RESTRICTED
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SERVICE
CAMPAIGN STUDY No.3 MID 461
WAR DEPARTMENT
Washington, November 18, 1942
NOTICE 1. The publication of Campaign Studies is for the purpose of providing officers with reasonably confirmed information from official and other reliable sources. 2. Nondivisional units are being supplied with copies on a basis similar to the approved distribution for divisional commands, as follows:
In! Diu Div Hq ___ ____ Rcn Tr ________ Sig Co _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ Engr Bn _____ __ Med Bn _ _ _ _ _ _ _ QM Bn __ ____ __ Hq Inf R egt, 6 each__ Inf Bn, 7 each __ Hq Div Arty _ FA Bn, 7 each _
Cav Div 8 2 2
7 7 7 18 63 8 28
Div Hq _____ ___ 8 Ord Co_ _______ 2 2 Sig TL ________ Rcn Sq ________ 7 Engr Sq _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7 Med Sq _ _ _ _ _ _ _ 7 QM Sq_ ___ ___ _ 7 Hq Cay Brig, 3 each _ _ _ _ ____ 6 Ca v Regt, 20 each 80 Hq Div Arty __ 3 FA Bn, 7 each 21
Armd Div Div Hq ____ ___ Rcn Bn __ ___ _ _ _ Engr Bn _______ Med Bn _____ __ Maint Bn____ __ Sup Bn ________ DivTn Hq ____ Armd Regt, 25 each _ _ _ _ _ _ _ FA Bn, 7 each_ _ Inf RegL ___ ._
150
11
7 7 7 7
7 8 50 21 25 150
150 Distribution to air unit i8 bein!!; made by the A- 2 of
Arm~'
Air Forces.
3. Each command should cirr.ulate available copies among its officers. Reproduction within the military service is permitted provided (1) the so urce is stated , (2) the classification is not changed, and (3) the information is safeguarded. Attention is invited to paragraph lOa, AR 380-5, w hi ch is quoted in part as follows: "A document * * * will be classified and * * * marked restricted when information contained therein is for official lise only, or when its disclosure should be * * * denied t he general public." 4. Suggestions for future bulletins are invited. Any correspondence relating to Campaign Studies may be addressed directly to the Dissemination Group , Military Intelligence Service, War Department, Washington, D. C .
RESTRICTED
FILIPINAS HERITAG LJDllUtK
r ',{' ?
jr,
, ( ') TABLE OF CONTENTS Page
SECTION I. INTRODUCTION II . THE HONG KONG CAMPAIGN 1. The First Day of Attack . . . . 2. The Attack on the Mainland Positions: December 9 to 13. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. The Attack on Hong Kong Island.
1
3 3 4 5
I II. THE PHILIPPINE CAMPAIGN 1. Preliminary Landings . . . . . . 2. Main Landings: Lingayen and Lamon Bay. 3. Advance to Manila . . . . . . . 4. The Attack on Bataan: January . 5. The Attack on Bataan: February . 6. The Fall of Bataan 7. Corregidor . . . . . . . .
13 14 15 17
IV. THE MALAYA CAMPAIGN 1. Japanese Prepard.tions . . . 2. Kota Bharu . . . . . . . 3. The Attack on the West Coast: Parit Buntar. 4. The Fight in the Larut Hills . 5. The Perak River Crossing . 6. The Battle of Kuala Lumpur. 7. The East Coast Column . . . 8. The Conquest of the Southern Plain. 9. The Capture of Singapore . .
21 21 21 27 29 30 31 33 35 35
V. THE SOUTHWEST PACIFIC. 1. Preparations . . . 2. The First Pha~e. . 3. The Second Phase. 4. The Third Phase . VI. FACTORS IN THE JAPANESE SUCCESS
9 9 10 11
38 38 39 39 41 44
LIST OF MAPS Map Map Map Map Map Map Map
No. 1. N" o. 2. No.3. No.4. No. 5. No.6. No. 7. II
Hong Kong. Luzon . . . Bataan . . . Corregidor Island Malaya Singapore Southwest Pacific
2 8 12 17 20 34 22-23
JAPANESE
LAN D
Section I The following report of Japanese land operations during the first 6 months of the war was written by a military observer during the period of his confinement with the American Embassy in Tokio, from December 7 until June 17, 1942. The information on which it is based was drawn entirely from Japanese sources: official bulletins, news reports, speeches, radio commentaries, magazine articles, and accounts of personal experiences written by officers and men at the front. The only Allied bulletins used were those quoted in the Japanese press. Japanese accounts were nearly always vague, and in some cases conflicting, for the various agencies of the Government frequently differed with regard to the impression that they desired to make on the public. Thus the military would sanction the publication of a personal-experience story which admitted temporary reverses and heavy losses, in order to play up the courage and fighting spirit of the Japanese soldier, while the bulletins issued by the Bureau of Information were inclined to minimize all enemy efforts, in an attempt to make the white man appear as an incompetent and a coward . The information available, virtually all of which was published only in the vernacular, was sketchy and disconnected, and was issued piecemeal over a period of 6 months, so
OPERATIONS
INTRODUCTION that its translation and organization presented many difficulties. When Japanese accounts are checked with United Nations reports, many discrepancies will undoubtedly be disclosed. It is believed, too, that the Japanese occasionally deliberately falsified dates in order to cover up reverses, or to create an impression of greater speed or continuity in their campaigns than was actually the case. However, no revisions or corrections have been made in the original account, since much of its value lies in the fact that it analyzes the record as seen and presented by the Japanese themselves. By June the Burma, Campaign had not been officially terminated, and the Japanese Government had relefl.sed too little information on this operation to permit its inclusion in the present study. It is believed that this analysis of the early campaigns in the Far East from Japanese sources is a major contribution to our knowledge of Japa.nese methods of warfare. It reveals much of the basic strategy and tactics that our enemy has used and may be expected to use. Furthermore, an account drawn from such sources gives an insight into the military psychology of a prepared, determined, and resourceful opponent.
Japanese land operations (from Japanese sources) December 8, D 743 .U522 1942 RHC
11111111111111111111111111111111111 ::L - ,
e o ::L