Volume 11, No.1
January-June 2009
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1570171
Human Security and the Responsibility to Protect: A Holistic Approach to Dealing with Violent Conflict in Southeast Asia Otto
E
Von Feigenblutt"
Abstract : Mediation is mostly treated apartfrom other approaches to dealing with violent conflicts, especially when dealing with conflict in which one or both parties deny the legitimacy ofan overarching sovereign authority. This is the case in most viole,nt conflicts in southeast Asia which are ovetwhelmingly ethnic in nature and usually pit a group fighting against the central government. This paper treats mediation as just one tool in a wider set of approaches to dealing with so called "intractable-conflicts" and shows how mediation can and should be integrated so as to achieve the synergy and momentum necessary to deal with the many obstacles to a long term settlement of a dispute. The concept of Human Security as well as of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) are used as overarching theoretical frameworks necessary in order to achieve not only negative but also positive peace. An approach to mediation resembling Lederach b " elicitive model " and Burton's problem solving workshops are recommended as important tools in a concerted and holistic effort to move an intractable conflict towards settlement and sustainable peace. Examples are used throughdut the pape'r:from Southeast Asia's many intractable conflicts such as the one,in Indonesia between the government and the pan-Islamic movement Jemaah Islamiya (JI), the Muslim nationalist Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) fighting for independenee in the Philippines, and the Southern Muslim insurgency in Thailand fighting for an
Indenendent Greater Patani. Conflict, Southeast Asia, human security, peace
Introduction
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Mediation has been traditionally treated as a separate and distinct process with respect to humanitarian and development efforts forpeace building. This reflects the historical association ofmediation to high politics and the diplomatic 'Fellow of the Royal Asiatic SocieQ of Great Britain and lreland; Editor in Chief, Journel of Alternative P ers p ectives on Social Scienc es
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realm (Kissinger, 1994).However recent theoretical developments in the fieids of development studies and international security have attempted to bridge the gap between different approaches used to deal with similar conflict situations. Intuitively, it is easy to see the connection between short term humanitarian assistance, mid and long term development aid, and security in dealing with humanitarian emergencies which tend to be caused by infactable conflicts @runnee & Toope, 2006;Wjlliams, 2009). Galtung and other scholars from the Peace Studies tradition have stressed the importance of striving for positive peace rather than limiting the effort to searching for a more limited negative peace (Galtung, 1969; Jeong,2000). This early articulation of amoreholistic view of conflict resolution distinguishesbetween anegativepeacebroadly defined as the absence of violence to a more holistic view ofpeace which includes both the absence of violence and also the presence of socialjustice (Galtung, 1969). Galtung's positive peace can be interpreted to mean that for peace to be sustainable it must he
based on a just and stable social system. Burton added another piece to the puzzle with his stress on the importance of dealing with basic human needs as a prerequisite for achieving peace (ISiesberg, 1997). Thus, peace requires dealing with the root causes, usually a deprivation in terms of one of the basic human needs, before a sustainable resolution to a conflict can be achieved.
At a global level, two recent theoretical developments have attempted to integrate the previously mentioned holistic tradition in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Human security and the responsibility to protect came to the fore inthe last decade ofthe 20'h century as overarchingparadigms linkingpreviously isolated fields such as security studies, development studies, and conflict analysis and resolution (Be1lamy,2009;Brunnee & Toope, 2006; Khong, 2006; Mack,
006). Human S ecurity, broadly defined as "freedom fromwanf 'and "freedom from fear" encompasses humanitarian, development, and security assistance in a single theoretical paradigm (Von Feigenblatt, 2007). The importance of the concept lies in the fact that it successfully shows the connection between "want" and "fear" and how the two areas ofhuman security are interdependent, It follows that in orderto strive for greater human security, it is necessary to deal with both "freedom from want" and"freedom from fear".Asecond andequallyimportanttheoretical developrnent brought aboutbythe concept ofhuman securityis the emphasis on the individual human as the referent of security (VonFeigenblatt,2}}9).Thus, the goal shifted 200 5 ;Patcharawalai Wongboonsin, 2006 ; P eng-Er,
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from securing a territorial entity or a state to securing the individual. This theoretical
shift has the direct consequence of increasing the number of concerned stakeholders in conflict situations. In brief, it legitimized intervention by array ofnon-state actors in an effort to secure the "human".
