The 4th Solution: Can Refugee Camp Design Facilitate Life Post Camp? by Francis McCabe

The 4th Solution: Can Refugee Camp Design Facilitate Life Post Camp? Francis McCabe 200811824 Supervisor: Dr Jonathan Charley BSc Hons Architectural Studies Faculty of Engineering University of Strathclyde Undergraduate Dissertation 13th March 2014

Declaration AB 420 Dissertation 2013/14 BSc Honours Architectural Studies

â&#x20AC;&#x153;I hereby declare that this dissertation submission is my own work and has been composed by myself. It contains no unacknowledged text and has not been submitted in any previous context. All quotations have been distinguished by quotation marks and all sources of information, text, illustration, tables, images etc. have been specifically acknowledged. I accept that if having signed this Declaration my work should be found at Examination to show evidence of academic dishonesty the work will fail and I will be liable to face the University Senate Discipline Committee.â&#x20AC;?

Name:

Francis McCabe _____________________________________________________________

Signed:

_____________________________________________________________

Date:

12 March 2014 _____________________________________________________________

Contents

Maps .....................................................................

Acronyms ..............................................................

Abstract ................................................................

01 - Introduction .............................................

02 - Urban Design in 21st Century Camps ................................ p13 03 - Constraints ...............................................

p19

04 - Camp Design & Self-Sufficiency .......... p21 05 - Temporary Cities ..................................... p33 06 - Syrian Refugee Camps: Models for the Future? ........................... p36 07 - Conclusions .............................................. p42

Aditional Graphs ...................................................

p45

List of Figures ....................................................... p46 Bibliography .........................................................

Figure 01 - Cover

p49

image - Aerial view of Dadaab, the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s biggest refugee camp. (Bannon , 2011)

Maps

Refugee Camp Capital City Host Nation

South Sudan

Ethiopia

Kakuma Uganda

Somalia Georgia

Kenya

Dadaab

Nairobi

Tanzania

Figure 02 - Kenyan Refugee Camps (Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s own, 2014) 5

Lebanon

Israel

State of Palestine

Syria Zaatari Amman

Azraq (under construction)

Jordan Saudi Arabia

Figure 03 - Jordanian Refugee Camps (Author’s own, 2014)

Ankara

Turkey

Kilis

Domiz

Syria Figure 04 - Turkish Refugee Camps (Author’s own, 2014) 6

Iraq

Acronyms AFAD – Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency - Turkey BBC – British Broadcasting Corporation MSF - Médecins Sans Frontières (aka Doctors Without Borders) NGO – Non Governmental Organisation NRC – Norwegian Refugee Council UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees UNICEF – The United Nations Children’s Fund WFP – World Food Programme

Abstract Worldwide, there are currently more than 38million people of concern to the UNHCR (UNHCR, 2013a, p. 17). As conflict and natural disaster force people from their homes, the UNHCR pursue three solutions for refugees; voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement in a third country, known as their durable solutions (UNHCR, 2007, p. 11). There is however a fourth, supposedly temporary, solution – the camp. With new global crises emerging and chronic ones persisting life in a refugee camp is becoming the norm for a large section of displaced people. While the refugee camp is often the last sanctuary of protection for the displaced, there is debate over whether the camp is beneficial in the long term for individual refugees. This dissertation focuses on the affect the design and management of the camp has on the ability of its population to achieve selfsufficiency and improve life in protracted situations. The UNHCR’s guidelines for camp design propose a modular grid layout based upon the single family tent. (UNHCR, 2007, p. 216) Camps are often comparable to a city in scale, population and density but lack the urban qualities of similar sized settlements. The layout facilitates the saving of lives and the distribution of emergency aid but there appears to be little consideration of how the design of the camp will work in the long term, after the emergency phase. With little or no influence on their own environment and an imposed reliance on emergency aid, refugees in camps can quickly lose their independence and self-sufficiency. This study draws on analysis of current camp design and design guidelines to assess whether camps are designed for the benefit of refugees long term prospects or merely to control and defuse a potentially turbulent population.

Figure 05 - Zaatari refugee camp (French

Army/Michel Maure , 2013)

01 - Introduction “The care of others, more often than not, transforms into a governing of others.” (Herz, 2013, p. 9)

When violence, conflict and persecution tear people from their homes, the last sanctuary of protection is often the refugee camp. As new global crises emerge and chronic ones persist, life in a refugee camp is becoming the norm for a large section of displaced people. 2013 saw millions flee from violence in Syria, the Central African Republic and South Sudan adding to the global displaced population. In Syria alone, an average of 20,000 have fled each day for the past year, one in ten Syrians are now refugees (UNHCR, 2013d). Worldwide, there are more than 38million people of concern to the UNHCR, the organisation tasked with protecting refugees and displaced people (UNHCR, 2013a, p. 21). The global refugee crisis, and with it the issue of refugee camps, continues to be of major concern.

Major refugee hosting countries & UK I Mid 2013

Major source countries of refugees I Mid 2013

Pakistan

Afghanistan

Islamic Rep. of Iran

Syrian Arab Rep.

Jordan

Somalia

Lebanon

Sudan*

Kenya

DR Congo

Turkey*

Myanmar** Iraq

Chad Ethiopia

Colombia**

China**

Vietnam***

USA***

Eritrea

0.5m

1.5m

*Syrian refugee figure is a Goverrnment estimate **The 300,000 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice recieve protection from the government of China ***UNHCR estimate

Figure 06 - Diagram - (Author’s own, 2014) Data - (UNHCR, 2013)

0.5m

1.5m

2.5m

*May include citizens of South Sudan (in absence of separate statistics for both countries). **Includes people in a refugee-like situation. ***The 300,000 Vietnamese refugees are well integrated and in practice receive protection from the Government of China.

Figure 07 - Diagram - (Author’s own, 2014) Data - (UNHCR, 2013)

Refugee hosting countries I Mid 2013

***UNHCR estimate

from the Government of China.

Refugee hosting countries I Mid 2013

Number of Refugees (Includes people in refugee-like situations) >500,000 250,000 - <500,000 100,000 - <250,000 10,000 - <100,000 <10,000

Figure 08 - Diagram - (Author’s own, 2014) Data - (UNHCR, 2013)

The UNHCR pursue three outcomes for refugees referred to as their ‘durable solutions’. These are: voluntary repatriation, local integration or resettlement in a third country. (UNHCR, 2007, p. 11) When these durable solutions are unavailable however the fourth choice solution is implemented: the refugee camp. Intended only for emergency aid and to protect the most vulnerable, camps are now home to around half of the global refugee population (UNHCR, 2013d, p. 35). Of the largest populated camps the top four are in Kenya. They Number of refugees per 1,000 inhabitants I 2012 make up the Dadaab complex of Jordan 49 camps, the world’s oldest, havChad 33 ing been set up to deal with the influx of Somali refugees after Lebanon 32 the fall of Mogadishu in 1991. Rep. of Congo 24 Despite having existed for only Syria 23 18 months the next largest camp Mauritania 23 is Zaatari, in Jordan, home to Djibouti 22 around 100,000 Syrian refugees Malta 20 seeking protection from the onSouth Sudan 20 going civil war (UNHCR, 2014). Montenegro 18 Figure 09 - Diagram - (Author’s own, 2014) Data - (UNHCR, 2012)

Number of refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per capita I 2012

Refugees predominantly seek protection in neighbouring states Ethiopia 303 and the burden of protection Kenya 301 weighs disproportionately on South Sudan 209 developing nations. In 2014 the Chad 200 UK government agreed to take DR Congo 153 500 Syrian refugees, a number Uganda 130 dwarfed by the total of more Bangladesh 112 than two million, with the UK Yemen 98 and other EU nations preferring Syria 90 to commit to development aid than taking in refugees (WinFigure 10 - Diagram - (Authorâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s own, 2014) tour, 2014, p. 7). The wealthiest Data - (UNHCR, 2012) nations host only a fraction of the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s refugees, 80% seek protection in developing countries (UNHCR, 2013d, p. 2). Pakistan

552

The majority of refugees do not reside in camps at all so are refugee camps even necessary? There is some evidence to suggest that providing aid to communities that host refugees is a superior solution, not only for the refugees but for the host nation. Van Damme (1995) argues that Liberian refugees, free to settle, brought new farming knowledge to Guinea and the local economy grew with their presence. Compared to expanding local schools, hospitals and other services to deal with the influx in population, refugee camps are expensive, often the cost of a camp per refugee is greater than the gross national product per head of the host nation. (Van Damme, 1995, p. 361) Whilst freedom to move and work is by far preferable to camps, it depends upon the willingness of the host nation to accept refugees and trust that the international community will deliver sufficient aid. In the case of Liberian refugees in Guinea, due to the difficulties of providing food aid to refugees integrated with Guineans, later arrivals were placed in camps where distribution is easier (Van Damme, 1995, p. 361). In Jordan, where most refugees have settled in urban areas, as soon as a camp was built at Zaatari the number of refugees entering the country each day increased significantly (Seeley, 2013). This topic has been widely debated and whilst there are few who would recommend encampment over other options, it can be a vital lifeline when no other solution is available. Refugee camps act as an important safety net for the most vulnerable who cannot self-settle (Crisp, 2002, p. 6) and are willing to temporarily give up their freedom for a promise of safety. Guidelines on camp planning are clearly laid out by organisations such as the UNHCR, MSF and the NRC. Each of these organisations acknowledges that the design of a camp will significantly influence the life of its inhabitants. Understandably their priority when laying out a camp

