

Aquinas and D¯ogen: Questions and Answers on the Religious Life Douglas K. Mikkelson Professor Mikkelson explores in depth a remarkable parallelism, both in style and substance, between teachings of two thirteenth-century monastics, Thomas Aquinas and D¯ogen Kigen. Using a question-and-answer format, the Dominican master in his Summa Theologiae and the founder of the S¯ot¯o Zen school in his Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki addressed similar issues and came to similar conclusions concerning numerous aspects of monastic conduct.

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asao Abe, the renowned scholar of Zen Buddhism, once remarked in passing that the Japanese Zen Master D¯ogen Kigen (1200–1253) is comparable to his contemporary, the Catholic theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274),1 and considerable supporting evidence can be offered for this assertion. Both men employed prodigious knowledge, philosophical sophistication, and literary talent to articulate a profound religious worldview. Moreover, both Aquinas and D¯ogen attained prominence in their respective traditions, making them significant focal points for comparison. Aquinas is the Angelic Doctor whose theological thinking became normative for Roman Catholicism, the world’s largest Christian tradition; D¯ogen is widely regarded as both the most original and the most profound thinker of Japanese Zen Buddhism as well as being considered the founder of the S¯ot¯o Zen school, the largest Buddhist denomination in Japan.

Aquinas and D¯ogen were products of the “medieval age,” a time when both Europe and Japan suffered the stresses of frequently recurring feudal warfare and social unrest. Various forms of individual religious response arose in this violent and unstable world; it is notable that Aquinas and D¯ogen responded in a similar fashion. Both men were aristocrats who issue 4, june 2004

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overcame formidable family opposition in order to devote themselves to the religious life, and both subsequently made important contributions to the development of its ideological infrastructure. In Catholic tradition, both those leading the monastic life in community and those leading the mendicant life as friars are encapsulated by the term “religious.” We can appropriate the terms “religious” and “the religious life” and employ them to good effect for the comparative purposes of this article, along with more specific designations like “monks,” “nuns,” and “friars.”

D¯ogen is an example of a religious who led the monastic life. A detailed consideration of the significant similarities and differences between Christian and Buddhist monasticisms is beyond the scope of this analysis; for our purposes it is sufficient to note that both forms entail communal living within the context of rules that establish standards of behavior for the community; furthermore, monastics (monks or nuns) are linked to a particular monastery led by an abbot or abbess. During his tenure as a Zen master and an abbot, D¯ogen employed and adhered to the Bo-zhang qinggui, a systemization of previous rules of Zen monasteries created by the Chinese monastic Bo-zhang Hui-hai (749–814).

Aquinas is an example of someone leading the mendicant life. Like monastics, these mendicants, or friars, are centered in a community (a friary or priory) under a leader and a set of rules, and they pursue the ideals of renunciation, poverty, obedience and so forth. Yet while centered in their community, they are not bound to it, and they retain a mobility which enables them to engage in preaching and teaching activities “out in the world.”

Aquinas belonged to the Order of Preachers, more popularly known as the Dominican order (named after its founder, Saint Dominic). Dominicans are governed by the Rule of St. Augustine, attributed in part to the Church father St. Augustine of Hippo (d. 430).

In effectively employing the categories of the monastic life and the mendicant life in a comparative context, we must beware of making a hard and fast distinction between the two. For example, Buddhist monastics in the Japanese tradition may move from monastery to monastery somewhat akin to Christian mendicants moving from priory to priory in the course of their activities; conversely, mendicant orders are often described as monastic or semi-monastic in character.2 Thus in the comparative context of this article the terms “monastic life” and “mendicant life” are better understood as occupying the poles of a spectrum that we can label “the religious life.”

Within the massive collected works of both Aquinas and D¯ogen, we see considerable attention given to the activities of the religious life, and thus it is a promising topic for a comparative analysis. Such an analysis is a potentially daunting one, given the difficulties of penetrating the

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complexities of Aquinas and D¯ogen. Fortunately, both men produced introductory works which address the topic. Aquinas’s text is the Summa Theologiae, and in it we find 2a2ae q.187, “Activities of the Religious Life,” devoted to the subject. As we find elsewhere in the Secunda Pars of the Summa, 2a2ae q.187 is actually a written record of a series of questions on the topic, followed by his answers, providing a text to be read.3 What Aquinas has to say in this section concerns both the monastic and mendicant life, though at times he distinguishes between the two in making a point, as we shall see.

The question-and-answer format of this section of the Summa offers us a means for investigating and comparing D¯ogen’s thinking on the same subject. D¯ogen’s Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki, a work that has been described as a “primer” of S¯ot¯o Zen,4 will be the other focal point for this discussion.

