Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland: part of society or unwanted visitors?

2013–2014

ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research Labour Market and Employment in Central and Eastern Europe

Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland: part of society or unwanted visitors?

Oleksii Polegkyi

Oleksii Polegkyi PhD researcher, Wroclaw University, Poland polegkyy@hotmail.com Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland: part of society or unwanted visitors?1 Preface The fall of Communism has brought about significant social and economical changes and consequently, labour migration has reached serious dimensions in the regions of Central and Eastern Europe. The majority of the countries that make up this territory lacked sufficient experience in managing labour migration and integrating immigrants into society.

These factors have resulted in the growth of an international mobility experience for Poles. Poland has become sending emigrant country and simultaneously - the host of the tens of thousands of foreigners, including legal and illegal immigrants.

This is probably only the first stage of this well-spread phenomenon, ”once immigration to Poland has been initiated as a mass and long-lasting phenomenon, it will follow what seems to be a universal European migration cycle”.2 As Marek Kupiszewski and other Polish researchers argue, Poland should be immensely interested in proper labour migration regulations and practices: as both the sending country, and the receiving country, aiming to manage migration flows with a view to meet the emerging labour market shortages and to enhance the overall economic growth of the country.3 But not less important is the way the majority of Poles perceive these immigrants in their country. In various studies this factor was found as being practically insignificant. Poland is a very homogenous society and there is often no adequate understanding of the social and economic value of labour migration. Moreover, attitudes towards foreigners might also be an important mediating and decisive factor in Poland’s immigration process.

1

This research project was developed within the ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research 2013 2

Górny A., Grabowska-Lusińska I., Lesińska M., Okólski M. (eds) Immigration to Poland: policy, labour market, integration.

Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Scholar, 2010:18 3 Kupiszewski, Marek (ed.) Demographic developments, labour markets and international migration in Poland - policy challenges. CEFMR Working Paper. Warsaw, 3/2007:17

1

Research objectives and methodology The aim of this research is to provide a comprehensive overview of the Ukrainian labour migration phenomenon in Poland stemming from an economic, demographic, but firstly, from a social perspective.

The focus of research will be twofold. The first part comprises the analysis of the current situation of Ukrainian labour migrants in Poland and their possibilities to integrate into society. The second focus analyzes the perception of Ukrainian labor migrants in Polish society, their image in Polish public discourse, and Ukrainians perceive the relations towards them from the Poles?

Theoretical assumptions Larry Sjaastad4 introduced the human capital model to migration research. This model treats migration as an investment decision of an individual. The human capital theory assumes that personal assets such as skills, education, and physical abilities are fundamental “capitals” that boost economic production. According to this model, migration occurs when the anticipated future income available at a destination country is greater than the future income at the individuals’ current location, plus the costs of migration. Besides migration costs, all kinds of expenses associated with moving abroad have to be taken into account, including the psychological costs of leaving family and friends behind. The main contribution of the human capital approach is that we should not only pay attention to add labour market variables like wage and unemployment differences, but should also consider the importance of the heterogeneity of individuals and their social backgrounds.

According to Bauer and Zimmermann5, individuals calculate the present discounted value of expected returns of their human capital in every region, including their homeland, depending on their skill levels. Migration occurs, if the returns, net of the discounted costs of movement, are larger in a potential destination region than the returns in the country of origin.

The costs of movement not only include material expenses like differences in the costs of living and foregone earnings, but also the social and psychological costs that arise , for example, from the separation from family and friends. Every individual evaluates the returns and costs in a different way, depending on personal characteristics such as age, gender, and level of education. According to this approach, it is expected that an increase in immigration

4

Sjaastad, L. A. "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration," The Journal of Political Economy, 70, 1962: 80-93 Bauer Thomas K., Zimmermann Klaus F. ‘Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and its Labour Market Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe’. IZA Research Report No. 3, July 1999:15-16 5

2

may causes a decline in wages of the receiving country and could also lead to increased unemployment. Both declining wages and increasing unemployment in the receiving country might, therefore, make it beneficial for individuals to move on to another region or to return home. Individuals within the same country can display very different propensities to migrate, because the rate of remuneration on specific human capital characteristics is different in the destination and receiving country. The human capital approach concludes that the probability of obtaining a job in the destination country depends on the skill level of the migrants and their incentives to invest in destination-specific human-capital.

Research Methodology This study draws from a variety of source, including, a combination of desk review, research reports, a qualitative analysis of a secondary data and a primary data collected using qualitative semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian working migrants.

Analyzing the Ukrainian labour migration phenomenon in Poland and social perception of the character and scale of migratory movements requires the following methods, which will be employed in the research: 

Analysis of official documents, statistical

data and previous studies on

regional developments and migration trends in Poland 

Results of public opinion polls



Qualitative method: semi-structured interviews with Ukrainian labour migrants. The collection and analysis of semi-structured interviews will be an initial qualitative assessment

A sample Selection Criteria for qualitative semi-structured interviews was based on the Snow ball criteria. The sample size is dependent on the ability of the researcher to reach his or her respondents according to the limited time of the research (we based ours on 14 indepth interviews conducted in 2013 with Ukrainian migrants). These semi-structured in-depth interviews, range from one hour to one and a half hours with all participants. All the interviews, were conducted in Ukrainian or in Russian, transcribed, translated and coded. 

Each participant referred at most 2-3 contacts



There should be a minimum of 5 points of entry



Gender: respectively to gender proportions of working Ukrainian migrants in Poland 50% of female and 50% of male

3

Two categories of labour migrants have been interviewed: 

Low skills and seasonal labour migrants (50%)



High skills labour migrants (50%) Sampling location: Mazowiecke Wojewódstwo (Warsaw region), Dolnośląnskie

Wojewódstwo (Wroclaw).

Respondents have been interviewed under the conditions of confidentiality.

Short overview of Ukrainian situation The collapse of the USSR transformed migration on the post-Soviet territory from an internal to an external one and brought therefore, a significant increase in the cross-border mobility of the population. Nowadays, Ukraine is among the most prominent countries in the world with a large number of international migrants. Ukraine is simultaneously a country of origin, transit, and destination for migrants. These immigrants coming to Ukraine are mainly from former Soviet republics.6 But also some transit migrants (mainly from different regions of Asia) who did not succeed entering to the European Union stayed in Ukraine.

Ukraine currently supplies significant labour to the European Union countries, but only an insignificant part of migrant workers from Ukraine become legal migrants in their destination countries. The majority of these people works undocumented, and is therefore considered irregular migrant workers.7 An important trend contributing to the Ukrainian labour situation is the increase in labour migration, driven mainly by economic reasons. The major problem of the Ukrainian labour market is the high rate of unemployment in some regions (official statistics do not reflect the real number of unemployed persons) and unsatisfactory wages. The huge difference in salary between Ukraine and European countries pushes a significant share of the population to search employment abroad.

The deep economic crisis in Ukraine in the 1990’s provoked the huge migrations flow.

