The European-Security and Defence Union Issue 45

CBRN protection is vital, and not only for our continent

CBRN risks cannot be underestimated any longer! This is sadly illustrated by Putin’s attack on Ukraine and the obvious disregard for the nuclear sites on the Ukrainian soil and precautions to threats emanating from chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) material.

The European Union’s (EU) approach to CBRN security stems from the transnational character and the probably high number of potential casualties in the case of a wide scope of events, including naturally occurring disasters, manmade accidents and incidents at hazardous installations. The same is valid for the transport of dangerous materials. Finally, pandemics like the Covid-19 are from now on considered CBRN threats.

European political leaders have understood that is vital for the continent to request the best and the utmost from Member States in a close civil-military cooperation aiming to counter CBRN related risks and threats, get equipped to the highest degree possible, prepared and jointly trained to counter CBRN multi-hazard emergency situations. The aim is to provide rapid response capabilities for our citizens, if such an emergency ever occurs”, as stated Janez Lenarčič, EU Commissioner for Crisis Management, in a speech in Brussels in June 2022. However, the EU is aware that the security of European societies does not depend on European efforts alone but can only be assured through an efficient network with partners in Europe, Europe’s adjacent regions, and even beyond.

In 2009, the launch of an EU CBRN 2010-2015 action plan has given impetus to Brussels institutions and Member States for diverse national and international initiatives and actions.

In 2010 followed an EU-driven international cooperation project, creating the CBRN Centres of Excellence (CoE). This new methodology for providing technical assistance

in CBRN risk mitigation to countries outside the EU is combining regional and transregional networking approaches with national needs assessments and action plans developed by the partner countries, and a project delivery system to transfer EU expertise in a tailored manner to partner countries. A system of eight Regional Secretariats was established and has matured to an effective capacity-building platform.

In 2014, the EU communication “A new approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks” paved the way for a new approach on detection and mitigation of CBRN risks.

In 2017, eight years after the first one, a new EU CBRN action plan was presented, building on the work done so far.

In 2021, a study on “EU preparedness and response to CBRN threats”, requested by the European Parliament, recommended structural and processional measures. The study states that the Commission should “take measures to strengthen the response capacity to CBRN incidents, including pandemics, through building up indigenous production capacities for protective equipment and supplies (medical as well as nonmedical) in the EU, as well as ‘ramp-up capacity’ to start production of critical items not manufactured in the EU during a crisis. This would require not merely the setting up of manufacturing capacities but also to ensure compatible or common standards of the equipment to ensure interoperability”.

The political willingness in this field is promising for further progress!

IMPRESSUM: The European − Security and Defence Union

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Hartmut Bühl

Editorial, Hartmut Bühl

News, Nannette Cazaubon

What does CBRN mean? Documentation 9

Mission-oriented full spectrum CBRNe protection Changing threats and evolving demands by Dr Andreas Arnold, Erkrath 10 The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative gains maturity 8th National Focal Points meeting Report by Nannette Cazaubon, Paris 12 The EU’s unique approach to tackling CBRN threats, with the support of the UN Effective CBRN risk mitigation Interview with Natalie Pauwels, Brussels, and Marian de Bruijn, Turin 14 Horizon Europe – research to secure against CBRN risks Building up synergies by Dr Philippe Quevauviller, Brussels 16 Society-encompassing CBRN protection in our Common European House The importance of overt information by Sebastian Meyer-Plath, Erkrath 18 A decade of CBRN risk mitigation Documentation 20 The EU’s CBRN Centres of Excellence policy is a human act International efforts for saving lives Interview with Bakhtiyor Gulyamov, Tashkent

MAIN TOPIC: CBRN – Protecting those who protect us

22 Over 50 years of CBRN protection A success story Interview with Hasso von Blücher, Erkrath 24 Prevent, Protect, Recover Assuming the reality of CBRN risks by Colonel Stephan Saalow, Bruchsal 26 How to successfully prosecute CBRN crimes –from the crime scene to the courtroom EU-funded CBRN guidance handbooks by Talgat Toleubayev 28 The future Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Reconnaissance Surveillance System EU sensor networks to mitigate CBRN threats by Johann Fischer and Friedrich Aflenzer, Brussels 29 The Union Civil Protection Mechanism rescEU demonstrates European solidarity by Dr Antonella Cavallo, Brussels 31 Selection of authors and their articles/interviews on CBRN in this magazine (since 2011) Special edition in collaboration with BLÜCHER® www.bluecher.com/en/

photo: totojang1977 adobe.stock.com

Schengen Area Lifting of border controls with Croatia

During the Home Affairs Council of 8th December, EU Ministers adopted a decision on the full application of the Schengen acquis in Croatia. This means that from 1st January 2023, checks on persons at internal land and sea borders between Croatia and the other countries in the Schengen area will be lifted. Checks at internal air borders will be lifted from 26th March 2023.

EU Presidency Sweden presents its priorities for 2023

In a speech in the Riksdag on 14th December, Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson announced the priorities of the forthcoming Swedish EU Presidency. “Sweden is taking over the Presidency at a time when the European Union is facing unprecedented challenges. A greener, more secure and freer Europe is the foundation of our priorities”, he said. The four priorities of the Swedish Presidency are:

• Security – unity

• Resilience – competitiveness

• Prosperity – green & energy transition

• Democratic values and the rule of law – the EU’s foundation

The Minister for EU Affairs and for Nordic Cooperation, Jessika Roswall, stated that “this government will make Sweden’s work in the EU a top priority. It is in Sweden’s interests to maintain unity in the EU and advance issues that require joint solutions.”

Ukraine Council adopts €18bn assistance to Ukraine

Following the decision, Vít Rakušan, Czech Minister of Interior, said: “I am very pleased that during the Czech Presidency, Croatia was able to take two important steps in its European integration by joining both the euro and the Schengen areas. (…) I will continue to work hard to ensure that we can welcome Bulgaria and Romania into the Schengen family in the near future”. Croatia will also start to issue Schengen visas from 1st January 2023 and will be able to make full use of the Schengen Information System.

Web Schengen Area: https://bit.ly/3FoxeCM

Publications

UNICRI

On 10th December, the Council of the European Union (EU) agreed on a legislative package providing a structural solution to financially support Ukraine in 2023 with a loan of €18bn. “The legislation which we adopted today means that Ukraine can count on regular financial help from the EU throughout 2023”, the Minister of Finance of the Czech Republic, Zbyněk Stanjura, said. The aim of the “Regulation establishing an instrument for providing support to Ukraine for 2023” is to help finance Ukraine’s immediate needs, the rehabilitation of critical infrastructure and to provide initial support towards sustainable post-war reconstruction with a perspective to supporting Ukraine on its path towards European integration.

The loans to Ukraine will have a 10-year grace period and a major part of the interest will be covered by Member States via external assigned revenues.

The package was first opposed by Hungary with the aim of putting pressure on Brussels for the release of €7.5bn in cohesion funds and €5.8bn from the pandemic recovery fund (PRF) that were frozen because of Hungary’s violations of the rule of law. Victor Orbán’s government finally lifted its veto on 12th December following a deal with EU countries to lower the amount of a proposed funding freeze.

Web https://bit.ly/3hsxVmU

report on the impact of the conflict in Ukraine

The United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) issued a report assessing the impact of the conflict in Ukraine and its implications for organised crime and security-related issues for neighbouring countries, with a focus on Moldova. The focus is put on organised crime

and illicit trafficking (including trafficking in persons, drugs, arms, illicit tobacco, and other goods); cybercrimes and fraud; disinformation and propaganda; and Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) threats.

The report states that the conflict in Ukraine has already altered the

regional security landscape and will have lasting consequences on the international order. It calls for urgent regional cooperation as the multiple security challenges are common across the region. In response to transnational crime groups, border law enforcement agencies need to improve their cooperation and

communication across borders and in the region to share real-time information and intelligence on criminal activities and trafficking routes.

Web Report: https://bit.ly/3PtPDml

Minister Jessika Roswall walking from the Swedish parliament after the press conference on the priorities of the EU Presidency photo: ©Axel Öberg

The Conflict in Ukraine and its Impact on Organized Crime and Security A SNAPSHOT

photo: MasterSergeant, adobe.stock.com

Security and Defence 21st Berlin Security Conference

The 2022 Berlin Security Conference (BSC) took place from 30th November to 1st December with around 1500 participants. This year, Norway was partner country of the event which was held in the shadow of the ongoing Russian aggression of Ukraine. Speakers include the German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and the Prime Minister of Norway, Jonas Gahr Støre, the German Defence Minister Christine Lambrecht as well as several Ministers from other EU Member States. Jens Stoltenberg, Secretary General of NATO also delivered a speech. He said that “President Putin’s war of aggression has shattered peace in Europe with long-lasting shockwaves for global security”, and he added that “we should not underestimate Russia.” Also, Olaf Scholz stressed that the Russian invasion of Ukraine at the end of February had dramatically changed the European security environment. He underlined that “the foundations of our security remained solid based on the transatlantic friendship and close collaboration within the European Union”.

Web https://www.euro-defence.eu/

EU CBRN Centres of Excellence

Mobile laboratory units deployed in Uzbekistan

A field exercise in the deployment of mobile laboratory units was carried out from 7th to 18th November in Uzbekistan including a training for response teams held in Bukhara on 16th November.

While the outbreak of an infectious disease poses a substantial risk for public health, especially in remote rural areas, qualified laboratory specialists and diagnostic capabilities are mostly located in major urban centres. However, the Covid-19 pandemic crisis has demonstrated the importance to made available such capabilities in remote areas to support the population and prevent potential larger outbreaks.

The aim of the field training exercise was to support the Republic of Uzbekistan with such capacity needs. It was conducted within the framework of Project 53 of the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) Initiative.

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov, Head of the Regional Secretariat for Central Asia of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative, and Chairman of the Committee for Industrial Safety of the Republic of Uzbekistan said in his opening remarks: “As the ongoing pandemic has shown, with infectious diseases, nobody is safe until everybody is safe. The mobile laboratories will enhance the government’s ability to react to biological threats wherever they arise and to leave no one behind.”

Web https://cbrn-risk-mitigation.network.europa.eu

Security of critical services Council decides to strengthen resilience of critical entities

On 8th December, the Council adopted a directive and a recommendation to reduce the vulnerabilities and strengthen the resilience of critical entities. Latter provide services that are crucial for the maintenance of vital societal functions, economic activities, public health and safety, and the environment. They need to be protected against and respond to hybrid attacks, natural disasters, terrorist threats and public health emergencies. The directive adopted covers critical entities in sectors, such as energy, transport, health, drinking water, waste water and space. EU Member States will need to develop a national strategy to identify such critical entities, to enhance their resilience and to carry out a risk assessment at least every four years.   Against the background of the recent acts of sabotage against the Nord Stream pipeline and the new risks arising from Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the Council recommendation focuses on strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure. Member States are invited to update their risk assessments and encouraged to conduct stress tests of entities operating critical infrastructure such as the energy sector. They are to develop, in cooperation with the Commission, a blueprint for a coordinated response to disruptions of critical infrastructure with significant cross-border relevance.

