A matter of time : why the Philippines fell, the Japanese invasion, 1941-42

... A Matter

of Time 'R OBERT H. FIRTH

o 767.4 .F58 1981

lippine Inva sian

1941-1942

... A Matter

of Time Why the Philippines Fell The Japanese Invasion 1941-42

" ROM US R~ Robert H. Firth

Copyright ~ 1981 by Robert H. Firth

Library

.0.

o~

Congress Catalog Card

80-68365

ISBN 0-9605060-o-~

Revised and

enlar~d

edition ot

tlWhy the Philippines )'ell: The Japanese Iuvasion 1941-l~2-

Robert H. Firth

Publisher Walnut, C&lU'ornia

ADAMS PRESS CHICAGO

:Dedicated in memory o-r my mother an4 -rather !lena and John Firth

SAY

Nar, THE :mmGGIE NAUGHT AVAIIETH

Bay not, the struggle naught availeth, The labour and the wounds are vain, The enemy h.ints not, nor h.ileth, And as things have been they remain.

If' hopes were dupes, fears may be liars; It may be, in yon smoke concealed, Your comrades chase e'en now the fliers, And, but for you, possess the -rield.

For while the tired waves, vainly breaking, Seem here no painful inch to gain, Far back, through creeks and inlets making, Canes Silent, -rlooding in, the main.

And not by eastern windows only, When daylight comes, canes in the light; In -rront, the sun climbs slow, how slowly, But westward, look, the land is bright.

---ARTHUR MOOH CLWGH

i

ACKNOWLEDGDlENTS John Toland, "But Not In Shame." Copyright 1961. Random. House Inc., Rew York. Excerpts by permission.

Craven, Wesley Frank and James Lee Cate.

"The A;rmy Air Forces in World war II." Vol. I "Plans and Early Operations, Jan. 1939 to rJ. " University of Chicago Press, August, 1~2. copyright 1948. Excerpts reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.

Excerpts !'rom "'General Wainwright I s Story"

by Jonathan M. Wainwright. Copyright 194-5-~

by Jonathan M. Wainwright. Reprinted by permission of :Joubleday a.nd. Caapany, IDe. Herbert Feis, "'!'he Road to Pearl Harbor."

Princeton University Press, copyright 1950, (c) 1978 by Princeton University Press. Reprinted by permission of Princeton University Press.

Thanks to the Chief of Military History and Center of Military History for cooperation in the use of excerpts !'rom. the following: "COIIIIII8.I1d :Decisions" Kent Roberts Greenfie1.4 (ed.), 1960.

"Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare 1941-1J2," Maurice Mattloff and Edwin M. Snell. "'!'he Fall of the Philippines," by Louis Morton, 19~.

"The Signal Corps. The Test (Bee. 15)4.1 to July, 19lJ) • II George Raynor Thaupson am others, 1957.

Thanks also to the Raval Historical CeDter, Jepartment of the Ravy,for cooperation in use of the following: "At Close Cluarters: P.r boats in the U.S. Bavy," by Robert J. Bulkley.

1962.

Many t~ to Morton aD4 Petra Retzorg of the Cellar Book Shop, :Jetroit, Ml.hip..:.·.

11

CONTENTS

Prologue

1

1.

Plans far the :lefense of the Philippines

6

2.

American-Japanese Diplomatic Negotiations

12

The Philippine :Defense on the

28

3.

Eve of War

4.

War Comes to the Philippines

l!6

5.

The Bataan Campaign

57

6.

The Siege of Carregidar

88

7.

The Mosquito Fleet

101

8.

Conclusion

117

9.

Epilogue

12~

10.

Notes

128

11.

Bibliography

134

12.

Maps

132 139

iii

• • • A MtaTER OP TDlE PROLOOUE

The smoke from burning buildings aDd oil tanks hung heavily in the night air of Manila.

Troops of MacArthurls cCIIlIII8.m, as well as the forces of the U.S. Navy, were told to destroy anything which CQuld be used by the elltering J&pallese troops whQ were poised just outside Mamila on New Yed' s be, 1941. The Navy had won its battle with the firing of the fuel duqps on the 26th of December when .A dmiral Rockwell r s aide, Malcolm Cbamplin, had been sent to cQntac\ a C&ptain Morsell in Manila &m arrange to have businessmen blow up their fuel dumps. Morsell and starf had gone, evidently, to Bate.an. Lt. (jg) Champlin managed to find a man I18JI1ed Rock, who represented standard Oil I s interests. He knew his friends in the oil buisness and warned th&t some might have quaJ..m.s about blowing up the oil. Rock ordered forty or his men to. get together with the Manila Fire Department and arrange to carefully blow up the fuel. The two representatives of Shell, according to John Toland, would not consent to blow up the fuel so. Rock and Champlin had it done without their consent. There had been enough oil left by error to the inv8.ding Japanese in Malaya that the Navy was not interested in leaving such prizes or anything else for the

1

enemy this time and ccapowning the allied errors.

It bad been a heetic time since the war started on December 8, 191n ~Philippine date).

