Japanese Land Operations, from J 'anese Sources: December 8, 1, to June 8, 1942, Part 1 .4
"
A
Japanese Land Operations, from Japanese Sources: December 8, 1941, to June 8, 1942, Part 1 Military Intelligence Service
A~C ,
,ltD
R'I
111,/ fit'!
..j
"
) A
r¡
The BiblioGov Project is an effort to expand awareness of the public documents and records of the U.S. Government via print publications. In broadening the public understanding of government and its work, an enlightened democracy can grow and prosper. Ranging from historic Congressional Bills to the most recent Budget of the United States Government, the BiblioGov Project spans a wealth of government information. These works are now made available through an environmentally friendly, print-on-demand basis, using only what is necessary to meet the required demands of an interested public. We invite you to learn of the records of the U.S. Government, heightening the knowledge and debate that can lead from such publications.
Included are the following Collections:
Budget of The United States Government Presidential Documents United States Code Education Reports from ERIC GAO Reports History of Bills House Rules and Manual Public and Private Laws
Code of Federal Regulations Congressional Documents Economic Indicators Federal Register Government Manuals House Journal Privacy act Issuances Statutes at Large
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
CAMl'A1UN t)TUDY No.3 MID 461
WAR DEPART.\! EN'!'
Washington, November 18. 1942
NOTICE 1. The publication of Campaign Studies is for the purpose of providing officers
wilh reasonably confirmed information from official and ot.her reliable SO\l1'Cl¡~. 2. Xondivisional units are being supplied with copies on a basis similar to the approved distribution for divisional commands, as follows :
In! Div Diy Hq ____ ____ Rcn Tr ___ ___ __ Sig Co ________ Engr 13n _______ Mcd Bn _____ __ QM BIl ________ Hq Inf Regt, 6 each _________ Inf Bn, 7 each __ Hq Div Arty ___ FA Bn, 7 each __
8 2 2 7 7 7
18 63 8 28
Cav Div Div Hq ________ Ord Co ________ Sig Tr ___ ______ Rcn Sq _______ _ Engr Sq _______ Med Sq ____ ___ QM Sq ________ Hq Cay Brig, 3 each ________
8 2 2 7 7 7 7
6 Ca v Regt-, 20 each 80 Hq Div Arty ___ 3 FA Bn, 7 each __ 21
Arllld Div Div Hq ________ 11 Rcn Bn ________ 7 Engr Bn ______ _ 7 Med Bn _______ 7 Maint Bu ______ 7 Sup Bn __ ___ ___ 7 Div Tn Hq ____ 8 Armd Regt, 25 eaeh __ ______ 50 FA BII. 7 each __ 21 Inf RegL ___ ._ 25
150
150 ISO Distribution to air unit.s is being made by the A- 2 of
Arm~'
Air Forces.
3. Each command sho'uld circulate available copies among its officers. Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided (1 ) the source is ~ tate d , (2) the classification is not changed, and (3) the information is safeguarded. Attention is invited to paragraph lOa, AR 380-5, which is quoted in part as follows: "A document * * * will be classified and ... ... ... marked restricted when information contained therein is for official use only, or when its disclosure ...... denied the general public." should be 4. Suggestions for future bulletins are invited. Any correspondence relating to Campaign Studies may be addressed directly to the Di ~"('l11ination Group, i\tilitary Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D . C.
LitS! laS! ED
TABLE OF CONTENTS • Paure
SECTION 1. INTRODUCTION
. . . . . . .
II. THE HOi\G KONG CAMPAIGN 1. The First Day of Attack. . . . 2. The Attack on the Mainland Positions: DecemlJer 9 to 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The Attack on Hong Kong Island.
III. THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN I.
2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.
. Preliminary Landings . . . . . . Main Landings: Lingayen and Lamon Bay. Advance to Manila . . . . . . . The Attack on Bataan: January . The Attack on Bataan: February . The Fall of Bataall . . . . Corregidor . . . . . . . .
