International Journal of Religious Studies | IJRS | ISSN 1352-4623 |Vol. 4, No. 1, 2016 by FSSH Scholarly Journals

ISSN 1352-4623

Vol. 4, No. 1, 2016

International Journal of Religious Studies

International Journal of Religious Studies | IJRS | ISSN 1352-4623 Volume 4, Number 1, 2016 Editorial Board Adam P. Howard City University of New York/Hostos Community College, United States Jeremy J. Edward East Stroudsburg University, United States Jamil M. Sharif Emirates College for Advanced Education, United Arab Emirates Dennis R. Edgar Centre for Education and Research, University of Northampton, United Kingdom Editor in Chief Karel J Othman McGill University, Canada Editors Jeremy J. Edward, East Stroudsburg University, United States Jamil M. Sharif, Emirates College for Advanced Education, United Arab Emirates Dennis R. Edgar, Centre for Education and Research, University of Northampton, United Kingdom Alfredo U. Santos, Interdisciplinary Research Centre for Education and Development -ULHT, Lisbon, Portugal Jung-Hyun Kok, Utah Valley University, United States Muhammad Ataf, United Arab Emirates University, United Arab Emirates A Huang Min, Central China Normal University, China Patrick O. John, University of Nottingham, United Kingdom Suraphong Soepwongli, The Political Science Association of Kasetsart University, Thailand Hamid Ali Abed Al-Asadi, Faculty of Education for Pure Science, Basra UniversityBasra, Iraq Professor Jamie R Kirstin, University of Edinburg Karel J Othman, McGill University, Canada Mohamed Azam, Ph.D., American University, Beirut Martin P Atkinson, Faculty of Medicine | Imperial College London Dr. Adena B. Avigail, University of Haifa Baila R. Ayelet, Ph.D., The Interdisciplinary Center |Herzliya

Professor Catrina J. Cameron, College of Law and Business | Ramat Gan Dr. Aldila Isahak, International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia Dr. Katrin Muller de Guia, H.A.P.I. Fioundation (Heritage and Arts Academies of the Philippines Inc.), Philippines Salam Tahraoui Ramdane, Department of Curriculum@ Instruction. Faculty of Education. International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia Dr. Reena Kannojiya, Miranda House, Delhi University, India Dr. Arvind Kumar Singh, Gautam Buddha University, India Elder Joshua Onuenyim Nweke, Department of Sociology/ Anthropology, Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Ebonyi State University, Abakaliki, Ebonyi State Nigeria., Nigeria Professor Jamie R Kirstin, University of Edinburg Dr. Joseph Osei, Fayetteville State University/UNC, United States Dr Modestus Nnamdi Onyeaghalaji, University of Lagos, Nigeria Mr. Harlaoanu Paul-Cezar, Alexandru Ioan Cuza University, Romania Omar Julian Alvarez Tabares, Universidad CatĂłlica de Oriente, Colombia Graziano Lingua, University of Turin (Italy), Italy Dr Methusela Mishael Masanja, Local Government Training Institute, Tanzania, United Republic of Dr Maszlee Malik, International Islamic University Malaysia, Malaysia Head Office City University of New York, Eugenio MarĂa de Hostos Community College 500 Grand Concourse | Bronx | New York | 10451 | 718-518-4444 Branch Offices Warwickshire (England) : 6 Leather Street, Long Itchington | Southam, Warwickshire | CV47 9RD Cairo (Egypt): Khalifa El-Maamon st, Abbasiya sq. | Cairo | Post Code 11566 Bandung (Indonesia): Jl. Raya Bandung Sumedang Km. 21 | Jatinangor | West Java | Indonesia | Post Code 45363 Canberra (Australia): The Australian National University | Canberra ACT 0200 ACT 0200 | Australia All manuscripts must be submitted electronically through the e-mail to the editor at: editor@fssh-journal.org or fssh.editor@gmail.com

International Journal of Religious Studies | IJRS | ISSN 1352-4623

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editorial ............................................................................................................................ i – iv The Religious Composition of Ghana: The Dynamics of Islam Before and After Independence Andani Adam Mohammed (PhD) & Umar Abdullahi (Phd Candidate) ................... 1 – 36 From Hippies to Jesus Freaks: Christian Radicalism in Chicago's Inner-City Shawn David Young .................................................................................................. 37 – 64 Problem of Environmental Crisis and Hazard Mitigation: A Panaceal Approach of Buddhist Jataka in the Modern Age Rajeev Kumar .............................................................................................................. 65 – 74 The Crisis in the Islamic Civilisation Jan-Erik Lane ................................................................................................................ 65 – 94 Antecedents of Islamic Political Radicalism among Muslim Communities in Europe Akil N Awan ................................................................................................................ 95 - 115

International Journal of Religious Studies | IJRS | ISSN 1352-4623

ABSTRACTING AND INDEXING

The articles in the FSSH Scholarly Journals will be indexed and abstracted by the following database.

International Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, January – March 2016 Editorial

EDITORIAL

he term ‘religious radicalism’ can have many. meanings, but as the series title suggests, the principal meaning intended here is that of violence used to achieve goals defined by a religious ideal or impulse. This can be a limiting use of the term and some of those limitations become apparent in this volume. Nor is it much helped by the determination to make these essays relevant to `policy-makers’, signalled by an executive summary of about ten lines at the beginning of each chapter. Since these are probably all that the unspecified policy-makers will ever read of the book, it could have been a clever device to remove this constraint from the texts of the essays themselves. Unfortunately, in rather too many of them, it informs the thrust of an argument which revolves around assessing the odds for and against Islamic radicals’ capacity to challenge the status quo in the Middle East (13 of the 14 essays deal with Islamic radicalism in various countries). The disadvantage of this instrumentalist view of religious radicalism is not simply that it may quickly date (the conference on which the volume is based was held in 1994). More importantly, it brings out two fundamental epistemological problems. The first is the problem of the identification or classification of violence: when is it religious and what is being assumed by identifying it as such? The second is the analytically unhelpful binary opposition between ‘ideology’ and ‘pragmatism’ which surfaces in discussions structured in this way. As far as the first problem is concerned, there is a tendency for those who classify the political violence which they are seeking to explain as ‘religious’ or ‘Islamic’ to privilege an idealist and even a nominalist interpretation of social phenomena. Thus, on the one

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Editorial

hand, they are implicitly suggesting that the acts of violence are caused primarily by the distinctive religious beliefs held by their perpetrators and, on the other, they tend to take the perpetrators’ self-descriptions at face value. Both of these views have their dangers. In the first place, there is a tendency to ignore the structural and other ideational aspects of the situations in which violence is used. Emphasizing the religious significance of such acts to the exclusion of all else is to subscribe to the rationale of the perpetrators themselves. Although important in helping to understand such phenomena, it is clearly inadequate as a full explanation. Yet this is the path followed by a number of the contributors to this volume. Most obviously, it comes across in the essay by Ben-Dor, who seeks to stress the peculiarly radical and indeed violent propensities of Islam among world religions. His treatment runs into numerous difficulties. Among them is the question of jihad - a doctrine which he admits is complex, yet asserts is `deeply ingrained in the popular mind’ [sic], suggesting that it is easily invoked and thus presumably effective in popular mobilization. However, even a cursory examination of Islamic societies, their politics and their recent history would reveal the ambivalent and often contemptuous popular responses to various luminaries’ proclamations of jihad. Where these have succeeded in mobilizing people on an impressive scale, other factors have generally been at work - factors which in the end have also determined the ways in which jihad has been pursued and which have sometimes also limited its effectiveness. In this respect, adequate social explanation requires much more than simply identifying jihad as a peculiarly Islamic phenomenon. It is also significant that many of the other essays in the book implicitly contradict the assertion that there is something unique or peculiar about `Islamic fundamentalism’ as such. The most successful of these essays--most notably those by Kostiner on Saudi Arabia, Maddy-Weitzman on the Maghreb and Warburg on Sudan-bring out well the structural peculiarities of the states and societies with which they are dealing. They suggest strongly that there is a

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logic or dynamic at work within these states, emanating from the histories of their formation, from their distinctive patterns of capital accumulation and administrative centralization and from their component status groups and communities which must be taken into account when examining the patterns of their political life. None of these authors denies that an Islamic idiom has been important in the languages of established power and opposition or that defining a proper Muslim identity is a key element in often bitter and violent political contests. However, none of them subscribes to the notion that the politics of these countries, the intensity of their inner conflicts or the violence with which these may be pursued can be explained simply with reference to a nominal entity labelled `Islamic fundamentalism’ or indeed `religious radicalism’. The limiting and sometimes confusing nature of the unhelpful opposition between ‘ideology’ and ‘pragmatism’ also mars some of the essays in this book. Because a number of the authors seem to subscribe to an idealist account of Islam and to stress the capacity of Islamic values to determine political behaviour, they have to fall back on the ideology-pragmatism antithesis to explain those frequent cases where people’s Islamic identity and self-proclaimed Islamic goals obviously fail to account for their political behaviour. The problem originates in the fact that these terms may not be antithetical at all. In his essay on Iran, Ram seeks to overcome this difficulty by introducing the idea of `political culture’. This suggests that Iranian governments act in a moral universe which is not simply defined by Islamic values, but which is also formed by an idea of the Iranian national political community, as well as by the imperatives of the centralizing Iranian state and the economic interests of those who see themselves as the leading sections of society. Such a perspective is not without problems, but it helps to qualify the notion that Iran’s policies can be ascribed primarily to `religious radicalism’. It is thus a valuable antidote to the essay by Inbar who sees nothing odd in simply equating `radical Islam’ with Iran when talking about the acquisition of missiles and nuclear

Editorial

capabilities. Yet to see the latter as due simply to an Islamic radical impulse is a curious way of looking at the strategic dynamics of the Middle East. As may have been suggested by the above, the strongest essays in this book are paradoxically those which play down the equation of political violence with religious radicalism. On the contrary, a better understanding of these phenomena emerges where the authors have taken some trouble to ascertain what else is going on in these societies that cannot be so easily explained with reference to religion. The sole essay on non-Islamic religious radicalism - that by Sandler on religious Zionism--brings out well the contingent circumstances which make possible and which may indeed suggest and structure a political response that expresses itself in distinctively religious terms. As in the best of the essays on Islamic movements, the role of religion is certainly not downplayed in its shaping of worldviews and its influencing of moral imperatives, but nor is it assigned an overriding causal significance that ignores the importance of locale, history, identity and the myriad other factors which drive men to act in politics, sometimes with great violence.

International Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, January – March 2016 Andani Adam Mohammed & Umar Abdullahi

THE RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF GHANA: THE DYNAMICS OF ISLAM BEFORE AND AFTER INDEPENDENCE ANDANI ADAM MOHAMMED (PhD) Department of Sociology and Anthropology International Islamic University Malaysia

UMAR ABDULLAHI (PhD Candidate) Department Of Sociology And Anthropology International Islamic University Malaysia Ghana was formed from the merger of the British colony of the Gold Coast and the Togoland Trust Territory. It is located on West Africa’s Gulf of Guinea north of the Equator. The inhabitants during pre-colonial times were the Akan in the middle belt, Mole-Dagbani to the north, and the Ga and Ewe along the coast. The Mande-Gur (Mole-Dagbani) in the north established several Islamized states, particularly Dagbon and Gonjaland. These two states were the middle-men in trade in gold, kolanut and salt trade between Muslim states like Mali, Songhai and the early Akan states. The three principal religious legacies of Ghana are Islam, Christianity and Traditional African Religion (TAR). The adherents of Islam are mostly the Shafii, Hanafi, Maliki and Hambali schools of jurisprudence which spread over the regions of Ghana. As a historical and descriptive paper, it will critically look at varying forces that produce changes in Islam and those behind. The most significant theme is the nature of contact and relations among Islam, Christianity and the Traditional African Religion (TAR), and the survival Muslim culture in Christian and Traditional milieu. Therefore, the study will concentrate on extensive literature review on the major milestones, developments and crucial issues in the history of Islam in Ghana before and after independence.

hana, officially the Republic of Ghana formed from the merger of the British colony of the Gold Coast and the Togoland Trust Territory, is located on West Africa’s Gulf

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of Guinea only a few degrees north of the Equator. The country 2 spans an area of 238,500km (92,085 sq mi) and bordered by Cote d’Ivoire (Ivory Coast) to the west, Burkina Faso to the north, Togo to the east and the Gulf of Guinea to the south. Ghana in 1957 became the first sub-Saharan country in colonial Africa to gain independence. The Gold Coast, was renamed Ghana upon independence because of indications that present-day inhabitants descended from migrants who moved south from the ancient kingdom of Ghana thus the ancient kingdoms of the Western Soudan. Probably modern Ghana chose the name as a way of honoring early African history (Samwini, 2006; A. Rahman, 2006; Clarke, 1982 Ryan, 1998). Islam had spread into northern Africa by the mid seventh century A. D. a few decades after the Prophet Muhammad (saw) migrated with his followers from Mecca to Medina. Islam first came to Africa through Abyssinia, traveled up to Egypt and spread across the continent. The spread of Islam throughout the African continent was neither simultaneous nor uniform, but followed a gradual and adaptive path. Duringthe first half of the eighth century Islam began to cross the Trans Saharan trade routes from North to West Africa. Amongthe main commercial centers which sprang up along these trade routes from the eighth century onwards were Tahert in modern Algeria, Sijilmasa, Wargla, Tadmakka in Morocco and Awdaghost in Western Sahara. For several centuries one of the main trans-Saharan trade routes passed through Sijilmasa and continued on southwards to Awdaghost in the Western Sahara now Mauritania and from there on to Ancient Ghana (Bravmann, 1980; Samwini, 2006; Clarke, 1982; A. Rahman, 2006; Lindsay, 2010). Between the eighth and ninth centuries, Arab traders and travelers, then African clerics, began to spread the religion along the eastern coast of Africa and to the western and central Sudan literally ‘Land of Black People’, stimulating the development of urban communities. Not long after the Arab conquerors had overrun North Africa, the Umayyad rulers there began organizing military expeditions and slave raids into the southern regions of Morocco and as far south as

