Upland Conversion in China

Upland Conversion - Briefing Paper

Upland Conversion: Background Briefing The Context - Introduction - Deforestation - Climate Change - The Floods - The Great Western Development Strategy The Forest Policies - The Logging Ban - Natural Forest Protection Upland Conversion - Nature Conservation - Conclusions China's Upland Conversion policy (also known as Grain-for-Green) was introduced in 1998 in order to increase forest cover and prevent soil erosion on sloped crop and "wasteland". The program, one of the largest conservation set-aside initiatives in the world, aims to convert around 14.67 million hectares of cropland to forest.

It cannot be considered in isolation because it has been introduced along with a raft of other forest policies that appear to be predicated on a "biocentric discourse" that favours the environment at the expense of indigenous people & their culture (See Kitossa 2000).

The Logging ban, Natural Forest Protect, Upland Conversion & Nature Conservation were all introduced or expanded following the serious floods of 1998, under the aegis of the Great Western Development Strategy.

Collectively these policies have generally had a positive environmental impact but often impinge on the subsistence requirements, "forest commons" and customary rights of the poor and minority peoples and jeopardized the progress that was being made promoting community forestry [See Colchester 2002] Of the four new forest policies the only one that makes subsistence provision for firewood, NTFP, agro-forestry & co-management is the Nature Conservation policy. This however is not of much use if the experimental & buffer zones are miles from the villagers (as in the case of Ninglang) The logging ban has had a serious knock-on impact internationally resulted in the destruction, often illegally of some of Asia's and Siberia's remaining old-growth forests.

In the light of the hardship being caused to China's poor and minorities and the impact of the logging ban on Asian forests, a revision of China's new forest policies appears to be apposite.

Deforestation The forests of SW China, were among the most extensive areas of forest cover in China, and included the forests of SE Tibet AR, Western Sichuan, Northern Yunnan, South West Gansu, and SE Qinghai. Since 1950, when they were designated China's "second timber production base" and in 1956 when macro-scale timber production enterprises were established all these areas have experienced indiscriminate felling (Richardson

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1990, Li 1993). The majority of the destruction was not caused by population pressure, or "criminal elements", or local farmers, and it did not mostly occur as Pearce (1999) suggests "40 years ago to fuel backyard steel furnaces of Chairman Mao's ill fated Great Leap Forward". It was caused by "planned" commercial timber extraction based on government quotas (Smil 1984, Winkler 1998a). Timber was not only required for China's booming economy, but it was often the most important source of cash revenue for local administrations, enabling them to fund education health & infrastructure. State forest enterprises were required to sell a minimum timber quota which was often as much as 3 times the sustainable yield, at a price that was often below production costs (Winkler 1998a). To compensate for this they often sold even more timber on the free market. As a result in some areas annual felling was four times more than the sustainable yield. Consequently:- Forest cover in Tibet AR has fallen from 9 % (1950) to 5 % (1985), in Yunnan from 55 % (1950's) to 30 % (1975), and in Sichuan from 30% (1950) to 6.5% (1998). (Pomfret 1998, Winkler 1998a). Some of the most disquieting reports on deforestation come from Sichuan and Yunnan Province.

Deforestation in the most accessible parts of Western Sichuan (mostly Aba Prefecture) began in the late 1950's, and although Sichuan did lose one tenth of its growing stock (or 1.24m ha) during the Great Leap Forward (1958-61) this was mostly in the East.

Deforestation accelerated in Aba Prefecture in the late 1960's, when it supplied up to 84% of Sichuan's timber quota. It was not until the 1980's and 1990's, when most of Aba's forests were depleted (It only supplied 15% of Sichuan's total quota in 1980) that large scale deforestation spread into the main Yangtze catchment in Kham. The forests of Kham comprise ca 95% of forest land found in the "headwaters of the Yangtze", and their destruction, from the 1980's appears to have been paralleled by an almost annual occurrence of environmental destruction (Studley 1999a 1999b Wang Hongchang undated Smil 1984) Yunnan still ranks fourth in China, in terms of total timber resources, but in relative terms the province's deforestation has been even more extensive than in Sichuan, and its loss of forest land appears to be by far the greatest in China.

Clear felling began in N Yunnan In the early 1950's when about 55 percent of province was covered by forests, but by 1980's, it had dropped to 30 percent, and annual wood consumption was double the growth rate. In some areas it was much worse and in Zhaotong County forest cover fell from 50% to 8%.