Web Directive: https://bit.ly/3W0oWZ7 Recommendation: https://bit.ly/3G5lKpj

The Uzbek town Bukhara, where parts of the field exercise where organised

photo: © Евгений Вершинин, stock.adobe.com

German Chancellor Olof Scholz at the 2022 Berlin Security Conference photo: © Boris Trenkel

CBRN protection

Putin’s war in Ukraine affects the world. Ukrainian people continue to flee their homes and seek refuge in Europe, supply bottlenecks lead to record level food prices and famine in Africa, and global energy markets are widely impacted. What’s more, while NATO and Europe are providing military, humanitarian and financial aid to Ukraine, the Russian dictator continuously tries to blackmail the world with its weapons of mass destruction. Against this worrying background, the protection against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats is taking centre stage!

photo: ©yavyav, adobe.stock.com

documentation

What does CBRN mean?

The following definitions are excerpts from a study on “EU preparedness and responses to Chemical, Biological Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats”. The study, requested by the European Parliament’s Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) in 2019 and published in 2021, takes stock of the existing preparedness and response mechanisms and compares these against the changing threat landscape to determine the current state of play of the EU’s response tools and its remaining gaps where improvement may be needed.

Definitions:

“CBRN functions as an acronym to describe chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear materials and agents ‘that could harm the society through their accidental or deliberate release, dissemination, or impacts’. The term ‘CBRN’ goes back to cold war where it was first referred to as ABC (atomic, biological, chemical) and later as NBC (nuclear, biological, chemical). A variation of the current term is CBRNE (also spelt CBRN-E or CBRNe) which incorporates explosive substances or events into CBRN. (…)

Chemical weapons are harmful as a result of the toxic effects produced by chemical reactions. One generally distinguishes five classes of chemical weapons. These are irritants, choking or pulmonary agents, blister agents, blood agents and nerve agents. The most basic chemical weapons release gaseous or highly volatile chemicals, such as hydrogen cyanide or chlorine gas.

Biological weapons harm their targets by infecting them with natural or deliberately produced toxins or pathogenic micro-organisms, some of which may also be contagious. The US National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases (NIAID) has identified the following six biological agents as posing the highest risk to public health and national security: bacillus anthracis (anthrax), clostridium botulinum toxin (botulism), yersinia pestis (plague), variola major (smallpox) and other related poxviruses, Francisella tularensis (tularemia) and viral hemorrhagic fevers, such as Ebola. (…)

As for radiological weapons, they are harmful to their targets through the radiation emitted by the radioactive material that they contain. It is possible to produce radioactive material – that is, material emitting

“While responding to CBRN events is primarily the prerogative of the EU Member States (EUMS), the COVID-19 pandemic is a reminder that CBRN incidents have the potential to overwhelm the response capacities of several or even all EUMS.

To prepare for such situations, it is crucial that the EU has robust tools to anticipate, prevent, protect, and respond to CBRN crises and assist EUMS in a timely and effective manner when necessary.”

radiation – through nuclear processes. However, there are also some natural radioactive materials, like potassium, thorium and uranium. Radioactive materials can be used in radiological dispersal devices (RDD), which spread radioactive material (e.g. a ‘dirty bomb’) or in radiation exposure devices (RED), which can expose persons to harmful doses of radiation whilst being hidden from sight. RDDs are not as destructive as nuclear weapons but can nevertheless have a significant impact, especially in densely populated areas.

Finally, nuclear weapons can cause a huge amount of destruction as a result of nuclear reactions – that is, nuclear fis-

sion, nuclear fusion, or a combination of both. They can produce mass destruction through radioactive fallout, shock waves and extreme heat. They can also interrupt communications and control systems as a result of electromagnetic pulses, which can cause secondary damage or system failures. Whilst nuclear weapons are potentially the most harmful of all CBRN weapons, they are also the most complex to acquire or develop.”

Web Study “EU preparedness and responses to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats”, 2021, https://bit.ly/3h6JmQQ

Nathalie Loiseau MEP, Chair of the SEDE Committee

photo: © European Union, 2021, licend under adobe stock

Changing CBRNe threats and evolving demands

Mission-oriented full spectrum CBRNe protection

by Dr Andreas Arnold, Director of Product Management, Blücher GmbH, Erkrath

The comparison of current threats with common scenarios of the past, and the analysis of mission concepts, incidents and challenges repeatedly point to new requirements for personal protective equipment against CBRNe (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and Explosives) threats. These range from equipment providing high mobility, high availability, preparedness, operational capability and effectiveness of protection against a wide range of threats to favourable cost effectiveness of the equipment.

CBRNe protection adapted to current threats

When defining characteristics of protection equipment, it is important not to lose sight of the need for protection against current threats. Over the last years, requirements like protection against airborne particulate contamination, such as biological agents, radiological materials or aerosolised persistent and highly toxic chemicals have become more frequent. These demands are not only the result of increasing civil-military co-operation but are also emphasised by military as well as civil defence forces, such as first responders, police and riot control forces, or specialists like medical emergency and EOD (Explosive Ordnance Disposal) teams.

One new development in Personal Protective Equipment providing enhanced protection, is the integrated air permeable aerosol protection: an air permeable, aerosol protective fabric system, which overcomes the physiological deficiencies of conventional airtight barrier technologies. CBRN protective suits with such integrated aerosol filters, optimised with dedicated design elements for highest protective performance, have already been procured by the German and Norwegian armed forces. Further models as the SFI-NG Special Forces Intervention Coverall – Next Generation, are currently being evaluated

by police and special military units of other nations. Recently developed stretchable aerosol protective fabrics enable the design of air permeable CBRN protective undergarments, the preferred solution for specialists like EOD teams, special forces, pilots and tank/vehicle crews.

The way ahead

Long-term projects, driven by users’ indications of needs and not yet enshrined in requirements and specifications, focus on novel adsorbents such as metal organic frameworks, which are expected to extend the range of hazardous chemicals against which the suits can provide protection, as well as reactive and catalytic technologies that decompose hazardous chemicals into less toxic fragments. These technologies facilitate the safe disposal of contaminated clothing; protective equipment based on such technologies is a long-term goal. The integration of sensing and detection devices into the suits as well as the incorporation of adaptive technologies, which actively switch to protective mode, are considered even longer-term goals.

The two-way exchange about capabilities and requirements between end users and industry is essential to steer research & development work towards solutions which provide a real benefit to users, whether it is a tangible improvement of comfort, ergonomics and fit, a measurable improvement of lifecycle cost or a technical improvement in terms of enhanced protection. Again, as in similar cases in the past, standardisation work needs to keep pace with the definition of new requirements and the development of innovative technologies, such as standards for dermal protection against certain aerosols and toxic industrial chemicals. Only an established and jointly accepted framework of suitable standards will allow procurement agencies as well as end users to compare different solutions and identify the ensembles which satisfy their needs both quantitatively and qualitatively.

photo: © BLÜCHER

Back to in-person activities after the pandemic

The EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative gains maturity

Report on the 8th National Focal Points meeting of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative by Nannette Cazaubon, Paris

After a forced three-year break due to the Covid-19 pandemic, the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) Initiative held its 8th annual meeting of National Focal Points (NFPs) from 17th to 19th May in Brussels. Launched in 2010 by the EU, the initiative aims at increasing national and regional CBRN cooperation worldwide.

Hartmut and I were invited to join the event and to report on it. Since 2019 we have been following this successful initiative with great interest. We reported in our magazine on the last annual NFPs meeting (June 2019), and other events including a CBRN field exercise in Tashkent, Uzbekistan in autumn 2019. We were eager to know how the people involved in this international framework, with now 64 partner countries, managed to continue their work despite the pandemic, what impact the breakdown of in-person activities had on the initiative, and what the prospects for the future are.

The meeting took place at the “The Square” Meeting and Convention Centre in Brussels and was organised by the European Commission’s Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and the United Nations Interregional Crime and Research Institute

(UNICRI) with the support of the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JCR). The conference was attended by more than 100 participants with 51 National Focal Points (NFPs) out of, at that time, 63 partner countries and four observer nations (Chile, Djibouti, Mauritius, and Nigeria having become the 64th partner country most recently).

We discovered with interest the event’s new format, offering a combination of thematic panel discussions in plenary, bilateral and interregional meetings, a walking meeting, and last but not least the traditional award for the best "Regional Success Story" and the best "Innovative Regional Proposal".

Opening session

At the opening session, moderated by Natalie Pauwels, Head of Unit, Stability and Peace, FPI, all speakers underlined that despite the difficult circumstances due to the pandemic during the last two years, work under the EU CBRN CoE Initiative continued, with progress made across a range of different thematic areas and in the regions.

Marc Fiedrich, at that time Acting Director and Head of Service, FPI, recognised that the pandemic was a test for the initiative as experts and coordinators found ways to adapt to the circumstances, while Wiktor Staniecki, Deputy Head of Division, EEAS, who represented Joanneke Balfoort, Director for Security and Defence Policy, EEAS, pointed out that the initiative now has the maturity to support actions addressing security

governance issues. Sabine Henzler, Director of Strategy, Work Programme and Resources, JRC, underlined that despite travel restrictions during the last two years, the JRC has continued to support the EU CBRN CoE Initiative with scientific and technical assistance. Finally, Francesco Marelli, Head of Programme, CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance Programme, UNICRI, highlighted the hard work of the persons engaged in the initiative, saying that they prevent CBRN threats from materialising by promoting a culture of safety and security.

Updates from the eight regions

The opening remarks were followed by regional analyses of the work done in the last three years. The Heads of Secretariat (HoS) of the eight regions shared their experience and highlighted the perspectives for the future. During this session, moderated by both Natalie Pauwels and Marian de Bruijn, Programme Coordinator at UNICRI, there was a common understanding that the enlargement of cooperation with adjacent CoE regions has a positive impact on the understanding of national work on CBRN mitigation. The participants agreed on the importance of involving more women in the process of CBRN mitigation and on the value of engaging the younger generation. A prize was awarded to the young Uzbek winner of the 2020 Central Asia drawing competition, who was also in attendance.