is on protecting refugees from danger, disease and hunger. But beyond the immediate lifesaving purpose of camps, how does their design affect life in the camp over the long term? How does designing for a short term emergency affect progress to one of the UNHCR’s preferred durable solutions? Refugee camps persist because of geopolitical constraints yet when a durable solution does become available how does years spent in a camp affect refugee’s ability to return to normal life? This paper will argue that the current model for refugee camps has failed and that a new standard for refugee camp design is required. The modern refugee camp must walk the tightrope between the ‘endless emergency’ of temporary shelter and the permanent city. Camps must become sustainable and provide opportunity for residents whilst conforming to political constraints. A self-sufficient camp that can be dismantled when no longer required could change the attitude towards refugees from burden to opportunity. In order to adequately answer these questions, the issue must first be contextualised. The following chapter will discuss whether an urban design and architectural analysis is appropriate for the refugee camp. It will then analyse the design and design guidelines for refugee camps and their implementation in practice. This will show why camps are laid out the way they are as well as the design principles of the smallest unit in the modular system, the single family tent. The third chapter will look at the external constraints on camp design and how the design of a camp makes a political statement. Any proposed improvements would need the political backing of the host nation and the international community. Chapter four will ask whether improved self-sufficiency is the answer to increase opportunities to improve life post camp for refugees and how this could be achieved. This will include analysis of some of the major issues that disenfranchise camp inhabitants; camp economy, spatial governance, food stability, water and electricity, personal safety and education. Chapter five will ask how future camps could be designed to deal with these issues without compromising external constraints and whether a new camp design could establish the refugee camp as a viable long term solution. Finally, chapter six will ask whether the newest refugee camps, those hosting Syrians in Jordan, Turkey and Iraq are the future model for the refugee camp or the sites of another lost generation.

02 - Urban Design in 21st Century Camps “When the planning of refugee settlements is done in isolation by outsiders who lack the benefit of even such basic information as what are the ecological, economic and social constrains of an area, the results are bound to be problematic.” (Harrel-Bond, 1986, p. 93)

Figure 11 - Zaatari refugee camp, Jordan (Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images, 2013)

We are familiar with the images of bleak camps sprawling into the landscape, but what are camps actually like? The refugee camp is often portrayed as a desolate place, devoid of hope (Herz, 2013, p. 10). If their media depiction is accurate, why are camps so fundamentally flawed? The following chapter explains why an urban design analysis is a legitamate way to answer this question followed by an analysis of camp design guidelines.

Figure 12 - Dadaab refugee camp, Kenya (Catholic Medical Missions Board , 2011)

Figure 13 - Inke refugee camp, DRC (UNHCR/Céline Schmitt 2014) 13

Figure 14 - Ngara refugee camp, Tanzania (UNHCR/C. Sattlberger, 2009)

Can Urban Design and Architectural Theory be Applied to Refugee Camps?

“It is important to look at refugee camps through the eyes of the urbanist in order to see if these camps contain qualities of the urban end, if so, to what extent and of what kind” (Herz, 2013, p. 19) There is no great consensus on whether a refugee camp can be considered a city. Both Dadaab and Zaatari are the densest populated areas in their host nation whilst their population is comparable to the third and fourth cities of Kenya and Jordan respectively. Refugee camps may have many familiar urban traits but can urban design and architectural theory be applied to what Marc Augé (1995) refers to as one of his, “non-places”? A significant issue suggesting the refugee camp cannot be considered a city is its temporary nature. As a non-durable solution, camps are only ever intended to last until their inhabitants can be repatriated or moved on. This transience rarely materialises however as many camps last for decades. The reasons that refugee crises become protracted are numerous. As Jeff Crisp (2003) states, refugees in camps find themselves in limbo: they cannot return home as the situation they fled from has not yet stabilised; they cannot settle permanently in their country of first asylum as the host state does not want them to remain indefinitely; and they cannot move on to a third state as none have agreed to give them permanent residence rights. Although Dadaab’s 22 years in existence may be a short time in the life of a city, it has been the formative space for its young population, particularly for more than 10,000 inhabitants born in the camp since its formation (UNHCR, 2013d, p. 34). Despite the temporary architectural language of tents, refugee camps are rarely temporary settlements. “Camps may be needed for only a matter of months. Often the reality is that camps last for years and sometimes even for decades.” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008, p. 2) Urban planning theory has developed significantly since the birth of the UNHCR in 1951 and its influence on camp guidelines are clear to see. “An image starts to emerge from this agglomeration, one that – in its belief in structured organization, low density, and clear separation of functions and uses – suggests an idealized city reminiscent of those of early modernist urban planning of the 1920s.” (Herz, 2008, p. 283)

Figure 15 - Le Corbusier’s Radiant City. Camp plans have similar principles to early modernist urban planning (FLC/ ADGAP, 1925)

There are many urban attributes that make the refugee camp ripe for architectural analysis. Most camps develop some sort of informal trade, exchanging food rations for items such as firewood, clothes and plastic sheeting for tents. This often takes place in the busiest avenues with family tents acting as shop fronts. There are schools, hospitals and even hotels, cafes and restaurants. Today’s refugee camps display at least some of the attributes of urban life. “Urban planning is clearly a way to proceed in order to accommodate newcomers, to manage waste disposal, to lay roads, to be environmentally friendly, to prevent floods and epidemics, etc” (Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 219) The refugee camp has all of the characteristics to be considered, if not a city, then at least urban and there is recognition by NGOs that urban planning and architecture will impact camp life. It seems legitimate then to use urban design and architectural theory to analyse camp design, design guidelines and to propose a design solution based upon those findings.

Camp Design Guidelines The refugee camp, whilst comparable to other urban phenomenon, is a unique condition. Camps are designed as transient settlements where refugees are protected until a more durable solution can be found. Guidelines therefore prioritise efficiency in order to protect as many refugees as possible during an ongoing crisis and the modular grid layout becomes the default design solution. Official design guidelines propose a modular system based on the single family unit with a population up to 20,000. In protracted situations however, there seems to be little consideration of how to design the camp for longer term use or how refugee camps could provide opportunities for inhabitants and even the host nation.

“In focusing on the protection and survival of inhabitants, the international agencies that run these camps rarely empower residents to act as citizens of them” (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011, p. 137) Family Community

4-6 Persons

Block Sector 16 Families

Camp Module

16 Communities

4 Blocks

4 Sectors

Persons

Facilities

1 Latrine

1 Water tap 2 refuse Drums

1,250

5,000

20,000

1 School block 1 Distribution point

1 Health centre 1 Feeding Centre 1 Market Per 10 camp modules 1 referal hospital

Figure 16 - Camp organisation (Herz, 2013, p. 46)

The UNHCR handbook for emergencies states that each individual should have an area of 30m² plus 15m² for kitchen and gardening space. This initially seems perfectly adequate, however 30m² is not space for each individual but must include the area necessary for roads, foot paths, educational facilities, sanitation, security, firebreaks, administration, water storage, distribution, markets, relief item storage and, of course, plots for shelter (UNHCR, 2007, p. 206). In reality a refugee camp with a population of 20,000 at the minimum scale of 45m² per person is denser than New York, Hong Kong or Seoul. This fact is particularly alarming as refugee camps are usually entirely single storey tents. Space is always at a premium when setting up a camp and host nations are rarely keen to give up valuable land. Whilst density itself need not be an issue, camps lack the amenities of similarly dense settlements. “like suburbs – without the corresponding city” (Herz, 2007, p. 7)

Figure 17 - Camp

density (Google Earth, 2012)

Higlighted area of residential Glasgow population 3,200 The same area that would host a refugee camp of 20,000

Whilst the guidelines recommend a modular plan, based on the single family tent, they do not specify that the layout must be linear or based on a grid. In fact both the NRC and the UNHCR guidelines confront the issues with a grid layout. “Grid design does not promote ownership of services, which is crucial for proper usage, cleaning and maintenance. Furthermore, it undermines the protection concerns such as the long distances that refugees have to walk for services and susceptibility to violations.” (UNHCR, 2007, p. 216) “A U-shaped or H-shaped cluster pattern is preferred as it promotes neighbourliness and communication with other communities, encourages ownership of shared facilities and resources, increases access to facilities and services and decreases hazards associated with over-crowding. Family units may be centred and surrounded by shared facilities such as latrines and wash/laundry areas or recreation and meeting spaces.” (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008, p. 201) Whilst both organisations acknowledge the issues with the grid layout, and even promote other systems, often in an emergency the grid materialises as the quickest way to get a camp up and running to begin delivering aid. The grid layout, with all of its inherent flaws, still dominates refugee camp planning. The proposed layout of the community of 16 tents lends itself to repetition over a grid suggesting that whilst the issues with a grid layout are acknowledged, in practice they are inevitable. There is another major issue with the modular plan missed by the guidelines: basing the system on a single family unit leaves no space for those who do not fit the family model (Stevenson Figure 18 - Community layout (UNHCR, 2007, p. 214)

