Bad neighbours? Roma diaspora and radical right electoral performance in Central Eastern Europe

2015–2016

ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research Diasporas, nation states and mainstream societies in Central and Eastern Europe

Bad neighbours? Roma diaspora and radical right electoral performance in Central Eastern Europe Marta K. Rado Kornel J. Laszlo

BAD NEIGHBOURS? ROMA DIASPORA AND RADICAL RIGHT ELECTORAL PERFORMANCE IN CENTRAL EASTERN EUROPE Marta K. Rado & Kornel J. Laszlo Final Draft Version This research project was developed within the ERSTE Foundation Fellowship for Social Research 2015/2016

ABSTRACT By applying both quantitative and qualitative methodologies, our research explores the link between the share of Roma diasporas and radical right electoral performance in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). In other words, the present study investigates whether geographical proximity to Romani communities can influence far-right voting in post-socialist countries.

Based on theoretical models developed by social psychologists, we assumed that the presence of Roma people will affect electoral behavior the same way as immigrant populations do in Western societies. Quite surprisingly, our analysis revealed a highly controversial pattern.

While in the cross-national context, we found clear indications for a positive association, the individual level analysis has failed to prove that Romani communities would influence radical right voting in either way. By conducting nineteen semi-structured interviews with far-right supporters, we were expecting to clarify the theoretical link between minorities, prejudices and extreme right support across the post-communist region. In short, our study found that individual perception on the number of Roma might be a key factor to understand radical right electoral behavior in CEE countries.

KEY WORDS Radical right parties; Romani; Central and Eastern Europe; ethnic competition; welfare chauvinism; intergroup contact.

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TABLE OF CONTENT

I. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 4 II. THE KEY THEORIES ................................................................................................................ 5 RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORIES ....................................................................................... 6 INTERGROUP CONTACT THEORY ............................................................................................. 7 III. WESTERN THEORIES IN EASTERN CONTEXT ......................................................... 8 ETHNIC CONCEPT OF THE NATION STATE ............................................................................ 8 INSECURITY AND CRIME ............................................................................................................. 9 ROLE IN UNEMPLOYMENT ....................................................................................................... 10 EXPLOITATION OF THE WELFARE STATE............................................................................ 10 SUMMARY ...................................................................................................................................... 11 IV. RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA & METHODOLOGY ...................................................... 13 QUANTITATIVE PHASE............................................................................................................... 13 DEPENDENT VARIABLE ............................................................................................................. 14 INDEPENDENT VARIABLE......................................................................................................... 15 CONTROL VARIABLES ................................................................................................................ 16 QUALITATIVE PHASE .................................................................................................................. 17 V. DATA ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................... 17 THE INTERVIEWS ........................................................................................................................ 19 VI. CONCLUSIONS ........................................................................................................................ 21 VII. REFERENCE LIST ................................................................................................................ 23

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ATAKA CCEB CEE EED EP ESS EU EUMC FN GERB INSSE JOBBIK KSH MIEP NA NSI OECD PRC PRM RRP SNS SOSR TARKI VB

Attack Party Bulgaria Candidate Countries Eurobarometer Central and Eastern Europe European Election Database European Parliament European Social Survey European Union European Union Military Committee Front National Grazhdani za Evropeisko Razvitie na Bulgaria Romanian National Institute of Statistics Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom Hungarian Central Statistical Office Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja Latvian National Alliance National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Pew Research Center Partidul Romania Mare Radical Right Party Slovenska Narodna Strana Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic Tárki Social Research Institute Vlaams Blok

BG CZ EE HR LV LT HU PL RO SI SK

Bulgaria Czech Republic Estonia Croatia Latvia Lithuania Hungary Poland Romania Slovenia Slovakia

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I. INTRODUCTION Radical right parties (RRPs) are one of the most successful political formations appeared after the Second World War, and became popular in both sides of the former Iron Curtain (Mudde, 2014). In fact, observers of the last elections to the European Parliament (EP) have described their results as a 'political earthquake' across the old continent (Savage, 2014).

From France and Sweden to Greece and Hungary, right-wing extremists are becoming more and more influential actors in politics (Ramalingam, 2014). On top of that, their antiestablishment ideology which is often associated with xenophobia, racism and Euroscepticism have increasingly intertwined with mainstream politics (Goodwin, 2012). In order to explain why far-right parties became popular, scholars have proposed multiple different theories. According to Tim Bale, however, there are still less ’known knowns’ than ‘known unknowns’ (Bale, 2012). While many authors identified economic performance (Fukuyama, 1992; Lewis-Beck et al., 1993; Minkenberg et al., 2007), unemployment rates (Jackman & Volper, 1996; Arzheimer, 2009; Polyakova, 2013), and immigration (Kitschelt, 1995; Schain, 2002; Coffé, 2007) as key variables for radical right electoral success, there is surprisingly scant scholarship on such ethnic minorities as the Roma community in postcommunist countries.

In their volumes on European radicals, Kitschelt (1995), Schain (2002) and Norris (2005) argued that there is no clear relationship between the share of ethnic minorities and extreme right electoral performance in any given country. Others nonetheless suggested that large migrant communities could indeed facilitate far-right voting. Coffé (2007), for instance, demonstrated that the Belgian Vlaams Blok (VB) was substantially more successful in districts populated by immigrants, meanwhile similar findings have been revealed in other Western European countries (Lubbers & Scheepers, 2000; Mayer, 2002; Golder, 2003; Swank et al., 2003). Quite surprisingly, many scholars found empirical evidence for the opposite (negative) relationship as well. As Perrineau (1997), Chapin (1997) and Martin (1998) pointed out, the fact that migrants are absent in some geographical regions could also increase far-right voting. By making the interpretation more challenging, De Vos and his colleagues (1999) demonstrated that extreme right vote share was significantly higher in neighborhoods with Turkish and Moroccan immigrants, while other foreigners had no impact on the correlation. Although these findings seem to contradict each other at first glance, our piece will argue that they can be explained by the differences between interactions, as well as by theoretical shortcomings.

Although studying the link between Western radicals and immigration turned into a minor industry, research on new member states have remained relatively sparse (Mudde, 2007).

Despite the widespread indignation across the continent, academic work on the regional farright has been humble up until recently (Political Capital, 2010). According to Michael Minkenberg, such limited attention can be explained by the fact that "studying the radical right in (...) Central and Eastern Europe not only resembles shooting at a moving target but also shooting with clouded vision" (Minkenberg, 2002, p. 6). In the same volume, however, Minkenberg demonstrated that their opportunity structures are shaped by anti-Roma sentiments, nationalism and territorial concerns. In other words, as Herbert Kitschelt noted, member states with "the greatest potential for radical right mobilization are those with small, entrenched ethnic minorities" (Kitschelt, 2009, p. 14).

Page |5 In sharp contrast to existing studies on the topic, our paper applies mixed methodology in order to gain deeper understanding about the link between the share of Romani diaspora (independent variable) and radical right electoral performance (dependent variable) in Central East Europe. Based on the suggestions of past research (De Vos & Deurloo, 1999; Scheepers, 2011; Rydgren, 2013), our study examined whether the size of Roma communities can influence far-right electoral results in four countries. Selected member states included Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia. Besides the fact that these countries have the largest Roma communities, previous studies also suggested (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Beichelt et al., 2002; Pirro, 2014) that RRPs in these states represent the diverse patterns of emergence, and the swinging results of post-communist radicals. In order to support these associations theoretically, our study will explore whether assumptions suggested by (a) relative deprivation and (b) intergroup contact theory could hold both for immigrants in Western Europe, and for Roma in CEE countries. On top of that, by conducting semi-structured interviews with radical right voters, our contribution is expecting to describe the theoretical link between minorities, prejudices and far-right support across the post-communist region.