a
wide
A second theoretical curent that arose in the late twentieth century was that ofR2P (responsibility to protect). This concept attempts to redefine sovereignry away from its traditional inviolability and basis on right to one based on responsibility @ellamy, 2009). The importance ofthis shift is that a new intemational nolm was created establishing the duty and responsibility ofnational govemments to protect their citizens. HoweveE the concept went even further than that and assertedthe right and dutyofthe intemational communityto intervene in cases in which national governnients are unable or unwilling to protect their citizens (Brunnee & Toope, 2006).It is also important to note that the concept includes both protections from "fear" and from 'kant". Therefore, R2P increased the theoretical traction ofHuman Securityby appending an operational code for attempting to achieve human security.
Violent Conflicts in SoutheastAsia SoutheastAsia is home to some ofthe most intractable conflicts in the world (Dupont, 2005). Several ofthe world's most feared rebel armies operate in the region, as well as several terrorist groups (Hazen,2008). Most of the violent conflicts in the region involve disputes over sovereignty. That means that at least one party to the conflict refuses to recognize a sovereign authority. Thus, an overarching authority with the power to terminate the conflict is lacking. In addition to that the multiethnic nature ofthe region and the residual effects ofthe colonial experience further exacerbate conflicts Q.{eher, 2002;Rolfe, 2008; Saul, 2006; Singh, 2008-2009). Three important regional conflicts will be discussed in the following sections so as to show how human security and R2P provide an appropriate theoretical framework to analyze and possibly resolve them.
Indonesia and Global Terrorism Indonesia is home to most infamous terrorist groups in SoutheastAsia, Jeehmah Islamiyah (n). As the largest Muslim country in the world, Indonesia is known for its moderate strand oflslam (lv{ulder, 1996). However, inroads made by Wahabi teachings and neo-Salafism imported from the Middle East has
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radicalized an important sectorofthepopulation (Ramakrishna,2005). The late 1 990s and early years of the 21't century saw a sharp increase in the number of pesantrenteaching a strict interpretation oflslam.' Concurrent economic woes brought about by the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and the consequent fall from power ofthe Suharto regime opened up the necessary functional space for radical groups such as JI to operate (Smith, 2005). Political space was also available due to the increase inthenumber ofdisgruntledyouths without gainful employnent who were increasingly exposed to fundamentalist strands oflslam. Moreover, the global geopolitical context following the September 11 attacks
followingAmericanled war onterror supported radical arguments of an American conspiracy against the global ummah (Barber, 1996).'? and the
radical strand of neo-Salafism stressing the importance ofthe strict interpretation of Islam and emphasizing a religious identity over anational one (Liow,2006;Ramakrishna,2005). Thus, JI spouses the goal of creating a Pan-Islamic Caliphate uniting the Muslims in Malaysia, lndonesia, the SouthemPhilippines, and SouthemThailand. As an organization, JI is thought to have around 1000 active members, some with considerable battle experience inAfghanistan andMindanao (Haklai, 2009; Smith, 2005). Interms of funding it receives considerable aid from the Middle East, especially Saudi Arabia, through Islamic charities and front companies. Nevertheless, JI's power is not only based on its individual capability but rather on its function as a node JI's political ideology is based on
a
between regional Radical Muslim groups and the global Islamic Terrorist movement. Thus. JI has extensive links withAl-Qaeda and local groups such as the MILF and the Patani United Liberation Organization (PULO) in southem Thailand (1ory,2007). It has cooperated with the MILF in terms oftraining and in conducting some terrorist attacks in the Philippines (Rodell, 2005). In terms ofefforts to deal with the tenorist threat in lrdonesia, the govemment first tried to avoid accepting that there was a terorist threat and later on accepted
join theAmerican led war on terror. However, the support ofradical Islamic Groups in Indonesia by some sectors of the armed forces has made the implementation of a counter-terroristplanvery difficult (Ramakrishna,2005). Weapons and protection are provided by the armed forces for some terrorist groups. Moreover, the instability of the post-suharto democratic system in Indonesia hampers the development of a unified approach to deal with terrorism
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(Neher, 2002). The Bali bombings, orchestrated by JI, led to a more active participationby Indonesia in the war on terror. However, the govemment tried to play down the terrorist threat due to fears of the effect it could have on the tourism indushy. Westem nations such as Australia and the United States provided technical and economic help to the Indonesian government and foreign security specialist were deployed to the region. Nevertheless, most aid has been earmarked for the implementation of a traditional counter-terrorist strategy. Improvements, in intelligence, surveillance, and military equipment have been emphasized by the United States. In addition to that, better control over the flow of funds in order to disrupt the funding ofterrorist activities has been attempted. The traditional counter-terrorist sfategy that has been pursued by the United States and Indonesia in dealing with JI and extremism has not been effective in destroying JI for the simple reason that it has not reduced the political space for it to operate (Smith, 2005). Even ifthe functional space is reduced by traditional
counter-terrorist approaches, as long as there are a large number ofyouths ready to join extremist groups, the ranks of JI will be replenished. In addition to that, there is a large portion of the population that while not part of JI and not in agreement with some of its methods, is generally sl,rnpathetic to it. This is very important in that they can provide safe-houses for its members and limit the ability of the government to deal with the root causes of the struggle, namely, fundamentalist Islam (Chalk, 2005).