International Journal of Religious Studies

the boundaries of Ancient Ghana. The Umayyad invasion of North Africa in 705 brought Islam into Sub-Saharan Africa through the Ancient Kingdom of Ghana. The first converts were the Sudanese merchants, followed by a few rulers and courtiers especially in ancient Ghana in the eleventh century and Mali in the thirteenth century. The majority of the North African Muslim merchants who became increasingly involved in trade with West Africa from the middle years of the eighth century were not only of Berber stock but they were also unorthodox Muslims (Samwini, 2006; Clarke, 1982; Ryan, 1998; Hiskett, 1984; Lindsay, 2010;. Fisher, 1973; Levtzion, & Pouwels, (Eds.). 2000). In the eleventh century, the Almoravids intervention led by a group of Berber nomads gave the conversion process a new momentum in the Ghana Empire and th beyond. From the 8 century North African Muslim traders accompanied by Muslim missionaries were attracted to the commercial centers of the Sahara and Sudan by the prospects of obtaining plentiful supplies of gold and slaves among other things. They came into contact with the Sanhaja and Tuareg who acted as their protectors and guides along the trade routes and also mixed with, and eventually settled and established Muslim quarters in, the capital cities of West African states, such as Kombi-Saleh in Ancient Ghana (Ryan, 1998; Hiskett, 1984; Samwini, 2006; Clarke, 1982; A. Rahman2006; Lindsay, 2010). This was the beginning of Islam in West Africa and throughout the period trade has been important in terms of introducing and even attracting many people to Islam. The realization, then, that West Africa was a land of gold made it the focus of greater attention in North Africa, attracting increasing numbers of Muslim traders to the commercial centers of the Sahara and West Africa itself. It was in this way that West Africa made its first contacts with Islam (Samwini, 2006; A. Rahman2006). In the local accounts of early conversion of Islam, for example, in some parts of modern Republic of Ghana there is very little reference to the role of Muslim traders as carriers or vehicles of Islam to these regions, for instance Central and Western regions. Therefore this paper critically looked at varying forces or processes

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that produce changes in Islam hence it is historical and descriptive in nature. The most significant theme is the nature of contact and relations between Islam, Christianity and the Traditional African Religion (TAR), and the survival of an indigenous Muslim culture in Christian and Traditional milieu (Samwini, 2006; Sarbah, 2010; Okafor, 1997; Atiemo, 2003). Therefore, the study concentrates on extensive literature review, highlighted and exposed the major milestones, developments and crucial issues in the history of Islam in Ghana before and after independence. It also highlighted important viewpoints relating to changes that it initiates. It placed religions in Ghana within the wider framework of West Africa so that any study of religion in the sub-region will take into account of the religious differences. The understanding of Islam in Ghana can provide new themes for and insight into the study of Islam in Africa as a whole. METHODOLOGY The methodology for this study is primarily a description, analysis and interpretation of the data. In order to put the study into the correct perspective, data from historical printed news articles, , selected books chapters and scholarly journals focusing on the historical development of religions in Ghana before and after independence were consulted. Whereas there is a relative wealth of written sources available for the precolonial history of the coastal regions and even Asante, this is not the case for the Voltaic Basin. Archival sources, earlier academic research forms an integral and important part of the study. Published academic texts, articles or monographs, usually include a wealth of information which is either difficult to get access to, or, more or less impossible. At the same time, one has to acknowledge the fact that earlier academic studies are like other written texts, individual interpretations of a historical event, past actions or reconstructions of the past. Therefore, this paper is only a refraction of earlier texts religious composition of Ghana, Evolution and Attitudes of colonial government towards Islam before Independence, the Mande-Gur kingdoms in Northern

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Ghana, Islam in the inland Kingdom of Asante, Islam along the Coast of Ghana (Fante and Ga), Islam after independence as well as characteristics and structure of muslim population after independence. RELIGIOUS COMPOSITION OF GHANA The constitution of Ghana provides for freedom of religion and is generally respected by the Government. The general amicable relationship among religions in society contributed to religious freedom. However, tensions among different branches of the same faith, as well as among Christian and Traditional Africa Religion somewhat occur. There are a number of governmental and nongovernmental efforts to promote inter and intra faith understanding among these three major faiths in the country (Sulemana, 2003; Ryan, 1996; Sarbah, 2010). Even though freedom of religion exists in the country, a Religious Bodies Registration Law 2989 was passed to regulate religious activities. The law was designed to protect the freedom and integrity of genuine religious organizations by exposing and eliminating groups established to take advantage of believers. To support this effort, the Government has increased its prosecution of violent acts, including religious violence and improved it efforts in religious conflicts resolution (Samwini, 2006; Atiemo, 2003; Okafor, 1997). The three principal religious legacies of Ghana are Islam, Christianity and Traditional African Religion (TAR).The religious composition of Ghana in the post-independence population census of 1960 was 12 percent Muslim, 38 percent TAR, 41percent Christian and about 9 percent for the rest. According to the 1985 population census estimate, the general population of Christians in the country rose sharply to 62 percent and that of Muslims declined to 15 percent (Atiemo, 2003; Okafor, 1997; Ryan, 1996; Sarbah, 2010). According to the US Department of State (2008) the international religious freedom report indicated that approximately 69 percent of the population is Christian, 16 percent is Muslim and 15 percent adheres to TAR. The Muslim community has however,

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disputed these figures, asserting that the Muslim population is closer to 30 percent. Official figures reflecting regional distribution of the various denominations is that the southern part of the country is more Christian, while the north is more Muslims. Religious tolerance in Ghana is very high. These three forces are sometimes mutually supportive, sometimes mutually antagonistic, and sometimes independent parallel lines in Ghana’s history (Ansah1994; Samwini, 2006; Arnim & Ukoha 2007; Sulemana, 2003; Ryan, 1996).Guided by the authorities of the Muslim Representative Council and that of Christians, religious, social and economic matters affecting them have always been redressed through dialogue (Holfwe 2004; Sulemana, 2003; Ryan, 1996; Okafor, 1997). What is significant about religious composition of Ghana is that some Christians and Muslims still hold traditional indigenous religious beliefs. Most Ghanaian Muslims are Sunni, following the Maliki version of Islamic law, whilst a significant number follow the Shafi’i school of thought, who are spread over many ethnic groups and geographical regions of Ghana. Four Islamic traditions are present in Ghana thus the orthodox Sunni, Ahmadiyah, Tijaania and a small group of Shi’a. The Ahmadiyah, a sect originating in nineteenth century India, is the only non-Sunni order in the country (Nyuot & John 2005; Islam Awareness Homepage, nd; Holfwe2004; Sulemana, 2003; Tariqa 2009). The Movement was invited into Ghana in 1921 by a section of coastal Fanti Muslim converts. As such membership and leadership of the sect remains dominated by the Fanti and Asante Islam in contradiction to Sunni or mainline Islam which is dominated by northern Ghanaians. Sufism, involving the organization of mystical brotherhoods - tariq - for the purification and spread of Islam in not widespread in Ghana, however, the Tijaaniyah and the Qadiriyah brotherhoods are represented (Tariqa 2009; Samwini, 2006) .The majority of the Muslim population resides in northern part of Ghana as well as pocket of Muslims in the urban centers of Accra, Kumasi, SecondiTakoradi, Sunyani and Koforidua. The major celebrations of

International Journal of Religious Studies

Muslims in the country include idl-fitr and idl-adhah both of which are recognized national holidays. On the other hand, the presence of Christian missionaries in the fifteenth century on the coast of Ghana is dated to the arrival of the Portuguese. The Basel/Presbyterian and Wesleyan/Methodist missionaries laid the foundation for the Christian church in Ghana in the nineteenth century. Various Christian denominations are well represented in Ghana. The Christian groups in Ghana include Roman Catholic, Methodist, Anglican, Mennornite, Evangelical Presbyterian, Presbyterian, African Methodist Episcopal Zionist, Christian Methodist, Evangelical Lutheran, Fâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;eden, the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Mormons), Seven-day Adventist Pentecostals, Baptist, African Independent Churches, the Society of Friend s (Quakers), and many other charismatic churches. The unifying organization of Christians in the country is the Ghana Christian Council (Atiemo, 2003; Okafor, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 2002; Samwini, 2006). This Christian organization is concerned primarily with the spiritual affairs as well as social well-being of their congregations. To begin their conversions in the coastal area, the missionaries established schools as nurseries of the church in which the educated class was trained. Almost all major secondary schools, especially exclusively boys and girls schools are mission related institutions. Although churches continue to influence the development of education in Ghana, church schools have been opened to all since the state assumed financial responsibility for formal instruction. The major celebrations of Christians in Ghana include Christmas and Easter both of which are recognized national holidays (Atiemo, 2003; Okafor, 1997; Owusu-Ansah, 2002; Samwini, 2006). Despite the presence of Islam and Christianity, Traditional African Religion (TAR) in Ghana has retained its influence because of its intimate relation to family loyalties. The traditional cosmology expresses belief in a Supreme Being, usually thought of as remote from daily religious life and is therefore not directly worshipped. There are lesser gods that can be found in streams, rivers, trees and

Andani Adam Mohammed & Umar Abdullahi

mountains which are generally perceived as intermediaries between the Supreme Being and society (Adarkwa-Dadzie, 1998; Bell, &Aslan, 1997; Fisher, 1998). Ancestors and numerous other spirits are also recognized as part of the cosmological order and belief that some of the ancestors are reincarnated to replenish the lineage (Parker, 2004). The TAR groups include Afrikania Mission popularly known as the Afrikan Renaissance Mission. The rest are the Bahâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;i, Buddhist, Jewish, Hindu, Shintoist, Ninchiren Shoshu Soka Gakkai, Sat Sang, Eckankar, Trokosi, the Divine Light Mission, Hare Krishna and Rastafarian. Important festivals - which are a major characteristic of TAR -are celebrated during which people gather together to remember the dead and on these sacred occasions the ancestors are venerated (Dovlo, 1994; Quashigah, 1998). The ancestors are believed to be the most immediate link with the spiritual world, and they are thought to be constantly near, observing every thought and action of the living. The religious rituals associated with these festivities are strictly observed by the traditional elders (Saj, et al., 2006; Parker, 2004).). The religious activities of traditional leaders and heads of lineage are generally limited to the routine biweekly and annual festivals, but traditional priest with specific shrines are regarded as specialized practitioners through whom the spirits of the gods may grant directions (Adarkwa-Dadzie, 1998; Saj, et al., 2006; Asamoah-Gyadu, 2009). The traditional priests undergo vigorous training in the arts of medicine, divination and other related disciplines. They are therefore consulted on more regular basis by the public because many diseases are believed to have spiritual causes; traditional priests sometimes act as doctors or herbalists (Ganusah, 2000; Boaten, 2001). Shrine visitation is strongest among the uneducated and in rural communities but that is not to suggest that the educated Ghanaians have abandoned traditions. TAR is described as the most tolerant in the country because Ghana did not experience religious conflicts before Islam and Christianity arrived (Okafor, 1997; Atiemo, 2003). The ATR is basically communal and do not sought to convert the whole of human kind for that matter not in

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competition with the two latter faiths which are universalist in nature. There is one Jewish synagogue in Ghana, located in Sefwi Wiawso,1 a village in the Western Region, about 3 hours inland from Takoradi. Their belief is that their community originated from Jews in North Africa crossing the Sahara Desert centuries ago, ending up in the Ivory Coast. Over time, people lost connections to their Jewish roots, but maintained some Jewish customs. For many decades, the Jews of Sewfi believed they were the last remaining Jews in the world. It was not until the late 1980s, that the Ghanaian Jews2 were surprised to discover there were millions of other Jews in the world. Most members of the community today are the first generation of Ghanaians to be Jewish. The Israeli embassy provided the community with one Torah Scroll and a single siddur, prayer book. Through support of Tifereth Israel Synagogue in Des Moines, the Jews of Sewfi have received an additional 200 prayer books and an English language Tanach. "Rabbi" David Ahenkorah has been the spiritual leader of the House of Israel Community since 1993. During nightly group meetings, there are readings from donated books about Judaism, teaching community members of all ages about Jewish traditions. The community's goal is to build a Jewish school for the children of Sefwi. The Nichiren Shoshu in Ghana was a branch of the Soka Gokkai International (SGI). The SGI is a Buddhist movement founded in Japan in 1937. This movement was introduced to Ghana by Mr. Jeseph Asomani in 1965. He fostered the growth of the 1

See; The Jews of Sefwi-Wiawso: a lost African Tribe? By Hannahgaventa (2012) and A visit to the Jewish community of Sefwi-Wiawso, Ghana by Michael V Gershowitz https://hannahgaventa1.wordpress.com/2012/07/30/the-jews-of-sefwi-wiawso-a-lostafrican-tribe/ 2 see Bruder, E., & Parfitt, T. (Eds.). (2012). African Zion: Studies in Black Judaism. Cambridge Scholars Publishing. pp. 117 see also, Awuah-Nyamekye, S. (2010). Religious education in a democratic state: The case of Ghana. pp. 7

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movement in Ghana with the membership around 9,500 as of 1990 and a Headquarter/Temple in Ghana (Dovlo, 1994). The temple is located at Anyaa-Ablekuma Raod at the Fan Milk Junction in Accra. The movement has over 50 branches, spread mainly over the southern sector of the country. Ghana has the largest Nichiren Shoshu Temple outside of Japan (Dovlo, 1994). There are other small Buddhist prayer spaces in larger cities, and with a proper request and a small donation, you would be welcome for meditation and chanting. The origins and practices of two Hindu communities in Ghana, the Hindu Monastery of Africa and the International Society for Krishna Consciousness commonly known as the Hare Krishnas. The Hare Krishnas are the local branch of the well-known worldwide proselytizing movement. Hinduism has developed in Ghana without a significant indian presence. .The African Hindu Monastery is located in Odorkor, a suburb of Accra, is Ghana's largest centre of Hindu worship in Ghana. It was formed in the 3 1970s by Kwesi Esel a traditional priest, it is headed by Swami Ghanananda Saraswati. Ghana has a Hindu population of around 12,500, of which as many as 10,000 are indigenous Africans, including Swami Saraswati. The center for their activities in Ghana is the Sri Radha Govinda Temple in the town of Medie outside Accra (Laumann, 2014). The Indian Social and Cultural Center in Osu has a beautiful temple complex with statues of all deities as well as facilities for celebrations. There are also a number of temples devoted to the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (Hare Krishnas), including temples in Takoradi, Tarkwa, Nkawkaw, Kumasi, Sunyani. The largest temple is in Medie a suburb of Accra, claiming almost 13,000 worshipers in

Laumann, D. (2014). Hindu Gods in West Africa: Ghanaian Devotees of Shiva and Krishna by Albert Kafui Wuaku (review). Ghana Studies, 17(1), 247-249. Hindu Gods in West Africa: Ghanaian Devotees of Shiva and Krishna by Albert Kafui Wuaku (review)

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their huge temple4. The locus of the Hare Krishna temple if Medie and the home of the Hindu Monastery of Africa is in Odorkor (Wuaku, 2013). ATTITUDES OF COLONIAL GOVERNMENT TOWARDS ISLAM BEFORE INDEPENDENCE The British colonial government closed the Northern Territories to Christian missionary and restricted their activities in other areas of the then Gold Coast. As such the Christian missionary declared British colonial policy in the gold Coast as proMuslim during the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910. Although criticized, Okafor (19975) in a similar claim indicated that the British colonial policy in the Gold Coast especially the Northern territories was in favour of Islam and Muslims (Weiss, 2005). The general view of Europeans of the Traditional African Religion was that of fetish worship and that practitioners themselves were uncivilized and savage (Samwini, 6 2006). The Europeans perception about Islam during the nineteenth and early twentieth century was that Islam provided superior civilization to the pagans of fetish worshipers. So Islam was viewed as a civilizing force that could be used as a bridge between the savage and modern world. Some colonial officials argued that Christianity was too complicated for ordinary Ghanaian mind even though Christianity was seen to the apex of the moral, 4

Wuaku, A. (2013). Hindu Gods in West Africa: Ghanaian Devotees of Shiva and Krishna. Brill. 5 Okafor, G. Maduka (1997). Christianity and Islam in West Africa: the Ghana Experience. A study of the forces andinfluence of Christianity and Islam in modern Ghana, pp, 97-98(Wurzburg), cited in Holger Weiss (January 2004).Working Paper on Ghana. Abo Akademi University and University of Helsinki 6 Carl Meinh of Afrikanische Religionen (Berlin 1912). Cited in Holger Weiss (January 2004).Working Paper on Ghana. Abo Akademi University and University of Helsinki.

