The European Security and Defence Union Issue 7 by The European-Security and Defence Union

ISBN 978-3-934401-20-4

Independent Review on European Security & Defence

Volume No 3/2010

Main Topic Prevention of Crise s Disaster Managem and ent

No 3/2010

Checks and balances in Brussels â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the new role and influence of the European Parliament in the European Union

The European Union and the integration of the Western Balkans

Haiti: What lessons to learn

Martin Schulz MEP, Leader of the Group

Piero Fassino MP, Rome, Chairman Political

Ambassador Shirley Skerritt-Andrew,

of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists

Committee ESDA / WEU Assembly,

Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean

and Democrats in the European Parlia-

Paris

States and Missions to the European

ment, Brussels/Strasbourg

Union, Brussels

EDITORIAL

Editorial The European External Action Service (EEAS) July 29, 2010 will go down as a milestone in the history of the European Union. On that day, following a longstanding tug of war between the Brussels institutions and the Member States over competences, the Council of the EU launched the EEAS. This decision, provided for in the Lisbon Treaty, reflects the EU’s determination to help shape – indeed to put its stamp on – world affairs. The example the EU has set with its own multilateral organisational structure will give it greater influence. To succeed, the EU must do its utmost to present an independent and autonomous face to the world, entering into alliances with other powers with similar values and compatible policy objectives as needed. It is very important that the EU demonstrate consistency and purpose as well as integrity in its actions, placing appropriate emphasis on the quest for peace and human dignity that constitutes its identity. Now that the European External Action Service has been established, the focus must be on supporting Baroness Ashton, the High Representative responsible the new instrument, and on charting the course for the future. 1. To start with, the EU should probably concentrate its foreign policy efforts on the countries of Europe. The EU must pay more attention to its neighbours – those that aspire to join the Union and those that are its geopolitical and strategic partners. Essentially, these are the countries of the Western Balkans and the Mediterranean rim. But they also include Russia, which seeks closer ties with the EU – a move that would not require a paradigm shift in relations with the United States, traditionally the Union’s closest partner.

only temporarily. Any departure from European values would immediately weaken the EU and when it comes to the arc of crisis – Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran and Iraq – the EU remains well advised to rely on its civilian capabilities. Hartmut Bühl 3. The Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) remains a central part of the European integration process. Time has demonstrated the wisdom of the approach taken by the EU in complementing NATO by focusing on civilian issues. The missions (risky, but successfully completed) in which the EU has engaged outside Europe to date have demonstrated the EU’s ability to take action, but if it is to maintain this ability going forward, the Union will have to take a more rigorous approach to expanding its military and civilian capabilities. Above all else, Europe needs modern systems for airborne ground surveillance to create information superiority, the most modern command and control systems as well as its own military/civil command structures, so as not to permanently depend on NATO but be able to supplement its capabilities.

The European Union has much to offer. If it succeeds in projecting a consistent foreign policy that reflects its agreed goals and values, it will not only enhance its influence in the states and societies outside its borders but also consolidate its identity inside the EU. It is to be hoped that the Union’s diplomatic service will soon be up and running, acting as a multiplier to promote and defend European interests.

2. Relations with the Union’s other strategic partners –China and India, as well as Latin America and Africa – require candour and clear policy objectives. Principles must be conscientiously affirmed, with attention to political necessities, and overridden only in politically or economically compelling cases, and then

Impressum The European − Security and Defence Union ProPress Publishing Group Brussels/Berlin Headquarters Berlin: Kaskelstr. 41, D-10317 Berlin Phone: +49/30/557 412-0, Fax: +49/30/557 412-33 Brussels Office: Hartmut Bühl Avenue des Celtes, 30, B-1040 Brussels Phone/Fax: +32/2732 3135, GMS: 0049-1723 282 319 E-Mail: hartmut.buehl@orange.fr Bonn Office: Am Buschhof 8, D-53227 Bonn Phone: +49/228/970 97-0, Fax: +49/228/970 97-75 Advertisement Office Bonn: Karin Dornbusch Phone: +49/228/970 97-40 E-Mail: karin.dornbusch@behoerdenspiegel.de

Publisher and Editor-in-Chief: Hartmut Bühl, Brussels Editorial Deputy: Nannette Bühl-Cazaubon, Paris Publishing House: ProPress Verlagsgesellschaft mbH President ProPress Publishing Group: R. Uwe Proll E-Mail: magazine@euro-defence.eu Layout: SpreeService- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH Print: Heider Druck GmbH, Bergisch Gladbach The European − Security and Defence Union Magazine is published by the ProPress Publishing Group. The ProPress Publishing Group is the organizer of the congress on European Security and Defence (Berliner Sicherheitskonferenz), the European Police Congress and the European Congress on Disaster Management. For further information about the magazine and the congresses please visit www.euro-defence.eu Suscription: This magazine is published quarterly in Brussels and Berlin. The copy price is 16 Euro: 4 copies for one year: 56 Euro (Euro EU Subscription). 4 copies for one year: 88 Euro (International subscription) Quarterly, including postage and dispatch (4 issues) © 2009 by ProPress Publishing Group Bonn/Berlin

THE EUROPEAN − SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Checks and balances in Brussels – the new role and influence of the European Parliament in the European Union by Martin Schulz MEP, Leader, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP, Brussels/Strasbourg

The regional dimension of Afghan conflict by Dr. Zia Nezam, Chief of the Afghan Mission to the European Union, Brussels

POLITICS and POLICIES Editorial The European Union and the integration of the Western Balkans by Piero Fassino MP, Rome and Chairman, Political Committee, ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris 17-18

The European Union Speech by EU High Representative Baroness Catherine Ashton at the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010

Europe and its Security and Defence Afghanistan: Key points of the “Report on a new European strategy for Afghanistan” by Pino Arlacchi MEP, Vice President of the European Delegation for relationship with Afghanistan, Brussels/Strasbourg 23-24 Checks and balances in Brussels – the new role and influence of the European Parliament in the European Union by Martin Schulz MEP, Leader, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the EP, Brussels/Strasbourg 8-9 The European External Service (EEAS) – a good idea started off on the wrong foot by Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Foundation, Director, Europe’s Future, Brussels Office, Brussels 10-12 EU Foreign Policy – reduced liberty of action in operations due to lacking air transport capabilities – the special case of transport helicopters by Claire Curtis-Thomas, UK Rapporteur, Defence Committee, ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris 14-16

The regional dimension of Afghan conflict by Dr. Zia Nezam, Chief of the Afghan Mission to the European Union, Brussels 25-28 Afghanistan: Where does our duty lie? by PD Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Director, Institute for Theology and Peace, Hamburg 29-31

CONTENT

The Transatlantic Defence Equipment Market â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a European point of view by Axel Fischer MdB, Berlin, Chairman of the Technical and Aerospace Committee, ESDA/ Assembly of the Western European Union, Paris

Haiti: What lessons to learn by Ambassador Shirley Skeritt-Andrew, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States and Missions to the European Union, Brussels

SECURITY and SECURITY SOLUTIONS Industries The future of the European Security and Defence Industries What more should be done to develop a Common European Security and Defence Market by Edgar Buckley, Thales Senior Vice President for NATO, EU and UN, Neuilly-sur-Seine 34-36

Security Solutions Modern technologies for the training of European managers in Crisis Prevention and Disaster Management Interview with Ulrich Aderhold, Vice President for Europe & Africa, CAE Military Products and Services, General Manager, CAE Elektronik GmbH, Stolberg/Rhld. 46-48

Efficient crisis management as a prerequisite for networked security by Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO, Thales Deutschland GmbH 49-50

Institutions and Associations European Defence and Security in the 21st century by Thomas Homberg, EADS, Corporate Vice President and Head of EADS Strategic Coordination, Paris 37-38

Security has a social dimension by Emmanuel Jacob, President, European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL), Brussels 51-53

Security Climate change and future global security by Maxim Worcester, Senior Advisor, ISPSW, Berlin 42-43 Haiti: What lessons to learn by Ambassador Shirley Skeritt-Andrew, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States and Missions to the European Union, Brussels 44-45

Security and Defence News European Union NATO

54 58

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Documentation

Speech by EU High Representative Catherine Ashton at the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, 20 July 2010 “This is a significant moment in Afghan history: the first major international conference on Afghanistan, hosted by the Afghan Government in Afghanistan. London set out an ambitious agenda of mutual commitments – we agreed to review these regularly. Now, we need to show that we have the will and determination to take them forward. This conference is about Afghan sovereignty and leadership. The Government of Afghanistan can rightly claim credit for what it has achieved since London, as reflected in its documents on governance, agriculture and rural development, economic and social development, and human resources. The EU, through its Action Plan, will focus on Afghan priorities while at the same time ensuring continuity of our assistance. On the security side, we welcome the “Inteqal” transition strategy. Without security, long-term development will be impossible, and we need to ensure that the progressive handover of provinces and districts facilitates Afghanistan’s ongoing efforts. The Consultative Peace Jirga sent out a clear message about the Afghan people’s desire for peace and reconciliation. The EU will support Afghan efforts to reintegrate those who are ready to renounce militant extremism and violence, and to respect the Afghan constitution. Development takes time. We must ensure that events on the political and security sides provide a framework for sustainable recovery to take root. This should not be driven by a prescribed calendar but by the reality on ground. Most importantly, we must support Afghanistan’s efforts to provide public services efficiently, accountably and impartially. Afghan citizens across the country need to feel that they are increasingly safer, better served and better governed. Improved governance is central to success in all other sectors. Better management of public finance is key and will also encourage donors to route more assistance through the Afghan Government. Equally important is a functioning formal justice sector, the essential counterpart to better policing. People will put their trust in a competent and accountable judiciary and in a police force which is well trained and uncorrupted. The EU is investing considerable amounts in all three areas, partly through the Trust Funds which operate on the Government’s behalf, and through EUPOL, whose mandate has just been extended. Through the Action Plan we have made it clear that the EU has a long term perspective. It is also important that when Afghan citizens vote in September, they have confidence that the elections are transparent and inclusive, but also that the reform process will continue

Catherine Ashton Vice President and High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security

afterwards. The EU is ready to continue to support Afghanistan in strengthening its electoral institutions. The other side of the security coin is that Afghan citizens must expect their human rights to be protected. It is essential to ensure that human rights defenders must be able to work in safety and that civil society be allowed, indeed encouraged, to play a major role in Afghanistan’s development. Moreover, the ongoing involvement of women in Afghan political, social and economic life is essential and must be protected and actively promoted. I was privileged to spend time with Afghan women this morning and I hope Afghanistan is proud of them. Finally, it remains vital for Afghanistan’s neighbours to support constructive solutions for Afghanistan’s future. On the economic side, where we can assist with our expertise, well managed borders will ensure that you can address transnational security threats, such as the drugs trade, while facilitating the vital exchanges that make regional cooperation a reality. I want to congratulate you for the recent signing of the Trade and Transit Agreement between Afghanistan and Pakistan, which is a significant step towards boosting regional cooperation, and I extend my congratulations to both sides for making this happen. The EU stands ready to assist, in whatever needed, with taking forward implementation of the Agreement in the period ahead. In conclusion, the EU is doing what we promised. We are taking steps to align our assistance with Afghanistan’s priorities. We have coordinated our operations under a single EU Representative. We are ready to raise the level of our support in line with our Action Plan and the EC and some of our Member States have already done so. I am confident that when we shall look back to this gathering we shall realize that it has been a turning point in Afghan recent history, having set out a path towards Afghan ownership and made our work in Afghanistan sustainable, so bringing stability to the whole region.”

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Checks and balances in Brussels – the new role of the European Parliament in the European Union by Martin Schulz MEP, Leader, Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats in the European Parliament, Brussels/Strasbourg Europe looks back at an unprecedented success story. After centuries suffering under a precarious balance of power, devastating conflicts and the catastrophe of the two World Wars, a new era dawned with the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community. The idea of creating peace, stability and prosperity through regional integration has become a reality. The absence of war, together with Europe’s open borders, has made one of humankind’s oldest dreams come true. With member countries transferring only a few sovereign rights from the nation state to a supra-national institution, a spiral of integration was set into motion. From the Schuman Plan in 1950, to the 1957 Treaty of Rome that paved the way for the common market, to the Monetary Union, a breath-taking level of integration has been reached. Starting with six founding members, France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg, over time the Union has grown to 27. Peace, freedom, democracy and prosperity were extended to Spain, Portugal and Greece at the end of their dictatorships. Eastern enlargement put an end to the artificial separation of the continent by the Iron Curtain, and has contributed substantially to the peaceful transformation of these countries, thereby contributing to the security and stability of Europe as a whole. A war between EU member countries is unthinkable today.

A new design for the European Union The rules established by earlier Treaties, however, were designed for a much smaller EU - the number of Member States has quadrupled, in the past six years alone the number has

Martin Schulz MEP Martin Schulz MEP is since 2004 the leader of the European Socialists (PES), renamed in 2009 the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (PASD). He was born in 1955 in Helrath, Germany. Martin Schulz started his civil career in 1975 as a bookseller and held a bookshop from 1982 to 1994. He was mayor of Würselen from 1987 to 1998 and a member of the German SPD Council from 1991 to 1999. Since then he is a member of the SPD Federal Executive. In 1994 he was elected a Member of the European Parliament, became chairman of the PES Group and was PES Group Coordinator in the Subcommittee on Human Rights. In 1996 he became Coordinator of the Committee on Civil Liberties and Home Affairs.

A considerable strengthening of the Parliament’s rights The Lisbon Treaty considerably strengthens the rights of the European Parliament and thus tackles the democratic deficit the EU has been afflicted with since its foundation. The legitimacy of the European Project can not solely grow out of efficiency, and the capability to deliver results, but needs to be based on democracy. While national Parliaments lost some of their rights to scrutiny and legislative powers during the integration process, they were not equally transferred to the European Parliament.

“The idea of creating peace, stability and prosperity through regional integration has become a reality. The absence of war, together with Europe’s open borders, has made one of humankind’s oldest dreams come true.” almost doubled - and they were designed for a Union that did not have to face global challenges in the same way. Today the EU is called on to deal with climate change and a global financial crisis. The purpose of the Lisbon Treaty was thus to give the EU the tools to tackle these challenges, improve the way it works and also make the EU more democratic, efficient and transparent. The Lisbon Treaty gives its citizens a greater say in EU affairs and the EU a stronger voice in the world.

Though the competences of the European Parliament have grown with the years, they are still not sufficient to satisfy our democratic standards. The Parliament’s striving for separation of powers While sovereign rights were transferred to the supranational level, the founding fathers and mothers failed to transfer the separation of powers that is fundamental to our understanding

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of democracy since it was first developed in ancient Greece. It must be added that parliamentary democracies are often characterized by a fusion of power, where the government is often drawn from the legislature. Thus systems of separation of powers are always ideal-types that will never to be found in their pure form in reality. The EU, of course, is not a state, but still strives for a separation of powers. The central political institutions of the European Union with legislative powers are the “triangle” consisting of the Parliament, the Commission and the Council. Each of these institutions has competences, which deviate from the classical competences we know from the nations-state. It is this entwinement of competences that can be compared to a system of checks and balances.

The veritable improvements through Lisbon What improvements did the Lisbon Treaty bring in terms of strengthening the role of the European Parliament? The European Parliament was provided with important new powers regarding EU legislation, especially concerning the EU budget for agriculture, judicial and police cooperation, delegated acts, criminal law and the ratification of international agreements treaties. Co-decision was extended to 50 additional areas and has become the ordinary legislative process. The widespread use of co-decision in policy-making ensures that the European Parliament is on an equal footing with the Council and guarantees the democratic legitimacy of European legislation. National parliaments in each Member State have been given a greater role in examining EU laws before they are passed to ensure that the EU does not overstep its mark on matters that should be dealt with at a national or local level. As such parliamentarianism has been strengthened on the European and the national level - creating something akin to a transnational network of parliamentary democracy. The Parliament-Commission Framework Agreement Since 1990 relations between the European Parliament and the European Commission have been governed by a Framework Agreement. It defines the political responsibilities of each institution towards the other, lays down rules for the flow of information between them and aims to improve the planning and co-ordination of the two institutions’ legislative procedures. It also regulates the Commission’s participation in Parliament’s proceedings, and timetables for the Commission’s legislative and work program with respect to Parliament. The negotiation for the revised Framework Agreement was successfully concluded by the end of June this year and reveals a major break-through for Parliament in its cooperation with the Commission. The right to elect the President of the Commission The history of parliamentarianism is littered with examples of national parliaments fighting tooth and nail with the executive branch in order to win ever greater rights and powers. Since

the introduction of direct elections to the European Parliament in 1979, that reinforced both the principle of representation and participation rights, Euro-parliamentarians have won further significant powers. But it is not only the stipulations of treaties or constitutions that form the systems of checks and balances, but political praxis. The European Parliament has the power to elect the President of the Commission on the basis of a proposal from the European Council. The Hearings of the Commissioners at the beginning of this year have proven that the Parliament takes its responsibility, to test the qualification of the College, very seriously. There is no room for the rubber-stamping of unqualified candidates as the demission of the Bulgarian candidate showed. All major political groups announced that they would also defer the second date for the vote on the Commission if Barroso failed to guarantee the Parliament more powers. Legislative mile-stones The Parliament demanded that the Commission respond to legislative initiatives from the European Parliament within three months and produce a substantive draft law within one year. If the Brussels authorities cannot or will not do so, they will have to provide detailed reasons for this. This has become part of the Framework Agreement of 1990. The vote on the SWIFT-agreement on the 11 February 2010 was a further mile-stone as it put the Parliament firmly at the centre of EU decision-making. A progressive majority of MEPs – led by the 184 member-strong Socialist & Democrats (S&D) Group – voted against an agreement between the EU and the U.S. that would allow the mass transfer of European citizens’ banking details to Washington. In its first big decision since the entry into the force of the Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament thus wielded its newly won power and showed that it, unlike national governments and parliaments, was able to mount an effective defence of European citizens’ fundamental rights. The S&D Group’s rejection of the SWIFT agreement – negotiated by governments behind closed doors and in violation of the European Parliament’s right to participate – was always aimed constructively at improving the existing agreement. In renegotiating the agreement concluded between the EU and the United States, the European Parliament has been successful in balancing legitimate security interests with civil liberties.

A new political balance in Brussels During the confirmation of the European Commission and the SWIFT vote the Parliament − not the Commission or the Council − was at the centre of European politics. Now the Parliament is taken more seriously - in European capitals and in Washington. Though the Lisbon Treaty does provide for a new political balance between the institutions, it is the political praxis and the political will that in the end decide whether we will have a stronger system of checks and balances in place.

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The European External Service (EEAS) – a good idea started off on the wrong foot by Stefani Weiss, Bertelsmann Foundation, Director, Europe’s Future, Brussels Office, Brussels

The European External Action Service is now a reality, though a genuine common EU foreign policy has receded into the distance. The Member States are simply afraid of surrendering their sovereignty in this area. The Treaty of Lisbon was supposed to enable the EU to face up to the challenges of the 21st century in the area of foreign and security policy. However, a feeling of despondency is beginning to make itself felt only seven months after it entered into force. Nothing has changed when it comes to the image that the EU is an economic giant and a dwarf in foreign policy terms. Furthermore, as a result of the financial and economic crisis Europe is also on the verge of collapse as a global economic power.

There isn’t any new dynamism The important institutional innovations of the Treaty of Lisbon include the office of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice President of the Commission (HR) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), which is under the control of the HR and is supposed to support his or her endeavours. This newly created office means that in foreign policy the EU will be represented by one person. It combines the posts previously held by Benita Ferrero-Waldner, the Commissioner for External Relations, and Javier Solana, the Council’s foreign policy appointee. At first sight this seems like a good thing. After all, it reduces the number of foreign policy players in the EU who are jockeying for position. There is nonetheless little reason for rejoicing. For in view of the fact that we have the President of the EU, a post newly created by the Treaty of Lisbon, the President of the Commission with growing ambitions in the field of foreign policy, the Commissioners involved in the area of external trade, the 27 Member States, the rotating EU Presidency, and the many special envoys, it is clear that there are still enough players out on the field in order to confuse friend and foe alike.

“Divide et impera” The EU has not witnessed systemic change. Foreign and security policy continues to be solely in the hands of the Member States, and all important decisions still have to be taken unanimously. As a result the dual structure consisting of Council and Commission continues to exist, in which the Council, the organization which represents the Member States, is responsible for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), and at the same time the European Commission is responsible for the

Stefani Weiss Stefani Anna Weiss is Director for “Europe´s Future / International Governance” in the Brussels Office of the Bertelsmann Stiftung since 2007. She was born in Bonn in 1960 and studied Political Science, International Law and Sociology at the University of Bonn and at the University of California, L.A. From 1992-1999 she was Director for “European Law and Politics” at the Gustav-Stresemann-Institute in Bonn, before becoming Senior Project Manager for “European Foreign and Security Policy” at the Bertelsmann Stiftung in Gütersloh (1999-2007). From November 2009 to May 2010 she had an EP contract and worked in the office of MEP Franziska Brantner, Spokeswomen for Foreign Policy of the Greens, on the topics of the European External Action Service, the CFSP and ESDP-Annual Report, and the EP Resolution on the NPT-Review Conference.

equally important tasks of enlargement and neighbourhood policy, development policy and humanitarian aid, and, last but not least, trade policy.