Walking meeting

The morning of the second day was dedicated to a walking meeting. Hartmut and I appreciated this new format. We discovered the decorated booths dedicated to each Regional Secretariat presenting their activities with clearly designed posters and showing the variety and the specificities of their respective regions. Wearing the traditional dress of their home countries, the HoS and their staffs were on hand for three hours to answer questions and exchange ideas. The regional culinary delights were appreciated by the booth visitors and by us. When we asked participants about their feeling regarding this new method of communication, we collected positive feedback and compliments for the organisers. “We had never exchanged so profoundly on single issues as we did this morning”, one NFP said to me.

Thematic sessions and interregional meetings

The afternoon of the second day was dedicated to three thematic sessions moderated by Silvia Bottone, Project Manager at FPI. The first session focused on developing and implementing the Regional Action Plans (RAPs), the second identified the available options for partner countries to develop CBRN expertise at national and regional levels, while the third session was dedicated to the organisation of a field exercise and considered the experiences from the recent successful experience of the ARZ 2021 exercise in Lebanon.

At the end of the second day, an interregional meeting between Central Asia (CA) and East and South East Europe (SEEE) took place, as well as a meeting of the African regions focussing on the preparation of an inter-Africa meeting in 2023 in Addis Ababa.

Thematic sessions continued on the third day. Experts from the European Union reported on EU CBRN related priorities in a plenary session moderated by Baskar Rosaz, FPI. While the first two presentations focused on the EU dual-use export control policy, the third presentation gave detailed insights into the EU approach to CBRN crisis response. A final presentation covered the European monitoring and emergency alert systems for nuclear and radiological threats.

Outcome of the 8th NFPs meeting

Having discussed a lot with the HoS and NFPs during this intense three-day meeting, the first after three years and coinciding with the ongoing armed conflict in Europe’s neighbourhood, Hartmut and I agreed that the EU CBRN CoE Initiative, which has funded 90 regional projects since its launch in 2010, has reached maturity.

For us it became clear that the pandemic, the war in Ukraine and the complex global security situation have encouraged the CoE partner countries to strengthen the ties between them and continue their efforts within the initiative to strive for the harmonisation of procedures for regional and interregional cooperation and efficient mutual assistance.

In her closing remarks Natalie Pauwels agreed that the initiative is more than just a network of experts but a community of people who know each other, “a sort of family”.

Impressions from the 8th annual National Focal Points meeting of the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative in Brussels, 17-19 May 2022

photo: UNICRI/Freya Morales

risk mitigation

The EU’s unique approach to tackling CBRN threats, with the support of the UN

Interview with Natalie Pauwels, Head of Unit, European Commission Service for Foreign Policy Instruments, Brussels, and Marian de Bruijn, Programme Coordinator, United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI), Turin

The 8th National Focal Points (NFPs) meeting of the European Union Chemical, Biological, Radiological Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) Initiative took place in Brussels mid-May 2022. We discussed with two of the organisers the achievements and the future of this remarquable global network which counts 64 partner countries.

The European: Ms Pauwels, Ms de Bruijn, please let us start our conversation by looking back to the beginning of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative which was launched by the EU in 2010. Ms Pauwels, can you tell our readers how it developed from its modest beginnings involving 13 countries into what it is today: a truly global initiative with 64 partner countries and still growing? What do you think explains its success and how was that reflected in this year’s National Focal Points (NFPs) meeting?

Natalie Pauwels: The EU CBRN CoE Initiative was ambitious from the start in terms of both its geographic and thematic focus. However, "chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear risk mitigation" is not the most easily accessible terminology. It takes some time to explain what it is all about, which makes attracting political attention to this area of activity more difficult. The Covid-19 pandemic, the explosions in the ports of Beirut and Aqaba, and now the unjustified and unprovoked Russian aggression against Ukraine have put a spotlight on the very real risks related to CBRN materials and the need to work with partner countries to enhance their capacities to mitigate and eventually respond to CBRN events.

The European: The 8th NFPs conference offered enormous opportunities for long and solid future cooperation. What is your view from the United Nation’s side, Ms de Bruijn?

Marian de Bruijn: Indeed, it is important to have our eyes on the future and adapt to the rapidly evolving threats and challenges related to CBRN materials. All participating countries realise that this threat is cross-border and can only be addressed through effective international cooperation. The role of the UN and in particular of UNICRI is to ensure that the initiative remains agile and responsive to the needs of the partner countries and the international community, in complex and sensitive issues related to CBRN risk mitigation.

The European: Do you both think that the success of the initiative is due to its methodology and its demand driven structure to support CBRN preparedness?

Marian de Bruijn: The EU CBRN CoE is a decentralised network, in which countries cooperate. This starts within the countries by understanding, through the creation of national CBRN teams, the specific needs and priorities related to CBRN risk mitigation. The NFPs share their priorities in a regional context, with the support of the UNICRI Regional Coordinators, and together with experts they develop regional project proposals to address their needs. This has not been a quick process, but the methodology has proven to be very effective. Today we are a trusted community of 64 partner countries, the EU and the United Nations, and we are still growing.

Natalie Pauwels: The methodology underpinning the EU CBRN CoE Initiative is indeed unique and successfully contributing to mitigating CBRN threats. This was also the finding of the European Court of Auditors in its special report on the initiative in 2018. Many if not most CBRN risks require inter-agency coordination as well as cross-border cooperation, and the initiative supports both. It encourages partner countries to define common challenges that need to be addressed in a given region, where the EU can then step in to support with concrete actions.

The European: Has the EU any interest in monitoring single projects or actions or does it leave this to the regions or NFPs?

Natalie Pauwels: The initiative is designed to be bottom-up, in the sense that the NFPs in each region together identify and define the projects that they want to see prioritised for funding by the EU. This ensures that projects correspond to identified needs and are “owned” by the partners, who have

An ambitious initiative for CBRN

“The EU CBRN CoE Initiative was ambitious from the start.”

Natalie Pauwels

an interest in engaging the right people and institutions in the project implementation. That said, we are closely involved in the process together with UNICRI. Members of my team attend regional round table meetings and participate in discussions to ensure that what is proposed is actually workable from our perspective as a donor. And we follow projects from conception to conclusion, monitoring their implementation and impact, and drawing lessons that can feed into the design of similar projects in other regions of the initiative.

The European: Ms de Bruijn, how can you ensure, that regions follow common guidelines and what is the role of UNICRI in accompanying them?

Marian de Bruijn: All regions can rely on the same methodology and guidelines for needs assessment and the development of National and Regional Action Plans (NAPs/RAPs). However, the country is the owner of their needs assessment and NAP and therefore, how they are shaped and whether they are public or not is based on their strategic decision. The EU has supported the countries and regions by funding over 90 projects that support them in addressing their needs, from laboratory safety, to border security and CBRN waste management. However, the EU cannot address the needs alone and therefore UNICRI is working together with the Union to open the network to other international stakeholders that can provide additional support to the partner countries.

The European: Ms Pauwels, how does the EU influence interregional cooperation and what is the value of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative within the Union’s Strategic Compass?

Natalie Pauwels: We are putting increasing emphasis on drawing out lessons from over 10 years’ experience of the initiative, which is implemented in eight regional groupings. While every partner country and region has its own particularities and its own set of CBRN risks, there are also many commonalities. We are at a point where a successful action in one region is being replicated in another region, albeit adapted to its needs and particularities. But the initiative is also policy driven. It

supports the external dimension of the EU’s own Action Plan to enhance preparedness against CBRN security risks, which calls for enhanced cooperation with strategic partners as well as specialised international organisations. Although the initiative is development-focused, it is supporting efforts to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, highlighted in the Strategic Compass as a key security concern for the EU.

The European: At the 8th NFPs meeting, a Head of Regional Secretariat said to me “never before have we had such an intense exchange of views among the regions”. Ms de Bruijn, what is your assessment as a co-organiser?

Marian de Bruijn: As mentioned by Natalie, the initiative is now mature and the exchange between regions is vital to ensure that best practices and lessons learned are considered. Indeed, projects that have been implemented successfully in one region can be replicated in another. During the EU CBRN CoE Academy that was organised at UNICRI headquarters in Turin on 26-30 September 2022, NFPs from all regions jointly addressed key questions such as the ideal composition and mandate of the national team, the implementation of the NAP and the sustainability of the EU CBRN CoE. These events highlighted once again that, together with the EU and the UN, the partner countries are the owners of the initiative.

The European: My congratulations for your convincing leadership in the conference and thank you for our conversation.

Interview first published in Vol. 44 of this magazine

Natalie Pauwels (on the right) and Marian de Bruijn during a panel discussion at the 8th National Focal Points meeting in Brussels. On the left, the Head of Regional Secretariat for the Central Asia region, Bakhtiyor Gulyamov

photo: ©UNICRI/Freya Morales

“Today we are a trusted community of 64 partner countries, the EU and the United Nations." Marian de Bruijn

Building up synergies

sectors involved Horizon Europe – research to secure against CBRN risks

by Dr Philippe Quevauviller, Policy and Research Programming Officer, DG Migration and Home Affairs, European Commission, Brussels*

To set the scene, it is important to stress that CBRN research cannot be discussed on a solely scientific ground, i.e. research needs must be placed in a larger policy, industry and civil society context. Actions to secure against CBRN risks involve many different sectors and actors, such as policymakers and stakeholders, scientists, industry (including SMEs), training and operational units, civil society (including municipalities), and more generally the citizens!

Establishing a proper dialogue

One of the main challenges in this context is to ensure that a proper dialogue is established among them, both horizontally (among sectors and disciplines) and vertically (from the international to the national/local levels). In the first place, the policy landscape needs to be well understood in its overall complexity as it represents the main framework for CBRN risk management. It concerns various regulations set at international, EU or national level in the field of security, civil protection, consumer and health protection, environment and industrial

risks, energy and transport, customs, and is prone to international cooperation (e.g. through networking of CBRN Centres of Excellence).

While international and EU policies are developed in close consultation among the different sectors, in practice interactions are less obvious at the implementation level among sectors within the Member States. This is partly due to an insufficient sharing of information and joint actions. The dialogue hence needs to be designed to build up cross-disciplinary and cross-sectorial synergies, gathering and sharing knowledge from policies, scientific disciplines, industry/SMEs, practitioners (including first responders, police forces, civil protection units, etc) and risk management authorities (including municipalities).