IV. THE MALAYA CAMPAIGN 1. Japa.nese Prepardtions . . . 2. Kota Bharu . . . . . . . 3. The Attack on the West Coast: Parit Buntar. 4. The Fight. in the I,arut Hill., . 5. The Perak River Crossing . . 6. The Battle of Kuala Lumpur. 7. The East Coast Column 8. The Conquest of the Southern Plain . 9. The Capture of Singapore . . V. THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. 1. Preparations
2. The First Ph8.l!e. . 3. The Second Phase. 4. The Third Phase .
VI. FACTORS IN THE JAPANESE SUCCESS
1 3 3
4 5 9 9 10 .11 13 14 Iii
17 21 21 21 27 29 30 31 33 35 35 38 38 39
39 41
44
LIST OF MAPS Map Map Map Map Map Map Map
Xo. 1. No.2. No.3. No.4. No.5. No.6. No.7. II
Hong Kong . . . Luzon . . . . . Bataan . . . . . Corregidor Island Malaya Singapore Southwest Pacific
2 8 12 17 20 34 22-23
JAPANESE
LAN D
Section I The following report of Japanese land operations during the first 6 months of the war was written by a m.ilitary observer during the period of his confinement ,vith the American Embassy in Tokio, from December 7 until June 17, 1942. The information on which it is based was drawn ent'irely from Japanese sources: official bulletins, news reports, speeches, radio commentaries, magazine a,rticles, and accounts of personal 8..xperiences written by officers and men at the front. The only Allied bulletins used were those quoted in the Japanese press. Japanese accounts were nearly always vague, and in some cases conflicting, for the various agencies of the Government frequently differed with regard to the impression that they desired to make on the public. Thus the military would sanction the publication of a personal-experience story which admitted temporary reverses and heavy losses, in order to play up the courage and fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier, while the bulletins issued by the Bureau of Information were incJined to minimize all enemy efforts, in an attempt to make the white UlUII appear as an incompetent and a coward. The information avn.ilnble, virtually all of which was published only in the vernacular, was sketchy and disconnected, and was issued piecemeal over a period of 6 months, so
OPE RAT
o
N 5
INTRODUCTION that its translation and organization presented many difficulties. When Japn.nese accounts are checked with United Nations reports, many discrepancies will undoubtedly be disclosed. It is believed, too, that the Japanese occasionally delibero.tely falsified dates in order to cover up rcyerses, or to Crcn te an impression of greater speed or continuity in their campa,igns than was actually the case, However, no revisions or corrections have been made in the original aceount, since much of its value lies in the fact thllt it analyzes the reeord as seen and presented by the Japanese themselves. By June the Burmn Campaign had not been officially terminated, and the Japanese Government had released too lit,tle information on this operation to permit its inclusion in the present study, It is believed that this analysis of the early campaigns in the Far East from Japanese SOurces is a major contribution to (Jur knowledge of Japo.nese methods of warfa,re. Jt, re"ellis much of the basic strategy und tactics t.Iltlt our enemy has llsed and may be expect,ed to use. Furthermore, an ace-ount drawlI from such SOUI'('t'S gives an insight into the military psychology of a prepared, determined, nnd resourceful OppOIi en t.
Japanese sources) December 8, D 743 . U522 pt. 1 RHC
11111111111111111111111111111111111 The BiblioGov Project is an effort 1 50 50 documents and records of the U.S. ~ publications. In broadening the pubhc--ullueI :sldlluIllg 'tir¡¡..go~nrr[~y----" and its work, an enlightened democracy can grow and prosper. Ranging from historic Congressional Bills to the most recent Budget of the United States Government, the BiblioGov Project spans a wealth of government information. These works are now made available through an enVironmentally friendly, print-ondemand basis, using only what is necessary to meet the required demands of an interested public. We invite you to learn of the records of the U.S. Government, heightening the knowledge and debate that can lead from such publications. :1- .., ..,
59B4B7