The fall of the GDP in Ukraine was the worst among all of the countries in the Eastern Europe region (between 1990 and 1999, the GDP fell by 59.2%, according to Ukrainian State Statistics Service), The situation changed a little bit in the mid-2000’s, due to some revival of the Ukrainian economy (average annual GDP growth of 8.5% in the years 2000-2008) and hopes related to the success of the so-called “Orange Revolution”. Introduction of visa

6 MPC – Migration profile: Ukraine, 2013, http://www.migrationpolicycentre.eu/docs/migration_profiles/Ukraine.pdf 7 Migration in Ukraine: A Country Profile 2008. International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2008:12

4

regimes for trips to the neighbouring Central European countries (Czech Republic and Slovakia introduced a visa regime for Ukrainian citizens in 2000, Poland and Hungary in 2003) and also some revival of the Ukrainian economy contributed to a minor decrease of labour migration in the mid2000’s. However, the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the political instability in Ukraine has destroyed the hopes for changes in the labour market.

According to different studies, the overall stock of Ukrainian migrants working abroad after 1990 ranged from 1 to 5 million persons. The official statistics registered 2.7 million Ukrainian emigrants between 1991 and 2010. Around 2 million of them emigrated to postSoviet countries and around 700,000 emigrated towards other countries.8 As a result of a nationwide sociological survey conducted by the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Science of Ukraine until 2006, 15.7 per cent of Ukrainian families have had at least one or more members with the experience of temporary labour migration.9 (See: Figure 1) The first large-scale survey on labour migration, conducted by the State Statistics Committee of Ukraine (SSC) in 2001 in 8 oblasts of Ukraine (covered 8,000 households with 18,000 working-age individuals), allowed assessing temporary labour migrations abroad at that time. The number was 2.3 – 2.7 million people or 10% of the working age population10.

According to the EU-funded Project “Effective Governance of Labour Migration and its Skills Dimensions”, implemented by the International Labour Organization (ILO) and shared

with the International Organization of Migration (IOM) in 2012, 1.2 million

Ukrainians, or 3.4% of the population worked abroad. Almost half of them (48.5%) were short-term migrant workers.11 According to a State Statistics Committee survey on labour migration conducted in 2008, about 50% of the emigrated Ukrainians work in Russia, others - in the neighbouring Central European countries (Poland, Czech Republic) as well as in the Southern European countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal). If before the crisis of 2008, Poland occupied the forth place as a destination country for Ukrainian labours, in 2012 it moved to second place, after Russia.

(See: Figure 2)

8 It should be noted that official statistics significantly underreport population’s migration movements. The first Ukrainian Census of 2001 revealed that actual losses of the population due to migration were 1.7 times higher than stated in figures from the current records mentioned above. See: Libanova, E., (ed.), Complex demographic research in Ukraine, (Комплексне демографічне дослідження в Україні). Ukrainian center for social reforms, Kyiv. 2005: 144 9 Ukrainian Society 1992-2006 / Ed. by V.Vorona, M.Shulga. – Kyiv, Institute of Sociology NAC, 2006: 546. (in Ukrainian) 10 Researches in the field of labour migration: Ukraine: analytic report, ILO, Kyiv, 2005 11 Source: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/2013_05_31_2_uk.htm

5

The increasing attractiveness of Poland caused by economic crisis and growing unemployment in the EU, especially in countries of southern Europe (where previously many Ukrainian migrants worked), and a more restrictive immigration policy adopted by the majority of EU countries in comparison with Poland. An important role is played also by a developed network of Ukrainian immigrants in Poland.

The degree of economic divergence between Ukraine's regions is significant. These economic disparities and asymmetric development paths between the regions have to be perceived as one of the factors explaining the current geographical distribution pattern.

(See: Figure 3) In general, the population of western Ukraine is more involved in labour migrations than people residing in other parts of the country. It can be explained by the low level of industry development in the western part of Ukraine; other key factors include EU border proximity, established migration networks, personal, and cultural ties.

Temporary labour emigration has a stronger influence on the domestic labour market, particularly on the level and scale of unemployment. According to the calculations of experts at the Institute of Demography of NASU, the unemployment rate would be 1.6 times higher in 2008, if there would have been no labour migration.12 Remittances have a stabilizing, anti-crisis effect on the economy of Ukraine.

Remittances flowing from labour migrants working to Ukraine are an increasingly important source of extra income for migrant families. According to World Bank, the total amount of remittances in 2012 exceeded 6.5 billion USD that were transferred into Ukraine. The National Bank of Ukraine suggests an even higher figure of USD 7.5 billion for 2012, which accounts for 4% of GDP in Ukraine, with informal transfer channels constituting approximately 14% of the total flow.13 The legal status of Ukrainian labours abroad improved due to migration amnesties in several destination countries (Italy, Spain, Portugal) and to new legislations on foreign employment (Russia and Poland). According to the survey, in 2008, 35.1% of labour migrants had permits for work and residence, 39.3% had temporary registration, and 25.6% stayed abroad without any official status. The biggest share of such irregular migrants was reported

12

Kalicka V. et al., (2009): Establishment of the middle class in Ukraine: dominating idea of national strategy of Ukraine [Stanovlennya seredniogo klasu v Ukraini: dominant nacionalnoi strategii Ukrainy], Kyiv, p. 234 13 National Bank of Ukraine (NBU), 2013, http://www.bank.gov.ua/doccatalog/document?id=80651

6

for Poland (56.2%) and Italy (36.2%), while the lowest number was reported for Spain.

14

(See: Figure 4) According to survey performed by the Razumkov Centre Sociological Service in April, 2010, quite a large number of respondents reported readiness to look for a job abroad.

However, the number of people who were not ready to look for a job outside the country borders increased compared to 2003 (respectively, 60.3% and 52.6%). The share of people ready to look for legal work abroad decreased (from 32.6% to 26%), of those disposed to seek illegal earnings – remained stable (respectively, 8.7% and 8%). More inclined to work abroad are residents of the West and Centre, persons under the age of 4015.

(See: Figure 5) Labour migration of Ukrainian citizens became large-scale and is linked to numerous social challenges, but the full-fledged policy focusing on this issue has not been formulated yet. According to Libanova and Malynovska, the major regulatory activities are: “control of activities of recruiting agencies providing services of employment abroad; diplomatic efforts related to conclusion of the inter-country agreements on employment and social security; and counteraction to human trafficking”.16 Migration may have positive effects on individual members of the family or on the income of people; however for the family as a whole, it has a disintegrating effect. An increase in the share of women among the labour migrants and their commitment to stay abroad is one of the reasons for family crisis and dissolutions, and problems with raising children left in Ukraine. The outflow of the most active inhabitants of rural settlements and depressed regions, narrows development opportunities in these settlements and regions and deepens regional disproportions.

Specifics of Poland Poland is in the first stage of transforming from typical emigration into an emigration and immigration country. The large scale outflow of labour force from Poland led to serious population losses and to the establishment of migratory patterns and networks in other EU countries. The new mobility patterns in Poland that transformed it from an emigration only to an emigration and-immigration country. Till the present days, Poland has maintained its status 14

Libanova E., Malynovska O. Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Final Country Report: Ukraine. European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2012 15 Razumkov Centre Sociological Service, 2010, p.14 http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/Yurchyshyn_SIDA_employment_poll.pdf 16 Libanova E., Malynovska O. Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Final Country Report: Ukraine. European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2012: 26

7

as a net sender in European migratory flows. A novelty was the experience of inflow of immigrants that triggered a need for the new regulation and policies responding to the new phenomena.17 “Poland – traditionally a migrant-exporting country – cannot yet solidify its status as a migration destination country, neither statistically nor in terms of migration’s importance in the public discourse”.18 On the Polish labour market we can currently observe two parallel processes: from one side – a considerable unemployment rate (according to Polish GUS more than 14% in 2012), and the lack of labour in some segments of labour markets, enhanced by emigration of specialists and skilled workers to other EU countries.