A platform for success

Horizon Europe, the EU research and innovation framework programme (2021-27), provides a platform via EU research funding to contribute to these dialogue needs, in particular through the so-called Cluster 3 “Civil Security for Society” programme. Within this framework, various types of actions related to CBRN risk management are funded, namely research, innovation and networking (in particular practitioners’ networks), which cover a range of issues related to CBRN risks,

Dr Philippe Quevauviller

has been a Research Programming and Policy Officer in the Directorate General (DG) Migration and Home Affairs of the European Commission since 2015. Holding two PhD in oceanography and environmental chemistry, he was a researcher in chemical oceanography from 1984 to 1989. Dr Quevauviller then joined the European Commission, firstly as a Scientific Officer at the DG Research and Innovation, then as a Policy Officer at the DG Environment in 2002. In October 2008, he went back to the Research DG where he managed projects on climate change impacts on water systems/resources and natural hazards. In April 2013, Dr Quevauviller moved to the Secure Societies Programme (firstly at DG Enterprise, then DG Migration and Home Affairs since early 2015) where he is responsible for programming and managing security research projects, in particular on disaster risk and crisis management (natural catastrophes, accidents, terrorist threats).

between the different

photo: private

“While international and EU policies are developed in close consultation among the different sectors, in practice interactions are less obvious at the implementation level among sectors within the Member States.”

either accidental or due to deliberate actions, on technologies, methods, novel solutions to enhance or improve prevention, preparedness, response and recovery. CBRN is a cross-cutting issue which is covered by the five thematic areas of the programme, namely

• Disaster-Resilient Societies (DRS),

• Fight against crime and terrorism (FCT),

• Infrastructure (INFRA),

• Border management (BM), and

• Support to Scientific Research and Innovation (SSRI).

Bringing the human dimension back

The work programme and related yearly calls for proposals are complemented by regular exchanges among different sectors and actors involved in the five thematic areas through the Community of European Research and Innovation for Security (CERIS), which is the successor of the successful Community of Users (CoU) developed in the years 2014-2020. Since 2021, CERIS not only facilitates exchanges and synergy building between different research and capacity-building projects, it now moves to a more proactive participation of experts, calling for inputs and supporting the overall implementation of the Civil Security for Society programme. An important feature is that this networking initiative brings the human dimension back into highly technical discussions, considerably facilitating working exchanges. An illustrative example of this is the willingness to join forces and establish synergies among projects that take place within the CERIS framework, including in the context of international side events such as the one that involved 13 projects (see box) at the CBRNe Research & Innovation conference held in Lille, France in early May 2022 (https://cbrneconference.fr/).

This very important CBRNe Research & Innovation Conference also discussed various features such as stakeholder engagement in CBRN preparedness (including the general public), multidisciplinary, multi-agency and civil-military cooperation, innovative CBRN technological solutions for CBRN agents detection, PPE, decontamination, testing and validation of technologies, scenario building, cross-border exercises, harmonisation of procedures in preparedness and response and, if required, standardisation, uptake of innovative technologies and market dimension, etc.

Web Horizon Europe https://bit.ly/3SucgYQ

*With thanks to Dr Olga Vybornova (UCL, Belgium) for her contribution to this paper.

European CBRN projects and initiatives

PROJECTS

PROACTIVE: PReparedness against CBRNE threats through cOmmon Approaches between security praCTItioners and the VulnerablE civil society https://proactive-h2020.eu/ HoloZcan: Deep Learning Powered Holographic Microscopy for Biothreat Detection on Field https://www.holozcan.com/

RESIST: REsilience Support for critical Infrastructures through Standardised Training on CBRN https://project-resist.eu/

VERTIgO: Virtual Enhanced Reality for inTeroperable traIning of CBRN military and civilian Operators https://cbrn-vertigo.eu/ EU-RADION: European sensor system for CBRN applications https://eu-radion.eu/

NETWORKING ACTIONS

eNOTICE: European Network of CBRN Training Centers https://www.h2020-enotice.eu

INCLUDING: Innovative Cluster for Radiological and Nuclear Emergencies https://including-cluster.eu/

NO-FEAR: Network Of practitioners For Emergency medicAl systems and cRitical care https://no-fearproject.eu/

FIRE-IN: Fire and Rescue Innovation Network https://www.fire-in.eu/ PANDEM-2: Pandemic Preparedness and Response https://pandem-2.eu

CAPACITY-BUILDNG INITIATIVES

ECCofEX: On the feasibility of the creation of a European CBRN Centre of Excellence

https://www.umu.se/en/research/projects/eccofex/ JA TERROR: Strengthened preparedness and response to biological and chemical terror attacks https://www.jaterror.eu/ Bullseye: A Harmonised Response to Chemical and Biological Terrorism https://www.bullseyeproject.eu/

Society-encompassing CBRN protection in our Common European House

by Sebastian Meyer-Plath, Sales Director, BLÜCHER, Erkrath

As Winston Churchill once very rightly observed, “national security is the primary duty of any government and certainly takes precedence over economic stability”.

Defending people against potential attacks with chemical, biological, radiological or nuclear (CBRN) substances by terrorist groups or state aggressors is a crucial part of national security and hence must be addressed, whatever cost it may incur.

A changing perception of risks and threats

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has triggered a change in the threat perception among politicians but also among the public in general. But are Europeans ready to play their own role to achieve a working society-encompassing CBRN defence/ protection? What could that role be? Clearly, establishing and equipping relief organisations is one side of the coin, the other side is how to prepare the public to accept personal responsibilities. These responsibilities start with, for instance, accepting as perfectly normal bi-weekly test runs of sirens, the organisation of training sessions in schools and workplaces, keeping stocks of essential supplies at home, and, of course, agreeing that taxpayers’ money is spent on essential installations and equipment, including collective protection installations, respirators, protective suits, mass decontamination facilities and much more. Cold war levels of preparedness spring to mind…. Thankfully, the economic burden of this responsibility does not just rest on the shoulders of each Member State, but can be shared between them, since the European Union (EU) participates in this mission, starting with the rescEU programme under the EU Civil Protection Mechanism.

The example of Germany

Developing multi-nation capabilities, however, creates challenges in various areas. Germany, a federal republic, can serve as a perfect example to examine the most prominent issues. Of course there are government organisations with CBRN defence capabilities like the Bundeswehr, the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance, the famous “Technisches Hilfswerk (THW)“ and a small portion of the Federal Police, all under the responsibility of the Ministry of the Interior, except the Bundeswehr. There are also disaster relief organisa-

tions at state (Land) and county levels. But how can they all be brought together to maximise efficiency?

It is of course intrinsic to a non-centralised federal system that there is a tendency for non-coordinated and insular procurement. Only after major incidents involving more than one of the 16 states has the importance of interoperability been realised and implemented, as evidenced by recent procurements under federal leadership and the introduction of standardised technical specifications according to a DIN Standard, providing procurement agencies, at the very least, with an opportunity to follow a common standard if desired.

But taking further steps towards society-encompassing CBRN protection means continuing to close substantial gaps. As an example, the “normal” police patrols, that play an important role in satisfying the need for security in communities and that are always the first on the scene, are currently not equipped with any personal CBRN protection, nor are the ambulance services, hospitals or morgues. And to drive the nail home, there is no CBRN Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) for personnel operating critical infrastructure like power stations, water supply and communication facilities etc. So, even though Germany, like many other Member States, has excellent specialised capabilities, it is still far from having a society-encompassing CBRN defence and has not yet brought about a change in the public’s mindset, simply because such overt information is not available.

The magic word is standardisation

In scaling up the challenge to the European level, we face similar difficulties, in particular in organising relief or response packages for delivery to the location of an incident in an EU Member State. Interoperability with the CBRN protection

A lack of overt information for the general public is a major handicap

photo: © 2022 Daniel Schumann

equipment in use locally, doctrine, training and sufficiency in numbers are topics that require a lot more work.

The magic word regarding society-encompassing CBRN defence or protection for the EU is standardisation. There are existing standards in the area of technical capabilities within NATO, in the form of numerous Allied Engineering Publications (AEPs) and Allied Technical Publications (ATPs). They define a multitude of accepted test methods and capabilities, but still give a lot of choice in the test methods used at national level, depending on the facilities and competencies of the national testing laboratories.

In Europe, we still have a chance to agree on a set of European norms, rules, and regulations to achieve as much harmonisation as possible, to at least ensure that all Member State understand the capabilities and limitations of Personal Protective

Equipment, to take just one example. Anything less might well lead to a follow-on disaster after the primary incident if first responders fall victim to a misjudgement over the protection characteristics of, say, a respirator or filter cartridge.

CBRN defence – a European endeavour

Another important factor is for procurement agencies to understand industry and supply chain constraints. The Covid-19 pandemic still has a tremendous effect on the current supply chains of many companies in Europe that are crucial for supplying CBRN defence or CBRN protection equipment. Lead times are much longer than anticipated and there is not much potential for improvement. Expected and actual delivery times can differ by six months or more. Since industry cannot and will not be able to stock for all eventualities, the term “war time reserve” springs to mind, perhaps under a more palatable name! So, is society-encompassing CBRN defence achievable? It certainly is and most EU Member States were quite close to it during the cold war. Since then, a lot has been disbanded, forgotten or shelved, but with some effort, some of it can be reactivated, at least on the planning side. So, we don’t need to start from scratch in every area, but in some we do, and we should start now. This however provides us with a chance to rectify some of the errors made in the fifties and sixties and to make this a European endeavour.

For equipment, standardisation is the magic word, for the rest it is understanding and accepting realities.

“When life seems hard, the courageous do not lie down and accept defeat; instead they are all the more determined to struggle for a better future”.

Queen Elizabeth II, 2008

The EU Emergency Response Coordination Centre (ERCC)

photo: ©European Union 2022 EC Audiovisual Service, Pierre-Yves Jortay

A decade of CBRN risk mitigation

(Ed/ak, nc) The ongoing Covid-19 pandemic that started in the Chinese city of Wuhan in December 2019 has brought biological risks and the necessity to prepare for pandemics to the fore. But the mitigation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) risks and threats has already been part of the European Union’s activities for over a decade. In 2010, the EU launched the CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative for international cooperation in CBRN risk mitigation (64 partner countries in 2022). In 2014, the EU Commission published the “Communication on a new EU approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks”. In 2017 a new EU CBRN Action plan was presented, building upon the work launched in the EU with the first Action Plan and addressing emerging threats.

Excerpts from the 2014 communication:

“[T]he threat from CBRN materials and explosives remains high and is evolving. […]

The EU debate on radicalisation recently intensified. Latest reports suggest that of particular concern are returnees from Syria. Some of these and other radicalised individuals, having access to and working in sensitive areas might use their insider knowledge to strike against critical infrastructures, such as a water purification plant, or they may disable railways electrical power supplies. Such insider threats may have transnational impacts and

therefore also pose threats to EU security. […]

While work at national level continues to play a vital role in the fight against terrorism, a robust, better designed, and proportionate strategy to anticipate and deter future CBRN-E risks at EU level is needed, including tackling illegal methods of production, handling, concealing and storing these materials.

