Security and Defence
“The Union must be in the driving seat!” Questioning initiatives in European defence
In a telephone conference, we asked Dipl-Ing, Major General (ret), Reinhard Wolski, Moderator of The Berlin Security Conference, to take a stand on some of the developments in the EU’s security and defence policy and major armament developments. Nannette Cazaubon: General, the EU High Representative and Vice- President of the European Commission, Josep Borrell has made a proposal to enable the EU to better react to crises with its military capabilities by building on an operational Intervention Force of 5000 military personnel. What should be the criteria for the deployment of such a force, that should replace the current system of battlegroups? Reinhard Wolski: Thank you for inviting me to this telephone conference. My answers will reflect my personal views. Indeed, what would be the criteria? Certainly, it is not only international crisis management operations that should be in the remit of this force. As we observed in Kabul in August, but also in Somalia in 1993, so called “Peace Support Missions” require the full spectrum of political, strategic, and operational willingness to commit forces to high-density war operations… and the will to commit a combat force. The political and legal framework for committing such a force at EU level should include crisis management operations, but also rapid reaction operations wherever needed in the defence of Europe – possibly as a first responder. The Union must be in the driving seat in this decision making! Nanette Cazaubon: What needs to be included in such a construct to make it fully operational?
Reinhard Wolski: We know that terrorist groups, non-state actors or other non-combatant potential adversaries (eg organised crime, freedom fighters acting across national borders to raise money…) enjoy high-tech weapons and force multipliers, such as cyberspace capabilities, Unmanned Systems (UAS) etc. So, the 5000 men/women strong force must be equipped and trained for multi-domain operations. This would include a resilient, powerful Command and Control (C2) system, fully digitised and standardised for the whole force, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities that range from tactical and operational assets (eg drones, reconnaissance and attack helicopters, radar sensors) to the access to “reach back” strategic EU intelligence, such as satellite and human intelligence – without “national caveats”! In terms of impacts, this force requires non-kinetic and kinetic capabilities with direct and indirect firing, electronic and cyber warfare capabilities, air power and strategic communications to cover the area of responsibility. I think that is clear enough. Hartmut Bühl: This force would therefore need the whole spectrum of land force capabilities. But what about strategic and operational mobility and logistical support? Reinhard Wolski: Strategic and operational mobility is the condition sine qua non for each operation. The air and sea transport facilities have to be contributed by the Union and, if necessary, supported by NATO (Berlin Agreement 1994). Tactical mobility in the theatre has to be guaranteed by a proper
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