Although the recent post-accession migratory and labour market developments in Poland, still represents more of a sending, than a receiving country in the European labour migration system, but as Marek Kupiszewski argues, the revealed labour market shortages clearly indicate that the immigration to Poland is likely to rise in the future. In his opinion, Poland should be immensely interested in proper labour migration regulations and practices: first as a sending country, aiming to offer best protection and employment conditions to Poles abroad, and secondly as a receiving country, aiming to manage migration flows with a view to meet the emerging labour market shortages.19 The picture of present-day scale of migrants in the Polish labour market does not foretell a future massive and institutionalised inflow of immigrant labour. However, as other Polish researchers believe20, “current immigration levels may be sustained and indeed a massive, institutionalised influx may occur due to employers’ strategies, such as a growing demand for foreign labour in the secondary labour market”. But in the nearest future, Poland will need foreigners used as a substitute for domestic labours with possible emergence of ethnic enclaves and continued segmentation of the labour market.

Demographic situation in Poland In 2004 the population of Poland officially amounted to about 38.2 million permanent residents, however this number does not take into account the long-term legacy of unregistered emigration.

17

See: Okólski M. The effects of political and economic transition on international migration in Central and Eastern Europe, in: Massey, D.S., Taylor, J.E. (eds.), International migration: prospects and policies in global market. Oxford University Press, 2004c; Kupiszewski Marek (ed.) Demographic developments, labour markets and international migration in Poland - policy challenges. CEFMR Working Paper. Warsaw, 3/2007 18 Górny A., Grabowska-Lusińska I., Lesińska M., Okólski M. (Eds.) Poland: becoming a country of sustained immigration.

IDEA Working paper, 2009:117 19 Kupiszewski Marek (ed.) Demographic developments, labour markets and international migration in Poland - policy challenges. CEFMR Working Paper. Warsaw, 3/2007 20 Górny A., Grabowska-Lusińska I., Lesińska M., Okólski M. (Eds.) Poland: becoming a country of sustained immigration.

IDEA Working paper, 2009:117

8

POPULATION ABSENT IN 2004—2011 DUE TO DEPARTURE ABROAD FOR TEMPORARY STAY BY COUNTRIES OF STAY — ESTIMATES (in thousands) (The presented estimates should be treated as approximates given the differentiated data sources — national and international ones) Year: TOTAL

2002 786

2004 1000

2005 1450

2006

2007

1950

2008

2270

2009 2010

2210

2011

2100 2000

206021

In the forecast, the global population size of Poland is expected to decline from 38.2 million in 2004 to between 29.4 and 30.3 million people (corresponding to a decline by 21– 23%), respectively under the ‘Stagnation and Control’ (S&C) and ‘Development and Liberalisation’ (D&L) migration scenarios till 2054. The results for the overall labour force resources include a decline from 17.2 million in 2004, to between 12.3 and 12.8 million people respectively under the S&C or D&L migration scenarios.22 In Poland, the official age of retirement is 60 years for women and 65 for men. Under the assumptions of the forecast, with life expectancy in 2054 foreseen to equal 80.4 years for males and 85.8 years for females, such retirement ages are impossible to uphold, especially as they are very unfavorable for women in terms of the height of their future pensions.

So, from a demographic point of view, the long-term reduction of population loss can be achieved through a fertility increase. The second possible option to reduce the imbalance of population structures resulting from the ageing process is an increased migration. Although the second option will not change the demographic situation radically, because the migrants are also getting older over time, it can change the situation in the labour market at least shorttime.

Analysis and forecasts for the demand for workers on the Polish labour market show that, over the next ten years, shortage of workers on the Polish labour market and the consequent need for foreign workers is unlikely to occur. According to M. Szylko-Skoczny and M. Duszczyk in 2020, the level of immigration to Poland will be, depending on the scenario, 30 to 80 per cent higher than in 2008 (average near 50 per cent). However, the demand scale for foreign workers depends on the economic situation in Poland, and on whether structural reforms will be implemented in coming years. At the same time, as SzylkoSkoczny and Duszczyk claim, the scale of employment of foreign nationals on the grey market still remains unknown. Furthermore, analysis indicates that between 2009 - 2020 the

21

The Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2012. Central Statistical Office of Poland, Warszawa, 2012, Tabl. 58 (222) Kupiszewski Marek (ed.) Demographic developments, labour markets and international migration in Poland - policy challenges. CEFMR Working Paper. Warsaw, 3/2007:7-18 22

9

occupational structure of foreign workers in Poland will be subject to transformation. The relative proportion of low-skilled construction workers and those employed in agriculture will fall, while the percentage of foreign nationals employed in positions of low and medium level service sectors will increase.23 As a result, in the future, the employment of foreigners may not be a matter of choice – rather one of necessity for some sectors of Polish economy.

Polish migration policy has been becoming more open to immigrants between the years 2009 and 2011, especially immigrants needed by the Polish economy (seasonal workers, foreign students and graduates, highly-skilled migrants).

The issue of immigrants’ integration had a low priority for policymakers ”due to a relatively small scale of inflows and their mostly seasonal or transit character, rarely resulting in settlement”24. There is no will among policymakers and politicians to encourage immigrants to settle in Poland. We can agree with Gorny and others that “migration policy in Poland, being a set of ad hoc and post factum activities carried out without a migration policy doctrine and combined with restrictive rules of entry, work and settlement for foreigners does not favour more institutionalized inflows and settlement of immigrants”.25 Poles’ attitude to immigrants of other nationalities Attitudes towards foreigners from the native population might also be an important decisive factor for coming to Poland. In various studies this factor was found as being practically insignificant. According to Gorny and others26, probably due to the very small amount of migrants living in Poland, few Poles had the chance to directly contact or collaborate with a foreigner. On the other hand, as foreigners usually remained almost ‘invisible’, “they did not provide the native people with frequent opportunities to express any particular attitudes or dispositions. According to a majority of foreigners, however, the contacts they had with Poles hardly discouraged them from staying in Poland or coming there again”. 27

23

Szylko-Skoczny M., Duszczyk M. Polish immigration policy – opportunities and challenges for the labour market. University of Warsaw, Institute of Social Policy, 2010: 17, http://www.ips.uw.edu.pl/pliki/badania/politimigrac_rynekpracy2010/immigr_policy_en.pdf 24 Górny A., Grabowska-Lusińska I., Lesińska M., Okólski M. (Eds.) Poland: becoming a country of sustained immigration.

IDEA Working paper, 2009:76 25 Ibid: Górny A., Grabowska-Lusińska I., Lesińska M., Okólski M. (Eds.) Poland: becoming a country of sustained immigration. IDEA Working paper, 2009:118 26 Gorny A., Grabowska-Lusinska I., Lesinska M., Okolski M. (Eds) Poland: becoming a country of sustained immigration.