Granted, the structure of these two texts is not precisely the same, as the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki simply records D¯ogen’s pedagogical encounters with his listeners. However, many of these encounters also follow a questionand-answer format, especially when the subject is the activities of the religious life. Further, the text in many places seems to be addressing implied—or perhaps just unrecorded—questions, or questions that were “in the air” at the time.

Allowing Aquinas to set the questions, we see how his views and D¯ogen’s compare and contrast on six topics: 1. whether or not those leading the religious life may teach, preach, and perform similar functions; 2. whether they may be involved in secular matters; 3. whether they may be bound to manual labor; 4. whether they may live on alms; 5. whether they may beg; 6. whether they may wear clothes that are coarser than what others wear.

As we shall see, their respective answers reflect a nuanced but respectful relationship to the outside world, an appreciation for situational context, and an emphasis on inner motivation, among other things.

A seventh topic arises when we recognize that Aquinas and D¯ogen adopt a similar pedagogy in these introductory works. Perhaps the similarity in approach to the subject of activities of the religious life, a questionand-answer format, between the Summa and the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki is significant. After all, “the activities of the religious life” is by no means simply a subject for the religious scholar who, ensconced in his or her study, issue 4, june 2004

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produces an arcane religious treatise and seeks to fill in holes that few or none are really interested in. One can readily surmise that the format reflects vital and practical questions that have actually arisen in two different religious and cultural contexts.

The historical context of these documents can support us here. The Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki is a collection of D¯ogen’s conversations with various individuals between the years 1234 and 1237, within which time D¯ogen opened and took the leadership of K¯osh¯oji, the first Chinese-style Zen monastery in Japan. Clearly D¯ogen, seeking monastic reform in Japan, followed Chinese monastic practice to a great extent in establishing his community, but as we would expect, he transformed it in ways appropriate for a Japanese sangha. Under this new and transformative situation we would expect both D¯ogen and his followers to address questions pertaining to activities of the religious life, and we have an explicit record of this in the text.

A consideration of historical context also informs us that, to a great extent, live questions underlie 2a2ae q.187 of the Summa. Aquinas produced this text around the year 1271 while he was a professor at the University of Paris, towards the end of the “anti-mendicant controversy,” which waxed and waned between the years 1252–1272. At the heart of this conflict was the resentment amongst secular masters (i.e., teaching priests not bound to the monastic or mendicant life) against the growing number and influence of mendicant masters such as Aquinas at the University of Paris.

This led to a series of polemical attacks by the secular masters on the validity and justification of the religious orders; Aquinas responded with several counterattacks over these years.5 The anti-mendicant controversy and Aquinas’s defense of the religious orders serves as a backdrop to 2a2ae q.187 and influenced its development, as we shall see. Yet it is also important to remember that, as noted previously, 2a2ae q.187 addresses the religious life in general, including not only mendicants but also monastics, and to this question-and-answer section we now turn in order to begin our comparative analysis.

I. The first question Aquinas poses on the subject is “whether it is lawful to teach, to preach and perform similar functions” (2a2ae q.187.1). Aquinas’s usual modus operandi here was to first entertain opinions producing a conclusion opposite to his own, and then—beginning with the words sed contra (often translated “on the other hand”)—Aquinas would give an initial indication of his own views, followed by a responsio that expanded

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upon his sed contra. Finally, he would provide replies to the opposing opinions based on his own response. For the question of whether a religious can properly teach, he begins by outlining three arguments, each of which leads to the assertion that monks cannot lawfully teach, preach and so forth. The third argument effectively encapsulates the basic points of the first two: teaching and preaching are ecclesiastical functions, but, “[as] Gregory says, ‘No one can discharge ecclesiastical functions and consistently observe the monastic rule, and this is quoted in the Decretum.’”

Aquinas relied heavily on authoritative “proof-texts” like this passage from Pope Gregory the Great (540–604)6 in order to advance his argument.

Following his standard procedure, Aquinas responds directly to this argument at the end of 2a2ae q.187.1. But his initial answer to the question also plays off the third argument: On the other hand (sed contra), Gregory is quoted in the same section, “In the view of this decree, promulgated by our apostolic authority and the duty of our office, it is lawful for monks who are priests, and thus configured to the apostles, to preach, baptize, and pray for sinners, impose penances, and absolve from sin.”

Countering the proof-text of the opposing argument, Aquinas draws his own proof-text from the same place, thus affirming that those leading the religious life can teach, preach and so forth, assuming they have the proper qualifications. He develops this point further in his responsio. But how is this compatible with Gregory’s authoritative words quoted in the third oppositional argument? Aquinas harmonizes the two quotes in his conclusion: The ordinary care of ecclesiastical duties and the observance of the monastic rule in the monastery are not compatible. But this does not preclude monks and other religious from sometimes being commissioned to occupy themselves with ecclesiastical duties by those prelates, who have ordinary care of such matters, and especially those whose religious institutes were specifically founded for that purpose, as we shall see.