The sophisticated structure of the EEAS The EEAS forms the substructure for the HR’s activities. In analogy to the HR’s two “hats,” the service will combine under one umbrella those departments for foreign relations which have hitherto been assigned to the Commission (Directorate General RELEX and parts of the Directorate General for Development) and the Council (Policy Unit, Directorate General E, ESDP Structures). In addition to this, the delegations which the Commission maintains in more than 135 states in the world are being transferred to the new service to serve as its future out posts. It is also taking over the EU representations at international organizations. Up to a third of the staff of the EEAS (in addition to civil servants from the Council and the Commission) will consist of diplomats from the Member States, who will have the same rights and duties as their colleagues from the Council and the Commission. Lady Ashton´s lonely battle Lady Ashton was chosen to be the first incumbent to wear the “double hat.” Her central task was to set up, at the behest of the European Council, an establishment plan for the diplomatic service which comprises the budget, staffing provisions and service regulations. The EEAS enters into force through a

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unanimous decision of the European Council* after coordination with the Commission and consultation with the European Parliament (EP). However, the EEAS can only begin to work after a series of regulations which are required for it to function have been modified. These include staff regulations for EEAS employees and a budget of its own. Here the EP is on an equal legislative footing with the Council. The ambiguous role of the Commission President of the Commission Barroso struck the first blow against the EEAS. He decided to move the important foreign policy dossier for Neighbourhood Policy to the Commissioner for Enlargement. All those who had thought that the new HR would be able to take over exactly those tasks which had been assigned to the former Commissioner for External Relations had to think again. The Commission was not and is not prepared to hand over (or in its eyes to surrender) its foreign policy responsibilities to the EEAS. The Council’s reluctance The Council, which functions as the representative of the Member States in Brussels, showed little sign of any willingness to enhance the EU’s image as a global player with the help of a compact and efficiently organized EEAS. Calls to dismantle tiresome dual structures in the Council and Commission, and the wish to enhance the EU’s voice and external clout have remained mere lip service. Lady Ashton was greeted with great scepticism after all she comes from the Commission camp. It certainly seemed as if the Council was doing everything in its power to ensure that nothing would change as a result of the forthcoming transfer of the Council departments concerned to the EEAS. In this respect one was not going to be outdone by the Commission. Even before Lady Ashton could present her first personal draft proposals relating to the EEAS, the Council confronted her with a fait accompli and unveiled a new Crisis Management and Planning Directorate (CMPD) which combined the Council’s civil and military crisis reaction instruments. The Council intends to transfer this Directorate to the EEAS as a special unit with its own staff regulations, and also the staff of the Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability (CPCC), the Military Staff of the European Union (EUMS) and the Situation Centre (Sitcen). These plans, which the Council managed to insert in the Ashton draft proposals of 25 March 2010, immediately aroused fears in the Commission and the European Parliament that the Community method would no longer apply to the capabilities set up by the Commission in the areas of conflict prevention, crisis reaction and post-conflict peace-building. The Greens in the EP, and with regard to this issue they have the support of most of the other parties, have come out in favour of making the most of the opportunity which the EEAS offers by adopting a modern

Fact sheet on the European External Action Service (EEAS) The European Council has endorsed the creation of the EEAS on 29 July 2010. The service will enter into service on December 1st 2010. Nature and scope The EEAS will support the High Representative (HR) in the various tasks conferred to her by the Lisbon Treaty. The EEAS will also assist the President of the European Council and the Commission and its President in their functions in the area of external relations. The EEAS will cooperate with Member States and the European Parliament, to whose Members it will also provide logistical support in third countries. Organisation Central administration The EEAS will be managed by an executive Secretary General, two deputies, and a senior Director General for budget and administration. Furthermore, the EEAS will consist of a number of geographic Directorates General covering all regions of the world, as well as multilateral and thematic departments, a policy planning department, a legal department, and departments for inter-institutional relations, information and public diplomacy. EU delegations They will be an integral part of the EEAS. EU delegations will take up tasks previously carried out by the former rotating Presidency. Civil and military crisis management structures They will be placed under the direct authority of the HR and their special status will be respected. The coordination with the other EEAS structures should be ensured. The HR will also have to ensure that the relevant units from the Commission transferred to the EEAS, which deal with planning and programming of crisis response, conflict prevention and peace building, and the CSDP structu res, work in close cooperation and synergy, both under her direct responsibility and authority. Staff Officials from the European Commission and the Council Secretariat as well as national diplomats (at least 30%) will constitute the staff of the EEAS. After July 2013, also officials from other EU institutions can also apply for EEAS positions. When the EEAS has reached its full capacity, at least 60 % will be permanent staff of the EEAS. The HR will each year present a report to the Council on the occupation of posts in the EEAS. Budget As the EEAS does not have its own budget, the relevant existing budget lines from the Commission and Council Secretariat will be transferred to the EEAS, once it has been established. The operational budget for the EEAS is the Commission’s responsibility. The first real budget for the EEAS, covering 2011, will come in the second semester of 2010. Next steps One month after the entry-into-force of the EEAS decision, the High Representative will have to present to the Commission an estimate of the EEAS revenue and expenditure, with a view to drafting an amending budget. The EEAS will enter service on 1st December 2010 Source: www.securitycommunity.eu

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and comprehensive security policy. They have demanded against ongoing resistance from the Council that the corresponding capabilities of the Commission and the Council should at least be assembled under the umbrella of an EEAS “Peacebuilding” Directorate General. In the meantime the EP has received from Lady Ashton a declaration that she intends to include a “peace-building” structure of this kind. If the former Council and Commission structures were to be transferred to the diplomatic service unchanged and moreover shielded from one another, the EEAS would not have convincingly demonstrated why it was better than its predecessors. Creating a new bureaucracy cannot be an end in itself. But as yet it cannot be completely excluded that it mights actually happen.

als submitted by Lady Ashton in March it seemed that the EP was going to be fobbed off with one of her deputies who was responsible only for administrative questions. But the EP insisted that in matters to do with the Commission it would only communicate with the corresponding Commissioners as deputies of the HR. In the case of the CFSP/CESDP it called for special appointees along the lines of the German minister of state. A powerful position of the Secretary General was also too much as far as some of the Member States were concerned. This post will not include the power to act as a deputy externally. Thus the EP will be getting commissioners. The foreign minister of the incumbent of the rotating presidency, who had already been discarded, is being resuscitated as CFSP deputy.

The Member States’ scant attention The report on the EEAS by the Swedish Presidency in October 2009 precisely delineated its structure, composition and working methods. The implementation of this plan through a draft resolution by the HR would be a mere formality. After all, the Treaty of Lisbon stated that the European Council would be making the decision and that was that. The Member States do not seem to have reckoned with the level of resistance in the Commission and the EP. However, the reasons for the scant attention to the EEAS which was displayed in the EU capitals is a reflection of the fundamentally ambivalent attitude to the EU’s foreign and security policy architecture as introduced by the Treaty of Lisbon. Hitherto the debate about the EEAS has excluded strategic thinking of any kind. How the EEAS has to be structured so that it can serve the interests of the Europeans in an increasingly challenging international environment seems to be of no interest whatsoever. A department for strategic planning was included in the organizational chart of the EEAS only as a result of pressure from the EP.

There is hope for a way ahead

The EP as warrantor of an ever closer union According to the Treaty, the EP merely has to be consulted before a decision is taken to establish the EEAS. But it is on a par with the Council with regard to any legislative amendments that may be required to set up the EEAS. The EP did not want to set up the EEAS as an independent institution with a budget of its own and its own staff regulation, and was in favour of putting it under the aegis of the Commission. Among the players in this game of poker, the EP at least wished to remind all the participants of the final goal of European integration. If one was striving for “an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe,” it meant a progressive communitarization of foreign and security policy. Another bone of contention is the question of who is permitted to deputize for Lady Ashton. The EP did not like the Secretary General model at the head of the EEAS, and in the draft propos-

In the Member States the foreign ministries themselves have been consigned more and more to the sidelines and the heads of state and government have taken things into their own hands. But they seem to be farther away than ever from embracing the EEAS. Yet that would be a significant precondition if it is going to be a success. But on the other hand they have not managed to show how each acting on his own can still make a difference in the international arena. It is clearly a drawback that when the EEAS was introduced, conceptual and strategic ideas on how the service can be beneficial for both the Member States and the EU as a whole were not deemed to be important. There is no mission statement. Whether the service will tend to place the emphasis on classical diplomacy or whether it will pursue new and more comprehensive approaches in which diplomacy, development and security are included in an overall context and topics such as climate change are included, continues to be an unanswered question. At the moment all that remains is the hope that the EEAS will have the effect of a large socialization structure. Since Commission civil servants, Council civil servants and national diplomats will be forced to work together under one roof in the EEAS, the differences which are still so noticeable today, and the question of where someone comes from and to whom he has to be loyal, may in the long term be overcome to make way for a European esprit the corps. It remains to be seen whether the Europeans still have enough time for this to happen. After a seemingly endless debate about the composition of the EEAS, it is now time for some hard thinking in conceptual and strategic terms about how the service can be beneficial for both the Member States and the EU as a whole.

This op-ed is based on a longer article published in the Bertelsmann Stiftung´s Spotlight Europe series. * This decision was taken on 29 July 2010

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EU Foreign Policy – reduced liberty of action in operations due to lacking air transport capabilities – the special case of transport helicopters by Claire Curtis-Thomas, UK, Rapporteur, Defence Committee, ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris The helicopter has become a key tactical system. More flexible than fixed-wing aircraft, helicopters can be u.s.ed on land or at sea, take up a relatively small space and do not require the construction of landing zones with prescribed dimensions and surfacing. They are able to hover and can drop or pick up troops and equipment free of the constraints (minimum altitude and proper take-off and landing strips) that apply to fixed-wing aircraft. In inaccessible areas that lack air transport infrastructure, helicopters are vital operational assets, which is why they are so much in demand for operations in Afghanistan.

Is there really a transport helicopter gap? Recent European military operations involving NATO or the EU (EUFOR Tchad/RCA) showed that Europe suffers from major qualitative and quantitative shortfalls of these essential assets and that the European states are reluctant to pool their national helicopter capabilities for u.s.e in coalition operations. Europe’s helicopter fleet is highly heterogeneous Moreover, Europe’s helicopter fleet is highly heterogeneou.s., with a range of models from three different sources: Europe, the United States and Ru.s.sia. In the field of heavy-lift transport helicopters (10-15 tons payload) the United States CH-47

Italien Augusta Helicopter during the EDA exercise Azor II in Spain. Photo: EDA

Claire Curtis-Thomas Claire Curtis-Thomas was a Member of Parliament for Crosby (Merseyside, United Kingdom) from 1997 to 2010. She is currently a member of the Defence and Technological and Aerospace Committees of the European Security and Defence Assembly. She recently submitted a report entitled “Strengthening the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB)” together with Mr O’Hara (United Kingdom) in December 2009 (Assembly document 2048). At the Assembly’s last plenary session in June 2010, she presented a report on European cooperation on military helicopters (Assembly document 2072). She has also been a member of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly since January 2008.

Chinook, CH-53 Sea Stallion and the Ru.s.sian Mil Mi-26 are the leaders. Europe is well represented in the middle of the range (5 tons) with Eurocopter’s NH-90 and EC-725 Caracal and Agu.s.ta Westland’s EH-101 Merlin. The problem for European countries is that new helicopters are arriving only in dribs and drabs in the current major theatre of operations, Afghanistan. This means having to rely on American equipment, in the case of those countries that have CH47s and CH-53s, or on Ru.s.sian helicopters of the Mil Mi-17/18 type. Attack helicopters such as the Tiger are also in short supply, while American AH-64 Apaches and Ru.s.sian Mil Mi24s are available by the dozens. The existing assets were designed back in the 1990’s In addition to the small size of the production runs of the new models, the existing assets were designed back in the 1980’s with European conflicts in mind. They were tailored therefore to European logistical requirements and to Europe’s climate and geography. Now, those helicopters need to be deployable at distances of over 5 000 km from their home base to places with poor infrastructure, with the relatively high cost that this entails for shipping, logistics and operating and maintaining the equipment on the spot. Equipment mu.s.t also be adapted prior to its deployment, again at extra cost, and personnel have to be

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retrained to cope with wear and tear and risk levels associated with operating the helicopters in the new environment, rather than maintaining it in peacetime conditions in Europe. Moreover, since these are coalition operations, the countries concerned mu.s.t be able to meet the requests of allies less well-endowed with helicopter capabilities. All is different: material, standards, procedures, rules As a result, it would appear that helicopter capabilities fall short of requirements for the European forces in Afghanistan, as was also the case for the EU mission in Chad (EUFOR TchadRCA) in 2008-2009. In fact, the resources in terms of equipment and personnel exist, but are spread among the member states which are wary of pooling them. Different countries also have different standards and procedures and rules governing the u.s.e of helicopters.

The consequences In response to those challenges, European states, with the support of indu.s.try, NATO and the EU are attempting to develop a coordinated European approach to military helicopters, and in particular as regards transport helicopters. Scant availability According to the European Defence Agency (EDA), the European NATO and EU member countries have at their disposal an estimated 2 000 helicopters, counting all the different models, and only 6-7% of these are being deployed for external operations. 70% are concentrated in a quarter of EU member states and only 50% are actually available and operational.

A profusion of initiatives The solutions depend first and foremost on the resolve of states which, as the owners of the helicopters, are primarily responsible for their condition and availability. However, a national effort on its own is not enough, which explains the profu.s.ion of bi- and multilateral initiatives in the NATO and EU frameworks. A pragmatic way to success − the example of Bückeburg In Europe there are many initiatives, in areas ranging from crew training to the standardisation of equipment and procedures, with a view to increasing functional interoperability. There are limits to those efforts due to the fact that the equipment itself is heterogeneou.s. in terms of its origin, characteristics and performance, but common or shared crew training is a way to reduce the gap in interoperability between the different national fleets. The German Army’s Aviation School at Bückeburg (Northern Germany) is a successful example of cooperation among European nations. This establishment has a programme for training of the crews of the NH-90 and is the

The most modern training center for helicopter simulation in Bückeberg (Germany) could be an example for EU-Simulation Centers. Photo: CAE, Montreal

result of a public-private partnership. That partnership, a consortium called Helicopter Flight Training Services, is composed of the companies CAE Elektronik Gmbh ( part of CAE, Canada, the world leader in the field of simulators and other civil and military aviation systems), Rheinmetall, Eurocopter and Thales. The consortium has delivered a complete solution for the instruction and training of NH-90 helicopter crews in the framework of a contract signed in 2004 with the German Government for the supply of four simulators and the equipment and operation of three training centres and related services. The aim of this project is to centralise the instruction and training of NH-90 helicopter crews from European and non-European owner countries of that helicopter. In 2009, six NH-90 states were involved in Bückeburg training activities: Au.s.tria, Belgium, Finland, New Zealand, Oman and Sweden. The EDA European Helicopter Training Programme (HTP) In November 2009, the European Defence Agency’s Steering Committee decided to launch the European Helicopter Training Programme (HTP), which started in 2010. It consists of instruc-

the cost of modernising a single helicopter is three to five million Euros on average. To date only half a dozen helicopters upgraded under the Franco-British initiative (including three Czech aircraft) have been deployed in Afghanistan.

The heavy transport helicopter (HTH) initiative

NH-90: Standard Transport Helicopter for several EU and NATO Member States. Photo: Behörden Spiegel/archive

For the moment the HTH is a Franco-German project, formalised in a declaration of intent signed on 20 June 2007 at the Le Bourget Air Show. This will be a 40-tonne helicopter capable of transporting 1315 tonnes of payload over 200-300 km. It will have three engines and an essentially interior payload capacity. The HTH is planned to arrive around 2020. The EDA, in cooperation with NATO, has the difficult job of harmonising the desired characteristics.

A chance for transatlantic cooperation tion and training modules and two annual exercises, the first of which (AZOR 2010) took place in Spain in June of this year. One exercise is devoted to individual instruction and training in an environment similar to that of a possible theatre of operations, the other to interoperability and operational tactics. Get Russian sourced helicopters in shape Another important initiative at the European level is the modernisation and upgrade to NATO standards of the fleet of Ru.s.sian made Mil Mi-17 helicopters (5 tons) in service in several central European states. Up to 100 platforms are considered operational but need upgrades and simulation and training for pilots and crews. As far as Mil Mi-17 helicopters are concerned, the Czech Republic plays the role of framework nation within NATO’s HIP Helicopter Task Force (HHTF) (HIP being the NATO designation for the Mil Mi-17), with the aim of creating the conditions for the formation of a multinational force of medium-lift Mil Mi-17 helicopters as well as other models such as the Mil Mi-24 attack helicopter. Poland also has an important role in this area, inspired by the example of Bückeburg and CAE. The French-British St. Malo Initiative In March 2008, France and the United Kingdom launched an initiative addressing “critical shortfalls in capability which constrain the deployment of helicopters in operations”. Three avenues were identified: “pilot operational and advanced training courses, upgrading aircraft and establishment of a tru.s.t fund that could improve the availability of helicopters to our European partners and NATO allies”. At NATO’s Bucharest summit in April a 2008 European fund was set up at some 30 million Euros in order to finance all the measures proposed. The fund saw contributions of 10 Member States and PfP nations, including Au.s.tralia, and was managed by NATO. But

As the United States is also in the process of considering options for future heavy lift helicopters, Europe and the U.S. could find common ground to fill their needs. Notwithstanding the technology gap that exists in general terms between Europe and the United States in the field of defence equipment, when it comes to helicopters the two are more or less at the same level. Given the interest expressed by U.S. firms such as Sikorsky and Boeing in a transatlantic partnership, Europe therefore has a choice of options. The HTH is a flagship project which offers major potential in terms of developing the projection and in-theatre operational capabilities of European forces, helping establish a better balance in transatlantic cooperation on defence equipment and preserving and developing European capacities, jobs and exports for the benefit of the European defence indu.s.trial technological base. The development of the HTH would give European armed forces a projection and operational capability in the field of heliborne operations comparable to that of the United States. There is also a large civilian market for this type of aircraft. In conclu.s.ion, the European helicopter fleet offers a wide choice and range of capabilities, but is fragmented into “families” and by the different rules of engagement. There is an urgent need to harmonise requirements and define minimum standards and embrace a cooperative and proactive approach based on the complementarity between different types of helicopters and on joint training and logistics, for example. This calls for an effort on all sides, by governments and organisations (NATO, EU/EDA) alike. Without such an effort the burden will inevitably continue to fall on those countries that contribute the most equipment, without all the countries that benefit having contributed to the maintenance, modernisation and replacement costs. This situation is approaching its limits and is detrimental to the cohesion of the European and NATO operations.

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The European Union and the integration of the Western Balkans by Piero Fassino MP, Rome, Chairman, Political Committee, ESDA/WEU Assembly, Paris

On 2 June 2007, during its Western Balkans Conference in Sarajevo, the European Union reaffirmed that the integration of the countries of the region was one of its strategic priorities. This is consistent with the efforts made in the area by the European Union since the European Conference of Zagreb (2000) and the EU Council in Thessaloniki in 2003.

The EU needs to back up its efforts Nevertheless, for the sake of credibility, the EU’s favourable position needs to be backed by a concrete strategy that sets out the stages, the ways and means and the timetable of the integration process. 15 years have elapsed since the Dayton Agreement and 10 years since the Kosovo crisis. In this period, the Balkans has become progressively more stable thanks to the direct involvement of the international community on several fronts: through the military presence of NATO and the EU; through the civilian missions of the international community, the latest example of which is Eulex in Kosovo; and through the appointment of High Representatives who have maintained constant links between the international community and the region. Above all, the European Union and many of its countries have remained directly engaged with the region. At the same time, NATO has enhanced relations with the countries of the region, three of which, Albania, Croatia and Slovenia, are now members of the organisation. Shaping a comprehensive and structural linkages Further, the European Union has accompanied the progressive integration of the Balkans with several tangible steps: preferential trade arrangements to foster an increasing openness between the Balkans and the European market; the signing of the Stabilisation and Association Agreements in order to shape a comprehensive and structural linkage between the European Union and countries in southeast Europe; the accession of Slovenia to the European Union; the opening of accession negotiations with Croatia, which are now reaching their final stage; and the recent agreement between the European Union and the Balkan countries for the abolition of visas to allow the free movement of Balkan citizens within the Schengen area. Strengthening democratic institutions in the region These developments have been strengthened by the fact that all the countries of the region have submitted applications for EU membership, while the EU’s relations with each of the countries have been growing in breadth and depth over the years.

Piero Fassino Piero Fassino MP is a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Chamber of Deputies and Chairman of the Political Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly/WEU Assembly. He was born 7 October 1947 in Avigliana (Turin), studied Political Science . From 1991 − 1996 he was Secretary for international relations of the new founded party Democratici di Sinistre (DS). In 1994 he was elected as a Member of Parliament. As former Minister for Justice, Foreign Trade Minister and State Secretary for Foreign Affairs and European Policies, Piero Fassino is a renowned specialist in foreign and European affairs and an essayist and writer on politics, economics and social issues. He is the foreign affairs spokesperson of the National Political Committee of the Italian Democratic Party (Partito Democratico). In November 2007, he was appointed European Union Special Envoy for Burma/Myanmar.

The EU’s commitment has brought about significant results. For more than 10 years the Balkans have been free of those wars that brought to the eyes of the world the horrors of ethnic cleansing and mass rape, and caused untold suffering and loss for millions of people. In recent years, the disputes between the countries of the region have been reduced, and significant steps towards peace and reconciliation taken, such as the declaration of the Serb Parliament regarding the responsibility of the Serbian militias of General Mladic for the massacre of Srebrenica, the presence of President Tadic at this year’s commemoration ceremony at Potocari, or the recent agreement between Slovenia and Croatia, followed by a referendum in Slovenia, to settle their border dispute. In the same period, each country of the region has strengthened its democratic institutions, market economy and the rule of law. Accelerating integration into the EU None of this would have been possible unless the European Union and the international community had made a strategic decision to actively engage with the Balkans. These achievements notwithstanding, there are, of course, still some causes for concern: the frailty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the weakness of its state institutions; the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosovo, which was recognised by most European countries and around seventy other countries in the world, but not by Serbia; the dispute between the former

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Piero Fassino MP in the ESDA/WEU Assembly on 17 June 2010 reporting on the developments in the Balkans. Photo: ESDA, Paris

Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Greece, the issue of refugees and their return to their countries of origin, and the phenomena of corruption, smuggling and organised crime which are weakening the stability of the region. For all these reasons, the integration of the Balkans into Europe must be accelerated. Concrete steps need to be taken, for there is nothing more dangerous than continually indicating a goal without doing everything possible to pursue and achieve it.

The need for a concrete EU roadmap The European Union must therefore draw up as soon as possible a roadmap clearly setting out the stages and the timetable for the process of integration of the Balkan countries. Some of these stages can already be identified: conclude negotiations with Croatia before the end of 2010 and set a date for accession as soon as possible; open negotiations with Macedonia, which has already fulfilled its preliminary requirements; give effect to the Stabilisation and Association Agreements signed with the countries of the region, including Serbia; extend the abolition of visa requirements, already effective between the EU and Serbia, Montenegro and Macedonia, to include also Albania and Bosnia, as announced recently by the Spanish Presidency of the EU; grant Serbia, Montenegro and Albania candidate status so that the procedures for the opening of accession negotiations can begin; strengthen the state institutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that they can take over the powers currently held by the European Special Representative and the Office of the High Representative (OHR). These are absolutely necessary steps for the integration process to move forward, stage by stage, in a credible manner, while encouraging countries to carry out reforms to achieve economic, social, political and legal standards that are in keeping with those of the EU.

of the players in the Balkans. For this reason, we are encouraging the Serbian and Kosovo authorities to reopen bilateral talks to reach a reciprocally satisfactory agreement, also because the forthcoming decision of the International Court of Justice cannot bring about a political solution to the problem of relations between the two countries. The Kosovo authorities must guarantee the rights of Serbs and the Orthodox Church. We urge the Bosnian entities to enact indispensable constitutional reforms to give Bosnia and Herzegovina the necessary strength and authority of a state. We urge Greece and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia to come to an agreement on the official name of the Macedonian state. The Albanian political parties must make an effort to overcome the stand-off between them that is paralysing the country. More details on these recommendations can be found in my report on â&#x20AC;&#x153;the EU and the Western Balkansâ&#x20AC;? adopted by the European Security and Defence Assembly/WEU Assembly (http://assembly-weu.eu) at its plenary session in June 2010. The responsibility of the EU for the whole region The task at hand is a particularly significant test for the European Union. 50 years ago, the European Union was established in order to overcome centuries of wars that had stained the continent with blood. In the 1980s, by including Spain, Portugal and Greece, the European Union led those countries out of the dark night of dictatorship. With enlargement to the east in the new century, we brought democracy and the market to where there had been dictatorship and poverty. In the Balkans today, the EU has a great responsibility. It must create the right conditions so that countries and peoples that have historically been in conflict with each other may conceive of a future achieved by working not against but rather with their neighbours. It is therefore vital that the EU continues to support the work of the ongoing missions and provide its representatives in the region with all the necessary assistance and resources.

