Field Notes Volume XI

Field Notes #11

Field Notes #11

Land Acknowledgement

As geographers seeking to explore and understand space and place it is imperative that we prioritize a critical and ethical approach to the world and our place within it. With that in mind, we would like to acknowledge that this journal and the works within it were produced on Tiohtià:ke, the unceded territory of the Kanien’kehá:ka. We make this acknowledgment as a preliminary step towards taking action against colonial histories and their ongoing effects, especially given our discipline’s colonial past.

Letter From the Editors-In-Chief

Dear Readers,

It has been an honour leading the 11th edition of Field Notes. The opportunity to thoughtfully assess and curate this year’s complicated and diverse works was an enlightening process. We are proud of the team of editors and writers who contributed to making this year’s journal what it is, and are excited to share the outstanding work.

Geography is an education for life. In today’s age of uncertainty and transformation, learning through geography – whether through a classroom setting or through inthe-field travel and expeditions – crucially shapes socially and environmentally sensitive, better informed, and responsible individuals.

Through Field Notes, we are proud to publish the diverse work of the talented and creative undergraduate students in the department. This year’s edition showcases eleven papers that truly epitomize the interdisciplinarity of the program. Geography is a study of people, places, and the ways that people interact with those places. The topics, techniques, and perspectives displayed in each paper demonstrate the ways that social sciences, humanities, and physical sciences interact with one another to create a deeper geographic understanding.

We would like to issue a big thank you to our authors and editors whose hard work brought this year’s edition to life. Thanks especially to the vision of our outstanding graphic designer, Ankiné Apardian. Additionally, we would like to thank MUGS and AUS, without whom this year’s edition wouldn’t be possible. Lastly, we are especially grateful to our readers for supporting Field Notes.

Cheers!

Lilly Lecanu-Fayet and Olivia Kennedy Editors-In-Chief

Index

The Pulp and Paper Industry Cluster of the St-Maurice Valley

Zacharie Magnan

Plex Housing as the Montreal Model

Madeleine Anderson

Tewin, a Contested Suburb: Complexities of Incorporating Reconciliation into Urban Planning

Cat Carkner

Women in the Modern Suburb: A Comparison of Albany, California and San Francisco, California

Ailish McGiffin

Dependent Development and Subalternity in Puerto Rico: Why Hurricane Fiona was Worse than Expected

Max Garcia

05 1 3 23 3 1 39

Geospatial Analysis of Water Treatment Plant Vulnerability to Storm Surge-Induced Flooding and Proposed Adaptive Strategies in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Violet Massie-Vereker

Charter City and its “Birthplace” - Hong Kong: Do Charter Cities Worsen Inequality Instead of Alleviating Poverty?

Chester Chau

The Life and Death of the MUGS Lounge: A Brief History of MUGS Lounge BH305 and Its Move

MUGS Executive Board

Meta-Analysis on the Study of Entomophagy

Isabella Pannu

Ontology of a United Geography

Abbi Baran

5 1 69 77 87 95

The Pulp and Paper Industry Cluster of the St-Maurice Valley

Zacharie Magnan

Abstract

This article examines the history and evolution of the pulp and paper industry in the St-Maurice region of Quebec, from the beginning of the 20th century to the 1990s. Using historical archives, government data, and company reports, the article explores the organization of the industry, labor relations, and the impact of the industry on the region. The piece shows that the industry was an important driver of development for the province of Quebec, with the St-Maurice Valley being an excellent location to develop a pulp mill due to the abundance of a low grade essence used in the production of newspapers. The industry was organized around the subcontractor system, with big entrepreneurs buying logs from small units

of peasant-lumberjack groups dispersed over a large territory. The article highlights the importance of the St-Maurice River as the main method of transportation of the wood that was destined to become paper, and the location of the paper and pulp factories downstream of the river. The article also explores the impact of the industry on labor relations and the difficulty of creating workers’ unions in a highly fragmented labor market. The article concludes by examining the collapse of the industry in the 1990s and its impact on the region.

Keywords: Pulp and paper industry, St-Maurice region, labor relations, subcontractor system, Quebec.

Introduction

The pulp and paper industry has been an important driver of development for the province of Québec along with propel interest over the province’s hydroelectric potential. In the 19th century,the pulp and paper industry was first driven by a protected trade between the British empire and its colonies that used its lumber to build ships and sustain war efforts against France during the Napoleonic wars. After Britain decided to end this special monopoly system, The province was forced to compete on the free market with other European nations such as Norway and Sweden who were also important lumber exporters in Europe. Due to these changes the province turned to the United States which was developing demand for lumber and its by-products in the second half of the 19th century.

The St-Maurice Valley was an excellent location to develop a pulp mill because of the poor quality of the wood found in the region caused by the clear cuts of the past. This lumber, however, was considered perfect to sustain the insatiable demand for paper, especially newspapers at the turn of the century.1 It was at this point that the first pulp mill was erected on the St-Maurice near Grand’mère, backed by new technology and investments from the United States. This was the beginning of a region changing industry that went on to prosper until the 21st century. In this piece, I will explore the different facets of the industry using historic data and company reports compiled by the work of numerous local historians and newspapers. The organization of the industry, labour relations and the overall evolution of the industry during the period of interest from the start of the 20th century to the 1990s. We will report our main findings in the conclusion following our analysis of the death of the industry and its impact on the region.

Methodology

The data sources I chose to write this article mostly consisted of historical archives and government data on the exploitation of the forest and the revenues it brought back to the province. Company reports from the Consolidated paper company, representing almost all mills in the St-Maurice region from 1933 give us insight into the possessions and investments made in the region. It is also important to note that these sources are quite specific only providing data for a few variables from specific years or groups of years. Thus, it was hard to find some continuity in the records given the fragmentation and the age of the data. Specific numbers for the rentability of specific pulp mills do not seem to be readily available.

On the other hand, I analyzed many scholarly articles relating to the economic development of the province of Québec at the turn of the 20th century specifically about the St-Maurice region. Many tend to focus on the macro-level of analysis of the industry only describing the larger-scale movements taken by the industry rather than explaining its mode of operation and interaction between the different levels of production. Most describe the level of production is easily the harvesting of the resources and the floating of “pitounes”2 down the rivers of the basin in direction of the pulp mills at different locations along the river. To complete my analysis I used one of the last reports from Emploi-Québec in which the office made an analysis of the current situation in the industry when it was on the verge of collapse in 2000. It will be interesting to compare the state and relevance of the economic cluster from one end of the 20th century to the other.

1 René Hardy, “L’exploitation forestière dans l’histoire du Québec et de la Mauricie,” Histoire Québec 6, no. 3 (2001): 6–7.

2 Refers to a certain type of logs the lumberjacks were dumping in the river roughly about 4 feet long. ONF, “Bûcherons de la Manouane,” video, 1962

The factories

There is a long way to travel from the lumberjack camp to the paper that would be printed with the New York Times. The locational organization of the industrial cluster can be defined by the different rivers and lakes that were a part of the St-Maurice basin, (see Figure 1). The paper and pulp factories were dispersed downstream of the St-Maurice River, the major stream that connected all the other rivers and the main method of transportation of the wood that was destined to become paper. On nearly every river upstream, the provincial government gave away concessions that could be used by owners that met the conditions for an operating permit. The bosses of these concessions hired lumberjacks to go work all winter which was usually about 4 months where they would be paid according to their personal production after they were allocated a site by the foreman. Usually, these men were farmers, factory workers or even Indigenous peoples from the region. Any person, but predominantly men, who wished to make a good amount of money without any distractions such as Alcohol, Women etc would sign up.3 This system is what is called the subcontractor system.4 Big entrepreneurs bought logs from small units of peasant-lumberjack groups dispersed over a big territory. Most logging operations were very small in size but still accounted for a large part of the provincial production. More than 50% of the logs destined for the pulp industry came

from the St-Maurice valley in 1905.5 The fragmentation of the labour permitted the big entrepreneurs to control the prices they paid the workers to a minimum creating a system that kept French-Canadian labour cheap relative to other groups, which was very common at the time. This part of the industry offered high mobility and freedom for the labourers since they were paid as per their production. It is also important to note that this disorganization made the creation of workers’ unions very difficult and the lumberjacks only started to regroup in 1930 under the Catholic cultivators union to fight for better conditions.6

Conveying the ressource

government enacted an embargo on the exportation of pulp, forcing the exportation of a finished product. The US, which was facing an enourmous rise in demand for newspapers introduced the underwood act in 1913 effectively waiving custom taxes on paper. This stimulated production like never before and the industry saw tremendous growth in the following years.8

Conclusion

The rise and fall of the St-Maurice industrial cluster tells the story of the specialization of a region. The terrain, the resources and the people were perfect for the creation of a competitive pulp and paper cluster. We saw the mode of operation of both facets of production. The sub-contraction model of the extraction of the resource led to the emergence of a traditional Fordist mode of accumulation in the actual factories. It goes without saying that this would have never happened without the considerable financial infusions from rich American capital that was pivotal in the success of this cluster for almost a hundred years.

3 C.-A.

Travailleurs Forestiers En Mauricie Au XIXe Siècle” (thesis, Université du Québec, Trois-Rivière, 1983).

4 B. Gauthier, “La sous-traitance et l’exploitation forestière en Mauricie (1850-1875),” Material Culture Review 13 (1981).

5 G. Gaudreau, “L’exploitation des forêts publiques au Québec (1874-1905) transition et nouvel essor,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 42, no. 1 (1988): 3–26.

6 C.-A. Fortin, “Les Travailleurs Forestiers En Mauricie Au XIXe Siècle” (thesis, Université du Québec, Trois-Rivière, 1983).

7 C. Bellavance, N. Brouillette, and P. Lanthier, “Financement et industrie en Mauricie, 1900-1950,” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 40, no. 1 (1986): 29–50.

As the ice melts and logs start running down the river and the ramps built to avoid the dangerous sections of the river. The wood slowly floats down to the pulp mills established at different levels, the Laurentides Pulp Co. in Grand’Mère, the Belgo in Shawinigan Falls and the Wayagamack in Trois-Rivières are examples of these different companies that established themselves at the beginning of the century. These companies bought the logs from the concession owners mentioned earlier and established their production in two parts. Since the mill needs electricity to function the mills also worked as hydroelectric plants harnessing the power from the river to power the heavy machinery inside the factories. The factories were also located close to railway stations or had owners influential enough to bring the rail directly next to their operation center. It is also less costly for the companies to transform the pulp directly inside the complex and ship a finished product out to the printing centers.7

This whole system could not have been made possible without the intervention of the Québec government. In the early 1910s, the factories were only producing pulp and were exporting it to Europe and the US to be transformed into paper. Seeing that they were missing out on a lot of revenue, the

The pulp and paper industry of the St-Maurice Valley gave way to prosperous times for the region. Over time, the employees who were just considered labourers were considered professionals and were given many benefits and rewards for working lifelong careers at the mills.9 My Grandparents were given a house where they paid a very low rent until they bought it for a reasonable price from the company at retirement. This Fordist model of industrial activity came into a drastic wake-up call in the 1980s-1990s, the markets were becoming more and more open to international competition and the Consolidated Paper company which had bought out the other mills of the region in the 1930s was thrown into crisis. The logs were still quite valuable but it was becoming more and more unprofitable to transform the pulp into paper at the same location. Environmental groups were also becoming evermore concerned with the health of the St-Maurice river from the centuries of log transportation and pushed for a ban on the activity. Ultimately, the factory assets went to the Consolidated Abitibi company which decided to close down many of the region’s mills leaving only the most profitable such as the Laurentide paper mill who was still producing high-end paper.10 In 1996 the last pitounes floated on the St-Maurice. Trucks now deliver the logs driving on the 155 road from the La Tuque area.

I had some challenges with the redaction of this paper, first sources are somewhat sparse especially in terms of raw economic data on the production and rentability of the pulp industry, especially in the early 1900s. The classification is also messy, and figuring out what factories were actually owned by the same companies or when they changed names made the task more tedious than anticipated. I think that future research trying to describe this particular industrial cluster would probably be pertinent since most of the literature is written by historians and an economist’s point of view could be beneficial to understand the trends in industrial activities of the St-Maurice.

9 Ibid

8 V. Bourgeois, “La capitale mondiale du papier journal,” Cap-auxDiamants 98 (2009): 19–21.

10 François Hallé, Profil de l’industrie pâtes et papiers en Mauricie François Hallé... (Trois-Rivières: Emploi-Québec Mauricie, 2002).

Fortin, “Les

References

Bellavance, Claude, Normand Brouillette, and Paul Lanthier. “Financement et industrie en Mauricie, 1900-1950.” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 40, no. 1 (1986): 29-50. doi:10.7202/304423ar. Accessed March 29, 2023. https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/haf/1986-v40-n1-haf2342/304423ar. pdf?fbclid=IwAR2V_mkLsASXDO0C__RWPGeU7EquZrXxWalLCX90p-oA78G7sV_wBvMKyBU.

Bourgeois, Vincent. “La capitale mondiale du papier journal.” Cap-aux-Diamants 98 (2009): 19-21. Accessed March 29, 2023. https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ cd/2009-n98-cd1044827/6368ac/.

“Bûcherons de la Manouane.” 1962. YouTube video, 23:47. Canada: ONF. Accessed April 10, 2022. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w4DJAB5kGuo&fbclid=IwAR3zdl7gUqEAy5njxxWVChkah9bNK1b2qxmXtek8QVgq1FKFQeZM5XlcKok

Consolidated Paper Corporation Limited. “First Annual Report of Consolidated Paper Corporation Limited and its Subsidiaries.” 1933. Accessed March 29, 2023. https://digital. library.mcgill.ca/hrcorpreports/pdfs/C/Consolidated_Paper_Corporation_Ltd_1933. pdf?fbclid=IwAR06ikD_sZN-hgu9fcNqmJHbTcr0rz_iS-I57pDvXkqGatn9e4GWfVv8nck.

Fortin, Claude-André. “Les Travailleurs Forestiers En Mauricie Au XIXe Siècle.” PhD diss., Université du Québec, Trois-Rivières, 1983. Accessed March 29, 2023. https://depot-e.uqtr.ca/ id/eprint/6348/1/000325838.pdf.

Gaudreau, Guy. “L’exploitation des forêts publiques au Québec (1874-1905) : transition et nouvel essor.” Revue d’histoire de l’Amérique française 42, no. 1 (1988): 3-26. doi:10.7202/304648ar. Accessed March 29, 2023. https://www.erudit.org/fr/revues/ haf/1988-v42-n1-haf2382/304

Gauthier, Benoit. “La sous-traitance et l’exploitation forestière en Mauricie (1850-1875).” Material Culture Review 13 (1981). Accessed March 29, 2023. https://journals.lib.unb.ca/index. php/MCR/article/view/17080.

Hallé, François. Profil de l’industrie pâtes et papiers en Mauricie François Hallé.... Trois-Rivières: Emploi-Québec Mauricie, 2002. Accessed March 29, 2023. https://collections. banq.qc.ca/ark:/52327/50643.

Hardy, René “L’exploitation forestière dans l’histoire du Québec et de la Mauricie”. Histoire Québec 6, no. 3 (2001) : 6–7. Accessed March 29, 2023. https://www.erudit.org/en/journals/ hq/2001-v6-n3-hq1057791/11343ac/

Annex 3.

Evolution of the Provincial part of logging in the Mauricie Region (%)

* calculated by dividing the percentage of cutting rights by the area percentage. Source: Rapport du commissaire des terres de la couronnes de la province de Québec

Annex 1.

Hydrographic basin of the St-Maurice

(Groupe de recherche sur la Mauricie)

Annex 2. Concessions for the exploitation of the forest (1872-1874)

(Groupe de recherche sur la Mauricie)

Plex Housing as the Montreal Model

Madeleine Anderson

Abstract

Montreal’s triplexes are an emblem of the city’s architectural style, contributing to the diverse, dense, and dynamic character of the city. Built mainly in the late 19th century, plexes have stood the test of time as an efficient yet comfortable housing option. The vertically stacked apartments foster rental dynamics which support upward mobility, offering an affordable housing solution which promotes diversity. Additionally, plexes are designed for density at the human scale: their external staircases make individual units ground-oriented and provide a sense of independence while also fostering dense and highly walkable neighbourhoods. In an increasingly expensive and inaccessible

housing market, the Montreal plex housing model is a form which could pose innovative and sustainable solutions for the densification of other cities.

Triplex and 6-plex for sale in Montreal’s Mile End neighbourhood, Madeleine Anderson, April 2022.

Along with Habitat 67, the Notre Dame Basilica, and the Olympic stadium, Montreal’s rows of unique plex apartments have become an emblem of the city’s architectural style. The outdoor staircases that climb, coil and curve along Montreal’s residential streets give the city a truly unique flair, making it stand out among other North American cities. Built most intensely in the late 19th century, the dwelling style has stood the test of time, despite increasing trends towards suburbanization or high-rise apartment buildings seen in other cities. In an increasingly expensive and inaccessible housing market, the Montreal plex housing model is a form which could pose innovative and sustainable solutions for the densification of other cities.

The inspiration for this paper comes from my own third floor triplex apartment in the Mile End, which I adore living in for both the apartment itself as well as the energy of the neighbourhood. Love them or hate them, the plexes are a quintessential experience as a renter in Montreal, and their history and influences make them a truly Montrealspecific architectural phenomenon.

What is a Plex?

The term plex is derived from the suffix of the types of multi-family stacked housing most common in Montreal; duplexes having two units, triplexes having three units, and multiplexes having generally four or six units, though many variations exist across the city. The two- or three-story buildings typically contain one apartment per story and those with three or more units have a distinct visual style due to their external staircases. The standard triplex has separate entrances for each unit; the bottom floor having access from the street, the second floor being accessible from an external staircase onto a shared balcony with the third floor, and the third unit generally having a second, internal staircase leading to the top (Fig. 1 & 3). Plexes are built on modest residential lots, generally 20 to 30 feet wide1 and form continuous facades, often along entire blocks (Fig. 2 & 3). By stacking units and sharing a wall with

neighbouring buildings, plex buildings are able to efficiently conserve heat in the winter months, as heat is distributed upwards and not lost to the outside.2 Typically, units are laid out with bedrooms and living spaces in the front (street side), with the kitchen and laundry or other utility areas in the back, as well as access to a back balcony (Fig. 1). At the back, a narrow alleyway serves the rear of the buildings, where small backyards, parking spaces, or storage sheds can often be found. In addition to being energy-efficient, the openings at the front and rear of the units allows for optimal light distribution and through air flow, providing relief in the hot summer months. The form of the Montreal plex is unique for a variety of reasons; its external staircases and individual entrances to each unit, as well as the practice of vertical stacking (as opposed to traditional British townhouses). The social and economic backdrop in which these versatile buildings were constructed, as discussed below, ultimately shaped their iconic form.

How did Plex Housing Become so Ubiquitous in Montreal?

The largest building cycle of Montreal’s plexes took place in the late 19th century. Due to intense industrialization and urbanization, Montreal’s population almost tripled between 1870 and 1900.3 One or two large factories opened every year between 1842 and 1855,4 and consequently the housing stock grew from 12,000 to 65,000 households between

1 Sandrine Rastello, “The Plexes of Montreal Make Room for Change,” Bloomberg Citylab, August 4, 2021, https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-08-04/ looking-to-rent-in-montreal-get-to-know-the-plex

2 Anne-Lise Charroy, “Montreal’s Triplexes: The ‘Plex,’” Dynamic Cities Project, accessed March 23, 2023, http://dynamiccities. org/inspirations; Andrea Kennedy, “Montreal’s Duplexes and Triplexes,” The Fifth Column 10, no. 4 (2002): 64–69.

3 Jason Gilliland and Sherry Olson, “Claims on Housing Space in Nineteenth-Century Montreal,” Urban History Review / Revue d’histoire Urbaine 26, no. 2 (1998): 3–16; Kennedy, “Montreal’s Duplexes and Triplexes.”

4 David B. Hanna, The Layered City: A Revolution in Housing in Mid-Nineteenth-Century Montreal, Partage de l’espace, no. 6 (Montreal: Dept. of Geography, McGill University, 1986).

1860 and 1900.5 Additionally, the need for affordable housing for the working class was intensified by several fires which wiped out large swaths of the existing housing stock: of the recorded housing in 1950, 19% was wiped out by fire.6 Following the Great Fire of 1952, the city prohibited wood construction.7 Thus, not only was the existing housing stock depleted, but the supply and feasibility of affordable housing was constrained, as new laws required housing be built with more expensive materials, such as stone or brick.

Multi-family housing was a way in which more expensive and fire-safe housing could be affordable to working class families. Additionally, the vast majority of Montreal workers in the late 19th to early 20th centuries walked to work, making urban sprawl an unfeasible option. The stacked dwelling thus became an obvious solution to the intense need for housing in Montreal at this time.

The plex’s unique exterior staircase was derived from a variety of cultural phenomena. It allowed for multiple stacked units to have their own entrances from the outside and for each unit to have its own street address. Separate entrances, along with balconies and platforms were favourable for families who moved from the countryside into the city, as they were reminiscent of the porches on their country homes.8 This also allowed residents to live in a dense urban environment while retaining a sense of privacy and independence. The external staircase was inspired by older duplex houses in Quebec,

which were freestanding houses, but which featured an outdoor staircase which allowed upstairs tenants to have a separate entrance from the downstairs. Another reason for the separate entrances was the influence of the catholic church; it was frowned upon that multiple households should share a common entrance, because any number of sinful activities could happen in these liminal, unsupervised spaces.9

More practically, the external staircase saved money on utility costs, as it resulted in one less interior space that required heating. The city also implemented building setback rules, which required that the foundations of buildings be a certain distance from the sidewalk, for sanitation and crowding reasons. This led to builders opting to put staircases on the outside, to optimize living space without breaking any building codes.

neighbourhoods a distinctly French flair, the vast majority of plexes were built with a flat roof, maximizing space and cost efficiency.