In summary, the following sections will first provide a literature review on theories linking radical right parties to immigration in old member states of the European Union. In the second step, our contribution will discuss that in what extent can one apply these theories which were developed for migrants on the West - to Romani communities living in postsocialist member states. Further in the fourth and fifth sections, our paper will discuss the research design, summarize the key empirical findings, and consider certain limitations of the present analysis.

II. THE KEY THEORIES Scholars studying the radical right today are in agreement that immigration is a fundamental concern for Western European extremists (Rydgren, 2007). Despite the relatively strict regulations, labor markets today include roughly nine percent of foreign-born workforce across the old member states (OECD, 2014). By recognizing the importance of immigration in far-right politics, studies have started to investigate the link between foreigners and radical right voting. As a result of this, some scholars argued that anti-immigration sentiments can serve as mediating factors connecting them together (Lubbers et al., 2002; Norris, 2005).

Although not every xenophobic citizen would vote for radical right candidates, supporters of extremist parties are more likely to have concerns over migration than the average. In fact, a report on the European Social Survey (Rydgren, 2008) concluded that 93 percent of Austrian, 89 percent of Danish, and 82 percent of French far right advocates would allow 'only a few immigrants' into their countries.

In their seminal article, Bobo and Fox (2003) suggested that in order to understand hostility against minorities, one should consider both individual and contextual level factors. Indeed, concepts such as relative deprivation or intergroup contact theory could provide suitable frameworks for linking large minorities as a contextual factor to individual preconceptions (Blalock, 1967; Kitschelt, 1997; Coenders et al., 2002). While many scholars (Fosset & Kiecolt, 1989; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov, 2006) found empirical evidence for a positive relationship between sizeable outgroups and widespread prejudices, others could not confirm the hypotheses of relative deprivation models (Coenders et al., 2005; Evans & Need,

Page |6 2002; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Yet, even more surprisingly, some authors revealed significant negative correlations, and thus turned to a different concept called intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954; Wagner et al., 2006; Lubbers, 2006). In the following paragraphs, we will discuss in details these approaches: first (a) the relative deprivation theories, and then (b) the intergroup contact approach.

RELATIVE DEPRIVATION THEORIES Relative deprivation theories represent a branch of concepts which all assume that there is a positive relationship between large ethnic minorities and widespread prejudices (Pettigrew, 2002; Arzheimer, 2009). Nevertheless, for the present study, we should limit our discussion to the three most relevant models: (1) the group threat theory, (2) the ethnic competition theory, and finally (3) to welfare chauvinism. One of the first attempts to associate ethnic populations with individual-level prejudices was called group threat theory (Blalock, 1967).

In his groundbreaking volume, Hubert Blalock, an American sociologist suggested that group "competition over scarce resources" drives people to express anti-outgroup sentiments. The underlying logic behind this model constitutes two main steps: the first one implies that competition for insufficient resources fosters group competition, while the second claims that individuals react with exclusionary behavior. According to some authors that contributed to the concept, scarce resources can be both tangible and intangible commodities like employment, religion or language (Allport, 1954; Coser, 1956). Moreover, as Quillian (1995) and Bobo (1999) pointed out sharply, negative sentiments can also serve as 'protection shields' for the group interest.

In order to improve the basic model, some scholars proposed an alternative approach later known as the ethnic competition theory. In fact, this concept originates from two supplementary models, notably from realistic group conflict and social identity theory (Coenders et al., 2002). While the former presumes that competition between ethnic or immigrant communities triggers confrontation over values (Coser, 1956; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Austin & Worchel, 1979), the latter involves psychological approaches to explain hostile feelings (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1982; Brown, 2000). Besides actual rivalry, realistic group conflict identifies perceived competition on the contextual level and links it to individual prejudices. On the other hand, social identity theory claims that people tend to perceive their own community (ingroup) as something superior to any other groups (outgroup). In summary, ethnic competition theory combines these models, and focuses on the integration of "dispositional notions from social identity theory with the situational notions from realistic group conflict theory" (Coenders et al., 2004, p. 16). In other words, perceived threat works as a mediator between individual or group level determinants and hostile attitudes toward minorities.

Besides ethnic competition and group threat, the last approach has to be mentioned here is called welfare chauvinism. Briefly, this model sums up those ambiguous ideas which "support a system of social protection [only] for those who belong to the ethnically defined community and who have contributed to it" (Kitschelt, 1997, p. 22). Among many others, Scheepers (2011) also argued that the combination of sizeable migrant communities with 'comprehensive welfare provision' could indeed result welfare chauvinism in certain groups of voters. His article suggested that some citizens are convinced that 'non-native' ethnic groups exploit the welfare state, which will contribute to austerity measures. According to

Page |7 Kitschelt (1997), such mechanism also increases support for radical right-wing parties which are promoting xenophobic ideology. While some pieces argued (Houtman, 2003; Achterberg, 2009; Van der Waal et al., 2010) that 'working-class attraction' for welfare chauvinism could be explained by cultural differences, Malchow-Moller (2008) demonstrated that socioeconomic status has a greater effect on these sentiments. Observing the individual level, many scholars have demonstrated that unemployed, uneducated, and strongly religious citizens are more likely to engage with exclusionary attitudes (Scheepers, 2002; Gijsberts et al., 2004).

INTERGROUP CONTACT THEORY Whereas relative deprivation predicts more widespread prejudices with larger outgroups, intergroup contact theory argues that hostility can also be reduced by sizeable minorities. In fact, the concept presumes that face-to-face interaction between different social groups decreases negative sentiments (Allport, 1954; Hawley, 1944; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2006).

Moreover, some scholars found that even without supportive conditions like cooperation or equal status, contacts in general could improve intergroup relations (Stein et al., 2000).

Nevertheless, it has to be noted that although daily contact at school or at work could lead to positive attitudes, not every interaction will be experienced benign (Stephan & Stephan, 1985). In fact, according to some studies, positive sentiments could be explained by selfselection: individuals with prejudices will refrain from interactions, while those with favorable behaviour remain in contact. Despite such criticism, some variants of the intergroup contact concept claim that outgroup size per se enhances the likelihood for intergroup contact (Wagner & Schlueter, 2008). Hence, by twisting the logic of relative deprivation, many authors imply that interactions are decreasing perceived threats, which in turn lowers negative intergroup sentiments. Finally, one should also mention that academic research building on the aforementioned logic is relatively scarce. One exception is Wagner, who found that "an increase in the percentage of ethnic minority members (...) reduces the majority’s prejudice" across electoral districts in Germany (Wagner et al., 2006, p. 380).

In order to sum up this section, we are now able to conclude that empirical evidence supporting the aforementioned theories are questionable at best. While some scholars (Semyonov, 2004; Ullrich, 2006; Schlueter et al., 2008) give preference to the so-called relative deprivation approaches and hence to a positive association, others (Stein et al., 2000; Tropp & Pettigrew, 2006; Wagner & Schlueter, 2008) argue for the exact opposite - not to mention those who did not find any significant correlation between the size of immigrant populations and radical right electoral success in Western European countries (Coenders et al., 2005; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). At the same time, one must also emphasize that these seemingly contrasting models are are not in direct opposition with each other. According to McLaren (2003), for instance, existing studies often forget about differences between various kinds of interactions. While a close intergroup friendship can strongly decrease hostility, rare or superficial encounter can have the opposite outcome. Besides McLaren, another possible explanation have been proposed by Blalock (1967) who suggested that people can get familiar with certain minorities but less with others. In fact, he suggested a curvilinear association between outgroup size and perceived threat. While smaller figures were associated with low level prejudices, increasing populations cause widespread hostility until a certain proportion when people do not feel threatened anymore (Blalock, 1967).