To make matters worse , all over SW China, large scale clear felling was widely practiced, tree planting to tree felling ratios were very low (1:10) tree seedling survival rates of less than 30% were common (Dong 1985, He 1991), less than 40% of woody biomass was utilized and only about 7% of milling wastes were utilized (Smil 1993).

Climate change The destruction of forest (and grassland) in SW China, from the early 1980's onward appears to have impacted not only regional but global climatic patterns. The environmental, social & economic impact, was not just confined to the region (Derbyshire 6 Gasse 1996 Smil 1984 Studley 1999a 1999b Wang Hongchang nd] The area, north of Yunnan, towers over the Eurasian landmass deflecting the jet streams in the upper atmosphere influencing the atmospheric circulation of the northern hemisphere. The area is a critical player in global climate stability and has an especially

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important influence on the Indian monsoon.

With the help of computer modeling up to 29 indicators have been identified which help predict the formation of monsoons. Two important indicators are the jet stream patterns and the amount of snow cover on the area. The amount of snow cover is partially determined by the amount of forest and grass cover, but more specifically any reduction in vegetation, increases albedo ( the fraction of solar energy (shortwave radiation) reflected from the Earth back into space) which delays rates of snow melt during the spring.

Green forest cover absorbs 95% of solar energy, clear-felled areas and grasslands absorb 80% while barren land and rock even less. Forested areas not only break up snow cover but retain heat. As the plateau's ability to absorb solar heat is crippled by deforestation, and pasture degradation, snow disasters are exacerbated (Studley 1999a 1999b O'Kane, M. 1998) & snow melt is delayed.

Due to the delay in snow melt, the heating mechanisms of the area diminish, and through a series of interconnections the pressure systems are altered which delay or reduce the Indian monsoon. The disruption of the monsoon is potentially disastrous for Indian agriculture. In 1998, for example, the erratic behaviour of the monsoon (unexpected rains & drought) caused extensive damage to crops, resulting in escalating food prices, and extreme hardship As the heating capabilities of the area are delayed jet stream patterns that affect the entire northern hemisphere are altered, and wind currents are deflected and compressed over thousands of kilometres (Reiter 1981). A correlation has, for example, been established between extended snow cover in Tibet and not only heavy rainfall in the Yangtze basin but high sea temperatures over the North Atlantic, resulting in sunshine in Europe and typhoons in the Pacific.

When the typhoons in the Pacific interrupt the trade winds off the West Coast of North & South America, they may cause el nino, which is seemingly responsible for disruption and storms in Peru, Ecuador & California and possibly droughts in New Zealand, Indonesia, Australia, India & southern Africa. It would appear that alterations to the areas vegetation cover play a role in generating regional climatic disruptions which have the potential to dovetail into global climatic change.

Although there is some debate in China about snow disaster reduction as a result of global warming (People's Daily 4/4/03) the recent evidence still suggests almost annual snow disasters in the region :1993-1994 - in Nagchu Prefecture 76% of livestock died (Xinhua news agency 28/8/94) 1995-1996 - i n Yushu Prefecture & Shiqu & Serta County 800,000 yak died with losses of USD 14.5 million (TIN 3/3/96) 1997-1998 - in Yushu, Chamdo, Nagchu Prefectures 50% of livestock died with losses of USD 125 million (TIN 13/3/98) 1998- 1999 - in Qinghai Province 100,000 yaks died with losses of USD 31 million (AFP 31/12 97) The Floods During the summer of 1998, China (as well as India & Bangladesh) experienced severe

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floods affecting many of Asia's largest rivers. The Yangtze experienced the worst flooding since 1954, claiming more than 3,650 lives and causing more than USD 30 billion of damage. Although most of the flooding occurred in the Chinese lowlands it also occurred on the Tibetan plateau. In Tibet AR, the Yarlang Tsangpo (Bramaputra), the Kyi-Chu and other rivers rose to record levels resulting in the loss of at least 53 people and 4000 head of livestock (mostly Yak).More than 40 counties were affected and most of TAR's roads were damaged. Flood frequency has been increasing in both Tibet and SW China. During the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) the Yangtze flooded every decade, and between 1921-1949 the frequency rose to once every six years. In the 1980's the frequency rose to a large flood every two years. In the 1990's the situation got worse with floods in 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1998.