Stability in the Balkans is our stability The integration of the Western Balkans is an essential step. It is not a question of granting concessions to these countries and their peoples; nor is it a reward. Their stability is our stability. Stability in the Balkans is tantamount to stability in Europe. It is our duty not to disappoint or frustrate their expectations, but, rather, to meet them, take them on board and build a common future together. Integration with European and Euro-Atlantic institutions is the necessary, just and irreversible route by which we can offer stability, security and prosperity to the Balkans.

1 The Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) constitute the framework of

More efforts needed within the Western Balkans The achievement of these goals requires the contribution also

relations between the European Union and the Western Balkan countries for implementation of the stabilisation and association process. The agreements are adapted to the specific situation of each partner country.

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The special dimension of Israel’s Security – how Europeans should understand it Interview with Colonel (ret.) Miri Eisin, former intelligence officer and government spokesperson of Prime Minister Ehud Olmert The European: There is no doubt on the European nation’s solidarity with Israel and the Jewish people; however, the European society today – after two decades without a serious military threat – has a difficult time understanding Israel’s foreign and security policy; especially the use of military force. Europeans learn through the mass media that Israel’s military forces do not discriminate between military objectives and the civilian population. Yet, you said in an interview in the U.S. that Israelis were profoundly shocked with the European narrative especially during war times in Israel. Does Israel feel a lack of solidarity coming out of Europe? Miri Eisin: There is indeed no doubt that Europeans view foreign issues differently from all the people of the Middle East, including Israel. One of the different views stems from Europe’s post war stance, after the impact of two world wars. Israel is a young country with a strict moral code and her need to defend herself from attacks has shaped society. The new challenges of extremists using violent force to achieve their aims make it all the more difficult. Israel feels part of Europe in many ways – yet we are a Middle Eastern nation, and our neighbourhood is different than most Europeans.

”Israel is a young country with a strict moral code and her need to defend herself from attacks has shaped society.” Israelis would like to approach our European allies knowing that they understand that our situation is not exactly the same as theirs. Europe is our natural ally and we feel the need to overcome the difference in perceptions. The European: Keeping history in mind, how does the Israeli society then understand security and defence for its country? Or more simply: What does security mean for an Israeli? Miri Eisin: Israel is a country that has been at war since before achieving independence. Israelis tend to almost always view their situation from the security point of view – as a response to the reality of their neighbourhood. The first meaning of security is the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish democratic state. We hope for a peaceful resolution with our neighbours and need to be sure that we don’t let the extremists define the agenda not in Israel or anywhere else.

Miri Eisin Miri Eisin is a retired Colonel of Israel’s Armed Forces. She holds a BA from Tel Aviv University in Political Science and Middle Eastern Studies and an MA in Security Studies from Haifa University. In addition, she is a graduate of the Israeli National Defense College and the Staff College. Miri Eisin served for 20 years in the Israeli intelligence community in various positions including combat units at the brigade and division levels, the production department in General Headquarters and the Northern Regional Command. She served as an assistant to the director of military intelligence and held from April − May 2002, during “Operation Defensive Shield”, the position of a special spokeswoman. Miri Eisin was assigned the position of special spokeswoman for the Israeli government during Hezbollah’s war against Israel in July 2006 before taking on the post as Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s foreign media advisor (Sept 2006 − Dec 2007).

The European: What could be a common ground? Miri Eisin: We need to reach out and find common ground with our neighbours and also be sure that the voices who call for the destruction of the state of Israel are side lined by the pragmatists. As a state, we have full expectations to be safe within our borders – and this is not the situation now. We will defend our state, within our borders and try to prevent the extreme violent factions from infiltrating in. A secure Israel is not immune to the general climate of extremism there is around the globe. It is allowed to defend itself against such extremism which is directed against us.

“Security is the continued existence of Israel as a Jewish democratic state.” The European: Israel has recovered from the last two wars, and I have the feeling that your country has become more self-critical. Today people are questioning more than ever how to deal with the threat of terrorism, especially coming from Hezbollah. What is Israel’s strategic answer to this threat? Miri Eisin: I strongly agree with the statement that Israel is even more self critical than we used to be. We are in the

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Photo: www.nationsonline.org

forefront of self examination – and include all portions of the Israeli system in our criticism – the government, the military and security forces, even the justice system. The European: The question is how to deal with terrorism. Miri Eisin: To deal with terrorism is an evolving one, as we see that the challenge of terrorism changes too. First is to make sure there is understanding that the extremists who employ terrorism do not define the agenda – not in Israel or anywhere else. Countries and individuals need to stand up to terrorism and not to succumb to the fear they try to instil. We need to strengthen the pragmatists both within Israel and in our counterparts around us – and sideline the extreme ideologies that have no room to compromise. Israel sees the terrorists as both a security challenge and a perception challenge. The European: What has to be done on the security level? Miri Eisin: On the security level it means high quality intelligence and operational capabilities. You need to understand and define clearly who you are covering and what you need to achieve. The European: This is the “hardware” and what about on the soft side? Miri Eisin: On the perception level Israel needs to branch out – to understanding the challenge of the battle for the hearts and minds. The European: To beat terrorism? Miri Eisin: Terrorism is a war you can win – the main challenge is on the perception front. Terrorist organisations have an edge in this field – as non state actors they can define “rules” that are heinous. They are not accountable or responsible and thus in the perceptions as they are presented in some of the media, they can be perceived as the underdog instead of the instigator of violence.

The European: Do you see a workable solution in the near future with an acceptable arrangement with your neighbouring states, arrangements that are favourable for Israel’s security? Miri Eisin: Security arrangements are part of any negotiation. The problem with Israel’s surroundings is that the extreme elements that are the main security threat are not willing to negotiate – they demand Israel’s destruction. The obvious example is the sovereign state of Lebanon: the most armed and ready force is Hezbollah, a non state actor with no responsibility and very little accountability. If Israel and Lebanon agree on the border arrangements. The European: Would Hezbollah accept it? Miri Eisin: They clearly state they will not – and that means, it is very difficult to arrive at a resolution which acknowledges Israel’s security needs. Can we continue to have cross border attacks by the non state actor and consider that a sustainable arrangement? I think not. The European: What is the consequence? Miri Eisin: We have been under physical attack since before we became a state. The new arena is the perception of Israel in the international arena. The European: But there is another strategic threat, the development of nuclear and maybe chemical weapons in Iran, whose leadership explicitly wishes to wipe out Israel from the map. What is Israel’s political and military answer to this alarming situation? Miri Eisin: Israel clearly states that we view Iran as a strategic threat – not just to Israel but to the region and to the world. The combination of an extreme ideological regime with the quest for nuclear capability alarms all rational countries. We just need to look a bit further east towards Southwest Asia,

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Destruction of a house in Haifa, Israel, by a Katyusha missile fired by Hezbollah from Lebanon during the 2nd Lebanon war in 2006. Photo: Calev Ben David

Pakistan and the current events there, to understand the negative potential to the world. The European: Apparently the different powers are lining up having understood the threat. Miri Eisin: Israel first and foremost sees the world powers as the leaders in making sure Iran does not go nuclear. The question to us is clear: if Iran is a rational country – it should respond to sanctions. If it is not – it should be isolated by the world. Iran should be deterred by the world – not by Israel. The latest sanctions both by the U.S. and now the EU are the way to contend with this issue.

“The new arena is the perception of Israel in the international arena.” The European: Nothing will work without the help of the U.S., which are Israel’s most reliable partner. Isn’t it a consequence, the strong security and defence linkage between Israel and the U.S., that gives Israel the necessary room for manoeuvre…. without having the necessary freedom of action? Miri Eisin: Israel is a sovereign state, with choices as any other – in a more challenging neighbourhood. We have freedom of action, and freedom of choice, and we have allies – and understanding our position and also our allies – is part of decision making.

The European: A consequence of what you underlined is that Israel has its own strategic capability, which should hinder an aggressor to use weapons of mass destruction against it, because retaliation would not be without a consequence. Miri Eisin: Iran is a regional power already, together with Turkey and Israel. The question is what Iran wants to achieve in her regional politics and in her quest for nuclear capability. Israel’s policy has been consistent for many years. We will not be the first to introduce nuclear capabilities to the Middle East. Iran is a threat to more than just Israel, so it is fitting that the world is responding to the threat. Israel is the only sovereign country that has been directly and repeatedly threatened by Iran with destruction. We stand with the world against Iran achieving nuclear capability. The European: The question is how to make peace. How can a stable relationship with the neighbouring states be developed? The Palestinian issue is certainly a priority that needs to be resolved. How can Israel manage a new and serious peace negotiation process which will not break down at the smallest provocation by either side, who can assure that the negotiation process will move forward? Miri Eisin: If we could have assurances then may be the negotiations would not take so long! Both sides have concerns, and at the end Israel as a sovereign state is both accountable and under scrutiny. Perhaps we all need to realize that the leap of faith needed to go forward takes a lot of trust, and trust

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building is a slow process. The extreme elements I mentioned before try hard to define the agenda and sometimes succeed. We all need to be aware of the pitfalls and continue forward. The European: Shouldn’t the EU take a stronger role in influencing the peace process in the Middle East? The U.S. is perceived in the majority of the Arab world as a one sided mediator between the two sides. This has created a lack of trust, frustration and anger among Arab countries as the U.S. is perceived as a biased mediator. Unlike the U.S., the EU is a heterogeneous actor with different facets in its foreign policy in the Middle East. Do you think Europe’s unique stand might pull the peace process out of its perpetual failures? Miri Eisin: The EU is already heavily involved in the peace process. They are the main supporter of Palestinian Authority government capabilities. These are the basic needs for any resolution between two future states. The bias as you put it is perhaps one that should be perceived in a broader sense: are the Europeans impartial? Do they not have their own preconceptions that influence their policies? At the end of the day the only resolution will come from Israeli and Palestinian leaders – and the role of “honest broker” is important but won’t bring about the solution unless the two sides find a level of trust between each other. There is no question that the Palestinians need assistance to arrive at a viable state, and not to establish a terror run corrupt entity.

The European: There is one field that Israelis perceive as an internal issue but Europeans see as an external issue: Israel’s settlement policy. Settlements in Europe – and if I am well informed in the U.S. as well – are seen as one of the main problems hampering the peace process. Could you bring some light to the situation? Miri Eisin: Israel showed itself and the world 5 years ago that the settlements are an issue that can be resolved. We removed 22 settlements, 11,000 settlers –an Israeli decision. We implemented this action although there were many voices that opposed this decision in Israel. That is the strength of the democratic values. The settlements are not “the” issue – they are one issue that will be decided upon in the course of arriving at a resolution for the overall status between Israel and the Palestinians. We have a strong democracy and will act in accordance with the decisions of the government and the rule of law. The European: What is your overall plan for Israel’s security and peace in the region? Miri Eisin: A Middle East where there is mutual recognition and respect for the different countries and ethnic groups. Israel needs to stay a vibrant, confident democracy and hope more countries in our neighbourhood are the same. Until that happens – we will stay strong, open and continue to fulfil our sovereign needs and acknowledge the Palestinian hopes too. The European: I thank you for your openness.

Israel’s Air Force bombing Hezbollah positions at Ayta a- Shahal in Lebanon, 2006

Photo: MOD, Israel

EUROPE AND ITS SECURITY AND DEFENCE

Afghanistan: Key points of the “Report on a new European strategy for Afghanistan” by Pino Arlacchi MEP, Vice President of the European Delegation for relationship with Afghanistan, Brussels/Strasbourg The international aid, the peace process, the impact of police training and the elimination of opium cultivation are the main points of the “Report on a new European strategy for Afghanistan ” which I presented to the European Parliament. During my recent mission to Afghanistan, last March, I noted that, with regards to the international aid, there is a massive waste of money on the side of the international organizations and a great degree of corruption on the Afghan side.

International aid Afghanistan’s most serious problem is poverty. Many more Afghans are dying because of poverty than as a result of the armed conflict. Maternal mortality claims over 25 000 lives per year, compared to “only” 2186 civilians killed between January and November 2009. More than half of the country’s population lives below the poverty threshold. All this happens against the backdrop of the large amounts of international aid pouring into Afghanistan.

Pino Arlacchi Pino Arlacchi MEP is Vice President of the European delegation for relations with Afghanistan and he is a Professor of Sociology at the political science faculty of the University of Sassari. He was born in 1951 in Gioia Tauro. From 1997 to 2002, he was Under Secretetary General of the United Nations and Executive Director of the Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention ( UNOCCP) in Vienna. His most important contribution at the UN is the convention against organized crime, which was signed at Palermo and came in force in 2003. Pino Arlacchi started his parliamentary career as a member of Parliament (Camera dei deputati) in 1994, and between 1996 and 1997 served as a Senator. During this time he was appointed Vice-President of the bicameral Antimafia Commission. He became Member of the European Parliament in 2009 and he is Member of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

“There is a massive waste of money on the side of the international organizations and a great degree of corruption on the Afghan side.” In the past 8 years US $ 40 billion of civil international aid arrived in Afghanistan. US $ 34 billions passed through different donor’s channels or NGOs, and only US $ 6 billions through the Afghan government. This widespread practice of

channelling most of the aid through a plethora of international organisations, IFIs, regional development banks, NGOs and private contractors, instead of the central government, continues, and much of the aid tends to be lost at different points along the supply chain. Vast sums are lost in fees (which can be as high as 50% per contract) to contractors and sub-contractors; high salaries and generous allowances for expatriates working for consultancies and contractors absorb further amounts.

The peace process

Photo: www.lib.utexas.esdu

After nine years of international involvement, things have yet to improve significantly in Afghanistan, security has deteriorated and the key socio-economic indicators are extremely disappointing. Linked to this, is the fact that far too often, decisions have been taken without there being sufficient Afghan involvement, and foreign entities, whether military or civilian, have operated in ways perceived by the Afghans as disrespectful and high-handed. The central tenet of my report is, therefore, the need to bring about the conditions which will allow for a swift “Afghanisation” of the Afghan crisis, with the goal of achieving a stable government, supported by the

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international community, and focussing all efforts on socioeconomic development. It therefore makes a case for the EU to lead an international effort in treating Afghanistan as a sovereign state and no longer as a “no man’s land”. I argue therefore for a “re-focussing” of the way aid reaches Afghanistan , proposing that much more of the aid should be delivered directly through Afghan institutions rather than through international co-operation and development bodies. Regarding the peace process, the Karzai- Government already set out in the past a basic outline of what a peace process for Afghanistan should involve, but it is only since the London Conference in January 2010 that specific elements have begun to emerge, including the intention to start a dialogue with the Talibans and an agreement among more than 70 countries to create a trust fund (of roughly US $ 1 billion over a period of five years) to help integrate Talibans and other insurgents. I do firmly believe that the EU should strongly support the peace process, allowing the Karzai Government autonomy in its choice of dialogue partners, but insisting on three main prerequisites: an Afghan commitment to banishing Al Qaeda from the country, the elimination of poppy cultivation, and the will to establish a basic respect for fundamental human rights. All other issues should be left to the Afghan people themselves to determine.

Police training Concerning the issue of Afghan police training, the solution is linked the date of NATO troops withdrawal. The London Conference established that the transfer of security responsibilities to Afghan forces would begin in 2011 and be largely completed by 2014. The main instrument for increasing the Afghan state’s ability to deliver security to its citizens is the expansion of its army to a volume of 171.000 soldiers, and its police from the current 94.000 to 134.000 officers by the end of 2011, with a final objective of 240.000 military and 160.000 police within five years. We know from ISAF sources that of the 94 000 men in the Afghan National Police, almost 90% are illiterate, 20% are drug users, and over 30% go missing after a year, not to mention the 1000 or so killed in service every year; moreover, I believe that one of the main factors behind the ineffectiveness of overall training has been the practice, predominantly by the U.S., of relying on private contractors to train the police. I do hope that a great effort can be made to constitute, within two years, an Afghan police force of over one hundred thousands men that, with the Afghan army, can become the main source of the country’s security.

The training of Afghan police forces is a difficult undertaking. Photo: www.bundespolizei.de

Opium cultivation About the last serious issue, the narcotics, the premise is that between 2001 and 2009 the international community spent around US $ 1.61 billion on counter-narcotics activities in Afghanistan without any discernible dent being made in narcotics production and trafficking. Afghanistan remains the source of over 90% of the world’s illicit opium. 2009 figures from UNODC indicate that 242.000 families (or 3.4 million people, 6.4% of the population) are involved in this trade. It is pre-eminently clear that the only way illicit opium cultivation can be eliminated is by offering a realistic alternative economy to the farmers in question. There are successful examples of how the phasing out of opium cultivation through its replacement by other sustainable alternatives has been done elsewhere (e.g. in Turkey, Pakistan, Vietnam, Laos and Thailand ). This goal can be achieved even in Afghanistan at a cost of around US $ 100 million per annum by specifically earmarking 10% of the European civilian aid to the country. The provision of alternative livelihoods requires infrastructures which in turn need security, and this will have to be addressed. Developing niche agricultural industries in each province could gradually help make the country more self-sufficient, enabling it in time, to supply the regional market, and make a transformation in the lives and expectations of Afghans.

There is a way ahead I am firmly convinced, therefore, that the best, – the only – approach involves a five-year plan for the elimination of illicit opium crops through alternative development, with specific benchmarks and deadlines, and the creation of a totally new office to implement this.

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The regional dimension of Afghan conflict by Dr. Zia Nezam, Chief of the Afghan Mission to the European Union, Brussels According to recent estimates, in Afghanistan, there are around 30,000 insurgents1, including 5000 combatants coming from abroad, against approximately 140,000 international troops and more than 200,000 Afghan National Security Forces. Despite considerable progress of Afghanistan in different areas, such as the economy, the security sector and governance, and a relatively small number of insurgents; we have not yet managed to defeat the enemy. As a result, this archaic and unpopular extremist movement still controls of significant areas on both sides of the Durand Line. The problem is that the current situation cannot simply be resolved within the borders of Afghanistan. What we are facing is a regional crisis.

Increased violence during the last months The past 18 months have been particularly challenging for both the international community in Afghanistan and the Afghan National Security Forces. Increased violence has come as a result of boosted activities from international and Afghan security forces in their pursuit of extending more control over the country. In addition, exit deadlines announced by some ISAF contributing nations might have also played a part in the surge of violence we are currently facing. These statements had an immediate psychological effect by discouraging and alienating the Afghan population, while providing momentum to the insurgents. As a result, June 2010 has been the bloodiest month for the foreign troops in Afghanistan since the beginning of this conflict, with more than 100 casualties. This, however, does not mean that victory in Afghanistan is unachievable or that the deployment of further efforts would be in vain. For the international community, a successful outcome is still an achievable goal, but it largely depends on the future approach to the conflict in its broader context.

Dr. Zia Nezam His Excellency, Dr. Zia Nezam, is the Chief of the Afghan Mission to the European Community and responsible with In late relations between Afghanistan, the EU and NATO. Late 2007 he was appointed by the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan as the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to the Kingdom of Belgium and nonresident Ambassador to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Grand Duchy Luxembourg and Greece. Ambassador Nezam was born the 6th October 1947 in Kabul, Afghanistan and studied International Law, Constitutional Law, Development Law, and Public Law at the Nice University in France. Before his current position, he served as the Afghan Ambassador to the Republic of Austria. He also has been, among other appointments, Permanent Representative of Afghanistan to the United Nations Office at Vienna (UNOV), the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) and the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban-Treaty Organization (CTBTO-Prep Commission).

ing”2. But only a handful of Al-Qaeda militants are still located in Afghanistan. The majority of them are now to be found in Pakistan and other countries. The largest number of safe havens, training facilities and recruitment centres lies outside the country. The scale of this regional conflict should be estimated by considering recent offensives such as the attacks on the Indian embassy in Kabul and on the guesthouses hosting Indian citizens, or the recent invasion of the Bargi Matal district in the Nuristan province, where 300 foreign assailants were involved in the plot. All these attacks had similar objectives: targeting and eliminating regional foreign nationals and the involvement of regional foreigners in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan − a combat field for extremist groups The crisis is not the problem of a single nation Afghanistan is the visible flame of a much deeper turmoil. Indeed, the crisis we face here has been a regional crisis from the beginning. If Afghanistan is generally more affected than the neighbouring countries, it is because its institutions are weaker due to more than 30 years of war. The crisis is closely intertwined with political tensions in neighbouring countries, which have also affected to Pakistan, perhaps even more than Afghanistan. The source of this crisis is an escalation of terrorist activity directed towards the governments of the region. The goal of the international community and of the Afghan Government is, as President Obama put it previously, “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat Al-Qaida and its allies and to prevent it from return-

To understand how this crisis has gradually become more violent and widespread, we have to keep in mind the fact that insurgents receive financial and logistic support from institutional and private donors based outside of Afghanistan, in addition to revenues from drug trafficking. A recent report released by the London School of Economics3 suggests that the support received by Afghan insurgents from specific structures in Pakistan is more consistent than previously thought. As a consequence, Afghanistan is a combat field for extremist groups acting in a global perspective. These groups sustain conflicts and wage proxy wars according to purposes that lie beyond their interest for Afghanistan. Experts highlight that some of these groups have gone out of control and have become the most dangerous. The most obvious example is the extremist organization Lashkar-e-Taiba which maintains strong

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Documentation Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan Communiqué of 20 July 2010 (excerpts) (…) PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP 7. To achieve success in Afghanistan, the partnership between the Afghan Government and the international community should be based on the leadership and ownership of the Afghan Government, underpinned by its unique and irreplaceable knowledge of its own culture and people. This partnership should include coherent support by the international community, lending its resources and technical knowledge to the implementation of Afghan-defined programs. Participants acknowledged that aid delivered through the budget is among the most effective means of reducing dependence, delivering the shared governance, development and security outcomes that Afghans desire, and increasing the coherence of aid and Afghan Government capacity. As donor funds are increasingly transferred to the Afghan Government in line with increased confidence in Afghan public financial management, off-budget development assistance should also increasingly align with the prioritized Afghan National Development Strategy. The Government of Afghanistan recognizes the importance of established and successful bilateral development programs and projects, which are in line with the Afghan development priorities and that fulfill the criteria for effective off-budget development finance and form crucial elements to meet Afghanistan’s reconstruction and development needs. 8. To implement these principles of effective partnership, international participants: − In line with the London Conference Communiqué, restated their strong support for channeling at least 50% of development aid through the Afghan Government’s core budget within two years while, as committed at the London Conference, the Afghan Government achieves the necessary reforms to strengthen its public financial management systems, reduce corruption, improve budget execution, and increase revenue collection to finance key National Priority Programs; − Expressed their readiness to align progressively their development assistance behind the National Priority Programs with the goal of achieving 80% of alignment within the next two years. Implementation and costing plans for these programs are to be brought forward by the Afghan Government by October 2010. Participants committed to work with the Afghan Government to take the concrete steps necessary to address the current limited capacity for the transparent absorption of funds; − Intend to begin work with the Afghan Government to practically implement the principles outlined in the 2010 “Operational Guide: Criteria for Effective Off-Budget Development Finance”; − Intend to work with the Afghan Government to improve procurement procedures and due diligence in international contracting procedures within a year, and, unless a clear case for added value is made, endeavor to reduce sub-contracting and to take responsibility for the visibility and transparency of all necessary sub-contracting networks. (…)

SECURITY 17. Participants recognized that civilian casualties and protection of civilians are of great concern and noted that most civilian casualties are caused by insurgent attacks. Participants regretted the death of every Afghan and international civilian, and Afghan and international military forces remain committed to the objective of a steady reduction in the rate of civilian casualties. 18. Participants welcomed the Government of Afghanistan’s commitment to a phased exercise of full authority over its own security. The international community expressed its support for the President of Afghanistan’s objective that the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) should lead and conduct military operations in all provinces by the end of 2014. The international community committed to provide the support necessary to increase security, and to the continued support in training, equipping and providing financing to the ANSF to take on the task of securing their country. Participants agreed to continue efforts to ensure stable areas benefit from development. 19. Within the framework of Afghan sovereignty participants endorsed the Afghan Government’s plan, developed in coordination with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), based on mutually-agreed criteria and phased transition to full Afghan responsibility for security, as set out in the technical Inteqal (transition) paper, and endorsed a decision-making process of the Government of Afghanistan and the North Atlantic Council (NAC). The international community committed to support the Government of Afghanistan in creating the conditions necessary to allow for transition and to continue to support the transition process to advance to the point where the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP) are fully capable of maintaining internal and external security, public order, law enforcement, the security of Afghanistan’s borders and the preservation of the constitutional rights of Afghan citizens. The Government of Afghanistan and NATO/ISAF are to assess jointly the provinces with the aim of announcing by the end of 2010 that the process of transition is underway. 20. In order to ensure stability and provide conditions for the effective rule of law, the Afghan Government pledged to: − Continue the implementation of the Afghan National Police Strategy and its underpinning Police Plan to build a strong, professional police force, with a focus on institutional and administrative reforms of the Ministry of Interior including the implementation of the Ministry’s Anti-Corruption Action Plan, and leadership development; − Progressively enhance the quality and quantity of the ANSF such that the ANA reaches a strength of 171,600 personnel and the ANP of 134,000 by October 2011, with the necessary financial and technical support by the international community; − Support the ANSF, in line with the Government’s financial means, with continued and sustained financial and technical support from the international community.