The Social Dynamics of Plex Housing

6 Hanna, The Layered City

7 Paul-André Linteau and Peter McCambridge, The History of Montréal: The Story of Great North American City (Monteal, UNITED STATES: Baraka Books, 2013), http://ebookcentral. proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=1162758

8 Kennedy, “Montreal’s Duplexes and Triplexes.”

9 Rastello, “The Plexes of Montreal Make Room for Change.”

10 Hanna, The Layered City

11 Kennedy, “Montreal’s Duplexes and Triplexes.”

12 Kennedy.

Though plex buildings share the recognizable features previously mentioned – stacked units, outdoor staircases, narrow but deep lots, back lane access – there is great variation of layout, materials, and exterior ornamentation across the city. The blocks are highly customizable, with some having larger two-story units up top to accommodate larger families, or different creative staircase layouts and shared balconies. These buildings were mostly not built en masse by large companies (though some larger scale actors were involved10), rather by small builders who took inspiration from each other and put their own flare into the projects. Thus, despite the residential and even suburban applications of this housing type, much variation among buildings exists, creating idiosyncrasies which “set Montreal’s townhouses apart from their European counterparts”.11 The wealthier British-inspired townhouses were often differentiated with flamboyant facades and different types of cladding, such as red brick, glazed brick, or Greystone, whereas the French workingclass residences were “usually quite austere, with dormer windows and cornice details to provide some decorations on the mansard roof”.12 While the mansard roof gave certain

At the time in which plex construction peaked, Montreal was largely divided between French, English, and Irish origins, with few common institutions. According to David Hanna (1986), “ethnic division fostered a mutually disadvantageous competition”,13 keeping wages low and characterizing Montreal as a manufacturing city. Additionally, the ownership dynamics of the plexes reflected the hierarchical class structure in Montreal. Oftentimes one family would own the entire building and rent out the other units. In some duplexes, a smaller unit in the semi-basement would be an affordable option for low-wage workers, while the wealthier owners of the building lived up top. In triplexes, the owners might occupy the bottom floor, and leave the treacherous outdoor stairs to the tenants up top. This created a physical class hierarchy within Montreal’s streets, but also meant that people of various classes and occupations lived together in close proximity, a recipe for diversity. The practice of tenants and landlords living in the same building persists today, though it is now increasingly common for entire buildings to be rented by a landlord who owns multiple buildings, or for the ownership of plex buildings to split up in condominium style.

Plexes also fostered diversity by providing affordable houses for recent immigrants and becoming a space of social mobility. Originally, the majority of the plexes were owned by wealthier English and FrenchCanadian families who lived in one of the units, and the other units were rented out to newer immigrants, often of Italian and Lebanese origin. But when the original owners opted to relocate to single-family homes in the suburbs, this opened the opportunity for those Italian and Lebanese renters to own buildings and provide rental housing to a new wave of migrants to the

city.14 In addition to the rental dynamics, plexes offer a form of high-density affordable housing designed at the human scale; they are ground-oriented and provide a sense of space and independence while enabling a high level of walkability and variability. In many cases, shops and establishments can occupy the ground floor, enriching neighbourhoods and promoting local businesses. Thus, the architectural form of the multiplex and the small-scale rental dynamics it fosters, has provided a vessel through which Montreal has been able to maintain its diverse, dense, and dynamic character for over 150 years.

The Plex in the 21st Century

Despite the classic triplex being a recognizable symbol of Montreal’s urban landscape and character, they were not granted any sort of special protection. In 1945, “the outdoor staircases were seen as unsightly” and a by-law was passed prohibiting them which initiated a new wave of apartment block and high-rise construction that lasted until the by-law was repealed in 1970.15 Without sufficient protection, the original stock of downtown townhouses is being swept away to make room for new developments.16 However, despite some new trends in housing, plexes remain the most common housing type in Montreal, especially in trendy central districts such as the Plateau and Little Italy (Fig. 5). The cultural and economic benefits of plexes are continuously seen, making maintenance and renovation of older buildings as well as the construction of new, modern multiplex housing an attractive option. In 1997, the Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation conducted research on the viability of plex

13 Hanna, The Layered City

14 Konrad Yakabuski, “Triplexes Help Keep City Vibrant,” The Globe and Mail February 20, 2004, https://www.theglobeandmail.com/ real-estate/triplexes-help-keep-city-vibrant/article994172/; Hanna, The Layered City

15 Yakabuski, “Triplexes Help Keep City Vibrant.”

16 Kennedy, “Montreal’s Duplexes and Triplexes.”

5 Gilliland and Olson, “Claims on Housing Space in NineteenthCentury Montreal.”

housing revitalization projects, finding that the “renewal of plex housing as a viable model is not only possible, it is also highly desirable, due to its many social, economic, environmental and sustainable development benefits”.17 With the demands for space per person in apartments increasing over the decades, many triplex buildings have been renovated and remodelled to increase space, or to simply update the facilities. The signs of this kind of update can be seen in my own triplex apartment, where the original walls were knocked down to create a larger, open living room where there was once a corridor connecting many smaller rooms. Additionally, examples of modern multiplex projects fit seamlessly with the pre-existing stock of plexes and are a viable model for new residential development (Fig. 7).

The Montreal Model could thus also be considered as a solution for other cities in need of densification. With cities growing and the demand for housing increasing, densification is a favourable option to urban sprawl, which brings with it a host of economic, environmental, and even health problems. The triplex offers a medium density housing solution which can accommodate up to 350 persons per hectare,18 promoting social interaction and diversity while still retaining a sense of place and independence. For example, Figure 8 compares a standard Montreal triplex to a typical Vancouver lot. The triplex is medium density housing at the human scale: dense enough to be within walking distance from all necessary amenities and to have a lively neighbourhood culture, and dispersed enough that units can have their own front door, not needing elevators to reach your apartment.

17 Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC), “‘Plex’ Housing : A Renewed Tradition,” Research Highlight. Technical Series 01-102 (Ottawa, July 1, 2002), https://publications.gc.ca/ site/eng/408767/publication.html, 4.

18 Charroy, “Montreal’s Triplexes: The ‘Plex.’”

Figures 2 & 3. Typical block of triplex housing. (CMHC, 1997)

Figure 4.

A typical street of triplexes in Plateau Mont-Royal in 1962. By Erich Andres, United Images via Getty Images (Rastello, 2021)

Figure 1.

Drawing and layout of a classic Montreal Triplex. By Josh Kramer, Bloomberg CityLab (Rastello, 2021)

References

Broudehoux, A.-M. (2019). Montrealism or Montréalité? Understanding Montreal’s Unique Brand of Livability. In Community Livability (2nd ed., pp. 3–15). Routledge.

Canada Mortgage and Housing Corporation (CMHC). (2002, July 1). “Plex” housing: A renewed tradition. https://publications.gc.ca/site/eng/408767/publication.html.

Charroy, A.-L. (n.d.). Montreal ’Plex. Dynamic Cities Project. Retrieved April 11, 2022, from http:// dynamiccities.org/inspirations.

Gilliland, J., & Olson, S. (1998). Claims on Housing Space in Nineteenth-Century Montreal. Urban History Review / Revue d’histoire Urbaine, 26(2), 3–16.

Hanna, D. B. (1986). The layered city: A revolution in housing in mid-nineteenth-century Montreal. Dept. of Geography, McGill University.

Kennedy, A. (2002). Montreal’s Duplexes and Triplexes. The Fifth Column, 10(4), 64–69.

Linteau, P.-A. (2013). The History of Montréal: The Story of Great North American City (P. McCambridge, Trans.). Baraka Books. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail. action?docID=1162758.

Oh The Urbanity! (2020, October 26). Montreal’s Medium-Density Multiplex Neighbourhoods. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Vsn0ahdfQ9k.

Rastello, S. (2021, August 4). The Plexes of Montreal Make Room for Change. Bloomberg CityLab https://www.bloomberg.com/news/features/2021-08-04/ looking-to-rent-in-montreal-get-to-know-the-plex

Yakabuski, K. (2004, February 20). Triplexes help keep city vibrant. The Globe and Mail. https:// www.theglobeandmail.com/real-estate/triplexes-help-keep-city-vibrant/article994172/

Figure 8. Comparison of a typical single-family house on a Vancouver residential lot to a typical Montreal Triplex. (Charroy, n.d.)

Figure 7. Front façades of traditional versus modern plex housing options. (CMHC, 1997)

Figure 5. Comparison of plex housing in different Montreal neighbourhoods, screenshot of YouTube video. (Oh The Urbanity!, 2020)

Figure 6. Comparison of densities between housing types – single family housing, plex housing, and high rise apartment buildings. Screenshot of YouTube video. (Oh The Urbanity!, 2020)

Tewin, a Contested Suburb: Complexities of Incorporating Reconciliation into Urban Planning Cat Carkner

Abstract

In settler-colonial nations such as Canada, cities and urban planning processes can act as mechanisms of colonial control. Moreover, there is a historic and ongoing underrepresentation of Indigenous peoples in Canadian planning processes and municipal governments. However, some Indigenous groups are now challenging these exclusionary dynamics, asserting their right to the city through their own urban mega-projects. One such project is Tewin, a future residential development that Ottawa City Council agreed to include within the city’s new urban boundary in 2021. Tewin is a collaboration between the Algonquins of Ontario, a treaty-negotiating body of Algonquin communities, and Taggart Investments, a local development company. Tewin is said to be founded on Algonquin values, and local political proponents of

the project have framed it as a symbol of reconciliation. However, both the project’s legitimacy and reconciliatory nature have been called into question by city planners and other Algonquin groups. Using the case study of Tewin, this paper demonstrates the complexities of enacting reconciliation through municipal planning initiatives. More specifically, it argues that local actors involved in reconciliatory urban planning must be prepared (i) to mediate between mainstream and Indigenous planning ideologies, and (ii) to carefully consider issues of identity when engaging in community consultation or participatory planning.

Keywords: Indigenous urbanism, reconciliation, urban planning.

In settler-colonial nations, cities are “key mechanisms of colonial expansion”,1 acting as economic command centres and residential hubs for settler populations. Thus, scholars have identified that cities and local governments in Canada are constructed as non-Indigenous spaces. Stranger-Ross describes the “widespread view that … Aboriginal people [have] no place in modern urban life”,2 even though over half of Indigenous peoples in Canada now live in urban centres.3 Meanwhile, Hertiz and the Ontario Professional Planners Institute note Indigenous peoples’ historic and ongoing underrepresentation in planning processes and municipal governments.4 However, some Indigenous groups are now challenging these exclusionary dynamics, asserting their right to the city through their own urban

Jordan Stanger-Ross, “Municipal Colonialism in Vancouver: City Planning and the Conflict over Indian Reserves, 1928–1950s,” Canadian Historical Review 89, no. 4 (2008): 543.

2 Stanger-Ross, “Municipal Colonialism in Vancouver,” 542.

3 Joanne Heritz, “From Self-Determination to Service Delivery: Assessing Indigenous Inclusion in Municipal Governance in Canada,” Canadian Public Administration 61, no. 4 (2018): 596.

4 Joanne Heritz, “From Self-Determination to Service Delivery: Assessing Indigenous Inclusion in Municipal Governance in Canada,” Canadian Public Administration 61, no. 4 (2018): 599; Ontario Professional Planners Institute, “Indigenous Perspectives in Planning” (Ontario Professional Planners Institute, 2019), 10, https://ontarioplanners.ca/OPPIAssets/Documents/OPPI/ Indigenous-Planning-Perspectives-Task-Force-Report-FINAL.pdf

5 Julie Tomiak, “Contesting the Settler City: Indigenous Self-Determination, New Urban Reserves, and the Neoliberalization of Colonialism,” Antipode 49, no. 4 (2017): 937.

6 Jon Willing, “Council Allows Algonquins of Ontario ‘Tewin’ Site inside a New Urban Boundary,” Ottawa Citizen, February 10, 2021, https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/council-allows-algonquins-of-ontario-tewin-site-inside-a-new-urban-boundary

7 CTV News Ottawa, “Ontario Approves Ottawa’s New Official Plan with Expanded Urban Boundary,” CTV News Ottawa, November 4, 2022, https://ottawa.ctvnews.ca/ontario-approves-ottawa-s-newofficial-plan-with-expanded-urban-boundary-1.6140323

8 Joanne Chianello, “Tewin Has Councillors Making up Planning Policy on the Fly,” CBC, February 9, 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/ news/canada/ottawa/tewin-reconciliation-1.5905975

9 AOO-Taggart, “Homepage,” Tewin, 2023, https://www.tewin.ca/ (AOO-Taggart, 2022).

10 Jamie Pashagumskum, “Tewin Development by Algonquins of Ontario Will Be Voted on Wednesday,” APTN News (blog), February 10, 2021, https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/ottawa-citycouncil-to-vote-on-tewin-housing-development-wednesday/ Jamie Pashagumskum, 2021.

11 However, given the length of the paper, judgments or conclusions concerning Tewin’s overall contribution to the mission of reconciliation are not within its scope.

mega-projects, such as Senákw in Vancouver or New Urban Reserves (NURs).5

Another such project is Tewin, a future residential development that the Ottawa City Council agreed to include within the city’s proposed new urban boundary in February 2021.6 The new urban boundary, which was officially endorsed by the provincial government in 2022 (albeit in an amended form), aims to expand Ottawa’s boundary, allowing the city to develop more land, supply more housing, and accommodate more residents.7 Tewin is a collaboration between the Algonquins of Ontario (AOO), a treaty-negotiating body of Algonquin communities, and Taggart Investments, a local development company. It will be a suburb of 45,000 residents, built on 445 hectares of land that AOO-Taggart bought from the province in 2020 for $16.9 million (Figure 1).8 The AOO promotes Tewin as a “community founded on Algonquin values” that will deliver “wide–scale socioeconomic benefits for the Algonquin people”.9 In line with this narrative, local political proponents of the project, including then-Mayor Jim Watson and City Councilor Tim Tierney, posited Tewin as a symbol of reconciliation when advocating for its approval. Tierney stated that the Council is “committed to reconciliation with local Indigenous communities and recognizes the importance of working with the [AOO] as a meaningful opportunity towards achieving that goal”10 (Pashagumskum, 2021).

However, both the project’s legitimacy and reconciliatory nature have been called into question by city planners and other Algonquin groups. Using the case study of Tewin, this paper demonstrates the complexities of enacting reconciliation through municipal planning initiatives. More specifically, it argues that local actors involved in reconciliatory urban planning must be prepared (i) to mediate between mainstream and Indigenous planning ideologies, and (ii) to carefully consider issues of identity when engaging in community consultation or participatory planning.11

To illustrate these points, I first explain how local actors struggle to find a balance between advancing reconciliation through Tewin and adhering to mainstream planning policy and expertise. Second, by exploring current debates around Indigenous identity, I show that determining which actors should be involved in such ‘reconciliatory’ urban planning is not a clear-cut process. Finally, I reflect on the task of incorporating Indigenous sovereignty and reconciliation into municipal planning practices and make suggestions for future research.12

existing suburbs, water mains, and public transit in Ottawa. Meanwhile, parcels of land that city planners usually recommend for inclusion in the new urban boundary achieve scores between 40 and 70.14 In a joint statement, local developers Claridge Homes and Minto, whose lands were initially passed over in favour of Tewin, expressed their dismay that the Council opted to sidestep a “prescribed scoring process … and include a parcel of land with a zero score on servicing”.15 The Council and AOO-Taggart also dismissed city planners’

Figure 1. The area where the AOO and Taggart Investments will build Tewin. (www. tanakiwin.com)

Tewin has faced criticism and scrutiny from many urban actors, including Council members, planning staff, and local environmental groups.13 However, for most actors who oppose Tewin, the central issue is not its reconciliatory mission or Algonquin character. Rather, disapproval stems from its associated divergences from mainstream planning policy, namely the Tewin land’s inclusion in Ottawa’s new urban boundary despite its very low score on council-approved planning criteria. Parcels of Tewin land scored as low as -8 points due to deductions related to its distance from

12 Following Tomiak (2017), I want to briefly discuss my positionality in relation to this work. am a Vietnamese-Canadian settler who grew up in Ottawa, on the traditional and unceded land of the Anishinaabe Algonquin Nation. As such, I write as an outsider to the Algonquin Nation and do not intend to speak for them.

13 Willing, “Council Allows Algonquins of Ontario ‘Tewin’ Site inside a New Urban Boundary”; Chianello, “Tewin Has Councillors Making up Planning Policy on the Fly”; Paul Johanis, “Johanis: There’s No Need to Expand Ottawa’s Urban Boundary Anywhere,” Ottawa Citizen, October 4, 2022, https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/ johanis-theres-no-need-to-expand-ottawas-urban-boundary

14 Kate Porter, “Tewin: The Land at the Centre of Ottawa’s Reconciliation Controversy | CBC News,” CBC, February 5, 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ tewin-parcel-details-planners-aoo-1.5901324

15 Kate Porter, “Algonquins Come out Sudden Winners in Urban Boundary Vote,” CBC, January 27, 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ algonquins-ontario-tewin-planning-arac-vote-1.5888419

Planning Policy: Progressive or Prohibitive?

request to prolong Tewin’s approval for a five-year study to comprehensively assess its long-term financial and environmental consequences, citing the time-sensitive nature of accomplishing reconciliation.16

By choosing Tewin lands over more highlyrated lands in the west,17 Council disregarded the Provincial Policy Statement, Ontario’s planning guidelines.18

Mayor Watson acknowledged planners’ unfavourable assessment of the Tewin lands, stating that “I know we have a point and a rating system, but I think at times you have to be flexible to recognize that when a proposal like this comes forwards and it’s the first of its kind, that we should take it seriously and look at its merits”.19 While the low quality of the Tewin lands will present real development challenges, Watson’s comments evoke Bouvier and Walker’s work, which questions if Indigenous inclusion in city planning should be “conditional upon strict adherence to colonial capitalism and

16 Chianello, “Tewin Has Councillors Making up Planning Policy on the Fly.”

17 That said, when the Ontario Provincial Government ultimately approved Ottawa City Council’s new official plan in November 2022 (which includes Tewin), they did make amendments to include additional areas for urban development. The provincial government’s amendments include land previously-passed over in favour of Tewin, such as the South March area (CBC News, 2022).

18 Chianello, “Tewin Has Councillors Making up Planning Policy on the Fly.”

19 Kate Porter, “Watson Seeks Reconciliation with Algonquins of Ontario Development | CBC News,” CBC, January 27, 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/watson-support-algonquins-of-ontario-taggart-development-1.5890474

20 Noelle Bouvier and Ryan Walker, “Indigenous Planning and Municipal Governance: Lessons from the Transformative Frontier.,” Canadian Public Administration 61, no. 1 (2018): 133.

21 Bouvier and Walker, 131.

22 John Forester, Planning in the Face of Power, 1989, 28.

23 Bouvier and Walker, “Indigenous Planning and Municipal Governance,” 131.

24 Due to legacies of and ongoing colonialism, there are debates regarding the authenticity or legitimacy of non-status-holding Indigenous peoples’ claim to Indigenous identity. Because of the Indian Act, there are many people of First Nations descent who are unable to acquire ‘Indian Status’ or memberships in First Nations communities. Some individuals also hold the view that those who hold status are the only ‘authentic’ First Nations or Indigenous peoples, causing tension. For more information, see: https://indigenousfoundations.arts.ubc.ca/indian_status/

settler (including municipal) regulatory authority.”20 Tewin’s opponents could reflect on the financial and technical difficulties involved in developing the Tewin lands (costly expansion of water pipes and transit, for example) and ask themselves if these factors should take precedence over the project’s potential socio-economic contributions to reconciliation.

Tewin is a development that compromises adherence to colonial-derived mainstream planning practices and expertise in favour of centering reconciliation and Indigenous planning proposals. This case study demonstrates that incorporating reconciliation into municipal planning practices may involve the complicated task of negotiating conflicting demands from the “parallel traditions of colonial-derived mainstream and Indigenous planning”.21 Urban centres that seek to develop similar projects should be prepared to navigate similar conflicts between actors and planning goals.

Reconciliatory Planning: Who Gets a Seat at the Table?

Forester writes that planners, by merit of shaping who is involved in the planning process, “can make that process more democratic or less.”22 In the Canadian context, making planning processes more democratic must involve consulting Indigenous peoples and recognizing their “distinctive rights and title beyond those of typical urban stakeholders”,23 given their ongoing exclusion from planning practices, as well as their position as the traditional stewards of the land. However, the controversy surrounding the legitimacy of the AOO’s claim to Indigeneity demonstrates that planners and municipal governments must exercise caution and cultural sensitivity when choosing who to consult in ‘reconciliatory’ planning processes.24

Out of the ten Algonquin communities that make up the AOO, only the Ontario-based Pikwakanagan First Nation is a federally recognized, status-holding Algonquin

community.25 In light of this, many of the recognized Algonquin communities that are not part of the AOO have criticised the Council for failing to consult them on Tewin, given that they are championing it as an act of reconciliation.26 In a joint statement, the Chiefs of the recognized Wolf Lake, Timiskaming, and Barriere Lake Algonquin communities condemned the Council’s approval of the project. They argued that “reconciliation is long overdue. But we believe that it must be done in the right way, and with the right parties”.27 The process of achieving reconciliation through a project on unceded lands, the chiefs argued, “must take place between two nations, not between a municipal government and an organisation or company”.28 Kitigan Zibi First Nation Elder Claudette Commanda went as far as to deem then-Mayor Watson’s endorsement of Tewin as a flawed attempt to get a “gold star on his reconciliation report card”.29 In response to this backlash, Chief of Pikwakanagan First Nation Wendy Jocko and Ottawa AOO representative Lynn Clouthier defended their Algonquin identity and reiterated the reconciliatory nature of Tewin. Jocko asserted that any status-holding Algonquin questioning the Indigeneity of the AOO’s non-status Algonquin groups was subscribing to colonial-minded definitions of Indigenous identity.30

Considering Ottawa’s existence on unceded Algonquin territory and the Council’s proclamation of Tewin as “reconciliation with local Indigenous communities”,31 it stands to reason that every recognized Algonquin community, regardless of whether or not the AOO should be considered a legitimate representative of the Algonquin nation, should have been consulted before Tewin was given the green light in the name of reconciliation. As the debates around the identities of Tewin’s partners demonstrate, planners and municipal governments attempting to enact reconciliation via planning initiatives should be mindful of whom they include in the planning process to ensure that these initiatives respect all Indigenous actors and meaningfully contribute to their goal of reconciliation.