The Chinese government first officially recognized a causal link between deforestation and environmental destruction after the floods of 1981 and 1983 (Richardson1990), and measures were implemented in some areas. Chinese forest researchers have for many years been developing pragmatic eco-friendly silvicultural and harvesting guidelines (eg Yang 1986, 1987). All these measures, however well-intentioned have rarely been translated into best practice on the ground. Best practice has always had to compete with the doctrine of "social market forces", which has treated trees as a free good and lacks the feedback processes of the conventional market economies (Zhang 1998). After four decades of timber mining, the floods caused the government to consider in more detail both logging practices and reforestation in the headwaters of many of Asia's largest rivers.

As a result it introduced a logging ban and a raft of new forest policies in what appeared to be a "knee-jerk" reaction to the floods. Although to be fair they had been planned for some time and broadly-speaking were included under Great Western Development Strategy, China's 10th 5-year plan and Agenda 21.

The policies appear to be overly biocentric and very little attention appears to have been given to the impact of individual or collective policies on the subsistence economy, the inclusion of best practices in community forestry, or the impact on gender relation or the poor, or minority groups. The impact of forest policy on the last two groups should not be underestimated, because they are often the most vulnerable, dependent upon the forest for their subsistence livelihoods, and are often impacted in ways not experienced by those who are part of the socialist market economy.

The Great Western Development Strategy The Great Western Development Strategy (which includes the new forest policies) is not a new concept, it represents an acceleration of policies which began when SW China was "Liberated" in 1949. In the 1950's the Soviet Union helped China to build factories in the region and in the 1960's Mao Zedong announced plans to develop heavy industry. In the 1980's, however, Deng Xiaoping focused his market reform policy on the East Coast, and urged the western regions to be patient, stating that their time would come.

President Jiang Zemin launched the campaign to develop the west with great fanfare in June 1999. The development model being used, however resonates, with Locke & traditional Marxism, where society is deemed to progress through set stages (TIN 2000) The Leading group for Western Development, in their search for an apposite development model, have ignored grass roots participation & consultation, and local need and focused instead on outmoded 19th century colonial models of

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development. Their "exemplars" for study included the "development" of the American West, of 20th century Siberia, of post WW2 Japan, and the poorer areas of Brazil and India. The project was heralded as "epoch-making" and a "once in a millennium opportunity". It would appear, however, that already policies imposed top-down are failing to address local needs and are detrimental to the indigenous people. Policies with the aim of "ecological protection", such as the new forest policies are depriving people of their livelihood. The influx of Han Chinese migrants is having a dramatic impact on the lives & livelihoods of the local people. Indigenous people face increasing competition for employment and marginalisation within their own communities due to numbers of Han migrants entering the area, leading to concerns for the survival of their culture and identity. While Beijing presents the campaign as an entirely positive initiative leading to wealth creation and poverty alleviation, many think its a smokescreen to transfer hundreds of Han Chinese for permanent settlement into minority areas, to further exploit resources, and to bear down heavily on "splittism" or political intransigence. Top-down policies such as this have tended to exclude the indigenous people from participating in the shaping of their environment and development of their economy The Logging Ban In mid-August 1998 the State Council recognized that the Yangtze river floods were related to deforestation in the upper reaches and it urged all governments to protect their forests. Sichuan province responded by introducing a felling ban on 1 September in 54 counties [4.5m ha] and closing 9m ha of grazing to facilitate reforestation. In late August the State Council urged 51 key forestry enterprises to stop logging and Yunnan introduced a felling ban, along its section of the Yangtze. In December Tibet AR closed all sawmills in SE Tibet [Winkler 1998b] and the State Council ratified the ban. Almost immediately after the felling ban was introduced timber prices in the Beijing wood market rose by up to 30% and the authorities announced they were expecting a shortfall of 45m cubic metres, out of a total requirement of 100 m cubic metres [Anon 1998a] In Yunnan the logging ban has been imposed in 54 counties comprising 164,343 km2 including 9 counties where reforestation experimental units operate.

Impact of the logging ban The logging ban has had both positive and negative impacts. The policy appears to have helped accelerate the process of natural forest protection. There is evidence though of economic hardship domestically and the "export" of deforestation to other countries.

Domestic Impact Initially the logging ban was welcomed although there were immediate signs that it was being flouted, and officials who questioned if funding for conservation was a sustainable income stream.