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EU-Afghanistan relations – key figures The European Union has been present in Afghanistan since the mid 1980’s, with an office in Peshawar, in western Pakistan, covering the country. ECHO had programmes in Afghanistan from the early 1990’s delivering humanitarian assistance. With the fall of the Taliban, EU engagement in the country increased and there has been an ongoing political dialogue between the EU and the Government of Afghanistan. On 16 November 2005 the Joint EU-Afghanistan Political Declaration was signed, a comprehensive framework for the EUAfghanistan relationship. It confirmed EU continued support while stressing the commitments of the Government of Afghanistan in key areas. EU assistance Total EU assistance – from the EU budget and Member States’ bilaterally – is around 1 billion Euro annually. Of this amount, the EU budget assistance accounts for around 150 million Euro, with additional amounts for humanitarian assistance and support to the elections. The EU’s budget assistance is planned to rise to 200 million Euro a year for the period 2011-13. The EUPOL mission The EU is one of the largest donors to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (265 million Euro since 2002). This financial support has been complemented at an operational level by the EU Police Mission in Afghanistan (EUPOL Afghanistan) which has been on the ground since 2007 and currently has approximately 300 international personnel and 170 local personnel. EUPOL Afghanistan aims to contribute to the establishment under Afghan ownership of sustainable and effective civilian policing arrangements, which will ensure appropriate interaction with the wider criminal justice system. On 18 May 2010, the Council of the EU has extended the mission for a period of 3 years, until 31 May 2013. Reform of the justice sector The EU has also been engaged in support to the reform of the justice sector since 2007. Like other donors, EU budget assistance has been channelled into the World Bank managed Trust Fund to take forward

Impressions from Kabul, Afghanistan.

infrastructural improvements, training, and key institutional reforms in the justice sector. In addition to these activities in the rule of law sector, the EU will also support capacity building in local and regional administration, with a view to increasing the focus on the rule of law in the provinces. Health The EU is one of the three key donors to the health sector (with the World Bank and the U.S.) with a focus on provision of primary health services in Afghanistan. EU assistance has helped raise the level of primary health coverage up to 80% across the country (from less than 10 % in 2001). EU Action Plan The Plan for Enhanced EU Engagement in Afghanistan and Pakistan was approved by EU Foreign Ministers on 27 October 2009. The Plan sets out a number of areas where the EU – through EU budget and Member States bilateral assistance – can better coordinate its approaches and programmes in both countries. For Afghanistan, particular emphasis was laid on strengthening sub-national governance and the police and justice sectors as well as having joint EU support to key national programmes and the reintegration process. Another area highlighted in the Action Plan is EU support to the electoral framework and democratic institutions. The EU has consistently supported the electoral processes in Afghanistan and made a number of recommendations in its 2009 Election Observation Mission Report after the Presidential elections. The recommendations make reference to the need for vetting administration appointments and candidates and for an impartial election commission that reflects the composition of the parliament.

Source: Council of the European Union

Photos: MOD, Berlin; ESDA, Paris

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connections with AlQaeda and various other terrorist groups. They have been operating for some years on Afghan territory, targeting Indian nationals as well as international workers, and they are equally present and feared in Pakistan. All this points to a deliberate policy of proxy conflict Photo: Afghan Mission to EU, Brussels that is extremely harmful to everybody: to the stability of the region, the security of international forces in the field, and most of all, to Afghanistan. The issue has been considered by President Karzai, who stressed4 that the Afghan government will not allow any foreign country to use Afghan territory to harm its neighbours and will not allow countries of the region to transfer their tensions to Afghan territory.

Extended interconnectivity of terrorist organisations Another worrying fact is the multinational composition of extremist groups operating in the region. These groups now recruit Arabs, Uzbeks, Chechens, Afghans, Pakistanis and people from other countries as far as Sudan. This evolution reveals two important facts: first, the extended interconnectivity of terrorist organizations and the scale of their recruitment range, and second, the persistent use of Afghanistan as a theater for what terrorists believe to be their international ‘jihad’. It is crucial to draw attention to this last point, as some Western officials and media professionals wrongly believe that international troops are only interfering in a national conflict with no significant consequences for the rest of the world. The reality is much more complex and for some insurgents, Afghanistan is a forward base for the worldwide advancement of their particularly dangerous extremist views. Our Western partners entered the global war on terrorism with little understanding of the enemy they faced. Today, we know that the insurgents have a multifaceted, versatile and largescale agenda. They oppose democracy and progress in any form. They fight to bring chaos, and from chaos, to establish their vision and to impose their rules. This agenda is not about nationalism, social justice or Islamic loyalty. It is about destroying human dignity. Any country supporting this agenda should assume its co-responsibility in destruction. Concerning the Taliban, we don’t have conclusive information as to the extent of their cooperation with other regional terrorist groups, but we know that some of their factions do maintain such connections. The militants are better organized

than ever: they speak in one voice, they work together and join forces in the tribal areas on both side of the border, and they team up in a broad based ideological movement. They may have different components, different agendas and different resources but they share one single objective: toppling the Western backed democratic governments in the region.

Regional cooperation is needed Therefore, a sustained regional response to terrorist threats and major cooperation involving all regional stakeholders are essential. In order to stabilize the region, there is a strong need for effective and sincere collaboration among all neighbouring countries, especially between Afghanistan and Pakistan. As Henry Kissinger pointed out in a recent article5, the states in the region share a strong security interest with the United States and EU countries, but they are actually more directly threatened by the expansion of terrorism in and around Afghanistan. A “regional diplomacy” is therefore badly needed if we want to stop the progress of the extremists’ momentum. More than ever, we are convinced that sustaining good neighbourhood relationships and building a consistent regional cooperation are preconditions to the stabilization and development of the region. No country is safe from terrorism and violence. No country can go alone in fighting extremisms. We thus need to develop a sincere cooperation based on shared principles, common objectives and joint actions. Terrorism and extremism cannot be defeated with selective operations addressing a national interest, while ignoring the security of others. In our volatile region, security is a collective challenge, not only for the countries of Central and South Asia, but for the international community. Only a regional solution that engages Afghanistan with its neighbours is likely to produce long lasting effects. A regional approach is therefore vital, and should be developed as soon as possible, as time is running out. Unless we are able to efficiently coordinate, we may miss the opportunity to reverse the momentum of our enemies and face the perspective of an irreversible defeat. 1 Address of the Afghan Minister of Defense Gen. Abdul Rahim Wardak to the Wolesi Jirga (Afghan Chamber of Representatives), 13th June 2010. 2 President Obama’s speech, 27th March 2009. 3 The Sun in the Sky: the Relationship between Pakistan’s ISI and Afghan Insurgents, Matt Waldman, 9th June 2010. 4 President Hamid Karzai’s speech, 10th March 2010. 5 America needs an Afghan Strategy, not an Alibi, Henry Kissinger, Washington Post, 24th June 2009.

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Afghanistan: Where does our duty lie? by PD Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven, Director, Institute for Theology and Peace, Hamburg The international engagement in Afghanistan raises a wide variety of issues, as evidenced by the debates that have taken place in recent weeks and months in Germany, across Europe and in the U.S. Where exactly does our duty lie in Afghanistan? In the following, we address this question by looking at Germany, it being understood that the ideas and answers that apply to that country by no means apply as such to other nations with their very different societies and historical experience. The thoughts set out here can nevertheless serve as input to the debate elsewhere. If nothing else, they will serve to explain to outsiders why the argument about Afghanistan is so rancorous in Germany and how it differs from the debate in other countries. My contribution will focus specifically on one aspect of the multi-faceted discussions in my country: the ethical issues.

We need to re-focus on ethics What is striking about the German debate concerning the international commitment in Afghanistan is that the perceived primary purpose of the mission is to safeguard German security interests.1 Stability in Afghanistan is seen as a means to an end, the objective being to protect Germany from terrorism; the interests of the Afghan population are a concern only to the extent that a stable Afghan state is considered a prerequisite for our own security.2 This view determines our policy. In contrast, an ethical approach should always focus primarily on the weak. The issue in Afghanistan In the context of the Afghanistan mission this means that we must listen to the voices of those who suffer most and are least able to defend themselves - the Afghan civilian population. For the last three decades, Afghans have lived in a state of virtually uninterrupted civil war. Do we not have a duty to help this sorely afflicted population? After all, for the last eight years Germany has shouldered special responsibility in the northern part of the country under a United Nations mandate. In taking on that commitment, Germany raised hopes among the Afghan population that we cannot disappoint by simply turning our backs on the country at the earliest opportunity. Political ideals versus disenchantment The last eight years have demonstrated that a democratic state based on the rule of law cannot be built in Afghanistan within a matter of a few years. The optimism of 2002 has now given way to realism. There is disagreement both within Afghan society and between East and West as to what constitutes a good

Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven PD Dr. Heinz-Gerhard Justenhoven is the Director of the Institute for Theology and Peace in Hamburg since 1995 and President of the Katholische Friedensstiftung. He was born in 1958 in Cologne. 1979-1984 Studies of Theology and Philosophy at the University of Philosophy and Theology at St. Georgien, and at the Marquette University, Milwaukee/U.S.A. He holds since 1990 a Ph.D. in Theology. 2006 Postdoctoral qualification (habilitation) in Moral Theology at the University of Freiburg/Breisgau and Private Lecturer and Visiting Professor at universities in the U.S. and in Kenya (2007-2009). He is a member of Justitia et Pax and of the German Catholic Central Committee (ZdK). Finally, he is a member of the Advisory Committee for the exploration of the Catholic Military Pastoral Care Service.

system of governance. But precisely because it is difficult, we must side with the weak. We must not forsake the Afghan civilian population. Instead we must do two things: seek ways to improve living conditions under current circumstances and prevent anarchy and terror from spreading and yet again victimising defenceless civilians. Having said that, what does this involve in practice?

A realistic and ethical definition of political objectives We must not give in to resignation or cynicism, but define political objectives that are realistic, achievable and ethically responsible. Since the ideals of democracy and human rights â&#x20AC;&#x201C; to be aimed for as a matter of principle â&#x20AC;&#x201C; are out of reach in the short and medium term, what minimum objectives should the effort to bring about a new political order in Afghanistan achieve (with the help of the international community, for the time being)? What are the necessary and responsible intermediate objectives? How should political objectives be prioritised? Security is the top priority The vital requirements are straightforward. The first is to provide security, in order to protect the civilian population. Beyond security of life and limb, the second is to create conditions in which human beings can meet their basic needs for food, clothing and shelter. Together, these could be termed the requirements incumbent on a minimal state. Despite eight years of reconstruction assistance, the Afghan government is not providing even these basic services. Because the international community was from the start unwilling to make the necessary personnel and resources available, the only way to

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and third step? Once agreement has been reached regarding the relative priority of political objectives, we can then ask how they can best be achieved under current circumstances.

Political objectives – realism is called for

French soldiers in Afghanistan − the French society as many others in Europe − after series of dead and wounded soldiers − is asking for justification of the engagement in Afghanistan. Photo ESDA,Paris

establish rudimentary, if questionable, security throughout the country was to cooperate with militia leaders and warlords. Construction of security structures It is only once a minimal state has been created that it will be possible to build Afghan security (police and judiciary) structures worthy of the name – i.e. structures that protect rather than oppress the population and therefore have legitimacy in the eyes of the Afghan citizenry. But since state building is very difficult and cooperation with militia leaders seems unavoidable, further questions arise: what are the alternatives? Is ensuring security of life and limb through cooperation with militia leaders not preferable to complete anarchy?

Are there alternatives to the current policy? How can the primary goal of security be achieved while at the same time holding out prospects for further developing rudimentary governance in order to secure additional human rights? The other necessary and worthy goals, albeit with lower priority than security, are education, administration, media, and political participation. Lower priority does not mean unimportant but rather less urgent compared to the primary goal of immediate survival. So how can a political process be set in motion and sustained that starts with ensuring the priority objective of security and then works toward meeting realistic intermediate objectives to sustainably improve living conditions? Without going into this question right away, let us first consider priorities.3 These are based on the ethical principle of nemo ultra posse obligatur – that one is only obliged to do what is de facto within one’s power. The question is therefore: under present conditions, what is our primary obligation to the Afghan population and what objectives should be pursued as a second

To have a chance of being achieved, political objectives must be backed by appropriate resources. This applies – in Afghanistan as elsewhere – to both the civilian reconstruction effort and the military mission. Experience with international deployments teaches us that civilian reconstruction involves building or rebuilding the justice system, police forces, basic infrastructure, the education system and state administrative structures – all depending on the degree of destruction - as well as a system to ensure political participation, since democracy is not immediately achievable. In recent years, two problems have cropped up. First, the financial resources and personnel pledged at donor conferences are subsequently not made available, with some exceptions. As I understand it, Germany too has failed to live up to its pledges. This must be looked into. Second, it is often impossible for Germany to deploy personnel to carry out reconstruction because none are available for such a purpose. The Bundeswehr has troops ready to cover the military part of the mission, but comparable personnel are not available for civilian assignments such as training the Afghan police. Other countries have police units – the Carabinieri and the Guardia Civil are cases in point – but Germany does not. It should not be impossible to set up a federal German police force to cover international police missions. In such cases, where there is a will there is a way. By the same token, where there is no way (for lack of resources), there is clearly no will to achieve the objective.

The introduction of democracy has failed for the time being One mistake made in the Afghanistan mission, which has now become crystal-clear, could perhaps have been foreseen eight years ago: the attempt to introduce a democratic system has failed for the time being because the pre-conditions for the rule of law in Afghanistan have not been met:4 2001 Petersberg conference - realistic standards? Over the course of history, Afghanistan did not develop, through internal processes, as a state, but rather as what could best be described as a loose, embryonic confederation of tribes. Moreover, the country’s borders, defined by the colonial powers − British India and Russia − split up the traditional tribal areas. National borders are therefore seen as artificial and relatively irrelevant; more important are the traditional tribal areas straddling the national borders with other countries. The civil war that has raged since 1979 substantially eroded the system of governance and the Taliban did not restore it. The Petersberg conference of 2001 then set the goal of building a

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democratic state. This goal was based on the assumption (widely held by Western academics) that formal democratic structures, if institutionalised, would generate a democratic political culture that would in turn, in the fullness of time, produce the mechanisms of peaceful conflict resolution. Absence of the social prerequisites of democracy The basic prerequisites of democracy have so far not been developed in Afghanistan. Thus, for example, it is not possible to vote for political ideas or movements but only for individuals. And because Afghan society lacks the underpinnings of democracy, electoral majorities are put together on the basis of the existing patronage-based structure − as in, for example, the election of President Karzai. Hence it has been necessary to work with and involve regional leaders (warlords, commanders, tribal elders). This has discredited the concept of democracy among the Western-oriented urban population. The international community has an interest, related to its own security goals, in building an Afghan state. Whether the Afghan power elite wants this to happen is appearing increasingly doubtful. But if the regional leaders and the government around President Karzai have no real interest in building a state, how is that state to be constructed? And as for the West, it simultaneously supported formal democracy and cooperated with militia leaders in a bid to achieve its own security objectives. Thus some militias were not disarmed because they were needed as allies to fight Al Qaida or to provide security. The involvement of the warlords proved counterproductive, discrediting both the concept of democracy and the West itself in the eyes of the population. What conclusion is to be drawn from all this? Is Afghanistan

incapable of democracy? No, the question as to whether Afghanistan can ever become a democracy must be left for the Afghans themselves to answer. The best we can do is to help the process along by providing training and support.

Lawlessness and rampant despotism remain a serious problem Taliban insurgents are still tyrannising large swathes of the population in an attempt to impose their radical social order. But it is also becoming increasingly obvious that the end of Taliban rule in 2001 did not put a stop to despotism but merely replaced it with a new form of lawlessness. In recent years the Karzai government has proven to be corrupt. The daily lives of many Afghans are governed by the law of the jungle and influence peddling. In Kabul and in most provincial cities, the powers that be lack the political will to implement a legal system, with the result that a legal basis is lacking in many instances and hardly anyone holds administrations accountable for performing the tasks assigned to them. Last but not least, the states and organisations engaged in Afghanistan for the last eight years must apply legal standards in their action toward the Afghan population. This includes recognition of the Afghan population and thereby of Afghan men and women as citizens with equal rights. The states working in Afghanistan in the years since 2001 have been fairly reluctant to take this approach and only since the London conference has the need for it been clearly recognised. The way forward is fraught with obstacles Germany and Italy have taken on particular responsibility for building the legal system in Afghanistan, albeit so far without success. At the London conference a renewed effort was pledged. So far both the Afghan authorities and the international community have been unwilling to heed the call to put a stop to the culture of impunity in Afghanistan and to begin implementing the rule of law. But what is really needed, if such an undertaking to succeed, is the consent of the population. The rule of law depends primarily on the recognition of the citizens, and to a far lesser extent on enforcement. And because the states engaged in Afghanistan cannot impose the rule of law from outside, the process will take time – not a few months or years, but decades. 1

Spanish paratroopers landing to liberate comrades captured by the Taliban. Photo: MOD, Madrid

Cf. Michael Brzoska/Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Ending the war in Afghanistan?, in: 2009 State of Peace Yearbook, p.69. 2 Cf. Federal government position paper: The path to responsible transfer of responsibility: the German mission in Afghanistan following the London conference (25.1.2010): “The purpose of our mission is to enhance security for Germany by ensuring long-term stability in Afghanistan.”; this position is critically analysed by: VENRO, Was will Deutschland am Hindukusch? VENRO-Position paper 7/2009, p.7. 3 Schetter notes the lack of priorities in the reconstruction of Afghanistan until 2006: cf. Conrad Schetter/Katja Mielke, Governance and Intervention in Afghanistan, in: Friedenswarte 83 (2008), 71-96, 85. 4 Cf. Conrad Schetter/Katja Mielke, Governance and Intervention in Afghanistan, in: Friedenswarte 83 (2008), 71-96, 76.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Unlocking value with informa

Economic conditions over the past two years have forced both private and public sector organizations to look for creat information technology professionals are continually being asked to do more with less funding. However, at the same support from IT in rolling out new initiatives. A global study conducted by HP in October 2009 revealed that more than fundamental enabler of their business success.1

“Innovation Gridlock” While department and communication and information systems services (CIS) heads alike agree that technology can drive overall benefits, the challenges of rigid infrastructures and aging applications have presented significant roadblocks. Both continue to eat up the bulk of IT budgets in operations, severely restricting the amount that can be spent on driving the introduction of new capabilities. The result is what HP refers to as “innovation gridlock,” a situation where the technology organization is blocked from driving new innovation due to the majority of funding being consumed in operating the current environment. Thus, a critical challenge for the IT department within a Department of Defense (DoD) today is finding ways to break this innovation gridlock.

Self-funding The secret to success will be “self-funding,” meaning investing in projects that will free up funds that can then be invested in new capabilities. To do so, IT section groups should look for projects that allow transformation within current budgetary constraints and have quick paybacks like application retire-

“The best IT value is the value of interlinking information, technology and people within any activity or command driven processes.” • IT budgets − cost cutting, expectations grow • COTS at the core of IT practices driven by technology and new business models − but challenging • Usage of IT as a business value enabler • In Time Information Management as the main weapon • Time for a new model of governance

Tobias Bahlinger Tobias Bahlinger was born in Sindelfingen, Germany. He has been working at HP since 1995 and has held different positions in consulting and sales. Tobias Bahlinger is the responsible Client Principal for HP’s Public Sector, Defense and Security segment in Germany since November 2006. In this role, he is accountable for driving growth, revenue, profitability and customer satisfaction of HP’s Public Sector Defense and Security business across the entire HP Technology Service Portfolio.

ment, creative financial arrangements and ways to reduce licensing requirements. MoD IT departments should turn to COTS (Commercial of the Shelf) technology vendors that can help their CIS departments self-fund and create technology environments that are architected for change. Architecting new solutions for change allows CIS departments to quickly and easily add new functionality as the command requires it. This ensures that today’s innovation does not become tomorrow’s legacy and reduces the on-going operational cost of the new solution as compared to its predecessor.