Reflections

Undoubtedly, advancing the Indigenization of the city and Indigenous participation in planning processes are necessary goals for local actors, primarily municipal politicians and planners. However, as debates surrounding Tewin demonstrate, these are not straightforward tasks. In shaping the ‘reconciliatory city’, urban governance actors must be keenly aware of the tensions between Indigenous versus mainstream colonial planning policies and expertise. Moreover, they should be cognizant of the complexities of Indigenous identity.

Future research could compare the urban governance dynamics surrounding Tewin with those of other urban Indigenous developments, such as the Squamish Nation’s Senákw mega-project in Vancouver or the Muskeg Lake Cree Nation’s NURs. Moreover, the current research could be elaborated on once Tewin’s master plan is released. Who, for example, was consulted while drafting the plan? Although out of the scope of this short paper, questions of how effectively speculative and capitalist real estate projects such as these can advance Indigenous sovereignty are also worthy of further analysis.

25 Hafez, “Algonquin Anishinabeg vs. The Algonquins of Ontario: Development, Recognition & Ongoing Colonization - Yellowhead Institute,” Yellowhead Institute, February 18, 2021, https://yellowheadinstitute.org/2021/02/18/algonquin-anishinabeg-vs-the-algonquins-of-ontario-development-recognition-ongoing-colonialization/

26 Joanne Laucius, “Chiarelli Asks Province to Delay Approving Official City Plan so New Council Can Reconsider Tewin,” Ottawa Citizen, September 18, 2022, https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/ bob-chiarelli-asks-province-to-delay-approving-official-plan-so-newcouncil-can-reconsider-tewin-lands

27 Algonquin Nation Secretariat, “Algonquin Nation Secretariat Calls for Tewin Project to Be Put on Ice.” (Algonquin Nation Secretariat, February 8, 2021), http://new-wordpress.algonquinnation.ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ANS-Press-Release-AOO-Tewin.pdf

28 Kate Porter and Joanne Chianello, “Council Greenlights Algonquins of Ontario Land for Future Suburb CBC News,” CBC, February 11, 2021, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ urban-boundary-tewin-council-vote-properties-1.5908405

29 Porter and Chianello.

30 Hafez, “Algonquin Anishinabeg vs. The Algonquins of Ontario: Development, Recognition & Ongoing Colonization - Yellowhead Institute.”

31 City of Ottawa, “Indigenous Relations,” City of Ottawa, November 14, 2022, https://ottawa.ca/en/city-hall/creating-equal-inclusive-and-diverse-city/indigenous-relations; Pashagumskum, “Tewin Development by Algonquins of Ontario Will Be Voted on Wednesday.”

References

Algonquin Nation Secretariat. “Algonquin Nation Secretariat Calls for Tewin Project to Be Put on Ice.” Algonquin Nation Secretariat, February 8, 2021. http://new-wordpress.algonquinnation. ca/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/ANS-Press-Release-AOO-Tewin.pdf

AOO-Taggart. “Homepage.” Tewin, 2023. https://www.tewin.ca/.

Bouvier, Noelle, and Ryan Walker. “Indigenous Planning and Municipal Governance: Lessons from the Transformative Frontier.” Canadian Public Administration 61, no. 1 (2018): 130–35.

Chianello, Joanne. “Tewin Has Councillors Making up Planning Policy on the Fly.” CBC, February 9, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/tewin-reconciliation-1.5905975

City of Ottawa. “Indigenous Relations.” City of Ottawa, November 14, 2022. https://ottawa.ca/ en/city-hall/creating-equal-inclusive-and-diverse-city/indigenous-relations

CTV News Ottawa. “Ontario Approves Ottawa’s New Official Plan with Expanded Urban Boundary.” CTV News Ottawa, November 4, 2022. https://ottawa.ctvnews.ca/ ontario-approves-ottawa-s-new-official-plan-with-expanded-urban-boundary-1.6140323.

Forester, John. Planning in the Face of Power, 1989.

Hafez. “Algonquin Anishinabeg vs. The Algonquins of Ontario: Development, Recognition & Ongoing Colonization - Yellowhead Institute.” Yellowhead Institute, February 18, 2021. https:// yellowheadinstitute.org/2021/02/18/algonquin-anishinabeg-vs-the-algonquins-of-ontario-development-recognition-ongoing-colonialization/

Heritz, Joanne. “From Self-Determination to Service Delivery: Assessing Indigenous Inclusion in Municipal Governance in Canada.” Canadian Public Administration 61, no. 4 (2018): 596–615.

Johanis, Paul. “Johanis: There’s No Need to Expand Ottawa’s Urban Boundary Anywhere.” Ottawa Citizen, October 4, 2022. https://ottawacitizen.com/opinion/ johanis-theres-no-need-to-expand-ottawas-urban-boundary.

Laucius, Joanne. “Chiarelli Asks Province to Delay Approving Official City Plan so New Council Can Reconsider Tewin.” Ottawa Citizen, September 18, 2022. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/ local-news/bob-chiarelli-asks-province-to-delay-approving-official-plan-so-new-council-canreconsider-tewin-lands

Nejad, Sarem, Ryan Walker, Brenda Macdougall, Yale Belanger, and David Newhouse. “‘This Is an Indigenous City; Why Don’t We See It?’ Indigenous Urbanism and Spatial Production in Winnipeg.” The Canadian Geographer/Le Géographe Canadien 63, no. 3 (2019): 413–24.

Ontario Professional Planners Institute. “Indigenous Perspectives in Planning.” Ontario Professional Planners Institute, 2019. https://ontarioplanners.ca/OPPIAssets/Documents/OPPI/ Indigenous-Planning-Perspectives-Task-Force-Report-FINAL.pdf.

Pashagumskum, Jamie. “Tewin Development by Algonquins of Ontario Will Be Voted on Wednesday.” APTN News (blog), February 10, 2021. https://www.aptnnews.ca/national-news/ ottawa-city-council-to-vote-on-tewin-housing-development-wednesday/.

Porter, Kate. “Algonquins Come out Sudden Winners in Urban Boundary Vote.” CBC, January 27, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ algonquins-ontario-tewin-planning-arac-vote-1.5888419

Porter, Kate, and Joanne Chianello. “Council Greenlights Algonquins of Ontario Land for Future Suburb | CBC News.” CBC, February 11, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ urban-boundary-tewin-council-vote-properties-1.5908405.

Stanger-Ross, Jordan. “Municipal Colonialism in Vancouver: City Planning and the Conflict over Indian Reserves, 1928–1950s.” Canadian Historical Review 89, no. 4 (2008): 541–80.

“Tewin: The Land at the Centre of Ottawa’s Reconciliation Controversy | CBC News.” CBC, February 5, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ tewin-parcel-details-planners-aoo-1.5901324

Tomiak, Julie. “Contesting the Settler City: Indigenous Self-Determination, New Urban Reserves, and the Neoliberalization of Colonialism.” Antipode 49, no. 4 (2017): 928–45.

“Watson Seeks Reconciliation with Algonquins of Ontario Development | CBC News.” CBC, January 27, 2021. https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/ottawa/ watson-support-algonquins-of-ontario-taggart-development-1.5890474.

Willing, Jon. “Council Allows Algonquins of Ontario ‘Tewin’ Site inside a New Urban Boundary.” Ottawa Citizen, February 10, 2021. https://ottawacitizen.com/news/local-news/ council-allows-algonquins-of-ontario-tewin-site-inside-a-new-urban-boundary.

Women in the Modern Suburb: A Comparison of Albany, California and San Francisco, California

Ailish McGiffin

“Cities are planned by men for men”.1 The lack of consideration given to considering the needs of women in urban planning means that women have a unique relationship with their built environment. This necessitates the analysis of how women interact with and within cities and how these interactions evolve as social contexts shift. Suburbs are a particularly interesting entity to examine both when discussing the role of women in urban areas and how these roles have transformed over time. Although suburbs and cities once offered two segmented lifestyles, the suburb today appears to be taking on more characteristics of city life, which has been beneficial for the suburban woman. Through a comparison of the major city of San Francisco, California (population: 874,784)2 and the suburb of Albany, California (population: 20,145)3, it becomes evident that previous views on a woman’s life in the suburb are less applicable in the present context. Although suburbs were once thought to confine women, suburban life is increasingly becoming interconnected with the needs of modern women.

The city is commonly represented as a source of liberation for women while the suburb is portrayed as a space that limits women’s potential. A popular premise in television and film is a young woman attempting to get out of her stifling suburban town to reach the wonderful big city. The T.V. show The Carrie Diaries,4 centers on a

Wekerle, G. 2006. “A Woman’s Place Is in the City.” Antipode doi:10.1111/j.1467- 8330.1984.tb00069.x, 12.

2 “San Francisco, CA.” 2021. Data USA. https://datausa.io/profile/ geo/san francisco-ca

3 “Albany, CA.” 2021. Data USA. https://datausa.io/profile/geo/ albany-ca

4 Whole. 2013. The Carrie Diaries. The CW.

5 Gerwig, Greta, dir. 2017. Lady Bird. A24.

6 Hutchinson, Ray, Judith N. DeSena, and Susanne Frank. 2009. “Gender Trouble in Paradise: Suburbia Reconsidered.” Essay. In Gender in an Urban World. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 128.

7 Wekerle, 11.

teenage Carrie Bradshaw attempting to leave her suburban Connecticut hometown for New York City. The film Lady Bird5portrays a similar plot except that Sacramento, California is the suburban town that Lady Bird is attempting to rid herself of in favor of New York City. This view of suburbia as being detrimental to the growth of women spans multiple disciplines, including that of urban sociology. In research on women in suburbs, the suburb is often presented as an urban form that is the antithesis of modern feminism; something to be escaped. In “Gender Trouble in Paradise: Suburbia Reconsidered,” Susanne Frank explains that the concept of suburbia as “a place which casts the women’s social subordination… belongs to today’s unquestioned basic assumptions of critical and feminist urban studies”.6 Frank touches on the fact that, in the word of urban scholarship, the suburban environment as a stunting force for women has been universally accepted. This notion has cemented the perception of suburbia as limiting for women both in research and in popular culture. While the suburb is depicted as an oppressive force for women, the city is presented as a place of opportunity. In “A Woman’s Place is in the City,” Gerda Wekerle states that there is a demand by women for services such as daycares, places of employment, social service offices, and community centers “that can only be found in cities”.7 The idea that these services only exist in cities is compounded by the idea that they are more accessible in cities because public transportation is not prominent in suburban areas. Together, this creates the perception that women will be left without access to key services such as childcare or employment should they live in the suburbs. In past urban research, the city for women is a place for them to reach key services and social institutions that are thought to be unavailable in suburban regions.Although this picture of the suburb as an entity disconnected from the city and its networks may once have been accurate, today the suburb presents many benefits for women that it is typically not given credit for.

A prominent criticism of suburban life is that it physically isolates women and binds them to their homes. This view emerged at the beginning of the suburban housing trend when the cities were designed for working men who commuted and it was less common for women to have a license or own a car. The design of the suburbs lacked consideration for the needs of the women, whose lives at the time were centered around the home. Suburbs during the mid-to-late 1900s were designed for “homebound women”8 and “constrain[ed] women physically”.9 While this viewpoint is applicable to a specific time in the history of suburbia, new upwards trends in both car ownership and the number of women who have licenses makes this criticism less applicable to the present-day suburb. In 2014, it was found that “the number of women with driving licenses (DL) in the U.S. overtook that of men”10 in “all age groups greater than 25”.11 Women’s increased access to cars expanded opportunities for suburban women regarding their way of life.12 Women have previously faced isolation due to a lack of access to transportation in the suburbs. However, women’s increased use of automobiles today means they experience a higher degree of mobility; suburban women are no longer confined to their homes. When comparing the car ownership patterns in San Francisco and Albany, it is found that the average car per household is two in Albany13 and one in San Francisco.14 Residents of San Francisco are more likely than people in Albany to rely on the public transportation system; a system that is non-congruent with the needs of many women.

Women often take multiple trips during the day to drop kids off at school or daycare, run errands, and go to work.15 Not only does this mean that women are having to get on and off public transportation with strollers and multiple bags of shopping, but it also means that they are paying the fare multiple times per day. This is not the only way women pay for their public transit use; the term “pink tax”16 refers to the fact that women experience fear for their safety using public

transportation and pay monetarily for this fear through their increased usage of private car services such as taxis and Ubers. In The San Francisco Examiner article “Women say ‘pink tax’ in SF transit all too real,” the co-chair of the San Francisco Women’s Political Committee, Kelly Groth, recounts being “grabbed from behind”17 after exiting the bus at a stop near her apartment. The same article conducted an informal poll and found that women were spending money on car services to avoid taking public transit at night.18 Experiences like this point to the fact that public transportation in the city of San Francisco is not designed to meet the needs of women. Furthermore, public transportation offers less flexibility and mobility than a private automobile: “A heavy dependence on public transportation means that women’s job choices are more limited and the journey to work is more time consuming”.19

Today, the prevalence of car ownership in the suburb allows women to access a wider range of services such as employment opportunities. It also allows them to spend less time commuting. This contrasts with the previous view of the suburbs as limiting women’s mobility. Suburbs are not only

8 Hayden, D. 1980. “What Would A Non-Sexist City Be Like? Speculations on Housing, Urban Design, and Human Work.” Signs, S170–S187. doi:http://www.jstor. org/stable/3173814 S171.

9 Hayden, S171.

10 Singh, S. 2014. “Women in Cars: Overtaking Men on the Fast Lane.” Forbes, May 23. https://www.forbes. com/sites/sarwantsingh/2014/05/23/women-in-cars overtaking-men-on-the-fast-lane/?sh=364d481468d2

11 Singh, 2014.

12 Frank, 134.

13 Data USA, 2021.

14 Data USA, 2021.

15 Filkobski, Ina. 2022. “Gender.” SOCI 222 Lecture presented at the SOCI 222, November 1.

16 Rodriguez, J. 2018. “Women Say ‘Pink Tax’ in SF Transit All Too Real.” SF Examiner, November 21.

17 Rodriguez, 2018.

18 Rodriguez, 2018.

19 Wekerle, 12.

perceived as physically isolating women, but also as socially isolating. Harry Hiller writes that housewives in the suburbs in the 1960s “were thought to be isolated and lone, cut off from traditional kinship and community ties”.20 The view of women as lacking ties to their community and as being lonely in their suburban lives was found to be untrue even in the 1950s and 1960s: “many women continued their social and political engagement even after leaving the city”.21 Although suburbs are characterized as isolating, there are still many opportunities for women to socialize and engage with their environment. In Albany, the smaller community means many informal groups organize themselves. On Madison Avenue, just off Solano Avenue, Brenda hosts a book club that meets once a week to talk over a glass of wine. Albany Bulb, where Solano ends and the beach begins, is known for hosting many dog walks or beach clean ups organized by members of the community. Although there are more formal social institutions in San Francisco, there are still many informal ways in Albany for women to gather and participate in their community. Another instance of community organization in Albany occurs on National Night Out, a day in the United States where neighborhoods host parties to socialize with their community. In Albany, the community hosts block parties organized amongst neighbors. In contrast, National Night Out parties in San Francisco are organized by formal institutions; they occur in parks or in community spaces.22

As can be seen in the case of National Night Out, the community ties in Albany can be more stronger due to the smaller population size and more direct community involvement. In “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” Louis Wirth characterizes relations in urban life as containing “superficiality,” “anonymity,” and a “transitory character”.23 Wirth touches on the fact that individuals in the city may meet a higher volume of people in their daily interactions, but these interactions lack meaning. Hiller explains Wirth’s theories using the notion of secondary relations, which are “fleeting exchanges between strangers or routine instrumental interactions”24 that render urban residents “incapable of developing deep, personal connections”. Although Wirth’s theories may verge on the extreme, they still point out a key difference for women between socializing in San Francisco and in Albany. While the San Franciscan may see the same barista every day, a resident of Albany is more likely to run into a friend while out running

errands or form a close bond with their neighbors. The high volume of people in the city has also been equated with a diversity that exists in the city but is lacking in the suburbs. However, in the present day, a variety of residents live in the suburbs. Hiller writes that “today’s suburbs are also more diverse than they have ever been, with dual worker households, aging populations, single parents, non-family households, multi-generational families, and ethnic enclaves”.25 Albany reflects this trend with racial and ethnic diversity—the largest groups being White, Asian, and Multi-Racial—and a variety of different family compositions.26 On Madison Avenue in Albany, there is a house of college students, a woman living alone with her teenage daughter, and a young married couple who just had their second child. Today, suburbs are more diverse than ever, meaning women can feel comfortable living their lifestyle of preference and are offered a multitude of opportunities to develop meaningful community ties.

Suburbs have been condemned for lacking essential services for women such as those for work, raising children, and running errands.27 Although commuting from the suburb to the city for employment was once common practice, more employment opportunities have relocated to the suburbs. In her study focusing on the San Francisco Bay Area, Kristin Nelson examines “the process of relocating so-called subordinate office and administration activities from cities to the suburbs for reasons of reducing costs”.28 This process has been labeled “the third and most mature wave of suburbanization”.29 Many services and jobs are now present in suburban areas previously disjointed from the physical job market. This shift was beneficial to the suburban woman: “the decentralization of back offices also helped to systematically access the sought-after pool of a female workforce which had not been available beforehand due to socio-spatial isolation”.30 Although San Francisco hosts a bustling tech job market, Albany offers its fair share of employment opportunities; for example, law offices, architecture firms, and contracting firms. In addition to employment opportunities, Albany has many options for childcare, an essential service for women in the workforce. Albany has many daycares and preschools, three elementary schools, one middle school, and two high schools.31 There are also a variety of options for consumers, including both retail needs and food shopping. Despite previous criticisms of the suburbs lacking essential services for women, present day Albany offers a large variety of services for employment, childcare, consumption, and education.

20 Hiller, Harry H., 2014. “Gender and the City.” Essay. In Urban Canada. Don Mills, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press, 93. 21 Frank, 133.

22 “12 Different ‘National Night out’ Sf Block Parties & Free Bbqs.” 2022. SF Fun and Cheap https://sf.funcheap.com/12-nationalnight-sf-block parties-free-bbqs-2022/.

23 Wirth, Louis. 1938. “Urbanism as a Way of Life.” American Journal of Sociology 44 (1): 1–24. doi:10.1086/217913, 12.

24 Hiller, Harry H., 2014. “Social Ties and Community in Urban Places.” Essay. In Urban Canada. Don Mills, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press, 91.

25 Hiller, 239.

26 Data USA, 2021.

27 Wekerle, 11.

28 Frank, 139.

29 Lewis, Paul George. 1996. Shaping Suburbia: How Political Institutions Organize Urban Development. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press, 6.

30 Frank, 140.

31 “Albany Unified School District Home.” 2023. Albany Unified School District. Accessed March 13. https://www.ausdk12.org/

While the inclusion of essential services ameliorated the experience of suburban life for women, there are still lingering challenges surrounding inequities in urban spaces. There is a lack of consideration for women’s urban experiences in city planning, leading to a disconnect between the design of the city and how women use the urban space. This affects not only suburbs but spans all levels of urban forms, from the smallest village to the largest city. As a result, women must struggle with their urban environment or find ways to adapt to inadequacies. In order to create more inclusive and accessible urban spaces, it is crucial to include women in the planning process and to design spaces that are oriented towards integrating women seamlessly into their urban communities.

References

“12 Different ‘National Night out’ Sf Block Parties & Free Bbqs.” 2022. SF Fun and Cheap https://sf.funcheap.com/12-national-night-sf-block parties-free-bbqs-2022/

“Albany Unified School District Home.” 2023. Albany Unified School District. Accessed March 13. https://www.ausdk12.org/.

“Albany, CA.” 2021. Data USA. https://datausa.io/profile/geo/albany-ca.

Filkobski, Ina. 2022. “Gender.” SOCI 222. Lecture presented at the SOCI 222, November 1.

Gerwig, Greta, dir. 2017. Lady Bird. A24.

Hayden, D. 1980. “What Would A Non-Sexist City Be Like? Speculations on Housing, Urban Design, and Human Work.” Signs, S170–S187. doi:http://www.jstor.org/stable/3173814

Hiller, Harry H., 2014. “Social Ties and Community in Urban Places.” Essay. In Urban Canada Don Mills, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press.

Hiller, Harry H., 2014. “Gender and the City.” Essay. In Urban Canada. Don Mills, Ontario, Canada: Oxford University Press.

Hutchinson, Ray, Judith N. DeSena, and Susanne Frank. 2009. “Gender Trouble in Paradise: Suburbia Reconsidered.” Essay. In Gender in an Urban World. Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing Limited.

Lewis, Paul George. 1996. Shaping Suburbia: How Political Institutions Organize Urban Development. Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press.