& Sutton, 2011). These people are often the most vulnerable, such as unaccompanied minors and the elderly, and the guidelines have no satisfying answers as to how they are accommodated within the camp. The smallest module within the camp is almost always a tent. Shelter Centre recommend that the tent should ideally only be used as temporary accommodation for the first week after a disaster (Shelter Centre, 2012, p. 3) but often refugees find themselves with nothing more than plastic and canvas to protect themselves and their few belongings from the elements for years. According to guidelines, the tent has to protect the refugee from weather and climate, should create a moderate internal temperature, provide for personal, emotional and physical security, privacy and facilitate the storage of personal belongings and food supplies (UNHCR, 2007). Guidelines stress that shelters should ideally be built of local materials and be constructed by the refugees themselves. With host nations rarely keen to allow any permanent dwellings, so as to discourage others from seeking refuge, the standard UNHCR tent is the widely accepted compromise. Guidelines suggest facilities are centralised with one market and feeding centre per camp (20,000 persons) and one school and distribution point per sector (5,000 persons) (UNHCR, 2007, p. 215). This is indicative of the priority of efficiency in camp planning. As Stevenson and Sutton ask though (2011, p. 142), the question is, for whom is this centralised planning efficient, the refugees or the agencies managing camps? Facilities are centralised in order to provide aid to the maximum number of people possible. The places where refugees receive aid are invariably located at some distance from their shelters. This is seen as a way of making for ‘an easy escape’ for NGO workers should unrest break out within the camp (Herz, 2013). Guideline recommendations on this are confused at best with the UNHCR’s handbook giving conflicting advice; “Services can be provided to a large population in a centralized and efficient way” (UNHCR, 2007, p. 208) “The overall physical layout of a site should reflect a decentralized community-based approach.” (UNHCR, 2007, p. 213) In all, planning guidelines acknowledge the myriad of issues with designing a refugee camp but cannot sufficiently address them. Whilst there is recognition that design and layout will have an impact on all aspects of camp life, from the efficiency of aid distribution to physical and psychological wellbeing, there are few practical solutions as to how good design can be achieved for camps that last years or even decades. The logic is that any flaws in a quick response design are negligible as inhabitants will only stay for a short time. When crises become protracted however, and no durable solution presents itself, those same design principles that made the camp an efficient life saver can become major obstacles for long term refugees.

03 - Constraints “As doctors are bad politicians, and politicians are bad doctors, political, military and humanitarian interventions should be strongly distinguished from each other. Political conflicts have to be solved on a political level, not through humanitarian or architectural means.” (Herz, 2007, p. 11)

Any discussion on refugee camp design must acknowledge the significant external constraints on the designer. These constraints can be explained through the acute difference between emergency aid and developmental aid. Emergency aid that is given by humanitarian organisations in situations of conflict intentionally refrains from dealing with the causes of conflict and ‘only’ aims at alleviating the symptoms. This chapter looks at the problems with supplying emergency aid in protracted refugee crises and the impact this has on the quality and volume of shelter and space provided. Ideally, in a settlement expected to last more than ten years the main building material would be more durable than canvas. The dilemma with this however is that a permanent settlement would suggest the second durable solution had been achieved, integration with the host nation. Where there is not the political will for this solution the spatial strategy of the camp must be visibly temporary. We have already established that camps are very rarely temporary settlements and thus this paradox of perpetual transience is the crux for the camp planner. The rhetoric that a camp is temporary is convenient for several parties. The UNHCR can claim a commitment to durable solutions, host nations are encouraged to allow a settlement in the first place and the state from which refugees have fled can maintain that the displaced can return at the advent of greater stability (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011). Appeasing these diverse groups creates a stalemate around camp planning yet notable by their absence is the refugee population. In the case of constraints on Dadaab’s design, the Kenyan government’s policy is one of non-refoulement. Kenya currently complies with the 1951 Refugee Convention and 1969 Organization of African Unity Protocol, in that it does not force repatriation nor refuse asylum. However the extent of the protection provided is minimal (Crisp, 1999, p. 1). In December 2012, the Government announced that urban refugees and asylum-seekers must move to camps in Dadaab and Kakuma enforcing an encampment policy (UNHCR, 2012, p. 1). The situation for refugees entering Kenya is worsened as Dadaab is located in the arid north-east of the country due to the fear that refugees would use valuable agricultural lands if they were allowed to locate in fertile areas (Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 207). A shortage of firewood in the region has led

to many residents selling their WFP food rations to buy fuel or to forage in unsafe areas outside the camp (UNHCR, 2012, p. 3). This area of the country is sparsely inhabited and has received minimal investment from the state. As stated by Napier-Moore (2005, p.7) it is important to remember that Kenya itself is a developing country and bears the brunt of refugees in a turbulent region. Kenya may not be accommodating to refugees but they are not entirely hostile either. Managing the worldâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s largest complex of refugee camps within this framework is a complex task, although camps in Kenya are left to NGOs and have little government input. These constraints may explain the poor conditions in Dadaab but they do not excuse it. It may be difficult to achieve a durable solution for most Somalis in Kenya but lessons can be learned from Dadaab and how it dealt with its significant constraints. The legal and political landscape of the host nation has a serious effect on the ability of refugees to achieve self-sufficiency. When excluded from the labour market and denied access to educational and health services the camp inevitably becomes a site of exploitation (UNHCR, 2012, p. 51). Dealing with these constraints is essential if the refugee camp is to become a long term residence. Fundamentally, host nations do not want to reduce the motivation to resolve political issues by providing a safe hospitable environment. If the situation remains an emergency, the impetus to resolve it remains, thus removing the burden of a refugee population. This is essentially taking refugees as hostages in a political game and ignores the fact that protracted refugee situations occur regardless of whether settlements are good, bad or non-existent. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Refugee camps are probably the most direct translation of politics into space. Any political strategy or decision has immediate consequence on a spatial dimension in the camp. And any spatial modification, at whatever scale, immediately resonates on a political and demographic level. The camp is an instance of politics directly translated into space.â&#x20AC;? (Herz, 2008, p. 288)

04 - Camp Design & Self-Sufficiency “I have adapted to life here, to being a refugee, to being spoon fed. But the problem is that we have stayed in refugee camps for ten years, with no hope of getting citizenship or at least equal human rights. We are not allowed to earn the same amount of money as Kenyan citizens, our movements are restricted and we cannot settle anywhere in Kenya. After disintegrating and collapsing due to clan conflicts, my country of origin, which belongs to the third world, has demoted me to the fourth world of being a refugee” (Hajir Aden, a Somali refugee in Dadaab, quoted in Horst, 2006, pp. 77-78)

On entering the refugee camp control of one’s own life is left at the gate and it is difficult to leave again without retrieving it. In an emergency, NGOs setting up camps seek to make saving lives as easy as possible. This requires a very efficient camp plan. In order to best provide aid, rations, healthcare and education equally NGOs must have a level of control over the camp populaton. It is no surprise then that camp plans bear resembelance to other controlled environments such as the Roman military barracks, the prison camp or the concentration camp (Hannah, 1997, p. 173) (Herz, 2013, p. 8).

Figure 19 Roman military camp (Fisk, 1919)

Figure 20 Boer concentration camp (1899–1902)

Figure 21 Dadaab refugee camp (Hall, 2011)

The modular system theoretically ensures equality within the camp but this level of control makes self sufficinency near impossible to achieve.

“The standardized plan of refugee camps and settlements ignore the needs of refugees. Refugees are not a uniform group; each household varies in size, number of dependents, physical ability and personal resources, all of which combine to determine the households’ needs and capacity to meet those needs. Yet, everything from the layout to the size of plots of land for individual households is predetermined based on what is believed to be ideal, ignorant of the socio-political, environmental and demographic realities of individual refugee crises.” (Hunter, 2009, p. 22) Camp design is ideal for the emergency phase, but after years spent in the limbo of a camp, could a refugee thrive on returning home? If camps are to improve life for refugees, not just in the short term but considering life after the camp, their design must become focused on achieving self-sufficiency. “The emphasis within self-relience on the long-term fulfilment of needs is compatible with the lengthy nature of most refugee situations and the effects this produces on refugee welfare. As an end in itself, real and meaningful self-reliance can make a genuine contribution to refugee well-being.” (Hunter, 2009, p. 6) This chapter will be a study some of the ways in which camp design and management disenfranchise inhabitants. Whilst the current approach to design makes conforming to the humanitarian system essential for refugees to earn money, for their education, to have a stable source of food, to power and heat their shelters and for their own personal safety, through the same approach they lose their autonomy and with it any chance of returning to a normal life. The same thing that makes the camp a lifeline may also makes it a prison.

Camp Economy “The trading networks of the camps supply the surrounding areas as far away as the refugees’ countries of origin. Because of shortages, refugees are forced to sell a portion of the food distributed to them, in order to purchase the items that they lack such as shoes, clothes, meat, milk, pasta, kerosene, matches, etc. Whatever is distributed can be sold, including the products of development projects around the camps, such as trees planted to provide firewood for refugees.” (Perouse de Montclos & Kagwanja, 2000, p. 212) The estimated annual turnover of the Dadaab complex of camps is $25million (Gildestad, 2010, p. 43). There is clearly potential for refugees to earn a reasonable living within a camp yet trade often develops in camps in spite of the camp design rather than because of it.