Consolidation, integration and virtualization In the past IT infrastructures were often put in place to support specific needs but this has led to islands of under-utilized, unconnected infrastructure and excessive wastage. Defense teams need to look across their entire CIS infrastructure and understand the full portfolio of their assets - data centers, networking, and systems, their tools, their applications, and their processes. They need to look for areas where they can consolidate, integrate and virtualize to drive out costs, increase utilization and ultimately provide the same or improved services at a reduced cost. IT departments also need to help the headquarters use IT as a means of reducing costs in their missions. IT needs to help the headquarters unlock mission value and enable new capabilities by changing the way an existing process is managed or delivered, or by helping to introduce a new capability. By utilizing technology services and infrastructure consulting intelligently, Hewlett Packard can create cost-efficient technology infrastructures that are reliable, more flexible, readily scalable and secure. In addition, projects that modernize the

COMMUNICATION

ation technology

tive ways to stay competitive. Even as organizations recover from this era of unpredictability, e time Ministries of Defense (MoDs) and the users are demanding increased service levels and n seven out of 10 business executives indicated that their technology department was a

applications infrastructure can increase responsiveness to MoD priorities, improve productivity and reduce costs, eliminating the complexity inherent in legacy systems.

Flexibility Many CIS departments are looking increasingly at the technology-based solutions that allow them to increasingly access IT as a mission utility – the same as you would consume your electricity. Utility mission solutions help reduce capital expenditures and pay more flexibly only for the services consumed. These can often provide a good solution to help introduce a new service or capability more quickly and cost-effectively but with the appropriate security and reliability.

In-time information Increasing focus is also put on extracting the information from the IT infrastructure with departments turning to IT as the information service provider. IT section groups are investing in solutions to provide the right information in a timely fashion to help military personnel. The extracted information from the systems will be used in critical and operational situations. Information needs to be turned into intelligence and needs to be available and secure. Regardless of the route chosen to break innovation gridlock, the key is finding a strategic partner who can bring together the skills, knowledge and capabilities to help MoDs to drive new mission innovation.

IT Towers Technology Utility Cost, availability and the range of technological innovations are mainly influenced by the offered IT functions.

Service Center IT function delivers IT services according to SLA. To extract the value of the IT Services out of the usage of IT is driven trough the Responsibility by the business.

Business Technology IT is considered as part of the competitive levers of the business. The value of technology and information are the main KPIs of the company.

HP Capabilities

Technology, Cost, Business, - oriented

Business owner – IT supplier model IT service delivery, - oriented

Business process Partnership,

- oriented

New model of governance It is time for a new model of governance. Public sector and commercial departments need to start sharing best practices and experiences from freeing up money and making it available to invest in new capabilities and missions. The rapid rate of change continues to escalate. Defense teams that are unable to harness that change will continue to rack up big disadvantages from the cost of lost – lost time, lost effort, lost opportunity.

Contact Details: Tobias Bahlinger, Principal Public Services Hewlett Packard GmbH Hewlett Packard Str. 1 61352 Bad Homburg, Germany Tel.: + 49-151 1475-1666

Abbreviations used: (CIS) = communication and information systems services (MoD) = Ministry of Defense (DoD) = Department of Defense (COTS) = Commercial of the Shelf 1 HP Research: Thrive in Unpredictability,” Coleman Parkes Research Ltd, October 2009.

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

What more should be done to develop a Common European Security and Defence Market by Edgar Buckley, Thales Senior Vice President for NATO, EU and UN, Neuilly-sur-Seine The recent global financial crisis showed government decision-making at its worst and at its best: at its worst in its failure to foresee or prevent the events which occurred; but at its best in managing the crisis as it unfolded. Extraordinary decisions were taken at very great speed − to sell or nationalise banks, to prop up insurance companies, to support national finances and even currencies themselves. Governments showed that they could act quickly and decisively, doing whatever was necessary to keep the financial system afloat. What a pity that similar urgency cannot be brought to other important policy issues, for example those affecting our defence and security.

Significant steps fowards Every pronouncement over the last five years has agreed on what needs to be done – we need stronger European defence and security, better transatlantic cooperation and better relations between NATO and the EU − but precious little has been done to deliver concrete improvements in these domains. To some extent, the defence and security equipment market presents an exception to this picture. Three significant steps have been taken: An interpretative communication from the European Commission, issued in December 2006, clarified the application to Europe’s defence sector of Article 296 of the Treaty establishing the European Community (now Article 346 of the Lisbon Treaty), limiting possible misuse of the exemption, so that it is now more difficult to avoid applying normal competition rules to most defence contracts. The European Defence Agency’s Code of Conduct introduced voluntary reciprocal opening of competition for those defence contracts which remain covered by the Article 296 / 346 exemption, although with some important exceptions for the most sensitive procurements and R&T The EU Commission’s 2007 “defence package” paved the way for two new directives to be adopted in 2009, one simplifying the rules for licensing of intra-Union defence transfers, the other setting new rules for defence and sensitive security procurement outside the scope of Article 296 / 346, again with important exceptions, which had also been available under pre-existing rules, relating to security of supply and security of information. But on their own – leaving aside the exceptions

Edgar Buckley Edgar Buckley is Senior Vice President, European Business Development, based at Thales headquarters in Neuilly-sur-Seine, France. He was born in London and has a BA (Hons) and a Ph.D. from London University. Edgar Buckley joined Thales in September 2003 following a career in British government and international organisation service. He was from 1999 until 2003 the NATO Assistant Secretary General for Defence Planning and Operations. Before that he was from 1996 until 1999 Assistant Under Secretary of State (Home and Overseas) in the Ministry of Defence in London, responsible for policy advice on UK military operations and UK defence relations with countries outside Europe and North America. Edgar Buckley was the Defence Counsellor to the UK Delegation to NATO and the Western European Union from 1992 until 1996 and Head of the MOD Defence Arms Control Unit from 1991 to 1992.

they contain and the question of how well they will be respected by governments – these steps are unlikely to be fully effective in establishing a common European defence equipment market, because they only address the demand side.

Little willingness on the supply side The supply side is equally important and there is much less evidence of willingness to make progress on this part of the equation. Major industries in Europe remain largely associated with particular governments, have their technologies locked within national jurisdictions and are often treated as “national champions”, with all that entails. With rare exceptions, attempts to establish true cross-border capabilities, upon which more than one country can rely, have met with resistance – for example Germany’s reluctance to see French participation in its naval industry. We are a long way from having a common market for defence and security products which provides open and assured access to products of EU origin for all Member States. That being the case, governments currently waste money duplicating equipment / system developments and supporting increasingly uneconomic industrial capabilities. Today in Europe, despite the significant national and international consolidation which has already happened, there are

INDUSTRIES

more companies able to construct military aircraft, missiles, armoured vehicles, ships and submarines, and more defence electronics companies able to deliver a range of sensors and systems, than there are in the U.S., where the market is around four times the size. Today in Europe, despite the significant national and international consolidation which has already happened, there are still four companies able to construct military aircraft, four missile manufacturers, eight armoured vehicle manufacturers, eleven shipyards able to construct naval ships or submarines, and eleven defence electronics companies able to deliver a range of sensors and systems. In each domain, except defence electronics, this is more than in the U.S., where the market is around three times the size.

Conditions for the development of a common defence market A true common European defence market will only emerge when three conditions are met: • governments no longer implement national preference policies, accept mutual dependency and provide mutual security of supply ; • defence industries reorganise and rationalise their presence so that the economic benefit of their activities is seen to contribute to Europe as a whole and does not disadvantage any individual Member State; and • Member States harmonise their export control policies so as to allow cross-border companies to carry out their business with minimum bureaucracy.

tions which set the broad outlines of the US defence industrial landscape we see today. Europe’s defence and security industry is facing similar pressure today as its main customers downsize their activities and seek stronger cooperation. Diversification and increased efficiency will not on their own solve this problem, nor will a policy of “Mutual Assured Starvation” – the name given to the pre-Last Supper approach of the US defence industry as it sought to share every scarce contract. Indeed, we can see signs that change is on the way. In France, the government has been strongly encouraging further rationalisation in the electronics / optronics sector. Germany has recently seen a new joint venture in naval shipbuilding between TKMS and Abu Dhabi MAR. A high level government and industry working group between France and the UK is pursuing bilateral technological and industrial capacity sharing in a number of defence domains. Meanwhile, most defence and security companies are implementing cost reduction and performance enhancement plans to try to remain competitive.

Restructuring the European defence and security industry Three main options are open to decision-makers as they approach restructuring of the European defence and security industry: 1. rationalise nationally first 2. merge with other European capacity 3. accept non-European investment.

With defence budgets likely to be reduced in most if not all Member States in the wake of the financial crisis, it is likely In considering these options, European leaders should keep in that the pace of defence and security industrial restructuring mind that the long-term health of the European defence in Europe will now increatechnology and industrial “European leaders should keep in mind that se, particularly in the nabase (EDTIB) is of key val, land and electronics importance to our future – the long-term health of the European defence domains. Governments both to ensure access to technology and industrial base (EDTIB) is of key should encourage this autonomous capabilities in trend because it will prothe security domain and to importance to our future.” duce a more efficient in be one of the foundations dustry and one better able of high technology innovato compete and survive. tion and economic production. Where choice exists, therefore, the preferred option should be to advance towards stronger European capabilities American rationalisation efforts as a model (option 2). In 1993, 15 US defence industry chiefs sat down with US Defense Secretary Les Aspin and his team for what became This is not to suggest that national restructuring may not be a known as the Last Supper. They were told clearly that the necessary first step – that was the choice taken by Germany Pentagon had no intention of paying increasingly high overand France a few years back in the naval domain – but it risks heads to support surplus industrial capacity and that it would frustrating the more preferable long-term European approach, support rationalisation measures undertaken by the industry as can now be seen in the naval industry. itself. The result was a rapid series of mergers and acquisi-

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

or not, these countries are still the key decision-makers in this domain today. Somehow, they need to re-energise their work, recognising that not everything at issue can be decided at EU institutional level

Nor does it mean that Europe should close its doors to US or other non-European investment in its defence market. US activity in the European market is particularly welcome and provides both an opportunity for high technology cooperation and the competitive baseline against which European proposals must often be judged. The key points to guard against with US investment are that it should not constrain the autonomy of European-based industry, or restrict access to European technologies, or affect confidence in its security arrangements.

A systematic review of what is needed

Governments must encourage more radical consolidation and industry leaders must be ready to take the initiative as opportunities arise. “Share it or lose it” is the choice facing governments as they seek to retain critical technologies resident in their industries. “Merge it or close it ” might become the choice of European industries in some domains as their main customers reduce their spending.

One critically important domain where the EDA and the Commission can make a difference is in monitoring and supporting critical security and defence technologies. There will be no EDTIB worth having if we allow key technologies to disappear as a result of programme reductions. The EDA and the Commission can help by systematic review of what is needed to support security and military capabilities, and judicious intervention to support new research or shared activity (both functions are routinely carried out by the Pentagon for the US DTIB). R&T spending is rightly excluded from the recent demand side regulatory measures referred to above, but EU mechanisms can and should study the issues and bring their assistance where needed.

At the European level, both the Commission and the European Defence Agency need to continue their pressure on national governments. But we need to recognise that 90% of European defence equipment production resides within the six countries (France, Germany, Italy Spain, Sweden and UK) who in the late 1990s signed the Letter of Intent Concerning Measures to Facilitate the Restructuring of European Defence Industry. Like it

Early implementation of a true common defence market in Europe depends on governments and Industry recognising that the need for change is urgent and having the courage to make investment choices with wider factors taken into account. It requires leadership, judgement and nerve. Governments should provide the necessary encouragement and guidance. Industry is ready to play its part.

Pressure on national governments has to continue

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European Defence and Security in the 21st century by Thomas Homberg, EADS, Corporate Vice President and Head of EADS Strategic Coordination, Paris Limited defence and security coordination across Europe still causes a fragmented industrial landscape, which suffers from duplicative capabilities. According to earlier studies of the European Defence Agency, European defence R&D and procurement spending that can be considered as purely national is above 80% and above 70%, respectively. This leads to redundant, complex, and costly product development. Different national specifications also cause interoperability issues among European Armed Forces and security authorities and agencies.

Fragmentation and consolidation needs The economic crisis has exacerbated and highlighted this fragmentation of Europe’s defence and security industrial base. Because of the crisis, it has already proven difficult for many countries to maintain existing spending levels and further significant spending cuts are projected. Despite these difficulties, some European states favor a protectionist reflex, instead of European and/or transatlantic cooperation. While this is often a natural reaction during hard economic times, it is not a sustainable, long-term industrial strategy for Europe. A more consolidated multinational European industrial base would allow policy-makers and industry to more effectively address current and emerging threats.

Increasing complexity of future threats However, this array of complex threats makes consolidation more difficult. Threats include classical, high-intensity conflict scenarios, asymmetric warfare such as Afghanistan, and challenges such as terrorism, pandemics, energy- or cyber-security. The varied and global nature of contemporary threats means that military operations, abroad and domestically, will increasingly integrate civilian agencies and even non-governmental organizations in a multinational context. This divergence within modern threat scenarios creates a need for increasing convergence between defence and security.

Thomas Homberg Corporate Vice President and Head of EADS Strategic Coordination since 2008. He drives the development of EADS Group Strategy and chairs EADS’ Strategy Board. Responsible for the departments of “Corporate Development”, “Business Intelligence & Analysis”, “Group Strategic Projects”, “Industrial Strategy” and “Service Development”. Member of the Supervisory Board of EADS Deutschland GmbH. 2005-2008 Senior Vice President at the helm of EADS “Corporate Strategy & Planning” department and served previously as Vice President of “Strategy & Planning” for Strategic Business Development in Defence & Security Systems. Homberg graduated as a paratroop officer in the German Armed Forces and from the University of the Bundeswehr, Hamburg (Economics). In 2002, he graduated from the German General Staff Courses, Hamburg and the French Collège Interarmées de Défense in Paris. Before joining EADS, Mr. Homberg was a Military Attaché at the German Embassy in Paris and responsible for the French-German defence cooperation.

environment the interoperability of all actors, be it defence, security forces, or civil agencies, must be increased, while considering their Concept of Operations, deployment in theatre, equipment and training.

“ Without enhanced cooperation and consolidation, Europe will not be able to effectively address modern threats long-term.” In addition, cooperation between security and armed forces can also enhance domestic security operations. The deployment of Eurofighters for air policing missions during the 2008 European Football Championship is one example.

Convergence of Defence and Security Consequently, defence and security should be harmonized on four levels. Convergence the operational level First, convergence is required at an operational level. All military operations abroad, even high intensity conflicts, will include a security component .When operating in the same

Convergence at a conceptual level Second, resulting from operational realities, there has to be convergence at a conceptual level. A report by the Group of Experts led by Madeleine Albright on the new NATO Strategic Concept highlights the importance of a comprehensive approach that combines military and civilian elements to execute operations. Equally, it is part of the priorities of the European

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

Defence Agency’s capability strategy to develop the interoperability between Armed Forces, Police, and civilian actors.

gic interests on an international level rather than a national one, which could include a transatlantic dimension.

Convergence at the spending level Third, defence and security spending could be more tightly integrated. Substantial defence budget cuts are envisaged in almost all European countries. However, the current threat perception requires further investments in our defence forces, as well as in domestic security for critical infrastructure protection, transportation, and border security. Consequently, policymakers should attempt to eliminate budget fragmentation and duplication in this field and maximize value for money.

The economic crisis drives cooperation and consolidation needs

Convergence on the technological level Finally, there is an opportunity to benefit from convergence on the technological level. Dual use should be applied across different operational domains. Not only because of budget reasons, to exploit benefits of scale and scope, but also because emerging security and defence technologies allow us to do so. For instance a UAV or mission aircraft with adaptable mission systems can equally detect targets in theatre, operate in border protection systems, or increase situational awareness during events like the Olympic Games.

In times of budgetary crisis two reactions can materialize. One option is to make the crisis an accelerating factor to encourage increased cooperation among nations in order to efficiently manage limited resources. On the other hand, the crisis could cause a protectionist reflex with governments, leading to protectionism as opposed to European and transatlantic cooperation. To strengthen Europe in a global context and to ensure its ability to work together with global partners, the choice is obvious. Separate national approaches will fall short because they contradict interoperability requirements, and ignore the need for industrial and financial rationalization in times of limited resources. Instead, new European and transatlantic collaboration approaches are needed.

The need for a new dialogue As a consequence of defence and security convergence and the added complexity of a constrained budgetary environment, a straightforward, honest, and constructive discourse needs to be pursued between industry and governments. Trust needs to be re-built. Objectives for such dialogue should include how to refrain on both sides from over-customization and -specification in design and development, which often results in program complexity, cost overruns, and delays. Also the option of “spiral developments” has to be considered. Industry could deliver basic product- or system-configurations that are deployed quickly to theatre and then adapted according to lessons learned. This requires industry to improve capabilities in rapid prototyping and modifications. As part of this, the acquisition process should be more flexible and faster. Various initiatives have been launched. France and the United Kingdom have taken the first steps to implement adapted acquisition processes via their memorandum of understanding for procurement in cases of urgent operational requirements. Similarly, Germany’s quick procurement of urgently required equipment in theatre1, has proven a success. Shortened development and procurement cycles also need to be supported by providing industrial partners with access to defense and security planners, concepts, and lessons learned. Such dialogue as described above could be backed by common European principles and policies, including a further harmonization of requirements to support industrial rationalization across European countries. It would also be desirable to define strate-

The above recommendations gain specific relevance in today’s challenging budget situation. Substantial defence budget cuts are envisaged in Europe and also the US budget is under increasing pressure. Nevertheless, the current threat environment requires investments in defence forces, as well as in domestic security. This includes the need to maintain, if not to increase research budgets.

Consequences In times of budgetary crisis and a multidimensional threat, cooperative multinational approaches should be favored over parochial ones, to effectively support interoperability between defense, security, and civil actors as an answer to today’s and the future’s complex threats. A European-wide approach will enhance European states’ national security, more efficiently allocate resources, and potentially also strengthen the transatlantic link by enabling Europe to remain an equal partner when answering today’s and tomorrow’s threats. Within such an approach, the convergence requirements of security and defence need to be answered on various levels, reaching from concepts to technology. European industrial competitiveness and innovation capabilities will suffer if investment levels in research will not be supported. This would lead to a slow erosion of the European industrial base in an increasingly competitive world with emerging global players. In addition, without enhanced cooperation and consolidation, Europe will not be able to effectively address modern threats long-term. 1 Einsatzbedingter Sofortbedarf

INDUSTRIES

The Transatlantic Defence Equipment Market – a European point of view by Axel Fischer MP, Berlin, Chairman of the Technical and Aerospace Committee, ESDA/Assembly of the Western European Union, Paris The strategic defence relationship between the United States and Europe, in particular those European states that are members of NATO and the European Union, is a fundamental part of today’s international order. A relationship that was built up over the Cold War years and pursued thereafter, it is central to the defence choices of a large number of European states, both large and small. While NATO is the body that symbolises that relationship, it is not the only component. A transatlantic political and economic area, unparalleled in terms of coordination and integration in other parts of the world, is maintained and developed through bilateral defence cooperation agreements and commercial, social, educational and cultural exchanges. This multifaceted relationship is not without its tensions and disagreements, but shared interests outweigh any differences which – where they do exist – are more a matter of form than of substance.

Axel Fischer Axel Fischer MP has been a Member of the Deutsche Bundestag (Karlsruhe-Land) since 1998. He is among other functions a member of the Budget Commission. He was born in Karlsruhe in 1966 and started his career as an electrician before studying engine building at the University of Karlsruhe where he was certificated “Diplom Ingenieur” in 1995. He is a Reserve Officer of the German Bundeswehr. He has also been a member of the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly since January 2006. Fischer is currently the Chairman of the Technological and Aerospace Committee of the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA). Together with Mrs Nurmi (Finland), he submitted a report on behalf of the Committee entitled “European Armoured Vehicles: current programmes” in June 2009. One year later at the Assembly’s last plenary session, he presented a report on the Transatlantic Defence Equipment Market.

Change of balance between Europe and the United states While European support for American initiatives and action cannot automatically be taken for granted, there is a general consensus among European governments to go along with them, if only in an attempt to mitigate any potential adverse effects. Europe “from Venus” complements the United States “from Mars” but that has not hindered the emergence of a single European entity, embodied in the European Union, which aspires to changing the balance of the transatlantic relationship. The United States would also like its European allies to take on a greater share of responsibility, so long as its leadership role in international affairs remains unaffected. Europeans are among the most loyal partners of the U.S. Cooperation versus competition Europe and the U.S. have a history of cooperation spanning over 60 years. It is a cooperation that bears elements of competition, however, particularly in the economic sphere. Europe is the U.S.’ leading economic and financial partner. The extent of the relationship can be seen in the impact of the American subprime crisis on the European economy and the trade in certain products and financial assets/liabilities between the two sides of the Atlantic. Nevertheless, Europe also has national and shared (in the EU) economic and industrial interests to protect, including the

European security and defence technological and industrial base. From dependency to more autonomy There is no denying that the United States has provided Europe with a great deal of defence equipment, especially during the Cold War period, and it is still the main external supplier of defence equipment to Europe. However, with the exception of a small number of capabilities and systems – i.e. strategic power and force projection and global missile defence – the majority of European needs could be met by European industries. Of course, turning to European firms might entail costs that are sometimes higher than simply buying “off the shelf” from the United States, but it is also a guarantee of operational autonomy. And beyond being a matter of protecting and developing national and European industrial and technological capacities and the economy, it is a source of prestige and influence in the international defence equipment market.

What about a transatlantic defence equipment market? When it comes to defence equipment, the transatlantic relationship is based as much on cooperation as on competition,

THE EUROPEAN – SECURITY AND DEFENCE UNION

and access to the Euro-Atlantic markets is two-way. Some American and European experts are in favour of establishing a more integrated transatlantic defence equipment market. It is a tempting proposition considering the benefits European firms might derive from easier access to the American defence market and the hundreds of billions of dollars it represents annually. On the other hand, given the respective sizes, capacities, capital value and political clout of American and European firms in the defence sector, an open transatlantic market based on the model of the integrated European common market would most likely result in a proportionally similar division of labour as in the Euro-Atlantic strategic relationship: America leads, Europe plugs the gaps. Mutual attraction versus suspicion The transatlantic defence equipment market is still characterised by mutual attraction and cooperation on the one hand and by suspicion and competition on the other. The controversy surrounding the American air tanker contract, the competing bids for the modernisation of the Brazilian and Indian air forces and the legal battles over subsidies to the European and American aeronautical industries are some current examples that illustrate the complexity of transatlantic relations. The supplier-client relationship exists on both sides, but it is neither mutual nor balanced; there is an element of entrepreneurship with European and American firms investing and setting up in both the United States and Europe respectively, and cooperation on both a large and small scale in equipment and technological research and development (R&D). The one way street in technology transfer On the R&T side, there is the somewhat sensitive issue of technology transfers, in particular from the United States to Europe. These exchanges are subject to legal and regulatory constraints, including ITAR (International Traffic in Arms Regulations) – a source of discord in Euro-Atlantic relations when it comes to cooperation in defence equipment and technology.