Aquinas affirms that those leading the religious life may be members of religious institutes specifically founded for preaching, a point he develops in detail later in the Summa (2a2ae q.188.4). But he also does not miss the opportunity to strike at his opponents in the course of producing his responsio to 2a2ae q.187.1:

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Indeed, it is foolish to say that one becomes less suited for exercising spiritual offices by advancing in holiness, and consequently it is a foolish opinion which maintains that the religious state constitutes an obstacle to the performance of such functions.

Here he has in mind those secular masters mentioned earlier who attacked the Dominicans for these activities.7 Of greater relevance for our comparative purposes is his recognition that, while ordinarily ecclesiastical duties are incompatible with the monastic rule, this must not be taken as an absolute principle. Aquinas’s point draws upon a principle stated repeatedly in the Summa, namely that “due circumstances” must be taken into consideration when determining the right course of action (see, for example, 2a2ae q.189.6). What Aquinas has in mind, we must note, is not the exercise of ecclesiastical functions by qualified monks performed solely within the monastic community itself.

Opposing argument number two quotes a statute from the Council of Nicea to the effect that “no monk shall hear confessions, except of another monk, as is right,” and nowhere in the question is the propriety of monks confessing other monks under review. Rather, he is addressing the matter of monks performing ecclesiastical functions out among the world, so to speak—such as preaching from a pulpit to the laity.

That it is lawful for Zen monks to teach, preach and perform other religious functions is evident from the structure and content of the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki. What we find are numerous teaching sessions and sermons delivered by D¯ogen, himself a monk, as recorded by his chief disciple Ej¯o. Prima facie we may see a distinction here, “Due circumstances” must as the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki is largely a product of D¯ogen’s teachings and sermons and activities within a be taken into consideration temple, specifically K¯osh¯oji, and we may hold in our minds the image of the Zen master, seated before his when determining the right monks, turning the wheel of the Dharma. But the laity flocked to the new temple not only to admire the monks meditating in their new hall but also to receive course of action.

D¯ogen’s instruction. These teachings and preachings directed to the laity comprise a significant portion of the text, albeit an indeterminate one, inasmuch as it is not always clear as to whom D¯ogen’s audience was in every given instance. Nonetheless, teaching and preaching to laity is clearly sanctioned. For example, amidst D¯ogen’s own instructions are general references to the instructional activities of various Zen patriarchs and masters of the past, along with official teachers and priests and the like (see, for example, Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 4.2) But we also have

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specific mention of Ejo¯ ’s elevation to the position of meditation director (shuza) at K¯osh¯oji. (The shuza occupied the first seat in the monk’s meditation hall.) A meditation director sometimes served as a substitute preacher for the head priest of the temple. What Ejo¯ preached to the assembly upon the formal occasion of his appointment is not recorded in the text, but we are told what D¯ogen had to say about the matter. He tells his monks not to be bothered by the fact this is Ej o¯ ’s first lecture, and he tells Ej o¯ not to underestimate his sermonizing ability (Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 4.5).

Flexibility on this issue in accordance with circumstances characterizes both Aquinas’s and D¯ogen’s viewpoints. For example, monks could have teaching duties delegated to them by a proper authority in certain circumstances, according to Aquinas. As for D¯ogen, he put his imprimatur on ad hoc situations of instruction by ordinary monks, though he also counsels its proper execution: If a sincere seeker after Buddhism asks you about the teaching, do not begrudge him an answer. Explain it to him for his sake. But for three questions, give only one answer; long-winded dissertations are worthless. (Sho¯ b¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 5.7) As with all other activities, the answer should be in accord with making Buddhism flourish and benefiting all sentient beings, a principle first articulated in Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.20 and repeated numerous times within the text.

II. In Section 2a2ae q.187.2 of the Summa, Aquinas asks “whether it is lawful for religious to be involved in secular matters.” Aquinas answers in the affirmative, using as his sed contra proof-text Paul’s closing remarks in his “Letter to the Romans”: “I commend to you Phoebe, our sister . . . that you assist her in whatsoever business she shall have need of you” (16.1–2).

Key to Aquinas’s answer is the matter of motive. Avarice, pleasure and glory are not licit motives for monks and other religious to intervene in secular affairs. But, as Aquinas subsequently states in the responsio of 2a2ae q.187.2, “If the need of their neighbor demands it, they should involve themselves in his affairs out of charity.”

The English word “charity” here is a translation of the Latin word “caritas,” the term most consistently employed in the Vulgate to translate the New Testament Greek word “agape” (love). Charity is the infused virtue issue 4, june 2004

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uniting humans to God via love. Like the theological virtues of faith and hope, the object of charity is God, but “charity is higher than faith and hope, and consequently higher than all the virtues” (2a2ae q.23.6).

In Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.19 we find a similar question-and-answer segment, which begins as follows: Supposing someone comes to you to talk about his affairs and asks you to write a letter soliciting a favor or aiding him in a lawsuit. Do you refuse him to his face, saying: “I am now a monk who has retired from the world and have no business concerning myself with mundane affairs?” This must be considered carefully in terms of the time and the occasion.

While this may seem to be the proper attitude for a monk to take, if you think about it, what you are really saying is, “I am a monk who has retired from the world, and if I say something that I have no business saying, I will probably be thought ill of.” This shows an attachment to the Self and a concern over one’s own fame. At a time like this, think the matter over thoroughly, and if you can help the man even slightly, do so without worrying about what others will think of you. . . . Your primary concern inwardly is to free yourself from egoistic attachments and thoughts of your own name, even though outwardly you are doing something quite unbecoming to your position.

For both Aquinas and D¯ogen, motive is key to resolving this matter.

But whereas the former articulates wrong motives for a monk intervening in secular matters, the latter outlines the wrong motives for not intervening. To some extent, D¯ogen’s observations on motive parallel Aquinas; for example, just as Aquinas criticizes glory as a motive, D¯ogen’s final remark of the section states: “The main point is that, whatever the situation, you must discard attachments to fame and self.”

Underlying D¯ogen’s instruction on the matter are more broadly the Buddhist doctrines of detachment and no-self. Faulty understanding might lead one to apply these doctrines superficially, leading to the outer appearance of moral rectitude rather than true right action proceeding from inner moral wisdom.

But at the heart of D¯ogen’s response is his reference to the underlying moral foundation for right action: “When someone asks a Buddha or a Bodhisattva for help, they are willing to offer their own flesh and limbs.

Why then turn away someone who asks you to write one letter just because you are afraid of what people will say?”

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D¯ogen’s meaning will perhaps be more transparent if we take a moment to peruse Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 2.2, which tells of Eisai, the abbot of Kenninji, receiving the following request from a poor man: “My family . . . is on the verge of starvation. Please have compassion and save us.” Since the temple itself was poverty-stricken, initially Eisai was stymied, but finally he hit upon the idea of taking a copper halo intended for a statue of the Yakushi Buddha and giving it to the poor man to sell for food. The man rejoiced upon receiving the gift, but Eisai’s disciples were critical: “You’ve given the halo of a Buddhist statue to a layperson. Isn’t it a crime to make personal use of what belongs to the Buddha?” “You are right,” the abbot replied, “but think of the will of the Buddha. He cut off his own flesh and limbs for the sake of all sentient beings. Certainly he would have sacrificed his entire body to save starving people.”

D¯ogen instructs his students to reflect on and never forget the “excellence” of this attitude.

Clearly what Eisai, and by subsequent appropriation D¯ogen, wanted this event to evoke in the minds of his listeners is the “limitless” compassion (karuna) of the Buddha. The primacy of karuna in Buddhist morality is attested to in a myriad of ways in the tradition. It is, as Har Dayal insightfully observed, “the last word and consummation of the Mahayana.”8 (Karuna is the first of the four brahma-viharas, often translated as “the four cardinal virtues of Buddhism”; the others are maitri [limitless kindness], mudita [limitless joyfulness], and upeksa [limitless equanimity].)

Applying this interpretive key to Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.19, we realize that D¯ogen appeals to the Buddha, and also the Bodhisattvas, as models for right behavior in this situation. Since monks are, technically speaking, Bodhisattvas-in-training and Buddhas-to-be, they too must exercise limitless compassion. Therefore, monks ought to write a letter for a layperson out of compassion if they think they have the ability to help— and D¯ogen notes that he himself has responded affirmatively to such a request (Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.19).

Thus we see how both men answer the question posed in 2a2ae q.189.2. For Aquinas it is lawful for a monk and other religious to be involved in secular matters out of the demands of charity, the highest of the three theological virtues of Christianity. For D¯ogen, it is lawful for a monk to be involved in secular matters out of the demands of compassion, the most important of the four cardinal virtues of Buddhism.