Figure 22 - Market stall in Yusuf Batil camp, South Sudan (UNHCR/C. Pouilly, 2012)

Figure 23 - A shopkeeper in Dadaab (Harrison/Oxfam 2012)

There is a tendency to assume that a refugee population will be an economic drain on the local area yet there is potential for refugees to contribute to the local, and even nationl economy. To achieve the maximum benefit to the host state refugees would ideally be allowed to integrate. Where this is not possible however a camp may still benefit the host nation. “The presence of refugees can increase the overall welfare of the host community in two ways: international refugee assistance ` trickles out’ into the community, and the economic activities of refugees contribute to the host community’s standard of living” (Jacobsen, 2002, p. 580) Although much of the economic activity generated in camps ends up in black markets, a camp economy legalised and regularised would allow a camp to better contribute to the host economy (Seeley, 2013). Refugee camps can become repositories of various resources such as food aid, construction material, communication equipment, employment and transport (Jacobsen, 2002, p. 577). Host Policy Institutional Environment

Isolation

Market Outcomes

Humanitarian Assistance

Nature of Conflict

Refugee Composition

Figure 24 - Refugee camp economy (Werker, 2007, p. 475)

The economy of a refugee camp is affected by many variables such as the nature of aid distribution and access to external markets. Camp refugees’ sources of income are typically through agricultural production, wage labour, small businesses, outside remittances, lending, investing and humanitarian rations (Werker, 2007, p. 462). “Larger markets allow people to specialize in the trades that they are best at, instead of having everyone grow their own food, build their own houses, grind their own grain and mend their own clothes. Isolating a market is effectively equivalent to making it smaller. And if the market is poor and capital-starved to begin with, its isolation and small size will prevent its participants from specializing, which reduces overall productivity and purchasing power.” (Werker, 2007, p. 466)

To ensure the quality of a camp market, better integration with the host is required, as stated by Werker, an isolated market is a small market. If refugees can continue to earn they must develop skills which requires the opportunities a large and diverse market can provide. A strong, integrated economy creates the opportunity for individuals to specialise and develop skills in a new area or continue with a trade they worked before entering the camp, rather than having to meet all refugee needs through aid. This relies on the host nation’s refugee policies allowing an open market yet the potential benefits for the host are equally great. Improving camp markets would not only assist refugees in becoming self-sufficient, improved skills could allow them to prosper on return.

Spatial Governance “It is possible to use the experiences in exile to transform a society as long as those who assist them do not remove from them the authority to do so.” (Harrel-Bond, 1986)

In ‘Imposing Aid’ Harrel-Bond argues that by forcing refugees to rely on a humanitarian system they become dependent on it and less able to find a durable solution. In camp design this manifests itself through a lack of spatial governance. With little or no influence on their own environment refugees may feel disempowered and unable able to improve their situation. Guidelines promote refugee input in the management of the camp and state that refugees should construct and maintain their own shelters. Beyond this, however, the guidelines may be too restrictive to allow much participation, and thus ownership, of camps. There are two main ways in which refugees could have more authority over their living space, the administrative organisation of space and the physical layout and design. The first of these refers primarily to larger camps. The UNHCR guidelines state that organising water distribution around small, socially cohesive groups reduces waste and damage to pipes and taps (UNHCR, 2007, p. 219). When visibly distinct areas are responsible for their own resources they are more likely to look after it as their own. This could go even further; guidelines note that food distribution normally takes place in groups of 20 heads of family rather than mapping to the physical layout of communities of 16 families. A more coherent connection between the physical and organisational layout of camps would allow inhabitants to take ownership and invest in their space. Control over the physical environment is already recommended in guidelines and the importance of this for achieving self-sufficiency should be emphasised. This may be demonstrated in the arrangement of shelters in traditional community groups or through the development of spontaneous commercial enterprises. Providing decentralised resources and a network of routes that a

camp could develop around as required would, in practical terms, merely be a stricter adherence to existing guidelines that stress the importance of avoiding making decisions and performing tasks that could be handled by the community (MSF & Shelter Centre, 2007, p. 56). The risk here is that later arrivals would be left with the least developed parts of the camp however, so long as decentralised resources were distributed in anticipation of new arrivals, camps could grow organically. More refugee participation in camp design will create a more culturally and environmentally appropriate design and create a population that is invested in its environment. Spatial governance would allow refugees to take better control of their lives and, in developing the skills for life after the camp, refugees will be better placed to leave it. “If left passive in major decisions that impact their surroundings in the camp, displaced individuals may find themselves again disempowered after leaving the camp, lacking the skills to change their situation. Conversely, active engagement in camp planning constitutes a learning opportunity for residents, to be applied when negotiating with their fellow community members and governing bodies in their lives after the camps.” (Stevenson & Sutton, 2011, p. 143)

Food Stability The UNHCR pursue a self-reliance strategy and in an attempt to adopt this, in the Ugandan camps of Arua, Moyo and Adjumani, refugees were given settlements in which to support themselves through farming. As yields increased aid was reduced with the intention that camps could become self-reliant systems. In reality, restricted movement, poor access to markets and little potential for growth meant few coud achieve this (Kaiser, 2006, p. 611).

Figure 25 - Refugee child farmer in Dosseye camp, Chad (David Axe/IPS, 2009)

The provision of food in refugee camps often saves lives. Food is distributed as aid within camps and the guideline’s reccomendation of 15m² alloted to each refugee for growing food is intended to promote food stability and self-sufficiency. Herz explains how this simple act of design imposes a certain way of life upon refugees that they may not have been used to before entering the camp and have no intention of taking up when they leave.

“Other refugees are nomads of the tribe of the ‘Buel’ and have been raising large cattle herds. They don’t like vegetables they don’t want to grow vegetables, and don’t want to eat vegetables. Through a specific act of planning and a simple design move, those nomadic and village societies are being made into vegetable farmers. The architect takes on the role of the demographer, altering fundamentally the structure of the regional population and helping to change a culture of craft, or a nomadic way of life.” (Herz, 2007, p. 7) The quality and quantity of food rations are rarely sufficient and usually deteriorates over the length of a crisis. As such, malnouroushment is common in camps (Feldman, 2007, p. 52), clearly an obstacle to self-sufficiency. The location of refugee camps are generally in under developed border regions where supplementing food aid through farming is difficult, due to poor quality land, and there is little or no access to quality markets. “As camps are often allocated the least productive land and are located far from centers of economic activity, opportunities for generating income or sustaining oneself without traveling some distance can be quite limited.” (Feldman, 2007, p. 52)

Figure 26 - Food distribution in Dadaab (Kate Holt/ CARE. 2011)

Figure 27 - Daily bread distribution in Zaatari (2013)

Importing rations is an expensive system for providing nutrition. A superior system may be to adopt the model of the Syrian refugee camps in Turkey, discussed in more detail in chapter six, to provide a food fund for refugees rather than the food itself. Access to a market with an allocation of food tokens could not only improve the quality, variety and cultural appropriateness of food, if food was provided by the host nation, this system could boost the local economy as aid money makes it way to nationals. Markets have the potential to act as urban centres for camps a nd even the surrounding area. Whilst food stability is key to attaining self-sufficiency, in the inevitabley arid regions that camps are set up, small scale subsistence farming can rarely provide this.

Water and Electricity â&#x20AC;&#x153;Water is essential to life, health and dignity and is therefore a basic human right. In emergencies, it is often not easily accessible in adequate quantity and quality, thus creating a major health hazard. Hence, water is among the primary criteria in the selection of a site for a refugee camp.â&#x20AC;? (UNHCR, 2007, p. 236)

Figure 28 - Water aid delivery to Dadaab (Andrew Buchanan/CARE2008)

Figure 29 - Refugees collecting water in Dadaab (Hockstein, 2011)

Access to water affects almost every aspect of refugee camp life. Water is essential for hydration, cooking, sanitation and agriculture. There are also significant indirect issues relating to water, collecting water can limit access to education and poorly designed access can exacerbate safety concerns, examined further in the next section. Providing water for a camp is a major drain on resources in arid regions and its provision can lead to local environmental issues, further deteriorating the, often strained, relationship between refugees and the host community (Abdi, 2005, p. 10). Access to water is a priority to camp planners as it can save lives and is an example of how a refugee camp is well placed to deal with an emergency. Electricity is not essential to life and is therefore not provided in an emergency. As the situation becomes protracted however, limited access to power can have a detrimental effect on inhabitants. The negative effect of no or limited power in a camp are numerous. Poorly lit circulation exacerbates safety concerns, food is limited to what can be stored at ambient temperatures and limited access to communication facilities further isolates the camp.

Figure 30 - Media room in Dadaab (Jo Harrison/Oxfam, 2012)

Figure 31 - Zaatari power lines (Jared J. Kohler, 2012) 28

Whilst access to water and power seem like separate issues, they are grouped in this section as the solution may be similar. Difficulty in accessing utilities is not limited to refugee camps but a newly constructed camp has the opportunity to make delivering these facilities sustainable rather than making complicated infrastructure developments later. Utilities could be managed like a regular municipal system, with inhabitants that use more and can afford it, such as those running small businesses, contributing to the cost. Whilst emergency aid would ensure water was provided for all, developmental aid could ensure its provision was sustainable, through the construction of storage, pipes and other required infrastructure that could also benefit the host nation. By planning for the long term camps could provide a sustainable source of water and power. This would not only improve self-sufficiency but could have a positive impact on the host community.

Personal Safety â&#x20AC;&#x153;If there is no alternative to the establishment of large camps, then it is essential that they be planned and designed in a manner that is conducive to the maintenance of peace and security. In Kakuma and Dadaab, that does not appear to be the case.â&#x20AC;? (Crisp, 1999, p. 31)

Figure 32 - Somali refugees collect firewood outside Dadaab (UNICEF/Holt, 2011)

A supposed short term benefit of the refugee camp is its provision of personal safety until refugees achieve autonomy (Agier, 2002, p. 318). Whilst it is certainly easier to monitor goings on in the controlled environment of a camp than in an integrated population, cases of physical and sexual abuse in camps are commonplace (Horst, 2006, p. 88).