The Philippines vas ride open to iJlvaaion since the rearming of .berican and Pilip:hlo troops bad been slow. The long buildup was beginning to swell and grow. MacArthur bad thought and hoped that the Japanese would not strike until April, 1942. The War Department was putting the elll:phasis on the Atlantic theater, vhile still attempting to keep a defensive postln'e in the Pacific. A convoy on its way to the Philippines had been rerouted to Australia. Thirty five bombers bad been sent the previous summer and autumn to the Philippines by way of Australia. It was thought that the B17 bomber would be just the weapon to hold back the Japanese, since it had been so successful. in the llIIrope,an theater. The only base s in the Philippine s able to take heavy bombers vere Clark Field in Luzon and Del Monte Field in MjndsDBo. On New Year's Eve, 1941, the warehouses and. docks vere thrown open to the public. Mass hysteria followed vith vild scrambling over boxes, barrels, cases for anything of value that could be moved. One open box contained the macabre body of a corpse. Cars were abandoned, keys left in the ignition. Their owners u.y have fled either to Bataan or Corregidor.

In the night clubs on New Year's Eve, 19q.l, those who could, danced to the music of bands, or juke boxes, just as in the better days.

Among the couples was Lieutenant-OClllllll!Ulder Charles "Chick" Parsons and his rife Katsy.

This was no celebration. Parsons, a Reserve Officer, had been in charge of pumping oil into submarines as well as replenishing torpedoes and food. Working out of the Port Director's 2

office he saw to it that everything that could be used vas taken to Corregidor. On New Year's Eve, he and his wife toured the dock areas giving instructions to blow up and fire vast stores that should not be left to the Japanese.

Parsons vas to playa lIIOst unusual role in the long years ahead in the Philippines, returning time after time with supplies by submarine.

These articles of medicine, food, and ammunition helped the guerrillas and others to keep going.

This book will deal with the story of the fall of the Philippines to the Japanese invaders in the months from De<!ember, 19'n, to May, 1~2.

To understand why the defenses collapsed so quickly we will look at several factors which contributed to the final 1r.mrl.liating defeat of the American am. filipino forces. Included in this will be a brief resume of American-Japanese diplomatic negotiations during the cru<!ial lIIOnths before Pearl Harbor. We will also look at the state of preparedness in the Philippines fiom the time of General MacArthur's aSlJ\1lll.Ption of office as Military Advisor to the Commonwealth of the Philippines. We will diseus s the military history of the campaign which began vith 'the attacks on airfields and the landing in North and South Luzon, with emphasis on Lingayen Gulf. We will sketch the outline s of the retreat from North and South Luzon as the defenders withdrew into Bataan peninsula and held off the Japanese for a few short months.

In the beginning months of the Pacific war it is the writer's opinion that the role of the Pr boats should not be left out. A brief account of their role will be presented. Their page in history vas a bright one , albeit short.

We will see the humiliation of ~rioans surrendering--scmeth1ng for which kllericans and their filipino , ~cmrades vere lUIPrepared. They

3

could not understand. why a great country J ike America would leave those on Bataan and Oorregidor, vulnerable and. isolated. It seemed incred..., ible to the average American that a great power like the United states could be knocked down by a race o~ people who were generally considered by them to be imitators and also uncivilized.

Racial prejudice against the ~apanese and. the Chinese since early in the 20th century had distorted ma.ny American I s views o~ the people o~ the Orient.

How did it happen that a great western country like the United states cou.ld be reduced overnight to a second-class power? Why were thousands o~ Americans and Filipinos lefi to the "tender mercies" o~ the i nvading Japanese?

Why was the Far East relegated to second. place in the war against the Tripartite nations.

Most Americans had been br~t up to believe that they were able to do anything, be a~hing, to be able to handle any situation. They had never been de~eated and the ignominious ~ailure at Pearl Harbor and in the Philippines stunned most Americans.

This book cannot go into detail on all aspects o~ the problems raised. It was thought suf~icient to sketch brie~, but succinctly, the problems, both diplomatic and JIilitary, that brought about the debacle. We will not attempt, there~ore, to review the d.ay-to-day episodes o~ the tortured campaign on Bataan and Corregidor. We will look at same things which governed the conduct o~ the campaigns--supplies and highlevel planning. ~estions this writer would like to raise include: Would it have been better ~or General MacArthur to have concentrated his supplies on Bataan earlier instead o~ moving them ~orward

"

to advanced depots near the iRvasiGR beaches?

What were the options o't War Plan Oraage 3 ana :Rainbow 5 and which suited. this curpaign?

Shoul.d MacArthur haTe aS8UIIIed the success o't the Japanese troops ahead ot time and conserved. lie. aDd. supplies tor a lOllg c8J11'P8.ign OD Bataan? Did the United states ave an obligation to the people ot the Philippines aDd to its 0WJl Ar-.y there to Bake a detense ot the IslaDds a higher priority project than it was? was there aDy possibility that Mae.Arthur was right about the loose encirclement ot the Japanese Iavy? Ooald ships have broken through? was our national. honor and self-interest t.pugned by oar actions in accepting the prospective deteat ot the ~ in the Philippines, or was there DO other way?

It is hoped that the answers to these questions _y be found in the york itsel't.

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D 717.4 .F5I1881 A rnafter of time : why \he Philippines fell, \he Japa_

I. 1 K II A II Y

invasion, 1941 ....21 Robert H. Filth

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