The U.S. side – missing progress results The Obama Administration has expressed the intention to reform the system for the control of defence equipment exports and technology transfers, for the benefit first and foremost of U.S. exports, but also with a view to cooperation with the United States’ chosen allies. However, progress in this area is being held up by red tape and by the reluctance of Congress to reform and deregulate the current system. The American security and defence industry has been calling for these reforms for years and the United States’ European allies are hoping to benefit from a relaxation of the current procedures. In June 2007, under the Bush Administration, the

United States even signed a treaty on this issue with the United Kingdom. The fact that Congress has still not ratified this important agreement three years later was recently the subject of unofficial criticism conveyed by the British Government to the president of the United States’ Aerospace Industries Association (AIA), Marion Blakey.

Discord in the field of subsidies Another major area of discord is that of subsidies for the American and European civilian aeronautical sector, with both sides filing complaints with the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The relevant WTO panel issued an initial decision on 30 June 2010 following a request for consultations submitted to it by the United States in 2004. Its findings, which were interpreted by the United States as validating American complaints against Europe, were perceived as inconclusive by the relevant European firms and governments as well as by the European Union. The Europeans are in turn hoping that their arguments regarding socalled indirect subsidies for U.S. firms will be supported by a decision being awaited from the WTO. The Europeans argue that defence contracts, which represent tens of billions of dollars each year for aerospace companies, are also being used to fund civilian aerospace programmes thanks to a spillover effect. What is behind us The problem in these cases is that certain industrial, political and military interest groups in the U.S. are using the conclusions as arguments for relegating European security and defence companies to the subsidiary role of subcontractors on the U.S. market, while enjoying the full benefit of the technical and technological know-how that is brought by European firms at the expense of European tax-payers. This is what happened with EADS with regard to the contract for replacing part of the American air tanker fleet. The Department of Defense is due to take a decision at the end of 2010, in a process which has been ongoing for 10 years. The EADS case EADS’ competitor Boeing, and the latter’s supporters in Congress and other influential circles, are claiming that the subsidies EADS-Airbus receives from European governments are distortions of competition. These claims are not falling on deaf ears, because one of the decisive criteria for awarding the final contract will be that of the cost of the tanker aircraft. Whatever the final outcome, and once the period of complaints and appeals is over, what is important is that another major European company, following the foothold that BAE has gradually established on the U.S. market over the last 10 years, should also be able to position itself there, notwithstanding the risks of a political nature and otherwise, with a

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view eventually to becoming a prime contractor for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). We should also mention the fact that the Italian group Finmeccanica, which is a participant in the F-35 Lightning II programme, is in the process of buying American companies in order to consolidate its position on the U.S. market.

lantic defence equipment market is very dynamic and offers unique opportunities for return on investment. It is part and parcel of a strategic relationship which has been built up over more than half a century and which remains alive and well in an international context that is very different from the one that helped create it.

Despite restrictions â&#x20AC;&#x201C; a dynamic market

The political cornerstones

As for American companies, which have been firmly established in Europe for decades now without, for all that, dominating the European market, they are about to step up their export efforts in anticipation of future reductions in the size of defence equipment orders from the DoD and a slowing-down or halt of major programmes.

This is because the transatlantic market is not only founded on economic factors, profit and returns, sales and corporate strategies, but also has a major political dimension, characterised by a strong degree of interdependence. It is based on three pillars: the acquisition of equipment and technology, industrial aspects and cooperation/competition. This is necessary to support a wider transatlantic strategic partnership needed to face old and new threats and challenges. Europe (NATO and the EU) and the U.S. are still the cornerstones of international security and stability, but they are no longer alone and their power is not without limits. Deepening their alliance is a necessity to keep the lead in global affairs and a better transatlantic defence equipment market is an integral part of this relationship.

Although those efforts will focus on the global market â&#x20AC;&#x201C; specifically Asia and the Middle East, but also Latin American and Africa â&#x20AC;&#x201C; Europe, being highly developed, solvent and a political and military ally of the United States, continues to offer sound prospects for sustainable development. This situation illustrates that notwithstanding the restrictions, tensions and legitimate protectionist impulses, the transat-

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Climate change and future global security by Maxim Worcester, Senior Advisor, ISPSW, Berlin

The effects and impacts of climate change are already being felt. Over the past 30 years, global temperatures have risen at around 0.2 degrees Centigrade per decade, and are set to increase further over the next decades due to past emissions. Estimates suggest that the world has until 2020 to reverse the trend of greenhouse emissions to avoid some of the most dangerous effects of climate change. Given the lack of agreement demonstrated at the recent Copenhagen Summit, necessary steps seem unlikely and we should brace ourselves for temperature rises of up to 3 degrees Centigrade by 2030.

The challenges Assuming that temperatures will rise to such levels in the next 30 years, we must be prepared for significant global changes in security in the short term. It would thus be irresponsible not to address the issue of adaptation to significant climate changes which, if they come about, will have a major impact globally. Some adaptation will occur autonomously at an individual or company level, but major decisions such as those related to infrastructural changes, land use planning, natural resources and coastal protection will require governmental foresight and planning that is currently lacking. Vulnerable developing countries The challenges will be particularly acute in developing countries, which are much more vulnerable to the impacts and lack the resources and know-how to act. Many developing countries are already struggling to cope with their current environment and even small increases in climate change will extract a disproportionate effect. Water scarcity The effect on water availability will be significant. Today around one-third of the global population lives in countries experiencing moderate to high water stress and over one billion people do not have access to safe water. Should global temperatures continue to rise, Southern Europe can expect periodic droughts and the number of people exposed to significant water stress could increase by up to four billion. At the same time flooding would increase in low lying costal regions. Water shortage will also have an impact on those at risk of hunger and on the incidence of vector-borne diseases.

Impact on international security Such developments will have an impact on international security, largely based around the correlation between environmental degradation on the one hand and social disruption on

Maxim Worcester Maxim Worcester is Senior Advisor at the Berlin think tank ISPSW. In the past he worked at The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU) were he was responsible for the Units Country Credit Risk Assessment Service. He was subsequently the founder of the FAZ Institut, the business publishing arm of the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung. Following a spell at Deutsche Börse, were he was Head of Corporate Communications, he assumed the position of Managing Director of Control Risks Deutschland and was responsible for the company’s activities in Continental Europe and Eastern Europe. He left Control Risks to join KPMG in Berlin were he was responsible for Corporate Intelligence.

the other. The causal chains from climate change to consequences such as conflict are long and uncertain, but as the effects of climate change become more apparent, so the cause and effect between the two will become blunter. Social turmoil Of the major environmental changes, degradation and depletion of agricultural land, forests, water and fish stocks will contribute to social turmoil in coming decades. Two other important factors are population growth and unequal resource distribution, the latter as a result of political decisions. This is likely to result in ethnic clashes arising from population migration caused by environmental scarcity, or civil strife caused by scarcity that affects economic productivity and thus livelihoods. As scarcity increases, the social impacts of population movements, economic decline and weakening of states will become more apparent alongside propensity for conflict. Thus population growth, scarcity of resources and unequal access to such resources will result in migration and expulsion which in turn will lead to weakened states. Such a development is likely to result in ethnic conflicts, a fight for resources and coups d’état. Zones of future tensions The most vivid example of such linkage can be seen in the developments in Darfur. The region is located within an arid desert environment which has experienced a 50%-70% reduction in rainfall as well as large-scale desertification consistent with climate change. The replacement of fertile farming land with desert has resulted in less available farmland for crops and cattle, resulting in tensions between

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Fire and water in Russia and Pakistan − consequences of climate change?

herders and farmers for access to both land and water supplies, which became increasingly violent as the Sudanese government armed and trained the local Arab Muslim population against attacks from tribes from the south. The stress caused by climate change increased political, ethnic and religious tensions. Such intra-state conflicts over winners and losers may spill over into regional conflicts. In this light, West Africa, the Nile Basin and Central Asia are regions at risk of future tension and conflict.

Climate change – a geopolitical dimension Climate change will increasingly become a geopolitical consideration for major states, with links made to security and terrorism in un-governed spaces because of transient borders and failing states. Such countries might be tempted to resort to increasingly draconian measures to ensure security by looking at military options to prevent adverse social impacts from climate change. Such a development will become increasingly likely as the impacts of climate change exceed the capabilities of states to adapt. Preparing for the eventuality The current debate between those who regard climate change as inevitable and those who see the debate as artificial is not helpful. It would be poor risk management if the industrial countries did not prepare for the eventuality of climate change. We need to assume that parts of Europe will experience increased flooding in costal areas and droughts in Southern Europe. At the same time climatic stress in Africa and other regions will result in mass migration and will impact the supply chain to our industries. Ethnic strife, conflicts, hunger and sickness in affected countries will result in calls for intervention by armed forces and aid workers, it will be the developed nations which will be asked to help by providing aid and support.

Photos: www.n24.de/media

Identifying risks Good risk management consists of identifying potential risks and developing strategies to mitigate such risks. We might agree that these risks exist; we are however far from developing a strategy to counter such risks at a European level. We need to consider providing those states at risk from climate change with the necessary institutional capacity to increase the adaptive capability of such nations and regions. Priorities We also need to prioritise such support – there is not much point in focusing attention on those countries which represent the worst case – we need to focus such programmes on those countries which have proved able to cope and on those nations and regions where failure would be most catastrophic for their neighbours and the rest of the world.

Clear and comprehensive concepts need to be urgently developed The recent Copenhagen Summit did address this issue and developed countries have pledged $10 bn a year for the next three years. It is however unclear where this money is to come from. Furthermore, the programmes are focused on the most vulnerable developing countries rather than those who stand the best chance of implementing successful programmes to mitigate the effects of climate change. There is very little talk of programmes to improve governance and resilience as a part of a strategy to both combat climate change and prepare countries for dramatic changes in their societies. What is missing in the debate is a clear distinction between aiding those countries in the event of a catastrophic event such as mass hunger and drought and development aid for countries to help them mitigate the effects of climate change.

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Haiti: What lessons to learn by Ambassador Shirley Skeritt-Andrew, Embassies of the Eastern Caribbean States and Missions to the European Union, Brussels The 12th of January, 2010 is a day that should live long in our consciousness. Not solely because of the magnitude of the earthquake that ravaged Haiti, the scale of lives lost, or even because of the enormity of the task that lay before us as an international community, but because of the forceful reminder of the resilience, dignity and courage of the people of Haiti. Haiti for decades has struggled with political, economic and social setbacks that have limited its potential. It has also suffered from the added misfortune of constant natural disasters. We are not strangers to those facts. We are also not strangers to the fact that human courage can affect human progress. This relief and recovery effort that is ongoing gives us an opportunity to see beyond short term fixes and focus on long term reinvestments in the development of Haiti. Such reinvestments will inevitably serve both the cause of development and of disaster preparedness, as they are inextricably linked. It gives us the opportunity, both here in Europe and in the Caribbean, to make serious progress on advancing the Haitian people. Not as a cause, not as charity but as sisters and brothers of humanity. A key issue of lessons learnded.

Haiti requires a creative approach to development In that vein, I would underscore the need for the issue of reinvestment and development not to be separated from the ongoing relief and recovery efforts. At this point, I should also unpack the term development. The term “development” is often used in very narrow, simplistic and even parochial ways. Haiti’s problems, both underlying and visible, are anything but narrow and simplistic. Hence, I would posit that if there is any lesson to be learned, it is that we should pursue reinvestment and real development in Haiti, with all its complexities and nuances. No longer is it relevant to focus on the past or even some current understanding of the Washington Consensus for

Haiti earthquake rescue

Photo: www.wordpress.com

Shirley Skerritt-Andrew H.E. Shirley Skerritt-Andrew is Ambassador to the Kingdom of Belgium and the European Union since December 2008 for the four Eastern Caribbean States of Dominica, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and St. Vincent and the Grenadines (OECS). She is a national of St. Kitts and Nevis, studied at the Universtity of the West Indies and at University College London. She is an economist by training. H.E. was until recently a senior advisor to the Government of St. Kitts and Nevis, and in particular was the lead official dealing with European affairs primarily through the European Commission’s Delegation to the Eastern Caribbean. She has worked as an economic planner in Jamaica and in the public sector in the United Kingdom.

guidance, or any other model that is based on binaries, either/or or top/down approaches. Haiti doesn’t require models; it requires a different and creative approach. Fundamental elements for developement We should measure development in Haiti along a continuum and through a comprehensive lens. We should also recognise the paramount importance of dignity, self determination, independence and empowerment in the pursuit of progress. For without these fundamental elements, development will be an exercise in futility. Too often this is what has been missing the dignity of the individual and the rightful place of the Haitian at the planning and implementation table. We already know what happens when infrastructure isn’t built to code, when institutional capacity isn’t prioritised, when governance structures are either absent or characterised by inertia, when standards of care and security are not adhered to, when human capital and community cohesion aren’t fostered or when international action lacks legitimacy because the people being helped are marginalized. I put it simply, people aren’t just not better off, they also die. The absence of these primary principles makes it so much harder to cushion the blow of natural disasters like the one that further devastated the Haitian Republic. The stakes in this crisis are high because in Haiti and in fact, much of the Caribbean, we cannot separate development from disaster preparedness. Implement structures and strategies for reinvestment Going forward then, as a representative of the CARIFORUM grouping, a group that is keenly aware of some of these challenges, we must implement structures and strategies that

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facilitate the requisite reinvestments for short term relief as well as long term development. We are already aware of some of the more superficial fixes that must take place throughout the reinvestment efforts. These include ensuring that Haiti’s infrastructure is up to international standards. ISO building codes have been effective in preventing major loss of life in other parts of the world. We also know we need to get government institutions up and running again, which means that government infrastructure would have to be reconstructed. Also, durable shelter and homes for the more than 3 million people who are currently without homes must be a priority especially given the upcoming hurricane season in the Caribbean. Education and health care – areas for cooperation with the EU CARIFORUM also places heavy emphasis on the urgency of restarting schools, rebuilding hospitals and clinics, as well as injecting substantial resources into agriculture and food security. These are efforts that can spur immediate recovery and get people back to a sense of normalcy as well as factor into disaster preparedness strategies. They can also be built upon for the long term development. These are areas that CARIFORUM and the European Union will seek to cooperate on. Any comparative analysis with other earthquake-ravaged countries would demonstrate that had Haiti’s governance structures and capacity been such that they could have been mobilised at a moment’s notice, with efficacy and efficiency, the fallout wouldn’t have been as disastrous as it was.

The overarching idea for Haiti‘s rebuilding CARIFORUM endorses the views that: • The absolute sovereignty of Haiti must be respected: the recovery effort should not be an avenue through which to make Haiti subservient to or dependent on its donors. It should be an equal partnership in every effort. • The priorities, as presented by Haiti, should be the overarching guide for every plan and strategy adopted. • The reconstruction will require the international community, particularly the UN and the EU, to be wedded to Haiti for at least 10 to 15 years. • CARIFORUM/CARICOM should be included in all discussions in order to play the role of advocate as requested by Haiti. • A special Multi-Donor Trust Fund ought to be established and funds made available to the government of Haiti.

Critical and specific lessons If we are to venture beyond these points, which seek to provide umbrella notions for relief and recovery and pave the path for reinvestment and development, we will find other critical and more specific lessons to be learned: • The Haitian diaspora has a role to play in the development of Haiti, whether it is through remittances, academia, expertise in

Haiti is not a lost island.

Photo: www.geographicguide.net

governance or the economy. • The International Financial Institutions together with Multi National Corporations/INGOs should initiate a program whereby highly skilled individuals from the diaspora, who work overseas, can return home and be employed in their home country in ways that inevitably will lead to capacity building in key sectors of the economy. • Every aspect of relief, recovery and investment must take a bottom-up approach. This legitimises the effort and places ownership of solutions in the hands of Haitians. Local ownership empowers leadership; a key component of development. • Persons skilled in community development must be partners in the recovery and long term development of Haiti. Haiti is a country with many cleavages, economic, religious, cultural, etc. Hence, efforts at community building and cohesion and a culture of oneness could place the onus on communities to develop themselves regardless of wealth or status. This will have a cascading effect on the entire country. Without these investments by the people of Haiti themselves, the country suffers from lack of national unity. • The Caribbean Community, because of its ties with Haiti, ought to be front and centre of these efforts. Where we can, resources must be mobilised (CARICOM sends Creole speakers to Haiti) and where we can’t, we must be the staunchest advocates for Haitian advancement.

Bring Haiti back to its glory The underlying argument being made is that, these ideas form part of the lessons that Haiti, the Caribbean as well as the international community must learn if we are to avoid the repeat of the catastrophe plastered across the TV screen on January 12th. Some of these lessons are for short term consideratio, some are for the long term. Collectively, they are not a panacea for what ails Haiti. However, they are a start if we can conjure the political courage to bring Haiti back to its glory.

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Modern technologies for the training of European managers in Crisis Prevention and Disaster Management Interview with Ulrich Aderhold, Vice President for Europe & Africa, CAE Military Products and Services, Managing Director, CAE Elektronik GmbH, Stolberg/Rhld. The European: Mr. Aderhold, you are the general manager of the German group of CAE, a well-known global player for simulation and training for fixed and rotary wing aircraft. Around the world, CAE trains pilots and crews of civil airline companies and military personnel with great success. In the last years, you also developed tools for simulation and training for military leaders at every level of command, and as an outcome of your experience with the system “GESI” in several NATO states, your company developed tools for Computer-Based Simulation (CBS) in crisis management. What are the advantages of this technology? U. Aderhold: Computer-based simulation technology is a cutting-edge approach to effectively support crisis prevention, preparedness and management. Simulation means to identify and understand key factors, interactions and interdependencies of processes in the real world and to replicate these processes in a digitized world. In that replicated world, you will be able to play through various scenarios using different parameters and settings and to see the respective implications. Hence, simulation is the perfect means to train crisis managers in dealing with complex crisis situations by confronting them with the consequences of their decisions and actions. Furthermore, that ability to forecast potential impacts of events and decisions makes simulation a valuable tool for analysis and planning. The European: How do you see the future contribution of this unique competence in modelling, simulation and training and how could the application of it help individual nations or groups of European nations in training for crisis prevention?

Modern classroom for computer-based simulation in Crisis Management training. Photo: CAE

Ulrich Aderhold Managing Director of CAE Elektronik GmbH Ulrich Aderhold was born in Hannover in 1956. He studied Electrical Engineering in Hannover and started his professional career at AEG. 1985 Head of the Space Sector of AEG (Power Electronics Division). 1992 Managing Director of Phototronics Solartechnik GmbH. 1994 Managing Director of Applied Solar Energy (ASE). 1997 Head of the Satellite Services Division of DaimlerChrysler Aerospace (DASA). Since 2003 Managing Director of CAE Elektronik GmbH, Stolberg, a subsidiary of CAE inc., Toronto, Canada, responsible for the Region Europe & Africa, Military. Since 2009: Chairman of the Board of Rotorsim SRL, Milan, and of CAE Aircrew Training Services plc, UK., Chairman of the Aerospace Suppliers Committee in the German Aerospace Industry Forum. Board Member of Helicopter Flight Training Services GmbH, Munich, Helicopter Training Media International GmbH, Munich and the Centre for Flight Simulation, Berlin.

U. Aderhold: More than ever, governments are faced with the challenge of protecting their populations against the growing and diversifying range of threats. The increasing frequency and dimension of natural disasters, threats posed by terrorist activities, the fundamental dependency of modern societies on critical infrastructures, and the far-reaching impacts in case of failure are key aspects characterizing the challenges’ natures. Dealing with the potential range of disaster scenarios requires cooperation between nations across Europe and even worldwide. Especially when it comes to major disasters, the assistance from other countries must be reliable and sharing the respective capabilities make sense from both a technical and a budgetary perspective. The European: Do you think that European countries have the necessary competencies in crisis management and how do you think about coordination in Europe? U. Aderhold: Yes, I believe that every European country has its own and local capabilities and competencies for managing crises, and some even have very sophisticated structures and capabilities ready for use. However, where international cooperation is needed, any such assistance requires a coordinated approach − ideally supported or even directed by a

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centralized EU agency â&#x2C6;&#x2019; to be successful. Coordinated management is also necessary when it comes to crossborder disasters affecting more than one EU Member State. The European: Mr. Aderhold, this sounds like a very promising but also very complex and costly approach, and knowing that not all nations may be able to afford those kind of investments, what would you recommend as an efficient and synergetic approach within the EU? U. Aderhold: I am not in the position to give recommendations to the EU but as far as I see the development in the EU concerning crisis prevention, Brussels seems to develop adequate tools to support and to coordinate crisis and disaster management. The newly created Crisis Management Planning Directorate in the EU Council has certainly something to do with coordination and training, and indeed instruments for monitoring have been developed over the years in the Commission. I would also note that simulation offers a number of advantages, most notably cost advantages, that simply cannot be ignored in todayâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s uncertain economic and security environment. The challenge of bringing together multiple agencies and countries, environmental impacts, and more all point to the greater use of simulation and synthetic training. Just as important, simulation is the perfect tool for preparation and rehearsal, which is critical for ensuring the readiness of crisis and disaster management agencies as they face new and changing threats. The European: What would be your advice? U. Aderhold: I strongly believe that it is high time for the European nations to agree on the foundation of and participation in a European crisis management and training network. When you ask for my recommendation, I suggest that the EU should take a leading role in defining a new European crisis management strategy that bundles leading competencies and technologies and serves as a hub that connects local national capabilities. Of course the Union does not need to start from scratch but can rely on a wide spectrum of national experiences and means. The European: Mr. Aderhold, may I ask you to be more precise. What is it you would like to propose the EU to reflect on and what are the key benefits resulting from your recommended approach? U. Aderhold: If my assumptions about Brusselsâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; goals in this field are correct, then let me structure my thoughts and ideas into three aspects and considerations: First: The introduction of simulation technology for crisis management poses a huge challenge to EU Member States, partly due to budgetary constraints but predominantly due to the need to build up competencies regarding that new technology.