“Most of the Somali Bantu women collected firewood in the bush outside the camp, and most talk about being raped there. Some were robbed first. Some had infants on their backs. Some were raped at gunpoint.” (Napier-Moore, 2005, p. 8) Clearly many camp dwellers become victims of abuse and entering a refugee camp does not ensure safety. One of the key pull factors for those fleeing conflict is the assurance of a safe haven across the border. Refugee protection is a fundamental responsibility of host governments and the UNHCR and as such the safety of camp inhabitants should be paramount when considering camp design. Horn argues that as the design and management of camps can increase incidents of violence, it could also reduce it. “Most displacement-related factors identified as contributing to domestic violence are consequences of the structural conditions of refugees’ lives. This suggests that systems for providing refuge have the potential not only to contribute to domestic violence, but to reduce it.” (Horn, 2010, p. 356) Refugee camps are also prone to ethnic violence, cross border insurgency, banditry and it is common for armed militia to recruit from inside camps (Crisp, 1999, p. 3). The reasons for high rates of violence in camps are numerous. Crisp argues that, short of disbanding camps altogether, improvements must be made to security, water provision, lighting, communication and camp management generally. There is also an argument that safety would be improved in smaller camps. When the maximum recommended population of 20,000 is surpassed, policing becomes more difficult and dangerously isolated areas become more frequent. The UNHCR have also looked into improving the safety of shelters themselves, first with tents and more recently with caravans. “In refugee camps a survival mentality combined with close quarters can be an explosive combination, often increasing the incidence of physical abuse of women and children. To mitigate such violence, the designers created a fabric partition to divide the tent, creating a semiprivate space where women can change and parents can sleep away from children.” (Architecture for Humanity, 2006, p. 62)

Figure 33 - Standard UNHCR tent as of 2006 (Human Rights Watch, 2012)

Figure 34 - Interior of UNHCR tent (UNHCR, 2008) 30

Refugees in a climate of violence and fear are far less likely to achieve self-sufficiency. Personal safety in camps is another example of how an efficient camp plan is not necessarily beneficial. That the built environment affects personal safety is well established yet the provision of safety when designing a refugee camp is often an afterthought. If the refugee camp is to act as a sanctuary it must be designed with the safety of its inhabitants as a top priority.

Education “Refugee education is controversial in the camps to the extent that it is not needed for survival and therefore not pertinent to humanitarian operations. Yet for refugees stuck in the ‘stopgap-measure-camps’, refugee education is essential and codified in international refugee law. It is part of the liberal democratic discourse of rights.” (Hyndman, 2011, p. 13) Education is perhaps the most important to enfranchising a refugee population. In most nations it is taken for granted that the quality and quantity of education on offer is directly related to that society’s level of economic growth and prosperity (Crisp, 2002, p. 23) and the UNHCR acknowledge that education is key to achieving self-sufficiency (UNHCR, 2012a, p. 51) yet its provision in camps is poor. UNHCR recommends one school for approximately 5,000 persons and a ratio of not more than 40 pupils per teacher (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008, p. 542). Guidelines also

Figure 35 - Dadaab school (Rita Irwin, 2013) 31

suggest that schools in camps are opportunities to provide extra-curricular knowledge on subjects such as HIV/AIDS, hygiene promotion and human rights. A school can also provide access to post-trauma counselling and additional feeding programmes thus contributing to a child’s mental and physical progress (Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008, p. 540). “Experience shows that refugees who have led a productive life in exile, received an education, developed practical skills, and accumulates some resources may actually be better prepared and equipped to go home and contribute to the reconstruction of their country than those who have languished in camps for years, surviving on minimal levels of humanitarian assistance.” (Crisp, 2002, p. 22) Access to education should be seen as vital if time spent in camps is to emancipate its inhabitants. An educated generation of returnees are essential if a nation is to be rebuilt after conflict. More so than any other issue discussed, education is the tool that will allow refugees to solve the complicated challenges they will undoubtedly face and its importance cannot be over emphasised. As a camp population, education should significantly expand opportunities. Schools are key to providing opportunities for self-sufficiency. As with other services discussed in this chapter, this could be part of a developmental scheme within the region. At the Gondje camp in Chad a move towards integrated education gave Chadians access to facilities that had never before been available to them (Herz, 2007, p. 6). An integrated education programme will bring benefits to the host nation long after refugees return and so incentives are high to pursue a flexible refugee policy. “Refugee camps, undesirable as such, should be treated as an opportunity to provide the residents with new or upgraded skills so as to help them reconstruct their livelihood when the opportunity arises. To this effect education, training and literacy programmes aimed at all sectors of the population should not, as so often, be seen as ancillary but as vital, primary and no less important than the provision of food and health care” (Sperl, 2000, p. 12)

05 - Temporary Cities The issues described in the previous chapter are by no means independent of each other, nor are they the only issues that make achieving self-sufficiency in camps difficult. They are symptomatic of a system that prioritises the emergency phase of a refugee crisis but then merely continues to meet emergency needs over the course of a protracted situation. “Essential refugee needs comprise minimum standards, but also go beyond them, and evolve over time. Focusing on minimum standards rather than essential needs constrains the whole picture, and inhibits the elaboration of a forceful response to meeting the full and legitimate spectrum of refugee needs.” (Jamal, 2000, p. 11) The potential solutions would transform the refugee camp into something even more akin to a genuine city. Yet how can this function while remaining within the strict political constraints of encampment? Radical proposals for moving and temporary cities are nothing new and range from Archigram’s iconic walking city to the seasteading movement, permanent cities at sea.

Figure 36 - Archigram walking city (Ron Herron/Archigram, 1964)

Figure 37 - Seastead proposal (Marko Jarvela 2010)

But is such an extreme solution required for refugees? If camps are to become comparable to other durable solutions, allowing refugees to meet their needs self-sufficiently rather than providing minimum standards, perhaps such drastic change is required. A city-like camp need not clash with political constraints and, if successful, a development based approach could even turn hosting refugees into an asset. “A model of integrated development assistance creating significant new services in the area of education, health, infrastructure and markets, and available to both refugees and host populations, could cause a shift in the attitude of local host communities.”

(Betts, 2009, p. 10) If a camp can provide for the host, as well as the refugees, a more liberal policy may be adopted, allowing further freedoms and potential opportunities for inhabitants (Jacobsen, 2002). The focussed attention of the international community during a refugee crisis could benefit the host region, the local people and thus reduce major restrictions and hostility towards refugees. This would require a move towards development aid during a refugee crisis that could create the infrastructure required to develop a refugee hosting area. Schools and hospitals could accommodate both refugees and nationals while, with focussed aid on a small area, food and water stability could be achieved within an underdeveloped region. Accommodating a mass influx of people will always be logistically difficult and the greatest asset of the camp is its quick response. While the familiar language of tents and temporary structures could deal with the emergency phase, the key to improving the lives of those who must spend time in a camp is the development phase. As the camp expands to meet growing needs reusable temporary structures could provide shelter while key infrastructure could be constructed permanently for use by host community after the crisis. The potential of the city-camp should be placed in the context of an urbanizing global population. 2009 was the first year that the majority of the global population resided in cities and this trend looks set to continue (Saunders, 2011, p. 1). With this in mind, it could be suggested that if a camp is to facilitate life post camp, it must become a stepping stone to urban living. As Herz (2013, p. 19) argues, refugee camps can be seen as “motors of urbanization” as many refugees from rural areas, when they have the opportunity to return, instead choose to move back to an urban centre. It could be argued that this approach is merely local integration by the ‘back-door’ and two questions with the method instantly arise. The first, if the refugee population are integrated, why have a camp at all? It is vital to remember the importance of the camp as a safety net for the most vulnerable refugees. The new ‘city-camp’ would have all the beneficial attributes for dealing with emergency, distributing food, vaccination, and providing shelter for those without the means to self-settle in urban areas and it would leave a legacy of infrastructure for the host community. Significantly however, it would also provide the opportunities for a self-sufficient life. The second question with this system is, if the refugees become accustomed to high quality accommodation over a long period, why would they choose to leave? The limbo of protracted situations has already been described and the quality of accommodation would not change this. Refugee camps persist, not because inhabitant’s needs are well met, but because they have no viable alternative. A population that has achieved self-sufficiency is far more equipped for return and this is a policy the UNHCR currently pursue.

“UNHCR’s livelihood programmes aim to enable refugees and other people of concern to build human, financial and other capital that will help them find durable solutions to their displacement situation.” (UNHCR, 2012, p. 49) The ‘city-camp’ solution potentially appeases three groups; the host nation gains the economic benefit of improved infrastructure without submitting to permanent integration, refugees can continue their lives and gain new skills and capital for future return and the UNHCR can still reach the most vulnerable refugees. The latest generation of camps, built to host Syrian refugees in Turkey, Jordan and Iraq, follow some of these principles and it is possible that the ‘city-camp’ solution has already arrived. The following chapter studies some of these camps in more detail and asks if they could provide the self-sufficiency required to facilitate life post-camp. “People who have benefited from education, skills training and livelihood opportunities during their time as refugees, and who have been able to attain a degree of self-reliance while living in a country of asylum, retain their hope in the future and are better placed to create and take advantage of new economic opportunities after their return” (UNHCR, 2008, p. 10)

06 - Syrian Refugee Camps: Models for the Future?