Concerns were also expressed about the impact of the ban and pasture closure on the local inhabitants and that most of the funds for replanting would go to Han Chinese forestry workers, instead of local people.

It caused much initial hardship to county governments and those receiving income from the logging and transportation business. Additionally those individuals who had invested in logging or transportation equipment received no compensation and were forced to sell at very low prices. It is estimated that in Zhaotong Prefecture, for example local income was reduced by 35m RMB, in Lijiang by 70% [USE 2000a Zhao pers comm 21/8/01].

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The logging ban greatly limited sources of income in many villages because farmers were not able to earn income from collective forest and labour opportunities in logging or transportation had gone [Mallee 2000]. This drove many to find off-farm income or back to subsistence lifestyles and as a result 1.2 m people became poor. The impact on the subsistence sectors appears less severe, because limited access to the forest was allowed for firewood and NTFP [Xu pers comm 18/9/01].The ethnic minorities were especially upset by the logging ban, because they had been using the forest sustainably for thousands of years [Colchester 2002] While local farmers are opposed to the ban they know that the policy comes from the top and cannot be disputed. The ban reinforces their sense of powerlessness, justifies their skepticism of the durability of policy impositions, and weakens their security of tenure.

Although employment was provided for those state employees in the logging industry and some compensation was given to local governments this proved inadequate at the time. As a result the capacity of local government to develop infrastructure and maintain health and education services was impaired [Xu pers comm 18/9/01] In spite of the impact of the logging ban, there were signs of localised recovery within 2 years. In Deqin, for example, where government income was reduced by 80% and 340,000 people became poor the economy changed from logging to tourism, and by 2001 access fees to nature reserves alone provide the same income as logging used to [ Wang Deqiang pers comm 24/9/01] International Impact Clearly China could not have anticipated all the outcomes of the logging ban, and it would be unfair to single out China alone for blame. In moving to avoid ecological disaster at home, Beijing however has causing a catastrophe abroad, to supply its huge demand for timber and timber products. Environmental groups are monitoring the alarming impact of demand from China in Russia, Indonesia, Burma, Cambodia, Laos, Vietnam, Thailand, Gabon and Papua New Guinea. Japan's hunger for timber helped destroy the rain forests of the Philippines and Borneo and ecologists now fear China will fell the rest.

To make matters worse illegal loggers are taking advantage of entrenched corruption in timber-producing countries to supply this demand.

The lowland forests of Indonesia, for example are being systematically destroyed by a corrupt triangle of military officers, timber barons and international companies. At the current rates of destruction forests will disappear on Sumatra by 2005 and in Kalimantan by 2010. China is moving in aggressively, muscling out competitors and was rapidly becoming the leading destination for Indonesia's illegal logs. There was evidence to suggest that in 2002 China imported 200 times the quantity of logs reported by Indonesian customs (Lague 2003) Nearly 50% of China's imports come from the coniferous forests of Siberia and the Russian Far East and illegal logging could exceed 70% of the total (17m cubic metres) with corrupt officials and criminal gangs on both sides of the border playing a role (Lague 2003 2004). With a border that extends approximately 2000 miles and dozens of border crossings (and frozen rivers) that allow for the unregulated export of logs. Local

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observers claim there is little monitoring or legal control of the timber trade and that hundreds of small contractors are supplying Chinese timer buyers.

Some Chinese logging companies have begun investing in logging companies (Kluchi & Epos) in Siberia and the Russian Far East and to manage logging operations as well (Wen Bo nd Knight 2000) It is estimated that 70% of Cambodia's logging is unregulated and much of it is destined for China. Phnom Penh, however expelled the environmental group Global Witness, who had been contracted to monitor illegal logging, because they named corrupt officials in the timber trade (Larmer and Seno 2003) The cash-strapped military regime in Rangoon has been accused of excessive logging in some of the world's largest remaining tracts of virgin tropical forest. Extensive areas of pristine forest in Kachin state, on the Western slopes of Gaoligongshan, have been felled to supply the China trade. While two national nature reserves protect the Chinese side of the mountains, Chinese companies are carrying out large-scale, unregulated logging and mining operations on the Burmese side. The implications for local communities and the environment will be catastrophic (Global Witness 2003) As the logging ban took hold in the late 1990's China suddenly became the world's second biggest timber importer, after the USA. The logging ban was a huge factor, but there are others too. Domestic consumption is growing fast as the middle classes buy new homes and China undertakes huge civil construction projects. China's entry into WTO has driven tariffs for most timber imports down to zero, fuelling imports as well as a rapidly expanding export industry most of it destined to the US and Europe.