Rodriguez, J. 2018. “Women Say ‘Pink Tax’ in SF Transit All Too Real.” SF Examiner, November 21. “San Francisco, CA.” 2021. Data USA. https://datausa.io/profile/geo/san francisco-ca.

Scott, Allen J., Michael Storper, and K Nelson. 1988. “Labor Demand, Labor Supply and the Suburbanization of Low-Wage Office Work.” Essay. In Production, Work, Territory: The Geographical Anatomy of Industrial Capitalism, 149–71. Boston, Massachusettes : Allen and Unwin.

Singh, S. 2014. “Women in Cars: Overtaking Men on the Fast Lane.” Forbes, May 23. https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarwantsingh/2014/05/23/women-in-cars-overtaking-men-onthe-fast-lane/?sh=364d481468d2

Wekerle, G. 2006. “A Woman’s Place Is in the City.” Antipode. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8330.1984. tb00069.x.

Whole. 2013. The Carrie Diaries. The CW.

Wirth, Louis. 1938. “Urbanism as a Way of Life.” American Journal of Sociology 44 (1): 1–24. doi:10.1086/217913.

Dependent Development and Subalternity in Puerto Rico: Why Hurricane Fiona was Worse than Expected Max

Garcia

Abstract

Puerto Rico today is an island in shambles. Despite enduring multiple tropical storms every year, the aftermath of Hurricane Fiona—which made landfall in September 2022—demonstrates that the severity of the situation is beyond the impacts of a natural disaster. Although it was designated as Category 1, the mildest ranking, the storm caused lasting damage throughout the island, devastating people who still face power outages, a lack of clean water, and other challenges months later. Though the United States (US) government may be quick to blame Puerto Ricans on their precarious situation, this paper examines the variety of historical factors that have shaped the island’s current trajectory. Using dependency theory and subalternity

as a theoretical framework, I argue that US intervention supporting corporate interests has entrenched Puerto Rico in dependent-oriented development at Puerto Ricans’ expense. Nonetheless, despite their status as second-class citizens of the US, they continue to fight valiantly against their oppressor with the hope that their voices may one day be heard.

Keywords: Puerto Rico, Dependency Theory, Subaltern, Hurricane Fiona, colonisation, LUMA.

Introduction

On a cloudy day, a virtuous white woman sails over a crowd of pioneers. Working the land and expelling its previous inhabitants, they act on her behalf, for she is the symbol of fortune and destiny. Shining light on the path ahead, she frames the title for the painting in which she stars: American Progress (see Figure 1). This work represents a period of change for the US. Idealizing the word of President James Monroe, whose 1823 Doctrine declared that the US would seek to defeat and replace European influence in the Western Hemisphere, the painting depicts America as a global superpower through the angelic woman who commands her people and relinquishes those that stand before her.1 She represents the concept of Manifest Destiny, an extension of the Monroe Doctrine that idealizes America as a “chosen people” who represent a force for good that must be spread.2 At the time of this painting, Spain’s influence was declining throughout the Western Hemisphere, providing the perfect opportunity for US expansion into the region—part of its campaign to become a global hegemon. By 1898, the US had won the Spanish-American war and gained control of key territories, including Puerto Rico. However, rather than helping the native Taínos sustain themselves, Americans developed the island through the colonizer’s model of the world.3 As such, “Puerto Rico had been invented: a tropical island in the Caribbean Sea,” meant to support American imperialism throughout capitalist development.4 Any contestation of the commercial and utilitarian agenda for the island went on deaf ears, only to be heard when beneficial to the colonizer.

Puerto Rico today is an island in shambles. Despite enduring multiple tropical storms every year, the aftermath of Hurricane Fiona—which made landfall in September 2022—demonstrates that the severity of the situation is beyond the impacts of a natural disaster. Although it was designated as Category 1, the mildest ranking, the storm caused lasting damage throughout the island, devastating people who still face power outages, a lack of clean water, and other challenges months later. Though some government officials and private corporations may be quick to blame the current state of affairs on Puerto Ricans themselves, that is surely not the case. I will argue that the situation in Puerto Rico following Hurricane Fiona is the result of US intervention supporting its own interests at the expense of Puerto Ricans. To do so, I will use dependency theory as a lens to examine the economic policies implemented on the island since the US first arrived. From there, I will use the subaltern to explain the political context surrounding these policies and determine how they have affected the evolution of Puerto Rico. Then, I will demonstrate how these economic and political factors affected the response to Hurricane María, a precursor for the events that unfolded around Fiona. Lastly, I will elaborate on the current conditions on the island following Hurricane Fiona to prove my initial claim. The paper will conclude with areas for further research and final remarks that provide hope for the future.

Dependency Theory and Early Economic Development

Puerto Rico did not reach its current predicament without the help of external sources. Particularly, US colonial influence on the island has played a major role in shaping the economic, political, and social structures that define it. However, in order to understand these features in their entirety, it is important to view them through the lens of dependency theory, which posits that it is a country’s “historical insertion into the

worldwide political-economic system” that determines the course of its development.5 Rejecting modernization theory—a set of economic policy ideas created by Western scholars to make “developing” countries more “developed” through the transformation of traditional society—it seeks to understand the interdependent nature of the world capitalist system by seeing the core, colonizing countries as exploiters of the peripheral, poor countries on which they rely for raw materials and services. This dependent development has generated major inequities, allocating benefits to sectors participating in the world market and denying them to other groups. As such, “the economy of certain countries is conditioned by the development and expansion of another country to which the former is the subject”.6 This dynamic is realized in the relationship between Puerto Rico and the US, as the development of Puerto Rico is reliant upon what the US stands to gain. Therefore, when one actor no longer sees the benefits of engagement, there are serious consequences for the party left in the dust.

This complex dynamic is manifested in the way each country is treated in relation to the other. For instance, in Puerto Rico it is clear that the US had a palpable impact on the policies that determined the island’s economic structure. As a primarily agrarian society during the first period of its rule, agriculture was dominated by US corporations seeking profits from sugar production.7 These actions represent nascent forms of export-oriented production that were key to Puerto Rico’s development into an economic engine of the US. Operation Bootstrap, a 1940s-era strategy that advocated for the modernization of Puerto Rico’s economy through industrialization, was the culmination of these efforts. The initiative mainly centred around providing tax exemptions to American corporations, as Americans knew they would only stand to profit from their territory through outside investment.8

Capitalizing off the proximity to Puerto Rico and its lower labour costs, Operation Bootstrap advocated for a shift toward an

economy “in which the bulk of the island’s production was aimed at the American market instead of the comparatively tiny local market”.9 However, while it successfully industrialized the island by making it attractive for investors’ bottom line, growth in the net income of trade and commerce from $26 million to $375 million between 1940 and 1964 was only surface level.10 The introduction of American industry in Puerto Rico would have a ripple effect throughout the island, impacting not only its economy, but its geography, politics, and society.

As competing industries also grew around the island, new settlements were constructed to meet their needs, further illustrating Puerto Rico’s dependent development. Bolstered by the establishment of new tourist enclaves and their corresponding local housing,11 almost 60 percent of the population was urbanized by 1970.12 Though this transition occurred following the influx of Americans to the island, it also demonstrated the island’s shift away from subsistent forms of production. By the late 1970s, nearly 4/5 of Puerto Rico’s food and related products were imported,

5 Valenzuela, J. Samuel, and Arturo Valenzuela, “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment,” Comparative Politics 10, no. 4 (July 1978): 544. https://doi.org/10.2307/421571

6 Skidmore, Thomas, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green, “Chapters 1 and 2,” in Modern Latin America, 7th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 8.

7 Ficek, Rosa E, “Infrastructure and Colonial Difference in Puerto Rico after Hurricane María,” Transforming Anthropology 26, no. 2 (2018). https://doi.org/10.1111/traa.12129

8 Ruiz Toro, Juan, “Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap | Modern Latin America,” in Modern Latin America: web supplement for 8th edition. Accessed November 20, 2022. https://library.brown.edu/create/modernlatinamerica/ chapters/chapter-12-strategies-for-economic-developmen/ puerto-ricos-operation-bootstrap/

9 Ruiz Toro, “Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap Modern Latin America.”

10 Ruiz Toro.

11 Aponte-Parés, Luis, “The Imperial Gaze.”

12 Dietz, James L., “Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Theoretical Perspective and a Case Study of Puerto Rico,” Review of Radical Political Economics 11, no. 4 (December 1, 1979): 27. https://doi.org/10.1177/048661347901100403

Douek, Daniel, “POLI 319 Lecture: Dependencia - Economic Theories of Development, Modernization, and Marginalization,” McGill University Department of Political Science, October 24, 2022.

2 Douek, “Dependencia.”

3 Aponte-Parés, Luis, “The Imperial Gaze: Tourism and Puerto Rico - A Review Essay,” Centro Journal 31, no. 1 (Spring 2019).

4 Aponte-Parés, “The Imperial Gaze,” 106.

showing how inhabitants could no longer produce the most basic means of survival.13 Though income increased, the proliferation of new industries cost them valuable skills that would have ensured resilience to a decreased US presence. As a result, dependency theory explains that Puerto Rico, as the periphery country, has a “reflex type of development” that is both constrained by its forced incorporation into the global system and reflected in its adaptation to the requirements of the core.14 Therefore, given that Puerto Rico’s development is inherently linked to American needs, it becomes inconceivable to think that the island could somehow evolve beyond its current status. Consequently, when the island was no longer internationally competitive for manufacturing, firms relocated to newly industrializing countries, and many people had to move to the US if they wanted to survive. This dilemma of unequal economic growth and widespread emigration was made easier due to the strong colonial relationship between the two countries. By providing Puerto Ricans with an escape from the labor problems that arose as Operation Bootstrap progressed, US intervention stood to benefit no matter the outcome on the island.

The Plight of the Subaltern: Colonization and Representation

The economic arrangement that produced dependent development in Puerto Rico would not be possible without the political status that gave it a uniquely marginalized social standing. Before Operation Bootstrap was enacted, Puerto Rican people were given US citizenship under the Jones Act of 1917.15 However, despite them being citizens, the law did not allocate them seats in Congress, nor could they vote for president. This lack of representation meant that “Puerto Ricans do not determine their status in their relationship with the US, do not vote on matters that concern the ‘mainland’, and are often not recognized internationally as a country nor as a part of the US”.16 Therefore, the law masked colonial relations and recognized Puerto Rican people as subaltern or “not mattering, not worth listening to,” in comparison to full US citizens.17 Although the subaltern can technically speak for themselves, this arrangement meant that it was only possible to do so through the voice of the dominant actor, who only allows flattering speech. Despite rarely being given this opportunity to provide input, the subaltern must confront the institutionally sanctioned authority every day in other ways.18 For example, Puerto Rican citizenship coincided with the onset of US intervention in World War I, meaning that they only became American to be pawns in another imperialist demonstration of power.19

their own cultural way of life. Moreover, it denied colonial difference by making people more comfortable with the luxuries that working with the US would afford them. As people felt increasingly American via these projects, their expectations of the state and behavior towards it changed. Therefore, the modernization of the island coincided with the strengthening of its subaltern status; the more the US helped, the more Puerto Rico was willing to be complacent and silent. As a result, this mentality transcended every aspect of the island’s evolution.

13 Dietz, James L., “Imperialism and Underdevelopment,” 27.

14 Valenzuela, J. Samuel, and Arturo Valenzuela, “Modernization and Dependency,” 544.

15 Melendez, Eduardo, “Comments on the Jones Act and the Grant of U.S. Citizenship to Puerto Ricans. - Document - Gale

OneFile: Contemporary Women’s Issues,” CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 29, no. 1 (Spring 2017).

16 Vidal-Ortiz, Salvador, “On Being a White Person of Color: Using Autoethnography to Understand Puerto Ricans’ Racialization,” Qualitative Sociology 27, no. 2 (June 1, 2004): 192. https://doi. org/10.1023/B:QUAS.0000020692.05355.6e

17 Beverly, John, “Chapter 3: Our Rigoberta? I, Rigoberta Menchu, Cultural Authority, and the Problem of Subaltern Agency,” in Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory (Durham: Duke University Press, 1999), 66.

18 Beverly, John, “Chapter 3: Our Rigoberta?”

19 Melendez, Eduardo, “Comments on the Jones Act,” 321.

20 Ficek, Rosa E, “Infrastructure and Colonial Difference in Puerto Rico after Hurricane María.”

Puerto Ricans’ subaltern status allowed US intervention to quickly assimilate them to, and become dependent on, an unsustainable way of life. Specifically, while direct involvement of the state in rural electrification brought power to areas “so remote that it did not make sense to electrify them” at the beginning of Operation Bootstrap, Ficek20 notes that the population had to be coaxed into permitting these ventures (p. 105). This happened because people equated becoming infrastructurally connected in the intimate space of the home with American modernity and whiteness. To accept this technology was to conform to American standards and erase

The most notable area where Puerto Rico experiences subalternity is none other than the economy. By the 1970s, private sector employment from Operation Bootstrap had declined and public sector employment rose significantly, supplying nearly 30 percent of the island’s jobs.21 Although there were benefits from providing more government-sponsored work, such as the assimilation of Puerto Ricans to American societal structures, rising public sector employment contributed to unequal expenditure hikes that could not be offset. Given that migration to the mainland became increasingly common in this period due to Operation Bootstrap’s slowing progress, the government faced a double-edged sword of increased spending and decreasing income. According to Dietz,22 the Commonwealth government tried to “buy time” by gathering more debt to bolster the economy. Using American banks to subsidize itself, the core-periphery model that inspired dependency theory becomes increasingly relevant. By 2016, Puerto Rico had amassed $74 billion of debt to Wall Street banks and $50 billion of pension obligations to its employees.23 Since the island’s colonial status prohibited it from filing for relief under the federal bankruptcy code, it enacted its own bankruptcy law in 2014 to save itself from further damage.24 In response, Wall Street bondholders sued Puerto Rico and won the case, ruling that federal law superseded the Puerto Rican bankruptcy law. Subalternity is thus experienced when the periphery is silenced for standing up against the core.

Given that Puerto Rico was no longer an advantageous possession for the US following the downturn of Operation Bootstrap, it was clear that the island would be left vulnerable to political dominance. On July 1, 2016, President Obama signed into law the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA).25 The act established the Financial Oversight and Management Board (FOMB), known in Puerto Rico as la junta, which presides over the government’s fiscal and economic policies.26 Not only are the members of this board appointed by Congress and the president, but the PROMESA bill contains a provision that allows the FOMB to file a petition for debt restructuring in federal court on behalf of the island.27 Similarly, the FOMB has the authority to order the Puerto Rican government to implement its recommendations. It can block the enforcement or execution of certain contracts, executive orders, and “any territorial law or regulation that is inconsistent with [PROMESA] or fiscal reform plans.”28 These clauses clearly show how little faith the US government has in Puerto Ricans, reaffirming their status as subaltern by ensuring that decisions are made without consulting people on the ground, thus increasing their dependence on the state to

21 Dietz, James L., “Imperialism and Underdevelopment,” 28.

22 Dietz, James L., “Imperialism and Underdevelopment,” 29.

23 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath: Redefining Puerto Rico’s Colonial Status?” Current History 118, no. 805 (February 1, 2019): 44. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2019.118.805.43

24 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath.”

25 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath.” 43.

26 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath.”

27 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath.”

28 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath.” 44.

make decisions for them. Even for those who moved to the mainland, this status followed them. In observing an interview, Vidal-Ortiz29 (2004) notes an important question: “Did you identify as Latino in Puerto Rico, or as Puerto Rican? I didn’t, I identified as [Puerto Rican] when I lived in my country. It was when I moved here that I adopted a Latino identity” (p. 182). Moving to the mainland US thus adds another layer to the subaltern identity of Puerto Ricans. No longer were they Puerto Ricans, subordinate to America. They were conflated with other Latinos, subordinate to White Americans and forced to silence the place where they came from. This form of assimilation has had grave consequences, subjecting them to various systemic forms of oppression that have hindered their ability to achieve any means of upward mobility in American society.

One Thing Leads to Another

Hurricane María exposed the fault lines in contemporary colonialism. When it struck Puerto Rico in September of 2017, the island was already in crisis: “Even though countless factories left and homes and businesses were abandoned, the roads and rest of the transport system from the past era remain— full of holes but still in use because there are no other roads. Even though less and less people are able to pay their utility bills, the electrical grid and aqueduct system remain

in place, decaying, but still in use”.30 Although they weren’t perfect due to a lack of investment, these infrastructures concealed Puerto Rico’s colonial difference with false comforts and conveniences. However, with this luxury came dependency on the US to help maintain these norms that it had established, putting the island in grave danger as American interest declined in the years leading up to María. For that reason, “something like the end of the world happened” when it made landfall as a Category 4 hurricane.31 Its strong winds decimated the island’s electricity grid, destroying the promise of progress and development that the original systems provided. Not fully American, the recognition of Puerto Ricans as colonial others when relief efforts began brought their subaltern status into clear view.

Kwasinski, et. al.36 say, “Hurricanes are natural, but disasters are political.” The silencing of grievances, the inequitable aid response, and FEMA’s direct control over relief efforts define the reality of dependent development as a tool for conditioning a population to be subordinate.

29 Vidal-Ortiz, Salvador, “On Being a White Person of Color,” 182.

30 Ficek, Rosa E, “Infrastructure and Colonial Difference in Puerto Rico after Hurricane María,” 107.

31 Ficek, Rosa E, “Infrastructure and Colonial Difference in Puerto Rico after Hurricane María,” 109.

32 Lluch, Jaime, “Trumpist Ethnonationalism and the Federal Response to the COVID-19 Crisis and Other Natural Disasters in Puerto Rico (2017–21),” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 27, no. 3 (July 3, 2021). https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2021.1954297

33 Ficek, Rosa E, “Infrastructure and Colonial Difference in Puerto Rico after Hurricane María.”

34 Ficek, Rosa E, “Infrastructure and Colonial Difference in Puerto Rico after Hurricane María.”

35 Zahn, Max. “Puerto Rico’s Power Grid Is Struggling 5 Years after Hurricane Maria. Here’s Why.” ABC News, September 22, 2022. https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/puerto-ricos-power-gridstruggling-years-hurricane-maria/story?id=90151141

A few days after the devastation of Hurricane María, Former President Trump suggested that Puerto Ricans were ingrates responsible for much of their suffering, placing the blame on a people who had just experienced a tragedy and were grieving their situation (Lluch, 2021).32 This sentiment is echoed in the US’ response, as Puerto Rico received significantly less aid money and relief workers than the states where two other storms had occurred around the same time. Moreover, beyond shaping the physical condition of essential infrastructures, the debt crisis resulting from Operation Bootstrap’s failure also affected the Puerto Rican government’s ability to respond to the disaster.33 Not only was it unable to get money from the US federal government, but its lack of funds prevented it from requesting mutual aid from other states, as well as the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). Once support did arrive, FEMA took direct control of all incoming resources, managing how they were distributed, and at what speed, thus demonstrating how the colonial (core) state’s historic control over Puerto Rico extended to the life and death of its people.34 Consequently, restoring the island wide blackout took 328 days, making it the longest blackout in US history.35 As

Instead of helping create a new society better than the one on the cusp of bankruptcy, the US federal government worked to restore the same economic system that brought Puerto Rico to crisis in the first place. In October of 2018, more than a year after María, the FOMB released a fiscal plan to put the island on a path to financial solvency.37 In order to transform Puerto Rico’s economy and society, la junta agreed to “downsize the public bureaucracy, close and consolidate hospitals, privatize public corporations, eliminate worker-protection legislation,” among other measures like major cuts to the University of Puerto Rico.38 These efforts constitute an experiment in social engineering—where the sole purpose is to extract more value from the vulnerable population—to increase domination and dependency on the US. Combined with Act 73 that provides tax exemptions and credits to businesses, Act 20 that promotes the export of services from Puerto Rico, and Act 22 that attracts new residents to the island, these policies constitute efforts to convince Puerto Ricans that they are, in fact, subaltern. They can only develop when the US is in control.39 Cutting funding in places like education also served to ensure dependency by removing the possibility that Puerto Ricans could educate themselves on the problems they face. In sum, given that the US no longer had invested interest in Puerto Rico, the actions it took in the aftermath of Hurricane María set the island up for future exploitation and failure if another disaster were to strike.

What Now?

Things were expected to change after Hurricane Maria, but they didn’t. Nearly $13 billion in federal support was set aside by

the Trump administration and FEMA to repair the island’s energy system, yet problems persisted.40 Due to disagreements between Puerto Rican officials and FEMA, much of the federal money was never spent and over a million customers on the island experienced intermittent power outages as a feature of daily life.41 The island’s electricity provider, the Puerto Rico Electric Power Authority (PREPA), was also known for having “a revolving door of management...which mimicked political cycles,” making it difficult for any change to occur.42 Given that two governors were ousted between the years of 2019 and 2022, it is clear why the organization went bankrupt and rates were never increased to offset costs; hiking prices would ensure political sabotage.43 As a result, Puerto Rico remained in a perpetual state of need, pushing them to further dependence on the US. Much of the existing infrastructure—plants, transmitter towers, poles, and cables—remained in flood-prone areas or at risk of sea level rise, strong winds, and earthquake damage. Despite grassroots activists and environmental experts arguing that distributed rooftop solar would be cheaper, cleaner, and more resilient than moving what is left of the system, their

36 Kwasinski, Alexis, Fabio Andrade, Marcel J. Castro-Sitiriche, and Efraín O’Neill-Carrillo. “Hurricane Maria Effects on Puerto Rico Electric Power Infrastructure.” IEEE Power and Energy Technology Systems Journal 6, no. 1 (March 2019): 86. https://doi.org/10.1109/ JPETS.2019.2900293

37 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath.”