It is therefore important to adopt a proactive approach and to put effective, proportional safeguards in place, including prevention, preparedness and response measures at EU level, while respecting fundamental rights. […]

Major historical CBRN incidents and attacks

A new approach to the detection and mitigation of CBRN-E risks

The objectives of this Communication are to better assess the risks, to develop countermeasures, to share knowledge and best practices, test and validate new safeguards with the ultimate goal of adopting new security standards. […]

Better detection

[…] The Commission will

• support further short-term trials for practitioners in order to improve detection … ultimately leading to creation of an EU approach to public events security

• review and build on the gap analysis on the detection of explosives

• carry out a gap analysis on the detection of CBRN materials

• prepare analytical papers and overviews of CBRN and explosives threats and risks in different areas of public security, including transport to support policy

• organise and support more actions dealing with the issue of insider threats […].

1962–1971

Herbicide attacks 1984, December

Industrial accident 1986, April Nuclear accident

1995, June Religious terrorist attack

Vietnam

• US herbicide operations during the Vietnam war

• 80m litres of agent Orange and other herbicides were sprayed from aircraft and helicopters to defoliate forests in order to detect Viet Cong military hideouts

• More than 3 million Vietnamese are still suffering today from the consequences, mainly due to malformations and immune deficiencies

National Museum of the United States Air Force

Ukraine

Tokyo , Japan

• The religious movement Aum Shinrikyo released sarin nerve gas in Tokyo subway

• 13 people died

• More than 6,000 others suffered the effects of the nerve gas

people died during the accident

• Long-term effects like cancers, radiation syndrome or leukemia still being investigated

• This worst attack in modern Japanese history prompted global concern about terrorist groups obtaining chemical weapons

photo: Uwe Brodrecht, CC BY 2.0, Flickr.com

photo:

photo: Luca Mascaro, CC BY-SA 2.0, Flickr.com

Using better research, testing and validation

[…] The Commission will

• continue to ensure that research takes security policy needs into account …

• further support CBRN-E research, testing and validation activities, and progress towards appropriate detection standards adapted to each type of environment…

Training, awareness and capacity building

[…] The Commission will

• further develop training tools, encourage the sharing of best practices and develop guidance materials to support practitioners with state-of-the-art training, in particular helping law enforcement practitioners improve their detection practices …

• continue to raise awareness of the limitations of explosives detection equipment …

• address the human factor risks by promoting a programme to ensure that those who operate detection equipment are well trained and motivated, and improve communication between industry, security service providers and Member States through workshops

and tools and improve the level of security

• ensure CBRN risks are taken properly into account in the development of the European Emergency Response Capacity

• closer links with training and exercises provided in the framework of the EU Civil Protection Mechanism should be explored […].

Promote more lead country initiatives and work with industry

[…] The Commission will

• proactively engage with stakeholders and organise meetings with Member States’ representatives on CBRN-E affairs to better handle prevention, preparedness and response measures;

• set up a platform for the exchange of information between the Commission, Member States and other stakeholders, and organise regular workshops on the research needs of end-users;

• continue to help Member States put forward lead country actions under one or more of the actions in the CBRN or explosives action plans. The Commission will in particular encourage initiatives that address detection issues.

web 2014 Communication: https://bit.ly/3Btu1B2

The external dimension

CBRN-E threats know no borders, as shown by the SARS and bird-flu (H1N1) viruses […]. Threats from commercial and homemade explosives, such as the 2010 Yemen cargo bombs, are another example of external threats that go beyond EU borders. For this reason, we need to build relationships with, and support preparedness and detection measures, in third countries to ensure that we can adequately protect the EU. […]

Conclusions

With the innovation and opportunism shown by terrorists seeking to inflict damages using CBRN-E materials, the EU needs to adopt a more proactive approach to detecting CBRN-E materials. This new step by step approach includes considering each threat and environment, using better research, testing and validation, promoting awareness building, training and exercises while engaging all stakeholders. With this approach, the Commission believes it can play an active role at EU level in helping Member States and other important actors to make Europe a safer place for its citizens. […]”

2017 Action Plan: https://bit.ly/3iV9pLs

2011, March

Nuclear accident

2013, August

Military chemical attack

2014–2016 Ebola epidemic

2018, March Poison attack

Fukushima, Japan

• Nuclear accident (level 7), following a major earthquake

• A 15-metre tsunami disabled power supply and cooling of three reactors of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant leading to meltdowns and hydrogen-air explosions

• 200,000 people evacuated

• 10,000 tons of radioactively contaminated water flowed into the ocean

Jean-Pierre Dalbéra, CC BY 2.0, Flickr.com

Damascus, Syria

• Syrian military rockets containing chemical agent sarin struck suburbs around Damascus

• at least 3,600 people displayed “neurotoxic symptoms” (Médecins Sans Frontieres)

• Estimates of death toll among civilians: from at least 281 people to over 1700

• Deadliest use of chemical weapons against civilians since the Iran-Iraq War

Adam Jones, CC BY-SA 2.0, Flickr.com

West Africa

• Ebola fever: disease caused by one of five different Ebola viruses

• Contagious through contact with body fluids from infected people

• First human outbreaks in 1976

• Epidemic in 2014 to 2016 in West Africa (outbreak in Guinea, Sierra Leone, Liberia)

• 28,712 cases (WHO figures)

• 11,372 people died

photo: CDC Global, CC BY 2.0, Flickr.com

Salisbury, United Kingdom

• Attack with nerve agent Novichok, presumably operated by Russian agents of the military agency GRU

•Directed against Sergei Skripal, a former Russian military officer and double agent for the British intelligence agencies, and his daughter Yulia

• Poison hidden in a perfume box later found in rubbish, poisoning other people. One person died.

©Woody Alec, stock.adobe.com

photo:

photo:

photo:

Documentation by Céline Angelov

The EU’s CBRN Centres of Excellence policy is a human act

The European: Mr Gulyamov, you have been the Head of Secretariat of the Central Asia (CA) region within the European Union's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (EU CBRN CoE) Initiative since 2015. You are known for your innovative capabilities and your pragmatism, and you were one of the first to promote interregional cooperation in the field of CBRN risk mitigation.

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: Mr Bühl, I am honored that you invited me to be interviewed for your magazine which pays special attention to security issues. Thank you.

The world is currently facing multiple challenges related to issues such as conflicts, the Covid-19 pandemic and climate crisis that are amplifying insecurity around the world. But how do we reverse this negative trend, how do we ensure that countries become more committed to the cause of security and stability? In an encyclopedia, I read that the “ability to set goals is one of the elements of human behaviour and conscious activity, which characterises anticipatory thinking, or thinking in advance of an activity result and ways to accomplish it with certain means.”

The European: At the end of 2019, during the international CBRN exercise Jeyran organised under your responsibility in Tashkent, you commented on the EU CBRN CoE Initiative: “We have a common charter and we made enormous progress in technical cooperation, but the initiative is far more: it is a human act”.

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: Indeed, the EU CBRN CoE Initiative brings together a community of professionals whose aim is to reduce the threats and risks from the use of CBRN materials. The

interventions within the frame of the initiative combine efforts of each member, and represent an endeavour to create, maintain and guarantee safe living environments across all regions. It is achievable only by the actions and behaviour of each individual person. This is a human act that plays an utterly important role. I am sure that cooperation is primarily built between people on an individual, human level. In this way, human relationships further evolve into cooperation at the organisational and institutional levels; this way trust is built, and cooperation is strengthened.

The European: Let us go back to policy and the strategic importance of interregional cooperation in the actual political and economic context. What are the particular ties established between the Central Asia (CA) region and the South East and Eastern Europe (SEEE) region?

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: As the Head of the CA Regional Secretariat, I concluded that the cooperation potential between my region and the SEEE region is high, and that our common historical past and similar development models enable stronger linkages allowing a constructive exchange of experience and cross-fertilisation of expertise.

Our joint containment of the spread of Covid-19 in the region is one example. By extending Project 53 on the strengthening of the national legal framework and provision of specialised training on bio-safety and bio-security – initially designed to cover countries of the CA region – to the SEEE region, we were able to strengthen capacities for managing the pandemic, establish an exchange of information regarding the application of primary epidemiological measures, support activities of epidemiological and clinical centres, and, most importantly, facilitate measures to maintain the performance of strategically important sectors of the economy in each country of the two large regions.

Interview with Bakhtiyor Gulyamov, Head of Regional Secretariat for Central Asia, EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative, Tashkent

Cooperation is primarily built between people

Statue of Amir Timur (1336-1405) in Tashkent, Uzbekistan photo: © Nicola/stock.adobe.com

The European: What are the facilitators of such a cooperation?

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: The development and implementation of joint events, actions and road maps are key points, as well as shared successes and lessons learned from the projects, supporting exchange visits among experts, replicating successfully implemented interventions.

Cooperation stimulates innovations at scale, contributes to the establishment and development of continuous partnerships between regions in the field of CBRN security. Other examples are the formation of joint working groups and informal and formal mechanisms for regular interregional consultations to discuss the current state and prospects for improving interregional and worldwide cooperation in the CBRN fields.

The European: Your region has been implementing an innovative project raising awareness of CBRN risks and threats. What is the idea behind this?

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: There are a lot of ordinary people who do not know what CBRN threats and risks are, although they may encounter these in everyday life, or people, including children, living in places of such threats and risks of chemical or radioactive contamination. In most cases they are not aware of the detrimental effects of these existing threats. It is our task to explain to them the essence of such risks and adverse consequences for human health and the environment in a comprehensive yet understandable manner.

The European: And what is your pedagogical approach?

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: Within this innovative project, we hold various competitions for children and adolescents at schools, conduct lectures for university students, with an aim to inform the population about existing risks. For such an awareness raising campaign to be sustainable, it is necessary to constantly engage educated and respectable community members who are able to reach out to a larger population, therefore we also educate teachers as the key target audience of our project. Recently, as part of the exchange between the CA and SEEE regions, we successfully held similar awareness raising events in Georgia, and these interventions were enthusiastically received.

The European: What is, in this context, the added value of interregional exercises?

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: In November 2019, you came to Uzbekistan to observe the Jeyran field exercise in Tashkent, designed as close as possible to resemble a real-life event. On a national level, early warning and communication systems, logistical base and medical capacities were tested, and plans of action for response and recovery measures were clarified and adjusted. Today, due to globalisation processes, closer relationships, travel and interdependence between countries, threats such as pandemics, climate change, conflicts, and terrorism are transnational ones that require coordinated action not only within countries, but also between neighbouring countries, as well as at the regional and interregional levels.