The rise in demand from China is particularly devastating for Asia in terms of its timing and momentum. Forests were already depleted after decades of felling, by the US and Europe and more recently Japan, Taiwan & Korea, before China became a major player.

In many Asian countries conservation policies were only just being implemented when China's economy took off and there are fears that protective measures will prove inadequate in the face of economic pressure.

Managing China's requirements is vital for the survival of some of the world's most valuable remaining tracts of forest. Despite the grim outlook there are signs that Beijing is willing to work with foreign governments and environmental groups to try to end the trade in illegal logs and timber products.

In Dec 2002, Beijing & Jakarta signed a memorandum of understanding to curb the flow of illegal timber into China. It outlines no specific plans or policies, only a list of intentions.

It is however a positive step holding both governments accountable (Larmer & Seno 2003).Many environmentalists, however remain sceptical that this will have any impact until Jakarta tackles the corruption surrounding the logging and timber industries (Lague 2003) There are also high hopes that China will join international efforts to certify legally logged timber so that it can be tracked from forest to end-user.

Beijing is also coming under pressure to relax its logging ban selectively so that designated forests can be harvested on a sustainable basis. At the same time environmental groups, such as WWF are encouraging China to expand its commercial timber plantations, which could replace a big proportion of imports if managed efficiently.

Some foreign-owned timber plantation companies view China as a "suppliers' market for

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20 years" and are expanding their holdings. The Toronto listed Sino-Forest Corp, which operates plantations in southern China, plans to list a subsidiary, Sino-Wood, in Hong Kong early in 2004 with the proceeds to be used to fund expansion on the mainland (http ://www. si n of o rest. co m/) Discussion Studies of the impact of logging bans show very mixed results. In some cases a logging ban has increased pressure on forests in neighbouring countries and in other they have provided protect for forests at risk. An FAO report [2001] on logging bans in New Zealand, China, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand and Viet Nam concluded that bans have in some cases stopped or slowed deforestation. On a regional or global scale however bans have not significantly slowed deforestation. A key conclusion to be drawn is that logging bans are simply one set of policy tools available to decision-makers within a spectrum of options and alternatives.

Several case studies on the logging ban (CCICED 2002 2003) have concluded:The banning of logging in collective forests actually lacks a legal basis. According to the Forest Law farmers who plant trees on collective land own these trees and can harvest them based on a harvest quota system.

That subsidies failed to address the problems of the local communities dependent on the timber economy. .

Blanket logging bans create a very powerful disincentive for farmers and the private sector to plant trees, including negative effects on sustaining forest development in the mid and long term They propose The logging ban should be removed from collective forests where appropriate and the farmers provided with secure property rights over their forests • Compensation should be provided for the losses of private investors The natural forest protection program should not be considered equivalent to a logging ban. In many cases natural resource conservation can coexist with timber and NTFP utilization, given a carefully designed operational plan and an appropriate harvesting regime.

The government should make a gradual and carefully planned transition over time from a blanket ban to a more diversified flexible approach that enables sustainable forest management of state-owned forests, this will require establishment of land use planning for diversified land use that includes ensuring adequate protection of old growth forests, tree planting as well as natural rehabilitation of sites [CCICED 2003] That community- based natural forest management should be considered as an option for better management of natural forests instead of the logging ban [ Weiji Deng nd] Natural Forest Protection Project In Dec 2000 the State Council announced a large and unique plan for protecting China's natural forests, the Natural Forest Protection Plan. The historic roots for the plan go back to the 1970's, but the issues were dramatically brought to public attention, as a result of the heavy floods in 1998 and a number of provinces introduced a felling ban. In the two years following the Chinese government invested ten billion RMB in NFPP and related activities. Some of the funds were used to provide new jobs and some for compensation to local governments [ Mallee 2000] but the main focus was on forest protection and reforestation.

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In Yunnan this project covers 8.5m ha of forestland [accounting for 66% of forest land in Yunnan] in the main river basins, namely the upper Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween comprising 74 counties [13 prefectures]. The aim of these forests is to provide an environmental function in terms of biodiversity, climate regulation, nutrient cycling and water and soil conservation. The project includes not only the protection of existing natural forest but afforestation by planting, air seeding and mountain closure.