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III. WESTERN THEORIES IN EASTERN CONTEXT In the following pages, we will discuss in what extent can relative deprivation and intergroup contact theories hold for immigrants in Western Europe, and for Roma in CEE countries.

Although research in the past emphasized the differences between Eastern and Western radical right parties, more recent studies have concentrated on their similarities. Because the same ideological features (nativism, authoritarianism, populism) and similar arguments (ethnic state, criminality, unemployment, welfare) have been expressed on both sides of the former Iron Curtain, a growing body of literature implies resemblance across Europe (Zaslove, 2004; Betz & Johnson, 2004; Mudde, 2007; Webb & White, 2007; Bustikova & Kitschelt, 2009; De Lange & Guerra, 2009). In addition, some scholars have also pointed out that "similar determinants underlying unfavourable attitudes" toward minorities everywhere in the continent (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008, p. 32). Despite such a close resemblance, approaches mentioned above should be applied carefully in new member states, due to their legacy of state socialism and the absence of democratic history (Mudde, 2007).

By building on the scarce literature on this comparison, our contribution will now discuss in what extent can one apply theories which were developed for immigrants in Western Europe to Romani communities living in CEE member states. On the other hand, we will argue that assumptions of intergroup contact, ethnic competition and welfare chauvinism could hold both for foreigners on the West, and for Roma in postcommunist countries. While intuition suggests that prejudices supporting the far-right discourse are very similar in both sides of the continent, one should nonetheless clarify certain differences between them. Following the radical right's four main arguments against immigration (Rydgren, 2008), our paper will compare migrants in Western Europe to Eastern European Roma in four different aspects: (1) their alleged violation of the ethno-national identity; (2) their key role in growing insecurity and criminality; (3) their importance in high unemployment rates; and finally (4) their suspected exploitation of the welfare state.

ETHNIC CONCEPT OF THE NATION STATE In short, the ethno-nationalist doctrine argues that in order to maintain genuine national identity, different communities have to live isolated from each other because mixing might lead to the extinction of cultures (Taguieff, 1988; Minkenberg, 1997; Griffin, 2000). Indeed, far-right discourses across Europe often implied that national identities have the right to protect themselves. By extending the basic concept, Mudde (2007) proposed the notion of nativism that could link Eastern and Western extremism together. By nativism he meant "an ideology which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state" (Mudde, 2007, p. 19). According to Mudde, this notion applies both to Western radicals focusing on immigrants, and to the Eastern European far-right targeting Roma. However, as radical politics in old member states are focusing on recent migration, CEE extremists mobilizing against minorities that have been living there for centuries, and sometimes indistinguishable from the native population (Rothschild et al., 2000). In order to understand such logic, one should recall ethnic competition theory which claims that people perceive their own community superior to others, which eventually leads to value competition between them (Tajfel, 1981; Coenders et al., 2002).

Page |9 Table 1. Negative sentiments against Roma and other ethnic minorities.

Bulgaria

Hungary

Romania

Slovakia

General negative sentiments against Roma

60

69

66

78

General negative sentiments against other minorities

30

33

42

*

Feeling uncomfortable living next to a Roma family

36

29

20

40

Minorities increase insecurity

38

54

*

50

Diversity is disadvantageous

47

67

40

46

Source: Eurobarometer (65.4, 69.1, 71.3); PRC (2009); CCEB (2003).

Not very surprisingly, scholars were able to observe such tendencies in post-communist countries as well, where the division between citizenship and nationality, as well as the ethnic concept of nation states are widespread within societies (Hockenos, 1993; Zubrzycki, 2001).

According to the latest Eurobarometer surveys, for instance, more than two third of the Hungarian population thinks that diversity in races, religions or culture could not contribute to the national identity, while roughly half of the Romanian, Slovakian and Bulgarian respondents replied the same (CCEB, 2013). On top of that, a survey conducted by the Hungarian Tรกrki Institute found that 59 percent felt hostility against the Pirez, an ethnic group which is completely fictional (Tarki, 2006).

Although regional minorities in general became a major concern for populist radical parties shortly after the socialism, Romani citizens are the primary targets of discrimination across new member states (Pirro, 2014). In fact, the popular perception of Roma is fuelled by more hostile and discriminative emotional content than to any other groups in the region (Csepeli & Simon, 2007). Surveys on Central and Eastern Europe revealed that 40 percent in Slovakia, 36 percent in Bulgaria, and 29 percent in Hungary felt uncomfortable living next to a Roma family (Eurobarometer 69.1). In summary, one might be able to conclude now that the ethnonationalist doctrine - or in other words the nativist idea - can be found in both sides of the European Union, and is directed against the relevant populations.

INSECURITY AND CRIME In his research on Western European radicalism, Rydgren (2008) demonstrated that discourses connecting immigration to criminality are highly effective electoral strategies for mobilising support toward far-right parties. In fact, his analysis of six European countries indicated that voters who believe that foreign migration increases criminality were more likely to support the radical right. As it has been suggested above, such beliefs are also widespread across the East European region. A recent survey conducted by the Hungarian Tรกrki revealed that 60 per cent of the respondents agree that 'criminality is in the blood of

P a g e | 10 Roma people' (TĂĄrki, 2014). In fact, the popular perception of ethnic groups is not very different in other post-socialist states either. According to the latest Eurobarometer surveys, more than half of the Slovak population was convinced that minorities are increasing insecurity (Eurobarometer 71.3), whereas 78 percent seen them as suspicious people (Pew Research Center, 2009).

Besides outgroups in general, Roma communities are the primary associations with criminality in Central East European states. In Bulgaria, for instance, 60 percent of the population views Roma as unfavourable, while 'only' 30 percent thinks the same about Turks (Pew Research Center, 2009). In certain regions, reactions to the alleged Roma criminality has been particularly worrying. European Commissioner Androulla Vassiliou, for example, had to warn the Slovakian authorities to remove a wall separating Romani from the rest of a town (BBC News, 20 August, 2013), while a group of Hungarian skinheads have been sentenced to jail for murdering six Roma, including a whole family (Kreko, 2014). As a closing note, one might be now able to conclude that discourses linking ethnic minorities to criminality are as widespread in old member states as among the new ones.

ROLE IN UNEMPLOYMENT According to Rydgren's (2008) concise description, radical right parties in Western Europe often describe immigration as the major source of unemployment. In fact, relative deprivation theories have also confirmed that substantial foreign communities are perceived by the majority as competitors on the labour market (CoffĂŠ, 2007). In his public speech in the early 2000s, Jacques Chirac, the President of France that time pointed out that "if there were fewer immigrants, there would be less unemployment, less tension in certain towns, and a lower social costs" (Marcus, 2005, p. 136). Moreover, according to the Eurobarometer surveys, more than half of the West European population believes that immigrant groups are the 'reason for unemployment' (EUMC, 2001).

While such interpretations appears to be widespread across the EU's old member states, farright politics in Central East Europe are focusing less on jobs, and more on the alleged exploitation of welfare benefits by Roma communities. Since unemployment rates among Romani are significantly higher than the average, the popular argument concludes that they are inherently 'lazy, irresponsible and they do not like to work' (Moravkova, 2008; McGarry, 2012). Hence unlike migrants in Western Europe - and despite what group threat theory suggests - Romani are less likely to be seen as competitors on the labor market, but more as 'parasites' of the generous welfare state. As a conclusion, it must be acknowledged that there are fundamental differences in radical right discourses linking jobs to ethnic minorities.