The European: To delve deeper into the subject of cooperation, could you reflect on the interoperability of the material?

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: Of course, the compatibility of equipment, means and materials employed during a CBRN incident would contribute to a greater efficiency. Therefore, this important aspect of standardisation and compatibility of such equipment, means and materials to be procured for the emergency services of neighbouring countries must be taken into account while developing and implementing projects and programmes of regional, interregional and global character.

The European: Mr Gulyamov, what is your appeal to the community formed by the now 64 partner countries of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative and the EU Member States?

Bakhtiyor Gulyamov: There is a global demand for mutual trust. We must engage in constructive dialogue and facilitate close cooperation between countries, as dialogue and cooperation are and will continue to be critical for ensuring CBRN safety and security. The EU CBRN CoE Initiative provides a platform for dialogue and cooperation among countries. Therefore, I encourage all partner countries of the initiative and the EU to continue dialogue and expand and strengthen cooperation in the field of CBRN risk mitigation within the framework of the initiative for our common cause – security and prosperity for all. In the end, all our efforts to increase the efficiency of emergency services will ultimately result in saving human lives.

The European: Mr Gulyamov, thank you very much for the interview.

The Interview was led by Hartmut Bühl.

Bakthiyor Gulyamov, is the acting Chairman of the State Committee of Industrial Safety of the Republic of Uzbekistan and the Head of the Regional Secretariat for Central Asia of the EU CBRN CoE Initiative

“I am sure that cooperation is primarily built between people on an individual, human level.”

photo:

© National authorities of Uzbekistan

Over 50 years of CBRN protection

The European: Herr von Blücher, this year [2019] you are celebrating the 50th anniversary of your highly successful company. May I offer you my warmest congratulations and thank you for granting me an interview on this occasion here in Erkrath. What first gave you the idea of founding a company that aims to protect people?

Hasso von Blücher: In the 1960s and 1970s, Central Europe was overflowing with millions of soldiers, countless tanks and all of the attendant military hardware. The two German states were seen by their respective allies as the battleground of a future nuclear war. In West Germany alone, almost 6,000 nuclear warheads were deployed – most of them mounted on short or medium range missiles – and almost all of them designed to detonate on German territory. Nothing whatsoever was envisaged for the protection of the population.

In cooperation with the German Federal Office for Civil Protection, we therefore developed a basic protection kit for civilians to ensure that their respiratory tract and skin would not be contaminated by radioactive particles. That programme collapsed two years later because

the German Parliament refused to pass legislation to implement the law on civil protection. At that point, we decided to continue our work as a small working group and capitalised on our experience to develop military protection suits. This has enabled us, little by little, to conquer today’s leading position in military protection garments.

The European: So, a somewhat timeless political and philosophical perspective then, and a certain idea of man as the focus of your thinking and your work. As well as your military background.

Hasso von Blücher: Please don’t give me such praise! With the CBRN defence troops in Sonthofen and at the army officers’ training school in Munich, I acquired detailed knowledge of the means of mass destruction. That is what gave me the technical background to develop various technologies for personal protective equipment.

The European: You have always been entrepreneurial and innovative. Proof of that is surely the Brügger Mühle (Mill), your Head Office, where we were walking around. I am most impressed by the harmony between

The conversation with the owner of Blücher GMBH took place in early 2019 in Erkrath. It was first published in Volume nr. 32 of this magazine

photo: ESDU

“In the area of CBRN protection, the next generation of protective suits will be more lightweight than before and made from fairly stretchable material, so more comfortable to wear while offering additional protection against aerosols.”

Hartmut Bühl asked Hasso von Blücher (right) about innovative CBRN protection and the success of his company

CBRN protection combined with a maximum of flexibility: example of a chemical protective suit from the portfolio of SARATOGA CBRN protective clothing for specific military or first responder user groups

history, functionality and the connection between art and nature. Was that a matter of intuition or deliberate planning?

Hasso von Blücher: It was both. Contrary to most people who look at something and see only rubble, rats and rust, I have a wonderful gift for imagining how it can be restored and exploited. The Brügger Mühle was unsellable for 30 years. It layed damaged and unused. I was able to buy it for a good price and it is now the most sought-after corporate facility in Erkrath, with about 14,000 square metres of office space.

The European: Your company has always been at the forefront of research and is renowned for its capacity to innovate.

Hasso von Blücher: In the area of CBRN protection, the next generation of protective suits will be more lightweight than before and made from fairly stretchable material, so more comfortable to wear while offering additional protection against aerosols.

The European: From the outset, the Blücher company was export-oriented and has had great and lasting success. Over the last 50 years, you have sold more than 12 million protective suits or the material to make them. Has the change in US trade policy had any effect on your company yet?

Hasso von Blücher: No, our sole obstacle has been the German Foreign Ministry because of extremely restrictive export regulations.

The European: How would you define a future strong European industrial policy?

Hasso von Blücher: A good EU industrial policy should set the right incentives and leave the rest to the market. It would have

to be exactly the opposite of the current German industrial policy. I believe that there are too many subsidies producing the opposite of the intended outcome. Subsidies for renewable energies for example hinder the efficient reduction of CO2 emissions through certificate trading. And for every nuclear power plant that is shut down in Germany, a new one is built on the other side of the border, which may not be maintained as carefully as the one that has been shut down. None of this is coordinated with our neighbours. The result is confusion, environmental nationalism and incompetence! The exact opposite of what we need!

The European: And what about the European armament cooperation? German governments continue to be reluctant. Do we need a new definition of what constitutes an armament?

Hasso von Blücher: In Germany, there is a peculiar attitude towards everything military: it is the “triumph of hope over historical experience”! Take as an example the restriction of our own products: they are designed exclusively to protect and not to destroy life, but defined as armaments, just like explosives and ammunition! Which means that they are not only hit by all official sanctions, but also by informal, politically motivated, export restrictions.

The European: If you could make one wish for yourself and one for Europe, what would they be?

Hasso von Blücher: The wish for myself would be that I remain healthy in body, mind and soul so that I can go on being active and creative for another 20 years. For Europe I hope for a joint protection of our external borders, a European army and a much tighter network of the various intelligence and police agencies.

The European: Herr von Blücher, thank you very much for your openness. I wish continued success to your firm and good health to you personally.

BLÜCHER GmbH

Founded in 1969 by Hasso von Blücher and located with its Headquarters in Erkrath, near Düsseldorf, the company is an internationally operating provider of CBRN protective fabrics and clothing. With its worldwide established product SARATOGA, Blücher is a leading manufacturer for air permeable protective clothing for military and civil defence, emergency and disaster management based on the development and production of adsorptive compound materials for the protection against chemical and biological agents.

Web https://www.bluecher.com/en

photo: BLÜCHER

Keeping troops effective in the face of advanced CBRN threats

Prevent, Protect, Recover

The use of fourth generation chemical agents in Salisbury (UK), continued nuclear sabre-rattling from NorthKorea and Iran, nuclear power plants (NPPS) under threat like in Zaporizhzhia (Ukraine), the exploitation of World War 1 chemical warfare agents documented by the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in Syria and the spread of ballistic missiles are only a snapshot of the tense and complex chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats that have emerged in and around Europe over the last few years. The Russian attack on Ukraine and its brutal consequences mark a turning point in the threat perception of the European population.

Tangible CBRN threats for Europe

The possible use of CBRN materials and weapons against European countries by hostile aggressors continues to be a tangible threat and needs to be addressed politically by greater coherence in security and defence and a common sense of purpose and urgency in the resulting actions. Of special concern is the erosion over recent decades of the global security architecture in arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation of CBRN materials and weapons, with a negative impact on geopolitical strategic stability.

NATO has initiated a process of addressing CBRN risks, has closed ranks, enhanced deterrence, increased the Alliance’s defence capabilities and tackled the complex security threats with a new Strategic Concept, which was endorsed at NATO’s Summit in Madrid 2022. In addition, NATO heads of state and

government have turned their focus to threats posed by CBRN weapons of mass destruction and approved a new NATO CBRN defence policy. CBRN threat assessments are shifting back to state actors. Russia is explicitly referred to as “NATO’s most pressing CBRN security challenge”. This clear focus on state actors with extensive and diverse CBRN weapon arsenals has an impact on the capability profile required by NATO, which must now invest more in CBRN defence capabilities in order to ward off the threatened use – or protect and recover from the actual use – of CBRN materials and weapons.

Assuming the reality of CBRN risks

The EU must be aware that the trend towards possession and use of CBRN materials and weapons will continue and should not expect a secure system of control and verifiable destruction of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems to be set up, even partially, in the foreseeable future. In addition, the destruction of all chemical weapons declared in the context of the Chemical Weapons Convention is unlikely to be completed by the end of 2023. Therefore, a credible deterrent through effective, sustainable and robust CBRN defensive and

by Colonel Stephan Saalow, Commander CBRN Defence Command and Chairman FNC Cluster CBRN Protection, Bundeswehr CBRN Defence Command, Bruchsal

Decontamination of a MARS rocket launcher

photo: ©Bundeswehr CBRN Defence Command

Soldiers donning their CBRN individual protective gear, applying the buddy-system

photo: ©Bundeswehr CBRN Defence Command

protective measures is essential. Consequently, the EU and its Member States should continue all preventive activities aimed at strengthening the international framework of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, along with efforts to protect the European population, regions and forces from CBRN threats, and, should these measures fail, to recover from the effects of a CBRN attack. However, not only do CBRN attacks directly targeting unprotected troops carry the risk of enormous damage, a further potential risk, as demonstrated in Ukraine, is the damage to critical and CBRN-related infrastructure itself. Nuclear power plants in Europe, not unlike the Zaporizhzhia NPP, have the potential to endanger the population and military throughout the EU, especially if they are deliberately chosen as military targets. As seen in Ukraine, preventing an enemy from damaging critical infrastructure is not always possible, so protecting potentially affected troops and appropriate recovery methods take on an even greater importance.

Pragmatic efforts: the example of Germany

The CBRN Defence Command of the Bundeswehr is a joint enabling headquarters that is not only responsible for equipping and training sufficient and appropriate CBRN defence capabilities but also for the functioning of the CBRN Defence System of the German Armed Forces. This fully acknowledged conceptual approach to protect against CBRN hazards enjoys international recognition. It is organised around a set of interdependent preventive and reactive measures that aim to significantly strengthen all parts of the German armed forces through a detailed and systematic CBRN risk and threat analysis, precise and methodical CBRN advice, CBRN individual and collective protection measures, and CBRN reconnaissance and decontamination. In this way, the CBRN defence system contributes to maintaining or restoring the operational capability and readiness of the Bundeswehr by a flexible and effective response to potential CBRN threats and risks and can be deployed across the full mission spectrum of the Bundeswehr. The organisational structure, capabilities and functions of CBRN defence are designed to be graduated and sustainable. Depending on the CBRN threat and risk analyses for a given mission, these capabilities can also be used in a modular fashion. CBRN defence tasks are carried out in all military services in an echelon-appropriate manner at various capability levels, including

• basic capability (CBRN protective measures for individual soldiers to be taken immediately to survive a CBRN attack);

• enhanced capability (unit level CBRN defence measures, allowing continuation of unit tasks albeit for a limited time under CBRN conditions);

• specialist capability (additional measures carried out by qualified and specially trained CBRN defence personnel and Joint Medical Service personnel).