Warszawa, 2009 27 Ibid: Gorny and others, 2009:27

10

Polish society in general, as considered by some Polish sociologists, 28 is at least reluctant to strangers. These kinds of attitudes facilitated by the fact that the average Pole had very limited contacts with foreigners and foreign workers were a completely unknown phenomenon.29 Over the years, Poland was a country of emigrants providing European and non-European labour markets, rather than a destination country for a migration.

Poles' attitudes to other nationalities depend on many factors: national stereotypes, current socioeconomic events, historical legacies, personal experiences, and many others.

Generally, Poles declare sympathy for these nations, who represent a positive reference group for them, determine the level of their ambitions and aspirations, and represent the world to which they want to belong. Their friendly feelings arouse therefore, first at all to nations where the level of socio-economic development is higher than in Poland. Other factors include cultural proximity, historical events, current social and political events, and personal experience. For many years, Poles have had a better attitude to nationalities of Western Europe. This distribution of sympathy is associated with the stereotypical image of the rich, developed “West” and poor, backward “East”. This stereotype is confirmed by objective measures of socio-economic development.

We can identify at least two contrary opinions within the debates on migrants in Poland. On the one hand, there is a position that wants to protect Poland from an “immigration flood”, which can damage Polish culture and society. On the other hand, there is the perspective applying more economic arguments, based on the needs of immigration due to some gaps within certain segments of the labour market.

As is indicated by public opinion polls, with years Poles have become more open to foreigners, in comparison to the 1990’s, although quite a strong negative attitude is still palpable towards other nations. These attitudes have evolved significantly, from almost unequivocally highly favourable towards all nationalities to far less favourable and strongly differentiated with respect to migrants’ nationalities. The highest level of sympathy and tolerance was notable towards the westerners; the lowest level towards Romanians (in popular perception – Gypsies), “Russians” (including Ukrainians and Belarusians) and Jews (Jews,

28

See: Konieczna, Joanna. Polacy-Ukraińcy, Polska-Ukraina. Paradoksy stosunków sąsiedzkich.[Polish-Ukrainians, PolandUkraine. The paradoxs of neitbouring relations] Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw, 2003 29 Also, we can look at the amount of Poles who have been abroad at least once. Since 1993, the proportion of people with experience of foreign travel has increased systematically (20 % in total). At present, over two-thirds of Poles (69%) declare having been abroad at least once, while less than one-third (31%) have never left the country (see: Figure 6). Source: Polish public opinion. CBOS, November 2012

11

not Israelis). However, no extreme feelings and behaviours towards any ethnic or national group were exhibited.30 According to a survey conducted in 2012 (Polish public opinion, CBOS)31, about onethird of the respondents expressed sympathy towards Russians, Belarusians, Armenians, the Chinese, Ukrainians and the Vietnamese (those nationalities represent the biggest ethnic minorities in Poland). The attitude to these nations is characterized by a small plurality of positive feelings, and in some cases positive and negative feelings are equally common.

From a longer perspective, it is clear that the attitude to a vast majority of nationalities has improved. While sympathy and antipathy to Ukrainians is equal, the improvement in attitude to them has been the strongest. Compared with 1993, the proportion of respondents who display sympathy towards them has grown three-fold, while the number of respondents who expressed dislike decreased by half.

(See: Figure 8) As can be observed from the analysis of Public Opinion Research Centre, the relation to other nations depends primarily on the level of education and financial situation of respondents. The higher the education, the more frequent the declarations of sympathy were for the nations, and particularly noticeable is the difference between, on the one hand, people with university degrees (average level of sympathy to other nations in this group is 16.8 (average 14.4), on the other hand - primary education (9.2) and vocational education (10.9).

Respondents with higher education also characterized by a much lower than average level of hostility towards other nations (6.2). Relations with other nations clearly differentiate the financial situation of the respondents. The groups differentiated by age, where older people over 65 years of age were the only ones to differ and were characterized by a low level of sympathy for other nations (mean 9.8), although low levels of hostility (6.7). Taking into account the declared political orientations, it can be noticed that a positive attitude towards other nations was expressed by respondents who support centrist and liberal parties (mainly Platforma Obywatelska) – meaning, 15.4, and the least - those politically indifferent (10.2).32

30

See: ‘Stosunek Polaków do innych narodów’ [Poles' attitudes to other nations] CBOS, Public Opinion Research Centre, Warsaw, February 2013 31 (See: Figure 7) 32 Ibid: Stosunek Polaków do innych narodów. [Poles' attitudes to other nations] CBOS, Public Opinion Research Centre, Warsaw, February 2013:9-11

12

According to another research33, a relatively small group of respondents (17%) believe that the influx of citizens of Belarus, Russia and Ukraine to work in Poland will have positive effects for them personally, and the third of respondents (32%) - expected negative effect. The majority of respondents (55%) recognize the benefits for the national economy and the fourth respondents (25%) see it as a threat. The better educated the respondents were, the more they recognized the economic benefits. The vast majority of respondents (77%) believe that companies employing foreigners have benefits from incoming labour migrants.

Ukrainian labours in Poland Ukrainians represent the most significant group in terms of legal immigrants and irregular foreign workers in Poland. Knowledge on illegal participation of foreigners in the Polish labour market is very limited, as well as research on the shadow economy. According to S. Golinowska, analyses based on registered employment only showed that the largest demand for foreign labour is generated by small and medium-size enterprises; however, this is not relevant to their share in the total number of active companies in Poland.34 The analysis of number of residence permits issued to foreign citizens (Office for Foreigners) reveals that Ukraine is the country sending to Poland the largest number of foreigners.

(See: Figure 9) Biggest group of foreigners according to type of residence permit and citizenship, 2002 Citizenship

Ukrainian

Russian

Category

[%] number

[%] number

permanent residence temporary residence

Belarusian

Vietnamese

[%] number

[%] number

23% 6 723

14% 4 016

7% 2 023

6% 1 666

29% 6 610

8% 1 912

8% 1 820

4% 806

Total foreign population (long-term status): permanent residence: 29 748, temporary residence: 23 03235

33

Szylko-Skoczny M., Duszczyk M. Polish immigration policy – opportunities and challenges for the labour market. University of Warsaw, Institute of Social Policy, 2010:13 http://www.ips.uw.edu.pl/pliki/badania/politimigrac_rynekpracy2010/immigr_policy_en.pdf 34 Golinowska, S. (ed.) Popyt na pracę cudzoziemców.Polska i sąsiedzi [The demand for foreign labour. Poland and neighbouring countries]. Institute of Labour and Social Studies, Warsaw 2004 35 Source: National Census of Population, Central Statistical Office of Poland, Warszawa 2002

13

FOREIGNERS

WHO

RECEIVED

PERMIT

FOR

SETTLEMENT

AND

RESIDENCEF OR A FIXED PERIOD BY CITIZENSHIP For settlement Year:

2000

TOTAL: 858

For residence for a fixed period

2005

2009

2010

2011

2000

2005

2009

2010

2011

3589

2936

3336

3733

15039

22625

30563

30451

29650

1553

1690

3216

8304

8490

8427

816536

Ukraine: 156 1518

1280

Number of people who hold a valid residence permit (as of 31.12.2012) by citizenship and type of permit.37

Citizenship

Assylum

Permanet residence

Permanet residence of EU

Temporary Total residence

UKRAINE

2

16 329

1 940

15 980

34 303

Total

2 369

47 908

5 722

54 503

111 971

In the nineties trade was a main activity undertaken by Ukrainians in Poland. Travels abroad became an important aspect of survival for many Ukrainian families. The petty traders, so called “shuttles”, bringing small amounts of goods to sell across the border, gained incomes from the difference in prices and exchange rates. At the same time, the experience gained by the “shuttles” and the established contacts with locals gave possibilities for Ukrainian citizens to find jobs in Polish the labour market. This period was characterised by irregular labour migration, i.e. the majority of Ukrainian labour migrants moved to European countries on tourist visas and worked there without working permits. 38 Finally, trade was replaced by short term employment as a main economic activity of Ukrainians in Poland. Migrants situated in less favorable segments of labour market chose activities that were not so attractive for Polish workers. In the nineties, labour migration of Ukrainian citizens was mostly spontaneous and developed as a form of self organization of society.

