9 The Defence of Kingston

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THE DEFENCE OF KINGSTON

by eArly August 1813, the citizens of kingston And the militiamen, regulars, Royal Navy, artificers, and labourers began settling into an uneasy wartime routine. Before standardized time, an agreed measure of time was important in coordinating activities. To mark the intervals of the day, a gun at Point Henry was fired at the break of day and noon, and at 9:00 p.m., and retreat would beat when the flag was lowered.1 This routine in some form was usually followed until the departure of the British in 1870.

Commodore Yeo and the fleet returned to Navy Bay on August 19. He had been ill through much of the cruise. But he came back with two prizes, USS Julia and USS Growler. They were promptly renamed HMS Confiance and HMS Hamilton, respectively, and added to the fleet. It had been hot and calm on the lakes, although some vessels had been damaged in a storm.2 Leaks had developed on the Royal George and the Melville, which were dealt with afloat. Work on the gunboats and yard buildings was interrupted by the need to refit and repair the two prizes, as well as the Melville. The other ships were moored nearby or on patrol outside the harbour, searching for threats. The victualling agent and storekeepers began provisioning the eight-vessel fleet for a six-week deployment on the lake. Armourers reviewed and replaced the munitions used in battle. Additional sailors, an entire ship’s company dispatched from Quebec, were added to the crews.

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So far the war had played out mainly on the Niagara frontier, with the Royal Navy on Lake Ontario supporting the land operations. This was about to change. U.S. secretary of war John Armstrong, a former soldier and politician, considered Kingston the most important target on Lake Ontario. He felt that taking Kingston would give the Americans control of the lake, and with it, all points west. It would also provide them unchallenged access to the St. Lawrence River, an invasion route to Lower Canada.

U.S. major general James Wilkinson, another old Revolutionary War warrior, was planning to assemble his army at Grenadier Island, roughly midway between Sackets Harbor and Kingston, and then either attack Kingston, or bypass it, and descend the St. Lawrence River to join another U.S. army to attack Montreal. Grenadier Island seemed a good choice for massing troops in preparation for either strategy.

Wilkinson came to Sackets on August 20 for a meeting with Commodore Chauncey. Their plan was to transport Wilkinson’s army to Niagara as a feint to draw the British Army and Royal Navy to the west end of the lake. If the British took the bait, Wilkinson plotted to quickly double-back and attack or bypass Kingston while the British Army was at Niagara.3 At Sackets, carpenters were employed to make small boats to transport his army. Meanwhile, U.S. regular army and militia were being gathered, while additional troops were collected at Forts George and Niagara. Wilkinson hoped that Chauncey with his new, larger warship, USS Pike, would be able to meet and defeat Yeo on Lake Ontario before they attacked Kingston.4

Yeo and his squadron left for Niagara on August 24, intending to resupply the army at Burlington Heights and provide guns for an attempt to recapture Fort George. He also hoped he would find the U.S. fleet and entice Chauncey to fight.5 Although still short of sailors and marines, he was looking for the most advantageous situation. With trouble brewing on the St. Lawrence River, some of Yeo’s sailors were needed to man the gunboats.6

By August 30, news reached Wilkinson that Yeo was at the west end of the lake, reinforcing British positions.7 A few days later, on September 4, Yeo and his ships anchored off York, but lookouts in the rigging could see the U.S. fleet near Niagara.8 Wilkinson knew he would be tracked by the British and remained hopeful that more British soldiers would be sent from Kingston to strengthen the British at Burlington Heights. Secretary of War Armstrong, not to be left out, came to Sackets Harbor on September 6, optimistic about an

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attack on Kingston.9 The lieutenant governor of Upper Canada, Major-General Francis de Rottenburg, became concerned about the strength of U.S. troops at Niagara, and true to Wilkinson’s hopes, sent for more reinforcements.