38 Cabán, Pedro, “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath.” 46.

39 Sotheby’s International Realty: Puerto Rico, “Act 20 - Act 22Act 27 - Act 73 | Puerto Rico Tax Incentives,” June 9, 2016. http:// puertoricotaxincentives.com/

40 Zahn, Max, “Puerto Rico’s Power Grid Is Struggling 5 Years after Hurricane Maria.”

41 Alfonseca, Kiara, “After Hurricane Fiona, Puerto Ricans Are Frustrated with Electric Grid, Infrastructure Problems,” ABC News, September 23, 2022. https://abcnews.go.com/US/hurricane-fiona-puerto-ricans-frustrated-electric-grid-infrastructure/ story?id=90262537

42 Tucker, Emma, “Behind the Blackout Triggered by Hurricane Fiona Is a Long-Embattled History of Puerto Rico’s Weak and Outdated Electrical Grid,” CNN, October 1, 2022. https://www.cnn. com/2022/10/01/us/hurricane-fiona-puerto-rico-electrical-grid

43 Lopez Torregrosa, Luisita, “Opinion Hurricane Fiona Damage Shows That It’s Time for Puerto Rico to Go Its Own Way,” NBC News, September 29, 2022. https://www.nbcnews.com/think/opinion/ hurricane-fiona-damage-shows-puerto-rico-go-way-rcna49809

48

expertise went unheard, and the island remained connected by a centralized power grid.44 In fact, the FOMB hired LUMA Energy, a Canadian-American power company, to take over the management of the power grid in 2021 in a 15-year deal (Tucker, 2022).45 The result is therefore the culmination of suppression by the US, which views Puerto Rico as a subaltern, in an effort to make the island completely dependent on outside powers.

Though LUMA made significant improvements during the first year of its contract, it was not enough to save Puerto Rico from impending natural disasters. Thus, when Hurricane Fiona hit as a weaker Category 1 storm, it was “still powerful enough to thrash the power grid, flood towns small and large, collapse bridges, ruin crops, and leave the 3.3 million residents of the island short on water, food, medicine, everything.”46 This level of devastation depicts how vulnerable Puerto Rico has been made. While President Biden acted promptly after the Hurricane made landfall, issuing emergency declarations, releasing federal money, and dispatching FEMA support, he was slow to announce the pro forma sympathy tour that presidents routinely embark on in disaster areas.47 Hesitation in this form demonstrates the performance of providing aid and demonstrates that Puerto Rico is

not high on the US’ agenda, proving that subalternity causes a positive feedback loop in which every moment of ignorance makes the situation worse. In spite of this fact, residents know that life in Puerto Rico remains a challenge no matter the weather. Cynthia Burgos López, a Puerto Rico resident and executive director of La Maraña, a group dedicated to rebuilding the island, says, “We know that without Fiona, we are not having light. So with Fiona, we were going to be months long without light” (Alfonseca, 2022).48 Living in a mountainous place that is constantly changing is challenging. But living in this environment inside one of the richest countries in the world should not be. The situation is simply the result of dependent development on subaltern people.

Conclusion

44 Lakhani,

45

46 Lopez Torregrosa, Luisita, “It’s Time for Puerto Rico to Go Its Own Way.”

47 Lopez Torregrosa, Luisita, “It’s Time for Puerto Rico to Go Its Own Way.”

49

Puerto Rico remains a nation at war with its oppressor. Along with Haiti and Myanmar, the island has been the most affected in the world by extreme weather such as storms, floods, heatwaves, and droughts, yet data has not driven any meaningful change (Lakhani, 2022).49 This fact comes as no surprise to Puerto Ricans who, as long standing pawns in the US’ colonial agenda, see solutions to their strife yet no means to enact change. Nonetheless, despite their dependent development and their precarious status as citizens rendering them extremely susceptible to damage, people remain hopeful that change will come. With each new challenge, Puerto Ricans will learn from their past mistakes and work toward sustainable development. Further research should therefore be conducted around grassroots efforts at fighting US disaster relief plans, solutions to Puerto Rico’s electricity problems, or the future of this colonial relationship. In conclusion, there is still hope for the island that has contributed so much to a country that neglects to see its value. If American Progress misses the mark somewhere, it is that the virtuous white woman cannot expel everything in her path— there will always be someone who is resilient enough to remain. That outlier is Puerto Rico.

Figure 1. Gast, John, American Progress, 1872. https://mythology.stackexchange.com/questions/5197/ is-it-liberty-or-columbia-depicted-in-john-gasts-american-progress.

Nina, “Thousands Still without Power Weeks after Hurricane Fiona Hit Puerto Rico,” The Guardian, October 12, 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/ oct/12/power-outages-puerto-rico-hurricane-fiona

Tucker, Emma, “Behind the Blackout.”

Alfonseca, Kiara, “After Hurricane Fiona, Puerto Ricans Are Frustrated with Electric Grid.”

Lakhani, Nina, “Thousands Still without Power Weeks after Hurricane Fiona Hit Puerto Rico.”

References

“Act 20 - Act 22 - Act 27 - Act 73 | Puerto Rico Tax Incentives.” 2016. Sotheby’s International Realty: Puerto Rico. June 9, 2016. http://puertoricotaxincentives.com/

Alfonseca, Kiara. 2022. “After Hurricane Fiona, Puerto Ricans Are Frustrated with Electric Grid, Infrastructure Problems.” ABC News. September 23, 2022. https://abcnews.go.com/US/ hurricane-fiona-puerto-ricans-frustrated-electric-grid-infrastructure/story?id=90262537.

Aponte-Parés, Luis. 2019. “The Imperial Gaze: Tourism and Puerto Rico - A Review Essay.” Centro Journal 31 (1): 103–41.

Beverly, John. 1999. “Chapter 3: Our Rigoberta? I, Rigoberta Menchu, Cultural Authority, and the Problem of Subaltern Agency.” In Subalternity and Representation: Arguments in Cultural Theory. Durham: Duke University Press.

Cabán, Pedro. 2019. “Hurricane Maria’s Aftermath: Redefining Puerto Rico’s Colonial Status?” Current History 118 (805): 43–49. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2019.118.805.43

Dietz, James L. 1979. “Imperialism and Underdevelopment: A Theoretical Perspective and a Case Study of Puerto Rico.” Review of Radical Political Economics 11 (4): 16–32. https://doi. org/10.1177/048661347901100403.

Douek, Daniel. 2022. “POLI 319 Lecture: Dependencia - Economic Theories of Development, Modernization, and Marginalization.” McGill University Department of Political Science, October 24.

Ficek, Rosa E. 2018. “Infrastructure and Colonial Difference in Puerto Rico after Hurricane María.” Transforming Anthropology 26 (2): 102–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/traa.12129

Gast, John. 1872. American Progress https://mythology.stackexchange.com/questions/5197/ is-it-liberty-or-columbia-depicted-in-john-gasts-american-progress

Kwasinski, Alexis, Fabio Andrade, Marcel J. Castro-Sitiriche, and Efraín O’Neill-Carrillo. 2019. “Hurricane Maria Effects on Puerto Rico Electric Power Infrastructure.” IEEE Power and Energy Technology Systems Journal 6 (1): 85–94. https://doi.org/10.1109/JPETS.2019.2900293.

Lakhani, Nina. 2022. “Thousands Still without Power Weeks after Hurricane Fiona Hit Puerto Rico.” The Guardian, October 12, 2022, sec. World news. https://www.theguardian.com/ world/2022/oct/12/power-outages-puerto-rico-hurricane-fiona

Lluch, Jaime. 2021. “Trumpist Ethnonationalism and the Federal Response to the COVID-19 Crisis and Other Natural Disasters in Puerto Rico (2017–21).” Nationalism and Ethnic Politics 27 (3): 331–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/13537113.2021.1954297

Lopez Torregrosa, Luisita. 2022. “Opinion | Hurricane Fiona Damage Shows That It’s Time for Puerto Rico to Go Its Own Way.” NBC News. September 29, 2022. https://www.nbcnews.com/ think/opinion/hurricane-fiona-damage-shows-puerto-rico-go-way-rcna49809.

Melendez, Eduardo. 2017. “Comments on the Jones Act and the Grant of U.S. Citizenship to Puerto Ricans. - Document - Gale OneFile: Contemporary Women’s Issues.” CENTRO: Journal of the Center for Puerto Rican Studies 29 (1). https://go.gale.com/ps/retrieve.

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Ruiz Toro, Juan. n.d. “Puerto Rico’s Operation Bootstrap | Modern Latin America.” Modern Latin America: Web Supplement for 8th Edition. Accessed November 20, 2022. https://library.brown. edu/create/modernlatinamerica/chapters/chapter-12-strategies-for-economic-developmen/ puerto-ricos-operation-bootstrap/.

Skidmore, Thomas, Peter H. Smith, and James N. Green. 2010. “Chapters 1 and 2.” In Modern Latin America, 7th ed., 3–41. New York: Oxford University Press.

Tucker, Emma. 2022. “Behind the Blackout Triggered by Hurricane Fiona Is a Long-Embattled History of Puerto Rico’s Weak and Outdated Electrical Grid.” CNN. October 1, 2022. https:// www.cnn.com/2022/10/01/us/hurricane-fiona-puerto-rico-electrical-grid

Valenzuela, J. Samuel, and Arturo Valenzuela. 1978. “Modernization and Dependency: Alternative Perspectives in the Study of Latin American Underdevelopment.” Comparative Politics 10 (4): 535-557. https://doi.org/10.2307/421571.

Vidal-Ortiz, Salvador. 2004. “On Being a White Person of Color: Using Autoethnography to Understand Puerto Ricans’ Racialization.” Qualitative Sociology 27 (2): 179–203. https://doi. org/10.1023/B:QUAS.0000020692.05355.6e.

Zahn, Max. 2022. “Puerto Rico’s Power Grid Is Struggling 5 Years after Hurricane Maria. Here’s Why.” ABC News. September 22, 2022. https://abcnews.go.com/Technology/ puerto-ricos-power-grid-struggling-years-hurricane-maria/story?id=90151141

Geospatial Analysis of Water Treatment Plant Vulnerability to Storm Surge-Induced Flooding and Proposed Adaptive Strategies in Port-au-Prince, Haiti

Violet Massie-Vereker

Climate change adaptation grows increasingly challenging for low-income, low-elevation island states in the Caribbean, with damages amounting to tens of billions of USD per natural disaster. Climate change-induced flooding specifically will become more severe as sea surface temperatures rise, increasing the intensity and frequency of tropical storms and the amount of rainfall. Port-au-Prince, Haiti, faces the brunt of these challenges, with high vulnerability due to political instability, population density, and economic fragility. Vulnerability nodes were identified throughout the city to target adaptation responses based on which storm surge damages would impact the city the most. Water treatment plants were chosen as the infrastructure to focus on, as they are units

that cities require daily to service their needs. By combining coastal dynamic and geomorphological data with sociodemographic data, the southwestern region of the town emerged as the zone with the most significant storm surge flooding risk. After selecting a treatment plant, a decision tree was developed to determine which floodproofing methods would protect the facility’s machinery most effectively. Four methods were selected and classified for implementation in the plant. However, further research is required to determine their cost-effectiveness and funding eligibility. There is a tremendous opportunity for developing vulnerability node adaptation in infrastructure protection, especially in areas of low development with the potential for transformational adaptation.

01 Climate change in the Caribbean

Regarding annual average natural disasters, the Caribbean is among the most vulnerable regions globally, second only to Asia.1 This vulnerability is due to the region’s location in an ocean corridor of cyclogenesis between western Africa and eastern Mexico, where tropical storms form.2 Moreover, global warming has led to higher sea surface temperatures and, thus, more frequent hurricanes. The correlation coefficient between sea surface temperatures and a rise in hurricane frequency for Category 5 hurricanes was 0.82 in 2018.3 Climatological changes have also caused 24-hour wind intensity in tropical storms to increase by 3.8 knots per decade.4

The compound effects of sea level rise (SLR) and these tropical cyclone changes add to wave heights and storm surge volumes. They will cause 1 in 100-year floods every 1 to 30 years in the late 21st century Caribbean under the worst-case scenario of climate forcing.5 Flooding was selected as the critical stressor

Balaguru, Karthik, Gregory R. Foltz, and L. Ruby Leung. 2018.

Hurricane Rapid Intensification in the Central and Eastern Tropical Atlantic.” Geophysical Research Letters 45 (9): 4238–47. https://doi.org/10.1029/2018gl077597

2 Shultz, James M., James P. Kossin, J. Marshall Shepherd, Justine M. Ransdell, Rory Walshe, Ilan Kelman, and Sandro Galea. 2018. “Risks, Health Consequences, and Response Challenges for Small-IslandBased Populations: Observations from the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season.” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 13 (1): 5–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2018.28

3 Hosseini, S. R., M. Scaioni, and M. Marani. 2018. “ON the INFLUENCE of GLOBAL WARMING on ATLANTIC HURRICANE FREQUENCY.” ISPRS - International Archives of the Photogrammetry, Remote Sensing and Spatial Information Sciences XLII-3 (April): 527–32. https://doi. org/10.5194/isprs-archives-xlii-3-527-2018

4 Balaguru, Karthik, Gregory R. Foltz, and L. Ruby Leung. 2018. “Increasing Magnitude of Hurricane Rapid Intensification in the Central and Eastern Tropical Atlantic.” Geophysical Research Letters 45 (9): 4238–47. https://doi.org/10.1029/2018gl077597

5 Marsooli, Reza, Ning Lin, Kerry Emanuel, and Kairui Feng. 2019. “Climate Change Exacerbates Hurricane Flood Hazards along US Atlantic and Gulf Coasts in Spatially Varying Patterns.” Nature Communications 10 (1): 1–9. https://doi.org/10.1038/s41467-019-11755-z.

6 Udika, Rudo. 2010. “Flood Management: An Examination of Mitigation Measures for Flooding in Urban Areas in Trinidad.” Isocarp.net. https:// www.isocarp.net/data/case_studies/1758.pdf

for this study as it is the most common natural hazard facing the Caribbean. It causes more damage than any other severe, weather-related event.6,7

02 Socioeconomic vulnerability to climate change in the Caribbean

Urban areas were chosen for the study’s focus because 80% of all reported disasters in Latin America affect urban areas.8 Furthermore, 80% of the Caribbean population will live in cities by 2050.9 Caribbean cities also experience inadequate enforcement of development standards, deficits in governance and infrastructure, poverty, high reliance on tourism, and unregulated urbanization, all contributing to flooding vulnerability.10 A spatial clustering study identified hotspots of coastal risk, determining that 500,000 individuals in Latin America and the Caribbean live where coastal hazards, exposure, and poverty converge.11 Additionally, the Caribbean region is the most tourism dependent in the world, and 95% of all tourism infrastructure lies within 10km of the coastline, which could cripple the economy.12

7 Chawaga, Peter. 2017. “How to Protect Your Water Supply against Flooding.”www.wateronline.com.November 10, 2017.https://www. wateronline.com/doc/how-to-protect-your-water-supply-againstflooding-0001

8 Bloch, Robin, Nikolaos Papachristodoulou, Rawlings Miller, Jose Monroy, Tiguist Fisseha, Lorena Trejos, Melanie S. Kappes, and Beatriz Pozueta. 2014. “Lessons from Urban Risk Assessments in Latin American and Caribbean Cities.” Development in Practice 24 (4): 502–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2014.907773

9 Wilkinson, Emily, Michel Frojmovic, Garfield Young, Paul Sayers, Mairi Dupar, Margaux Granat, Carol Archer, et al. 2022. “The Caribbean: A Region of Excellence for Urban Climate Resilience Lifelong Learning for Urban Planners.” https://cdn.odi.org/media/documents/ODI_Policy_ brief_Caribbean_urban_climate_resilience.pdf

10 Udika, Rudo. 2010. “Flood Management: An Examination of Mitigation Measures for Flooding in Urban Areas in Trinidad.” Isocarp. net. https://www.isocarp.net/data/case_studies/1758.pdf

11 Calil, Juliano, Borja G. Reguero, Ana R. Zamora, Iñigo J. Losada, and Fernando J. Méndez. 2017. “Comparative Coastal Risk Index (CCRI): A Multidisciplinary Risk Index for Latin America and the Caribbean.” Edited by Juan A. Añel. PLOS ONE 12 (11): e0187011. https://doi. org/10.1371/journal.pone.0187011

12 Udika, Rudo. 2010. “Flood Management: An Examination of Mitigation Measures for Flooding in Urban Areas in Trinidad.” Isocarp. net. https://www.isocarp.net/data/case_studies/1758.pdf

03 Threats to public infrastructure

A determining factor in a city’s vulnerability to coastal flooding is infrastructure. Without adequate infrastructural development, flooding interrupts vital urban processes such as transportation, power generation, water treatment, sanitation, agriculture, education, and trade, decreasing the quality of life. Latin American governments invested a mere 3% in infrastructure in 2018 due to the high debt burden, indicating regionwide vulnerability.13 However, the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations would lose five times less to climate catastrophes if the relevant infrastructure was retrofitted.14

This study will focus on water treatment plants for several reasons. In 2014, 32 million people in Latin America and the Caribbean lacked improved water sources.15 Improved water sources means a “sufficient amount of water (20 L/person/day), at an affordable price (less than 10 % of total household income), available without being subject to extreme effort (less than one hour a day of walking time)”.16 SLR will disproportionately affect the water storage capacities of

13 Watkins, Graham George. 2014. “Approaches to the Assessment and Implementation of Sustainable Infrastructure Projects in Latin American and the Caribbean.” Iadb.org. 2014. https://publications.iadb. org/en/approaches-assessment-and-implementation-sustainable-infrastructure-projects-latin-american-and

14 Mycoo, Michelle, and Michael G. Donovan. 2017. “A Blue Urban Agenda: Adapting to Climate Change in the Coastal Cities of Caribbean and Pacific Small Island Developing States,” May. https:// doi.org/10.18235/0000690

15 Watkins, Graham George. 2014. “Approaches to the Assessment and Implementation of Sustainable Infrastructure Projects in Latin American and the Caribbean.” Iadb.org. 2014. https://publications.iadb. org/en/approaches-assessment-and-implementation-sustainable-infrastructure-projects-latin-american-and

16 Jaitman, Laura. 2015. “Urban Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean: Public Policy Priorities.” Latin American Economic Review 24 (1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40503-015-0027-5

17 Cashman, Adrian, Leonard Nurse, and Charlery John. 2009. “Climate Change in the Caribbean: The Water Management Implications.” The Journal of Environment & Development 19 (1): 42–67. https://doi. org/10.1177/1070496509347088

18 Ibid

low-lying coastal zones, where the size of the land mass partly controls aquifer size.17 Water systems also need to be close to water sources, meaning that infrastructure components are often placed in floodplains and, thus, highly exposed to flood hazards. Moreover, Caribbean countries have seen a rise in water stress in recent decades due to warming in average temperatures and decreased rainfall periods, which lengthens the dry season and increases the frequency of drought conditions.18

Disabled water treatment allows for cross-contamination with wastewater, exposing the serviced population to waterborne infectious diseases such as pneumonia, cholera, leptospirosis, dysentery, E. coli, and typhoid, as well as chemicals and pollutants from hazardous waste sites.19,20 Unsafe water impacts children the most, as damage from childhood diseases and malnutrition can be irreversible. Anemia, for example, can inhibit cognitive development, and infectious diseases left untreated and proliferating in slums can raise child mortality rates.21

19 Shultz,

(1): 5–17. https://doi.org/10.1017/dmp.2018.28

20 Jaitman, Laura. 2015. “Urban Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean: Public Policy Priorities.” Latin American Economic Review 24 (1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40503-015-0027-5

21 Ibid

James M., James P. Kossin, J. Marshall Shepherd, Justine M. Ransdell, Rory Walshe, Ilan Kelman, and Sandro Galea. 2018. “Risks, Health Consequences, and Response Challenges for Small-IslandBased Populations: Observations from the 2017 Atlantic Hurricane Season.” Disaster Medicine and Public Health Preparedness 13

“Increasing Magnitude of

Port-au-Prince, Haiti, was systematically chosen as the case study city because Port-au-Prince has the third largest urban population in the Caribbean, with 1,234,742 residents. The city represents 90% of the nation’s investments and formal jobs.22 Haiti is also a UNESCO World Heritage Small Island Developing State (SIDS), a designation characterized by unstable economies, limited natural resources, growing populations, and risk for climate disaster, with 1 out of 5 residents living in low-elevation coastal zones (LECZs) less than 10 meters above sea level.23,24 Additionally, Haiti has the lowest GDP per capita in the region, at $1,821 USD.25

In 2004 and 2008 alone, 4,000 Haitians died, and 20,000 were left homeless after hurricanes, tropical storms, and flooding.26 The bathymetry around Hispaniola Island varies but is exceptionally shallow in the Port-au-Prince Bay in Haiti, hovering between

22 Forsman, Åsa. 2010. “A Situational Analysis of Metropolitan Port-AuPrince, Haiti.” Unhabitat.org. United Nations Human Settlements Programme. unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2022/10/3021_alt.pdf

23 UNESCO. 2023. “Small Island Developing States | UNESCO.” www. unesco.org. 2023. https://www.unesco.org/en/sids

24 Mycoo, Michelle, and Michael G. Donovan. 2017. “A Blue Urban Agenda: Adapting to Climate Change in the Coastal Cities of Caribbean and Pacific Small Island Developing States,” May. https:// doi.org/10.18235/0000690

25 countryeconomy.com. 2023. “CARICOM - Caribbean Community 2023 | Countryeconomy.com.” Countryeconomy.com. Summer 3, 2023. https://www.countryeconomy.com/countries/groups/ caribbean-community

26 Forsman, Åsa. 2010. “A Situational Analysis of Metropolitan Port-AuPrince, Haiti.” Unhabitat.org. United Nations Human Settlements Programme. unhabitat.org/sites/default/files/2022/10/3021_alt.pdf.