In order to deal with radical Islam in Indonesia a more holistic approach should be undertaken. Following the concept of human security and R2P, the United States and the International community should undertake amultilevel approach to deal with the root causes ofthe rise ofradical Islam in a historically moderate region. Development proj ects aiming at increasing gainful emplolnnent could reduce the functional space of JI and related groups. An improvement in the public education system would weaken the role of r adical p e s at ren in favor of a more moderate version of Islam. Finally, a public relations campaign should also be undertaken so as to stress the impoftance of tolerance for a peaceful realm (Ramakrishna,2005). The previous possible activities would close the political space available for the JI to operate as well as deal with some of the most important grievances ofthe grassroots supporters ofradical groups. Without new foot soldiers to replenish the ranks fallen due to the traditional counter-
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tenorist approach, JI and related radical organizations would be greatly weakened and their abilrty to regroup would be limited. Thus, "fear" and'kant" should be tackled concurrently by the International Community and the Indonesian Govemment.
Mediation in the Indonesian context should be undertaken by moderate academics and moderate religious scholars. Strengthening the position of those moderate scholars would weaken radicals and allow them to mediate between thepeople andthe govemment aswell as withthe International Community.A tack-2approachis the onlyrealistic possibility in Lrdonesia since JI is not seeking to negotiate with any govemment. The same is not true for its grassroots supporters and the communities that synrpathize with them. Furthermore, by having insiderpartial mediators who are part ofthe social system and who will have to live with the consequences oftheirintervention, theywouldhavemore credibilitywiththe people (Lederach, 1996).Moreover, regional culture stresses the importance of hierarchy and favors a directive approach to mediation (Cohen, i 996; Mulder, 1996).Therefore, a concerted track-2 mediation approach by moderate scholars
commrulty would go a long way in closing the political space for radical Islam in addition to providing a different image of international intervention as not only based on taditional secwity but rather concentrating in finding long-term solutions to building and religious leaders supporled by the govemment and the intemational
a sustainable peace.
The Philippines and Muslim Separatism The main armed threat in the Philippines is the separatist insurgency in Mindanao (Rolfe, 2008). Aviolent insurgency carried out by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and other related groups in order to seek the establishment of an independent Islamic State in the South has grown in intensity and size in the last few decades (Mulder, 1996, Nehet,2002; Rodell, 2005). The MILF is an organizationmainly devoted to nationalist goals rather than an
intemationalistpan-Islamic agenda. Nevertheless, ithas cooperatedwithJl and other terrorist groups operating in the region. Several training camps in MILF controlled territory have been known to harbor members of JI and Al-Qaeda (Abuza, 2005). ln terms of capability, the MILF is a formidable oppbnent for the Filipino armed forces. Historically, itreceivedweapons fromthe SovietUnion
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and Libya and is thought to have a standing army of about 10,000 well armed and trained insurgents (Rodell, 2005; Singh, 2008-2009). In addition to that it enjoys the support of the population ofthe region and is not listed as a terrorist or
gatizationby the United Nations,
While the main goal of the MILF is the establishment of an independent state for the Muslims in the Philippines, the insurgency is fueled by a vast array of grievances. The Muslim population has historically been discriminated in terms of government jobs and development programs organized by the central govemment. Thus, the region inhabited by the Muslim community is one ofthe poorest regions in the country (Neher, 2002).Infrastructure is lacking and unemployment is a serious problem. Furthermore, a population bulge among young Muslims further exacerbates the situation. Historical grievances are also present for, the rest of the country was successfully converted to Catholicism during Spanish rule while most of the areas inhabited by Muslims were never successfully subdued by the colonial government. During the colonial period Catholic Filipinos from the central regions of the country were given most opportunities in the local administration and this situation continued during the period underAmerican control. Therefore, the Muslim community has been historically considered a frontier region. In terms ofthe approach taken by the Philippine govemment to deal with the insurgency, ithas closelyfollowedthe dictates oftheAmericanWar onTerror.