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Second: Although each Member State should build up its own capabilities, these capabilities should not be isolated but linked assets enabling joint planning, training and operations to meet the growing and diversifying range of threats efficiently. Third: The creation of capabilities should follow a joint approach wherever possible to exploit a maximum of synergies and to save personnel, time and costs. The European: What would be the political or even the emotional and socializing result? U. Aderhold: I think that Europe needs a European “spirit of crisis and disaster management”. We saw it in Haiti: a European crisis management body was on the spot and coordinated the activities successfully as I read in your magazine some months ago, and national teams did a great job. This in the future will be a part of European foreign politics and activities that should not be underestimated in its effects of creating a positive image of our Union. It gives the EU credibility as well as trust. The European: What should be the consequence of your ideas? U. Aderhold: The answer to these issues could be an EU initiative supporting the creation of crisis management simulation capabilities in Europe by focussing on a European Crisis Management Planning & Training Network. The European: Mr. Aderhold, if I understand you correctly you expect the European nations to invest in their own and local capabilities but in a way that they benefit from some standardisation and collaboration. Can you be more precise and specific on this key element? I think we are in the very core now. U. Aderhold: A future European Crisis Management Planning & Training Network would technically and conceptually network all European crisis management simulation technologies and corresponding competencies to enable joint planning and training. The European: How should that work? U. Aderhold: An EU Simulation Competence Centre (SCC) would serve as the core element and hub of the European Crisis Management Planning and Training Network. With its leading competencies, the EU SCC would have a supporting and coordinating role: Assisting EU Member States in building up their own simulation capabilities and coordinating EU-wide activities regarding simulation. The European: In your earlier statement you mentioned the aspects of analysis and planning, and the crisis management training. Can you explain in more detail what the EU Simulation Competence Centre would offer? U. Aderhold: The introduction of computer-based simulation in EU training courses would provide state-of-the-art training for

crisis managers of EU member states. The EU will either conduct its own training courses or will assist EU Member States in the conception of such training courses. Furthermore, the EU SCC should have the capability to organize and coordinate EU-wide simulation-based crisis management exercises while setting up a corresponding cross-border simulation network. In order to conduct these networked exercises, the simulation capabilities of the participating EU Member States would be linked together with the EU SCC or the EU SCC would provide mobile simulation components and on-site assistance to the participating EU Member States. The European: What would be the consequence? U. Aderhold: The European Crisis Management Planning & Training Network would encourage its participating Member States to conduct joint simulation-based analysis of threats and risks posed to the EU and its member states. Under the guidance of the EU SCC, possible impacts on the EU’s critical infrastructures and citizens will be investigated to identify measures of prevention and appropriate emergency response plans. The European: Including forecasts? U. Aderhold: In crisis situations, the EU SCC would be able to provide simulation-based forecasts on the course of disasters and evaluate respective EU countermeasures. It would support the planning and allocating of coordinated EU emergency assistance in time. The European: Finally, what is the essence of your considerations? What is the essence and value gained? U. Aderhold: Modern simulation technology can provide decisive support for crisis management in Europe. Well-prepared EU action plans, high-quality training of European crisis management personnel and precisely coordinated European emergency response missions are to be achieved through the application of simulation technology. The European: As I understand, you are proposing to the European Union to start a crisis management simulation capability initiative in order to create a European Crisis Management Planning and Training Network exploiting the benefits of simulation. U. Aderhold: In doing so, the EU would take the initiative to significantly increase the efficiency of EU crisis prevention and crisis response and create in this very field a European spirit of solidarity, all respecting the principle of subsidiarity. The European: Thank you Mr. Aderhold for this interview. I could imagine that it will be evaluated with much interest by Brussels’ institutions.

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Efficient crisis management as a prerequisite for networked security by Dr. Markus Hellenthal, CEO, Thales Deutschland GmbH

The requirements for efficient crisis management – and thus effective crisis prevention (I am referring to non-military crises here) – have changed dramatically in recent years. Rapid advances in information and communications technology, increasing mobility within a number of societies – including our own – and the corresponding rise in migration flows worldwide, an ominous climate change and an upswing in the urbanisation of the global population as a result of all of these issues on the one hand, along with new types of security threats ranging across the entire spectrum from crime to terrorist attacks on the other, make crisis management a critical element of efficient security concepts today.

The need for integrated networks Providing an integrated network that extends beyond organisational borders to the wide range of members who have a security role to play is the key criterion for maintaining the highest possible response and anticipation capability, thereby ensuring command of the situation as early as possible. In systems with agencies responsible for managing different security tasks at the national (country), federal (state) and local (communal) level and in the private sector, as is the case in the Federal Republic of Germany, this translates into an extraordinary yet necessary challenge. The German example demonstrates the numerous advances in international and interorganisational cooperation that have already been made in the past. One example of this is the German Joint Information and Situation Centre of the Federal Office of Civil Protection and Disaster Assistance and Catastrophe Aid, which began its services in 2002.

The industries’ answer The industry’s task is to offer technological answers to the changing security situation and the growing demands of crisis management within the framework of integrated security. This involves establishing security architectures that provide all of the agents involved an opportunity to plan and act on the basis of a joint information architecture blueprint, thus enhancing the overall security level. Modern integrated technologies are an essential prerequisite for this in order to substantially improve the level of security.

A four-tiered solution The industrial sector provides a four-tiered solution approach to address these challenges.

Dr. Markus Hellenthal CEO Thales Germany Dr. Markus Hellenthal was born in Düsseldorf, Germany, on October 9, 1957. He has studied law, socology and, as a post-graduate, public admnistration. He is Chief Executive Officer of Thales Germany and Senior Vice President of Thales. Prior to this, he held executive positions in the private and public sectors. As Senior Vice President, he was responsible for EADS business development for civil security solutions. He worked as Partner with Accenture, a consultancy, and held various executive police functions in the German Ministry of the Interior. Dr. Hellenthal has been representing German industry as chairman of the European Security Research Advisory Board (ESRAB) and in other international bodies.

1. Safety: First and foremost, system and application (operations) safety is aimed at reducing the risk of human and technical failure during operations. 2. Security: The second level is concerned with security against external threats such as unauthorised intrusions, terrorist attacks and cyberspace attacks. 3. Business continuity planning: The third level, business continuity planning, fosters the development of strategies for countering serious disruptions that can bring critical activities to a halt. These types of interferences can for example include pandemics or natural disasters and weather catastrophes. 4. Crisis management: Finally, the highest level is that of crisis management. This level deals with mechanisms that organisations use to prepare for the unthinkable and thus enable them to react in extreme situations. Technology plays a central role here because it is the optimal basis for obtaining a clear picture of the situation, maintaining decision capability and, ultimately, successfully deploying security forces.

Increasing urbanisation Let us first consider the phenomenon of increasing urbanisation. Over half of the world’s population today lives in cities. According to the United Nations, there are currently 19 cities worldwide with more than ten million inhabitants. This number will reach 27 by the year 2025. Although cities naturally differ from one another, the security requirements are comparable. In an increasingly complex world, enhanced collaboration between those responsible for security and local authorities

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information technology. This self-reinforcement helps optimise the capabilities of the individual parties through the use of modern sensors whose results can be used directly by the security management centre and task force independently of one another. The same also applies to optronics such as video cameras. It would be ideal to combine sensors that are ground based, air borne or space based and that are preferably equipped with optical, optronic or radar systems in an intelligent way.

The Thales “Hypoviser”, a most modern solution for situation and control centres as well as command centres in crisis management. Photo: Thales, Paris

responsible for municipal infrastructures such as those that supply water and electricity or public transport systems is becoming one of the most significant challenges. High level of analytical expertise From a historical perspective, these duties and responsibilities are organised into silos that are located next to one another but are not interconnected and whose owners have their own proprietary information and communications systems. This makes it impossible to efficiently handle crisis situations because the key players are unable to take all of the crucial factors into consideration. This also renders the measures taken ineffective. Ultimately, this means: when a crisis hits, it is not managed according to the specific circumstances – but particularly from the points of view of the population and the security forces. Appropriate and powerful legislation An effective security architecture requires appropriate and powerful legislation along with qualified personnel in adequate numbers. Fast, complete information, a high level of analytical expertise and an efficient crisis management system are of practical importance in executing security measures, both for prevention and when put into action. Recursion In addition to the integration and dissemination of information, an essential element of this strategy is the principle of recursion, i.e. a system that reinforces itself. From the classic structure of information gathering and communication by the security management centre right down to the various task forces that are not networked with one another and back, an integrated security system evolves in which security management centres, other agents and sensors and optronics are linked together to enable mutual data collection. Hence, success lies in the cooperation between all of the parties involved within the overall system and their capacity to act, along with the use of modern digital communications and

Powerful industrial solutions Efficient crisis management is technologically feasible. The industrial sector offers powerful solutions to these challenges. However, the decisive factor for the success of these concepts is the desire of everyone involved to work together across organisational and national borders. This is the only way to build and operate an effective security architecture. Examples from Germany and abroad prove that there is momentum in this area that reflects the interests of the citizens who want to live in safety and the authorities who strive to successfully and responsibly fulfil their security duties.

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INSTITUTIONS AND ASSOCIATIONS

Security has a social dimension by Emmanuel Jacob, President, European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL), Brussels

As an umbrella organisation of 37 national military associations and unions, the European Organisation of Military Associations (EUROMIL) promotes the social and professional interests of military personnel of all ranks in Europe. Stretching across 25 countries, EUROMIL is the main Europewide forum tasked to facilitate exchange of information, experience and best practices among our member associations. The organisation moreover strives to secure and advance the human rights, fundamental freedoms and socioprofessional interests of soldiers by monitoring and intervening in multinational negotiations at the European level.

EUROMIL’s comprehensive approach to Security EUROMIL embraces a comprehensive and indivisible approach to security. Security is not only about military numbers and hardware, but also includes a human, economic, and environmental dimension. Security is therefore about the consolidation of democracy, the rule of law, and the wider society as such. While armed forces must be democratically accountable, soldiers should also be fully integrated in the civilian social order and the individual soldier should have a clear and obvious stake in democracy. Soldiers, moreover, ought to influence and effect the social and professional conditions in armed forces – and legitimately so. The OSCE – Code of Conduct This basic sentiment is reflected in the OSCE Code of Conduct on Political- Military Aspects of Security (paragraph 32), which states that active service personnel should be able to exercise the core right of freedom of expression and association. Such an entitlement is clearly stipulated in numerous international political and legally binding documents, e.g. the

President E. Jacob, Vice President B. Gertz and Board Member A. Tichonink Konwent (POZ) during a hearing in the EU-Parliament in 2008 Photo: EUROMIL

Emmanuel Jacob Emmanuel Jacob is the current President of Euromil, Brussels. He was elected in 2006 and reelected in 2008. Born in Hasselt in 1959, he studied social science at Genk the University and was a labour and social consultant at Syntra (Hasselt). He joined the Belgian Armed Forces in March 1979 and was nominated Chief Warrant Officer in March 2006. His association career saw Jacob as a delegate in 1987 and as a spokesman in the Belgian “national advisory council”. Jacob became National Secretary of the NCO trade union in May 1989. In 1991 he became Secretary General ACMP-CGPM and was elected as a Board Member of EUROMIL in 2000 and reelected in 2004.

European Convention on Human Rights (Art. 11), the European Social Charter (Art. 5), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (Art. 12). Yet, notwithstanding, such entitlements are curtailed or not implemented at all by national military authorities in almost half of Europe. This omission is often explained with reference to combat efficiency and the need to uphold discipline. But this misses the crux of the matter: military associations do not undermine the chain of command and neither condone nor support insubordination and mutiny, but rather strive to achieve an effective, modern-equipped force of well-motivated soldiers. The alleged loss of combat efficiency is therefore also unsubstantiated by current operations, e.g. in Afghanistan. The role of the soldier has changed The old maxim, that soldiers’ lot is not to reason why, ( …) but to do and die1, is no longer valid – if it ever was. Loyalty is not simply about issuing orders, and counting on discipline, but rather related to common ideas and perceptions. Soldiers must understand the overall mission to which they are deployed and be convinced of the value and purpose of the orders they are asked to carry out. In this context, it is important to recognise that the role of the soldier has changed. National armed forces are increasingly called upon to accomplish operations other than war, such as peacekeeping and nation-building. This implies that the soldier is no longer merely a “fighter” in the traditional sense, but rather a mediator and conveyor of certain, often humanitarian, notions. The soldier is thus sent to defend, and ulti-

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Photos: EUROMIL

Documentation EUROMILS’ 10 recommendations to be applied In 10 points, divided into 3 phases, EUROMIL seeks to raise awareness on the requests of soldiers.

The pre-mission phase EUROMIL advocates 1. For the pre-mission phase EUROMIL advocates that political mandates of current missions should adequately reflect the nature and purpose of the mission. Undeclared caveats need to be eliminated. Honest mandates and rules - regularly reality-checked - heighten morale and provide legal security for soldiers conducting their duty in the field. 2. Pre-deployment military training needs to address today’s military tasks, which go far beyond the traditional military operations of fighting wars. Pre-deployment training has to follow the task force principle “train as you fight” and to include exercises on and with the equipment to be used in mission scenarios. 3. Multinational missions and asymmetrical warfare make more comprehensive training of soldiers necessary. Therefore, language training, knowledge of national and international law as well as cultural awareness are essential in today’s mission scenarios. 4. With increasing cooperation between soldiers from different countries in multinational missions, it is only logical to take the task force principle “train as you fight” a step further to the international level. Combined pre-deployment training of multinational forces is vital to achieve a high level of interoperability and flexibility. Extensive training as a combined and joint force consequently promotes force protection.

During the deployment 5. During deployment EUROMIL recommends that the best equipment should be made available to complement the best possible preparation. The quality and reliability of equipment has a decisive influence on the morale and efficiency of soldiers. Appropriate equipment can save health and lives. 6. Medical care in the military aims to care for, to maintain and to reconstitute the physical and psychological well-being of the soldier - at home as well as during deployment. Medical care has to be of the highest quality and free of charge for every soldier. Psychological care has to furthermore incorporate awareness of training for posttraumatic stress prevention.

7. It is essential to have a successful arrangement between families and soldiers in place to minimise the stress levels for both soldiers and dependents. For soldiers to fully concentrate on the mission, they need to be assured that family members are kept informed and cared for during overseas deployment.

After the deployment 8. After deployment EUROMIL advocates that high-quality medical treatment has to continue to ensure the best achievable recovery of the wounded. Psychological care must include “battle-mind debriefing” and prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). PTSD - historically known as ‘battle fatigue’ or ‘shell shock’ - also has societal impact. It affects families, employers and the wider society. PTSD has an economic effect on personal income, the ability to work and treatment and support services. PTSD is a problem that will grow with the increase of international military missions if not addressed properly. Therefore, long-term medical surveillance and treatment of returning soldiers and veterans - including short-term volunteers and soldiers about to leave - needs to be guaranteed. PTSD should be recognised as an occupational sickness of peacekeeping veterans. 9. Especially in relation to Armed Forces made up mainly of volunteers with temporary contracts, EUROMIL sees the need for vocational and educational training schemes. Depending on the duration of service, soldiers need to be entitled to an appropriately broad variety of career advancement trainings and programmes that systematically facilitate re-integration into the labour market. 10. These entitlements - physical and psychological recovery as well as vocational and educational training - have to be tailored to veterans seriously wounded during a military mission. Veterans with the wish and the ability to be reinstated for duty must be permitted to continue as professional soldiers in appropriate positions or, with sufficient qualifications, in substitute careers as public servants in the administration of the Armed Forces. A simple discharge or transfer into retirement must only be permitted on request by the respective soldier.

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and that every reasonable measure has been taken to safeguard their lives and security. The soldier needs post-deployment cares After deployment EUROMIL advocates that high-quality medical treatment has to continue to ensure the best achievable recovery of the wounded. Psychological care must include “battle-mind debriefing” and prevention of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD).

Soldiers – a Dutch PR Team in Afghanistan with elders from a village. Photo: EUROMIL

mately to die for, the preservation and restorations of democratic and human rights in foreign countries such as Afghanistan.

How to form the soldier for modern military misions That said, the success of modern military missions depends on motivated and adequately trained, equipped and provided-for soldiers who can rely on solid welfare schemes that also cover their dependants. The policies that define the support available must state in clear terms what can be expected. The soldier needs adequate care Inadequate care before, during and after deployment of soldiers will result in higher attrition rates and lower recruitment numbers. Either of these two eventualities affects future force generation capabilities. This should encourage the political and military leadership, especially in the current circumstances with recruitment faltering and mission overstretch, to focus more than before on the soldiers’ operational welfare. Financial limitations on defence budgets cannot be used as an excuse to circumvent the duty of care owed to soldiers. The soldiers needs adequate training Soldiers should, and will, go where ordered, but the appropriate training and equipment must be in place to ensure that potential casualties are minimised. While service conditions obviously entail certain threats, the lives of soldiers should not be put unavoidably at risk, nor without a clear and legitimate military purpose. This implies the need for sound strategies, proper equipment, well-equipped medical facilities as well as social protection. It falls to EUROMIL to ensure that our soldiers are sent into the field with the best possible kit

Recommendations for Armed Forces in times of multinational crisis-management2. In this light, representative associations of European military personnel formulated the EUROMIL Recommendations for Armed Forces in times of multinational crisis-management and peace-keeping missions. These recommendations constitute the uncensored views of European soldiers of all ranks and have been well received by the European Parliament, the European Security and Defence Assembly, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly and the European Union Military Committee.

EUROMIL as an added value to military leaders The fact that the men and women who have chosen to serve their country happen to wear a uniform does not negate their fundamental rights, especially the right to life. Only when soldiers are able to exercise and enjoy fundamental rights and freedoms will the armed forces be truly integrated into society. The right of association does not challenge or undermine discipline. On the contrary, military associations make for more efficient and well-motivated forces and provide military authorities with a valuable partner for cooperation. 1 Alfred, Lord Tennyson, The Charge of the Light Brigade, Poems of Alfred Tennyson, J. E. Tilton and Company, Boston, 1870. 2 see page 52

To be a soldier – there is always a social aspect.

Photo: EUROMIL

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European Union Council of the European Union An internal security strategy for the EU by 2014 An operational European security strategy will be put in place by 2014. This was decided at an informal Council of Justice and Interior Ministers on 15-16 July 2010 During the Spanish Presidency, the European Ministers had reached a consensus on the crucial importance of an internal security strategy. Under the aegis of the Belgian Presidency, this concept will now be translated into an operational strategy, which encompasses the entire security chain: prevention, prosecution and punishment. The policy cycle will consist of four major phases: analysis of the situation, identification of the priorities, drafting, implementing and monitoring of action plans and, finally, the evaluation phase. Ministers agreed that both Europol and COSI (Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security) will play a key role in this process. Europol is

responsible for drawing up standard definitions of the different criminal phenomena and for collecting and analysing the statistics available, and COSI will draw up an operational action plan by December.

EU Agencies FRONTEX At the beginning of July, Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) published its quarterly report for the first three months of 2010. The report revealed significant drops of irregular migration at the external borders of the European Union. These lows continue a general decreasing trend already noticeable in 2009 and are attributed to reduced employment opportunities for irregular immigrants in the EU, combined with stricter migration and asylum policies in Member States and more effective co-operation with key countries of origin.

The Belgian Presidency’s six-month-programme (excerpts) On 1st July, Belgium took over from Spain the Presidency of the Council of the European Union. “Implementation of the Treaty of Lisbon The Belgian Presidency will continue the work carried out under previous presidencies to implement the Treaty of Lisbon. It will ensure this work is performed in a such way as to fully meet a prime objective: to make the Union’s activity more efficient, coherent and transparent. Building on the knowledge acquired by the Spanish Presidency, the Belgian Presidency will ensure, by working together directly with all individuals involved, that working methods and the sharing of responsibilities are consolidated and stabilised in full compliance with the Treaty of Lisbon. (…) Solidarity clause The Union and its Member States are, under the terms of the Treaty of Lisbon, to act jointly and in a spirit of solidarity should a Member State be subjected to a terrorist attack or fall victim to a natural or man-made disaster. The terms for the implementation of this Solidarity clause must be established by a decision. If the joint proposal of the High Representative and the Commission is to be presented during the second half of 2010, the Belgian Presidency must begin work to enable this clause to be operational as quickly as possible. (…) Justice and Home Affairs The reinforcement and effective implementation of the European Area of Freedom, Security and Justice represents a challenge for the European Union. The Belgian Presidency will continue with the effective implementation of the Multi-annual Stockholm Programme (2010-2014). The Treaty of Lisbon makes new instruments available in this respect. In close consultation with the European Parliament

and the European Commission, the Belgian Presidency hopes to take full advantage of the new institutional and procedural opportunities in order to generate positive momentum in this area. The concept of “internal security” expressed in the Treaty of Lisbon must be a far-reaching, integrated concept which covers prevention, repression and the judicial dimension. The Treaty of Lisbon has set up the Standing Committee on operational cooperation on internal security (COSI), which will also take responsibility for reaching a common accord with the Commission, for the translation and operational monitoring of the Internal Security Strategy for the EU approved under the Spanish Presidency. The Presidency also supports the intention of the European Commission to map information systems, particularly those which contain personal data, with a view to organizing an in-depth examination of information systems architecture as part of the integrated management of borders. In the fight against terrorism and organised crime, the need for security must be reconciled with the rights and individual freedoms of the European citizen. In this context, the agreement between the European Union and the United States concerning the transfer of data from the European Union to the United States within the scope of the American Terrorist Finance Tracking Program (TFTP) programme must be approved. It will also be appropriate to enter into negotiations with the United States on the subject of a universal agreement on data protection and to continue discussions on the use of data from passenger files (PNR − Passenger Name Records) within the EU based on a new Commission proposal.”

SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEWS

EUROPEAN DEFENCE AGENCY (EDA) Helicopter Exercise EX AZOR 2010

Poland and Sweden intend to join the MUSIS programme

In June, over 40 helicopters and 700 personnel from 9 EU Member States assembled in Agoncilla, Spain, for the EX AZOR 2010. This exercise was part of the EDA’s Helicopter Training Programme (HTP), designed to assist the EDA participating

At the end of June, Poland and Sweden announced their intention to join MUSIS, the Multinational Space-based Imaging System, a collaborative EDA programme of six European countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France and Italy) to enhance their future earth observation (EO) capabilities. MUSIS aims to federate some of the next generation European military or dual use satellites for earth observation, such as the replacements for the French Helios II, the Italian CosmoSkyMed and the German SAR Lupe, and assure “access to space” for each of the contributing Member States (cMS) by common User Ground Stations. Approved as a Category B project in March 2009 by the EDA Steering Board, MUSIS is open to participation of other EDA Member States, if their proposed contribution is acceptable to the existing contributing Members.

Member States to prepare their crews for the challenges of modern, coalition, expeditionary operations. Also, although not technically a participant, Luxembourg made an essential contribution to the success of the exercise by assisting nations in meeting the cost of participation. The number of participants is a testament to the requirement for such training, and the diversity of procedures and experiences provided an excellent opportunity to share knowledge and improve mutual understanding, both essential ingredients to ensuring future interoperability. The specific aims of this exercise (the first was hosted by France) were to allow crews to experience the hot and high conditions of the local mountains and to practice limited visibility landings in the dusty conditions of a military range near Zaragoza. Despite the unseasonable rain, 715 hours were flown and participants reported that they had achieving their training aims. Most importantly, the strategic success of the exercise was applauded by all, and its importance to the HTP is in no doubt. Spain and France’s willingness to host these ground-breaking events has enabled the EDA to identify many lessons to improve the programme further and has allowed other nations to observe the process and assess whether they would wish to host future exercises. This has proved a very successful strategy, as the EDA now has offers to host HTP exercises for the next 5 years. The nations participating in EX AZOR 2010 were: Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Italy, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. The helicopter types were equally diverse with 10 different types: A-109, AB 212, Mi-24, Mi-171, A219, NH90, EH101, AS 352, Lynx and SeaKing.