27 GEBCO. 2022. “GEBCO Data Download.” Download.gebco.net. 2022. https://download.gebco.net/

28 Jaitman, Laura. 2015. “Urban Infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean: Public Policy Priorities.” Latin American Economic Review 24 (1). https://doi.org/10.1007/s40503-015-0027-5

29 Ibid

30 World Bank. 2018. “Looking beyond Government-Led Delivery of Water Supply and Sanitation Services: The Market Choices and Practices of Haiti’s Most Vulnerable People.” World Bank. WASH Poverty Diagnostic. https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/ en/764651513150057693/pdf/122047-REVISED.pdf

31 Bignami, Daniele Fabrizio, Renzo Rosso, and Umberto Sanfilippo. 2019. “Flood Proofing Methods.” Flood Proofing in Urban Areas, 69–108. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-05934-7_7

0 and -200 meters, causing higher wave heights and storm surges.27 As such, Haiti’s climatic vulnerability rendered it a fitting hotspot for the study.

The capital city has faced rapid urbanization straining the resource management and provision of services, especially in informal slum settlements. Slum housing renders hundreds of communities impoverished, as tenure is a precursor to public investment; government agencies extend services such as water, drainage, and sewage networks to residents with regularized living situations.28 This rise in population needs to be addressed adequately by water utilities. In 2001, Haiti’s water services coverage in housing was 14.9% for the poorest 20% of the population and 23.2% for the population’s mean.29

Relative to the Caribbean community, Haiti had the lowest water access in 2006 of any nation despite not being the most water scarce island. The statewide failure of the water distribution network, particularly following the 2010 earthquake and a waterborne cholera epidemic, led to the demand for private water services.30 While the privatization of water supplies expanded access, it rendered the water network more vulnerable to economic shocks and, thus, the population more vulnerable to economic instability.

05 Floodproofing vulnerability nodes

A solution that achieves the same goal of defense without externalities includes infrastructural alterations to floodproof individual assets. The Federal Emergency Management Agency defines floodproofing as “any combination of structural and non-structural additions, changes, or adjustments to structures which reduce or eliminate flood damage to real estate or improved real property, water and sanitary facilities, structures, and their contents.”31 The focus is to prevent exposure to flooding or make a building resistant to flood damage.

The paper focuses on assessing and identifying nodes or hotspots of vulnerability. A flood that threatens a hotspot that serves a broader region will have a high floodproofing priority because of the potential impact of its inundation. Hotspot buildings are essential nodes in critical infrastructure upon which urban areas depend for their functioning. Physical alterations to water treatment facilities were chosen as the adaptive measure to minimize the impact of flooding from storm surges and reduce the time the damage prohibits operational capacity. The objective is to evaluate a hotspot at a sufficient resolution that the facility at risk can use the data for local-scale analysis.

Results

01 Geospatial analysis

The geomorphological analysis required a buildup of analysis. To assess vulnerability, areas of low bathymetry, high wave height, and storm surge inundation under the worst-case scenario of a Category 5 hurricane were the coastal dynamic threats. A bathymetric analysis showed that Port-auPrince Bay fell in the 0 to -200m bathymetric range or a shallow range. After narrowing to the Bay, the wave height, storm surge, and elevation raster files were overlaid. This overlay highlighted the risk in the commune boundaries of Port-au-Prince. The sociodemographic data were then incorporated, narrowing the search for a relevant water treatment facility to more population-dense areas. This population density is visible in Figure 1, where the SDE shapefile and the raster overlay are visualized.

Finally, a water treatment facility was selected within the commune’s southwestern population-dense regions. The research identified the SOTRESA water facility, which met the criteria of being a vulnerability node: located next to a vital road connection of Boulevard Jean Jacques Dessalines, having an uneven vertical load due to the change in elevation, including vital functions on the ground level.32 The site was also selected

for its proximity to dense housing, schools, businesses, and houses of worship and for sharing a lot with a hospital.33

02

The plant is a private water supplier that delivers water to the city through direct orders, shops, wholesalers, and street sellers. The company delivers water daily to over 1 million people in the commune and employs 800 workers full-time and 15,000 indirectly, with over 100 trucks servicing 80% of the city (SOTRESA).

Although no floor plans or similar documents are accessible to analyze the technical schematics of the SOTRESA plant structures, approximations were made based on published visual materials. The company contracts ITT Water Equipment Technologies for their machinery, a leading international water purification equipment manufacturer.38 Based on available images of the equipment and comparing the images with listed ITT products, it was possible to use a decision analysis process to determine how to adapt these structures to flood risk.39

32 SOTRESA. 2013. “SOTRESA.” www.sotresa.com. 2013. https://www. sotresa.com

33 Ibid

38 Ibid

39 Schipper,

org/10.1038/s43017-020-00109-9

SOTRESA water treatment plant

Matthieu A. de, Bonnie C. Ludka, Britt Raubenheimer, Arjen P. Luijendijk, and Thomas. A. Schlacher. 2020. “Beach Nourishment Has Complex Implications for the Future of Sandy Shores.” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 2 (1): 70–84. https://doi.

Overlay of enumeration area by population density onto wave height, storm surge, and elevation in Port-au-Prince, Haiti34,35,36,37

34 NOAA. 2022. “Historical Hurricane Tracks.” www.coast. noaa.gov. August 24, 2022. https://www.coast.noaa.gov/ hurricanes/#map=4/32/-80

35 HaitiData. 2021. “CNIGS Spatial Data Haiti Wave Height Zones Zones Hauteur Des Vagues 05/2010.” GeoNode. August 14, 2021. https://www. haitidata.org/layers/cnigsspatialdata_haiti_wave_height_zones_zones_ hauteur_des_vagues_05_2010:geonode:cnigsspatialdata_haiti_wave_ height_zones_zones_hauteur_des_vagues_05_2010

36 OpenTopography. 2010. “OpenTopography - Shuttle Radar Topography Mission (SRTM GL1) Global 30m.” Portal.opentopography.org. 2010. https://portal.opentopography.org/ raster?opentopoID=OTSRTM.082015.4326.1

37 Princeton University Library. 2003. “Population at the SDE (Section d’Énumération) Level Port Au-Prince Haiti 2003 - Digital Maps and Geospatial Data | Princeton University.” Maps.princeton. edu. January 1, 2003. https://maps.princeton.edu/catalog/ tufts-haitipopulationsde2003

Figure 2. Decision tree framework for floodproofing SOTRESA plant equipment40

40 Schipper, Matthieu A. de, Bonnie C. Ludka, Britt Raubenheimer, Arjen P. Luijendijk, and Thomas. A. Schlacher. 2020. “Beach Nourishment Has Complex Implications for the Future of Sandy Shores.” Nature Reviews Earth & Environment 2 (1): 70–84. https://doi. org/10.1038/s43017-020-00109-9

Figure 1.

41 SOTRESA. 2013. “SOTRESA.” www.sotresa.com. 2013. https://www. sotresa.com

42 SOTRESA. 2014. “SOTRESA.” www.youtube.com. April 24, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2ASYRwaywE

43 Permabond. 2015. UL® Classification of Pipe Sealants (Thread Sealants). Permabond. https://www.permabond.com/wp-content/ uploads/2016/01/LH050.jpg

Plastic packaging pumps face the most significant threat in the form of corrosion due to prolonged exposure to water. This primary component at risk is the packaging mechanism itself a), at risk of extended exposure to moisture from ground floor flooding. The adaptation tool for this technology would be dry floodproofing, an anaerobic thread sealant c) to protect critical hinges and joints from corrosion.

44 SOTRESA. 2014. “SOTRESA.” www.youtube.com. April 24, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2ASYRwaywE

45 Agrico Plastics. 2023. “1050 US Gallons Close-Top Cone Bottom Tank. - Stand and 2” Outlet INCLUDED.” Agrico Plastics. March 28, 2023. https://agricoplastiques.com/ en/1050-gallons-cone-bottom-tank-closed-top-cbn40359

The following structure is the treated water storage tank. The primary threat visible in the available images a) concerns the legs of the structure, which fit into joints at the base of the tanks and are small in diameter, lacking sufficient bracings. These features could cause collapse under un-equalized water pressure or extreme surge flooding. The solution, in this case, would be wet floodproofing in the form of a polyethylene tank stand b), preventing the base from corrosion and providing adequate bracing against uneven impact.

Figure 4. Proposed adaptation for water storage44,45

Figure 3. Proposed adaptation for packaging41,42,43

55,56,57

46 Bukhary, Saria, Jacimaria Batista, and Sajjad Ahmad. 2020. “Design Aspects, Energy Consumption Evaluation, and Offset for Drinking Water Treatment Operation.” Water 12 (6): 1772. https://doi. org/10.3390/w12061772

47 SOTRESA. 2013. “SOTRESA.” www.sotresa.com. 2013. https://www. sotresa.com

48 Generac. 2022. “1000kW Diesel Generator.” Generac Industrial Power. 2022. https://www.generac.com/Industrial/products/ diesel-generators/configured/1000kw-diesel-generator

49 Yang, Jianxiang. 2014. “Goldwind Powers Desalination Plant with Onsite Turbine.” www.windpowermonthly.com. May 21, 2014. https://www.windpowermonthly.com/article/1295273/ goldwind-powers-desalination-plant-onsite-turbine

50 Ebrahimi-Nik, Mohammadali, Ava Heidari, Shamim Ramezani Azghandi, Fatemeh Asadi Mohammadi, and Habibollah Younesi. 2018. “Drinking Water Treatment Sludge as an Effective Additive for Biogas Production from Food Waste; Kinetic Evaluation and Biomethane Potential Test.” Bioresource Technology 260 (July): 421–26. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.biortech.2018.03.112

51 Solartron Energy. 2016. “Water Treatment | Reverse Osmosis System.” Solartron. 2016. https://www.solartronenergy.com/water-treatment/

52 FuturENVIRO. 2019. “Acciona Officially Opens the Saint John Drinking Water Treatment Plant in Canada FuturENVIRO - Revista Técnica de Medio Ambiente.” FuturENVIRO. June 21, 2019. https:// futurenviro.es/en/acciona-officially-opens-the-saint-john-drinkingwater-treatment-plant-in-canada/

53 Casini, M. 2015. “Harvesting Energy from In-Pipe Hydro Systems at Urban and Building Scale.” International Journal of Smart Grid and Clean Energy. https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Harvestingenergy-from-in-pipe-hydro-systems-at-and-Casini/5e604c633070f2 0366b868a7c8beeb835564dc43

54 Guzmán-Avalos, Pablo, Daniel Molinero-Hernández, Sergio GalvánGonzález, Nicolás Herrera-Sandoval, Gildardo Solorio-Díaz, and Carlos Rubio-Maya. 2023. “Numerical Design and Optimization of a Hydraulic Micro-Turbine Adapted to a Wastewater Treatment Plant.” Alexandria Engineering Journal 62 (January): 555–65. https://doi. org/10.1016/j.aej.2022.07.004

55 Wibowo, Arsanto Ishadi, and Keh-Chin Chang. 2020. “Solar EnergyBased Water Treatment System Applicable to the Remote Areas: Case of Indonesia.” Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development 10 (2): 347–56. https://doi.org/10.2166/washdev.2020.003

56 Bukhary, Saria, Jacimaria Batista, and Sajjad Ahmad. 2020. “Design Aspects, Energy Consumption Evaluation, and Offset for Drinking Water Treatment Operation.” Water 12 (6): 1772. https://doi. org/10.3390/w12061772

57 USGS. 2021. “How Many Homes Can an Average Wind Turbine Power? | U.S. Geological Survey.” Www.usgs.gov. 2021. https://www.usgs.gov/faqs/ how-many-homes-can-average-wind-turbine-power#:~:text=At%20 a%2042%25%20capacity%20factor

58 SOTRESA. 2013. “SOTRESA.” www.sotresa.com. 2013. https://www. sotresa.com

59 SOTRESA. 2014. “SOTRESA.” www.youtube.com. April 24, 2014. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=N2ASYRwaywE

The third piece of equipment is the polymer coagulation sediment filter and pump. The primary concern is losing power for this energy-intensive machine during flooding. As such, the most apt solution would be a backup power source. In estimating energy consumption, coagulant addition using a metering pump took 85.8 kWh day-1, polymer addition with a jet diffuser pump a) used 202.8 kWh day-1, and flash mixing with a static mixer b) took 275.2 kWh day-1, amounting to 664 kWh day-1 46 As pictured in Figure 5, a Diesel generator c) and on-site wind turbine d) could cover the power requirements, producing 1040 kWh day-1 and 6393 kWh day-1, respectively. A combination of the following sources could act as power adaptation in addition: in-line microturbine e) providing 213 kWh day-1, a solar panel f) providing 353 kWh day-1 or a biogas lean-burn engine g) yielding 491 kWh day-1

The final adaptation solution focused on the pressurized filtration and centrifugal pump involved in the pre-treatment water purification. Because this mechanism involves multiple complex components close to the flood line, including micro-filtration tubes, a control panel, and a centrifugal pump, constructing a barrier is the best solution. A cost-effective, easily sourced, and waterproof material for a barrier would be concrete, supported by a footing platform, and backed by a waterproof membrane. At the floodwall’s base on the equipment’s side would be weeping stone drainage and a drain in the event of water penetration.

Figure 6. Proposed adaptation for filter58,59

Figure 5. Proposed adaptation for the jet diffuser pump47,48,49,50,51,52,53,54,

Although complete schematics are only possible to produce with specific measurements, the results of the adaptation decision tree provide a strong approximation of what it would take to floodproof the SOTRESA water treatment plant. Floodproofing a single water treatment facility may seem futile in the face of devastating storm surge flooding. However, the SOTRESA plant is a high-impact vulnerability node, serving packaged water daily to nearly the entire population of the Port-au-Prince commune.

A lack of mobilization around water infrastructure adaptation can lead to even further vulnerability. The financial losses regarding the impacts of infrastructure damages are estimated at $2,000,000 annually, meaning $460,000 is attributable to infrastructure.60 Moreover, if the plant were to shut down during a crisis, an already strained population would face further financial burden with the loss of wages or employment for almost 16,000 individuals indirectly.

Although the effects of floodproofing the SOTRESA plant would be monumental, local action is only limited to action at other levels that target underlying vulnerabilities. Climate change education campaigns must build on experiential knowledge, targeting engineering and planning professionals and engaging coastal communities through participatory mapping and 3D modeling to verify vulnerability analyses.61 Further water infrastructure adaptation could occur through

60 Ibid

regional development plans, addressing climate change impacts in employer-client mandates, instating regulations concerning rainwater harvesting, and mandating gray water recycling for tourism resorts.62

Limitations

There are several major limitations to this study, including the lack of cost assessment for the adaptation techniques, risk monitoring, and site-specific schematics. A formal way to structure the vulnerability node assessment and assessment of equipment vulnerable to flood inundation would have been a damage loss and needs assessment. This would have yielded cost-based quantitative results regarding the cost of damages in the case of inaction and the potential for savings in the case of adaptation application. The results could have been verified with a cost effectiveness analysis of the selected adaptation solutions, incorporating budget restrictions based on the probability of funding. This strategy could identify potential bundling of adaptation alterations which could qualify for a collective funding grant. Concerning risk monitoring, incorporating this into the proposed adaptation solutions would extend the longevity of all proposed floodproofing mechanisms. This is because a monitoring system would continuously gather data on flooding stressors in the facility, such that minor alterations could be implemented prior to infrastructural damage or collapse. Finally, site specific schematics would have allowed for precise adaptation suggestions, where measured floodproofing techniques could be applied specifically to the dimensions of the SOTRESA plant equipment.

Conclusion

Few regions are more vulnerable to climatic variability than the low-lying islands in the Caribbean. By targeting vulnerability nodes, climate change adaptation is well within reach of Small Island Developing States in the Caribbean. Instead of approaching adaptation through state governance or individual consumption, targeting through a sectoral lens with infrastructure protection allows for major impacts from small adaptive adjustments. In addition to the incremental planning in advance of worst-case scenarios like the high tide Category 5 storm surge used in this study, infrastructure adaptation has much more to accomplish. The CARICOM nations require stronger regional climate policy, and a transformational adaptation incorporating climate risk into all initial building design and spatial planning decisions.

61 Bloch, Robin, Nikolaos Papachristodoulou, Rawlings Miller, Jose Monroy, Tiguist Fisseha, Lorena Trejos, Melanie S. Kappes, and Beatriz Pozueta. 2014. “Lessons from Urban Risk Assessments in Latin American and Caribbean Cities.” Development in Practice 24 (4): 502–13. https://doi.org/10.1080/09614524.2014.907773

62 Moncada, Stefano, Catherine Iorns, Ilan Kelman, Hilary Bambrick, Leonard Nurse, and Lino Briguglio. 2021. “Small Island Developing States.” Springerprofessional.de. January 1, 2021. https://www.springerprofessional.de/en/small-island-developing-states/19773278

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Charter City and its “Birthplace” - Hong Kong: Do Charter Cities Worsen Inequality Instead of Alleviating Poverty?

Chester Chau

Abstract

Ever since Paul Romer’s idea of charter cities was introduced in 2009, there have been a lot of discussions in both academia and among the general public. While most of the discussions revolve around issues of its political legitimacy or its actual economic outcome, little is being mentioned about its implication on inequality. By studying the high land-price policy in Hong Kong and its impacts on inequality, I examine how charter cities would only worsen inequality mainly due to Romer’s proposal of adopting a high land-price policy for the charter cities and the impracticality of transitioning to liberal democracy in the host country through charter cities.

Keywords: Charter City; New Cities; Inequality; Poverty; Hong Kong; SEZ; Housing; High Land Price; Democracy.

First discussed among a small group of individuals in 2008, the concept of charter cities was officially launched by Nobel Laureate and economist Paul Romer in his 2009 TED Talk. Using the dynamics between Hong Kong and China as his prime example, he argues that the poverty problem in low- to middle-income countries could be addressed by establishing charter cities that operate under a different set of rules from the host country itself. While there are already other types of special jurisdictions related to charter cities, like special economic zones (SEZs), what makes charter cities stand out is that each would be administered by a high-income, third-party country rather than the host country itself, just like Hong Kong during British rule.1 He also mentioned that the primary source of capital for the initiation of the city would be from the land sale, for which he believes a high land-price policy like the one in Hong Kong would be adopted.2

The concept received both positive and negative feedback. Some criticised the idea as neo-colonial since charter cities require less developed countries to concede their sovereignty to more developed countries,

often Western countries with colonial histories.3 The governing of the cities would also potentially be undemocratic to the residents of the cities. The government would need to be more centralised, or even authoritarian, in order to run charter cities successfully.4 While many scholars see the shortcomings associated with charter cities, some of them believe charter cities are still the “second best” option to promote development and alleviate poverty, albeit with some limitations.5

While Romer has mentioned that Hong Kong is the very inspiration of charter cities on several occasions, it is also ironic to see that Hong Kong is cited as an example of successful poverty alleviation. Although it is true that Hong Kong had the fourthhighest Human Development Index (HDI) value in the world in 2019, which put Hong Kong in the “very high human development” category, it is also true that Hong Kong’s inequality problem is one of the worst in the world.6 A widely recognised index, the Gini coefficient measures the inequality within a nation or a social group. The coefficient can also be expressed as a percentage, with a percentage of 50% or higher indicating “considerable disparity”.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Ranging from scholarly articles to newspaper editorials and think tank reports, a wide variety of literature related to charter cities is available, and a majority of the literature focuses on both the benefits and shortcomings of charter cities in terms of economic outcomes or political legitimacy. By running various economic models on different SEZs - the nearest existing empirical analogue to charter cities - the intervention report published by the research organisation Rethink Priorities argues that charter cities may not be able to achieve the economic goals that others would have expected. SEZs in general do not seem to grow faster on average than their host country, and there seem to be no policy and regulation features that correlate with the high level of growth. The successful stories that charter city advocates often quote might also be hard to replicate as other factors, such as proximity to trading partners and highly skilled labour migration, also played a big role in the development of those cities.9

involved are less tractable, and resolving them by having a higher level of international engagement could, in turn, undermine the legitimacy of charter cities. Both authors recognise the debate around charter cities but diverge in their level of optimism about their potential benefits.

Overall, most of the discussions revolve around the economic and political aspects of charter cities, with relatively little attention paid to the social impacts, especially inequality. Therefore, based on the findings, this paper further elaborates on the potential socio-economic implications of the economic and political structure of charter cities.

WHAT ARE CHARTER CITIES?

Bernard, D. R. (2021, July 9). Intervention report: Charter cities. Rethink Priorities. Retrieved March 28, 2022.

2 Paul Romer, “Why the World Needs Charter Cities,” filmed July 2009, TED video, https://www.ted.com/talks/ paul_romer_why_the_world_needs_charter_cities

3 Sagar, R. (2016). Are charter cities legitimate? Journal of Political Philosophy, 24(4), 509–529.

4 Milton, A. (2020, May 13). Why charter cities won’t lead to Decentralized Government. Palladium. Retrieved March 28, 2022.

5 Freiman, C. (2013). Cosmopolitanism within borders: On behalf of Charter Cities.

6 Human Development Report 2020. (2020). (rep.). Hong Kong, China (SAR) - Human Development Reports. Retrieved March 28, 2022.

7 Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). Country ComparisonsGini index Coefficient - distribution of family income. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved March 28, 2022.

8 hkeconomy.gov.hk (n.d.). Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient compared with other economies. Retrieved March 28, 2022.