While Western extremism blames immigration for unemployment, Eastern radicals portray Romani as people unwilling to find a job (Csepeli & Simon, 2007).

EXPLOITATION OF THE WELFARE STATE In their volume on far-right politics, Scheepers and his colleagues (2011) suggested that Western European radicals are convinced that 'non-native' ethnic groups exploit the welfare state, which could contribute to the subsequent austerity measures. Moreover, Eurobarometer surveys have revealed that more than fifty percent on the West supported the argument that foreign immigrants "abuse the system of social welfare" (EUMC, 2001).

P a g e | 11 According to Csepeli and Simon (2007) – and as it was indicated above – these assumptions could hold very much for the Central and Eastern European region as well. In their paper on regional minorities, the two scholars demonstrated that there is a broad consensus within these societies that "the Roma are living solely on welfare and charity" (ibid, p. 25). In addition, Csepeli and Simon also pointed out that "very often members of the respective majority groups, including leading politicians, share the view that the major part of the country’s social expenditure goes to Roma families at the expense of poor and lonely old people as well as other vulnerable members of the majority" (Csepeli & Simon, 2007, p. 13).

On top of that, as it has been already mentioned above, the popular prejudice also states that Romani are inherently 'lazy, irresponsible and they do not like to work' (Moravkova, 2008; McGarry, 2012). In order to support these statements empirically, one might recall a representative survey conducted in Bulgaria which found that 86 per cent of the population was convinced that 'Roma are irresponsible and lazy' (Bulgarian Helsinki Committee, 2006).

As a closing note, one could now claim that the argument known as the 'alleged exploitation of the welfare state' can hold in both sides of the former Iron Curtain.

SUMMARY In general, this section may now be able to conclude that the radical right's perception of immigrants in Western Europe, and Roma in CEE states is highly corresponding but not identical. In fact, in three out of four cases (ethnic state, criminality and welfare exploitation), our contribution was able to identify analogous discourses in both parts of the continent - not to mention those ideological similarities as the expression of nativism, populism and authoritarianism. One the other hand, however, one must also acknowledge at least one fundamental difference between the Eastern and Western patterns. Notably, that unlike immigrants in old member states, Romani are less likely to be seen as competitors on the labor market, and more like 'parasites' of the generous welfare state. According to Csepeli and Simon (2007), such tendencies can be explained by the exceptionally high unemployment rates among Roma citizens. In the following paragraphs, we will discuss in details what are the direct consequences of such differences on the theories that have been summarized in the previous section.

Starting with group threat theory, our study argues that this model cannot hold for Roma in CEE states because in comparison to immigrants in Western countries, they are underrepresented on the labor market (Csepeli & Simon, 2007). Therefore, one could not apply its logic to the post-communist context since the concept focuses on the competition over scarce resources rather than rivalry for values. In contrast to the group threat concept, however, the advantage of the ethnic competition model lies in the fact that it is emphasizing conflict between values, while it recognizes the importance of the contextual factors.

According to this approach, perceived threat is mediating between group level determinants and hostile attitudes toward minorities, which makes it a particularly suitable theoretical framework for our investigation. On the other hand, although ethnic competition serves as a backbone of our study, it cannot describe the post-communist context unless it is integrated into welfare chauvinism. Since the 'welfare state exploitation' argument holds everywhere in Europe, one may now conclude that welfare chauvinism is indeed an appropriate model for the present analysis.

P a g e | 12 In addition, it must be also emphasized that low Roma employment might have an impact on intergroup contact theory as well. Like it was suggested earlier, existing studies often underestimated deviation between the different type of interactions. While a close collegial relationship, for instance, can decrease hostility toward minorities, rare or superficial contact may result the opposite (McLaren, 2003). In fact, in case of Eastern European Roma, it is much more likely to observe an accidental meeting than a close intergroup friendship.

Chances for personal interaction with Romani are limited, since they are underrepresented in workplaces (high unemployment rates), separated in schools (educational segregation) and facing with widespread prejudices (Ivanov et al., 2006; Jaroka, 2007). In summary, our paper suggests that assumptions proposed by ethnic competition theory and welfare chauvinism might hold in every corner of the European Union with certain restrictions.

Meanwhile, the intergroup contact model functions mainly in situations when interactions are going beyond the superficial level. Since it has been shown that these seemingly contrasting models are not in direct opposition with each other, the following four hypotheses could be formulated for the analysis: 

A higher share of Romani population indicates a higher share of radical right votes in Central and Eastern European countries (H1a).



A higher share of Romani population indicates a lower share of radical right votes in Central and Eastern European countries (H1b).



A higher share of Romani population indicates a higher share of radical right votes on the regional level within Central and Eastern European countries (H2a).



A higher share of Romani population indicates a lower share of radical right votes on the regional level within Central and Eastern European countries (H2b).

P a g e | 13

IV. RESEARCH DESIGN: DATA & METHODOLOGY In sharp contrast to existing studies on the topic, our paper applied mixed methodology in order to gain deeper understanding about the link between the share of Romani diaspora and radical right electoral performance in Central Eastern Europe. In other words, our research design combined both quantitative and qualitative data sources. Traditionally, these two methods are divided into a more positivist and a more interpretivist approach. While quantitative data is considered to provide numeric and generalizable conclusions, qualitative analysis can offer rich observational details.

Despite the initial reluctance of some researchers, an increasing number of studies are considering the combination of these two methods beneficial for investigation (Greene, Caracelli & Graham, 1989; Onwuegbuzie-Leech, 2005). By and large, the present paper applies an explanatory sequential design for the empirical analysis, which appears to be the most suitable choice over the various possible mixed method types (Kirรกly et al., 2014; Creswell, Plano & Clark, 2011). More specifically, the analysis starts with the quantitative investigation which is subsequently developed into a qualitative interview guide supported by the initial results (see in Figure 1). In the following few paragraphs, we will elaborate these stages in details.

Figure 1. Description of explanatory sequential design Stage 1.

Quantitative Analysis

Builds into

Stage 2.

Qualitative Analysis

QUANTITATIVE PHASE As the figure above indicates, a quantitative analysis had been the first stage of the present paper. Based on the suggestions of existing research (De Vos & Deurloo, 1999; Scheepers, 2011; Rydgren, 2013), our study examined whether the size of Romani communities can influence far-right electoral performance on the regional level in four Central East European countries. Selected member states included Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.

Besides the fact that these countries have the largest Roma communities, previous studies also suggested (Kitschelt et al., 1999; Beichelt et al., 2002; Pirro, 2014) that RRPs in these states represent the diverse patterns of emergence, and the swinging electoral results of postcommunist radicals. Generally speaking, we have tested three models which were built gradually on each other. While the first one was a (1) single two dimensional correlation, the second also (2) included variables on the regional level which were then accompanied by (3) individual level controls to establish the third model.

For the first and second step, data has been collected from the European Election Database (EED) and from the latest local censuses conducted by the National Statistical Institute of Bulgaria (NSI, 2011), the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH, 2011), the Romanian National Institute of Statistics (INSSE, 2011), and the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic (SOSR, 2011). In order to build the third model, however, information had to be gathered from the European Social Survey (ESS), which provided details about Hungary, Romania,

P a g e | 14 Slovakia and Bulgaria from 2008. Although ESS collected data in 2010 and 2012 as well, these projects did not include all CEE countries which were subjects of our study. Therefore, international comparison has been conducted on the dataset from 2008. Because the survey from this year did not contain enough observations for Hungary, the analysis was extended to the year 2012 as well. Besides the fact that it could raise the validity of our research, it also provided a great opportunity to observe change over time.