Until October 2003, Ukrainians benefited from a non-visa entrance; afterwards they had a quiet easy access with tourist visas. As a result, up until December 2007 and the 36

The Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2012. Central Statistical Office of Poland, Warszawa, 2012: 458 Source: Office for Foreigners in Poland. Statistics. http://www.udsc.gov.pl/Zestawienia,roczne,233.html 38 Libanova E., Malynovska O. Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Final Country Report: Ukraine. European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2012.

37

14

enlargement of the Schengen area, the trend of illegal work on the basis of legal stay visas and documents was the most characteristic feature of the Ukrainian immigration. Ukrainians who are engaged in circular migration in and out of Poland do not differ in appearance from Poles, who worked in Western Europe39. Poland’s protective to local labour forces labour policy and a liberal visa policy for eastern neighbours were the principal factors which led to the circular type of mobility and temporariness of the migration process in the case of the eastern neighbours. 40 The new visa regime brought about administrative and bureaucratic procedures that complicated mobility. What was before the fluid movement across the border became characterized by long curves, customs, higher money expenses and other difficulties.

Ukrainian migrant workers in Poland can be categorized by their legal status as follows: • persons with a permanent residence permit simultaneously securing the right of unlimited employment; • persons with a temporary residence and employment permit; • persons staying legally temporarily (education, tourism or private purposes) and working illegally in Poland; • persons staying illegally and working illegally in a foreign country.

Workers belonging to the first two categories are best protected in legal terms.

Some Ukrainian citizens with Polish roots are working in Poland on the basis of Polish Charter (Karta Polaka). In 2008 a new legal measure for ethnic Poles was came into force.

Ethnic Poles originating from states of the former Soviet Union, who were awarded the Karta Polaka could enjoy certain advantages when staying in Poland. They can take up any legal occupation (including being self-employed) without a work permit, also it allows its holder easier to get an entry visa. Moreover, those in possession of the Karta Polaka will receive free access to educational institutions, the health system in emergencies and some other benefits.

But Karta Polaka will not entitle its holder to settle in Poland, nor will the holder acquire Polish citizenship. Till the end of 2012, by Polish Consulate in Ukraine was awarded more than 46 thousands of Karta Polaka.

39

See: Iglicka K., Gmaj K., Borodzicz-Smoliński W. Circular Migration Patterns. Migration between Ukraine and Poland.

European University Institute. Italy, 2010 40 Bieniecki Miroslaw, Ukrainian labour migrations to Poland, in: Marie Jelinkova, Ian Cook (ed.) Visegrad Moves, Multicultural Centrer Prague, Warszawa 2007

15

Following IOM Kiev analysis41 the occupational status of the Ukrainian labour migrants varies in different countries. In Poland, employment in agriculture prevails (66.7% of female migrants). Although construction is the main sector of employment of male migrants in all destination countries, a share of those employed in transport is large in Russia (11.1%), while more than a quarter of migrants are employed in agriculture in Poland.

Ukrainian women follow a pattern similar to Polish women working as domestic workers abroad, circulating on a regular basis between their country of origin and the host country, entering the latter legally, but in general engaging in unregistered employment. This category of migrants usually stays in Poland for three months (on the basis of tourist visa). In the periods of their absence in Poland they are replaced by relatives or acquaintances. Women replace each other since they do not want to lose their job. Prevalence of Ukrainian females within the frames of domestic services is so significant that the label “Ukrainian lady” has become nearly a synonym of a foreign housekeeper in Poland. They are hired mainly because they are cheaper but also because they work hard and are ready to work flexible hours”. 42 Without Ukrainian seasonal workers it would be very difficult for small agricultural enterprises and even for some sectors to find enough labour for peak seasonal work. The costs of social contributions and taxes are very high for employers. The Ukrainian workers themselves don’t put pressure employers to legalize their work as it would reduce their wages.

Both sides ignore the risk of being punished – in private houses or small rural communities it is minimal.

Ukrainian seasonal workers stay in Poland usually for no longer than three months, concentrated mainly in agricultural and construction sectors, and after this period they return back to home. Working in Poland, they occupy those segments of the labour market that are not attractive to the local labour force and do not obtain rights of residence and labour for longer than this period.

In the agricultural sector people frequently seek employment with the same employee for several seasons. Information about agricultural work in Poland is usually distributed through migrant networks and drivers who, acting as informal work-intermediaries, are eager to bring migrants to work. A crucial role is played by such a “bus driver” who brings Ukrainians to Poland and is a contact person and a mediator between potential employer and seasonal employees. Ukrainians usually work unofficially, however sometimes Polish farmers 41

IOM Kiev. Labour Migration Assessment for the WNIS Region, International Organization for Migration. Kiev, 2007 Iglicka K., Gmaj K., Borodzicz-Smoliński W. Circular Migration Patterns. Migration between Ukraine and Poland.

European University Institute. Italy, 2010:12 http://www.eui.eu/Projects/METOIKOS/Documents/CaseStudies/METOIKOScasestudyPolandUkraine.pdf 42

16

provide the migrant with housing registration. Nevertheless, migrants are exposed to police checks, a fact that limits their freedom of mobility in Poland. As a result, their ability to develop social ties to Poles as well as their integration potential suffers.43 In 2006 a pilot project was introduced in which citizens of Ukraine, Belarus and Russia could work without a work permit up to three months of the year. Currently, citizens of five countries (Ukraine, Belarus, Russia, Moldova, and Georgia) can work without a work permit when an employer registers in the local Labour Office a declaration of intention to employ a person for no longer than 6 months per year. 44 As can be seen from the statistics of the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy, the employment of foreigners in Poland, in 2012, apparently decreased (compare to 20102011). In 2012 39, 144 work permits were issued, compared to 40,808 in 2011(decrease is 4%). The downward trend was also observed in the case registered at labour offices, where employers stated their intention to employ a foreigner. The statistics show that in 2011, there were 259 777 declarations on the intention to employ foreigners submitted by the employers, in comparison to 180073 submitted in 2010. And so, in 2012, the labour offices registered 243 736 employer statements of intention, so it is more that 16 thousands (6%) less than in 2011.45 Ukrainians, however, still have the highest activity among foreigners in the context of migration to Poland (near 52% of all work permits and more than 90% of the recorded statements of employers).46 FOREIGNERS WHO RECEIVED WORK PERMIT IN POLAND BY CITIZENSHIP AND PERIOD OF PERMIT’S VALIDITY year

2005

2008

2009

2010

2011

TOTAL:

11 151

21 733

32 410

37 121

40 808

Ukraine:

2 897

6 321

10 200

13 150

18 669 47

43

Poland: becoming a country of sustained immigration. (Eds.) Górny A., Grabowska-Lusińska I., Lesińska M., Okólski M. IDEA Working paper, 2009:86 44 Szylko-Skoczny M., Duszczyk M.Polish immigration policy – opportunities and challenges for the labour market. University of Warsaw, Institute of Social Policy, 2010, http://www.ips.uw.edu.pl/pliki/badania/politimigrac_rynekpracy2010/immigr_policy_en.pdf 45 Source: Office for Foreigners in Poland. Statistics.