Figure 38 - A child sells tea in Zaatari market (Lynsey Addario, 2013)

Many of the Syrians who cross the border into Jordan end up in Zaatari, the largest camp in the region. Zaatari signifies lessons learned by the UNHCR from Dadaab and other protracted refugee situations. The camp certainly has all the familiar negative characteristics of other camps but there is an ambition that it may be a future exemplar for camp design. The camp is planned in the familiar modular way and is in a rational grid layout. Tanks of water are delivered daily, at great cost, straining the relationship with locals in what is one of the poorest areas of Jordan. The camp has a young population and there are too few schools to meet demand. Yet things are improving here. Kilian Kleinschmidt, who runs the camp on behalf of the UNHCR, calls himself the ‘Mayor of Zaatari’. Kleinschmidt’s aim is to create a camp more like a genuine city than any before it (Rudoren, 2013). It has been accepted that the site will remain here for many years and that a constant emergency is unsustainable. “Any vision has to be a long term vision. Even if, hopefully the camp disappears tomorrow and people can go back and there is peace.” (Killian Kleinschmidt, quoted in Elterman, 2013)

Figure 39 - Zaatari development (CNES, 2013)

The Jordanian government were slow to build a camp in the wake of the Syrian crisis, initially preferring to allow refugees freedom of movement in return for development aid. As the war escalated and the number seeking assistance increased, it became increasingly difficult to rely on international aid to subsidise additional services. Nearing its second anniversary, after reaching a peak of 200,000 in April 2013, the population has now plateaued at just over 100,000 (UNHCR, 2014), still double the original expectations (Chulov, 2013). How would a town planner manage 100,000 people? How would they manage 100,000 very poor people? It is, in a way, the favelas of Rio de Janeiro.” (Killian Kleinschmidt, quoted in Elterman, 2013)

Figure 40 - A container shelter installed at Zaatari (AP Photo/Mohammad Hannon, 2013)

Figure 41 - Killian Kleinschmidt planning in Zaatari (BBC, 2013)

The opening months of Zaatari were volatile. There are still occasional protests and demonstrations in the camp but the atmosphere has generally settled since improvements were made (Johnson, 2013). These improvements are part of Kleinschmidt’s vision to create, “The most innova-

tive, modern refugee camp in the world” (Johnson, 2013). The emergency phase was met with standard tents but most have since been upgraded to caravans. These meet the city-camp brief of visibly temporary yet durable architecture. Many caravans have been converted into market stalls and the best pitches are bought and sold in an informal property market (Johnson, 2013). Another proposed development would involve a contribution towards services from those refugees that can afford it. “We are saying, brothers, maybe now is the time you pay for electricity because… he makes $200 profit a day. So am I going to cut him off? No. But I’m going to tell him I will supply him with the electricity but he will pay. And you know what, they are smiling and saying yes,” (Killian Kleinschmidt, quoted in BBC, 2013) The most striking feature about Zaatari is the diversity of the market, the ‘Champs-Élysées’. Shops include greengrocers, butchers, mobile phone stores and shops selling wedding-dresses and caged birds. There is a pool hall, an arcade, cafes and even a shawarma restaurant. Ziad Haroni, the owner of a salon on the main market street, described his experience running a business in the camp; Figure 42 - Street sign in Zaatari (BBC, 2013)

“Some people say the camp was better in the old days when they used to distribute meals but I think that now it is better. We can open our own shops and the fact that this is possible is good for us. Now we’re living like anyone else.” (Ziad Haroni, quoted in BBC, 2013)

Figure 43 - Bridal shop Zaatari (Jared J. Kohler, 2013)

Figure 44 - Barber shop Zaatari (Jared J. Kohler, 2013)

Figure 45 - Jewellery shop Zaatari (Jared J. Kohler, 2013)

As the influx of Syrians into Jordan continues a second, even larger, camp is under construction in Azraq with a capacity of 130,000 (BBC, 2014). The new camp will develop on the lessons learned at Zaatari. There will be more space for each resident, shelters will be of corrugated

Figure 46 - New camp under construction at Azraq (Rachel Smalley , 2013)

metal, there will be a municipal style water and power system and the camp will be divided into ‘villages’, each with democratic representation (Al Jazeera, 2013). Michele Servadei, the UNICEF Deputy Representative for the area, explained how the design would focus on decentralised distribution; “We are working on smaller water and sanitation units so that they can serve less people and there will be more ownership and less vandalism.” (Michele Servadei, quoted in Al Jazeera, 2013) If Zaatari and Azraq have the potential to become the world’s ‘most innovative and modern refugee camps’, today that title must go to Kilis, the ‘perfect refugee camp’ (Mcclelland, 2014). Kilis, in south-central Turkey, is unusually well equipped. Roads and paths are paved and regularly cleaned, streets are well lit, there are several playgrounds, proper plumbing and several larger structures house kindergartens, schools, medical facilities and even three supermarkets. There are no tents here, shelters are in the form of converted shipping containers, each with three rooms and a lockable front door. The bathroom is serviced by a hot water tank and the kitchen contains a refrigerator and a stove (Mcclelland, 2014).

Figure 47 - Kilis camp, Turkey (Tobias Hutzler, 2014)

Figure 48 - Lighting in Kilis (Tobias Hutzler, 2014)

Kilis is also host to an innovative WFP pilot scheme whereby each family is given a food e-card, loaded with 80 Turkish Liras (US$45) per family member per month (WFP, 2012). This allows refugees to shop for themselves, according to their own tastes and preferences in camp super-

markets. As the supermarkets are stocked and run by Turkish nationals, the WFP aid money goes back into the local economy, potentially decreasing tensions between the hosts and refugees (WFP, 2012). There are three supermarkets in the camp, with the intention that competition will help control prices, and they act as an urban centre for the camp. Not only is this system popular among refugees and locals, it is far more cost effective than shipping bland, basic food to camps where inhabitants queue to collect (Mcclelland, 2014).

Figure 49 - Kilis supermarket (Tobias Hutzler, 2014)

Figure 50 - Kilis street (Tobias Hutzler, 2014)

Kilis is one of six ‘container camps’ and one of 22 Turkish camps altogether in the border region, hosting around 210,000 displaced Syrians (Hall, 2013). The Turkish camps in general are of an exceptional quality and Turkey does not seem susceptible to the same political constraints as other camp hosting countries. Unlike most camps, the UNHCR act only as onlookers in Kilis and the camp is managed by Turkey’s Disaster and Emergency Management Presidency, or AFAD. This gives Turkey full control over how the camp is run. That refugee camps are highly visible and gain significant international media attention has not gone unnoticed by the Turks who may see the camps as an opportunity to present themselves as significant actors on the geopolitical stage (Mcclelland, 2014). Whatever the motivation, Turkey’s refugee camps offer freedoms and opportunities rarely found in such a crisis. Those Syrian refugees that fled to Iraq and Lebanon are less fortunate. In Iraqi Kurdistan the Domiz camp hosts Syrians of Kurdish ethnicity while Iraq also deals with a wave of returnees from Syria, now displaced for the second time in a decade. Domiz is over double capacity at 45,000 and more refugees have settled on the camps periphery, waiting for expansion to accommodate them. Overcrowding is a major issue here; water, education and health are all difficult to access (Jepsen, 2013). The extensions to the camp show signs of improvement with better facilities but Domiz is an example of an ad-hoc camp constructed with no long term plan. In Lebanon the situation is even worse. The Lebanese government have refused to set up camps at all, concerned of a repeat of the Palestinian camps, still in existence, 65 years later (Muir, 2013). Here, those who are not able to self-settle, around half the refugee population, are in unofficial squatter camps where international aid is hard to come by.

It is too early to tell whether the measures taken at the Syrian refugee camps will create a self-sufficient population. The UNHCR have an aspiration not to repeat the mistakes seen in previous camps. The Syrian crisis is an opportunity for the UNHCR and AFAD to redesign the refugee camp from first principles, bringing more opportunities for inhabitants. The camps of Iraq are early enough in their development to improve. Zaatari is already developing into Killian Kleinschmidt’s vision and a new Jordanian camp at Azraq has adopted his principles from its conception. It is the Turkish camps that set the standard however and, although they benefit from a more accommodating host government than most camps, their design principles could be future of refugee settlement. Three years into the Syrian civil war, global attention may soon fade, as it has in other protracted refugee situations, and as new crises in the Central African Republic and South Sudan demand the media spotlight. With no sign of peace in Syria, camps in Jordan, Turkey, and Iraq look set to persist. Their real test will not be whether inhabitants are self-sufficient today, but whether they can remain so as international aid and attention begins to focus elsewhere. “My hopes for the future for Zaatari are very clearly to provide dignity to people, giving people a future, giving them a skill, giving them the capacity to contribute to the reconstruction of the country when they go back. We must invest in the future of Syria, we must invest in these children.” (Killian Kleinschmidt, quoted in BBC, 2013)

07 - Conclusions “Durable solutions as they stand now are no more than exhortations, often amounting to no commitment from the international community. Exploring other options, and freeing refugees from “imaginary” solutions for their plight, should be at the top of the agenda of refugee-assisting organizations.” (Abdi, 2005, p. 12)

The UNHCR’s durable solutions should remain the ultimate goal for refugees. However, the ‘fourth solution’, the camp, need not amount to years of lost life whilst waiting for one of these to become available. Time spent in a well-designed, well-managed camp could be an opportunity for the inhabitants, not only to receive life-saving healthcare and nourishment, but to improve their lives through developing the skills to aid reconstruction when they return. The need to accommodate refugees is not going away. Offering poor protection and shelter to refugees as a deterrent will not stop those who must choose between a refugee camp across the border or war at home. Nor will it prevent the situation becoming protracted, despite poor conditions in Dadaab and Kakuma very few refugees have been able or willing to return. International conflicts are not resolved sooner because of additional refugee lives at stake in a neighbouring state. Guidelines on camp planning are only as good as the political and legal framework they are used in. Appeasing host states through improving the infrastructure required to accommodate refugees could allow guidelines to look beyond the emergency phase of a crisis and build a camp that lasts as long as required. The UNHCR handbook for emergencies may yet become the handbook for protracted situations. As more refugee crisis becomes protracted the average length of time a single refugee stays in a camp is rising. This suggests both success and failure for the UNHCR. Clearly many refugees who escape to camps are surviving but then what? Shouldn’t the camp provide more than survival? Camps are designed for short term emergencies but become long term drains on resources yet they could become, sustainable, self-sufficient cities that contribute to the host nation rather becoming a burden. Refugees cannot be expected to become self-reliant in an environment set up purely to distribute aid. Camps must be designed for more than survival but, more like real cities, for trade, for safety, for food and water stability, education and refugees must be represented in designing their own environment. A fast response system to deal with emergencies, built around a plan, flexible enough to develop, durable enough to last several years and temporary enough to be moved to where it is needed next. This is the future of refugee settlement. By designing a site

for the long term refugees could leave their camp in a better state than they entered it, facilitating their move to a durable solution. â&#x20AC;&#x153;When a person flees for his or her life, a plastic shelter, a jerrycan of water and a container of maizemeal provided in a camp far from home may be exactly what that person needs. Five years on, though, and those same minimum standards that once protected a life will, if unchanged, contrive to stifle it.â&#x20AC;? (Jamal, 2000, p. 3)