By allocating CBRN defence capabilities to these capability levels, the CBRN defence system creates synergies that

ensures not only the protection but also the operational readiness of deployed forces. It enables troops to survive a CBRN attack and restore their operational effectiveness, essential not only in the face of a direct military confrontation, but also considering new threat scenarios such as hybrid conflict. The linking of covert and overt operations, the interplay between diplomatic pressure and economic sanctions and targeted disinformation via the internet and social networks all blur the line between war and not war. In such situations, the threat from CBRN materials and weapons complicates decisions about protective measures. But in both direct military confrontations and new forms of warfare, the focus remains on the protection of soldiers in the field. The CBRN defence system ensures that this focus is maintained, thereby contributing to credible and robust European security and defence capabilities.

Acknowledging the new situation

We are surrounded by instability and conflicts and face a dangerous mix of armed aggression, illegal annexation, fragile states, revisionist powers and authoritarian regimes. This environment is a breeding ground for multiple threats to European security from terrorism, violent extremism and organised crime to hybrid conflicts, instrumentalisation of illegal migration, arms proliferation and the progressive weakening of the arms control architecture1. CBRN materials and weapons exacerbate this situation. The EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) must fully acknowledge this development, design capacity building measures and provide resources to strengthen the provision of effective troops capable of stopping the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, protecting against CBRN hazards and taking appropriate recovery measures should prevention fail.

1 A Strategic Compass for Security and Defence for a European Union that protects its citizens, values and interests and contributes to international peace and security.

photo: private

“The Russian attack on Ukraine and its brutal consequences mark a turning point in the CBRN threat perception of the European population.”

How to successfully prosecute CBRN crimes – from the crime scene to the courtroom

A series of guidance handbooks funded by the EU

by Talgat Toleubayev, UNICRI’s Regional Coordinator of the CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance Programme

The development of a series of CBRN Guides is funded by the European Union (EU) Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence (CoE) Initiative. This activity is coordinated by the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (UNICRI) in close cooperation with relevant international organisations and partners.

Killing or harming is rather cheap

Committing a murder through deliberate use of chemical and biological agents is much cheaper than killing someone with a radiological or nuclear material. According to the CBRN experts, it ranges from $1 to $1000 to kill someone with a biological or chemical weapon respectively.1 However, building up the CBRN forensics and investigative capabilities in any country, including prosecution and eventual indictment in court, requires considerable financial resources and substantial efforts from governments, especially from law enforcement authorities.

In order to enhance and strengthen the CBRN forensics capabilities of its partner countries, the EU CBRN Centres of Excellence Initiative successfully implemented two projects addressing crime scene forensics investigators of CBRN incidents:

• Project 57 “Strengthening crime scene forensics capabilities in investigating CBRN incidents in the South East and Eastern Europe (SEEE) Region”.

• Project 58 “CBRN Forensics equipment for the SEEE Region”.

The beneficiaries involved in forensic investigation of CBRN incidents, mainly consisting of police, investigators and forensics experts, requested that additional international guidance documents be produced, developed with relevant CBRN subject matter experts with a focus on the CBRN crime scene and from the crime scene to the courtroom.

Managing the CBRN crime scene

The deliberate use of chemical and biological agents is not always related to killing or physically harming someone, but instead may lead to negative consequences in terms of environmental contamination and pollution. Illicit trafficking and dumping of chemical waste and other hazardous and dangerous toxic materials have now changed the traditional crime scene which has expanded to encompass the nature and specific environments.

The investigative process and the subsequent prosecution are becoming even more challenging, especially if the crime scene is contaminated with CBRN materials. Forensics experts need to treat the CBRN crime scene with additional precautionary measures by respecting all relevant procedures in order to operate safely in the contaminated environment while preserving the evidence intact. Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) and different national rules, policies and regulations help the forensics and law enforcement officers to properly carry out their duties in a CBRN contaminated environment. Therefore, complementary guidance tools in the field of crime scene management were issued by relevant international organisations. For example, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)’s Nuclear Security Series No. 22G, Implementing Guidance on Radiological Crime Scene Management, outlines

1SCOTT P. LAYNE and TONY J. BEUGELSDIJK. High-Throughput Laboratories for Homeland and National Security, Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: 123 n.2 (2003)

photo: UNICRI

the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective and efficient operations at a crime scene contaminated with nuclear or other radioactive materials. This document was developed by IAEA and jointly sponsored by UNICRI and INTERPOL.

A similar handbook, a guide on chemical and biological crime scene management will be developed by UNICRI in close cooperation with relevant international organisations such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and other regional entities, including law enforcement organisations.

From the crime scene to the court room

As a complementary effort to guide prosecutors, investigators and judges, it was recommended that a prosecutor’s guide to CBRN crimes be developed. The first substantial result to fill this gap was the publication of the Prosecutor’s Guide to Chemical and Biological Crimes in May 2022. The Guide was developed by UNICRI in close cooperation with the Oranisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the International Association of Prosecutors. It includes high-level insights, theoretical and practical considerations and case examples related to the deliberate use or misuse of chemical and biological agents and toxins.

The Guide provides a basic overview of chemical and biological agents, their transmissibility, interactions and impact, transportation methods, equipment and security measures, and the challenges of coordinating a response considering rapid technological advancements and dual-use challenges.

One of the strengths of the Guide are the real-life case examples it includes to demonstrate the importance of multi-agency cooperation, intelligence and information sharing. The outline of the cases summary, key points of evidence, prosecutorial priorities, primary investigative focus, investigative intelligence, challenges encountered, and outcomes of those cases represent a useful reference for prosecutors.

Important components of the Guide are a detailed discussion on the key elements of a chemical and biological crime, providing insight into the type of triggers and indicators, evidence and intelligence that may be acquired along each stage.

Building a CBRN case for prosecution

The ultimate success in the prosecution of criminal cases depends on how relevant investigative and law enforcement authorities construct all relevant facts and present them intact to the court. For this particular purpose, the Guide represents a valuable summary of key components to building a successful case for prosecution including investigative avenues, evidence preservation and integrity, and the importance of case reviews as key elements of a success strategy.

The technological advancements that offer innovative options during the investigative process yet require a thorough understanding of their limitations and a legal standing. An outline of the investigative types of technology in use for crime scene

Talgat Toleubayev

is UNICRI’s Regional Coordinator of the CBRN Risk Mitigation and Security Governance Programme. He coordinates activities for 10 countries of the South East and Eastern Europe within the framework of the European Union’s CBRN Risk Mitigation Centres of Excellence Initiative. Prior to assuming this position in 2019, he worked at the headquarters of the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) for more than 16 years.

photo: UNICRI

teams is presented. The Guide also contains a basic description to differentiate the role of prosecutors in the civil and common law systems.

In some instances, in order to complete the entire process of constructing the case for prosecution, investigators and law enforcement officers require assistance from other countries and international organisations. An easily accessible list of relevant international conventions with the provision of summary tables providing short summaries of international organisations and supporting agencies is part of the Guide.

The Guide is completed with an extensive glossary developed by the European Union’s Joint Research Centre, that compiles useful and relevant terms often encountered during the investigation and prosecution of chemical and biological crimes.

Implementation and integration

A series of action-oriented guidance manuals is not meant to be produced only to end up on the user’s library or bookshelf. The ultimate objective is to integrate them in the standard toolkit of prosecutors and investigators in the performance of their professional duties. Based on the content, a series of curricula will be developed by UNICRI that will provide training for a targeted audience of prosecutors and investigators from law enforcement agencies including practical workshops. E-learning modules and educational videos will complement the Guide, providing a deeper understanding of the theoretical components.

Web Read the Guidebook https://unicri.it/index.php/Publication/ Prosecutor-Guide-Chemical-Biological-Crimes

Disclaimer: The opinions, findings, conclusions and recommendations expressed herein do not necessarily reflect the views and positions of the United Nations and UNICRI, or any other national, regional or international entity involved.

Article first published in Vol. 43 of this magazine

The future Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear Reconnaissance Surveillance System

by Johann Fischer, Head of Unit Land & Logistic, and Friedrich Aflenzer, Project Officer for CBRN Defence, European Defence Agency, Brussels

The early detection and reconnaissance of chemical, nuclear and biological incidents will be crucial for soldiers’ safety in future warfare. As part of efforts to increase the safety of its armed forces and the wider population, the European Union (EU) is developing a sensor network that can produce a recognised picture of a chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threat over a specific area.

One of the first steps has been to set up a project called the Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Surveillance as a Service (CBRN SaaS, see graphic below). In late 2018, Austria, Croatia, France, Hungary and Slovenia started a collaborative project under the EU’s flagship defence framework of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO).

Establishing a sensor network

The objective of the project is to establish a sensor network linking Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), or drones, and Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS) such as vehicles without an on-board human presence. Once developed, the system will be interoperable with older surveillance technology to provide

a recognised CBRN picture that should heighten the operational information shared across commands – such as troop positions and the status of threats – used for EU missions and operations.

Led by the European Defence Agency (EDA), the hub for European defence expertise, the project aims to reach initial operating capacity in 2024 and to become fully operational by the end of 2025. Meanwhile, a related project, the similarly named Chemical Biological Radiological Nuclear Surveillance Reconnaissance Surveillance System (CBRN RSS), is set to enhance the development of an eventual prototype.

Funding supported through EDIDP

Those involved in the EDA-led CBRN SaaS felt that involving funding from the EU’s industrial scheme to support innovation in Europe’s defence industry, the European Defence Industrial Development Programme (EDIDP), could bring additional funding. The Austrian Institute of Technology made its proposal for EDIDP support, based on ongoing work through the original PESCO project and the ensuing EDA project. To meet all additional capability requirements such as stand-off detection, biological detection/identification and drone sampling, the consortium has expanded to include a Danish enterprise and two French companies.

While the EDA-led and the EDIDP-funded projects remain separate, only one so-called “technological demonstrator” for a recognised picture will be assembled. But it must comply with both the CBRN SaaS and CBRN RSS high-level capability requirements. For Austria, Croatia, Hungary and Slovenia, it means that they should receive a more sophisticated end-product than might have originally come out of the process.