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III. In 2a2ae q.187.3 of the Summa, Aquinas asks “whether those in the religious life are bound to manual labor.” The anti-mendicant controversy prompted this question as well, as critics asserted that all those leading the religious life should engage in manual labor as stipulated by monastic tradition and the rule of St. Benedict. But as Jordan Auman notes, the Dominicans and other mendicant orders did not prescribe manual labor; therefore Dominic substituted the devoted study of sacred doctrine for his order.9 (Since the Rule of St. Augustine, which is followed by the Dominicans, does not require manual labor in the first place, this substitution in effect functions as an addition to that Rule.)10 Nonetheless, we must remember that Aquinas is not only addressing the question of mendicant orders but all the religious, and the initial opposing arguments present an impressive set of arguments in favor of the proposition that those in the religious life are bound to manual labor. His arguments are too numerous to outline in detail here, but we should note one particularly important proof-text, namely a passage from 2 Thessalonians 3.10, wherein Paul states: “If any man will not work, neither let him eat.” In response to this and other arguments, Aquinas quotes an earlier passage from 2 Thessalonians. Aquinas writes: On the other hand, those leading the religious life and the laity are bound in the same way to observe the precepts which are commonly proposed to all. But the precept on manual labor is proposed to all in general, as appears in 2 Thessalonians 3.6: “We urge you, brothers, to keep away from any of the brothers who refuse to work or to live according to the tradition we passed on to you.”11 [“Brother” here refers to any Christian, as in 1 Corinthians 4.12, “If any brother hath a wife that believeth not, etc.”]; and again, “If any man will not work, neither let him eat.” Therefore those leading the religious life are not more obliged to manual labor than the laity.

As we see, Aquinas acknowledges the authority of 2 Thessalonians 3.10 and indeed includes it in his own answer, but he does not agree with how it is applied by his opposition in this situation. Aquinas’s elaboration on his position is detailed, and we need not enumerate every point. But overall his position can be summarized as follows: No, monks and other religious are per se no more bound to manual labor than anyone else. Granted, some leading the religious life may be bound to manual labor by the rules of their religious order. Furthermore, if a person in the religious life would starve if he or she did not engage in manual labor, then he or she is bound

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to manual labor. But assuming there is neither a formal regulation of the order nor a necessity entailed for survival or some other extenuating circumstance, a religious is not required to engage in manual labor any more than a layperson is.

Let us now turn to D¯ogen. In Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.2, Ejo¯ asks D¯ogen “if the regulations of Bo-zhang ought to be followed in a Zen monastery.”

In the course of his response D¯ogen declares: “Students should guard with special care the regulations laid down by Bo-zhang.”

One of the most famous precepts of this text states: “A “A day without work— day without work—a day without eating.” As Hee-Jin Kim notes, manual labor was not in accord with the a day without eating.”

Buddhist vinaya from India, but in those days in China contributions from outside sources were scarce, and self-supporting manual labor within the monastic community was necessary as a means of survival.12 In effect, manual labor was elevated to the status of a spiritual discipline alongside meditation. In incorporating Bo-zhang’s rule, D¯ogen appropriated this idea as well.

Both Aquinas and D¯ogen, therefore, acknowledge the validity of the precept “no work, no food” as applied to those leading the religious life.

Aquinas did not view monks as necessarily bound to manual labor, whereas D¯ogen endorsed the idea of monks being bound to manual labor as a spiritual discipline.

IV. In 2a2ae q.187.4, Aquinas asks “whether it is lawful for religious to live on alms.” Aquinas’s basic view is spelled out in his sed contra: Gregory says the blessed Benedict, after leaving his home and parents, spent three years in a cave and lived on what was supplied for him by a Roman monk. Although he was able-bodied, we do not read that he sought his livelihood by manual labor. Therefore those leading the religious life may lawfully live on alms.

Gregory’s reference here is to Benedict of Nursia, to whom the Rule of Saint Benedict, the chief basis for monastic rules in Western Christendom, is attributed. Though under the Rule’s own classificatory schema Benedict can be described as an eremitic monk in the above example, he eventually assumed the role of abbot at Monte Cassino over what he called “the best kind of monks,” namely cenobitic monks who live communally under a monastic rule and the direction of an abbot.13 Obviously Aquinas’s answer sees Benedict’s example as authoritative for those leading the religious life issue 4, june 2004

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within a communal setting as well as an eremitic one, and furthermore he extends it to all who lead the religious life.

That monks could accept alms was also D¯ogen’s position, but he devotes considerable attention to clarifying matters pertaining to the practice. We can begin with Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 5.6: Monks must never delight in receiving public donations; yet they must not decline them either. The late Abbot Eisai said: “To enjoy receiving public donations does not accord with Buddhist regulations.

To take no joy does not accord with the heart of the donor.” The traditional view is that offerings are not made to the monk himself but to the Three Treasures. Therefore, you must say to the donor: “The Three Treasures will surely accept your offering.”

Technically speaking, monks receive alms on behalf of the Three Treasures, or Three Refuges, namely the Buddha, the Dharma and the Sangha (the community of monks and nuns). Alms received in this fashion support the monk or nun and by extension the monastic community of which he or she is a member. Further, alms must never be coveted, lest one become entrapped by a desire for fame and wealth and become obstructed from breaking free from attachment (see Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 5.20).

The kind of arrangement Benedict presumably had with the Roman monk who supported him in his three-year retreat does not meet with D¯ogen’s approval. In Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.16, a man asks for D¯ogen’s opinion about some advice he had received. The man had been advised to make arrangements with a parishioner or a patron so that he could retire to a quiet place where, in the words of his advisor, “You can peacefully practice Buddhism without worrying about food and clothing. This is not coveting wealth and property. You can then practice with your livelihood assured for a while.”