46 Sourse: Minister of Labour and Social Policy. http://www.mpips.gov.pl/analizy-i-raporty/cudzoziemcy-pracujacy-wpolsce-statystyki/ 47 The Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2012. Central Statistical Office of Poland, Warszawa, 2012:461

17

The foreigners employed on the basis of the above mentioned declaration are mainly citizens of Ukraine. The branches of economy in which

Ukrainians work were mainly in

sectors characterized by seasonal increases and decreases in employment, namely construction and agriculture. The popularity of such forms of employment is probably due to the seasonal nature of that kind of work, since it is possible to employ the foreigner on the basis of the employer’s declaration only for a period not exceeding 6 months in 12 consecutive months. If after six months the employer is still willing to hire the foreigner, the only possibility to do this is through a work permit application. The work permit, in turn, is issued for a fixed period of a maximum of three years and may be renewed.

So, we can observe the formation of a typical temporary labour migration system.

Therefore, questions arise as to whether the Ukrainian seasonal workers are integrated into Polish society, whether it is possible to measure the degree of integration, and whether the integration approach should be examined critically in view of the existing and functioning system of temporary labour migration.

Relations with Poles in the eyes of Ukrainian labour migrants48 Ukrainian immigrants are often perceived in Poland as being able to integrate to Polish society in a smoother and less troublesome manner. Ukrainians have a similar language and cultural code, which allows them to successfully accommodate in Poland without needing any special integration programs. This is related to a long history of common neighborhoods, and geographical, linguistic, and cultural proximity.

In the eyes of Ukrainian workers, Poland is an attractive country - better developed and organized than Ukraine. It is associated with current issues rather than the historical past. Some of the dominant elements in this picture are successful Polish reforms and well-functioning economy and government.

“Look, how Poland has changed from communist times! When I came here near 10 years ago, it was very similar to Ukraine, but now - it is really Europe! ” Olga, 38 With regards to why she is going to Poland to work, one of the interviewees answered: “Because it is close and everything is clear. Sometimes I go to Russia, but there everything is more complicated.”

Svitlana, 43

48

Based on the results of semi-structured interviews

18

Ukrainians generally do not feel discriminated on the base of their origin. Problems arrive with formal institutions are however, the most typical (for example with regards to obtaining a residence permit), but they assume that all foreigners in Poland are facing similar problems.

“Here, everything is better organized. If you are going to do some formalities – you can expect that you will do what you need in time and without money… However, sometimes they have too many formalities and rules” Maxim, 49 In Poland many people hold the idea that too many Ukrainians want to come to the country to settle. However, the findings of our research do not confirm this: only one third of respondents are potentially ready to settle in Poland (and mainly because of family ties with Poles).

The motivations for migration may be described as a combination of economic, social and personal factors. The decisions to search for workplaces abroad are clearly affected by unemployment and dissatisfaction with the domestic labour markets and certainly related to the search for a higher-quality of life. But for high-skilled respondents the main factor are the possibilities for “carrier and personal development”.

“I came to Poland, because a Polish company offered me a very good job. And here I have a space for growing… I have a lot of contacts with international partners and, probably later, I will try to find a higher position in the other country” Andriy, 28 We asked our respondents to range labour migration motives by the degree of importance for them. Near 90% of low-skilled respondents stressed that “low wages and personal income in Ukraine” is the most important reason for seeking jobs abroad. Near 30% of high-skilled respondents placed it also in the first place, while the other 70% stated that “possibilities for career grow was the main reason for leaving country”. Another important reason was expressed by 65% of low-skilled respondents, who mentioned “unemployment” (30% of high-skilled respondents), but 68 % of high-skilled respondents mentioned as very important reasons – “no possibilities for making careers in Ukraine, and personal development” (33% of low-skilled respondents). For 26% of low-skilled respondents another important reason was also - “low quality of services and bad housing conditions in Ukraine” (34% of high-skilled respondents), 24% - “bad governance, corruption, no prospects for future” (46% of high-skilled respondents).

19

Irregular workers follow well established patterns elaborated by their networks instead of searching for longer stay possibilities, as they are often not aware of other options. Those who work illegally in Poland focused primarily on the problem of finding work and earning money to send home. Young people are more frequently oriented towards non-circular migration, which constitutes a negative trend for Ukraine.

The important role for possibilities to integrate into Polish society is played by social and cultural capital gained by Ukrainians before of their arrival to Poland. According to most respondents, the chances for legal and a higher quality of life in Poland were expressed by the people who possessed a certain cultural and professional capital. The lack of professional achievements in the home country allows them only to occupy the limited niche among immigrants and fundamentally reduces the chance of changing their place in the social hierarchy.

The social ties are formed mainly within their own social group or between the similar social groups of students and high-skilled workers on the one hand, and illegal workers from another. Social groups are distinguished by their style and standard of living, a different range of social contacts in Polish society and a variation of plans for the future and life aspirations.

“Circular migrants” appear to be the least eager to develop social relations outside their sphere of work; any relations they do develop are relegated mainly to other migrants.

Highly-skilled “immigrants” are willing to maintain contacts with other foreigners, though these are usually combined with relations with Poles.

High skilled migrants have the broadest range of relations with Poles. In their case, having many Polish acquaintances and friends is typical. And the number of years spent in Poland is not a decisive factor. Relations with other Ukrainians are less in common in this group in comparison to seasonal or low skilled workers.

It should be noted that the majority of respondents who work illegally in Poland are not interested in legitimating their status on the basis of the Polish labour law. This is due to the fact that in these cases they must pay quiet high taxes and they will lose advantages that are crucial for their competitiveness in the labor market. For many employers it is also not profitable to legalize Ukrainian workers (especially irregular) because it will lead to higher cost of labours.

The fact that some Poles complain about competition from Ukrainian respondents was similarly explained either by the fact that the Poles do not want to do certain types of work for the proposed salary, or by the fact that Ukrainian have stronger motivations to work.

20

“A Polish unemployed person can always find a job if he wanted to. Who wants - will find. It doesn’t matter the person is Ukrainian or Polish. It depends on you”.

Zoltan, 32 Daily contact with Poles - at work, on the street, with neighbors - gave respondents awareness that actually it "all depends on the person". ”Like everywhere, there are honest people and not very good people”.