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philosophical, theological and ethical standard. The intellectual achievements of Islam was acknowledged when Europeans became familiar with Muslims and their institutions like system of education, codified law and respect for learning as well as for law and order (Weiss, 2005; Samwini, 2006). They claimed Islam would be the perfect religion because of certain level of morals and ethics and did not demand for absolute monogamy. Furthermore, Muslim preachers prohibiting drinks was also perceived as a positive impact of Islam and Muslims in non-Muslim communities. According to Richard Burton Islam brought unity in place of tribal division and had provided the basis for cultural and economic advancement. By dealing with the Europeans, the imams and Hausa traders rose to important positions. Due to the Muslim-British alliance as well as the good working relationship with Muslim community in the country, colonial officials would often ask the views of the Muslim communities on local affairs. Muslim scholars were posted to local courts to serve as clerks and they were ordered by the colonial government to keep records of all the cases tried by the chief. Muslims were found especially useful when the colonial administration planned the introduction of Indirect rule and the collection of a tribute tax at the beginning of the 1930s (Weiss, 2005 Samwini, 2006). As the collection of such tax presented the colonial administration with major organizational problems, not least in the form of the lack of literate and trustworthy tax collectors, the Commissioner of the Southern Province suggested the engagement of Muslims in the collection. In the Southern Province, Muslims were employed in the preparation of nominal rolls in the villages as well as scribes at the local courts. However, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Colonial pro-Muslim policy was seriously challenged when Mahdist movements were reported throughout British and German colonies. Muslim fanatics were viewed as arch enemies, especially after the traumas created by the Indian munity in 1857 and the fall of Khartoum in 1885. There was also a difference in the tone in the colonial reports concerning the impact of Islam and Muslims.

International Journal of Religious Studies

Muslim itinerant preachers in the country were viewed with suspicion, if not feared by the colonial officials. According to Wilks, there was a clear change of tone in reports during these years. The change in the presentation and image of Islam by the colonial officials could be exemplified through the three early censuses conducted between 1911, 21 and 1931. At the time of the 1911 census, there was still no sign of any doubt towards the belief in the usefulness of local Muslims and the civilizing effect of Islam which had changed by the time of the 1921 census. And the report claimed that the overwhelming majority of the population in the Northern Territories was non-Muslims (Samwini, 2006). The diminishing interests of the colonial administration towards the local Muslim population is reflected in the census report where only so called true Muslims were counted as Muslims. Castellain declared, ‘quite a number of these so call Mohammedans traffic in charms and their Mohammedanism is undoubtedly tainted with paganism. The colonial concept of ‘pseudo’ Muslims had become fairly well established by the early 1930s. The colonial administration felt that it had nothing to fear from these ‘pseudo Muslims (Weiss, 2005 Samwini, 2006). Thus the 1931 census only focused on the ‘true Muslims who might still be regarded as posing a possible danger to the Europeans. British colonial officials were worried about the impact of itinerant Muslim preachers, whom they labeled as ‘Mohommedan missionaries’ thus Mahdist preachers. They predicted the coming of the Mahdi ‘who would punish all nonbelievers, white or black and have generally conveyed the idea that the White men would be exterminated in the country. Such claims caused alarm among the colonial governments and threatened the existing society as well as the established colonial order. As a consequence, drastic measures were applied to curb the threat of an imminent Mahdist rebellion. The Mohammedan missionaries and followers were expelled and some preachers jailed. The missionaries raised a new problem which Europeans had not taken into account when dealing with Muslims thus the existence of difference among Muslims in their

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interpretation of Islam. The conclusion reached by the Europeans was that the negative and potentially troublemaking elements came from abroad, being termed as ‘alien’ Muslims. And that the local ‘native’ or ‘our’ Muslims were peace loving and have accommodated the colonial order. The British began to differentiate between true Muslims – those who could read and speak Arabic usually from Nigeria and Sudan- and pseudo Muslims (Weiss, 2005 Samwini, 2006). According to some British officials, the Muslims were no longer serving as a good example to their neighbours, but rather the contrary. In one report, the Muslim population in the Northern Territories was accused of residing in more ‘insanitary conditions’ than the non-Muslim population. The position towards Muslim education, too, changed during the early colonial period. Official colonial interest was only directed towards the schools run by the Roman Catholic missionaries as well as the modest attempts by the colonial administration itself to establish Government schools in the north. For instance, the 1920 annual report stated that Quranic schools and Muslim teaching existed in all prominent Muslim centers, and that Muslim education consist of learning parts of the Koran by heart ‘when they can do this thus write Hausa in Arabic characters- and read a few verses of the Koran by heart, they consider themselves educated. A similar change in tone concerned the situation in Krachi District that one cannot classify as school the gathering of youths at a Malam’s feet’. The main reason for the ceasing to report on Muslim education was due to the lack of governmental interest. This was due to several factors. Muslim education could not be controlled by the colonial administration mainly because the colonial state was not able to control the Muslim scholars and teachers (Samwini, 2006). Of equal importance was the fact that the colonial state had no use for pupils who had received Muslim education. With the diminishing interest in the Muslim population in the country, the matter of Muslim education was no longer felt to be a matter for the colonial government to bother about. The

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reason for governmental disinterest in Muslim education was said to be due to the general lack of interest among the population towards Muslim education. British and German accounts of the Asante hinterland during the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century suggest that at least Dagbon was then ruled by a Muslim king and through Muslim law. Regarding of Dagbon as a Muslim kingdom stopped only at the end of the nineteenth century. The Dagbon kingdom together with Gonja, Mumprusi and Wa were referred to as ‘countries with organized governments’ having a despotic monarchial government’ but also an influential Council of Eunuchs in Dagbon (Weiss, 2005 Samwini, 2006). In Eastern Gonja, Salaga was known to be an important market, which had declined due to the collapse of Asante’s power in the 1870s and the civil war in the 1890s but which was still a center for Muslim traders and scholars. Each section of the town has its own mosque there existed six Quranic schools in the town. In Mamprugu, Wa and Dagbon Muslim traders and imams were found living in almost all the larger settlements (Weiss, 2005 Samwini, 2006). By the mid-1930, the Muslims had more or less disappeared from the official reports. This is perhaps mainly due to a change in the style of the structure of the reports. Whereas previous model sheets included a section on religion, the new formula included a section on Liberty of Conscience and Worship. This change reflected, in a sense, the limited interest the British now felt towards the Muslim community. By 1935 Islam as practiced in the Gold Coast was no longer regarded as a positive example by the colonial officials. Thus, when Indirect rule was established during the early 1930s, it was built on alliance between the chiefs-who did not necessarily have to be Muslims and whose faith never was considered to be of interest- and the colonial government (Hiskett (1994; Weiss, 2005 Samwini, 2006). The history of Islam in Ghana can be explained in three stages as containment, mixing and reform. At first, chiefs and kings

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contained Muslim influence by segregating Muslim communities. Secondly, traditional rulers blended Islam with local traditions as the people selectively appropriated Islam practices and finally Muslims in Ghana pressed for reforms in an effort to rid their societies of mixed practices and implement the Sunnah. The role of rulers as early recipients of Islam and the importance of kingdoms influence the Islamization process. Kings and chiefs sought supernatural aid from Muslim experts to smoothen the process of state building because they experienced situations of uncertainties and strain, like competition over the chieftaincy, fear of plots and wars with other states, and the responsibility for the welfare of the whole community (Hiskett 1994; Clarke (982). They drew selectively from Islam thus, the religious life of the rulers was the product of the adaptation of a unified cosmology and ritual organization, and imams that directed the rituals for the chiefs were part of the court. The Muslim cleric taught the chiefs only those religious obligations and practices that no one may be excused from knowing. Hence, the chiefs were instructed only with the rudiments of Islam and were not heavily burdened from the beginning with the obligations of prescriptive Islam (Hiskett (1994; Weiss, 2005 Samwini, 2006). It is noted that only the chiefs, their family and entourage accepted Islam, whereas the commoners remained loyal to their ancestral religions. The chiefs adopted a middle position between Islam and the traditional religion, thus they behaved as Muslims in some situations but followed traditional customs on other occasions. They patronized Muslim religious experts but referred also to traditional priests and shrines/ from this middle position. Dynasties and individual kings, in given historical circumstances, could develop greater commitment to Islam or fall back upon ancestral religion. There are many similarities in the ways in which Islam became identified with the various ethnic groups and kingdoms in Northern Ghana in the sixteenth through the eighteenth centuries (Samwini, 2006). Firstly the history of the people among whom Islam found lodging in the northern parts of Ghana is so interwoven with the Islamic history of the area that it is difficult to separate one from the other. Secondly, some of the

International Journal of Religious Studies

kingdoms especially the Gonja and Wa, were established by the collaborative efforts of warriors and Muslim clerics as spiritual advisers who came in a number of ways. The inhabitants during pre-colonial times were a number of ancient inland states like the Akans, Mole-Dagbani, and the Ga and Fante along the coast. The Mande-Gur (Mole-Dagbani) speaking groups in the north of the country established several Islamized states, particularly Dagbon and Gonja. These two states were the middle-men in trade between other larger sahelian Muslim states such as Mali and Songhai and the early Akan state especially in the gold, kola-nut and salt trade (Levtzion and Pouwels 2000; Ansah, 1986; Lovejoy, 1980; Weiss, 2005; Samwini, 2006). ISLAM IN THE MANDE-GUR KINGDOMS IN NORTHERN GHANA A group of warriors from the middle Niger region of Bambara origin imposed their authority over the people of the Gonja region and established the state of Gonja with Buipei as its capital. This invasion probably took place sometime in the 16th century and already at that time there may have been Muslims in the Gonja area who had arrived there from Begho, Hausaland and Borno. The founders of the state, moreover, prior to the invasion had probably had contact with Muslim traders and missionaries in the upper and middle Niger region, and once they had taken control of the Gonja area they recruited Muslims to assist them in administering the new state. One of the functions performed by these Muslims was that of keeping ‘formal lists of past chiefs and their imams’. Peter B. Clarke (1982) observed that the Muslims in Gonja would read out the list of names of past chiefs in the presence of the ruler and the people on the occasion of the festival of Damba, an annual traditional chiefly festival held in Gonja, Dagbon, Mamprugu and Wa which came to be associated with the mawlid al-nabi, (the birthday of Prophet Muhammad) held on the anniversary of Prophet Muhammad’s birth (Mawlid). In return the Muslims expected and received assistance and support from the rulers. As Ivor Wilks

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indicated, there was a route which linked Gonjaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s central provinces of Buipei and Daboya not only with Kumasi to the south but also to Jenne and Timbuktu to the north. From Hiskettâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s account, the history of Islam in the north of the Volta began just before the end of the sixteenth century 1599 with the area known as Gonja. Before the arrival of Islam the area was dominated by the Mossi and Dagomba. Hiskett (1984) argues further that the Dagomba might have met Muslim traders probably of Dyula origin who had already settled there. But at the end of the century, he says, Mande-speaking cavalry raiders, thought to have come from Mali conquered the area and settled. Gonja Muslims also studied and recorded the history of the kingdom as a whole which later became the first source of material for Europeans and other western writers about the area. In addition to the existence of Muslim communities in the main commercial centers such as Bupei, there were several independent Muslim villages in Gonja such as Larabanga and Dokrupe. Moreover, all along the trade routes to the north and south there were numerous staging posts where Muslim and other traders rested. The people at and around these points must have come into contact with and have been influenced by the Muslim traders, who would have manifested their faith by, among other things, praying in public (Levtzion and Pouwels 2000; Ansah, 1986; Lovejoy, 1980; Weiss, 2005; Samwini, 2006). With regard to the advent of Islam in Mamprugu, it seems that this occurred in the 17th century before the long reign of Na Atabia, c,1688-1741. During this reign the trade between Hausaland and the Volta Basin increased in importance leading to the establishment of numerous Hausa Muslim trading settlements in the state. Muslims were regarded by the chiefs as men of learning and prayer and ordered to keep out of politics (Lovejoy, 1980; Weiss, 2005; Samwini, 2006). Islam probably entered Dagomba sometime in the 17th century, but it began to exercise any real influence there around 1700. Levtzion and Pouwels (2000) has identified three groups of Muslims that formed the core of Muslims in northern region. The first group is the Dyula-Mande (Wangara) Muslims