D¯ogen responds that “true students of the Way” have never behaved in such a manner; we see basically the same point reiterated in Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 2.6. Elsewhere he directly criticizes the idea of ensuring one’s livelihood through the almsgiving of another: You should not arrange in advance for the supply of your clothing and food. Even as regards the places of alms begging, to plan beforehand to beg at certain places or ask certain persons in case you run out of food is tantamount to storing up provisions, and violates the Buddhist regulations. Monks are like the clouds and have no fixed abode. Like flowing water, they attach themselves to nothing.

(Sho¯ b¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 5.21)

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V. The question of receiving alms leads naturally to the more specific question of “whether it is lawful for religious to beg,” which Aquinas addresses in 2a2ae q.187.5. Aquinas first presents five arguments against the practice, each one loaded with persuasive proof-texts. Aquinas’s extended attention to this question is not surprising, considering that the validity of the Dominican order and of all mendicant orders depends on the answer; after all, the mendicant orders are sometimes defined as “religious with the privilege of begging” (the term “mendicant” is from the Latin mendicare, “to beg”).14 Aquinas’s sed contra weighs in heavily with his own set of authorities in defense of his position, beginning with the model of the person of Jesus: It is fitting for those leading the religious life to live in imitation of Christ. But Christ begged, according to Psalm 39.18: “But I am a beggar and poor,” of which a gloss says, “Christ said this of himself under the aspect of a servant,” and later, “A mendicant is one who begs from another; a pauper is one who cannot supply his own needs.”

Again, Psalms 69.6 states, “I am needy and poor,” of which a gloss says, “I am needy, that is, a beggar; and poor, that is, unable to support myself because I have no worldly wealth.” And Jerome says, “Take care not to amass the wealth of others while your Lord (i.e.

Christ) was a mendicant.” Therefore it is fitting to beg.

As with the practice of manual labor, monks and other religious can lawfully practice begging when the need arises. But begging is also a legitimate practice for maintaining one’s livelihood in the religious life because of the goods one gives in recompense for the support by the laity.

Analogous to this section in the Summa is the following question-andanswer exchange in Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.20: Someone asked: “Must one beg in order to promote Buddhism?”

D¯ogen answered: “Yes, you should. This matter, however, must take into consideration the climate and customs of the country. In any event, it must be done to spread benefit to all beings and to advance one’s own training. If you wander about wearing a robe along dirty roads, the robe is bound to get dirty. Also, since the people in Japan are poor, it is impossible to beg in the prescribed manner.”

The “prescribed manner” refers to the regulations for begging, which stipulate that one is to visit seven houses without regard to whether or not issue 4, june 2004

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the houses are poor.15 What we see in the above quote is an excellent example of D¯ogen’s propensity for critical appropriation of Buddhist tradition without succumbing to a stultifying legalism. D¯ogen is well aware of the venerable tradition of Buddhist mendicancy, and he supports the practice in Japan, only, however, insofar as it will not only benefit one’s particular practice but also Buddhism in general. If the traditional begging practice must be jettisoned in order to function in the Japanese context, so be it. Furthermore, D¯ogen asserts no fewer than four times in this passage what we see in the final sentence, namely that one must always act to benefit Buddhism in general and to bring benefit to all sentient beings.

VI. In the passage quoted above, D¯ogen mentions that one’s robes will become dirty while one is begging. Regarding robes D¯ogen also had this to say: Students of the Way must not worry about clothing or food. They must merely follow the Buddhist rules and not concern themselves with worldly things. The Buddha said: “For clothing, use tattered cast-aside garments; for food, use what can be begged.” (Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 1.16) Aquinas, similarly, having discussed the propriety of monks engaging in begging, immediately addresses the matter of monastic clothing. In 2a2ae q.187.6 he asks “whether it is lawful for those leading the religious life to wear coarser clothes than others.” Aquinas defends the practice in his sed contra: St. Paul says, “They wandered about in sheepskins, in goatskins” [Hebrews 11.37], and a gloss adds, “like Elijah and the others.” And the Decretum says, “If any be found who deride those who wear coarse religious apparel, they should be corrected. For in ancient times all persons consecrated to God wore poor, coarse clothing.”

Motive is again the key factor in determining the proper response to the question. We see this reflected in the very next sentence, with which Aquinas begins his responsio: “Augustine says that in all external things, sin is not in their use but in the intention of the user.”

For D¯ogen, too, whether the practice of wearing coarse clothing is proper is also a question of motive:

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Aquinas and D¯ogen: Questions and Answers on the Religious Life

Once Ej¯o asked: “If a Zen monk refuses to throw away an old, mended robe, it looks as though he is coveting it. If he throws away an old robe and acquires a new one, he seems to be attached to the new.