Svitlana, 43 Thus, the differences can arise from personal characteristics and /or socio-economic status, which some Poles as well as some Ukrainians may have. We agree with Colic-Peisker who argued that hyper-mobile expats do not develop attachments with any location, but their profession was the main anchor of their identity-belonging and future prospects.49 One of the main differences of high-skilled Ukrainian workers from low-skilled workers was their distinct feeling of attitudes towards them from of Poles. If low-skilled workers expressed negative experiences (however overall they were positive), none of the high-skilled respondents mentioned any negative attitudes.

Contacts and relations between Ukrainians and Poles, particularly in the workplace, primarily depend on their job positions and social status. As one respondent mentioned, “It depends on you and the position that you have. People evaluate you according to your skills and behavior”.

Irina, 29 Conclusion In conclusion, the propensity of migrants to develop and maintain social ties with Poles depends to a large extent on the social positions and type of economic activity in which they are involved in Poland. The highly skilled workers reflected a much better integration process into Polish society. They are more likely to participate in social networks with the Poles and Ukrainians with a similar status.

Most Ukrainians who strongly connect their future with Poland are those who married Poles, and those who have a long term work permit. Students often declare a desire to return to Ukraine - especially if political and economic processes there will promote the prospects of self-realization. Some respondents declared their wish to move to the ‘West’, but rather for

49

Colic-Peisker V. ‘’Free floating in the cosmopolis? Identity-belonging of transnational knowledge workers’’. Global Networks, 10(4), 2010:483

21

the purpose of acquiring new knowledge (including new language acquisition), experience (work in their field) or better earnings than if they were to stay there as a permanent resident.

Among those, who consider their stay in Poland as temporary and without perspectives, those who are working illegally and doing the simplest jobs dominated. The stay in Poland they interpreted exclusively as a source of income. These people are less interested in establishing ties with Poles and they do not establish contacts that do not directly affect the possibility of increasing their earnings.

The image of Ukraine in Polish public discourse is often dependent on a historical context. The complicated Polish-Ukrainian relations throughout its history are also influenced by the dramatic events of World War II. The opinion of elderly Poles about Ukrainians is mostly constructed and affected by the memory of the past and is therefore rooted in historical stereotypes. The large gap between Ukrainians and Poles built World War II and all the armed conflicts that accompanied it. However, stereotypes and negative attitudes rooted in the past play a less important role with years. The importance of such stereotypes depends mainly on two factors: the level of education and age of the person. Younger generations generally are based on present-day observations - Ukrainians are for them often poor people, seeking jobs in Poland, so they are just unattractive.

The current Polish public discourse reproduces some historical stereotypes and creates a sense of superiority towards Ukraine, based on the opposition between East and West, a better economic situation in Poland. For many Poles, Ukraine is a country of corruption, endless chaos, inhibited by poor people seeking any income abroad.

Most respondents reported that they noticed a trend of improving relations between Ukrainians and Poles. Some of them describe the changes on the examples of better relations between countries on the political and official level, others – because of increasing the number and frequency of contacts of ordinary Poles and Ukrainians.

Besides some negative attitudes towards Ukrainians in Poland according to opinion polls in general, it is not transferable to Ukrainian workers’ personal experience in their everyday life in the country. Ukrainians generally do not feel hostility or aversion from Poles in their personal contact with them, and if there are conflicts, they are usually are due to a personal situation, and are not perceived by Ukrainians as discrimination. That means that personal contacts are able to modify the influence of stereotypes and not allow them to take root in the mass consciousness.

From the point of view of Polish interests, Ukrainian migration complements labour shortages in the Polish labour market. At the same time due to the fact that it acts as a 22

complement (Ukrainians perform work which Polish citizens take reluctantly) it does not increase unemployment in the Polish labour market. For Poland it might be beneficial to attract foreign workers, from countries with similar cultural backgrounds, mainly Ukrainians, who do not cause cultural tension and do not require a special integration policy. On the other hand, the majority of Ukrainian workers do not treat Poland as a settlement country. In the light of unfavourable aspects of the current situation with irregular workers from Ukraine, we could mention first of all the losses for the state budget associated with a high proportion of undeclared workers in Poland. 50 On the other hand, Ukrainian workers are left on their own in Poland. A support from the Ukrainian government offered to circular migrants may serve as a tool promoting Ukrainian state interests. These actions, however, depend on the development of proper government policy in this field.

Appendix: Figure 1:

Source: Labour Migration Assessment for the WNIS Region / IOM, Kiev, 2007, p.11

50

Brunarska Z., Grotte M., Lesińska M. Migracje obywateli Ukrainy do Polski w kontekście rozwoju społecznogospodarczego: stan obecny, polityka, transfery pieniężne. CMR Working Papers No. 60/118, 2012:30

23

Figure 2: Countries of destination of Ukrainian labour-migrants (in % of all Ukrainian emigrants working abroad) 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

2012 2008

Russia

Poland

Italy

Czech Republic

Source: for 2008 - State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Survey on labour migration, 2008; For 2012 - “Effective Governance of Labour Migration and its Skills Dimensions”, 2012, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ukraine/press_corner/all_news/news/2013/2013_05_31_2_uk.htm

Figure 3:

Source: Migration in Ukraine: Facts and Figures’, the Ukraine Mission of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), 2011

Figure 4: % of irregular workers by countries (from all Ukrainian emigrants working abroad)

Source: State Statistics Committee of Ukraine, Survey on labour migration 2008.

24

Figure 5

Source: Razumkov Centre Sociological Service, 2010:14

Figure 6

Source: Polish public opinion. CBOS, November 2012

25

Figure 7

Source: Polish public opinion. CBOS, November 2012

26

Figure 8

Source: Polish public opinion. CBOS, November 2012

Figure 9 Foreign applications for legalisation of stay in Poland in 2001-2010 60000 50000 40000 30000 20000 10000 0 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Source: Office for Foreigners in Poland. Statistics.

27

References: Bieniecki M. ‘Ukrainian labour migrations to Poland’, in: Marie Jelinkova, Ian Cook (eds.) Visegrad Moves, Multicultural Centrer Prague, Warszawa 2007.

Adamiec W. Nieformalna giełda pracy – przypadek instytucji ekonomicznej skupiającej Ukraińców, In: A. Grzymała-Kazłowska (red.). Między jednością a wielością.

Integracja odmiennych grup i kategorii imigrantów w Polsce. OBM WNE UW: Warszawa, 2008.

Bauer T., Zimmermann K. ‘Assessment of Possible Migration Pressure and its Labour Market Impact Following EU Enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe’. IZA Research Report No. 3, July 1999 Bieniecki M., Bojar H., Frelak J., Gąsior-Niemiec A., Konieczna J., Kurczewska J. Regulacja migracji zarobkowej – wyzwania dla Ukrainy w kontekście polskich doświadczeń.

Warszawa, 2005 Bieniecki M., Pawlak M. Strategie przetrwania. Adaptacja ukraińskich migrantów zarobkowych do polskiej rzeczywistości Instytucjonalnej. Instytut Spraw Publicznych, Warszawa, 2009.

Brunarska Z., Grotte M., Lesińska M. ‘Migracje obywateli Ukrainy do Polski w kontekście rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego: stan obecny, polityka, transfery pieniężne’.

[Migration of Ukrainian citizens to Poland in the context of socio-economic development: state of affairs, policy and remittances] CMR Working Paper, Nr 60 (118), Warszawa, 2012.