According to the CIA World Factbook, Hong Kong had a Gini percentage of 53.9% in 2016, making it the eighth-highest in the world and the highest in the developed world.7 It is evident that Hong Kong has a serious problem with income inequality, and it has no signs of going down either as the gap has been widening over the past decades8 (hkeconomy.gov.hk, n.d.). This shows Hong Kong is not the best example for reducing economic inequality, and any development model that is based on Hong Kong without significant alteration would be doomed to follow the same trajectory. By examining the effect of the high land price policy on inequality in Hong Kong, the “birthplace” of charter cities, and the possibility of having liberal democracy in charter cities in general, this paper aims to study how the economic and political structure of charter cities would affect inequality in charter cities.

Meanwhile, the scholarship by Ebner & Peck (2021) focuses on the political shortcoming of charter cities, with a particular emphasis on the repeating history of governmental corruption, corporate opportunism, and banana republicanism. The magazine article written by Milton (2018) also discussed why charter cities would not lead to decentralised government and, to an extent, democratic government.

On the other hand, Freiman (2013) is more optimistic about charter cities. Although he acknowledges the controversies regarding charter cities, he still believes that charter cities are the “second best” option to alleviate poverty. Compared to foreign aid, charter cities are more cost-efficient since they promote labour mobility. Sagar (2016), while believing that charter cities could be politically legitimate, is more cautious and sceptical than Freiman. Even though moral challenges regarding political legitimacy are resolvable, the practical challenges

As mentioned above, charter cities essentially extend the concept of SEZs by increasing their size and expanding the scope of their reforms. Rather than only reforming rules that purely relate to economic policies, charter cities require reforms of all the rules needed to structure interactions in a well-run city and to support market exchange. Thus, it allows for government partnerships that facilitate the transfer of rules from the partner country to the new locations.10 While the governance structure of each charter city could differ, Fuller & Romer believes that all charter cities are based on four common elements: first, a piece of undeveloped land, ideally along the coast; second, a charter that pre-specifies the broad rules; third, a commitment to choices that are backed by both voluntary entry and free exit for all residents, employers, and investors; and fourth, equal treatment to all residents under the law.11 By emphasising his commitment to voluntary choice for both the residents and

9 Bernard, 2021.

10 Fuller, B., Romer, P., & Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy. (2012). Success and the city : how charter cities could transform the developing world (Ser. Macdonald-laurier institute publication). Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy.

11 Fuller and Romer, 2012.

the host country, he emphasises that charter cities are not neo-colonial in nature. Only countries that want to create a charter city would offer the land, and only residents who want to move in would move in, meaning that no coercion is involved.12

Nonetheless, the scale of infrastructure and policies required to materialise such cities is unprecedented. Therefore, it is not surprising that none of the potential charter city projects have actually materialised. Ever since Romer released his grand idea, two countries had expressed their interest in the idea - Madagascar and Honduras. However, the projects did not progress as expected. The reformist president of Madagascar, Marc Ravalomanana, was interested in establishing two charter cities to boost the economy of the country, but it was immediately called off as soon as Ravalomanana lost his presidency in 2009 in a coup d’état.13 Incidentally, in Honduras, charter cities were made possible because of a coup. The hard-right administration rose to power in the 2009 coup, and this allowed Romer to negotiate for the establishment of charter cities in the country. However, Romer resigned from the project in 2012 after various scandals related to the Honduran project. He also seemed to lose interest in charter cities.14 Although the project is still progressing in the absence of Romer, academics are sceptical about it. The factors that led to the failure of the planning in the early stage of the Honduran

project still persist: secretive negotiation with the administration; absence of community involvement; heavy-handed and violet expropriations; backing from a cabal of foreign speculators and libertarian activists.15

HIGH LAND-PRICE POLICY, LIMITED DEMOCRACY & INEQUALITY

Although the concept of charter cities itself has also undergone significant changes ever since its launch in 2009, the discussion on how to finance them has been relatively unchanged.16 In Romer’s TED talk in 2009, he proposed that Hong Kong and Singapore’s high land-price policy could be used to finance the charter cities at the beginning stage. By selling the land at a high price, charter cities could use the surplus value from the land sale to establish various infrastructures such as the police, courts, school system, and healthcare system. These infrastructures could make the city a place where people would have higher incomes, which, in turn, makes the land more valuable and thus attracts even more investments. Besides his initial TED talk, Romer also published works in which he spoke about how allowing foreign governments to oversee the charter city would attract more foreign investment. However, no details were given in terms of how they would attract such investments in practice, especially at the beginning stage.17 Based on the current literature, the arguments in this paper have been developed on the assumption that a high land-price policy is the primary structure of the economy in charter cities.

HIGH LAND PRICES IN HONG KONG & THEIR IMPLICATION

sales, and real estate-related tax incomes have constituted more than half of the government revenue.19 After the Sino-British Joint Declaration was made in the 1980s, land sales were also under strict control for a brief period. Until 1997, the year when Hong Kong was handed over to China, the annual land release was restricted to a mere 50 acres.20 The government would also ensure that the housing market remained relatively stable by regulating the supply of new public housing.21 This shows that a de facto high land-price policy does exist in Hong Kong.

As a result, property price in Hong Kong remains high and has continued to grow in the past decades. This not only leads to unaffordability of housing but also inequality between those who live in public and private housing. Over the course of 35 years, tenants in public housing in Hong Kong have only become poorer, while those in the private housing sector are now much wealthier.22 This also signifies the problem of a shrinking middle class. Although the problem is not unique to Hong Kong, its effects there are particularly prominent. Income and wealth inequality for the shrinking middle class is especially driven by rising property prices, and Hong Kong’s high baseline property prices only magnify the effects.23

LIMITED DEMOCRACY IN CHARTER CITIES & ITS IMPLICATIONS

While the discussion above mainly revolves around the relationship between inequality and the high land price policy in Hong Kong, such a relationship could also be equally applied to charter cities if they insist on adopting the Hongkongese model. The good news is that the issue of inequality could potentially be resolved if liberal democracy is possible in charter cities. As Hong Kong is not a full-fledged democracy, citizens of Hong Kong can only influence the government’s policies in limited ways. Thus, the government only has to satisfy the demand of those who are important to the administration, in this case, the real estate industry. However, if citizens had greater influence over the government, through elections, then the government would have more incentives to listen to the demands of the citizens, which includes keeping the property price at an affordable level.

12 Paul Romer, “Why the World Needs Charter Cities,” filmed July 2009, TED video, https://www.ted.com/talks/paul_romer_why_ the_world_needs_charter_cities

13 Ebner, N., & Peck, J. (2021). Fantasy Island : Paul Romer and the multiplication of Hong Kong. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 46(1), 26–49.

14 Fuller and Romer, 2012.

15 Ebner and Peck, 2021.

16 Bernard and Schukraft, 2021.

17 Fuller and Romer, 2021.

18 Wong, R. Y. C. (2015). Hong Kong land for Hong Kong people: Fixing the failures of our housing policy. Hong Kong University Press.

While there is no evidence that proves the Hong Kong government has officially adopted a high land-price policy, various historical events and policies show that the government has no incentive to lower the land price in Hong Kong.18 Together with other profit taxes paid by property developers, such as transaction-based stamp duties and other costs involved in construction, land

The phenomenon could be explained by the lack of upward social mobility under such a land regime. Wong (2017:165) found that children who grew up in families that owned their homes had significant schooling attainment advantages over those who rented private units, in terms of years of schooling received. Together with the fact that public housing estates tend to have more divorced families, neighbourhoods with weak communities – in the forms of both public housing and private rental housing –generally provide less motivation for children to pursue higher aspirations, which is detrimental to upward social mobility and, in turn, social equality.24

Therefore, the real question here is whether democracy is actually possible in charter cities. Even though Romer claims that the door is always open for charter cities to transition to liberal democracy, it is unlikely that this would happen at the early stage of the establishment. As a charter city requires prudent and stable leadership, important features of democracy, like frequent elections, would become detrimental to the leadership. Thus, the prolonged divergence of charter cities from liberal democracy would

a high land-price policy. Journal of Urban Planning and Development 137(2), 112–120.

20 Wong et al., 2011.

21 Wong et al., 2011.

22 Wong, R. Y. C. (2017). Fixing inequality in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press.

23 Wong, 2017.

24 Wong, 2017.

19 Wong, F. W., Chan, E. H., & Yu, A. T. (2011). Property developers’ major cost concerns arising from planning regulations under

likely be the norm.25 Moreover, host countries would probably not allow their charter cities to be liberal democracies since they often use charter cities as a tool to legitimise their regime and further tighten their grip on the country. Taking Saudi Arabia’s NEOM project as an example, instead of decentralising the government and democratising the country, the Saudi government hopes that a successful NEOM will allow them to deepen their long-term resilience in the existing power structure by increasing legitimacy via economic growth and creating testing spaces for reforms with minimal country-wide disruption.26 If the charter cities in Honduras ever succeed, the cities may just end up becoming vehicles for the central Honduran elites to expand territorial control rather than build institutions.27

In reality, there are essentially no incentives for the host country to allow democratisation to happen in charter cities. Democratisation could potentially threaten their own regime if the movement ever becomes national in the host country. Thus, with the absence of liberal democracies in charter cities, a Hong Kong-based model for charter cities would be doomed to follow the same trajectory where citizens suffer from the inequality caused by high land prices with no democratic channels for change.

CONCLUSION

The unique role of Hong Kong within the pan-Chinese economy has no doubt allowed Hongkongers’ wages to be greatly increased, which helped Hong Kong become part of the developed world in the 1980s.28 However, as time goes by, the problem of inequality

has also become more and more prominent, with no signs of being reduced either in the past decades or in the near future. The rich continue to become richer, the poor continue to become poorer, and the middle class begins to sink because of the polarisation of the economic classes in the city caused by the high land price. Upward social mobility is limited as well. Without democracy, the voice of the poor and the shrinking middle class cannot be properly heard and addressed by the government, making society even more skewed toward the rich and worsening social inequality. Therefore, it is no surprise to see that the gap between housing prices and construction costs in Hong Kong started to widen in the 1980s, which coincided with the boom that came after China opened up its economy in 1979.29

If time could be stopped, just like when Romer was in his flashback to mid-century Hong Kong in his TED talk, then it would be possible for charter cities to alleviate poverty without causing significant social inequality. Unfortunately, this is not the way the world works. If charter cities are going to be run based on the Hongkongese economic model with no significant alteration, meaning an economy based on a high land-price policy with limited democracy, it will eventually run into walls. By that time, it might already be too late to fix the problems that arose from charter cities, particularly inequality problems caused by housing problems.

While this paper puts a heavy emphasis on how the high land-price policy in Hong Kong exacerbates existing inequality in society, literature on the political structure and legitimacy of charter cities was mainly used to study how liberal democracy would be impractical to be implemented in charter cities as a tool to address inequality. However, little analysis was done on how limited democracy in charter cities would impact the inequality situation directly. More research on this topic should be conducted in the future to give a full picture of the relationship between limited democracy and inequality in charter cities.

References

Bernard, D. R. (2021, July 9). Intervention report: Charter cities. Rethink Priorities. Retrieved March 28, 2022, from https://rethinkpriorities.org/publications/ intervention-report-charter-cities

Central Intelligence Agency. (n.d.). Country Comparisons - Gini index Coefficient - distribution of family income. Central Intelligence Agency. Retrieved March 28, 2022, from https:// www.cia.gov/the-world-factbook/field/gini-index-coefficient-distribution-of-family-income/ country-comparison.

Ebner, N., & Peck, J. (2021). Fantasy Island : Paul Romer and the multiplication of Hong Kong. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 46(1), 26–49. https://doi. org/10.1111/1468-2427.13060

Freiman, C. (2013). Cosmopolitanism within borders: On behalf of Charter Cities. Journal of Applied Philosophy, 30(1), 40–52. https://doi.org/10.1111/japp.12008

Fuller, B., Romer, P., & Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy. (2012). Success and the city : how charter cities could transform the developing world (Ser. Macdonald-laurier institute publication). Macdonald-Laurier Institute for Public Policy. Retrieved March 28, 2022, from https://www-deslibris-ca.proxy3.library.mcgill.ca/ID/233634.

hkeconomy.gov.hk. (n.d.). Hong Kong’s Gini coefficient compared with other economies. Retrieved March 28, 2022, from https://www.hkeconomy.gov.hk/en/pdf/wp/gini_comparison.pdf.

Human Development Report 2020. (2020). (rep.). Hong Kong, China (SAR) - Human Development Reports. Retrieved March 28, 2022, from https://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/ Country-Profiles/HKG.pdf

Milton, A. (2020, May 13). Why charter cities won’t lead to Decentralized Government. Palladium. Retrieved March 28, 2022, from https://palladiummag.com/2018/10/08/ why-charter-cities-wont-lead-to-decentralized-government/.

Ng, M. K., Lau, Y. T., Chen, H., & He, S. (2021). Dual land regime, income inequalities and multifaceted socio-economic and spatial segregation in Hong Kong. The Urban Book Series, 113–133. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-64569-4_6.

Sagar, R. (2016). Are charter cities legitimate? Journal of Political Philosophy, 24(4), 509–529. https://doi.org/10.1111/jopp.12089

Wong, F. W., Chan, E. H., & Yu, A. T. (2011). Property developers’ major cost concerns arising from planning regulations under a high land-price policy. Journal of Urban Planning and Development, 137(2), 112–120. https://doi.org/10.1061/(asce)up.1943-5444.0000046

Wong, R. Y. C. (2015). Hong Kong land for Hong Kong people: Fixing the failures of our housing policy. Hong Kong University Press.

Wong, R. Y. C. (2017). Fixing inequality in Hong Kong. Hong Kong University Press.

25 Sagar, 2016.

26 Milton, 2018.

27 Milton, 2018.

28 Ng, M. K., Lau, Y. T., Chen, H., & He, S. (2021). Dual land regime, income inequalities and multifaceted socio-economic and spatial segregation in Hong Kong. The Urban Book Series, 113–133.

29 Wong, 2015.

The Life and Death of the MUGS Lounge: A Brief History of MUGS Lounge

BH305 and Its Move

MUGS Executive Board

Introduction

The McGill Undergraduate Geography Society (MUGS) lounge Burnside Hall (BH) 305 was moved in Fall 2022 in the systematic reorganization of the Faculty of Science administrative structure. The top-down nature of this process shows that the faculty ignored students’ right to the space and have an insufficient understanding of the place. After contextualizing the lounge within a broader history of the department, this article will examine the process and impact of the move.

Theoretical Framework

We as geography students are naturally sensitive to the concept of “space”. The MUGS lounge, as a public, third space for geography students, is a “place” that carries meanings. Thus, I will start by analysing several important concepts: “space” and “place”, public space, third place.

01 Space and place

Space and place are key concepts in geography. Rather than directly defining these two concepts, current literature tends to

reveal their connotation by comparing them.1 They refer to different aspects of an entity. Space is more abstract and physical. Humans can feel space through movement. But once humans attach a certain meaning to a space, it becomes a place.2 Sense of place describes the bond between human and place. The interrelation of physical setting (materiality, appearance), activities (programming, functions) and meanings (symbols, memories) create the sense of place.3 When talking about geography, we tend to consider landscape or territory in a broad scale, but place can exist in multiple levels and forms. Place has been a central component to human geography. Current literature focuses more on how place is constructed through various relations, such as social structures and power imbalances.4

02 Placemaking

Meeting both criteria, the MUGS lounge fostered active interactions and was loved by students. The transition from lounge to office symbolizes a change from public to private space. Since the 1990s, academia has expressed an increasing fear about the privatization of public spaces because of the exclusion, homogenisation, and commodification that follows.10 Public space is a key element of “the right to the city”.11 The right to public space implies that everyone should have equal opportunities to participate in its design, management, and use.12 In the case of the MUGS lounge, users of the space should have the right to the room, and any change of such public spaces should include the participation of all users.

Methodology

01 Document analysis

Although I have a list of the questions, I did not ask them in an organized sequence and formal way. In many cases, the responses just naturally popped out when I explained the move and intention for the interview.

With the help of Patrice, the president of Graduate Geography Society (GGS), we also interviewed graduate students and professors. However, because most interviewees did not want to engage in the move afterwards, we chose to keep the comments of graduate students anonymous.

03 Record of physical changes in the lounge

Cresswell, T. (2014). Place: An Introduction. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated.

2 Cresswell (2014).

3 Relph (1976).

4 Chouinard, V. (1997). Structure and Agency: Contested Concepts in Human Geography. The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien, 41(4), 363–377.

5 Serin, B. (2018). Cross Disciplinary Review ofPlacemaking Literature: ALiterature Mapping.

6 Bull, M. (2008). Place-making: Planning, modernity and humanistic geography. Doctoral Dissertations 1–217.

7 Oldenburg, R. (1989). The great good place: Cafés, coffee shops, community centers, beauty parlors, generalstores, bars, hangouts, and howthey get you through the day (1st ed). Paragon House.

8 Fyfe, N. (2006). Images ofthe Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space. Routledge.

9 Jordan, P. (2014). The Meaning of Bilingual Naming in Public Space for the Cultural Identity of Linguistic Minorities. Review of Historical Geography and Toponomastics, IX, 21–24.

Placemaking is a term more commonly used in urban planning as one way to construct a “place” intentionally, believing space design can foster place attachment and values.5 Some scholars also point out that not only the physical design, but also the activities and usages that maintain the space afterwards are also critical in placemaking.6 Urban planners pay more and more attention to third spaces, which refers to places outside of work and home where people engage in less productivity-focused and more abstract social activities.7 Third places can bond people from different backgrounds and foster community.

03 Public Space and the Right to the City

Sociable activities often take place in public spaces, making them vital components of urban environments that fosters social interaction, cultural exchange, and civic participation. Public spaces that are accessible, flexible, and adaptable to the needs of the community attract a more diverse range of users and foster social interaction.8 The public spaces with cultural identity of the community are more likely to be valued and used by residents.9

To contextualize the change of the lounge, this article gathers various McGill internal sources. Most sources are used to support the history of the MUGS lounge or the move process, such as the MUGS meeting minutes, minutes from departmental meetings, and McGill Yearbooks. Some primary sources directly show the situation of certain events in time, such as the pictures from the MUGS social media and the emails associated with the MUGS lounge.

02 Interview

To gather opinion from the geography community, I randomly sampled 20 students who were using the MUGS lounge. After briefly mentioning the context of moving and the intention of the interview, I asked the following questions:

- Are you a geography student?

- How often do you go to the MUG lounge?

- How do you usually use it? and how do you

- think of it (does it satisfy your use etc...)

- Is there any disadvantage in the current

- lounge? How can we improve it?

- What do you think of the move?

Since November 14, 2022 I recorded the spatial changes taking place in the MUGS lounge, including occupants and objects. I did human flow tracking at least 2 times per day, with at least 2-hour intervals between each time. I use the average of all counts for a day. The information includes how many people are in the lounge, and which area they are in. I also tracked the change of the physical space over opening hours everyday. The significant part is the gradual furniture change beginning on November 16th.

Context of MUGS lounge and Geography Department

The Department of Geography has called Burnside Hall home since its establishment in 1971.13 As the undergraduate student executive body under the geography department, MUGS has a long history and has

10 Devereux, M., & Littlefield, D. (2017). A literature review on the privatisation ofpublic space.

11 Harvey, D. (2015). “The Right to the City.” In The City Reader (6th ed.). Routledge.

12 Harvey (2015).

13 McNally, P. (2004). History ofMcGillProject: McGillUniversity

Milestones: 1971-1990.

always had a communal lounge in Burnside Hall.14 In the summer of 1988, the MUGS lounge moved from BH426 to BH305.15 The department went through changes in space use periodically as needs changed and enrollment increased, but the department always valued independent meeting spaces for undergraduate and graduate students. The space shrinks the most is the faculty lounge, while MUGS lounge stayed in BH305 for a long time until Fall 2022.16 The lounge is not only useful for students, but also represents the emotional connections of geography students across generations.

Lounge areas can be divided into 3 categories: eating space (green), resting space (red), studying space (blue) (Figure 1).

Eating is the function most often mentioned by students. The availability of condiments, mugs, and a sink creates a comfortable eating environment. The MUGS lounge normally also reaches its peak occupancy during lunchtime. The eating tables are also a space of socializing, especially during activities like coffee hours. “I use it everyday! The lounge is always full. It is good because you can always see your friends and interesting people here! People feel more comfortable talking with each other in this space. It is really a social space.” Liza, a Sustainability, Science & Society (SSS) student commented.

The largest area of the MUGS lounge is resting spaces, which is also the most actively used space. All the soft couches are welcoming spots for tired students. “It’s a comfortable place to nap. My whole math class afterwards will be ruined without napping”, an anonymous geography student

mentioned. The arrangement of the couches also accommodates different users. Groups gather to chat sitting on the large lounge sofa surrounding the coffee table, while the more isolated loveseat allows for more private naps. Although less popular than resting and eating spaces, the study space still always has more than two people on the table. Compared to the bustling Geographic Information Center (GIC) on the 5th floor, it is a more comfortable and intimate space for studying. Many group discussions happen here when they are unable to book a room on campus.

The division of the space is arbitrary, and the spaces are always fluid and surely not limited to these 3 functions. During busy times, people directly start studying after finishing their food on the eating table. Distressing paintings on the studying tables allows a relaxing moment within a tiring schedule. The couches next to the bookshelf

are a quiet and rather isolated space for rest, but also a comfortable space for reading. It is the flexibility of the space that allows for connection within the geography community: “(the lounge is a) more intimate but communal, mixed used space,[because] most geography people know each other” Elianta, an SSS student, commented.