Both views are wrong. What attitude should one take?”

D¯ogen answered: “If you can free yourself from covetousness and attachment, neither would be wrong. Wouldn’t it be better, though, to mend a torn robe and use it for a long time than long for a new one?” (Sho¯ b¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 2.18) Aquinas also holds that those leading the religious life may be wearing coarse clothes for invalid reasons—for example, in order to deceive others by their outward appearance: “Coarseness of clothing does not of itself have the appearance of evil; indeed, it has the appearance of good, namely contempt of worldly glory. That is why evil persons hide their malice under coarse clothing.”

D¯ogen makes much the same point in Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 2.10. People in Japan, D¯ogen asserts, judge others on the basis of external appearances. Thus some followers of the religious life are dragged down into evil ways, because “it is easy to be esteemed by others. One need merely give the impression of having abandoned one’s status and being separated from the world by a fabrication of outer appearance.”

As one example of this, D¯ogen paints us the picture of a monk who heedlessly walks about in the rain, getting his tattered robes soaking wet; such activity is inwardly and outwardly useless, “yet people of the world immediately think what a venerable man he is, how detached he is, and so forth.”

Thus D¯ogen would almost certainly have agreed with Aquinas’s conclusion to his answer to the question. Again Aquinas builds his point from Augustine: “[W]hen a man deliberately and not because of extreme poverty draws attention to himself by exceptional squalor and shabbiness, we can judge by his other actions whether he does this out of contempt for excessive finery or to attract attention.” But those leading the religious life do not seem to do this for ostentation, because they wear a coarse garb as a sign of their profession, by which they proclaim a contempt for the world.

Contempt for excessive finery and the virtue of coarse garb is reflected in a remark D¯ogen makes in Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 4.11:

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Laypersons say it is good to wear luxurious silks, embroidered garments, and brocades, and bad to wear tattered and discarded rags.

But in Buddhism it is the opposite: tattered robes are good and pure; richly embroidered garments are evil and soiled.

D¯ogen remarks in Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki 3.7 that along with begging, coarse garb signifies the poverty of the monk, “and this is the outstanding characteristic of the Zen school.”

In conclusion, we have seen a notable overlap of concern between 2a2ae q.187 of the Summa Theologiae and the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki.

Aquinas poses six questions on activities of the religious life, and within the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki we can find answers by D¯ogen to all of these questions. There is a remarkable similarity in pedagogical approach as well as a clear parallelism in the questions and in the answers of two men who, though living at about the same time, taught in places far apart from each other and within two different religious traditions.16 Yet the question remains whether or not the comparative methodology of this article actually does have any value. Comparativist studies in general are often challenged on this point, and there is no reason not to apply the critique to this one. Perhaps the best response to offer here is to quote from the conclusion of an essay by Thomas F. MacMillan, “VirtueBased Ethics: A Comparison of Aristotelian-Thomistic and Buddhist Approaches,” which appeared in the 2002 issue of this journal: A brief comparison of selected features of Aristotelian-Thomistic and Buddhist virtue-based ethics has been presented here with the intent of encouraging further dialogue on matters of mutual ethical concern. One hopes that each party to the continuing dialogue would come to the table with a deeper understanding of and respect for the tradition represented by the other party. Insofar as this paper has contributed to such understanding and respect, it has succeeded. Insofar as it has added to confusion or misunderstanding, it reflects the limitations of the author’s scholarship and practice, which only compassion on the part of all readers may serve to ameliorate.17 As I cannot improve on these words, I will let the echo of them serve as my own conclusion. ❧ Notes 1. Masao Abe, Zen and Western Thought (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1985), p. 26.

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Aquinas and D¯ogen: Questions and Answers on the Religious Life 2. See, for example, the chapter on “Dominicans, Franciscans, and other Mendicant Orders” in Williston Walker et al., A History of the Christian Church, 4th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1985), pp. 310–22.

3. See Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (London: Blackfriars, 1964). Citations of the Summa employed in this article are based on the method used in the Blackfriars translation. Thus “2a2ae q.187” refers to question 187 of the secunda secundae (i.e., second half of part two) of the Summa. Whenever possible, I have tried to conform my translations to the Blackfriars translation.

However, my own interpretive perspective has led me to make a few minor changes at certain points. Thus, I must take full responsibility for all translations from Latin to English in this article.

4. The original source for translations of the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki in this article is Okubo Doshu, ed., D¯ogen zenji zensh¯u (Tokyo: Chikurna shobo, 1969–70).