Impact of NFPP Ethnic minorities are critical of mountain closure in areas that were historical grazing lands and are now designated for reforestation, have been fenced off and enclosed against them. They were also "rather upset" by the introduction of Natural Forest Protection because throughout their lives they had protected their forest and enhanced local biodiversity [Yin Shaoting 2001 He Yu and Li 2000 Chen Bo et al 2003] and they were not responsible for the felling. They received little or no compensation and are expected to "protect" the forest which excludes them and ignores their customary rights, indigenous knowledge and linguistic ecologies [He Shao Ying pers comm 2001] Case studies (USE CCICED 2001) have expressed concern * due to the lack of any specific operating regulations for forest care and management and its failure to address the subsistence needs of the poor that the ecological goals of NFPP are not being fully met in that the promotion of monoculture plantings in protected areas fails to ensure preservation of biodiversity Upland Conversion The aim of "Upland Conversion" was to curb all agriculture on lands with a slope of over 25 degrees. Under the programme, farmers were encouraged to plant trees on their steeper fields, and were offered free grain and cash compensation to make up losses.

Additional sums were advanced to establish nurseries and acquire saplings. When completed the aim is to convert around 14.67 million hectares of cropland.

During the first three years the program spread to 20 provinces, 400 counties and 27,000 villages. More than 15 million farmers have participated in the program.

In Yunnan there are 9 pilot counties, comprising 11.21m mu of steep land of which 2m mu have been transferred to terrace, 8m mu to forest and 1m mu to grassland. Of 128 counties in Yunnan, 126 include steep land suitable for conversion to forest.

Impact of Upland Conversion The potential impact of upland conversion is huge and affects 25% of the mountain population of SW China. Compensation in terms of grains and cash is inadequate for the local population and alternative livelihood strategies are required [Zhao et al 2001] The programme was widely adopted and demand for tree seedling exceeded 6m/year [TIN 2000]. By November 2000 50,000 rural households in Yunnan had signed contracts, while others [usually poor non-participants] were reporting a decline in income and farmland [Li Weichang 2001 Ward & Chaudry 2001], The enthusiasm at local level can be explained by two factors. Firstly the compensation of food and cash per mu generally exceeded the farmer's yield on the targeted land.

Secondly the previous three years had been poor in terms of agricultural output, and

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stored food was running out. The compensation, then served as emergency aid to farmers.

Others, however reported a reduction in [on-farm] employment, increasing uncertainty in terms of customary rights over grazing, and firewood & an increasing gap between rich and poor [CCICED 2001] There was also evidence that upland conversion was causing socioeconomic change, including loss of income and farmland, increased out-migration and school dropout rates, reduced community action, labour exchange and social cohesion and a decrease in collective trusteeship of natural resources [Du and Guo 2001]. Curiously this loss of "common land/forest common" has taken place at the same time as local village elections, which are predicated on "local self-governance". The two processes, the loss of control over commonly managed resources and increased village control appear to be contradictory phenomena (Sturgeon 2003) Some farmers have been forced to sell livestock, rent grazing, graze illegally in "closed" forest or mountains, or even cross international boundaries in search of grazing [Ward and Chaudry 2001] Ethnic minorities have been critical of the implementation of Upland Conversion and a delegation at the World Summit on Sustainable Development [2002] complained that the policy excluded them, marginalized them and impoverished them just as much as the logging prior to 1998. Although China has reversed its policies, it continues to treat minority people as primitive and backward with no positive role to play in the regeneration of forest. The delegation would welcome the opportunity to participate in reforestation to ameliorate environmental damage as core stakeholders and for community forestry based on best international practice rather than as an instrument of social engineering. They requested WSSD to press China to allow all ethnic minority groups to become full partners in sustainable development [Howard 1994 Li and He 1998] There are those who question if Upland Conversion is economically sustainable, what will happen when the compensation runs out and if the compensation is adequate in the long term [USE 2000a]. If compensation arrives late this can cause problems and species choice is key because people need income early. The Lisu and Nu people of Nujiang used to grow Cannabis sativa [hemp] as a cash crop, but because economic trees do not give the same return, the government compensate them for not growing hemp. If the compensation arrives late the people have to cut trees, for sale from their collective forest. In many parts of SW China, grazing continues in the new forest areas, and some have suggested that for reforestation to succeed the local economy should have been allowed to diversify into areas like NTFP and ecotourism [TIN 2000] In terms of biodiversity and erosion prevention there are those who have suggested that a conifer monoculture does little to prevent erosion and that the previous agricultural land may have even supported greater diversity. Multiple-storey agro-forestry would have been a more suitable option in terms of addressing nutrition, biodiversity and erosion prevention [Mallee 2000].

