Alain Coldefy, Paris

Constrained by the economic and financial crisis Consistency for a Defence White Paper –France’s answer

by Admiral ret. Alain Coldefy, Director of the “Defense Nationale” magazine

The 2013 White Paper on Defence and National Security is set apart from its predecessors by the severe economic and financial constraints it is under in terms of debt and deficit. The defence budget shows a marked reduction as of 2015, with an average of €30.14 billion (in current terms) until 2025. France has now been overtaken by Germany and its defence budget has fallen to third place in Europe. In spite of those budget cuts, France’s overall strategy has not changed. Its nuclear deterrent with its two components protects the country against an attack by a state against its vital interests. France’s capacity for external action gives it greater strategic depth, which in turn strengthens deterrence and provides the best possible protection against other forms of aggression. France, then, wishes to remain a military power that is medium-sized but as complete as possible, and to maintain a minimum capacity to exert influence over world affairs in the framework of the Alliance and in support of its commitment to Europe. Hence the first guiding principle for its armed forces model is the capacity for autonomous assessment, decision-making and action, and the five strategic functions remain unchanged: knowledge and anticipation, deterrence, protection, prevention and intervention. And emphasis is at last given to cyber defence and intelligence (in particular drones). To keep within the budgetary envelope, operational contracts must be reduced by half, with a direct impact on force sizes and troop numbers. Land forces will comprise 66 000 deployable troops (compared with a strength of 88 000 in 2008), 200 heavy tanks (as against 250) and 7 joint brigades (as opposed to 11, this being the most significant reduction). Naval forces equipped with 4 SSBN, 6 SSN and 1 aircraft carrier will reduce the number of frigates (from 18 to 15) and BPC (projectable command) vessels (from 4 to 3). Air forces will go from 300 to 224 combat aircraft (Air Force and Navy), from 14 to 12 multirole tanker aircraft and 70 to 50 tactical transport aircraft. The qualitative leap to a generation of more modern aircraft (Rafale and M200OD, A400M, A330 MRTT) will partially offset those large quantitative reductions. Furthermore, savings are expected from the distinction that is made between conventional coercion operations, on the one hand, and crisis-management operations, less demanding in all respects, on the other. Expensive capabilities will only be funded “where they are necessary”; the White Paper is also counting on a “relative specialisation of forces” in order to make savings. This is obviously a big mistake, for two main reasons. The first is that nowhere is there a “two-speed” army that remains homogenous, coherent and well trained. The second is that armed forces are designed to win wars rapidly, at the lowest possible cost in terms of human lives and equipment. A strong capability differential offers those advantages that are decisive for crisis operations, as France recently saw for itself during the operations in Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and Mali. Conversely, the reference to an innovative defence industry that generates exports and creates highly skilled jobs that are not at risk of relocation is a welcome new development. In summary, this White Paper is very tough on the armed forces, constantly being subjected to restructuring that they are the only social institution in France to accept, in an international context which is not becoming any more peaceful. Nonetheless it is also a White Paper that “keeps the tools intact” in the hope of better days to come. Admiral (ret.) Alain Coldefy is now Chairman National Defence Review. Alain Coldefy entered the French Naval Academy in 1965 and also graduated from Naval War College and High Military Studies College. Admiral Coldefy’s major unit commands at sea include DDG Du Chayla (D630), CV Clemenceau (R98) and as commander French Carrier Group, he was Commander FR UK Task Force 473 in support of “Allied Force” (Kosovo 1999) aboard CV Foch. His shore tours include service in the Navy Staff and the Minister of Defense Staff. As a flag officer he served in the Navy as Director for Naval Operations and Logistics and in the Joint staff as Deputy Chief of the Joint Operational Center, Deputy then Director for international affairs (J5) and Vice Chief ot the Defence Staff. His last appointment was as General Inspector of the French Armed Forces. “Nonetheless it is also a White Paper that “keeps the tools intact” in the hope of better days to come.”