The situation worsened for the British when they received the news on September 12 of the defeat and destruction of the Royal Navy on Lake Erie.10 Captain Robert Barclay, the commander, was severely injured, while Captain Robert Finnis was killed. Two days later, de Rottenburg ordered more troops to leave Kingston to reinforce those at the head of the lake.11 Yeo stayed near Niagara, exchanging gunfire with the Americans and taking some casualties. With the summer calm giving way to increased winds and then gales, Yeo was finally compelled to seek protection in port and sailed east. On September 15, Commander O’Conor came out from Kingston in a gunboat and found Yeo at the Bay of Quinte. He had anchored after two intense but indecisive battles with the Americans. O’Conor boarded Yeo’s flagship, the Wolfe, and advised him that Governor-in-Chief Prévost had ordered him to escort a transport convoy to Burlington Heights.12

Yeo’s fleet sailed to Navy Bay the next day, using its time in port to make alterations to improve the sailing performance of some of the vessels, off-load carronades to increase the speed of others, and add long guns. Disappointed with the sailing performance of his two prizes — HMS Confiance and HMS Hamilton — Yeo stripped them of armaments and made them transports. A reduced fleet of six pulled anchor on September 19 and met the transports the next day for a trip west.

Wilkinson was still at Fort George on September 20, getting better after an illness but planning to leave for Sackets Harbor and Grenadier Island. He reiterated the importance of Chauncey keeping Yeo from threatening him on the St. Lawrence River and remained confident that he had the British fooled. He confirmed to Chauncey that his principal aim was to attack and reduce Kingston.13

Two days later, Secretary of War Armstrong wrote to Wilkinson from Sackets. With the British fleet known to be heading to the west end of Lake Ontario, and Kingston defended by only 1,200 men, most of them unfit, “a state of things most precipitous to our objects and one of which we ought immediately to avail ourselves” existed, for with “Kingston captured the whole Upper Province westward of the mouth of the St. Lawrence, with all the British force it contains, naval or military, falls with it.”14

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In his reply, on September 27, Wilkinson wrote that they “have not a moment to lose” and that he would “proceed directly to Grenadier Island.” His whole force, an army of 3,000, was ready to embark in open boats, 30 to 50 men in each. There was one problem: Chauncey had lost track of Yeo and his fleet.15

The next day at about 10:00 a.m., in a remarkable focus of events, Wilkinson’s flotilla of 3,000 men in dozens of small boats began threading its way out of the Niagara River and east toward Sackets Harbor and Kingston.16 Chauncey was on the lake sailing north. Yeo, who had just arrived at York that morning, spotted the sails of the U.S. fleet, weighed anchor, and led his fleet of six out to meet 11 American vessels.17 The long-awaited match was at hand. At stake was Kingston, possibly the war, and the future of Canada.

Major-General de Rottenburg was at Burlington Heights with the army. Commander O’Conor, who had left Navy Bay and embarked with the fleet on September 19, had been put ashore at Burlington on September 25 to liaise with de Rottenburg and investigate the naval situation on Lake Erie. He and de Rottenburg were able to see the ships’ movements on the lake. Both understood the importance of the moment.

When the action on the lake ended at mid-afternoon, there was visible damage to at least one of Yeo’s ships. De Rottenburg soon learned that the U.S. flotilla was heading for Sackets Harbor and planning to attack Kingston. De Rottenburg dispatched a message to Prévost, describing the situation. He also sent a message to Major-General Duncan Darroch, commanding at Kingston, advising him of the likelihood of attack.18

On the Wolfe, Yeo was dealing with casualties and serious battle damage that included his main mast. The Wolfe had escaped a further mauling by the intervention of Commander William Mulcaster and the Royal George, and by skillful sailing before an easterly wind that brought them to a bay near Burlington. Chauncey’s flagship, the Pike, was also badly damaged, so he declined to follow Yeo. Anchored near shore, Yeo immediately ordered repairs19 and had the damaged masts and rigging cut away and methodically rebuilt. Within a remarkably short two days, the ship was restored.20

By October 2, Yeo knew the situation was changing quickly. He was aware that the U.S. Army was moving toward the eastern end of the lake and Kingston. De Rottenburg wrote of Yeo: “The damages sustained by his squadron have all been repaired and he is now fully determined for the sake of

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saving Kingston, to perish with his whole fleet or destroy that of the enemy.”21 The major-general countermanded earlier orders, commenced reinforcing Kingston with soldiers from York, and started moving his headquarters to Kingston in preparation for battle.