In terms of statistical models, our regional level investigation applied logistic regression. It is nonetheless important to note here that the present study examined geographical regions which were given in the ESS 2008/2012 dataset (NUTS3 in the case of Bulgaria, and NUTS 2 in Hungary, Romania and Slovakia). Because individuals reside in regions and regions are located within countries, the dataset had a so-called clustered structure. Accordingly, our study distinguished regional level variables (e.g. the share of Romani diaspora in the region) and individual level variables (e.g. support for far-right parties or gender). Such clustered structure is taken into account by applying robust variance estimates and setting regions as the primary sampling units (Kish & Frankel, 1974; Fuller, 1975; Binder, 1983). Descriptions for these geographical units can be found in Figure 2., Figure 3. and Figure 4. attached to the appendix.

DEPENDENT VARIABLE Like it has been suggested above, our dependent variable refers to the electoral performance of extreme right-wing parties first in the regional context within CEE member states, and then on the individual level. Focusing on the lower level provides many advantages over the more aggregate data: a) the present research could be applied on a more extended dataset, and b) it could avoid the common misinterpretation known as the ecological fallacy. In the European Social Survey dataset, far-right support was measured by asking people the following question: 'Is there a particular political party you feel closer to than all the other parties?' and if the respondent had answered positively than this person was asked to specify her choice. The 'support for national radicalism' variable took on value (1) if the respondent felt close to a radical right party in question and (0) when the respondent did not feel close to such political movement. Distribution of the variable by countries can be found in Table 2.

In his seminal article, Mudde (2011) pointed out that no other party family could attract as much attention as the extreme right. Depicted by countless terms and definitions such as far right, radical right, extreme right or neofascism, these political movements filled thousand pages in journal articles and newspapers. Despite the general impetus, research on the Eastern European region has remained scattered due to the extreme right's modest electoral results during the 1990s (Bustikova, 2014). Indeed, the performance of far-right parties in CEE have varied substantially across countries and over time. According to Bustikova (2014), one might be able to distinguish three types of states in post-communist Europe. Within the first group of countries, right-wing extremism has been significant since the fall of the Berlin Wall, but electoral results might swing over time. In the second category, the far right has never been noteworthy, whereas the third type includes states where radical right parties have emerged, but also faded away with the years.

Throughout this paper, we will focus on the first category, notably the Ataka from Bulgaria, the Jobbik Magyarorszagert Mozgalom (Jobbik) from Hungary, the Partidul Romania Mare

P a g e | 15 (PRM) from Romania, and the Slovenska Narodna Strana (SNS) from Slovakia. In the present contribution, we did not consider the Latvian National Alliance (NA) as a postcommunist radical right party, although they undoubtedly do have a few extremist politicians. Political parties selected for the present analysis have gained significant yet unstable electoral results in the past few years, and could therefore portray the genuine situation within the Central Eastern European region. However, one should also note here that the designated political groups have appeared or re-appeared over the third wave of post-socialist elections, representing a relatively distinct period of right-wing radicalism (Pop-Eleches & Tucker, 2010; Pirro, 2014).

INDEPENDENT VARIABLE After briefly reviewing the regional extreme right, our study will now focus on the independent variable, namely the share of Romani people in new member states. In similar research, scholars recommended outgroup size as a key variable, by defining it as the percentage of ethnic group members compared to the total population in a given geographical area (Blalock, 1967; Coenders, 2001; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002). In their study on Hungarian Roma, however, LadĂĄnyi and SzelĂŠnyi (2001) raised the most puzzling question on this topic, notably the size of the Romani diaspora within a country. By comparing different approaches from self-assessment to the enumerator's opinion, the authors concluded that this problem cannot be solved by a single research method because the observed populations deviate significantly from each other. Therefore, they pointed out that there is no accurate method for counting Roma in any given country.

Moreover, while statistical offices in our designated countries collected data voluntarily, there are minor differences in their methodologies as well. In cases where ethnicity was not available, for instance, Hungarian and Romanian authorities applied 'mother tongue' or 'religion' as relevant indicators. Although validity at the national level might be problematic, regional-level estimates are still valid for the present analysis. Considering such limitations in operationalization, our research will nonetheless use national census data for estimating the spatial location and number of Roma citizens in Central East Europe.

From the European Union's estimated ten million Roma, the majority of the population resided in Eastern member states like Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Slovakia, Poland and Croatia. While the exact number of Romani citizens is widely contested among scholars, according to the latest national censuses, Romania (621.000), Bulgaria (325.000), Hungary (315.000) and Slovakia (106.000) have the four largest Roma populations in absolute terms.

Yet, the share of Romani compared to the total population shows a slightly different order.

While Bulgaria has the highest figures (4.9 percent), Hungary and Romania (3.6 and 3.3 percent) are second and third, followed by Slovakia (2 percent), Croatia (0.40) and Latvia (0.40). In other postcommunist countries, Roma communities constitutes less than 0.2 percent of the whole population.

Although the Romani diaspora have settled in Central and Eastern Europe seven centuries ago, their relation to the non-Roma majority has shifted notably over time. Before the First World War, they lived in small villages across the Habsburg empire working as fiddlers, blacksmiths or as daymen in agriculture (Ladanyi & Szelenyi, 2006). By the time of industrialization, both the traditional professions of Romani, as well as their prospects have

P a g e | 16 vanished rapidly. In the early socialist period, the state has stigmatized Roma as people living outside the class system, but subsequent political decisions increased their integration and participation on the labor market (Kovats, 2003). Despite the official statements on complete equality, racism and marginalization have never disappeared from socialist countries.

More recently, transitions to the capitalist system have resulted further impoverishment of the regional ethnic minorities (Emigh & Szelenyi, 2001; Kovats, 2003). Conditions were particularly challenging for Roma, who have suffered the most by market transition as uneducated labor (World Bank, 2003). In summary, it hardly comes as a surprise that Eastern European Romani today are facing with multiple discrimination in employment, education and housing (Jaroka, 2007). Besides the fact that they live in the most underdeveloped districts, Roma unemployment and high school dropout rates are also considerably higher than the regional averages (Ivanov et al., 2006).

CONTROL VARIABLES Besides the two key variables discussed earlier in this section, one should also include a set of control variables into the empirical analysis. Based on the existing literature, we have considered variables that would (a) lead to the over-representation of Romani people and (b) increase radical right voting. Accordingly, relevant individual and contextual level characteristics have been included as controls. While the most important factors for our regional context were unemployment rates, individual level controls included age, gender, education, activity status, religious affiliation, subjective financial well-being and whether the respondent belongs to a minority group. In addition to our own presumptions, these variables were relevant in previous research project as well (Karacsony & Rona, 2011).

However, one should also emphasize that our contribution was not formulating hypotheses on these variables.

Lastly, it must be noted that the age variable has been recoded into five groups: it takes on value (1) if the person was between 15 and 29, (2) between 30 and 39, (3) between 40 and 49, (4) between 50 and 59 and (5) when the respondent is older than 60. In turn, gender took on value (1) when the respondent was male and (2) if this person was female. Level of education has been harmonized to the five level ISCED standards, in which variables take on value (1) when the respondent has less than lower secondary education, (2) if it is lower secondary education, (3) when it is upper secondary education, (4) if it is post-secondary non-tertiary education and (5) when it is tertiary education. In terms of activity status, our study could distinguish three categories: (1) the respondent had a paid job, (2) the respondent was unemployed, and (3) the respondent had other labor market position. Further, the religious affiliation variable takes on value (1) in case of a positive answer, and (2) in negative.