The uncertainty and ambiguities surrounding the tenure arrangements will hardly act as an incentive for farmers considering conversion, especially as tenure rights are difficult to support under Chinese law [Mallee 2000 Zhao pers comm 21/8/01]

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Lastly adequate funding has not been provided to protect and manage the forest after the become established [Hu and Lu pers comm 16/8/01] Discussion Although the program is impressive in terms of scale, success is dependent not only on Erosion reduction, and adequate levels of long-term income to participating farmers but the wellbeing of poor non- participants.

Surprisingly, given the large expenditures of effort and capital, the government has undertaken very little systematic evaluation.

While many countries have implemented ambitious conservation set-aside programmes (Uchida et al 2004 Ferraro & Simpson 2000) lessons can be learned from the US Conservation Reserve Program (CRP), because of its scale, history and modifications.

Officials in the US were concerned about the cost-effectiveness of CRP, its sustainability, the post-contract land use decisions of participating farmers. They found that farmers with high current farm income and those with highly productive land were less likely to re-enrol in CRP when the contract expired, and that farmers that were less risk averse, have higher discount rates and have more debt were more likely to return to cultivation.

While the policy's criterion was clear, case studies (Xu & Cao 2002 CCICED 2002 2003) have shown that the speed, top-down nature and over-uniformity of implementation led to some anomalies and failings . In addition to land with steep slopes some regions have given priority to flat sites close to the road . The program lacks systematic indicators that measures the environmental benefits of each site . There is no clear guidelines over property rights or future responsibility for management of the trees . There has been a mismatch between local and central government targets. . Tree survival rates have in general been less than 50% . There was a technical bias favouring tree planting over other vegetation and relied heavily on activities limited to the forestry sector. . The speed of implementation was beyond the financial, technical, institutional and human capacity of the actors involved. . There was little integration with other related areas of agriculture. . There was poor plant/tree selection and an economic tree bias . There was ambiguity over "wasteland" and "bare land" afforestation . There was a total lack of farmer participation in the planning design and long-term management of the land conversion program . There was poor extension in terms of the content of the policy . Farmers had no influence on the choice of technology or species of vegetation to be used. . It lead to a distortion of local markets putting downward pressure on prices, decreasing incomes for farmers who are not involved in UC yet still rely on crop production.

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They proposed Upland conversion should be integrated into watershed management Wasteland planting should be reduced Reliance on natural regeneration of anti-drought species should be increased .

Conservation technology should be integrated into the development of orchards .

An extension to the compensation period should be considered .

Farmer property rights on converted land should be reinforced The government should adopt a holistic, more flexible and multi-sectoral approach to make upland conversion both ecologically and economically sustainable. Needed is an approach aimed at achieving ecological restoration while providing realistic, economic market-based incentives to households. This will require a more fine-tuned, decentralized, location-specific approach suited to highly diverse upland conversion circumstances.

The government should promote routine independent monitoring and evaluation to improve planning and implementation at all levels, adopting a participatory consultative approach to planning that involves stakeholders.

Nature Conservation Plans were first made for nature reserves in Yunnan in 1958, but due to lack of funds and conservation awareness, they were not implemented for 22 years. During that time 900 tigers, 40,000 leopards and 85,000 pythons had been killed. Learning from this lesson the YPG has made a significant investment in the establishment of nature reserves. By the end of 1999 Yunnan had established more nature reserves (112) than any other province in China, with a total land area of 2.2m ha comprising 5.6% of the province (Li Chun 2000) Most Nature Reserves (100 out of 112) come under the direct management of The Wildlife Conservation Office of YFB There are plans to add 11 nature reserves and 3 bases for wild species during the 10th 5-year forestry plan.

Nature Reserves have a remit to • Protect Biodiversity & Nature Reserves • Protect wild & endangered species • To provide cooperation & support for other departments and international cooperation Impact of Nature Conservation Nature reserves are often situated near the poor, who may recognize their importance but require firewood, timber, food, medicines, and grazing for their subsistence livelihoods, which leads to conflict.

