Geopolitical Europe Should Prove Its Mettle in the Balkans By Srđjan Cvijić and Dimitar Bechev
In 2006, Javier Solana, the then head of the European Union’s (EU) diplomacy, proclaimed that Europe’s mission was to become “a global power, a force for good in the world”. Just two years before the economic meltdown, the EU, gazing at the world through rose-tinted glasses, pledged to transform its neighbourhood into a “circle of friends”. Today, those rose-tinted glasses have largely been cast aside: with the Covid-19 pandemic still raging, a looming migration crisis driven by the “ring of fire” beyond the EU’s borders, and the global rise of authoritarianism, most Europeans look at the international arena with angst. Notwithstanding this grim reality, the EU’s goal remains the same as what it was 15 years ago. Like its predecessors, today’s EU Commission under President von der Leyen aspires to be “geopolitical” by projecting the EU’s interests and values onto the world. The key difference today, however, is that more than anything, the Trump presidency has made Europeans realise that unconditional reliance on the United States is a thing of the past. Hence, the EU seeks to claim its spot as a bona fide global player. Turning to history offers lessons on how the EU can achieve this goal. Two centuries ago, in a message to Congress on 2 December 1823, US President James Monroe let the whole world know that “the American continents…are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers.” The Monroe Doctrine declared the Americas off limits to Britain, France, or any other outside power. Ever since the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia has tried, 84
with varying success, to assert its influence over what it calls “the near abroad”, and to keep away the West. China is pursuing similar goals in parts of Asia. Indeed, a cursory look at history suggests that no great power has managed to propel itself onto the global stage without first establishing its writ over its periphery. For years, the EU has pursued a working policy geared towards that goal: enlargement. From six members in the 1950s, the Union has grown to 27, a testament to its power of attraction. But unlike other great powers, the EU’s strategy combines geopolitics with transformative aspirations. Anchoring democratic change in Southern and then Eastern Europe chimed in with the strategic objective of unifying the continent. Political elites and societies at large looked at “Europeanisation”, meaning joining the EU, as a sure-fire way to transition from authoritarianism, whether right wing or communist, to a liberal democracy. Non-enlargement doesn’t work Today, however, enlargement is in a profound crisis. The EU pays lip service to its commitment to the Western Balkans. Whereas in the past, the membership negotiations lasted from two to eight years, accession talks with so-called “frontrunners” Montenegro and Serbia are proceeding at a discouragingly slow pace. Podgorica has been negotiating for more than eight years, and Belgrade for six. Other membership hopefuls such as North Macedonia and Albania are struggling to even begin the process, while Bosnia and