Subjective financial well-being value (1) means that the respondent lives comfortably on present income, (2) that he or she copes on present income, (3) if this person said it is difficult on present income and (4) when the respondent said that it is very difficult on present income. Finally, minority status has been measured by the following question: 'Do you belong to a minority ethnic group?' This variable takes on value (1) if the respondent expressed minority membership and (0) if not.

P a g e | 17 QUALITATIVE PHASE Like it has been suggested earlier, the second phase of our research design included a qualitative data collection and its analysis. More specifically, we have conducted nineteen (19) semi-structured interviews with Hungarian radical right voters to clarify the theoretical link between minorities, prejudices and extreme right support across the post-communist region. Without listing them all here, our questions (included in the Appendix) were revolving around the doubts arising from the quantitative analysis. In particular, whether (1) individual perceptions about the share of Romani matter more than factual numbers; (2) or if the type of interaction with Roma could influence prejudices; and finally (3) it might be the case that Western theories are simply unable to describe the context of East Central Europe.

In contrast to structured interviews, the semi-structured technique permits the interviewer to deviate from the original set of questions and even to raise new ideas during the conversation (Bjornholt & Farstad, 2012). Such method appears to be the most suitable strategy to explore sensitive and complex topics while it also provided us the flexibility to clarify certain replies.

Interviews have been conducted personally between July and November 2015 in different Hungarian locations, and lasted approximately for half an hour.

While our sampling was not representative, the study nonetheless included interviewees from the Hungarian capital, from major cities and from small towns as well. Besides that, one could also observe significant differences in terms of age (19-68), gender (41.6 percent women and 58.4 percent men), education (3 respondents had only primary, 10 of them high school, and 6 university level education), religion (Catholics and atheists) and income level (from high to low income). Respondents who either voted for, or in the future planning to vote for the Jobbik were identified as far-right supporters. Hungary as a case study had been selected due to its high percentage of right-wing extremist voters, as well as the researchers' knowledge about the context and language. In order to train our interviewer (25 years old, male, university student) for semi-structured conversations, we have held three preparatory sessions and two trial interviews. Before every talk, the interviewer made sure that the respondents are informed about the goals of our paper, as well as about anonymity. In most cases, the conversation took place in a private premise where only the respondent and the interviewer were present. Nevertheless, three talks had to be conducted through telephone calls and Skype. With the confirmation of all the nineteen interviewees, conversations have been recorded (Zoom H1 Ultra-Portable Digital Audio Recorder Black) and later transcribed verbatim for the researchers.

V. DATA ANALYSIS By looking merely at the results of the last European elections, one could have the impression that there is a direct link between the size of Romani diasporas and radical right electoral performance. Indeed, countries with sizeable Roma communities appear to be the same ones that have notable extreme right movements. As the two tables suggest it below, the largest Romani populations have been found in Bulgaria (4.9 percent), Hungary (3.6 percent), Romania (3.3 percent), and Slovakia (2 percent). Surprisingly, these are the exact same countries which have or had significant far-right parties since the financial crisis started in 2008. While such figures might be tempting for many reasons, it must be emphasized that a few observed data points could only indicate a correlation but they are certainly not enough

P a g e | 18 for drawing causal conclusions. In order to avoid ecological fallacy and explore this association thoroughly, our study applied individual level dependent variables within the designated cases of Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia.

Share of Romani Population in Central East European states (2011)

Electoral Results of Far Right Parties at the European Elections (2014)

5,0

15,0

Percentage

Percentage

4,0 3,0 2,0

10,0

5,0

1,0 HU SI SK BG RO EE HR CZ LV LT PL

0,0 BG HU RO SK HR LV SI LT PL EE CZ

0,0

Source: EED (2014), KSH (2011), NSI (2011), INSSE (2011), SOSR (2011).

Like we mentioned that earlier, our paper have tested three cascading models within these countries. Whereas the first one was a (1) single two dimensional correlation, the second (2) included variables on the regional level which were then accompanied by (3) individual level controls to create the third model. In sharp contrast to our aggregate level observations, the two-dimensional analysis (Model 1) found no clear evidence that there is a relationship between the presence of Romani people and far-right voting in post-communist countries.

Nevertheless, because the share of Romani communities correlated highly with regional unemployment rates, our paper built another model that combined both of these variables into a single formula (Model 2). Although the presence of Roma had a significant effect in case of Hungary (2008) and Romania (2008), one could observe contradicting mechanisms within these two countries. While Hungarians living in poor regions tend to support Jobbik only if they are surrounded by Romani, our study found the inverse situation in Romanian provinces.

In the next step of our analysis, we have controlled for individual level variables in addition to the regional unemployment rates (Model 3). While figures from Hungary and Romania (2008) suggested that the higher share of Roma increases support for right-wing extremism, this association did not hold for Hungary four years later, when Jobbik actually became an important player in politics. In conclusion, these findings confirm our suspicion that there is no consistent evidence for a link between the presence of Romani people and radical right voting in post-communist Europe. In other words, the present paper have failed to prove that the size of Roma diasporas would influence extreme right electoral performance in a regional context.

P a g e | 19

Table 1. Radical Right Electoral Performance by Exp(B) of Regional Variables Country Bulgaria 2008

Hungary 2008

Hungary 2012

Slovakia 2008

Romania 2008

Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3

Roma 1.013 1.083 1.083 1.042 3.344 *** 3.343 *** 1.020 1.120 1.083 0.937 0.862 0.861 0.667 0.627** 0.719

Unemployment 0.906 0.955 0.431*** 0.426*** 0.927 0.941 1.052** 1.054** 1.080 1.064

(Bulgaria 2008; Hungary 2008, 2012; Romania 2008; Slovakia 2008 in Model 1, 2 and 31) THE INTERVIEWS With these contradicting results in mind, we will now turn to our qualitative findings and briefly discuss their implications for the present study. Like it has been noted earlier, our semi-structured interviews were intended to explore if certain limitations of the statistical analysis could be the reason behind such mixed figures. Above all else, whether individual perception on the share of Roma matter more than their factual numbers in Central and Eastern Europe. Based on the nineteen interviews with radical right supporters, one could argue that subjective estimates on the proportions are heavily biased. While official figures suggest that Romani communities constitute roughly 3.6 percent of the Hungarian population, most of our respondents reported that it must be between 15 and 30 percent. Not to mention those who have emphasized that such numbers are considerably higher among youth and the newborn. Nevertheless, an even more striking observation was that as we have focused on the lower context (neighborhood or street level) the share of Roma have dropped drastically - even in the case where 90 percent of the town was said to be Romani previously.

In sum, one might hence argue that individual perception on the Roma population is highly subjective and systematically under or overestimated. Without further research on the topic, however, our study cannot formulate a clear judgement about its general implications.

In the next set of questions, we have tried to shed some light on the matter whether (a) different type of interactions or (b) past experiences with Romani could influence prejudices and voting behavior. Broadly speaking, almost every single respondent have or had closer interaction (colleague, classmate or neighbour) with Roma, but only two of them mentioned friendship and one as a family member. While it is hardly surprising that right-wing radicals tend to portray Romani as lazy unemployed burglars, it was striking that neither close Model 3 contains individual-level variables as well which are not shown in this table. Further details can be found attached in the Appendix (Table NUMBERS).

1

P a g e | 20 friendship nor family bonds were able to shift such negative sentiments. In order to illustrate how rigid are these notions, one should recall the case of a middle-aged Roma respondent from the capital. At some point of the conversation, she said that "I was also expecting that my roots, my identity means some sort of advantage [in interaction with Roma], but it does not (...) They can simply fool or cheat absolutely everyone, and they can also lie to everyone".

