The Rhodesia Settlement
As previous policies had failed anyway, we presented the new Conservative government, elected in May 1979, with an extremely risky plan, endorsed by Michael Palliser and his equally impressive deputy, a former submarine commander during the War, Sir Antony Duff. The new Foreign Secretary, Peter Carrington, and then the Prime Minister, were persuaded that the new Zimbabwe/Rhodesia constitution, which Margaret Thatcher subjected to forensic examination, did not represent real majority rule and that if we recognised the new regime, that would simply lead to an intensification of the war. Peter Carrington and David Harlech having helped to convince the Prime Minister that simply recognising Muzorewa was an option that could lead only to further and worse problems, it was agreed instead that we should insist on changes to the new constitution, convene a conference in which no party would be permitted to block progress and then arrange elections supervised by us, in which all parties would be invited to participate, following which Rhodesia would be declared legally independent. The intention was to show that, this time, we meant business, which we never really had before. Thatcher who, as she showed later in the Falklands, was a risk taker, liked the boldness of this plan and the astonishment with which it was greeted when presented to the Commonwealth leaders in Lusaka. When the Lancaster House Conference convened, we presented a constitution which, indisputably, did provide for majority role and did not accept any amendments to it. For the transition, we insisted on a British Governor with full executive and legislative powers. The only serious negotiations were over the cease-fire, which took place each morning with the Rhodesian commanders and in the afternoon with those of the guerrilla forces. Brigadier Gurdon of the Ministry of Defence came up with a plan to achieve separation of the forces and Mugabe’s military commander, Tongogara, proved far more interested in an agreement than his political master, as did Nkomo in his private meetings with us. But Mugabe’s intention was to string out the Conference indefinitely. Summoned to see the Prime Minister, Peter Carrington and I had to tell her that unless we took the extremely risky step of despatching the Governor to Rhodesia before a cease-fire had been agreed, the Conference would never reach a conclusion. The Conference ended apparently in failure, with Mugabe refusing to agree to anything and launching a viperish attack on us all. But we had befriended Fernando Honwana, the representative of President Samora Machel of Mozambique, who desperately needed an end to the war that had devastated his country. Fernando telephoned President Machel, who told Mugabe to sign the agreement or else he would receive no further 2