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traders from the upper Niger region who settled at Sabali. Their descendants became the local chiefs of the area and were known as head of Sabali Muslims. The Dyula Muslims were later outnumbered and outlasted by Hausa Muslims. They first settled at Kamshe near Yendi and became agents for the conversion of Na Zangina. Na Zangina later gave the Hausa Muslims chieftainship over Kamshe. It was during the reign of Na Zangina c, 1700-1714 that a strong and influential Islamic community began to emerge in Dagbon. Part of the reason for this was that Na Zangina sought the support of the Muslims in his attempt to fend off Gonja, whose leaders said that one of the reasons for their success against the Dagomba was that they had the support and prayers of their Muslim followers. The third Muslim group that Levtzion and Pouwels (2000) identified is the La’abansi, ‘Arab’ Muslims. This group was associated with the Larabanga Muslims of Gonja who together claimed Arab origin. Islam in Dagbon was not as popular in the first centuries of the religion’s diffusion as was its counterpart in other areas.By 1800 Islam had made some progress but Dagomba had not been transformed by this time into an Islamic state. Indeed Usumandan Fodio, writing in 1806, advised all Muslims to emigrate since the rulers there were unbelievers (Hiskett, 1950). The history of Islam in the Northern kingdoms thus contrasts with that of the religion in the south. Whereas in the north the history was mixed with invasions and trade, in the south it was purely through trade and the British external interventions. Muslims became integrated into northern chiefdom structures but maintained their distinctness in the south, keeping to the zongos, such as Asawase, Aboabo, Mossizongo all in Kumasi, Nima, Adabraka, Cowlane, Sofoline, Fadama all in Accra Kwesimintsim in SekondiTakoradi and many more across the urban towns (Ansah, 1986; Lovejoy, 1980). During the 19the century, as was the case in the 17th and 18th centuries, Muslim merchants from the Upper Niger region and Hausaland settled and traded in the most important commercial centers in northern Asante. The 19th century in fact saw an increase

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in the number of Hausa traders in this region, and one reason for this was that the Asante, with the abolition of the slave trade, began increasingly to look to the north for the goods they needed such as cloth, beads and leatherwork (Lovejoy, 1980; Weiss, 2005; Samwini, 2006).) Muslim traders from Hausaland obtained these goods from further afield in West Africa and brought them along the trading routes to Salaga. One of the safer and more frequently used of these th routes in the 19 century was the one that passed through Nupe and Borgu to Salaga. At Salaga the Hausa exchanged their goods for kola and gold as a result Muslims communities emerged in Salaga and developed around the market, and created an effective and prestigious educational system in the town(Lovejoy, 1980; Weiss, 2005; Samwini, 2006).). This attracted scholars to Salaga who wrote on theological and historical subjects and composed a number of poems of a polemical nature on Christianity. Salaga was rent by civil war in the 1880s and in the same decade and through the 1890s it became a victim of the increasing competition among the European powers for the most economically and strategically important areas in Ghana. The Muslim population moved on to places like Yeji, KetiKrachi and Kintampo in this way spreading Islam to other parts of Ghana. Islam in these states was adapted to fit in with local customs and traditions, for instance Muslims in Gonja and Dagomba helped the founders in strengthening these states and were therefore part of the political system from the beginning. The first Muslim settlers in the Wa region were Mandespeaking traders known as Wangara, who set up Muslim villages probably in the 16th century before the establishment of the kingdom of Wa. These traders were attracted to the area by the gold of the nearby Lobi goldfields. The traders were followed by Muslim religious specialists who seem to have taken up residence in villages in the Wa region by the middle of the 17th century (Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009). The Muslims in Wa forged close ties with the chiefs and took on the language and many of the customs of the local people. They also allowed Islam to be adapted to a very

International Journal of Religious Studies

considerable degree to the local culture. According to Wilks (2002), the Muslim population of the Wa District in 1921 was 3771, representing 9% of the total population of Wala, Dagarti, Grunshi and others. There is no doubt that the major concentrations of Muslims were to be found in Wa town and in a number of villages such as Nasa and Guroise which the colonial administrators had long recognized as exclusively or predominantly Muslim. Wilks (2002) in the 1960s, few villages of any size were found in the Wala and Sisala divisions that did not have a growing Muslim component. New mosques were being erected, Limams (from Arabic al-imam) appointed to them and Qur’anic schools opened. It is widely received view in Wa that a considerable majority of those who regard themselves as ‘Wala’ are now Muslim. ISLAM IN THE INLAND KINGDOM OF ASANTE It is noted that in the 15th century Mande-speaking Muslim communities from the upper and middle Niger regions began travelling across the Volta Basin along the trade routes and set up Muslim communities close to the gold and kola producing areas of the Akan forest. Among those people in the forest zone who came into contact with Islam for the first time in this period or perhaps a little earlier were the Asante in Ghana (Ansah, 1986; Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009).). Muslims began arriving in Kumasi, capital of Asante in modern Ghana, in 18th century. These Muslims came from further north, from Gonjaland, Mamprugu, Dagbon and from centers in the upper and middle Niger region and even from North Africa. The Mande-speaking traders and other Muslim traders from North Africa were also attracted to Asante by its natural resources, in particular its gold and kola (Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009; Ansah, 1986).. By about 1800 the Muslim community in Kumasi, situated in the center of the town close to the main market and the royal palace, was made up of several hundred of people some of whom were scholars and religious specialists while others were merchants. The rulers were particularly interested in availing themselves of the talents and gifts of the sharifs, those Muslim holy men who claimed

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descent from Prophet Muhammadâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s family and were endowed with Baraka, that is, a blessing and spiritual power which many people believed enabled them to heal and ensure success or failure. Muslims in Kumasi became the advisers to the rulers on important matters of state and they also came to control the distributive trade in gold, kola, salt and slaves, and at the same time securing a monopoly over the cattle industry ((Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009; Ansah, 1986; Lovejoy, 1980; Wilks, 1975; Austin, 1995). They were also allowed to preach and teach Islam. The involvement of Muslims, however, in the life of the court as advisers to the rulers meant that they were obliged to make compromises. They had, for example, to attend royal ceremonies involving traditional religious ritual and sacrifices. They did try, however, to change some of the un-Islamic ritual and worship performed at the royal court. According to Owusu-Ansah, (1983), approximately eighty percent of the population of Kumasi is Christian, twenty percent is Muslim and the rest follow ATR (Ansah, 1986; Lovejoy, 1980; Wilks, 1975; Austin, 1995). ISLAM ALONG THE COAST OF GHANA (FANTE AND GA) The Mossi, Zaberima, Wangara and the Kotokoli came from French West Africa to work in the plantations and in the mines and in the other trades of Ghana. The Hausa, Youruba and the Fulani came from Nigeria to Ghana and set up the zongos in the urban trading and mining centers. This is the period during which the Ga of Accra, and other towns along the coast came into contact with Islam (Nathan, 2006).Levtzion stated that the Hausa and Fulani came to Ghana already Islamized while the Zaberma, Songhai and Kotokoli were Islamized in various degrees (Levtzion 2007). The Ga words for the Muslim, hausanyo, a Hausa and Islam respectively depict the language and people from whom the Gas encountered Islam. Unlike their counterparts in the other parts of the country the Muslim late comers to Accra and other coastal areas set out to concentrate on the affairs of their isolated quarters and their own business, and were not involved in local politics and the socio-

International Journal of Religious Studies

religious affairs of the chiefs and people for the greater part of the period under review. They set up their own independent chiefdoms known as the Sarkyi Zongos in the zongos. Islam came to the Fante of the coast in entirely different mode. In the central and western coast the Fante encounter with Islam was different from the Dagomba, the Gonja, the Mamprusi and even from that of the other southern people such as the Asantes and Gas. In July 1872 the British colonialists brought in the first batch of Hausa Muslim troops to Ghana and were stationed in Accra, Elmina and Keta. By 1886 the British were paying salary to one ‘Mohammandan Priest’ at each of the military posts and Muslims were given government land to settle and build mosques. Research suggests that Fantekramo, Fante Muslim (or Fante Islam) started in 1885. The establishment of Islam in Fante land is associated with two men, Benjamin Sam and Mahdi Appiah. Unlike the other parts of the country, Islam among the Fante can be described as one of local initiative rather than of activity (Nathan, 2006; Levtzion 2007; Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009). As Fisher has shown, in about 1885 Benjamin Sam, a Wesleyan (Methodist) catechist at Ekrawfo near Cape Coast adopted Islam. It appears that after conversion to Islam Sam used his previous experience as a trader, catechist and ‘vigorous’ preacher to build up a sizeable Muslim community of about five hundred people scattered over Fanteland. He was the imam. Benjamin Sam, not surprisingly, was described as a ‘less orthodox Muslim and was tolerant about alcohol and said not to be insistent on circumcision. Sam’s liberal stance on alcohol became a major cause for disagreement between him and Mahdi Appah, Sam’s friend and fellow convert to Islam. Sam died in 1908. For a while ‘northern’ Muslim itinerant preachers supervised the nascent Fante Muslim community who were for the most part illiterate in Arabic. Fisher added that this supervision did not last indefinitely, and in 1921 the group invited the first Indian missionaries of the Ahmadiyah Movement to come to West Africa. In the words of

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Fisher, Fante Muslims preached from the Bible. This was so probably because of their background as former Christians or because they could not use the Qur’an since it was in Arabic and they knew no Arabic. ISLAM AFTER INDEPENDENCE The developed gold mines and cocoa plantations on the Gold Coast attracted hundreds of thousands of workers from northern Ghana, Hausaland, Upper Volta, Togo, Dahomey, Niger and Mali. Many of the migrants were not Muslims appointed their own headmen but soon adopted Islam and the Hausa language (Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009). The headmen were vital because they helped the sick and poor, provided food and lodging, took care of orphans, supervised inheritances, performed marriages and burials, and adjudicated disputes on the basis of Islamic and customary law. This populace was concentrated in the Zongo or Muslim quarter of Kumasi (Ansa, 1986). To rule the migrant population the British recognized the community headmen, allowed them to organize courts, and appoint a Sarikin Zango chief of the Zongo. With the coming of independence, the Muslim community was reorganized to meet the demands of the new situation. In 1957, Nkrumah removed the headmen from office and created a direct link between the government and the communities by the appointment Mutawakilu as Sarkin Zongo under the authority of the Ministry of Interior. The Muslim Council was created as an instrument of government control. With the removal of Nkrumah in 1966 the Muslim communities again set up their own headmen. Muslim 7

Hamphrey J. Fisher, Early Muslim-Western Education in West Africa’ in Muslim World, vol. 51, 1966, pp.288-98. Fisher indicates that the history of Islam in the Fante Coast is from records of European merchants, missionaries and administrators. Cited in ‘The Muslim resurgence in Ghana since 1950: its effects upon Muslims and Muslim-Christian Relation By Nathan Samwini 2006 Transaction Publishers, Rutgers University USA and London http://books.google.com/books?id=tpnaeupe4gkc&pg=pa30&sig=vco0rp5rp4li1x6qbc9yqxm7vn4 &hl=en#v=onepage&q&f=false

International Journal of Religious Studies

norms of hospitality require people of such social significance like Sarkin Zongo to receive strangers and give them the necessary assistance either in locating their relatives or in overcoming their immediate problems. Since 1966 until today the community structure of Muslims in Ghana has evolved to emphasize the common Muslim identity in the Zongo. Ethnic ties were generally strong among first immigrants, but the current generation identify with wider Islamic principles rather than with more parochial groups. The Hausa version of Islam has become standard thus marriage and naming ceremonies tend to follow the Hausa pattern (Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009; Ansah, 1986). Neighborhood, school, and youth groups are formed on a multiethnic basis. Festivals, funerals, ceremonial days, and worship in the common mosque also serve to reinforce a trans-ethnic solidarity and Islamic brotherhood. The old ethnic lineage headmen were challenged by a younger generation of urban-born, highly educated leaders who speak for the Muslim community as a whole. Since 1966 tension in the Muslim community has developed between the Muslim mission, thus a modernizing group and the more traditional Sunni communities (Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009).. Muslims have also become the scapegoat for Ghanaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s economic problems and hostility between Ghanaians and alien Muslims has increased after independence. Alongside of the traditional kin-based and ethnic groups there are numerous reformist and modernist Muslim associations have become widespread in the Post-independence period as an expression of Muslim communal interests in the context of non-Muslim national politics. In Ghana these included the Ahmadiya Muslim Mission, the Ghana Muslim Mission, the Islamic Research and Reformation Center, the Islamic Solidarity Association of West Africa, the Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs in Ghana, and the Ghana Muslim Representative Council- all of which sponsor English-Arabic schools and missionary activities (Weiss, 2015; Dumbe, 2009). Islamization is a significant force which is rapidly spreading throughout Ghana, even to areas that were considered to be

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resistant to Islam. This resistance belt is collapsing nowadays in Ghana as one can see the increasing number of Mosques in areas like Accra, the capital city where majority are Christians. The growth of Islam is faster than Christianity in Ghana as can be seen the influence of Islam such as their prayers and way of thought as well as practices. Propagation of Islam continues to spread to the southern part of Ghana where the majority is Christian. According to David et al., (2001), Muslim growth rate in Ghana is 3.10 and that of Christian is 3.06 which mean that Muslim is one fourth of the size 8 of Christianity. Besides, Mission Handbook is reporting that Islam is one of the fastest growing major religious groups, largely as a result of population grow in Asia and Africa. He further stated that Muslim will be almost half the size of Christians in Ghana in fifty years’ time, thus by 2050. The propagation of Islam is extremely effective in Ghana after independence. For instance Muslim missionaries are rapidly building schools, mosques and helping human welfare services at the villages in Ghana which spread the influence of Islam. However, the methods of propagation by some Muslims are rather contrary to the Qur’an and Sunnah. The early Islamic scholars in Ghana introduced new beliefs and practices into the religion after independence which necessitated the establishment many Sunni communities including Anbariyah Sunni Community in the Northern regional capital, Tamale (Kobo, 2012). Hajj Yussif Salih, popularly known as Afa Ajura established Anbariya with the main objective of ensuring that Islam was practiced according to the dictates of the Holy Qur’an and Sunnah (Aning, & Abdallah, 2013; Kobo, 2012, 2015). In the philosophy of revolution articulated by the Shehu Afa Ajura, as much as the individual Muslim in other 8