Additional Graphs Refugee camp characteristics 2003 - 2012

16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000

Mean camp population

2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

Median camp population

Figure 51 - Diagram - (Author’s own, 2014) Data - (UNHCR, 2013) Refugee repatriation 2003 - 2012 40m

30m

People of concern Refugees Repatriated Refugees

20m

10m

12 20

11 20

10 20

3 0

Figure 52 - Diagram - (Author’s own, 2014) Data - (UNHCR, 2013)

List of Figures Figure 01: B.Bannon 2011 Cover image - Aerial view of Dadaab, the world’s biggest refugee camp. [Photograph] www.unhcr.org Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 09: Diagram - Author’s own 2014 Number of refugees per 1000 inhabitants [Diagram] Data - UNHCR, 2012a. UNHCR Global Report 2012, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 02: Author’s own 2014 Kenyan Refugee Camps. [Map]

Figure 10: Diagram - Author’s own 2014 Number of refugees per 1 USD GDP (PPP) per capita [Diagram] Data - UNHCR, 2012a. UNHCR Global Report 2012, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 03: Author’s own 2014 Jordanian Refugee Camps. [Map]

Figure 11: Mandel Ngan/AFP/Getty Images 2013 Zaatari refugee camp, Jordan [Photograph] www.theguardian.com Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 04: Author’s own 2014 Turkish Refugee Camps. [Map]

Figure 12: Catholic Medical Missions Board 2011 Dadaab refugee camp, Kenya [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/akufQG Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 05: French Army/Michel Maure 2013 Zaatari refugee camp [Photograph] www.wfp.org - Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 13: UNHCR/Céline Schmitt 2014 Inke refugee camp, DRC [Photograph] www.twitter.com/Refugees Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 06: Diagram - Author’s own 2014 Major refugee hosting countries & the UK - Mid 2013 [Diagram] Data - UNHCR, 2013a. Mid Year Trends - 2013, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 14: UNHCR/C. Sattlberger 2009 Ngara refugee camp, Tanzania [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/6tRmYc Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 07: Diagram - Author’s own 2014 Major refugee source countries - Mid 2013 [Diagram] Data - UNHCR, 2013a. Mid Year Trends - 2013, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 15: FLC/ADGAP 1925 Le Corbusier’s Radiant City. [Photograph] www.fondationlecorbusier.fr Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 08: Diagram - Author’s own 2014 Refugee source countries [Diagram] Data - UNHCR, 2013a. Mid Year Trends - 2013, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 16: Herz, Manuel 2013 (redrawn by author) Camp organisation [Diagram] Herz, M., 2013. From Camp to City Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara. Zürich: Lars Müller.

Figure 26: Kate Holt/CARE. 2011 Food distribution in Dadaab [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/a5WSyE Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 17: Google Earth Image 2012 (Edited by author) Camp Density [Photograph] Glasgow. 55°52’ 38.70N, 4°18’ 07.79W, 0m. Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 27: Addario, Lynsey 2013 Daily bread distribution in Za’atari [Photograph] www.lynseyaddario.com Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 18: UNHCR 2007 Community layout [Diagram] UNHCR 2007. Handbook for Emergencies. 3 ed. Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 28: Andrew Buchanan/CARE 2008 Water aid delivery to Dadaab [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/a7YSqZ Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 19: Gordy, Wilbur Fisk 1919 Roman military camp [Illustration] www.etc.usf.edu Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 29: Hockstein, Evelyn 2011 Refugees collecting water in Dadaab [Photograph] www.evelynhockstein.com Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 20: Authour unknown 1899–1902 (dates of the war) Boer concentration camp [Photograph] www.commons.wikimedia.org Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 30: Jo Harrison/Oxfam 2012 Media room in Dadaab [Photograph] http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 21: Hall, Andy 2011 Dadaab refugee camp [Photograph] www.thinkafricapress.com Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 31: Jared J. Kohler 2012 Zaatari power lines [Photograph] www.uk.news.yahoo.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 22: UNHCR/C. Pouilly 2012 Market stall in Yusuf Batil camp, South Sudan [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/dvoaRJ Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 32: UNICEF/Holt 2011 Somali refugees collect firewood outside Dadaab [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/agjwcY Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 23: Harrison/Oxfam 2012 Shopkeeper in Dadaab [Photograph] www.lic.kr/p/cvdQUm Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 33: Human Rights Watch 2012 Standard UNHCR tent as of 2006 [Photograph] www.humanrightswatch.tumblr.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 24: Werker, E., 2007 Refugee camp economy [Diagram] Werker, E., 2007, Refugee Camp Economies. Journal of Refugee Studies, 20(3), pp. 461 - 479.

Figure 34: UNHCR 2008 Interior of UNHCR tent [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/6zGayb Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 25: David Axe/IPS, 2009 Refugee child farmer in Dosseye camp, Chad [Photograph] www.flic.kr/p/dekysE Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 44: Jared J. Kohler 2012 Barber shop Zaatari [Photograph] www.news.yahoo.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 35: Rita Irwin 2013 Dadaab school. [Photograph] www.international.educ.ubc.ca/dadaab-kenya-refugee-camp Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 45: Jared J. Kohler 2012 Jewellery shop Zaatari [Photograph] www.news.yahoo.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 36: Ron Herron/Archigram 1964 Archigram walking city [Illustration] www.designmuseum.org/design/archigram Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 46: Rachel Smalley 2013 New camp under construction at Azraq [Photograph] www.newstalkzb.co.nz Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 37: Marko Jarvela 2010 Seastead proposal [3D render] www.news.nationalgeographic.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 47: Tobias Hutzler 2014 Kilis camp, Turkey [Photograph] www.tobiashutzler.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 38: Lynsey Addario, 2013 A child sells tea in Za’atari market [Photograph] www.nytimes.com Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 48: Tobias Hutzler 2014 Lighting in Kilis [Photograph] www.tobiashutzler.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 39: CNES 2013 Za’atari development [Photographs] www.nytimes.com Accessed 03/01/14

Figure 49: Tobias Hutzler 2014 Kilis supermarket [Photograph] www.tobiashutzler.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 40: AP Photo/Mohammad Hannon 2013 A container shelter installed at Zaatari [Photograph] www.utsandiego.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 50: Tobias Hutzler 2014 Kilis street [Photograph] www.tobiashutzler.com Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 41: BBC 2013 Killian Kleinschmidt planning in Zaatari [Photograph] www.bbc.co.uk/news/business Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 51: Diagram - Author’s own 2014 Refugee camp characteristics [Diagram] Data - UNHCR, 2013d. UNHCR Global Trends 2012, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 42: BBC 2013 Street sign in Zaatari [Photograph] www.bbc.co.uk/news/business Accessed 09/03/14

Figure 52: Diagram - Author’s own 2014 Major refugee hosting countries & the UK - Mid 2013 [Diagram] Data - UNHCR, 2013d. UNHCR Global Trends 2012, Geneva: UNHCR.

Figure 43: Jared J. Kohler 2012 Bridal shop Zaatari [Photograph] www.news.yahoo.com Accessed 09/03/14

Bibliography Books Agier, M., 2011. Managing the Undesirables: Refugee Camps and Humanitarian Government. English ed. Cambridge: Polity Press. Architecture for Humanity, 2006. Design Like You Give a Damn: Architectural Responses to Humanitarian Crises. London: Thames and Hudson. Augé, M. & Howe, J. (., 1995. Non-Places: Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity. 1st (English) ed. London: Verso. Betts, A., 2013. Survival Migration: failed governance and the crisis of displacement. New York: Cornell University Press. Betts, A., Loescher, G. & Milner, J., 2012. UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection. 2nd ed. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge. Gehl, J., 2010. Cities for People. Washington: Island Press. Harrel-Bond, B., 1986. Imposing Aid: Emergency Assistance to Refugees. New York: Oxford University Press. Herz, M., 2008. Refugee Camps or Ideal Cities in Dust and Dirt. In: I. Ruby & A. Ruby, eds. Urban Transformation. Berlin: Ruby Press, pp. 276-289. Herz, M., 2013. From Camp to City Refugee Camps of the Western Sahara. Zürich: Lars Müller. Horst, C., 2006. Transnational Nomads: How Somalis Cope With Refugee Life in the Dadaab Camps of Kenya. New York: Berghahn Books. Hyndman, J., 2000. Managing Displacement: Refugees and the Politics of Humanitarianism. London: University of Minnesota Press. Kenyon Lischer, S., 2005. Dangerous Sancturies: Refugee Camps, Civil War and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid. New York: Cornell University Press. Koser, K., 2007. International Migration: A Very Short Introduction. New York: Oxford University Press. Loescher, G. & Milner, J., 2005. Protracted Refugee Situations: Domestic and international security implications. New York: Routledge. Napier-Moore, R., 2005. Entrenched Relations and the Permanence of Long-Term Refugee Camp Situations, Brighton: Sussex Centre for Migration Research. Redclift, V., 2013. Statelessness and Citizenship: Camps and the Creation of Political Space. Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge. Saunders, D., 2011. Arrival City How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world. London: Windmill.