In the same spirit, a slightly younger interviewee has claimed that her best friend is a Roma girl, but when she was asked about her experiences (positive or negative), the reply was a long list of crimes committed by Romani and nothing about the friend. Although the number of cases were limited, it appears that the type of interaction and past experiences with Roma are somehow independent both from prejudices and party preferences.

In the closing section of our conversations, we intended to clarify whether those mechanisms which hold for immigrants in Western Europe are also valid in the post-socialist context. In accordance to our prior theoretical comparison, the qualitative analysis found that prejudices between the two sides of the former Iron Curtain are surprisingly similar but not identical.

Unlike immigrants in old member states, Romani are less likely to be seen as competitors on the labor market, but more as 'parasites of the welfare state' or 'unemployed criminals'. Many of our respondents emphasized that Roma women are "giving birth to a bunch of children only to receive subsidies from the state" and "they simply do not like to work" or that "they only maintain themselves from crimes". Besides these well-known stereotypes, our study focused on the assumption of ethnic competition theory as well, which claims that conflict between values and culture can explain negative sentiments against outgroups. In sharp contrast to what previous studies found, our interviews have demonstrated that there are no such preconceptions against Roma. In fact, all interviewees strongly disagreed with the statements that Romani culture, values or language can violate the Hungarian one under any circumstances. Quite surprisingly, most of them did disagree with the sentence that Hungarian culture is superior to Roma as well.

As a closing remark, it might be important to note here that in all but three cases, respondents expressed without asking that the so-called 'Roma question' is one of the key reasons why they vote for far-right parties. According to one interviewee, "it is really important, because they are a large ethnic minority and there is no real discussion about it since the market transition in Hungary (...) Before every single election, we should talk about it (...) to talk about which party dares to deal with the question. This would influence the voters in a negative or a positive direction... ", she said. One the flip side, with one single exception, all respondents did agree with the statement that living close to Roma people means a better understanding of 'what is wrong' with them. In other words, we have been reassured that geographical proximity to Romani might be a key factor for understanding radical right voting.

P a g e | 21

VI. CONCLUSIONS As it was briefly mentioned in our introduction, the comeback of radical right-wing parties across the European Union is a great concern for member states today. While many scholars appointed economic conditions, unemployment rates and immigration as key variables for extreme right electoral success, there is surprisingly limited scholarship on such ethnic minorities as the Roma in Central and Eastern Europe. By applying mixed methodology, our paper explored the association between the share of Romani diasporas and radical right electoral performance in post-socialist countries. In other words, present study investigated whether geographical proximity to Roma communities can influence far-right voting in new member states of the European Union.

Based on two theoretical models developed by social psychologists (relative deprivation and intergroup contact), we were assuming that the presence of Roma people will affect electoral behavior the same way as immigrant populations do in Western societies. Quite surprisingly, our analysis revealed a highly controversial pattern: while we found clear indications for a positive association in the cross-national context, the individual level analysis has failed to prove that Romani communities would influence radical right voting in either way. By looking merely at the results of the last European elections, one could easily come to the conclusion that there is a self-evident link between the size of Romani diasporas and far right electoral performance. Member states with populous Roma communities coincide with those that have prominent extreme right movements (Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia).

Nevertheless, in order to avoid ecological fallacy, we also included individual level dependent variables which confirmed our suspicion that there is no consistent link between the presence of Romani people and radical right voting in post-communist Europe. Closure to Roma had a significant effect only in Hungary and Romania with substantial limitations.

With such ambivalent results in mind, we have turned to the qualitative findings expecting to resolve at least some of the inconsistencies. In short, our set of questions were revolving around topics whether (1) individual perceptions, (2) the type of interaction or (3) theoretical shortcomings could explain these mixed findings. Based on the nineteen semi-structured interviews, we mainly argued that subjective estimates on the number of Roma are heavily biased. While official figures suggest that Romani communities constitute 3.6 percent of the Hungarian population, most respondents believe that it is between 15 and 30. Moreover, it also became certain that different type of interaction with Roma is independent both from prejudices and party preferences. Neither friendship nor family ties could influence negative sentiments. As an example, one should recall the case of a Romani far-right voter who said that "I was also expecting that my roots, my identity means some sort of advantage [in interaction with Roma], but it does not (...) They can simply fool or cheat absolutely everyone, and they can also lie to everyone".

Ultimately, by building on the existing literature and our interviews, we also found that the mechanisms linking minorities and individual preconceptions are surprisingly similar but not identical in the two sides of the former Iron Curtain. Unlike immigrants in old member states of the European Union, Romani are less likely to be seen as competitors on the labor market, and more as 'parasites of the welfare state' or even 'unemployed criminals'. Besides these well-researched stereotypes, our study also did review the key assumption of ethnic competition theory, which claims that conflict between different values and culture might

P a g e | 22 explain the negative sentiments against minorities. In sharp contrast to existing studies, our interviews have demonstrated that there are no such preconceptions against Roma. As a matter of fact, interviewees did strongly disagree with the statements that Romani culture, values or language would violate the Hungarian one under any circumstances. In the same vein, most of them did not agree with the sentence either that Hungarian culture would be superior to Roma.

According to the empirical evidence presented above, one cannot formulate a clear judgement about the link between Romani communities and extreme right electoral success within new member states of the European Union. In other words, those models that have been developed for the Western European context could describe social tension in CEE countries only with limitations. Although the so-called welfare chauvinism theory seems to explain the relationship in the cross-national context, the lower level analysis have shown inconclusive patterns. Without further research on individual perceptions, therefore, one cannot have a definite answer why approaches function better for Roma in some countries and not in others.

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P a g e | 32

VIII. APPENDIX Figure 2: NUT 2 in Hungary

Hungary

Central regio

347 individuals

Middle- Transdanubia

208 individuals

West- Transdanubia

176 individuals

South-Transdanubia

169 individuals

North Regio

183 individuals

North- Plain

255 individuals

South- Plain

206 individuals

Figure 3: NUT3 in Bulgaria

Bulgaria

Blagoevgrad

110 individuals

Bourgas

142 individuals

Varna

112 individuals

Veliko Tarnovo

41 individuals

Vidin

46 individuals

Vratca

69 individuals

Gabrovo

49 individuals

Dobrich

61 individuals

Kurdjali

93 individuals

Kustendil

45 individuals

Lovetch

55 individuals

Montana

59 individuals

Pazardjik

92 individuals

Pernik

37 individuals

Pleven

100 individuals

Plovdiv

209 individuals

Razgrad

54 individuals

Rouse

91 individuals

Silistra

50 individuals

Sliven

57 individuals

Smolian

43 individuals

Sofia

282 individuals

Sofia-region

71 individuals

Stara Zagora

71 individuals

Targovishte

32 individuals

Haskovo

58 individuals

Shoumen

61 individuals

Iambol

40 individuals

P a g e | 33 Figure 4: NUT 2 Romania

Romania

Nord-Vest

262 individuals

Centru

240 individuals

Nord-Est

316 individuals

Sud-Est

331 individuals

Sud-Muntenia

334 individuals

Bucuresti-Ilfov

227 individuals

Sud-Vest Oltenia

228 individuals

Vest

208 indiividuals

Bratislava Reg.

226 individuals

Trnava Reg.

144 individuals

Trencin Reg.

194 individuals

Nitra Reg.

276 individuals

Zilina Reg.

190 individuals

Banska Bystrica Reg.

231 individuals

Presov Reg.