For an English translation of the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki I have relied primarily on Reiho Masunaga’s A Primer of S¯ot¯o Zen: A Translation of D¯ogen’s Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki (Honolulu: The University of Hawaii Press, 1978). I have also consulted Thomas Cleary, A Record of Things Heard: From the Treasury of the Eye of the True Teaching (Boulder: Prajna Press, 1980). For sake of accessibility, I have tried as much as possible to conform my translation of a given passage to these two authors. Thus, I am indebted to these authors for the translations appearing in this article; at the same time, I must take responsibility for any shortcomings of the passages as presented in English. The citation system of the text follows the one employed by these authors.

5. Regarding Aquinas and the anti-mendicant controversy, see James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D’Aquino: His Life and Works (Washington, DC: The Catholic University Press, 1974), pp. 80–92.

6. The quote is from Gregory the Great (pope from 590–604) as present in his Registrum Epistolorum; this passage is found in the Decretum Gratiani, a collection of canon law, related canonical passages, and accompanying commentaries compiled around the year 1140 by the monk John Gratian. The Decretum Gratiani comprised the first part of the Corpus Iuris Canonici, “The Body of Canon Law.” See Aemelius Friedburg, Corpus Juris Canonici, Vols. 1 and 2 (Lipsiae: Bernard Tachnitz, 1879). For the sake of convenience, citations in this article follow the Blackfriars system.

7. Most notable among the people he is contesting here are the secular masters William of St. Amour (d. 1272) and Gérard d’Abbeville (1220–72). In response to the latter, Aquinas composed Contra retrahentes a religionis ingressu; for an old but reliable translation of this text, see John Proctor’s An Apology for the Religious Orders (London: Sands and Company, 1902).

8. Har Dayal, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Sanskrit Buddhist Literature (London: Kegan, Paul, Trench, Trubner, and Company, 1932), cited in MacMillan, p. 45 (see Note 17).

9. See Volume 47, “The Pastoral and Religious Lives,” in the Blackfriars translation of the Summa cited above, p. 153.

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Douglas K. Mikkelson 10. A readily accessible copy of the Rule can be found at http://wmv.geocities.com/ Athens/1534/ruleaug.html; this is a translation by Robert Russel based on the critical text of Luc Verheijen, La regle de saint Augustin (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1967).

11. What Aquinas actually states here is as follows: “ut pates 2 ad Thess., ‘Subtrahatis vos ab omni fratre ambulante inordinante, etc.,” which can be translated as “Withdraw yourselves from every other brother walking disorderly, etc.”

Aquinas is quoting the Vulgate and, of course, omits the end of the passage. In order to help the reader understand how Aquinas is using the text, I have substituted the entirety of 2 Thessalonians 3.6, using the New Revised Standard Version (NRSV) translation.

12. Hee-Jin Kim, D¯ogen Kigen—Mystical Realist (Tucson: The University of Arizona Press, 1975), p. 230.

13. Anthony C. Meisel and M. L del Maestro, tr., The Rule of St. Benedict (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1975), p. 46.

14. For an example and a concise discussion of the point, see Richard P. McBrien, ed., The Harper Collins Encyclopedia of Catholicism (San Francisco: HarperCollins Publishers, 1995) s.v. “mendicant orders.”

15. See Masunaga, p. 114, footnote 44.

16. I have been employing questions and answers by Aquinas on the activities of religious in order to explore how D¯ogen would answer the same questions. As noted previously, we have been seeking answers solely in reference to the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki. This has the merit of identifying D¯ogen’s views on these matters during a specific period of time. Were we to apply Aquinas’s questions to D¯ogen’s other works, we could continue the exploration further. For example, apropos of the question just considered, in the Kesa Kudoku chapter of the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o, D¯ogen devotes considerable discussion to the significance of wearing the kasaya, the coarse cloth shawl comprising part of the Buddhist habit.

To what extent the views of the Kesa Kudoku, written in 1240, are and are not consonant with D¯ogen’s Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o Zuimonki, begun no earlier than 1234 and finished no later than 1237, is outside the scope of this discussion, but we could certainly benefit by pursuing the matter. If this methodology has any value, we might benefit from further exercises of this nature. From a cursory review of the contents of the Summa, listed as they are by topic, several avenues seem to hold promise, including others pertaining to the issue of the religious life. For example, 2a2ae q.189 addresses the matter of de ingressu religionis, “entrance into the religious life.” When we turn to D¯ogen’s works, we find in the Sh¯ob¯ogenz¯o a work entitled Shukke Kudoku. Kudoku means “merit,” while shukke denotes a person who has renounced home and family in order to enter monastic life. Thus Shukke Kudoku can be rendered in English as “The Merit of Entering the Religious Life.” I have argued elsewhere that there are excellent foci for a comparative analysis; see my forthcoming article in Buddhist–Christian Studies.

17. Thomas F. MacMillan, “Virtue-Based Ethics: A Comparison of AristotelianThomistic and Buddhist Approaches,” Religion East and West 2 (June 2002): p. 49.

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