3 minute read
Russophobia: Myth or reality?
Commonly, Russophobia (or anti-Russian sentiment) is understood as a fear and/or dislike for Russia, Russians and/or Russian culture. Undeniably, in the West, widespread stereotypical clichés are used in reference to Russia and Russians.
They are familiar stereotypes generated before the collapse of the Soviet Union and part of the lexicon of anticommunist rhetoric during the antagonisms of the Cold War. Russians today see this as unwarranted prejudice. Russian nationalists and Kremlin apologists (including its acolytes in the West) equate Russophobia, among other negative dimensions, as being akin to anti-Semitism, giving it a universal dimension, just as the fascism label has. The Kremlin refuses to see the irony in this – postulated by the two to three million Jews who scrambled to leave the Soviet Union, for the “fascist” West, mostly because of anti-Semitism.
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A typical Russophobe, according to the Kremlin, is the well-familiar enemy of Russia, an ideological adversary for whom it’s possible to engender emotional opinions. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are well suited to fit this category. For a few generations now, the Russian leadership has been promoting the idea that these people have an inherent and irrational proclivity for Russophobia.
Thus the myth of Baltic Russophobia serves a distinct purpose in recent years and its use in Moscow’s propaganda arsenal has intensified. This is seen to be the Kremlin’s typical knee-jerk response each time the Balts caution the world about the swing toward autocracy of Vladimir Putin’s regime. Putin’s proxies in the West dismiss this as irrational hysteria by dyed-in-the-wool Russophobes.
fCanadian professor Paul Robinson gives this observation an academic spin: “Canadian attitudes towards Russia must be understood in the context of decades of Russophobic thinking. Stereotypes of Russia as authoritarian and imperialistic exert a powerful influence on how Canadian elites view the country (Russia). Sensible, dispassionate analysis is almost certainly lacking.” Robinson gives a scholarly reaffirmation of the Kremlin’s accusations in the Canadian context.
The Russophobia card has not just remained as a verbal accusation. When Canada sanctioned 30 Russian officials in 2017 under the Justice for Victims of Corrupt Foreign Officials Act, the Russian Foreign Ministry immediately retaliated. Their embassy in Ottawa stated that “a large number of of Canadian political actors pursuing a toxic, Russophobic agenda were blacklisted”.
Similarly, among other actions, Moscow officially banned from entry individual Estonian citizens in 2018, including three prominent journalists, on the grounds of “Russophobic activities or stances”. This was in direct retaliation for Estonia placing a direct ban on 49 Russian citizens involved in human rights abuses in Russia. Like Canada, Estonia thus enforces a law, known popularly as “Magnitsky” legislation, which has been adopted by numerous Western countries and supported by the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the OSCE, the permanent body formed from the Helsinki Accords of 1975.
The Kremlin has drawn a ludicrous moral equivalency between the West identifying someone’s actual personal involvement in violations of human rights, sometimes resulting in death, and those who have been perceived as having expressed criticism of the Kremlin, labelled by Moscow as “Russophobes”. The Russian Foreign Ministry publicly stated that “entry is forbidden for those on the list, notably ‘Russophobic’ politicians and public figures’, individuals who have opinions and attitudes perceived to be critical of the Russian government. Russia’s ‘persona non grata’ criteria can be based on political viewpoints and doesn’t have to be suspicions of terrorism, possible espionage or other similar serious activities for which entry is usually barred.
Some Estonian citizens are also known to accept the Kremlin’s accusations about how widespread Russophobia has become in the country. Vladimir Iljaševits, United Leftist Party candidate for the Estonian parliament, head of the Russian Human Rights organization in Estonia and former KGB officer insisted that Estonia suffers from “total Russophobia”. “We aren’t talking about isolated incidents of Russophobia. This phenomenon is systemic, present throughout the country and society, from top to bottom.” One may then ask, “Does Russophobia, as identified by Moscow, have any legitimate substance? Is it justified to be used in the context that the Kremlin has chosen?”
(To be continued)
LAAS LEIVAT