Additionally birds and animals can destroy crops, and farmers receive inadequate compensation (e.g. during 1998 and 1999 birds destroyed 300 ha of crops in Lijiang wetland reserve, and farmers only received USD 4,200) "Voluntary" relocation of people , from reserves, has proved possible in some parts of Yunnan, although in Danshanbao township 30 families asked to be relocated within the township rather than moving to Simao Prefecture. Currently, however, no funding is available for relocation within a township.

Nature Reserve managers hope that tourism will bring increased income, but this

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may negatively impact the wildlife the environment and the local culture. Currently Horseback riding near Bitahai Lake is damaging fragile wetlands & grasslands, and concern has been expressed about tourism impact on the fragile mountain vegetation of Haba Xueshan Reserve. Both Zhongdian & Lijiang County have blasted unsightly roads along both sides of Tiger Leaping Gorge, destroying the scenic properties & filling the river bed with rubble.

Discussion Many reserves (especially in N Yunnan) are over-staffed, but underfunded, and as a result there is little data collection, inventory development or reporting.

Management capability is a major weakness and there are no systems to monitor growth and decline of wildlife species. Subsequently the actual status of wildlife populations in many of Yunnan's reserves is quite uncertain.

Better planning is required and more capacity building in wildlife conservation and tourism management, and more research is required to find a formula that balances environmental & biodiversity protection, cultural preservation, & community development. In order to maintain the reserves and reduce conflict provision has been made within the nature reserve legislation (in the experimental areas) for:- fuel wood plantations, economic trees, rural energy, NTFP development, eco-tourism, infrastructure development & employment... Provision also exists for the joint-management of nature reserve between the YFB and the local people.

Conclusions Neither upland conversion or any of the new forest policies enhance the environment and the well-being of Yunnan's poor or minority people, and so they appear to be incompatible with the Environmental-Poverty aims of YEDP. They all appear to be based on a biocentric discourse that prioritizes environmental justice over social justice. In so doing, this discourse strikes directly at efforts to address the felt needs of the poor and indigenous peoples.

The only policy that makes any provision for the subsistence needs (fuel, NTFP, agro-forestry, ecotourism) is Nature Conservation. Even this appears to be a concession rather than a deliberate aim.

Upland Conversion appears to be irrelevant in terms of the pilot projects because either they are not included within the UC programme or there is no local interest.

Ninglang County is subject to the logging ban and there is real concern that both the Nature Reserve and Natural Forest Protection project infringe on subsistence needs (fuel, NTFP, grazing). Additional they have planted trees in an area that has been incorporated into the Nature Reserve. Community Plantations on bare land within the Nature Reserve offers the only opportunity to address subsistence need.

One vision for forestry in Yunnan would be based on multi-aim community forestry (Colchester 2002) based on best international practice, rather than social forestry (He & Li 1998) which appears to be the antithesis. An alternative might be community-based Natural Forest Management (Weijie Dong nd)

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Unfortunately the main obstacle to wider success in community forestry is that the approach being demonstrated and advocated by a number of projects (e.g. Ford Foundation) in Yunnan has not been adopted by the government. Although the government permits foreign agencies to carry out community forestry initiatives, and South West Forestry College has an appropriate department, the government regards the approach as too expensive and time-consuming. Indeed all the new forest policies run directly counter to community forestry.

Given the lack of commitment to community forestry, ways should be sought to revise the new policies so that they enhance the environment and the well-being of the poor in the following ways:There should be full partnership/participation for all ethnic & local groups in all forestry programs The logging ban should be removed from collective forest and people provided with property rights There should be easier reclassification of nature reserve (from core to experimental where required) Forests subject to the logging ban should gradually become sustainably managed (multiple aim) or included in community forestry programmes .

10% of all forests should be designated for subsistence use.

Bare/burnt areas in all Nature Reserves should be designated for Community Plantations .

The firewood/NTFP quota should be increased from forests that were subject to logging ban.

That subsistence provision (of fuel, NTFP etc) be established in the experimental zones of all Nature Reserves .

That experimental zones be located near villages .

That clearer tenure arrangements be made for those participating in UC That funds for UC forest management be made available That species choice for UC should not just comprise conifer monocultures but should address water & soil conservation, biodiversity and agro-forestry.

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