In Yim (2004) unpublished Doctoral thesis; John A. Siewert, and Edna G. Valdez, eds., Mission Handbook 1998-2000: U.S. and Canadian Christian th ministries overseas (Monrovia: MARC Published, 17 ed.), 42. See also David B. Barrett, Gearge T. Kurian and Todd M. Johnson, eds. (2001), World Christian nd Encyclopedia. New York: Oxford University Press, 2 Edition, pp 307-311. Also, Melton, J. Gordon, and Baumann, Martin, eds., Religions of the World Vol. 2 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CILO, Inc., 2002)

International Journal of Religious Studies

parts of the country like Kumasi, Takoradi, Sunyani and Accra, had to commit their energy, resources and its very life to the propagation of Islam, the expansion of dar al Islam (the territory of Islam), the abasement of unbelief, and ensuring that the perpetual conflict between Islam and unbelief is resolved in favour of Islam (Aning, & Abdallah, 2013; Kobo, 2015). For instance like others in the country, Sheikh Afa Ajura started by moving from village to village to preach Islam using the Qur’an and Sunnah. In desirous to spread Islam, he started teaching from the porch of his house at Sakasaka in Tamale with only 24 students. In 1951 the Anbariya Islamic School was establish at Nyanshagu in Tamale, to house students from the porch of his house. He was assisted by a few volunteers who sacrificed both material and human resources to realize the dream and vision of a pure Islam and its propagation (Weiss, 2007). With determination and resilience by Afa Ajura, Anbariya Islamic School has now developed into a big Islamic Institute with student population of more than 2000 from Ghana and the surrounding countries like Burikina Faso, Togo and Niger. This Sunni Community is developed into a group of disciplined and devout Muslims, coupled with visionary leadership and the spirit of self-denial has resulted into building of numerous schools, mosques and other properties which is managed efficiently for the growth and development of Islam in Ghana and beyond (Dumbe, 2009). After Ghana’s independence in 1957, majority of Muslims were skeptical about the intentions of the Western secular system of education. As a result a lot chose not to enroll their children in school but continued to patronize the makaranta exclusively where the curriculum is Qur’an and sunnah. The exigencies of the moment led Muslims to establish Arabic English schools. Many of the traditional schools (makaranta) began to expand their curriculum to offer both secular and religious subjects. For instance in the northern region of Ghana, the first traditional Islamic school to incorporate secular subjects was Nuriya Islamic School in Tamale and others like Anbariyya Islamic Institute and Nah’da Islamic School followed suit (Aning, & Abdallah, 2013; Kobo, 2015; Weiss,

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2007). For effective management, the Ghana Education Services in 1987 established the Islamic Education Unit to assist and oversee the transformation of traditional schools into integrated institutions that teach the government curriculum, while maintaining their religious character and subject matter. The main objective is to Islamize the educational system or integrate the Islamic way of life into the modern education so that products of the educational system are able to participate meaningfully in societyâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s development. Also to maintain the Islamic identity of the schools to build trust with community and to encourage parents to send their children to the newly reformed schools. The Islamic Education Unity now oversees over 497 kindergartens, 699 primary schools, 255 junior high schools and a lot of senior secondary schools though out the country. The Arabic, Qurâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;an and Islamic religious studies are done in all the schools under the Unit.There are a number of Islamic Schools in Kumasi and other big cities in Ghana. In Kumasi we have Wataniyya Islamic School near Aboabo market founded by Alhaji Ahmed Baba Waiz, Nuriya Islamic School founded by the late Sheikh Ahmed Nurideen Ceesay and Uthmang Islamic School to be accredited as a tertiary institution to run diploma and other tertiary programs. TI Ahmadiyyah Secondary School, Sakafia Islamic School Complex, Sawaba, Yasirudiya Islamic School, Asawasi and King Khalid Mosque, Islamic Complex in Kumasi. CONCLUSION A central feature of these societies was the structure of state and religious organization. In Muslim societies, state and religion are unified and that Islam is a total way of life which defines political, as well as social and familial matters. This, of course, is the common Muslim view embodied in the ideal of the Prophet and the early Caliphs who were rulers and teachers, repositories of both temporal and religious authority, and whose mission was to lead the community in war and morality. This ideal continued to inspire the efforts of reformist, revivalist and Caliphal movements to create an

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integrated Muslim state and society around the world. Such movements were common in lineage communities, in which adherence to Islam led to tribal unification, conquest, and the formation of new empires and movements in North Africa, the Safavid movement in Iran, and others. What is known about the early history of West Africa comes from medieval accounts written by Arab and North African historians. Several models have been used to explain why Africans converted to Islam, thus emphasized economic motivations, others highlight the draw of Islam’s spiritual message and a number stress the prestige and influence of Arabic literacy in facilitating state building. What is apparent is that the early presence of Islam in West Africa for that matter Ghana was linked to trade and commerce. These Muslims from abroad had their own system of education which was quickly adopted by the newly converted and adopted to fit their local traditions and conditions. Schools were established to teach Qur’anic memorization and eventually to teach the other Islamic sciences at higher levels. Communities generally established Qur’anic schools and their purpose was to educate children. Parents usually paid the teachers often in kind and maintained the school space. Children of mixed ages studied together memorizing the Qur’anic verses assigned and writing them out on white wash board while committing them to memory.

REFERENCE A. Rahman I. D (2006). Spread of Islam in West Africa (part 1 of 3): The Empire of Ghana Abdel Seidu, S. (1989). The influence of Islam on the Dagamba in the twentieth century. Adarkwa-Dadzie, A. (1998). The Contribution of Ghanaian Traditional Beliefs to Biodiversity Conservation'.

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In Proceedings Of The Third UNESCO MAB Regional Seminar On Biodiversity Conservation And Sustainable Development In Anglophone Africa (BRAAF), Cape Coast. Aning, K., & Abdallah, M. (2013). Islamic radicalisation and violence in Ghana.Conflict, Security & Development, 13(2), 149-167. Ansah, D. O. (1986). Talismatic Tradition: Muslims in early 19th Century in Kumasi. Unpublished doctoral dissertation, Northwestern Universtiy, Evanston, Illinois. Arnim Langer and Ukoha U. (October, 2007). Ethnicity, Religion and the State in Ghana and Nigeria: Perceptions form the Street. Crise Working Paper No. 34.Oxford University. Retrieved 25/06/11 http://www.crise.ox.ac.uk/ Asamoah-Gyadu, J. K. (2009). African Traditional Religion, Pentecostalism and the Clash of Spiritualities in Ghana. Fundamentalisms and the Media, 161. Atiemo, A. (2003). Zetaheal Mission in Ghana: Christians and Muslims Worshipping Together?.Exchange, 32(1), 1536.Islam/Christians together, Islam, Christianity, TAR Austin, G. (1995). Between abolition and jihad, from abolition to civil war and colonization: the response of the Asante state and economy to the ending of the Atlantic slave trade, 18071896. R. Law (ed.), From Slave Trade to Legitimate Commerce: the Commercial Transition in Nineteenth-Century West Africa. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 93118. Barbara C. and Lucy C (1994). The Heritage of Islam: Women, Religion, and Politics in West Africa, pp 55. USA: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Bell,

C. M., &Aslan, R. (1997). Ritual: Perspectives dimensions (p. 41). New York: Oxford University Press.

and

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Boaten, A. B. (2001). The trokosi system in Ghana: Discrimination against women and children. African women and children: crisis and response, 91. Bravmann, R. A. (1980). Islam and tribal art in West Africa (No. 11).CUP Archive. Clarke (1982). A Study of Religious Development from the Eighth and the Twentieth Century: West Africa and Islam, pp. 176. England: Cambridge University Press Clarke, P. B. (1982). West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development from the 8th to the 20th Century. David B. Barrett, George T. Kurian, and Todd M. Johnson, (2001[eds]). World Christian Encyclopedia, 2nd Edition pp. 307-311. New York: Oxford University Press David, B. B., George, T. K., and Todd, M. J. (2001) World Christian Encyclopedia: A Comparative Survey of Churches and Religions in the Modern World, Oxford University Press, Volume 2 Department of Arts of Africa, Oceania, and the Americas (October 2001). "Trade and the Spread of Islam in Africa".In Heilbrunn Timeline of Art History. New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2000â&#x20AC;&#x201C;. Dovlo, E. (1994). The Nichiren Shoshu in Ghana. Institute of African Studies, 10(1-2), 46-60. Dumbe, Y. (2009). Transnational contacts and Muslim religious orientation in Ghana (Doctoral dissertation, University of Ghana). Education Development Center Inc (EDC) (October 1, 2007). Islamic Education sector Study. Fisher, H. J. (1973). Conversion Reconsidered: Some Historical Aspects of Religious Conversion in Black Africaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122; Africa 43:2740. In Nehemia Levtzion 2007. Islam in Africa and the Middle

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East; Studies on Conversion and Renewal, pp. 66. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, Great Britain. Fisher, R. B. (1998). West African religious traditions: Focus on the Akan of Ghana. Orbis Books. Ganusah, R. Y. (2000). Pouring libation to spirit powers among the ewe-dome of Ghana: an indigenous religious and biblical perspective. The Bible in Africa: Transactions, Trajectories, and Trends, 278. Hiskett, M. (1950). Kitab al-farq^: a work on the habe kingdoms attributed to'ujuman dan fodio. Journal de la Societe des Africanistes,20, 2. Hiskett, M. (1984). The Development of Islam in West Africa. Historical and Contemporary Studies 2.Abo Akademi University and University of Helsinki. Holfwe Weiss (2004). Variations in the Colonial Representation of Islam and Muslims in Northern Ghana, ca. 1900-1930 W O P A G - Working Papers on Ghana: http://academic.depauw.edu/mkfinney_web/teaching/com227/cultura lportfolios/ghana/worldviewreligion.html Iddrisu, A. (2002). Between Islamic and Western secular education in Ghana: A progressive integration approach. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 22(2), 335-350. Iddrisu, A. R. (1996). Al Haj Umar of Kete-Krach, a teacher, poet and a social commentator of his time. Unpublished masterâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s thesis, Department for the Study of Religions, Universitty of Ghana, Legon. Ira M. Lapidus (1988). A Histeoy of Islamic Societies, pp848-850. London: Cambridge University Press J. Spencer Trimingham, (1959). Islam in West Africa, pp. 19. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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John Azumah (2000). Muslim-Christian Relations in Ghana: “Too Much Meat Does Not Spoil the Soup”. http://www.wcccoe.org/wcc/what/onterreligous/cd36-01.html Accessed 25/06/ 2011 Kobo, O. (2012). Unveiling Modernity in Twentieth-Century West African Islamic Reforms. Brill. Kobo, O. M. (2015). Shifting Trajectories of Salafi/Ahl-Sunna Reformism in Ghana. Islamic Africa, 6(1-2), 60-81. Levtzion, N.(1968). Muslim and Chiefs in West Africa: A Study of Islam in the Midddle Volta Basin in the Pre-Colonial Period. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Levtzion, N., & Pouwels, R. (Eds.). (2000). The history of Islam in Africa. Ohio University Press. chiefs and kings merchants Levtzion, Nehemia, and J.F.P Hopkins, eds. (1981).Corpus of Early Arabic Sources for West African History.Trans. J.F.P. Hopkins. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. In Nehemia Levtzion (2007). Islam in Africa and the Middle East; Studies on Conversion and Renewal, pp. 66. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, Great Britain. Lindsay, L. (2010). The Influence of Islam on West Africa. Lovejoy, P. E. (1980). Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade, 1700-1900. Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press. Mervyn Hiskett (1994). The Course of Islam in Africa, pp. 121. London: Edinburgh University Press Lt. Mervyn Hiskett, (1984). The Development of Islam in West Africa, pp. 3-4. London: Longman Group Limited, N. Levtzion and R.L. Pouwels (2000). Islam in the Bilad al-Sudan to 1800; The History of Islam in Africa, pp.62-91. Athens, OH: Ohio University Press. In Nehemia Levtzion 2007. Islam in Africa and the Middle East; Studies on Conversion and Renewal, pp. 64. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, Great Britain.

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Nehemia Levtzion (2007). Islam in Africa and the Middle East; Studies on Conversion and Renewal, pp. 64. London: Ashgate Publishing Limited, Great Britain. NyuotYoh, John G. (2005).Type of Islam Practice in Ghana. University of South Africa. http://www.passia.org/conferences/2005/John-Yoh-2005.htm Accessed 25/06/15 Okafor, G. M. (1997). Christianity and Islam in West Africa: the Ghana experience; a study of the forces and influence of Christianity and Islam in modern Ghana. Islam/Christians together, Islam, Christianity, TAR Owusu-Ansah (1994), "Christianity and Islam in Ghana". Owusu-Ansah, D. (1983). Islamic influence in a forest kingdom: the role of protective amulets in early 19th century Asante. Transafrican Journal of History,12, 100-133. Owusu-Ansah, D. (2002). History of Islamic Education in Ghana: An Overview. Ghana Studies, 5, 61-81. Parker, J. (2004). Witchcraft, anti-witchcraft and trans-regional ritual innovation in early colonial Ghana: Sakrabundi and Aberewa, 1889â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1910. The Journal of African History, 45(03), 393-420. Peter B. Clarke (1982). West Africa and Islam: A Study of Religious Development for the 8th to the 20th Century, pp37, 93-96, 106,259. London: Edward Arnold Publishers Ltd. Peter Barker (1986). Peoples, Languages, and Religion in Northern Ghana, pp. 60. Accra, Ghana: Ghana Evangelism Committee in association with Asempa Publishers Quashigah, E. K. (1998). Religious Freedom and Vestal Virgins: The Trokosi Practice in Ghana. Afr. J. Int'l & Comp. L., 10, 193. R.Law, (1980). The Horse in West African History (Cambridge, England,) In Peter B.