With a strong wind backing to southwesterly, Yeo and his fleet ran the lake, passing Chauncey unseen in the night and arriving before Kingston on October 6.22 Unfortunately, in his hurry to defend Kingston, Yeo had left behind seven transports loaded with two companies of reinforcements as well as sick and wounded. All but one of the transports were captured by the Americans, the total loss numbering 252 soldiers and sailors.23

Major-General Darroch prepared for the defence of Kingston. To the west of the town was a long, defensive palisade, as well as two attached blockhouses still under construction. They eventually formed part of the west defensive perimeter completed later in the war. Large artillery batteries along the main roads had been finished in May.24 The first fort on Point Henry was still incomplete but described as well underway. It was armed with a 24-pound cannon and two 18-pounders. Two new Royal Navy gunboats were moored nearby.25 Garrison barracks remained unfinished, with construction not concluded for another year.26 The Kingston shore batteries were done and prepared.

Darroch distributed his regular soldiers between Points Henry and Frederick and Kingston. He called out 400 militiamen, and within days,

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Fig. 9.1: The Point Frederick batteries as depicted in 1815. The fraise is shown by the sawtooth appearance of the parapet surrounding the fort buildings. The counterscarp went to the shoreline. The blockhouse is the large structure in the centre.

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ordered four more companies of soldiers to Point Henry, attempting to establish a floating bridge between Points Henry and Frederick. Darroch then requested hammocks from the Royal Navy storehouses to accommodate the additional troops. By October 9, Kingston was “full of militia pouring in from all quarters.”27

The job of defending Royal Navy dockyards belonged to the army,28 explaining its presence on the south extremity of Point Frederick. American soldiers attacking Point Frederick would have been confronted first by the shallow rocks offshore that would have limited the approach of their vessels. Any assault on Point Frederick would have involved small boats subject to fire from batteries at Points Murney, Mississauga, and Henry. This would have been in addition to that from the elevated gun platforms on the Point Frederick blockhouse, which included a 68-pound gun.29 They would have also been engaged by the artillery and small-arms fire from the log-braced earthwork extending around the point.30 Any soldiers who reached the shore would have faced small-arms fire at ranges of 50 to 60 feet, as well as a steep 16- to 19-foot climb up the counterscarp.31 At the top of the slope was a “fraise,” or “sharp iron spikes, pointing outward,”32 and then the defending troops (see Fig. 9.1).

Major General Wilkinson reached Sackets Harbor on October 4 and immediately met with Secretary of War Armstrong. By this time, Wilkinson was not enthusiastic about attacking Kingston, probably because Commodore Chauncey had not destroyed Yeo’s fleet. They reviewed the merits of an attack on Kingston, which included wiping out the naval force and preventing them from “building, equipping, and even repairing a single vessel.” With winter approaching and another U.S. army waiting to join him to attack Montreal, Wilkinson thought that time was limited. Armstrong did not.

The U.S. secretary of war suggested the plan of attack, which involved taking Point Henry from the east. This unusual scheme may have been influenced by a drawing made by an American prisoner of war. Armstrong wrote: “If we effect a landing at McPherson’s farm, on the eastern side of Kingston, a point may be seized which will command the town, the forts and the harbour, and within seven hours after the landing is effected a sufficient battery may be erected and in operation…. The time necessary to reduce the place will not exceed a single day …”33

With Wilkinson still hesitant, Armstrong pulled rank and advised the major general that barring changes in the situation, their first objective would

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be Kingston. Wilkinson then informed Chauncey that he would attack Kingston the following day, Sunday, October 10. But Wilkinson wanted Chauncey’s assurance that he could hold off Yeo and guarantee a safe landing of troops above or below Kingston. Chauncey provided that pledge,34 and Wilkinson issued orders to his troops for the following day.