Colic-Peisker V. Free floating in the cosmopolis? Identity-belonging of transnational knowledge workers. Global Networks 10(4), 2010.

Frelak, J. ‘Praca Ukraińców w Polsce - rekomendacje dla polityki migracyjnej’, [The labour of Ukrainians in Poland – recommendations for migration policy], Analizy i Opinie, No. 38, Warszawa: Instytut Spraw Publicznych, 2005, (retrived 12.08.2008) www.isp.org.pl/files/15798847740345728001120731337.pdf Godlewska, J. Migracje i imigranci w Polsce – skala, podstawy prawne, polityka, Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw, 2011.

Golinowska, S. (ed.) Popyt na pracę cudzoziemców. Polska i sąsiedzi [The demand for foreign labour. Poland and neighbouring countries]. Institute of Labour and Social Studies, Warsaw, 2004.

Gorny A., Grabowska-Lusinska I., Lesinska M., Okolski M. (Eds.) Immigration to Poland: policy, employment, integration. Warszawa, 2010.

Górny A., Grabowska-Lusińska I., Lesińska M., Okólski M. (Eds.) ‘Poland: becoming a country of sustained immigration’. IDEA Working paper, 2009 Górny, A. & E. Kępińska ‘Mixed Marriages in Migration from Ukraine to Poland’, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 31(2), 2004:353-372.

Grabowska-Lusińska I., Żylicz A. (red.) Czy polska gospodarka potrzebuje cudzoziemców?. OBM WNE UW: Warszawa, 2008.

Grzymała-Kazłowska A. (red.) Między jednością a wielością. Integracja odmiennych grup i kategorii imigrantów w Polsce. OBM WNE UW: Warszawa, 2008.

Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. & M. Okólski. Influx and Integration of Migrants in Poland in the Early XXI Century, CMR Working Papers No. 50, 2003.

Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. & S. Łodziński (eds.) Problemy integracji imigrantów.

Koncepcje, badania, polityki. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2008.

Grzymała-Kazłowska, A. Konstruowanie „innego”. Wizerunki imigrantów w Polsce [The construction of ‘the Other’. The images of immigrants in Poland]. Warszawa: Wydawnictwa Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego, 2007.

Iglicka K., Gmaj K., Borodzicz-Smoliński W. ‘Circular Migration Patterns.

Migration between Ukraine and Poland’. Metoikos Project. EUI: Florence, 2011 28

http://www.eui.eu/Projects/METOIKOS/Documents/CaseStudies/METOIKOScasestudyPolan dUkraine.pdf, (retrieved on 22.06.2013) Iglicka, K., E. Jaźwińska, E. Kępińska & P. Koryś. ‘Imigranci w Polsce w świetle badania sondażowego’ [Immigrants in Poland in the light of the survey research], CMR Working Papers No. 10, 1997, (retrieved on 12.05.2013), www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/obm/pix/010.pdf Labour Migration Assessment for the WNIS Region, International Organization for Migration, Kiev, 2007.

Kaczmarczyk, P. & J. Napierała. ‘Labour market developments’, in M. Kupiszewski (ed.), Demographic developments, labour markets and international migration in Poland – policy challenges, 19-33, CEFMR Working Paper 3/2007.

Kalicka V. et al., Establishment of the middle class in Ukraine: dominating idea of national strategy of Ukraine (Становлення середнього класу в Україні: домінанта національної стратегії України), Kyiv, 2009.

Kindler Marta. Risk and Risk Strategies in Migration: Ukrainian Domestic Workers in Poland, (retrieved on 21.03.2013), http://laborarchive.blogspot.com/2011/10/ukrainiandomestic-workers-in-poland.html Kloc-Nowak W. Funkcjonowanie imigrantek z Ukrainy na polskim rynku pracy – sytuacja obecna i rekomendacje dla społeczeństwa przyjmującego, in: Analizy, Raporty, Ekspertyzy, SIP: Warszawa, nr 9/2007.

Konieczna, Joanna. Polacy-Ukraińcy, Polska-Ukraina. Paradoksy stosunków sąsiedzkich.[Polish-Ukrainians, Poland-Ukraine. The paradoxs of neitbouring relations] Uniwersytet Warszawski, Warsaw, 2003.

Konieczna, Joanna. Polska – Ukraina: wzajemny wizerunek [Poland-Ukraine: mutual image] Institute of Public Affairs, Warszawa 2001.

Kowal P., J. Ołdakowski, M. Zuchniak (red.), Nie jesteśmy ukrainofilami: polska myśl polityczna wobec Ukraińców i Ukrainy: antologia tekstów, Kolegium Europy Wschodniej, Wrocław, 2002 Kupiszewski M. (ed.) ‘Demographic developments, labour markets and international migration in Poland - policy challenges’. CEFMR Working Paper 3/2007, Warsaw, 2007.

Libanova E., Malynovska O. Social Impact of Emigration and Rural-Urban Migration in Central and Eastern Europe. Final Country Report: Ukraine. European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion, 2012.

Libanova, E., (ed.), Complex demographic research in Ukraine, (Комплексне демографічне дослідження в Україні). Ukrainian center for social reforms, Kyiv, 2005.

Migration in Ukraine: A Country Profile 2008. International Organization for Migration (IOM), Kiev, 2008.

Mrozowski M. ‘Obrazy cudzoziemców i imigrantów w Polsce’ [The images of foreigners and immigrants in Poland], in: K. Iglicka (ed.), Integracja czy dyskryminacja?

Polskie wyzwania i dylematy u progu wielokulturowości. Warszawa: ISP, 2003:184-235.

National Census of Population, Central Statistical Office of Poland, Warszawa 2002.

Office for Foreigners in Poland. Statistics, (retrieved on 11.05.2013), http://www.udsc.gov.pl/Zestawienia,roczne,233.html Okólski M. ‘The effects of political and economic transition on international migration in Central and Eastern Europe’, in: Massey, D.S., Taylor, J.E. (eds.), International migration: prospects and policies in global market. Oxford University Press, 2004c.

Okólski, M. ‘Najnowszy ruch wędrówkowy z Ukrainy do Polski. Charakterystyka strumieni, cech migrantów i okoliczności pobytu w Polsce’ [Recent mobility from Ukraine to Poland. Characteristics of the flows, the migrants and their stay in Poland], CMR Working Papers No. 14, 1997a, (retrieved on 11.08.2013), www.migracje.uw.edu.pl/obm/pix/014.pdf.

29

Razumkov Centre Sociological Service, 2010, (retrieved on 08.03.2013), http://www.razumkov.org.ua/upload/Yurchyshyn_SIDA_employment_poll.pdf Sjaastad, L. A. "The Costs and Returns of Human Migration," The Journal of Political Ecomomy, 70, 1962:80-93.

Szylko-Skoczny M., Duszczyk M. Polish immigration policy – opportunities and challenges for the labour market. University of Warsaw, Institute of Social Policy, 2010, http://www.ips.uw.edu.pl/pliki/badania/politimigrac_rynekpracy2010/immigr_policy_en.pdf, (retrieved on 11.05.2013).

The Demographic Yearbook of Poland 2012. Central Statistical Office of Poland, Warszawa, 2012.

Ukrainian Society 1992-2006. (Eds.) V.Vorona, M.Shulga, Kyiv, Institute of Sociology NAC, 2006.

30