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Ryan, P. J. (1996). Islam in Ghana: its major influences and the situation today. Orita: Ibadan Journal of Religious Studies, 28(1-2), 70-84. Ryan, P. J. (1998). Gradualist and militant in West Africa: A study of Islam in Ghana. Orientaliachristianaanalecta, (258), 147162. Saj, T. L., Mather, C., & Sicotte, P. (2006). Traditional taboos in biological conservation: the case of Colobusvellerosus at the Boabeng -Fiema Monkey Sanctuary, Central Ghana. Social Science Information, 45(2), 285-310. Samwini, N. (2006). The Muslim resurgence in Ghana since 1950: its effects upon Muslims and Muslim-Christian relations (Vol. 7). LIT Verlag MĂźnster. Sarbah, C. J. E. (2010). A critical study of Christian-Muslim relations in the central region of Ghana with special reference to traditional Akan values(Doctoral dissertation, University of Birmingham). Sulemana, H. M. (2003). Islamic Literacy Tradition in Ghana. Maghreb Review, 28(2-3), 170-185. Tariqa Tijaniyya (2009). Practices of the Tijaniyya. http://tijani.org/ practices/ retrieved 24/06/11. Trimingham, J.S 1962. A History of Islam in West Africa.p 19. London; Oxford University Press US Department of State 2008. International Religious Freedom Report 2008- Ghana, 19 September. Weiss, H. (2005). Variations in the colonial representation of Islam and Muslims in Northern Ghana, Ca. 1900â&#x20AC;&#x201C;1930. Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, 25(1), 73-95. Weiss, H. (2007). Begging and almsgiving in Ghana: Muslim positions towards poverty and distress.

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Weiss, H. (2015). Chapter One: The 'Northern Factor' in Ghanaian Historiography. Studia Orientalia Electronica, 105, 15-42. Wilks, I. (1975). Asante in the Nineteenth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wilks, I. (2002). Wa and the Wala: Islam and polity in northwestern Ghana (Vol. 63). Cambridge University Press. Wilks, I. 2002). Wa and the Wala: Islam and Polity in Northwestern Ghana, pp. 24-25 &93. New York: Cambridge Uninversity Press Wilks, The Position of Muslim in Metropolitan Ashanti, in I. M. Lewis (ed1966). Islam in Tropical Africa, p. 328-9. London: Yim, C. (2004). Understanding Islam, its History in Ghana, and an Effective Evangelistic Strategy to overcome Islamic Influence in Ghana. Unpublished Doctoral thesis. Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary.

International Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, January – March 2016 Shawn David Young

FROM HIPPIES TO JESUS FREAKS: CHRISTIAN RADICALISM IN CHICAGO'S INNER-CITY SHAWN DAVID YOUNG Department of Religious Studies, University of Saskatchewan This study traces the history of Jesus People USA (JPUSA). Founded in 1972, this community is one of the most significant surviving expressions of the original Jesus Movement of the sixties and seventies and represents a radical expression of contemporary countercultural evangelicalism. JPUSA's blend of Christian Socialism, theological orthodoxy, postmodern theory, and ethos of edgy artistic expression (as demonstrated at their annual music festival) prove what some scholars have longed suspectedevangelicalism is a diverse, complex movement, which simply does not yield to any attempt at categorization. JPUSA and their festival provide yet another example of this complexity. This study will provide more valuable information for scholars who seek to understand American evangelicalism and its continued relationship to American culture and society.

nce the Mecca of the hippie and peace movement, the Haight Ashbury area of San Francisco showed decline during the late sixties and early seventies and became a “dope infested hellhole,” according to Brian Vachon.1 The fading iconic status of Haight Ashbury and other signifiers intimated at possible decline within the peace ranks of the counterculture-the Kent State shootings, race riots, Manson murders, the Watergate scandal, secret bombings in Cambodia and North Vietnam, the break up of the Beatles, and the deaths of Janis Joplin and Jimi Hendrix.

Social action appeared to have little effect on a society entrenched in a technocratic nexus of bureaucracy and power. Thus many within the counterculture, particularly hippies, retreated further into Timothy Leary's inner-space. David Di Sabatino opens ISSN 1352-4624 http://fssh-journal.org

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his work with an overview of the chaotic milieu of the sixties, creating a scenario where young hippies sought “Dionysian ecstasy over Apollonian order,” seeking mother-love qualities of the divine, rather than the angry father in the clouds. While meaning appeared out of reach for some, others discussed notions of God, even if influenced by mind-altering drugs at the time. Simply put, there was a search for selfhood by those who felt robbed of there core selves. People were on the lookout for authentic community as well as the 2 end of time, whether secular or religious. It has become cliché to lump the peace movement into some esoteric quest for Eastern Enlightenment. There was an interest in transcendental meditation. But to have assumed that the East had better answers than the West would have been to fetishize a culture which does not seek justification, undermining the very reason for the countercultural war against religious conservatism. This is not to ignore the typical narrative of the “hippie quest for enlightenment.” But the hippie quest goes deeper than the search for anything not “us,” or a casting off of familial tradition in favour of some romantic notion of exotic culture. While this is certainly part of it, particularly when evaluating the more juvenile categories of the counterculture, it appears the hippie search for the divine is rooted in some quest for “otherness.”3 Theodore Roszak suggests that the rampant usage of psychedelic drugs during the sixties was not necessarily related to mere adolescent curiosity or teenage impulse rebellion. Rather, it was a deep-seated need to stop the mind-numbing voices of the technocratic status quo which seemed to define mainstream life during the fifties; to avoid the “evils” of the unrestricted pursuit of profit; to reach out and to know God. He suggests that Lysergic Acid Diethylamide (LSD) was thought to deconstruct what society had constructed, freeing the mind to evolve into a new way of being, unfettered by social maladies which Modernism's technocratic bourgeoisie had ignored. The sixties might be viewed as reaction to the dichotomy of the intellectual and the spiritual; a reaction against structure, reason, and established truth. As Acid

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gurus Timothy Leary and Allan Ginsberg brought LSD into the mainstream, a search for the “chemical messiah” seemed ample rebuttal to the cerebral argument of Modernism. Young seekers saw not just an escape from the Vietnam War and other social maladies, but an opportunity for psychic journeys, chemically wedding intellect and soul. Transcendence was sought and allegedly achieved after social and cultural constructs were abolished by LSD, allowing the tripper to “break on through to the other side,” as Jim Morrison encouraged, or to “find an answer in 'first order experiences',” as evangelist and apologist Francis Schaeffer suggested.4 David Di Sabatino refers to the sixties as a spiritual decade: “By studying the era as an age of recurring religious epiphany, scholars have rendered the decade, whether explicitly or implicitly, as the Spiritual Sixties.”5 Although not overtly “religious” (within the confines of traditional religious orthodoxy) it is quite appropriate to refer to this decade as “spiritual” rather than religious. Sometimes viewed as more mystic6 than religious, the sixties marked a time of religious experimentation, departing from more conventional, and perhaps nationally recognized religious establishments, embracing the unconventional, the fantastic, and the ancient. Paul Tillich reminds us of the existential crisis of meaning which defined much of the early to mid-twentieth century. Thus, hippies sought authenticity, selfhood, and the “new man.”7 This is best demonstrated in the work of Ronald Enroth who provides a concise analysis of various communes that sprang up during the early counterculture. While his study is Christian-specific, it nevertheless provides evidence that supports Paul Tillich's assertion (by way of Rossinow's work) that humans seek to escape the alienation felt within a technocratic world. The “twin fears” of the isolationism of a free-market system and the conformity indicative of Collectivism provided a needed “middle way” which would alleviate the crisis of meaning by providing a sense of community without totalitarian control from the state. Many intentional

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communities attempted to provide solace for those who sought escape from a meaningless, materialistic world. THE JESUS MOVEMENT As the sixties came to a close, various hippies became disenchanted with the counterculture. Former hippie Ted Wise recalls his own history fondly and pensively. His recollection goes reveals his own dissatisfaction with what he views as an overglorified culture that inevitably failed: Inside, known only to a small circle of friends, was our real life. Both of us and a few others were supremely disappointed; we found ourselves part of an alienated group that fell through the cracks of post-Korean War American society. We called ourselves the Interstitial Culture. Many of our adventures together were mixed with large doses of LSD. The experience that LSD produces is what makes it a dangerous drug. This is not a comforting thought. It means that the LSD will wear off but the experience, like any other event, will not. Eventually, (sometimes the first time) one will experience a brutal revelation of the poverty of one's soul or psyche.8 Wise counts his experience as one which transformed the way her perceived ultimate ideas. He states: “I found it necessary to cry out to God to save my life in every sense of the word. Jesus knocked me off my metaphysical ass. I could choose Him or literally suffer a fate worse than death. Historian Mark Noll argues that post-revolutionary people need anchors to ground them in the familiar, provide meaning, and encourage social and psychological stability. Simply, disenchanted hippies embraced an updated version of evangelical Christianity. The result was a Christian revival within the counterculture that became known as the Jesus Movement. This revival of evangelical Christianity within the counterculture proved astonishing as various hippies throughout Southern California were dubbed “Jesus people” or “Jesus freaks,”9 labels that were necessary “precisely because they could not be called anything traditional, even though they tended

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toward biblically grounded Christianity,” according to Preston Shires.10 Jesus freaks were coded as non-traditional simply because they mixed the hippie aesthetic with evangelical belief. Furthermore, Jesus freaks often critiqued the traditional church, implying the Restorationist position which characterized young hippie converts. In an article in Time Magazine (1971) Julian Wasser states that “it was the Jesus freaks, as a group, which “blended the counterculture and conservative religion.” Wasser goes on to point out the power which seemed to undergird the movement. “Once merely an arm of evangelical Protestantism, they [Jesus freaks] are now more ecumenical-a force almost independent of the churches that spawned them.”11 According to historian David W. Stowe, Southern California became the “epicenter, the Burned Over district of the Jesus Movement. The movement, however, developed multiple networks [which] linked young Christians across the country, from major cities to small towns in the heartland.”12 Lowell D. Streiker provides a first-hand ethnographic account of the Jesus Movement as it was happening. Written in 1971, his book provides analyses of various communities identified with the movement. While other scholars, notably the works of William Romanowski, David Di Sabatino, and Larry Eskridge, have written retroactive accounts, arguing that the longevity of the movement is indebted to various leaders and musicians whose methods boosted membership and garnered media attention, Streiker's work is an account of communities in their infancy. He recalls various intentional communities such as the Children of God and the Jesus Christ Power and Light Company, led by author Hal Lindsey, and Jesus People USA. The “Jesus freak” appeal to young hippies was due to a bricolage of sorts: the Jesus Movement's Dionysian beatnik aversion to the establishment, the carefree life, Pentecostal religious experience, millennial fascination, and the reengagement with social justice as the Religious Right attempted to offer answers. As with the

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greater counterculture, Jesus Movement communes (intentional communities) were often short-lived or sank into obscurity, as with the Children of God. Despite evanescent attempts, some communities enjoyed greater longevity than others. Shires points out that the secular counterculture and the Jesus Movement opposed the establishment, but disagreed about how to reshape the world. Bill Bright, director for Campus Crusade for Christ stated: “As the head of a large, international movement [Campus Crusade] I am involved with thousands of others in a 'conspiracy to overthrow the world.'“ The connection between Bright and the Jesus Movement involved a massive movement within Campus Crusade to affiliate with the Jesus Movement; many new hippie converts soon joined the campus organization and took part in the “crusade.” Furthermore, new Christians were encouraged by leaders such as Hal Lindsey, author of Late Great Planet Earth (1970). Lindsey was affiliated with the same circle of evangelists and began to teach a rigorous premillennialist 13 eschatology mixed with American nationalism. SPIRITUALISM, THE NEW LEFT, AND THE QUEST FOR AUTHENTICITY DURING THE 1960s James Farrell demonstrates how the “politics of Personalism”14 was exemplified in the attempted unification of various disparate ideas: e.g. leftist and libertarian politics. This position can be seen in various attempts on the right and the left as revolutionaries attempt to alter social structures. Personalism is defined as: a system of philosophy that regards the universe as an interacting system of persons (or selves). According to it, everything that exists is either a person, or some experience, process, or aspect of a person or persons in relation with one another. Reality is social or interpersonal. A person is taken to be a complex unity of consciousness that is able to develop rational thought and ideal values.15

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Doug Rossinow suggests there was an ongoing struggle against classic liberalism as the New Left sought to question older methods and seek new solutions.16 Hippies sought authenticity, chemical epiphanies, selfhood (within communitarian constructs) and a spirituality intended to either answer or silence the existential anxiety created by the establishment. The hippie ethic appealed to the rising Jesus Movement as they sought experience over intellect and body over mind (the collapse of mind-body dualism) as many awaited a soon-to-come messianic figure. Ex-hippies such as Lonnie Frisbee and Ted Wise, as well as counterculture preachers such as Arthur Blessitt and Duane Pederson affirmed the hippie ethos of anti-materialism and used the rhetoric the anti-establishment movement to demonize the “system” in a manner similar to that of Ginsberg's “Moloch”: Hippies understood. While there was an apocalyptic tendency within the secular hippie movement (American society was doomed and a new world would arise), Christian hippies embraced an existing messianic legacy of liberation (whether physical or spiritual). Doug Rossinow demonstrates throughout his work that many Christian activists within the liberation movements of the early sixties, such as the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), adopted the Christian Existentialism of Paul Tillich and the Social Gospel legacy of liberal Christianity. However, Oldfield points out that as the Christian Right came to power, many young evangelicals began to drop the Social Gospel legacy of early twentieth-century evangelicalism (institutions were viewed as corrupt) in favor of spiritual renewal. Despite their differences, both right and left sought a simpler, premodern life.17 The larger Jesus Movement was eventually swallowed up, absorbed into Calvary Chapel, Vineyard, and the growing megachurch phenomenon. At first glance, it appears that hippie converts eventually became part of the system originally touted as flawed and bureaucratic. Donald Miller has recounted the reflections of William James in The Variety of Religious Experience. Although James spoke as an agnostic and Miller speaks

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as a mainline liberal, both recognize the importance of encountering the sacred and the inevitable failure of religious institutions that do not engage a “personalist” position, as Farrell would argue, meeting the needs of the individual within a fragmented world. Farrell points out that the same language of “personalism,” which was used in the New Left, was also used during the formation of the New Right and neo-conservatism, preaching voluntary simplicity and the good life for the individual. Throughout the Jesus Movement and after, the desire for theological and social simplicity was always mixed with a technocratic drive which eventually influenced the growth of contemporary Christian media and the megachurch preoccupation with church growth models and demographics. Meanwhile, some 18 hippie Christians sought a different approach. The aversion to the Social Gospel within some post-Jesus Movement churches is palpable. While parachurch organizations continue relief efforts to feed the poor, there remains the belief that government should not be in the business of relief (this is the church's responsibility) and that any attempt to relativize the scriptures to fit personal agendas robs the scriptures of classical atonement theology-that the gospel is more spiritual than physical. But while conservative evangelicals have often been wary of “liberal” policies, the tide seems to be changing. A bit of context: James Davidson Hunter suggests that liberals who embraced the Social Gospel movement “became simultaneously sensitized to the appalling social conditions and needs generated by industrial capitalism and aware of the church's failings in ameliorating those needs. Born in response was the Social Gospel ...”19 Donald Miller is, however, aware of the lack of social justice within some post-Jesus Movement churches. But that is changing. While Oldfield argues that the Religious Right and conservative evangelical churches will continue to grow, Axel R. Schaefer demonstrates how evangelicals are evolving into a different kind of social force. Along with Miller, Schaefer argues that evangelicalism (even of the conservative ilk) is too complex to pigeonhole. The distinctions that make up the Christian Right (fundamentalist,