277 individuals

Kosice Reg.

270 indiividuals

Figure 5: NUT 2 Slovakia

Slovakia

Table 2. Descriptive statistics about the far right support in each country Mean 0.119 0.028 0.098 0.034 0.105

Hungary 2012 Hungary 2008 Bulgaria 2008 Romania 2008 Slovakia 2008

Std. Dev. 0.324 0.007 0. 009 0. 006 0. 011

Count of far right voter 66 15 108 28 81

Table 3. Mean and standard deviation of the continuous or binary independent variables in each country

Rate of Roma people (region) Unemployment rate (region) Sex Minority

Hungary 2012 Mean Std. Dev. 1.992 2.079

Hungary 2008 Mean Std. Dev. 3.210 0.058

Bulgaria 2008 Mean Std. Dev. 4.526 0.059

Romania 2008 Mean Std. Dev. 3.044 0.020

Slovakia 2008 Mean Std. Dev. 1.992 0.048

9.851

4.818

8.226

0.084

6.531

0.077

6.045

0.029

9.851

0.113

1.55

0.497

1.545

0.013

1.561

0.011

1.550

0.011

1.656

0.017

0.067

.001

0.052

0.006

0.180

0.008

0.158

0.008

0.054

0.005

P a g e | 34 Religious

0.656

0.002

0.586

0.013

0.805

0.008

0.930

0.006

0.765

0.010

Unemployment Paid

0.076 0.448

0.265 0.498

0.074 0.409

0.261 0.492

0.059 0.496

0.236 0.501

0.000 0.461

0.000 0.505

0.031 0.514

0,174 0.501

Figure 4. Median of ordinal variables in each country

Education Age group Financial wellbeing

Hungary 2012 3 3 2

Hungary 2008 3 3 2

Bulgaria 2008 3 4 3

Romania 2008 3 3 3

Slovakia 2008 3 4 2

Table 5. Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting far right support by regional and individual level variables (Hungary 2008)

Roma (region) Unemployment (region) Sex Fermi Female Minority Unemployed Religious Model P-value Pseudo R

Model 1 1.042

Model 2a 0.966

0.723 0.001

0.697 0.002

Model 2b 3.344*** 0.431***

Model 2c 3.343 *** 0.426***

0.001 0.056

(R) 0.405** 0.0000 6.242 1.044 0.000 0.118

Table 6. Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting far right support by regional and individual level variables (Bulgaria 2008)

Roma (regional) Unemployment (regional) Sex Male Female Education Less than lower secondary Lower secondary education Upper secondary education Post-secondary non-tertiary education Tertiary education Minority Activity status Paid work

Model 1 1.013

Model 2a 0.937

Model 2b 1.083 0.906 *

Model 2c 1.083 0.955 (R) 0.619 ** (R) 1.084 1.148 (empty) 1.028 0.125 ** (R)

P a g e | 35 Unemployed Other Material well-being Living comfortably on present income Coping on present income Difficult on present income Very difficult on present income Age group 15-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Religious Model P-value Pseudo R

7.841 ** 3.287 *** (empty) 0.621 ** 0.494 ** (empty) (empty)

0.790 0.000

0.200 0.007

0.162 0.012

(R) 0.334 * 0.427 ** 0.428 ** 0.299 *** 1.833* 0.000 0.100

Table 7. Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting far right support by regional and individual level variables (Slovakia 2008)

Roma (regional) Unemployment (regional) Sex Male Female Minority Religious Model P-value Pseudo R

Model 1 0.937

Model 2a 1.006

0.598 0.003

0.891 0.000

Model 2b 0.862 1.052 **

Model 2c 0.861 1.054 **

0.072 0.007

(R) 0.553 * 0.047 ** 1.452 0.000 0.041

Table 8. Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting far right support by regional and individual level variables (Romania 2008)

Roma (regional) Unemployment (regional) Sex Male Female Minority Model P-value Pseudo R

Model 1 0.667

Model 2a 0.920

0.141 0.016

0.646 0.002

Model 2b 0.627 ** 1.080

Model 2c 0.719 1.064

0.044 0.016

(R) 0.376 ** 0.270 ** 0.000 0.050

Table 9. Summary of logistic regression analysis for variables predicting far right support by regional and individual level variables (Hungary 2012)

P a g e | 36

Roma (regional) Unemployment (regional) Sex Male Female Education Less than lower secondary Lower secondary education Upper secondary education Post-secondary non-tertiary education Tertiary education Minority Activity status Paid work Unemployed Other Age group 15-29 30-39 40-49 50-59 60+ Religious Model P-value Pseudo R

Model 1 1.020

Model 2a 0.986

Model 2b 1.120 0.927

Model 2c 1.083 0.941 (R) 0.376 *** (R) 1.348 0.965 0.447 0.617 0.137 * (R) 2.231 0.940

0.708 0.000

0.624 0.001

0.676 0.002

(R) 0.605 0.248*** 0.205*** 0.067*** 0.664 0.000 0.201

Interview Questions and Translations: Ha most vasárnap lennének a választások, melyik pártra szavazna?

If there would be elections next Sunday, which party would you vote for?

Korábban szavazott már a Jobbikra?

Have you previously voted for Jobbik?

Mi a három legfontosabb érv a párt mellett?

What are the three most important reasons for your electoral choice?

Ha letezik ilyen, akkor mennyire fontos a „cigánykérdés” a választásokon?

If there is such, how important is the so-called 'gypsy question' at the elections?

Meg tudná saccolni a romák arányát Magyarországon, a megyében, a településen/kerületben, az utcában ahol él?

Can you guess the percentage of Roma population in Hungary, region, city/town/district, neighborhood/street?

Megítélése szerint a lakhelyén, illetve annak környékén sok/kevés roma él?

In your own opinion, are there a lot/few Roma living in the neighborhood?

Mit jelent Önnek az a tény, hogy a lakhelyén, illetve annak környékén sok/kevés roma él?

What does this mean for you that a lot/few Roma living in the neighborhood?

P a g e | 37 Van/volt bármilyen kapcsolata cigányokkal?

Do you have now or had in the past any interaction with Gypsies? Önnek személyesen volt-e bármilyen jó élménye vagy konfliktusa romákkal?

Did you have any positive or negative personal experiences with Romani?

Ha létezik egyáltalán ilyen, akkor mi a legnagyobb baj a romákkal?

If there is such, what is the greatest problem with Roma people?

Utolsó kérdés, mennyire ért egyet a következő állításokkal?

Here comes the last question, in what extent do you agree with the following statements?

Aki romák között él, az jobban ismeri a velük kapcsolatos problémákat.

People who live among Roma, also have a better understanding of 'what is wrong' with them.

A romák többsége segélyen él.

Majority of Roma live from welfare subsidies.

Segélyt csak az arra érdemesek kapjanak.

Social welfare should be available only for those who deserve it.

Bizonyos csoportokat - bevándorlok, romák - ki kellene zárni a segélyezésből.

Certain groups (immigrants, Roma) should be excluded from social assistance.

A segélyezés miatt szegényedik el Magyarország.

Generous welfare is the reason for Hungary's impoverishment.

A cigányok elveszik a magyarok elől a munkahelyeket.

Gypsies are taking the jobs from Hungarians.

A cigány nyelv(ek) miatt visszaszorul a magyar.

Spread of Roma language(s) is making the Hungarian one retreat.

A roma kultúra veszélyt jelent a magyar hagyományokra.

Roma culture means violation for Hungarian traditions.

A magyar nép/kultúra magasabb rendű mint a cigány.

The Hungarian culture is superior to the Gypsy.