Conference on Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) On 1 July, the EDA and the European Commission co-organised a conference dedicated to Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS). Over 450 senior government officials and industry representatives discussed the potential of UAS for European users, their economic, technological and industrial impact, as well as a common European way forward. Speakers outlined the dual use nature of UAS, both for defence and civilian security purposes. Military and civil UAS markets are highly interdependent, with technological developments inevitably driving both. EDA’s Chief Executive, Alexander Weis, announced ongoing work under the so called “European Framework Cooperation”, a pragmatic approach by the European Commission, the European Defence Agency and the European Space Agency to synchronise systematically research and technology investment in their respective frameworks. The conference recommended the establishment of a High Level Group on UAS, providing a discussion platform to European stakeholder communities in order to ensure coherence whilst improving sustainability and competitiveness, notably building on input and ongoing initiatives from research areas such as the “European Framework Cooperation”.

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EDA issued its first annual report for 2009 At the end of July, the EDA published its first annual report (2009), 5 years after the start of the Agency’s operational activities. The report gives an overview of the important projects launched or developed in 2009, among others the Multinational Space-based Imaging System (MUSIS) project, aimed at replacing the current European military earth observation capability and ensuring continuity of service from 2015 onwards, or the Future Transport Helicopter (FTH) project which was accepted in May as an EDA project, at the initiative of its originators, France and Germany.

EU Operations New Head of EULEX Kosovo Mission appointed On 27 July, Xavier Bout de Marnhac was appointed Head of Mission of the European Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo, EULEX Kosovo. The decision was taken by the European Union Political and Security Committee on a recommendation by the EU High Representative of the Union for the Foreign and Security Policy, Catherine Ashton. Xavier de Marnhac, who will succeed Yves de Kermabon, will take up his duties on 15 October 2010. The appointment is for one year renewable.

Xavier Bout de Marnhac, designate Head of EULEX Kosovo Date of birth: 7 July 1951 Nationality: French Profession/Rank: Retired army general Education: National Defence High Studies Institute, Paris, France; Ecole Supérieure de Guerre (Joint Staff College), Paris, France; U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, USA; Ecole Spéciale Militaire de Saint-Cyr (Military Academy), France Professional experience: 2008 to 2010: Commander, Army District South-East, Lyon, France; 2007 to 2008: Command of the NATO KOSOVO Force (KFOR), Pristina, Kosovo; 2005 to 2007: Commander, Army Operational HQ (EMF 2), Nantes, France; 1999 to 2004: Director, Operations Directorate, National Intelligence Service, Paris, France; Before 1999: Various positions of command and responsibility in the French Army, including several deployments in the Balkans, Africa, Middle East and Central Asia

European Parliament New SWIFT agreement was approved by MEPs The European Parliament approved on 8 July a new version of the SWIFT anti-terrorist agreement on bank data transfers to the USA. A few months ago, the agreement in its previous form was rejected by the Parliamentarians. The new agreement will enter into force for five years on 1 August 2010, and will be renewable year-by-year thereafter. It foresees the setting of an EU equivalent to the U.S. “Terrorism Finance Tracking Program” (TFTP). The Commission will start work in the second half of 2010 on the creation of the European TFTP and will have to publish a progress report within three years.

European Commission Measures against terrorists threats The European Commission adopted on 20 July a communication listing the existing measures against terrorist threats under the EU Counter-Terrorism Strategy. Cecilia Malmström, EU Commissioner for Home Affairs stated: “Thankfully, the overall number of terrorist attacks and arrests is decreasing in the EU, but at the same time terrorist methods and terrorist propaganda are evolving and taking new forms. We must make sure that we are able to meet these new threats. Today I am presenting a comprehensive overview of what the EU has done so far and what challenges still lie ahead. This will be an important component in the EU internal security strategy that I will present in the autumn.” The communication also identifies future challenges in areas such as radicalisation, crisis management and response. This stocktaking will feed into an overarching Internal Security Strategy, which is tabled for autumn 2010.

Security Research EU-fundet technology helps disaster workers safe life WORKPAD, an EU-funded ICT research project, has developed software applications that allow emergency teams responding to natural disasters to coordinate and communicate with each other quickly and efficiently, helping to save more lives. Coordination and communication is especially important when emergency teams from many different agencies, civil authorities and NGOs are on the ground at the same time. 1.85 million Euro of EU funding helped the researchers to explore how dozens of databases from different organisations can be linked via peer-to-peer technology to improve response time and avoid duplication of efforts. One central dispatch point

SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEWS

that receives and sends out information to all emergency teams can help save more lives in a quick and efficient way. The technology has already been tried successfully in Southern Italy and is available to be used anywhere in the world. Commission Vice-President for the Digital Agenda Neelie Kroes said: “When an earthquake, forest fire or flood hits, we need to deploy all our available resources to save as many lives as possible and to provide urgent rescue services. EU research funds have helped to develop a great ICT tool that makes emergency response even better and faster. This is how research and innovation can help to build the Digital Agenda for Europe.“ After an earthquake people trapped in collapsed buildings need to be reached as quickly as possible to increase their chance of survival. How do different emergency teams coordinate their efforts and avoid sending too many relief helpers to one place and too few to another? The key to optimise disaster response is to link the different back-office systems and databases used by emergency systems to ensure that all organisations have the full picture. The WORKPAD research project – funded by the EU – developed a network that can link those different back-office systems. Then, via a central coordination and dispatch point, front line helpers can communicate with each other through their handheld devices (mostly personal digital assistants PDAs). For instance, through geo-tagging, team leaders can keep track of the location of all their team members so they know where relief workers are at all times and the tasks they are carrying out. The information exchanged over this network via peer-to-peer (P2P) technology can also include details such as the names of people living in a collapsed apartment building, school class lists, telephone records, maps and other relevant information. WORKPAD has also developed software that can define tasks, assign roles, and provide step-by-step instructions to rescue workers. It can be updated in real time, so if a more urgent need arises, workers can be called to a new task.

The research results of WORKPAD have been successfully tested in Southern Italy, a region which suffers every year from forest fires, and sometimes earthquakes, that require emergency responses. The technology developed by WORKPAD is ready for use. The Czech Republic and the Italian region of Calabria are considering deploying it. Background From 2006 to 2009 researchers from universities in Italy and Austria, small and medium enterprises from the Czech Republic and Spain, IT companies and the Italian region of Calabria worked on the WORKPAD project. The research project has developed instantly deployable information and communication technologies that improve the level of disaster response coordination among diverse teams. 1.85 million Euro of the total cost of 3.16 million Euro was financed under the Commission’s research funding programme (Sixth Framework Programme 2001-2006).

More EU-funded ICT research success stories will be presented at ICT 2010, Europe’s largest ICT research event, in Brussels from 27 to 29 September 2010. http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/events/ict/2010/index_en.htm

ESDA /WEU Assembly Permanent Structured Cooperation à la carte On 16 June, the European Security and Defence Assembly (ESDA) presented a report entitled “Permanent Structured Cooperation under the Lisbon Treaty – reply to the annual report of the Council”. The report was written by the Earl of Dundee (United Kingdom, Federated Group) who recalled that in 2003, the EU had adopted a headline goal: to be able to deploy a 50 000 to 60 000-strong force within two months and sustain for it for one year. But that goal was nowhere near reached because of a lack of resources and slow and cumber-

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some decision-making. Lord Dundee explained that the Lisbon Treaty had made provision for Permanent Structured Cooperation but the terms of Article 2 of the relevant protocol were “too vague and for the most part too subjective to be used for the definition of quantifiable participation criteria”. The report submitted to the Assembly advocated an à la carte approach which offered scope for cooperation among willing member states either in the operational sphere under the chairmanship of the Director-General of the EU Military Staff, or in the area of capabilities and equipment under the chairmanship of the Director of the European Defence Agency (EDA). The report also called for maximum flexibility in engaging in such cooperation on a case-by-case basis, both for projects and member participation.

Think tanks ESRT’s 5th Annual Conference On 22 June, the European Security Round Table (ESRT) organised its 5th Annual Conference, in cooperation with KonradAdenauer-Stiftung, titled “The Lisbon Treaty − Real Progress for the Common Security and Defence Policy?” The round table was opened by a keynote speech from Belgian Minister of Defence, Pieter De Crem who insisted on the importance of implementing Permanent Structured Cooperation. In the

Improving availability of military helicopters On 16 June, Mrs Claire Curtis-Thomas MEP (United Kingdom, Socialist Group) presented to the ESDA a report on behalf of the Defence Committee on the urgent need to improve cooperation in the field of military helicopters within the EU and NATO, as well as to launch a European programme for heavylift transport helicopters necessary for force projection. The rapporteur said that helicopters have become vital operational assets, very much in demand in theatres of operation such as Africa and Afghanistan. But for the last 10 years there have been major qualitative and quantitative shortfalls in this capability in Europe and the European states are reluctant to pool their national helicopter capabilities for use in coalition operations. According to the report, the European Defence Agency (EDA) had counted 1 735 helicopters of 22 different types in the EU, while “only 6-7% of these are being deployed for external operations. 70% of the European helicopter fleet is concentrated in a quarter of EU Member States and only 50% were actually available and operational. That number includes the helicopters needed for training and those undergoing repairs and maintenance. The Assembly in particular recommends trying to improve “the availability of transport helicopters for external operations” and reaching “agreement on the launch of a European heavy transport helicopter programme” and studying the possibility “of giving a transatlantic dimension to that programme”. The ESDA also recommends supporting European industrial capabilities in the area of military helicopters concerning the refurbishing and the simulation. The report mentionned as examplary the Training and Simulation Center in Bückeburg where several nations co-operate with industries (CAE, Eurocopter, Thales) in a PPP for training on the NH-90.

panels, there was an important exchange on the European External Action Service with Claude-France Arnould, Deputy Director General of the EU Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, and former Director General of the EU Military Staff, David Leakey. This discussion took place only hours after an agreement was reached in Madrid dictating the future of the EEAS. Roberto Gualtieri MEP and Elmar Brok MEP, who negotiated the breakthrough with HR Catherine Ashton in Madrid, both gave a personal record of the negotiations at the ESRT.

First National ESRT Security and Defence Conference in Warsaw The ESRT will hold its 1st National Security and Defence Conference in Warsaw, Poland on 28 October regarding the EU`s role as a comprehensive security actor. This conference has been initiated by Krzysztof Lisek MEP and the Polish National Parliament’s Foreign Affairs Committee. High ranking personalities from Poland, the Brussels Institutions and other European countries, including industry representatives, will contribute to this conference in the premises of the Sejm. For more information on ESRT activities: www.security-round-table.eu

SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEWS

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation NATO and Russia discuss ways to deepen military-to-military cooperation On 24 July 2010, the Chairman of the NATO Military Committee, Admiral Giampolo Di Paola met in Moscow with the Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, Army General Nikolay Makarov, and his staff. The two day visit was mainly focused on discussing the implementation of NATO-Russia military-to-military cooperation in the framework of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). During the meeting at the Ministry of Defence, General Makarov and Admiral Di Paola

chaired by the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, and the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moon, brought together Foreign Ministers and senior representatives of more than 70 nations, international and regional organisations and financial institutions. In the meantime the Dutch − after four years in operations, in which they lost 24 soldiers − handed over command during a ceremony on 1 August to American and Australian forces. The Dutch contingent will be replaced by U.S., Australian, Slovakian and Singaporean soldiers. As an ISAF spokesman said, NATO will remain its current capabilities, especially for combat units, training and reconstruction. Since the out set of the mission which has cost, 4,1 Bn Euro, the Dutch approach, nicknamed “3D” which stands for development, diplomacy and defence, has often been cited as exemplary.

North Atlantic Council encourages Bosnia and Herzegovina to step up reform process

discussed the achievements of the NRC Military Work Plan for 2010 in the areas of logistics, combating terrorism, search and rescue at sea and counter-piracy. They also discussed the development of the NRC Military Work Plan for 2011, including several potential areas where the military cooperation can be deepened through concrete activities, such as improved cooperation in Afghanistan and counter-IED.

On 14 July, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Sven Alkalaj and Mr. Selmo Cikotic, met with the Secretary General at the NATO Headquarters. The Ministers also had a meeting with the North Atlantic Council, in order to discuss the completion of the first cycle of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s Individual Partnership Action Plan (IPAP). During the discussion, Allies congratulated Bosnia and Herzegovina for the progress achieved in cooperation with NATO, but they also reiterated the decision taken by

NATO supports roadmap for transition to Afghan security leadership On 20 July, the NATO Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, took part in the International Conference on Afghanistan in Kabul where the Afghan government presented its programme for transition to Afghan responsibility and ownership. As part of this process, the Afghan government and the international community, including NATO, endorsed a joint framework for transition to Afghan security leadership. The process of transition, or “Inteqal” in Dari and Pashtu, will be based on mutually agreed criteria; it will be implemented gradually on the basis of a sober assessment of the political and security situation to ensure it is irreversible. Building on commitments made at the International Conference on Afghanistan in London in January 2010, the Kabul Conference,

NATO Foreign Ministers, that a Membership Action Plan (MAP) will be granted to Bosnia and Herzegovina only when the defence property issue is resolved. Allies reiterated that MAP will be granted as soon as all immovable defence properties identified as necessary for future defence purposes have been officially registered as the state property of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for use by the Bosnia and Herzegovina Ministry of Defence.

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NATO missile defence capability passes key tests On 19 July, the Head of the NATO theatre missile defence Programme, General Alessandro Pera, announced that NATO’s first ever theatre missile defence capability had passed key tests, and that it is on schedule to be available to NATO commanders at the end of 2010. According to the Head of programme, NATO will then have – for the first time – a capability to link national sensors and shooters into a real-time missile defence capability. During the Dutch Air Force Joint Project Optic Windmill 2010 exercise, which concluded on 16 July, the NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defence (ALTBMD) Programme underwent a series of important tests, prior to its handover to NATO commanders. During the exercise the missile defence command and control system that NATO has developed was linked with both real and simulated sensors and shooters, to practice operations to counter simulated threats. The Programme has already delivered an interim capability (InCa Step 1), which allows commanders to plan a theatre missile defence battle. At the end of this year, the capability will be significantly upgraded and will add a realtime situational awareness capability (InCa Step 2). Prior to the handover of the capability, all InCa components – including missile defence sensors and shooters from NATO Nations – will be linked in an ‘ensemble’ test in December.

NATO Secretary General meets with newly elected German President Christian Wulff On 8 July, the newly elected President of Germany H.E. Christian Wulff visited the NATO Headquarters and met with the Secretary General. Their discussion focused on the development of the new Strategic Concept, to be adopted at the upcoming summit in Lisbon, NATO reform and the Alliance’s engagement in Afghanistan.

AGS without Denmark On 22 June, the NATO Secretary General commented on the announcement by the Danish Government to withdraw from the NATO Alliance Ground Surveillance System (AGS) project. He said that he “strongly regrets this decision.” He added that AGS is designed to make soldiers from all NATO countries safer and more effective when they are deployed on operations and that “Denmark’s withdrawal from the program sends the wrong signal to our forces and to other Allies.”

Fight Against Improvised Explosive Devices: the establishment of the C-IED Centre of Excellence During a signing ceremony on June 24 at the Headquarters, Supreme Allied Command Transformation (HQ SACT), the Counter Improvised Explosive Device Centre of Excellence (CIED COE) was officially established by a Memorandum of Understanding. The C-IED Centre will be located at the Engineer School Military Base in Hoyo de Manzanares, Madrid and especially aims to concentrate on the areas of defeating the system, the technological side of defeating the device and in the education and training of experts. The Centre of Excellence will become a multinational reference point in the fight against IEDs and seeks to provide this service to Alliance and Partner Nations. In order to meet this goal, the COE will provide an intervention against asymmetric challenges based on the Comprehensive Approach (CA) using a wide spectrum of civilian and military resources. The COE will also encourage practical cooperation with industry, the field of specialised investigation, the principle Allied bodies and other actors on the world stage, in particular the EU the UN and other Partners and the Mediterranean Dialogue Initiative. Spain is the framework nation and will receive support from Germany, France, Hungary, the Netherlands, Portugal, Romania and Turkey.

SECURITY AND DEFENCE NEWS

NATO’s role in energy security NATO leaders recognize that the disruption of the flow of vital resources could affect Alliance security interests. At the Bucharest Summit in April 2008, the Allies noted a report on “NATO’s Role in Energy Security,” which identifies guiding principles and outlines options and recommendations for further activities. These were reiterated at the Strasbourg-Kehl Summit in April 2009. The report identified the five following key areas where NATO can provide added value: - information and intelligence fusion and sharing; - projecting stability; - advancing international and regional cooperation; - supporting consequence management; and - supporting the protection of critical infrastructure. Consultations started after the Bucharest Summit regarding the depth and range of NATO’s involvement in this issue. Meanwhile, a number of practical programmes both within the Alliance and with NATO’s Partner countries are ongoing, alongside workshops and research projects. Work in practice Official discussions on this topic take place in the North Atlantic Council, NATO’s top political decision-making body. Concrete initiatives are underway. NATO members have supported a number of workshops and forums addressing this topic. Through Operation Active Endeavour, NATO maritime forces have been maintaining security for key resource routes in the Mediterranean. Allies also cooperate with Partner countries and relevant experts through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI)NATO’s Science for Peace and Security Programme and other frameworks. Maritime operations support Some 65 per cent of the oil and natural gas consumed in Western Europe passes through the Mediterranean each year, with major pipelines connecting Libya to Italy and Morocco to Spain. NATO ships have been patrolling in the Eastern Mediterranean monitoring shipping to detect and deter terrorist activity as part of Operation Active Endeavour since October 2001. The operation has since been extended to cover the Straits of Gibraltar and the entire Mediterranean, providing escorts to non-military shipping and conducting compliant boarding of suspicious vessels. NATO ships also systematically carry out preparatory route surveys in “choke” points (formed by narrow waterways and straits) as well as important passages and harbours throughout the Mediterranean.

Research projects and workshops The Advanced Research Workshop on energy security issues in Vilnius, October 2009, was supported by the Science for Peace and Security (SPS) programme. The workshop brought together numerous policy makers and advisors to discuss European energy security and supply, and to address Lithuanian energy security following the closure of the Ignalina nuclear plant. Under the multi-year SPS project on “Sahara Trade Winds to Hydrogen”, NATO supports cooperation between NATO and Mediterranean Dialogue countries, including Morocco and Mauritania. The aim is to develop cutting-edge hydrogen technology to store and transport renewable energy from wind turbines, in this way improving the capabilities of the energy expert community in these countries. Another multi-year SPS project deals with “Seismic Hazard and Risk Assessment for Southern Caucasus-Eastern Turkey Energy Corridors”. It involves scientists from Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan, who aim to assess the seismic risks and their monitoring along two vital energy supply lines, the Baku-Ceyhan crude oil pipeline and the Baku-Erzurum natural gas pipeline. Cooperation with Partner Countries Due to overlapping security concerns, cooperative activities with partner countries often impact on energy security issues. The main cooperative frameworks are the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), although bilateral arrangements also exist. Areas such as defence reform, critical infrastructure protection, counter-terrorism cooperation, scientific developments and environmental protection may all impact on resource security.

NATO cooperation with Pakistan NATO and Pakistan have significantly expanded political dialogue and practical cooperation in recent years, in particular with regard to the shared objective of bringing security and stability to Afghanistan. With NATO leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), Afghanistan is an important focus of cooperation At NATO’s summit meeting in Strasbourg and Kehl in April 2009, Allied leaders pledged “to reinforce our cooperation with all Afghanistan’s neighbours, especially Pakistan.” NATO-Pakistan relations go beyond the Alliance’s mission in Afghanistan. NATO and Pakistan have developed regular exchanges at various levels. NATO has agreed to open selected training and education courses to Pakistani officers. Such interactions provide opportunities to support regional stability and the fight against terrorism. NATO also aims at

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multiplying the interaction with parliamentarians, opinion leaders and the civil society at large to enlist support for NATO’s policies in the fight against terrorism. Pakistan’s support for the efforts of NATO and the international community in Afghanistan remains crucial for the success of the mission there. Instability, extremism and terrorism in Afghanistan pose a threat to Pakistan, as well as to the wider international community. The growing NATO-Pakistan military-to-military cooperation in the context of Afghanistan is reflected in the work of a tripartite Commission, a joint forum on military and security issues which brings together representatives from the NATO-led ISAF operation, Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Tripartite Commission meets regularly at various levels and is used to exchange views, as well as to discuss security matters of mutual concern. Its four main areas of cooperation are intelligence sharing, border security, countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and initiatives relating to information operations. A joint Afghan, ISAF and Pakistani intelligence centre was opened in Kabul in January 2007 to improve coordination within the Tripartite Commission.

New Director General of the International Military Staff at NATO HQ The new Director General of the IMS, Lieutenant General Jürgen Bornemann of the German Army, toole up his new position on Monday, 2 August 2010. General Bornemann has served NATO for many years, including a period as Assistant Director Plans and Policy Division, International Military Staff. His latest post was also at NATO HQ, as the German Military Representative to NATO’s Military Committee and to the EU Military Committee, from 2008 until 2010.

The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) The Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Coordination Centre (EADRCC) is a focal point for coordinating disaster relief efforts among NATO member and partner countries. The Centre was created in 1998 by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) as one of the two basic elements of the

EAPC policy on “Enhanced Practical Cooperation in the Field of International Disaster Relief”.* The Centre has guided consequence management efforts in more than forty-five emergencies, including fighting floods and forest fires and dealing with the aftermath of earthquakes. Since 11 September 2001, the EADRCC has also been tasked with dealing with the consequences of CBRN incidents, including terrorist attacks. EADRCC’s main tasks The EADRCC’s main function is to coordinate the response of NATO and partner countries to natural or man-made disasters within the Euro-Atlantic area. The EADRCC forwards the request to NATO and partner countries, which respond by communicating their offers of assistance to the EADRCC and/or the stricken country.The Centre also functions as an informationsharing tool for NATO and partner countries on disaster assistance. It organizes seminars to discuss lessons learned from NATO-coordinated disaster response operations and exercises. The countries of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) were given direct access to the Centre. All tasks are performed in close cooperation with the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA), where as the EADRCC is designed as a regional coordination mechanism, supporting and complementing the United Nations in its efforts. Where is it located The Centre is part of the International Staff’s Operations Division located at NATO’s Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium and is staffed by up from NATO and partner countries and members of NATO’s International Staff. The Centre liaises closely with UN OCHA, the NATO Military Authorities (NMAs) and other relevant International Organizations (IOs). Regular major disaster exercises have been organized in different participating countries designed to practice procedures, provide training for local and international participants, build up interoperability skills and capabilities of the nonstanding Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU), and harness the experience and lessons learned for future operations. * The other element is the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response Unit (EADRU) − a nonstanding, multi-national force of civil and military elements, which can be deployed in the event of a major natural or man-made disaster in an EAPC country.