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evangelical, “born again,” orthodox) are hazy and conflicted. Given the multiple political and theological beliefs that make up those who claim any or all of these classifications, it is difficult to understand what qualifies as “membership” within each camp. Schaefer considers the fiscal conservatism of the postsixties evangelical culture and the rise of liberal evangelicals, suggesting that the New Right “tap[ped] into the anti-liberal sentiment and moral concerns of Evangelicals” and that “its embrace of laissez-faire is one of its weakest planks, because capitalism itself helped undermine 'traditional values.'“20 JESUS PEOPLE USA One post-Jesus Movement community which continues and thrives in Chicago's inner-city is Jesus People USA (JPUSA). The fact that this group continues as a self-sustaining “Jesus commune” is worth considering. Glenn Kaiser, one of the founding members of JPUSA, joined Jim Palosaari's Jesus People of Milwaukee in 1971.21 At age seventeen, JPUSA elder John Herrin joined the Milwaukee group on February 18, 1972. Jesus People USA began in 1972 as a traveling “Jesus music” group, which included Herrin. Kaiser, Herrin and the Jesus music band Charity (later the Resurrection Band), traveled throughout the United States and eventually 22 developed its own identity and purpose. JPUSA's ability to balance two worlds is striking; they sustain a significant number of community members and continue to enjoy success at their annual Cornerstone Festival. After so many other Jesus Movements communities have faded into obscurity, JPUSA serves as an excellent case-study when considering the various expressions and complexities of the evangelical subculture. Why Chicago? When I interviewed Herrin, he recalled life on the road with the Resurrection Band. Herrin recalled that “if [they were] going to find some place to put down roots [they] wanted to live in the country where [their] kids could run around barefoot in the grass and ... do whatever young hippies do.”23 After touring in

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an old bus and a number of stops thought to be their new home, the group ended up in Chicago on a break. They realized that it was time to consider a permanent residence. The group ended up staying in Chicago for two weeks in an “old converted ... gambling house of some sort,” recalled Herrin. After their brief stay, the group was approached by the head of the “Chicago Full Gospel [Businessmen's Association]” who offered the band to live in a local church (Faith Tabernacle). When faced with the decision with whether or to remain, Herrin recalled the comparing what they had been encountering (teens at their rock concerts) with the problems which beset the inner city. Herrin states: “We were talking to all kind of folks with a lot of different problems, but we began to feel that maybe, maybe God wanted us to stay in Chicago, maybe that's why we came here ...” Upon reflection Herrin considers both divine inspiration and the environment of the city. JPUSA adopted the cosmological certainty of evangelical Christianity and embraced the techniques of evangelists like D.L. Moody. However, unlike others in the larger Jesus Movement, JPUSA, while still (in the early days) holding on to a premillennialist eschatology, saw a need to continue the “beatific” call of social justice. Herrin affirms the push toward a model of social justice as he recalls the initial reason for JPUSA's move from Milwaukee to Chicago: To be honest, we were just young. We didn't know exactly what we were doing. We were just taking it a day at a time. We really felt God called us together. But when I look back at it, some of the things that were real significant moves to us existing today were no doubt the fact that we moved to Chicago and moved to a town that was big enough for us you know ... for there was the enormous mission field here. Chicago was very Catholic, they were the “powers that be” in this city were kind of willing to accept a religious commune. I asked Herrin if their position was similar to the Catholic Worker Model. He agreed that there seemed to be a connection

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and stated that “the city itself was used to the idea of religious organizations being involved in doing things ... not just being a church.” He went on to discuss JPUSA's shelter program, care for the elderly, and their school. Chicago, according to Herrin's estimation, has been friendly toward social justice programs. He argued that the community “could have probably easily ended up in a much more hostile environment than what [they] would have seen ... in Chicago.” The community has been able to generate enough funding to continue various social outreach measures, and receives between 95 and 99 percent of all of the funding from their small businesses. The community receives very few outside donations and rarely solicits them, with the exception of their shelter program. Living in Chicago, according to Herrin, afforded JPUSA “opportunities to grow and to make it.” He states: “I don't know if we would have made it in a little town out in the middle of nowhere. We would have been such an odd duck you know?”24 Currently, the community occupies building in Chicago's inner city (previously a hotel), operating based on what they perceive as the New Testament model of community. That is, members-now approximately four hundred members of all ages-live in communitarian fashion, agree to voluntary poverty, work for one of many community-owned businesses, and agree to turn over material assets to the community. What is astounding about this group is their tenacity. JPUSA has managed to remain self-sufficient and continues the zeitgeist of the original Jesus Movement in Chicago and at their annual Cornerstone Festival near Bushnell, Illinois on the six hundred acre Cornerstone Farm, owned by JPUSA. One wonders how this particular group continued to the point of international influence via their festival, while so many other communes were short-lived. Their journey has been lengthy and arduous. In the early days, community members accepted a number of jobs conducting manual labour: hauling furniture, carpentry, etc. JPUSA purchased Friendly Towers, a senior's home, in 1989. When one studies the political climate of Chicago and the events which

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led to their current home, one is reminded of the strategizing so prevalent in real estate bargaining and social stratification. CHICAGO AND JPUSA'S NEW HOME In his work on Chicago's politics, David K. Fremon provides a bit of Chicago history pertinent to the rise of political battles and mythology. Chicago's history as an industrial city suggests an historical trajectory of both then rise and fall of neighbourhoods and persons. While a bastion of international culture, Chicago is also known for gothic structures, the University of Chicago, high-rise apartment slums, Victorian houses, ghettos fraught with gangs and drugs, homelessness, and great factory systems.25 Oddly, many Chicago wards that have slums are near prosperous neighbourhoods. Based on Fremon's analysis, Chicago is “the most segregated major city in the nation.” There are “two Chicagos-one black, one white.”26 And yet many of those of a plurality of backgrounds live within walking distance. However, overall the wards appear to be largely sectioned off based on community needs, business, class, race and ethnicity. Chicago is home to “corporate liberals” which the New Left dismissed as useless, when considering social justice. Given the ongoing political and ethnic rivalries, it is possible that various Catholic relief houses and other radicals groups such as Jesus People USA saw a need and sought to fulfill what corporate liberalism could not or would do. The 46th Ward is home to Friendly Towers, the building which currently houses the Jesus People USA community. Fremon describes the ward as one which invokes images of “derelicts, flophouses, vacant lots, storefront daylabor agencies, resale shops, and taverns, with a social worker on every corner.” While this is considered uptown, Fremon reminds us that in this ward, “the rich and the poor live here, and it is uncertain which group will dominate the area over the next decade.” Gentrification has been “given a boost.” Charges have been made that “historic district status was being used as a tool to force low-

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income people out of the area.” It is no surprise that “poor people abound in uptown.” It seems this ward has been “a port of entry and home for transients ever since the first apartment hotels appeared in the 1920s.” 27 When considering the race between Jerome Orbach and Helen Shiller, Fremon actually writes about Jesus People USA, suggesting that this “religious group with many members living in the ward [who] supported Orbach throughout his career ... suddenly switched to Helen Shiller [who was also backed by Slim Coleman and Harold Washington] in the runoff.” Those who supported Orbach charged that “city officials had offered the Jesus People's construction firm city contracts if Shiller was elected-a charge the group denies.” Fremon points out the differences: Orbach argued that “every vacant building in his ward either was renovated or scheduled for rehabilitation.” Shiller countered by arguing that “Orbach was attempting to drive out low-income people and senior citizens” and that his funding was largely from “large developers.”28 For members of JPUSA, this proved serendipitous. In John Herrin's account of JPUSA's history, he recalls the time JPUSA leadership spent seeking a permanent home and the events which led to the purchase of Friendly Towers. JPUSA found what served as low income housing to about one hundred senior citizens. The building was “in horrible shape” and had been owned by a “classic slumlord,” in Herrin's words. When the city realized the condition of the building they intervened, creating a media frenzy which highlighted the dilapidated condition of the building and the conditions with which the seniors lived. Leadership decided to place a bid on the property, only to find that “multiple developers were eying the property.” The city held a public auction. However, JPUSA felt the odds were against them. Herrin recalled heavy competition at the auction and pointed out that “the court room probably held ... two hundred people, and it was probably three hundred people in it and it was just packed ...

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you couldn't even get in there sideways.” Potential buyers had to bring a $100,000 cashiers check to be considered a bidder. Apparently, a potential bidder who represented a buyer requested a postponement until they had enough money. The judge insisted the bidding proceed. Herrin recalled that the opening bid was for $250,000, which was cheaper than JPUSA has offered. Representatives of JPUSA raised their hand and no one else placed a bid. The building was theirs. JPUSA became owner and occupants of Friendly Towers in 1989 and fully recognized the 29 massive overhaul project which became their responsibility. JPUSA AND RELIGION James Farrell recalls Gary Snyder's view of early “beatnik” culture-that “religiosity” is a matter of personal experience and practice rather than mere theory.30 JPUSA adopted “theory” (traditional orthodoxy), embraced the Pentecostalism of spiritual experience (within boundaries), and sought social justice similar to the Social Gospel of the Christian left and SDS urban collectives, while retaining classical atonement theology-though they are now open to postmodern methods of parsing out the meaning and recipients of the atonement. Furthermore, years after its inception the community saw the need for denominational accountability with the Evangelical Covenant Church. This distinguishes JPUSA from other communal experiments which maintained distance from the parent culture. JPUSA, like many others within the counterculture, are beyond classification, as Donald Miller points out. Arguing that the community has never been “typical evangelicals,” founder Glenn Kaiser pointed out that in some ways, JPUSA is one of the older “ongoing emerging churches.” He believes that that most church-debates involve methodology rather than theology. However, Kaiser recognizes that when it comes to theological particulars, there is “the Word, the interpretation of the Word, and the interpretation of the interpretation,” hinting at a possible postmodern position on biblical hermeneutics. For Kaiser,

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when a belief or interpretation is unclear, or when there is lack of certainty, he seems to simplify, suggesting that “God is love and there is judgment.”31 I was able to interview community leader Jon Trott, who has been with JPUSA since the early seventies. Trott pointed out that JPUSA is “very utilitarian in their theology,” believing that other Christian bodies posses something good to bring to the table. But when we considered the conservatism of the eighties, he recalled JPUSA's need for a muscular intellectual world at that time in the community's life (which they gleaned from the Reformed camp, although they JPUSA leaders self-identify as Wesleyan-Armenian). Throughout the eighties and part of the nineties, JPUSA entertained Modernist apologetics. For Trott, this was a reaction to his own liberal upbringing; he was troubled by what he considered nebulous, hazy answers offered by liberal theologians and ministers. JPUSA began to change, recalls Trott, as they saw potential problems with defining matters of belief based on strict binaries. Thus, a fascination with postmodern theory emerged within the community. Citing Pascal and Kierkegaard, Trott relishes the “hiddeness of God.” Recalling Jacques Derrida, Trott views language (thus meaning) as a system of flexible cables. While he considers himself orthodox, Trott holds on loosely, recognizing that human attempts to ascertain truth are often flawed, resulting in particularized ideas. For Trott, truth is always being revealed through the Holy Spirit.32 JPUSA AND POLITICS While classification is difficult for some, and although hippies and groups such as Jesus People USA could be lumped into the leftist category, others such as Preston Shires in Hippies of the Religious Right argue that young pre-conversion hippies were actually revolting against the liberal Christian church, attempting to locate an authentic religious and political experience. He suggests that since “the Old Left and the New Left disagreed on the means

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and purpose of reaching a non-capitalistic manner of life, countercultural Christianity [The Jesus Movement] and evangelicalism eventually became unified both in goal and practice.” That is, preconversion hippies found other political and mystical movements “wanting.” The newly converted became attracted to an idea which promised authenticity, truth, and community. But this does not automatically assume a conservative ethos on the part of the Jesus Movement. He goes on to point out that the socially and theologically conservative Francis Schaeffer became a primary 33 influence with the movement. Like other members of the Jesus Movement, Jesus People USA were initially apolitical. John Herrin has pointed out that while community members viewed Richard Nixon as “a crook,” their primary concern was not political, but rather a concern for sharing a conversionist version of the Christian gospel. What distinguishes JPUSA from others in the Jesus Movement is their final embrace of a rigorous model of social activism. After arriving in Chicago, JPUSA saw the need to engage vital social issues, according to Herrin.34 JPUSA represents a particular example of a contemporary Jesus Movement community which, in many respects, is iconic of what the evangelical left represents. On the other hand, as Miller points out, like most evangelicals even JPUSA appears to be immune to classification. For example, while Trott affiliated politically with McGovern, the community leaned rightward because of abortion; they do not embrace “abortion on demand.” However, JPUSA began to see troubling trends within the right wing. Trott argued that the Religious Right has traditionally been a “nationalistic movement” which seeks “empire.” During Reagan's presidency, Trott wrote about the “draconian” policies of the Reagan administration in JPUSA's Cornerstone Magazine. During my interview with Trott, he considered the Reagan era and pointed out that entire families in JPUSA's neighbourhood were homeless due to Reagan's “chopping of the welfare system.”35 John Herrin was equally forthcoming with his views on the policies of the

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Reagan administration. When I asked about his feelings concerning the evangelical connection to Reagan, he responded by stating that “the Reagan era was not good for us for [JPUSA and low-income families in Chicago].” Referring to Reagan's “trickle down economics,” Herrin stated that they did not see any “trickles” in their area, pointing out that “a lot of funding was cut for social services.” To members of JPUSA, Reagan looked like “big business,” and “really kind of stunk,” according to Herrin. He pointed out that both Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush “had more to do with [their] community being predominately democratic today than anything.”36 As we discussed the presence of the Right, Trott recalled a meeting of the Christian legal society in the early years of the Moral Majority. Apparently the society suggested four planks which defined the Moral Majority, the first of which was a strong militarythe suggestion was made that America needed to be “armed to the teeth” to become “the policemen for the world” and to “keep evil at bay.” Trott feels this position is simply unbiblical. He is a philosophical pacifist, though recognizes the need for just war, and is quick to point out that he has never seen one. When I asked how he reconciles this with the Old Testament, he argued that Israel was a theocracy whereas America is a democracy, despite what the Puritans originally sought. In some ways, JPUSA is reminiscent of the Religious Right. More often, they appear to be a picture of the evangelical left. One example of this balancing act between Right and Left is in Trott's own recollection of his conversion to Christianity. He holds on to his conversion experience, values it as an indicator of truth, but tries to remain humble when listening to those who are equally certain as they cherish their own traditions and conversion experiences, also validated by sacred texts. When “witnessing” he will explain why he believes his text and experience to be true. At the same time, Trott believes that a position of humility ought to be adopted when considering matters such as truth and judgment, recognizing that on some level, we are all in error.