However, even in terms of conventional weapons, the Philippine army is considered to be one ofthe weakest in SoutheastAsia (Emmers ,2001). Comrption among officers is common, and much of the weapons of the MILF and other violent groups comes from the govemment armory. Some attempts at mediation were undertaken with the help of Libya and several ceas e-fi res have been signed, including fhe 1975 Tripoli agreement (Rodell,2005). However, none of the agreements have proven to be durable. The United States has provided training and weapons to the govemment forces but the army has been unable to make a break in the stalemate with the MILF. Some ofthe difficulties in dealing with the
MILF
is that it enjoys the support ofmoderate andconservativeMuslimNations. In addition to that, the population is sympathetic to the cause and provides safe houses for MILF members in addition to a never endins flow of new recruits
(Dupont,2005).
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The Muslim insurgency is a good example of how atraditional security A approach to deal with violent non-state gloups is not very effective by itself' consultation, multilayered approach to the insurgency would encompass, development aid, efforts to increase the professionalism ofthe armed forces, and finally mediation. Consultation refers to a medium to long term process of track2 dipiomacy resembling the workshops recommended by Scholar-practitioners
such as Burton (Kriesberg, 1997). Development projects would ease with unemplo)ment and improve the infrastructure ofthe region. This would deal some of the general grievances of the population and thus weaken the support
fortheMIlF. ConsultationwouldimprovemutLralunderstandingbetweenMuslim tensions and Catholic leaders, academics, and other such notables and thus reduce approach and avoidmisunderstandings. Concurrentlywiththetraditional security population so as to make continued conflict costly for the MILF and the Muslim all ofthepreviouslymentioned activitieswouldleadto theproper cornbinationof factors to undertake a serious mediation process which would attempt to resolve the resources the entire dispute. It is evident that the Phiiippine govemment lacks the United from for such a daunting task and most of the resources it receives
the States are ear-marked for traditional security (Rodell, 2005). Following concept of Human Security and R2D it is imperative that the international
community devote an equal share of resources to soft-security efforls which encompasses development and consultations.