In addition to spatial arrangement, the comfortable environment of the MUGS lounge dissolved the cold feeling of Burnside Hall. The walls of BH305 are painted in the same airtight grey as the concrete building. The only bright outlet is the windows in the southeast part of the building. Following the path of the brightness, MUGS put up maps and paintings on the walls as decoration. The couches beneath them are soft and warm. Most furniture in the resting area uses brown or red color to offset the coldness. Near the eating area, the style becomes greener to represent the theme of sustainability. Even

the abrupt concrete pole in the middle is lightened by colorful paper notes.

The lounge is not only active in daily routine, but also keeps the memories of MUGS events over years. The MUGS lounge is the usual location for MUGS activities, such as bi-weekly coffee hour and special events (Figure 2).

These events continuously add layers of meaning to the place by attaching more communal memories to the physical space. According to the first VP Communication of MUGS, Alex Shiri, MUGS started its social media account in 2012. The name “mugs lounge” implies a strong “place” attachment.

By regularly sharing event pictures, “the MUGS lounge” also became a symbolic “cyberspace” that connected students. Even during the hardest pandemic period, the regular coffee hour on Zoom reminded geography students of the warmth of MUGS lounge.

The Removal of MUGS Lounge 305

The space reorganization was sudden and hardly incorporated students into the decision process. The earliest information we received was a notice on September 12, 2022 about the “potential change of location of the MUGS Lounge and allocations of rooms”.17 Until early November, the tone of the plan was still “a slow change”.18 However, the announcement in the department meeting on November 3, 2022 was undeniable. The change involved multiple departments, and thus the relocation of many rooms. The complex process was a domino effect, and geography students are just at the end of the domino.19 The meeting served as more

17 MUGS. (2022a). Meeting minutes with Department Chair.

18 MUGS. (2022b). MUGS Meeting Minutes Nov. 1.

19 MUGS. (2022c). Building Reorganization Minutes.

Figure 2. MUGS events in holidays

14 McGill University. (1966). McGill Yearbook 1966. 15 T. Moore & P. Kestelman, personal communication, 2023.

16 Moore & Kestelman, 2023.

Figure 1.

Floor Plan of Burnside 305

of a notification rather than discussion of future plans. No matter how MUGS and GGS pushed back, the message was that a systematic decision had already been made and could not be changed.

The faculty do have rationale for the lounge’s removal. The main reason, as stated by the Dean, is that the Faculty of Science is beginning operational reorganization to build resiliency in administrative structures.20 Physical structure is one of the components. Some departments in Science have been facing staff shortages. For example, Geography is still lacking a graduate coordinator. Sometimes as long as one person is sick, the work of the relevant departments cannot be carried out, leading to inefficiency of the whole system. Therefore, the solution is to create a united staff by combining different departments, allowing staff to replace one another for work. BH305 is planned to be the office of the administrators of Geography, Earth and Planetary Science, Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences.21 The appropriation of a new room rather than moving Geography to the Atmospheric and Oceanic Sciences

(AOS) office also symbolizes a “new” space for a united administration. The MUGS lounge would be moved to BH312, a previous graduate students office, only half the size of the original lounge.

Another rationale, mentioned by the coordinator of the reorganization project, is that the lounge is too large and undergraduate students do not need that much space.22 This is a “rational” reason if just looking at the building plans, but there is a difference between physical and psychological space. Upon entering the space, people did not feel like it was large or empty, because every area was actively used by students. Considering the department is expanding, it is also unreasonable to cut the size of the room in half.

The plan was not fully communicated. Geography students were suddenly informed to move without any consultation before, and the reasons for the changes have not been satisfactorily communicated. Therefore, the move is a highly top-down process that lacks transparency. During administrative meetings we were informed of decisions that had been made without any power to change them. This lack of transparency ignored the students’ “power to the room” and breaks students’ trust in the faculty. Moreover, although the faculty seem confident, the plan is disorganised and careless. The timing of the changes occur during the busiest periods for students, forcing them to displace themselves during already stressful times. The rushed timeline also made students busier. Graduate students have also complained about academic organizations like research labs and being separated.

Despite the difficulties, the actual moving process received various support. Stephanie Marshall, project administrator of Burnside Hall, helped with the planning and organization of the new room, providing new furniture as compensation. The geography

students also actively engaged in and helped with the move. Because of the short notice, MUGS had to inform geography students and move out at the same time. On November 5, MUGS sent an emergency notice after the emergency meeting about the lounge move. Unable to bring all the furniture into a smaller room, MUGS encouraged students to take some furniture for free, making the moving a more gradual and communal process.

The number of users gradually declined primarily due to the gradual removal of furniture (Figure 3). But until the last day of the removal, people were still actively using the existing facilities. The regular users in the MUGS lounge during the daytime averages around 10 people, but there are two days with a significant drop in the number of people: November 18th and after November 25th. The move started on November 16th and MUGS finished cleaning up by November 24th. Furniture was moved on November 16th and 17th, but the number of users in the eating space remains relatively stable throughout the moving period because of how critical the service is to students. Some students began going to the lounge only to eat, whereas before they would stay to rest. However, a brief time before the “Lounge Funeral”, the cleanup party in the lounge, the number of people in the lounge recovered. Some students expressed their attachment to the lounge, saying “I come here everyday. Surely, I’ll come to the farewell party”. The number reaches the peak during the “funeral”, in which geography students gathered to pick up the remaining furniture, decorations, maps, books, and memories in the lounge.

20 MUGS, 2022c.

21 MUGS, 2022c.

Figure 3. People count in MUGS lounge during the move

MUGS tries to keep the new lounge as cozy and useful as possible, but some functions are not run as smoothly as before.

Due to the reduced area, MUGS prioritized the resting space over studying space. This created more burden in the GIC. With an added microwave in the GIC, more people started to eat in there during lunchtime.

The space limitation also hinders MUGS activities. For example, MUGS and GGS could easily hold a social event between undergrad and graduate students with around 40 people. In the new lounge, to hold an event with over 20 people after class time, MUGS has to book other rooms in the building under the supervision of a faculty member.

The inconvenience also happens in everyday usage. With no sinks, people have to go to the nearest bathroom to wash their dishes. This discomfort makes many people not wash the dishes at all, leaving the cups and plates messy.

Conclusion

Standing for over 34 years, the MUGS lounge crystalised the connections across generations of geography students. Even though the Faculty of Science can justify the relocation, the moving process ignored the needs of students and effective community collaboration. A more organized and consultative approach is necessary to ensure the community’s needs are satisfied. Although thwarted, geography students and MUGS care about, and will continue creating, a better place.

References

Bull, M. (2008). Place-making: Planning, modernity and humanistic geography. Doctoral Dissertations, 1–217.

Chouinard, V. (1997). Structure and Agency: Contested Concepts in Human Geography. The Canadian Geographer / Le Géographe Canadien, 41(4), 363–377. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1541-0064.1997.tb01321.x

Cresswell, T. (2014). Place: An Introduction. John Wiley & Sons, Incorporated. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/mcgill/detail.action?docID=7103823

Devereux, M., & Littlefield, D. (2017). A literature review on the privatisation of public space. https://uwe-repository.worktribe.com/output/1433865/a-literature-review-on-the-privatisation-of-public-space.

Feldman, R. M., & Stall, S. (1994). The Politics of Space Appropriation. In I. Altman & A. Churchman (Eds.), Women and the Environment (pp. 167–199). Springer US. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-1504-7_7.

Fyfe, N. (2006). Images of the Street: Planning, Identity and Control in Public Space. Routledge.

Harvey, D. (2015). “The Right to the City.” In The City Reader (6th ed.). Routledge.

Jordan, P. (2014). THE MEANING OF BILINGUAL NAMING IN PUBLIC SPACE FOR THE CULTURAL IDENTITY OF LINGUISTIC MINORITIES. Review of Historical Geography and Toponomastics, IX, 21–24.

Köpfer, A. (2022). Reconstructing Students’ Appropriation of Space in Inclusive Schools in Austria and Germany Using Bourdieu’s Theory of Social Space. International Journal of Inclusive Education, 0(0), 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/13603116.2022.2073057.

McGill University. (1966). McGill Yearbook 1966. https://yearbooks.mcgill.ca/viewbook. php?campus=downtown&book_id=1966#mode/2up.

McNally, P. (2004). History of McGill Project: McGill University Milestones: 1971-1990. https:// historyofmcgillproject.mcgill.ca/1971-1990.html.

Moore, T., & Kestelman, P. (2023). Email interview [Personal communication].

MUGS. (2022a). Meeting minutes with Department Chair.

MUGS. (2022b). MUGS Meeting Minutes Nov. 1.

MUGS. (2022c). Building Reorganization Minutes.

Oldenburg, R. (1989). The great good place: Cafés, coffee shops, community centers, beauty parlors, general stores, bars, hangouts, and how they get you through the day (1st ed). Paragon House.

Rioux, L., Scrima, F., & Werner, C. M. (2017). Space appropriation and place attachment: University students create places. JournalofEnvironmentalPsychology, 50, 60–68. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvp.2017.02.003

Sebastien, L. (2020). The power of place in understanding place attachments and meanings. Geoforum, 108, 204–216. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2019.11.001

Serin, B. (2018). Cross Disciplinary Review of Placemaking Literature: A Literature Mapping. https://doi.org/10.13140/RG.2.2.17036.82568

Meta-Analysis on the Study of Entomophagy

Isabella Pannu

Introduction

Entomophagy, the consumption of insects, is a very common and longstanding practice in Southeast Asia. One hundred ninety-four edible insect species have been identified and 164 of them are commonly collected en masse and sold in markets across the region.1 As population rates steadily increase across the continent, with a growth rate of 1.2% in the last decade according to the Asian Development Bank, environmental pressures also increase in the effort to sustain population growth and maintain food security.2 Economic and socio-cultural limitations hamper the consumption of more common livestock protein sources, while edible insects are an accessible alternative.3 Moreover, “rapid changes in dietary, food-acquisition, and food-expenditure patterns have created concern” for food security, and the United Nations now recommend entomophagy as a plausible solution to the food shortage, malnutrition and pressure on the environment.4

Insects are naturally high in protein and micronutrients, providing energy, amino acids, and mono- and polyunsaturated fatty acids.5

This means that insects are a viable nutritional alternative to livestock in terms of nutrition, but may only be widely adopted if they can be produced at a competitive quantity. They are much more efficient in terms of land and water use as seen in Figure 1, especially as they can be reared on unproductive land while producing fewer emissions than traditional livestock.6 The higher market value of insects compared to other sources of protein also provides an additional source of income, especially for women.7

As such, there has been a shift in production patterns “to include not only traditional harvesting of insects from wild habitats, but also semi-domestication and insect farming”, which also provides a source of income and additional livelihood opportunities for the rural poor.8 However, there is a significant lack of regulation and standard practice policy for insects compared to typical livestock with regards to production, distribution and consumption. It is necessary to improve this in order to ensure long term sustainability of the supply, prevent exploitation of the environment, and avoid dependence on a limited number of species.9 Additionally, the inclusion of insects in national dietary

guidelines is currently not present, which poorly reflects their significance in the diets of many ethnic groups, and their inclusion would further improve the pursuit of sustainable diets and food security.10 Enthomophagy research should therefore identify areas in which regulation can be implemented sustainably and without disrupting local livelihoods or economies.

This study aims to investigate how communities in Laos can maintain the long-term sustainability of insect rearing and consumption despite its increasing commercialization and integration into formal markets. It evaluates how policy regulation and preservation of indigenous practices can coexist to provide the advantages of insect rearing while protecting local informal economies. It also explores how the practice can remain environmentally sustainable despite its increase in scale. Lastly, it investigates which aspects of insect farming should be regulated and to what degree, according to actors in the market.

Conceptual Framework

Dele Raheem et al., “Traditional Consumption of and Rearing Edible Insects in Africa, Asia and Europe,” Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition 59, no. 14 (March 15, 2018): 2169–88.

2 Asian Development Bank. (2017). Statistical database. Mandaluyong City, Philippines.

3 Raheem et al., 2019.

4 Yongyout Kachondham, “Food Security Issues Associated with Development in Thailand,” Food and Nutrition Bulletin 13, no. 1 (March 1991): 1–3.

5 A. Halloran et al., “Regulating Edible Insects: The Challenge of Addressing Food Security, Nature Conservation, and the Erosion of Traditional Food Culture,” Food Security 7, no. 3 (April 28, 2015): 739–46.

6 D. Dobermann, J. A. Swift, and L. M. Field, “Opportunities and Hurdles of Edible Insects for Food and Feed,” Nutrition Bulletin 42, no. 4 (December 2017): 293–308.

7 Doberman et al., 2017.

8 D. Dobermann, J. A. Swift, and L. M. Field, “Opportunities and Hurdles of Edible Insects for Food and Feed,” Nutrition Bulletin 42, no. 4 (December 2017): 293–308.

9 Raheem et al., 2019.

Figure 1.

Land, feed and water use of each protein type and percentage of edible parts (Dobermann, 2017)

This study is situated within and guided by the sustainable livelihoods approach framework. The sustainable livelihoods approach provides a holistic, people-centered, and multilevel understanding of the dynamic strategies in which traditional landholders can adapt their livelihoods in response to the changes induced by modernization.11 It is a way of “linking socioeconomic and ecological considerations in a cohesive, policy-relevant structure”.12 It emphasizes the concept of sustainable rural livelihood, which was introduced in 1992 by Chambers and Conway in response to the notion of sustainable development. Their definition of livelihood is widely accepted among scholars of the subject:

A livelihood comprises people, their capabilities and their means of living, including food, income and assets. Tangible assets are resources and stores, and intangible assets are claims and access. A livelihood

is environmentally sustainable when it maintains or enhances the local and global assets on which livelihoods depend, and has net beneficial effects on other livelihoods. A livelihood is socially sustainable which can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, and provide for future generations.13

According to the sustainable livelihoods approach model from the United Kingdom Department of Foreign and International Development, there are five assets of capital to note: natural, physical, human, social, and financial. Natural capital involves the land, water, and biological resources in the environment. Financial capital consists of liquid, or disposable, monetary assets, access to credit, distribution within the community, and variability of income levels over time. Physical capital pertains to results of economic production, including infrastructure. Human capital refers to the quality and quantity of labor available, at either the household or community level, and determining factors such as education and skill level. Social capital is established by assets such as claims or rights provided by group membership at a community or political level.14

10 Halloran et al., 2015.

11 Scoones, I. (1998). Sustainable rural livelihoods: a framework for analysis.

12 Krantz, L. (2001). The sustainable livelihood approach to poverty reduction: An introduction. Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, 2001.

13 Chambers, R., & Conway, G. (1992). Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century. Institute of Development Studies (UK).

14 Carney, D. 1998: Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What Contribution Can We Make. UK Department for International Development

When engaging in a project within a rural community, a sustainable livelihood assessment is executed, with the intent of generating an understanding of the impact and role of a project on securing and enhancing local people’s livelihoods.15 Assessing livelihoods involves an analysis of the “coping and adaptive strategies pursued by individuals and communities as a response to external shocks and stresses” and arise from “the dynamic interaction and mutual interdependence between human agency and the ecosystem”. 16 Adaptive strategies aim to attain successful and sustainable livelihoods.17

This conceptual framework is relevant to this study as Laos is currently on a “path that will make it more monetized, more commodified, more liberalized, and more integrated”, but the top-down policy decisions will affect local communities significantly (Bouahom et al., 2004: 607). 18 As such, this approach examines how rural communities can protect, develop, and sustain their livelihoods during a period of modernization and transition. The insect farming sector in Laos is still developing, especially compared to the already booming industry in neighboring Thailand, so there is room for policy design and research for long term sustainability implications.19 It will allow my investigation of Laos to examine

environmental, economic, and environmental sustainability, as the approach “focuses on the poor without using a specific sector as an entry point and involves the people to identify and implement necessary programs”.20 This means that improvement of health and nutrition and relief of environmental pressure can be explored simultaneously.

The sustainable livelihoods approach has been critiqued due to its “inability to address wider-scale global processes and their impingement on livelihood concerns at the local level”.21 Additionally, the relationship between the traditional economies of rural communities and the cash economy is often too complex and locally specific to be adequately addressed by the framework. Moreover, the local distribution of livelihood opportunities and resources within the community is often affected by informal relationships and structures of power or dominance within the communities themselves.22

Context

The research will be conducted in various communities across Laos. According to a survey conducted by L’Institut de la Francophonie pour la Médecine Tropicale,

of 1,303 households in 96 villages in 16 Lao provinces, 96.6% of Laotian people considered insects an important part of their diet, with consumption starting in childhood.23 Entomophagy is a widespread family practice in all of the Lao ethnic groups, in both rural and urban areas, with the most commonly eaten insect groups being “beetles, caterpillars, bees, wasps, ants, grasshoppers, locusts, crickets, cicadas, leaf and plant hoppers, scale insects and true bugs, termites, dragonflies and flies”.24 Lao people have long collected insects as a non-wood forest product, but commercial insect farming is at an early stage: only 7 insect farms were reported in the survey, with most people harvesting for themselves or to sell to non-locals rather than being purchasing consumers. Interviewees reported a decrease in consumption over the past decade, primarily due to issues of seasonal and geographic availability, but expressed that they would readily consume more insects if accessibility was improved. However, it is important to note that vending of insects remains a productive and active market: vendors reported consistent market exchange, differing from consumers’ responses.

As such, farming could ensure that “adequate quantities are readily available for

consumption” amidst increasing development, growing population and climate change concerns.25 Edible insects have always been a part of the informal economy, with small-scale collection, farming and processing being primarily informal activities.26 Laos currently has little engagement in semi-domestication and farming, but there is an upward trend according to the Raheem et al. Insect farming also provides an opportunity to generate income, particularly for women, who make up the majority of vendors, as well as diversify existing livelihoods. The government of Laos has already begun the process of integration into the formal economy, with the proposal of a regional food standard for edible crickets which was supported by neighboring countries of Thailand, Malaysia, and Cambodia, as well as encouraged by other national governments such as the Netherlands who actively fund research on the area.27 However, this is the only form of policy remotely close to regulation, meaning there is much room and necessity for improvement. Nevertheless, the formalization of this sector threatens local and informal economies. As such, indigenous traditional knowledge of local insect species and their harvesting can greatly complement developing scientific knowledge that is imperative to the process of large-scale farming.28

15 Elasha, B. O., Elhassan, N. G., Ahmed, H., & Zakieldin, S. (2005). Sustainable livelihood approach for assessing community resilience to climate change: case studies from Sudan. Assessments of impacts and adaptations to climate change (AIACC) working paper, 17.

16 Elasha et al., 2005.

17 Addinsall, C., Glencross, K., Scherrer, P., Weiler, B., & Nichols, D. (2015). Agroecology and sustainable rural livelihoods: A conceptual framework to guide development projects in the Pacific Islands. Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems, 39(6), 691-723.

18 Bouahom, B., Douangsavanh, L., & Rigg, J. (2004). Building sustainable livelihoods in Laos: untangling farm from non-farm, progress from distress. Geoforum 35(5), 607-619.

19 Chambers and Conway, 1992.

20 Krantz, 2001.

21 Addinsall, 2015.

22 Krantz, 2001.

23 Barennes et al., 2015.

24 Raheem et al., 2019.

25 Raheem et al., 2019.

26 Halloran, A., Vantomme, P., Hanboonsong, Y., & Ekesi, S. (2015). Regulating edible insects: the challenge of addressing food security, nature conservation, and the erosion of traditional food culture. Food Security, 7(3), 739-746.

27 Halloran et al., 2015.

28 Raheem et al., 2019.

Studies in entomophagy are significant for multiple actors including the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), local communities, and other food-related organizations. In a conference in 2014, the FAO advocated for policy makers to approve insect inclusive food in legislation and encouraged further research efforts to expand on preexisting data regarding benefits of insects.29 This area of study is also of use to communities that participated in interviews, as grassroots organizations and maintenance of tradition is incredibly useful in the establishment of good entomophagic practices and that the bottom-up approach will be the most considerate of local economies and individuals. The ASEAN Food and Feed Insects Association (FFIA) would benefit from entomophagy studies as they could contribute to tangible implementation of regulations. Laos is not currently a member of this as their market is still small compared to other members, but as the industry grows, the FFIA may reconsider including them.30 As Laos is a socialist state, the political and governmental spheres may be challenging to integrate, and even the aforementioned organizations may not have the impact necessary, which is why the grassroots organizations are equally important.

29 Halloran et al., 2015.

30 Durst & Hanboonsong, 2015.

References

Addinsall, C., Glencross, K., Scherrer, P., Weiler, B., & Nichols, D. (2015). Agroecology and sustainable rural livelihoods: A conceptual framework to guide development projects in the Pacific Islands. Agroecology and Sustainable Food Systems, 39(6), 691-723.

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Barennes, H., Phimmasane, M., & Rajaonarivo, C. (2015). Insect consumption to address undernutrition, a national survey on the prevalence of insect consumption among adults and vendors in Laos. PloS one, 10(8), e0136458.

Bouahom, B., Douangsavanh, L., & Rigg, J. (2004). Building sustainable livelihoods in Laos: untangling farm from non-farm, progress from distress. Geoforum, 35(5), 607-619.

Carney, D. 1998: Sustainable Rural Livelihoods: What Contribution Can We Make. UK Department for International Development.

Chambers, R., & Conway, G. (1992). Sustainable rural livelihoods: practical concepts for the 21st century. Institute of Development Studies (UK).

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Elasha, B. O., Elhassan, N. G., Ahmed, H., & Zakieldin, S. (2005). Sustainable livelihood approach for assessing community resilience to climate change: case studies from Sudan. Assessments of impacts and adaptations to climate change (AIACC) working paper, 17.

Halloran, A., Vantomme, P., Hanboonsong, Y., & Ekesi, S. (2015). Regulating edible insects: the challenge of addressing food security, nature conservation, and the erosion of traditional food culture. Food Security, 7(3), 739-746.

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