According to the October 9 edition of the Kingston Gazette, the “Americans are on the eve of attacking this place.” The Gazette noted that their intentions were anticipated, preparations had been made, and they would receive “a warm reception.” Reinforcements from the 104th, the 49th, and the Voltigeurs were expected on that day or the next. These regiments, plus the militia, would be sufficient reinforcement for the present garrison. The Gazette noted that the artillery “is most advantageously posted” and every defensible position in the town appeared “formidable.”35

Yeo was nearby, and Darroch felt confident. While Major General Wilkinson attempted to gather his forces for the attack on Kingston, Commodore Chauncey manoeuvred to obstruct the Royal Navy. Yeo positioned himself near Collins Bay, perhaps anticipating a landing west of Kingston. Expecting the Americans might enter the St. Lawrence River, Yeo established a gunboat flotilla near the entrance. O’Conor, who commanded the gunboats, was away in Lake Erie, so Yeo chose Commander Mulcaster to take over.

Wilkinson’s plan to attack Kingston was frustrated by gale-force winds and rain that started on October 9. With much of his flotilla scattered and some boats lost, the bad weather intensified and continued. A Royal Navy lieutenant visited Sackets Harbor under a flag of truce on October 15. He found the place filled with many boats and a newly launched ship. The indication was that Kingston would still be attacked.36 That intelligence prompted Yeo to split his forces. He would defend Kingston by keeping the Wolfe and the Royal George close but position the smaller warships and gunboats off the east extremity of Wolfe Island.37

Frustrated by the poor weather, the Americans still planned the move from Sackets Harbor to Grenadier Island for October 16. There was no clear understanding of whether they would attack Kingston. With the weather getting colder, the attempts to move to Grenadier Island failed, and most of the army remained at Sackets.

Meanwhile, work at Point Frederick finally turned to building the two large frigates. The keels of the two vessels were on Slips No. 2 and No. 3.

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Early progress was slow because of the continued shortage of workers.38 Some were still needed to construct buildings and expand the yard. Complicating the situation was the threat of a strike. It became known that the FrenchCanadian shipwrights who were building the frigate HMS Prince Regent were paid more than the ones working on HMS Princess Charlotte. This pay discrepancy caused bitter feelings and led to a near strike. O’Conor discovered the problem when he returned from duty on the upper lake. As a result of O’Conor’s intervention, George Record resigned as master builder, although he remained in the yard as a contractor. Despite the slowdown, the vessels were both framed by the end of November.39

By October 26, the U.S. Army was still stalled. An officer wrote that “we are at the east end of Lake Ontario, pelted daily with inexhaustible rains…. In consequence of the bad weather our troops … have been scattered everywhere along the coast.”40 By October 30, with his army demoralized and tattered, Wilkinson gave up on attacking Kingston. He met with Chauncey at Grenadier Island and told him they would bypass Kingston, descend the St. Lawrence River, and attack Montreal. Chauncey did not take the news well.41

A few days later, Wilkinson finally left Grenadier Island with his flotilla and rode the south channel current past Carleton Island toward Montreal. Yeo held the Wolfe and the Royal George near Kingston but sent Mulcaster in pursuit with the Beresford, the Sir Sidney Smith, and seven gunboats.42 On November 11, the British Army caught up with the Americans at Crysler’s Farm on the north shore of the St. Lawrence River. With Mulcaster and his gunboats providing artillery support from the river, the British confronted the Americans, who took heavy casualties. They were able to escape, however, and continued their path toward Montreal. Ultimately, Wilkinson was unable to join with other elements of the U.S. Army, and the attack on Lower Canada failed.

The threat against Kingston and Montreal was ended. The critical St. Lawrence River supply line to Lake Ontario and farther west was successfully defended. The Point Frederick yard continued to receive “all the ordnance and stores that will be required to fit … vessels for service.”43

The 1813 sailing season was coming to a conclusion. With the U.S. Navy in port at Sackets Harbor, the Royal Navy sailed unopposed on the lake and escorted some transports before mooring for the winter. One notable final

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trip involved the Beresford. It towed a large raft of timber from the Bay of Quinte, one of the two sent out in November,44 undoubtedly to be used in construction of the two frigates.

As U.S. commodore Chauncey settled into winter routine, he received the unwelcome intelligence that both Point Frederick vessels had their ribs up and were ready for planking. The keel lengths were 150 and 123 feet, the largest yet on Lake Ontario. And there was material available at the yard sufficient for a third vessel.

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