Unrest in the Deep South of Thailand The insurgency in the Deep South of Thailand is difficult to characterize the because it lacks a clearly identifiable gloup leading the violence' Formerly group Liberation Front (PULO) was lecognized as the principal
Patani United fighting for the independence of the former sultanate of Patani (Jory,2007 ;Liow, after the 2004 ZOOO;. llowever, the renewed insurgency that gained strength (Ungpakom, PULO raid of a government armory is not under the control of z}}7).Bombings and attacks on Buddhist s1'nnbols such as temples and monks
(Storey,2008)' happenregularly inthethree Southemmostprovinces ofThailand Historicaiy, an indep endent Malay Kingdom, the re gion was annexed by S iam (former name ofThailand) in the early years of the 2011' century (Askew, 2007;
McCargo, 2008; wyatt, 2003). Most of the population ofthe region is ofMalay central ethnicity and Muslim. Historically, the region has been marginalized by the
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government in terms of economic development and culture. Poverly and unemployrnent are widespread and the educational system does not include the predominant local language, Melayu P atani (Jory 2007 ; Liow, 200 6 ; McC argo, 2008). To complicate matters even more, the porous border with Malaysia is home to several important organized criminal groups engaged in the drug trade, weapons smuggling, and human trafficking (Askeq 2007). Thus, the rule of law is virtually absentintheregion. Historically, theofficial govemmentpolicyto deal with the insurgency was the same as the one used to deal with the Communist insurgency of the 1970s and 80s and was overwhelmingly based on a military approach (AHRC, 2009 ; Mc C argo, 2 00 8 ; Ungp akorn, 2007 ). Control over the administrationofthe Southemprovinceswas givento the Military andmartial law was declared in the area. The actual number of armed insurgents in SouthemThailand isbelievedto be of less than 1000 fighters divided among several small groups (McCargo,
2008; Ungpakorn ,2007). Nevertheless, there is a wider group of supporters among the locai population which could include as much as one third of the Malay community in the region. This explains the difficulties the military has had inidentiffing insurgent groups andtheirmembers. Furthermore, amajority ofthe population is syrnpathetic to the cause ofthe insurgents even ifthey do not approve of some oftheir methods. Thus, the popular support for the insurgency combined with the porous nature of the border with Malaysia makes it very difficult for the central govemmentto be able to dealwiththe insurgency effectively. Thailand's southem insurgency is mostly an ethnonational liberation struggle fighting to correct regional grievances such as underdevelopment compared to the rest ofthe country assimilationist attempts by the cenhal govemment, and a widespread feeling ofbeing treated as second class citizens in their own land (Ungpakorn,2007). Military abuse has further aggravated the situation by reinforcing the ideology ofthe insurgency in the eyes ofthe population @ingwerth, 2008). While the southem insurgency presents a difficult case for mediation since there is no single leadership for the inswgency a prenegotiation approach such as consultation and track-two diplomacy could be a very useful first step. Religious leaders have tremendous power through their control of a parallel education system in the three provinces. An improvement in mutual understanding between local leaders and Bangkok notables such as leading academics and bureaucrats
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could have important effbcts on the ground in terms of direct effects on the fi.rnctional and political space available to the insurgents. As mentioned in previous sections ofthis paper, it is very important to deal with the political space available to an insurgent movement because its naruowing would have a similar effect on the functional space without the cost in lives and money of the traditional counterinsurgency approach. Moreover, an appro ach b as ed on human security and R2P would involve local NGOs as well as the intemational community in a concerted effort to deal with some ofthe structural violence behind the unrest. Participatory development projects, improvements in the local infrastructure, and a restructuring ofpublic education in the region would be more effective than a military approach fighting against a nonconventional threat, Thus, foreign consultants could be hired to design an educational system that takes into account the cultural diversity ofthe region, and includes long term grievances such as the teaching ofMelayu Patani inpublic schools, as well as the religious component which couldbe made optional so that Buddhist students could choose to take Buddhism while Muslims take Islam. Cur:riculum design should be at the core of dealing with identity needs long sought by the local population. Conclusions As shown by the three case studies, violent conflict can be a very complex process. Violent conflict is a social process that is just one part of the overall social system in which it operates and thus it is affected and at the same times affects its context. Since social conflict does not happen in a vacuum, it should not be dealt with, as if, it were separate and distinct from its environment. A holistic approachto overall securityanddevelopmentprovides themostpromising theoretical approach to building sustainable peace. Human security provides the needed theoretical link between development and conflict and by addressing both "freedom from fear" and "freedom from want", it provides a wider lens needed to deal with'"intractable conflicts" such as the ones in southeastAsia. Complementing human security, responsibility to protect (R2P), operationalizes the concept ofhuman securiff in terms of creating a pertinent norm of intemational lawtojustifythemeasuresnecessaryto achievehuman security. Finally, mediation and consultation were discussed as important tools that can be used in a holistic approach to conflict resolution. It should be clear from the examples provided of radical Islamic terrorism in Indonesia, Muslim nationalism and terrorism in the
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Philippines, and unrest in the South of Thailand, that violent conflict is affected by many factors and its context and that a holistic approach to deal with the perpetrators ofthe violence, their supporters, their needs, inter alia, is more promising interms ofattaining sustainablepeacethan either afaditional approach or a counterinsurgency approach modeled after the "War on Teffor".
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tPesantren: Islamic religious schools and universities. 2Ummah: global body of Muslim believers.
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