Terry, F., 2002. Condemned to Repeat? The Paradox of Humanitarian Action. New York: Cornell University Press.

Journal Articles Abdi, A. M., 2005. In Limbo: Dependency, Insecurity, and Identity amngst Somali Refugees in Dadaab Camps. Refuge, 22(2), pp. 6-14. Agier, M., 2002. Between War and City: Towards an Urban Anthropology of Refugee Camps. Ethnography, 3(3), pp. 317 - 341. Black, R., 1998. Refugee camps not really reconsidered: A reply to Crisp and Jacobsen. Forced Migration Review, Issue 3, pp. 30-31. Crisp, J., 1999. A state of insecurity: the political economy of violence in refugee populated areas of Kenya. New Issues in Refugee Research, Volume 16, pp. 1-34. Crisp, J., 2002. No Solutions in Sight. New Issues in Refugee Research, Volume 75, pp. 1-30. Crisp, J. & Jacobsen, K., 1998. Refugee camps reconsidered. Forced Migration Review, Volume 3, pp. 27 - 30. Feldman, S. J., 2007. Development Assisted Integration: A Viable Alternative to Long Term Residence in Refugee Camps?. PRAXIS The Fletcher Journal of Human Security, Volume 22, pp. 49-68. Hannah, M. G., 1997. Space and the Structuring of Disciplinary Power: An Interpretive Review. Geografiska Annaler: Series B, Human Geography, 79(3), p. 171â&#x20AC;&#x201C;180. Harrell-Bond, B., 2000. Are refugee camps good for children?. New Issues in Refugee Research, Issue 29, pp. 1-11. Herz, M., 2007. Refugee Camps in Chad: Planning Strategies and the Architectâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Involvement in the Humanitarian Dilemma. New Issues in Refugee Research, Issue 147, pp. 1-14. Horn, R., 2010. Exploring the Impact of Displacement and Encampment on Domestic Violence in Kakuma Refugee Camp. Journal of Refugee Studies, 23(3), pp. 356 - 376. Hoyer, B., 2005. Nipe Nikupe: Dependency, Reciprocity, and Paradoxes of Food Aid in Lugufu Refugee Camp Kigoma, Tanzania. Frontiers, Volume 12, pp. 31 - 54. Hunter, M., 2009. The Failure of Self-Reliance in Refugee Settlements. POLIS Journal, 2(Winter), pp. 1 - 46. Hyndman, J., 2011. A Refugee Camp Conundrum: Geopolitics, Liberal Democracy And Protracted Refugee Situations. Refuge, 28(2), pp. 7 - 15. Jacobsen, K., 2002. Can refugees benifit the state? Refugee resources and African statebuilding. Journal of Modern African Studies, 40(4), pp. 577 - 596. Jaji, R., 2011. Social Technology and Refugee Encampment in Kenya. Journal of Refugee Studies, 25(2), pp. 221 - 238. Kaiser, T., 2006. Between a Camp and a Hard Place: Rights, Livelihood and Experiences of the Local Settlement System for Long-Term Refugees in Uganda. The Journal of Modern African Studies,

44(4), pp. 597 - 621. Martin, A., 2005. Environmental Conflict Between Refugee and Host Communities. Journal of Peace Research, 42(3), pp. 329 - 346. Perouse de Montclos, M. A. & Kagwanja, P. M., 2000. Refugee Camps or Cities? The Socioeconomic Dynamics of the Dadaab and Kakuma Camps in Northern Kenya. Journal of Refugee Studies, 13(2), pp. 205-222. Sperl, S., 2000. International refugee aid and social change in northern Mali. New Issues In Refugee Research, Volume 22, pp. 1 - 14. Stevenson, A. & Sutton, R., 2011. There’s No Place Like a Refugee Camp? Urban Planning and Participation in the Camp Context. Refuge, 28(1), pp. 137-148. Van Damme, W., 1995. Do refugees belong in camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea. The Lancet, Volume 346, pp. 360 - 362. Werker, E., 2007. Refugee Camp Economies. Journal of Refugee Studies, 20(3), pp. 461 - 479. Wright, L.-A. & Plasterer, R., 2010. Beyond Basic Education: Exploring Opportunities for Higher Learning in Kenyan Refugee Camps. Refuge, 27(2), pp. 42 - 56.

Reports Betts, A., 2009. Development assistance and refugees Towards a North-South bargain?, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre. Gildestad, B., 2010. Socio-economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities, Nairobi: Nordic Consulting Group. Grbac, P., 2013. Civitas, polis, and urbs Reimagining the refugee camp as the city, Oxford: Refugee Studies Centre. Jamal, A., 2000. Minimum standards and essential needs in a protracted refugee situation, Geneva: UNHCR. MSF & Shelter Centre, 2007. Camp Planning Guidelines 07b (Draft), s.l.: MSF & Shelter Centre. Norwegian Refugee Council, 2008. Camp Management Toolkit, Oslo: Norwegian Refugee Council. Shelter Centre, 2012. Transitional Shelter Guidelines, Geneva: Shelter Centre. The Sphere Project, 2011. Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Humanitarian Response. 3 ed. Rugby: Practical Action Publishing. UNHCR, 2000. The State of The World’s Refugees 2000: Fifty Years of Humanitarian Action, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2006. The State of the World’s Refugees 2006: Human Displacement in the New Millennium, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2007. Handbook for Emergencies. 3 ed. Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2008. PROTRACTED REFUGEE SITUATIONS A discussion paper prepared for the High

Commissioner’s Dialogue on Protection Challenges, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2012a. UNHCR Global Report 2012, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2012b. UNHCR Global Report 2012 - Kenya, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2013a. Mid Year Trends - 2013, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2013b. UNHCR Global Appeal 2013 Update, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2013c. UNHCR Global Appeal 2014 - 2015 - Jordan, Geneva: UNHCR. UNHCR, 2013d. UNHCR Global Trends 2012, Geneva: UNHCR.

Online Video Al Jazeera. 2013. Jordan to open new Syrian refugee camp. [Video online] Available at: aljazeera.com/ news/middleeast/2013 [Accessed: 5 Mar 2014]. BBC. 2014. People have been here for too long. [Video online] Available at: bbc.co.uk/news/worldmiddle-east-23801200 [Accessed: 4 Mar 2014]. Elterman, T. 2013. Creating Order from Chaos. [Video online] Available at: nytimes. com/2013/05/25/world/middleeast/kilian-kleinschmidt-calm-boss-at-center-of-a-syrian-refugee-camps-chaos [Accessed: 4 Mar 2014].

Newspapers Wintour, P. 2014. UK agrees to take up to 500 of the most traumatised Syrian refugees. the Guardian, 29 January, p. 7.

Online Sources Chulov, M. 2013. Zaatari camp: makeshift city in the desert that may be here to stay. [online] Available at: theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/25/zaatari-camp-makeshift-city-jordan [Accessed: 4 Mar 2014]. Hall, R. 2013. The Syrian children of the Kilis refugee camp: ‘We tell them not to worry, it’s far away, but they get scared’. [online] Available at: independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/the-syrian-childrenof-the-kilis-refugee-camp-we-tell-them-not-to-worry-its-far-away-but-they-get-scared [Accessed: 5 Mar 2014]. Jepsen, C. 2013. Syrian refugees set up home in Iraq’s Domiz camp. [online] Available at: theguardian. com/global-development/gallery/2013/jul/02/syrian-refugees-iraq-domiz-in-pictures [Accessed: 6 Mar 2014]. Johnson, H. 2013. The economy of a refugee camp. [online] Available at: bbc.co.uk/news/business-23661065 [Accessed: 4 Mar 2014]. Mcclelland, M. 2014. How to Build a Perfect Refugee Camp. [online] Available at: nytimes.

com/2014/02/16/magazine/how-to-build-a-perfect-refugee-camp.html [Accessed: 5 Mar 2014]. Muir, J. 2013. Syrian refugees forgotten in Lebanon. [online] Available at: bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-25375589 [Accessed: 6 Mar 2014]. Rudoren, J. 2013. Calm Boss Overseeing a Syrian Refugee Campâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Chaos [online] Available at: nytimes. com/2013/05/25/world/middleeast/kilian-kleinschmidt-calm-boss-at-center-of-a-syrian-refugee-camps-chaos [Accessed: 4 Mar 2014]. Seeley, N. 2013. The Last Refugee Camp. [online] Available at: foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/10/30/the_last_refugee_camp [Accessed: 4 Mar 2014]. UNHCR. 2014. UNHCR Syria Regional Refugee Response. [online] Available at: data.unhcr.org/syrianrefugees/settlement [Accessed: 7 Mar 2014]. WFP. 2012. WFP And Turkish Red Crescent Launch Food E-Card Assistance To Syrians In Turkey [online] Available at: wfp.org/news/news-release/wfp-and-turkish-red-crescent-launch-food-e-cardassistance-syrians-turkey [Accessed: 5 Mar 2014].

Francis McCabe 200811824 Supervisor: Dr Jonathan Charley BSc Hons Architectural Studies Faculty of Engineering University of Strathclyde Undergraduate Dissertation 13th March 2014