After the design phase, CBRN RSS is set to develop a prototype. Then comes the testing phase from late 2023. Possible procurement may then come from 2025 onwards.

Given that the CBRN RSS project proposal was accepted by the EDIDP with approximately €6.7million in additional funding, the grant agreement between the European Commission and AIT was signed on 1st December 2021. That allows both the EDIDP project and the EDA-led Category B project to end around the same time in mid-2024.

Article first published in Vol. 44 of this magazine

A collaboration project under the flagship of PESCO

Building the EU’s capacity to respond to CBRN threats The Union Civil Protection Mechanism

by Dr Antonella Cavallo, rescEU CBRN Lead, DG ECHO, European Commission, Brussels

On 19th October in Kyiv, the President of Ukraine Volodymyr Zelenskyy awarded a national order of merit to the EU Commissioner for Crisis Management Janez Lenarčič recognising the efforts in assisting Ukraine and people in need.

To this day, the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) has mobilised over 76,000 tonnes of Member States’ and Participating States’ in-kind assistance and supplies from the rescEU strategic stockpiles, transport and warehousing services, medical evacuation capabilities as well as donations from private sector thanks to the collaboration with all 27 EU Member States and 4 of the Participating States (Norway, Türkiye, North Macedonia and Iceland).

Ukraine: a wide range of needs

The assistance requested by Ukraine reflected the widest range of needs ever recorded in the history of the Union: from medical to agricultural needs, from medical evacuation (MedEvac) to energy-related requests to equipment to respond to chemical, biological and radio-nuclear (CBRN) threats. When it comes to MedEvac operations alone, 1,644 operations have been completed out of the 1,913 requested. CBRN assistance provided to Ukraine so far included medical

countermeasures such as antidotes, potassium iodide tablets, therapeutics, and response equipment such as detectors, decontaminants, radiometers, dosimeters, spectrometers, and personal protective equipment. Moreover, the deployment included significant quantities of medical equipment to treat patients exposed to Toxic Industrial Chemicals such as ammonia or chlorine.

When EU Member States could not match directly high-priority requests from Ukraine with offers, the ERCC mobilised these resources from the rescEU emergency reserves in collaboration with the countries managing the relevant stockpiles. These already contained critical medical equipment. In addition, they were reinforced with CBRN countermeasures and response equipment based on Ukraine’s current and projected needs. The overall financial value of the assistance provided to Ukraine and neighbouring states via the EU Civil Protection Mechanism amounts so far to over €489 million. Beyond the monetary significance of the assistance, the ERCC has acted as a coordination hub for the EU Member States and Participating States as well as for a wide array of international stakeholders. In so doing, the ERCC helped prioritise needs over a number of requests for assistance, which were circulated simultaneously to several institutions and organisations in the EU and beyond. In relation to the CBRN assistance, the ERCC secured a channel of communication with key contacts in international organisations, which were active in the delivery of C, B or RN equipment

Janez Lenarčič, European Commissioner for Crisis Management (on the left), receiving a national order of merit from Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, Kyiv, 19th October 2022

photo: European Union, 2022 / EC Audiovisual Service

Dr Antonella Cavallo

photo: Jerick Moral

for medical countermeasures to Ukraine. These organisations included e.g., the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), USAID (which has been tracking CBRN assistance from several US government departments), NATO, the World Health Organisation (WHO), the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC). Liaison officers from IFRC and the USAID were hosted in the ERCC. This coordination allowed to proactively deconflict any offers of assistance and ensure a better overall coverage of the needs expressed by Ukraine.

Which CBRN capabilities can the EU count on?

The European Civil Protection Pool

When a CBRN disaster occurs, the affected country is primarily responsible to organise the disaster response including by deploying relevant resources and specialist teams. Should there be a need for surge capacity, the affected country can request assistance to the ERCC. After a rapid analysis of the request, the ERCC considers whether the capabilities requested coincide with those available in the European Civil Protection Pool, which currently hosts CBRN detection and sampling and CBRN urban search and rescue capabilities including specialised teams and equipment. These are existing capabilities that France, Denmark, Portugal, Germany, Romania, Greece and Italy have pre-committed and are either already certified by the European Commission or are in the process of being certified. The Commission reimburses up to 75% of the deployment costs inside or outside the EU and supports the upgrade or repair of the capabilities to ensure their readiness and fitness to be promptly deployed in case of activation.

The rescEU emergency reserves

The 2019 “Member States’ Preparedness for CBRN Threats” report of the European Parliament found that EU Member States do not generally maintain stockpiles of CBRN medical countermeasures, and that preparedness could be improved1 It reported that while some countries have their own reserves, these would be sufficient to cover only a part of the potentially

affected population. Indeed, disrupted supply chains and long procurement times may present a structural weakness in the response to large-scale CBRN emergencies. In other words, there was a need for an additional layer of protection beyond national and pool capabilities. rescEU responds to this need by offering a European reserve of capabilities that serve as surge capacity in case of natural or human-induced disasters, including health crises. Primarily intended to support EU Member States2, rescEU capabilities are 100% funded by the European Union. So, if national and European Civil Protection Pool capabilities are insufficient or do not match the request of the affected country in terms of quantity or technical specifications, the ERCC may activate the rescEU strategic reserves. In CBRN, three streams of capabilities are under development comprising decontamination, detection and CBRN strategic reserves for several hundreds of millions of euros.

1. rescEU decontamination capabilities will be developed by Croatia, Germany and Spain and will boost the capacity of the Union to decontaminate infrastructure, vehicles, buildings, critical equipment and affected people (mass decontamination). Teams of experts will be responsible for the development of these capabilities and the readiness of specialist teams and equipment, which will also be able to be pre-deployed ahead of high-visibility events or major public events such as the Olympic Games.

2. rescEU CBRN stockpiles will focus on medical countermeasures and response equipment that can be used to quickly replenish national stocks after a sudden incident or that can be prepositioned in case of sudden and temporary heightened risk. The war in Ukraine has de facto accelerated the implementation of these capabilities as selected medical countermeasures and equipment were included in the existing rescEU medical stockpiles and consequently mobilised to ensure prompt relief in the context of the war.

3. Finally, similarly to decontamination, rescEU detection capabilities will count on teams of experts and equipment that will be able to be pre-positioned temporarily ahead of major public events or deployed after an incident. They will cover detection, identification and monitoring with the ambition of relying on innovative technologies and integrated communication systems. rescEU decontamination and detection capabilities will be progressively operational from 2023 onwards.

While individual countries are responsible for the development of each rescEU CBRN capability, the Commission regularly brings together CBRN experts from across the Union to ensure the interoperability of the capabilities and maximise the operational learnings across the EU. This is key to sustain a resilient EU response mechanism that is able to withstand identified and unidentified threats based on the adaptability and fitness of its systems.

1 European Parliament, ‘Member States’ Preparedness for CBRN Threats’, 2019, p. 30 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2018/604960/IPOL_STU(2018)604960_EN.pdf

2 rescEU can still be deployed outside the Union “if a disaster outside the Union could significantly affect one or more Member States or their citizens”, according to Art. 12 of Decision 1313/2013/EU.

“rescEU responds to EU Member States’ needs by offering a European reserve of capabilities.”

Selection of authors and their articles/ interviews on CBRN in this magazine

www.magazine-the-european.com

2011

N° 9, p. 21: Ana Gomez MEP, Portugal

Member States must enact an enhanced EU CBRN Action Plan

N° 10, p. 44: Hans Kühl, Germany

The CBRN threats and resulting challenges for the European Union

2012

N° 12, p. 50: Anne-Cathrin Schreiber, Germany

CBRN Defence: an obligation to protect Europe’s citizens

N° 9, p. 54: Hartmut Bühl, France

CBRN: The stockpiling of antidotes

2013

N° 15, p. 34: Rachel Suissa, Israel CBRN in the Cyber Area

N° 17, p. 54: Ioan Mircea Pașcu MEP, Romania

The European Parliament‘s view on CBRN preparedness and readiness

2014

N° 18, p. 53: Willmot Graham, Belgium Countering the CBRN-e threats

N° 19, p. 53: Kristian Krieger/Brook Rogers, United Kingdom Improving Public Resilience to CBRN incidents

2016

N° 26, p. 58: Thomas Popp, Germany

CBNR threats are relevant-decontamination concepts and capabilities

2017

N° 28, p. 10: Helga Schmid, Belgium

The EU’s response to CBRN risks and threats

N° 28, p. 26: Oliver Luycks, Belgium

EU-guided CBRN Centres of Excellence

N° 28, p. 28: Dr Andreas Arnold, Germany

CBRN-e protection for all missions

N° 28, p. 29: Philippe Quevauviller, Belgium

Horizon 2020 – Chances to reduce CBRN risks

N° 28, p. 40: Thomas Popp, Germany

Preparing for the future with innovative decontamination systems

2019

N° 32, p. 49: Hasso von Blücher, Germany

50 years of CBRN Protection

N° 32, p. 51: Henriette Geiger, Belgium

Effective development through coherent and concrete projects

N° 32, p. 56: Sebastian Meyer-Plath, Germany

Networking on CBRN detectors

N° 34, p. 50: Nannette Cazaubon, France

The EU CBRN Centres of Excellences Initiative

2020

N° 34, p. 42: Mohamed Salami, Morocco

The African CBRNe Master’s – a high level training course

N° 34, p. 50: Nannette Cazaubon, France

JEYRAN 2019 – a successful counter-terrorism exercise

N° 35, p. 20: Antonia Marie De Meo, Italy

International cooperation based on CBRN risk mitigation

N° 35, p. 24: Said Abousahi , Belgium

The Joint Research Centre’s (JCR) longstanding effort to support EU CBRN programmes

N° 35, p. 26: Alexa Keinert, Germany

A decade of CBRN risk mitigation

N° 35, p. 34: Kasimow Otabek, Usbekistan

Cross border cooperation-CBRN Exercise Jeyran completed in Uzbekistan

N° 35, p. 40: Hussein Ahmed ABL Harthi, United Arab Emirates (UAE)

CBRN Medical Emergency Response training in the Gulf Region N° 35, p. 42: Al Sharif Nasser, Jordan

The Regional Detection Training Centre in the Gulf Region N° 35, p. 46: EL Hadje Lamine, Algeria

Strengthening capacities for border detection and management of CBRN substances

N° 35, p. 48: Josef Maina, Kenia

Enhancing Nuclear Security in Eastern and Central Africa

2021

N° 41, p. 49: Sebastian Meyer-Plath, Germany

Enhancing resilience – preparing to protect against chemical threats