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Trott decries the two-party system in the United States, recognizing that both sides maintain agendas to which he does not ascribe. For example, during the Reagan era, JPUSA's magazine (Cornerstone) dealt with topics pertinent to both sides of the political aisle, affirming various positions, both liberal and conservative. When I visited JPUSA I saw no shortage of t-shirts, posters, or bumper stickers which celebrated Obama, as well as Nader. Trott argued that evangelicals are to blame for the Presidency of George W. Bush. This particular presidency brought down the remnants of what Trott was still hanging on to, politically. In Trott's opinion, George W. Bush was the â&#x20AC;&#x153;worst president in [his] lifetime, an arrogant man without humility.â&#x20AC;? Trott does not see Jesus in Bush or in the people who put him into office. While the Bush administration was in power Trott found himself having to reevaluate every position he once held, which he did not want to do 37 at age 52! REVIVALISM AND SOCIAL REFORM: A BIT OF HISTORY James Hunter demonstrates how geographical concentrations differ when considering mainline and conservative Protestant denominations. If conservative evangelicalism tends to be more concentrated in the Midwest and the South, what is it about Chicago that provides a good home for Jesus People USA, a group which is essentially evangelical? Do they see the city as a mission field or simply as a welcoming environment to live out their own ethos while serving the poor as a consequent of their presence? The American Midwest has often been viewed as fertile ground for Protestant revivalists as well as Catholic relief movements. According to Thomas Frank, the Midwest was home to the working class leftist of the thirties who fought corporate greed with organized Populism. However, farmers often lost land to agribusiness as they switched to fiscal conservatism.38 However, as George Marsden points out, earlier attempts to make American life better was far from being realized, despite attempts to organize.

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Citing evangelists such as William Jennings Bryant, Marsden points to a pattern which emerged during the Progressive Era-that “both parties [Republican and Democrat] were preaching moral reform and each presented a vision of America as the land where God's will should be done.”39 Thus the focus remained on political rhetoric more often than action. These similarities continued until the sixties. Marsden recalls the “mammoth industrialization” [which was] “accompanied by the social revolution of urbanization and the economic revolution of incorporation.” In the midst of rising anonymity for the individual who was lost in a sea of industry and the changing cultural landscape due to immigration, organizations such as the YMCA and the YWCA attempted to offer assistance. But as industry expanded during the mid-nineteenth century, problems arose concerning the relationships between labour and capital. Labourers organized, held strikes, and sought better working conditions. Marsden points to the 1886 riot in Chicago known as the Haymarket affair. When Chicago police attempted to calm the situation, local anarchists attacked. They were later sentenced to death. According to Marsden, many mainline congregations viewed the Chicago incident as a clarion call to action, but in a different direction, affirming the justice against the anarchists. Simply put, Chicago has a history of radicalism and social action. It is striking how greed has been mixed with attempts at good will. Marsden demonstrates how John D. Rockefeller (1839-1937), while a “devout Baptist,” was discovered by muckrakers as an unethical businessman who used “ruthless tactics to drive [competitors] out of business,” thus earning him the title as a chief among robber barons. Despite his tactics, he believed that “the Lord” had given him money. He endowed the University of Chicago, founded in 1890 as a “center for Baptist learning.”40 A compelling example of attempted benevolence is that of D.L. Moody (1837-1899). After converting to Christianity due to the

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efforts of the YMCA, Moody became the Charles Finney of his day. Moody resigned as a shoe salesman in Chicago to begin ministry in Chicago during the 1890s, later leaving to tour the British Isles, along with song leader Ira Sankey. Unfortunately, some who were influenced by Moody's message “firmly proclaimed that the world's destiny lay with the Anglo-Saxon race.” Marsden points out that many of these views were supported by the Social Darwinism of the day, encouraging a kind of backhanded benevolence to “lift up and help such people” [those of Latin and African heritage, as well as southern European Catholic heritage] which was the “white man's burden,” according to Rudyard Kipling. Legacies of mixed 41 intentions haunt Chicago's history. In spite of the racist views held by those considered pillars of American Christian moral reform, cultural pluralism was not to be ignored or dismissed. In 1893 the World Parliament of Religion met in Chicago to “promote understanding of the various religions of the world.” But there remained an insistence on religious and nationally superiority as John Henry Barrows suggested that Christianity was synonymous with civilization.42 On one hand, America was viewed as a “Christian nation with a special destiny in history.” Godfrey Hodgson makes this clear.43 Moody, a dispensational Premillennialism, believed the world would decline before the millennial reign of Christ. According to this position, history is divided into various dispensations, thus one is able to determine an approximate time of the End of Days. Moody assisted in the founding of Bible institutes which trained young ministers in this doctrine, bolstering young evangelists to weather the storm of Modernity's critique of biblical literalism. Moody Bible Institute in Chicago is one of the more notable examples. But these were training grounds for ministry of the soul. Randall Balmer suggests that those who adopted dispensational Premillennialism tended to “withdraw from campaigns of social reform ... to devote their full attention to

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preparations for the Second Coming of Jesus, which entailed cultivating inner-piety and trying to convert others to the faith.” Balmer goes on to highlight the exodus of evangelicals from public life and service: “In the face of mounting social ills, evangelicals shifted their attentions from the long term to the short term-because the time was so brief, they believed, until the return of Jesus.” Thus Moody viewed the world as “wrecked.” Evangelicals abandoned social reform and focused on “individual regeneration.”44 It is, perhaps, within this context that a sense of need grew in cities like Chicago; a region once known for religious reform and relief efforts seemed to wane. As a result, government agencies and radical movements were left to fill in the gap. NEW LEFT SIMILARITIES Viewing the Old Left as flawed, those within the New Left focused on individual persons, believing there forerunners were too focused on the economics of the proletariat; they argued that the American middle class and society “seemed impersonal, bureaucratic, and inhumane,” according to James J. Farrell.45 A pacifist, Marxist, and Christian Socialist, Dorothy Day (1898- 1980) was a key figure in American Catholic social justice. Farrell points to the revolutionary publication of both Day and the French peasant intellectual Peter Maurin: “The Catholic Worker decried the assumption of American capitalism (and of American labor) that work could be understood mainly as a commodity rather than as a means of fulfilling people's spiritual and material needs” -pointing out Pope Pius XI's argument that raw materials leave the factory “ennobled” while workers come out “degraded.”46 Their teaching provided a model for hospitality houses, Christian communal living, and ethics based on the teachings of Gandhi. The same sense of existential urgency can be found within the member is Jesus People USA. Their mission in Chicago is synonymous with those who sought social justice over eschatological eagerness. Leaders such as Jon Trott continue to embrace a leftist

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ethos and perceive the American pursuit of wealth as destructive to both workers and communities such as the 46th Ward. JPUSA has a history of activism which traditional evangelicals might find uncomfortable. Trott recalls that JPUSA activism includes “protesting American arms dealers gathering at O'Hare Airport for an 'Arms Bazaar' where third world nations showed up to buy, peaceful protests outside abortion clinics ... protests against Bush's illegal war in Iraq, counter-demonstrations against the “God Hates Fags” people (Fred Phelps), and political involvement with Helen Shiller, a progressive alderwoman once aligned with the Black Panthers and SDS.” Their vote, according to Trott, was “the difference in her first being elected in 1987.” Furthermore, they have worked with “Organization of the North East, a group made up of every progressive and ethnic group in the Uptown /Rogers Park area,” and have remained actively involved in issues 47 concerning housing, jobs, race, class, and gender. There are problems concerning any urban setting beset by mass influxes of people; this, along with the free-market, creates both pluralism and economic tension. When discussing the various influences on the Jesus Movement and the particular circumstances surrounding the Jesus People group in Chicago, I have tried to demonstrate various historical positions as they relate to the problems of social justice and reform. It seems those who suffer do so while theological and political theories have become the darlings of would-be rescuers. When considering the landscape of midtwentieth century American religion and politics George Marsden emphasizes the importance of the liberal/conservative divide and clarifies the primary differences-ones which have both theological and political implications. One the liberal side of the divide were those Americans who placed their strongest emphasis on the values of openness, pluralism, diversity, and mutual tolerance of differences. If these Americans were religious, they typically subordinated theology to ethical concerns [emphasis mine]. Their typical ethics emphasize love, relationships, peace, justice, inclusiveness, tolerance of

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minorities, and acceptance of varieties of lifestyles and expressions of sexuality. Various resurgent conservatives, on the other hand, tended to talk more of finding ethical absolutes, which reflected long-standing Christian and Jewish teachings concerning the family, sexuality, discipline, and the importance of moral law. Often they saw these as implications of more-or-less traditional theological beliefs. They also tended to be patriotic toward America, firmly anticommunist, for a strong military, and for law and order [although mainline liberals also believed in law and order, legislated by government].48 I have included this lengthy quote to emphasize the strict dichotomy which often characterized this period of American history. Furthermore, it is interesting to note that two champions of the divide (Moody the conservative and Day the liberal) have had an impact on students and practitioners of evangelism and social justice who were influential in Chicago. Although Dorothy Day can be classified as a liberal, she is more often viewed as a leftist anarchist, although anarchy also implies limited government. She believed that anarchists simply accepted responsibility for both self and community and promoted a decreased reliance on a distant state power. Thus, one could argue that she advocated individual responsibility within communal contexts. That is, particular communities take care of each other-a mixture of individualism and communitarianism.49 According to James Farrell, the Port Huron Statement was the first “manifesto” of the SDS, which, among many things, “called for the end of the depersonalization that reduces human beings to the status of things.” Furthermore, it called for “human independence” while warning against “egotistic individualism.” Participatory democracy was the key. This imbued a sense of Humanism into the SDS-some recall that the humanism of the New Left was Christian in that it emphasized the person over the institution, thus fulfilling Jesus' call to serve individual persons as if they were him, valuing human beings over both church and law. 50

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CONCLUSION Why did Chicago provide fertile ground for Jesus People USA? Why does a community, birthed during the Jesus Movement, continue to succeed as they seek to maintain the ethos of the original movement? Given Chicago's history of poverty, dissent, radicalism, and impulse to fund various public programs, it seems it provided a welcoming place where members of JPUSA felt they could make a difference. When considering their curious mixture of millennial expectancy, theological orthodoxy, and sense of social justice, Chicago was perhaps one of many cities in need of dedicated servants. As for the curious and continued existence of a “Jesus freak” commune in the twenty-first century, sociologists can only speculate. However, despite any difficulty to locate any one particular reason for JPUSA's success, I will offer this suggestion. The community was created by members dedicated to locating a final home, and in doing so, sought and found a sense of purpose. They found purpose in Chicago's inner city and at their annual Cornerstone Festival-a gathering which, according to Herrin, is “probably the largest gathering of ... [faith-based] indie bands anywhere in the country.”51 JPUSA's conspicuous presence at the festival-their ubiquityallows festival-goers to glimpse individual representatives of a countercultural ethos, despite the age of any particular community member. While the JPUSA community has often been a revolving door (people join, stay for a few months, then leave), the festival has a history of drawing seekers, occasioning within the seeker an awareness of their own liminality. Many of these seekers, such as Otto Jensen and his family, decided to join the community as they sought healing and a different way of experiencing “church.”52 Thus, the community appears to maintain a balance between “oldtimers” (Jesus Movement veterans) and “new-timers” (those who join because of the Cornerstone Festival). The fact that young seekers at Cornerstone are often attracted to the romance of JPUSA might account for its longevity and success.

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The reason for JPUSA's choice to live in Chicago is a matter of perspective. For Herrin and Trott, Chicago's Catholicism and its openness to religious groups (even communally-based) provided comfort and resources-and they believe it was the guiding hand of God. For others, Chicago is a city that naturally draws radical revolutionaries such as members of the SDS. While Chicago's history is a mixture of tragedy, rivalries, closeted skeletons, and radicalism, it remains a place which beckons to those who seek to serve. Some community members have joined out of necessity while others feel a sense of divine calling. Whatever the case, according to Glenn Kaiser, what strengthens the community is an ability to coexist with “disparate subcultures;” all pray, worship, question, eat, and live together in a tight-knit group. JPUSA is based on “the old country church model,” argues Kaiser. His depiction of daily life in JPUSA suggests that some are drawn to the authenticity of community, often lacking in postindustrial society. He states that JPUSA works because it is built around “people that care about each other, like cooking, [and] enjoy helping each other mourn when someone dies,” and...rejoice when a baby is born. It is a “barn-raising,” says Kaiser.53 JPUSA's ability to remain an active force of rescue in Chicago's inner city, while maintaining influence on spectators and musicians at their festival, is astounding. While categorizing the community remains challenging, it is, in my estimation, possible to locate their core impulse. The following quotation best captures the connection JPUSA has to the “spirit” of the New Left. Howard Zinn has suggested that the New Left tried “to create constellations of power outside the state, to pressure it into humane actions, to resist its inhumane actions, and to replace it in many functions by voluntary small groups seeking to maintain both individuality and co-operation.”54 This particular “small group” serves as an enclave of resistance as it is dedicated to avoiding the status quo of the evangelical subculture, challenges corporate greed, and holds accountable government leaders and programs which prove incapable or unwilling to provide assistance to “the least of these.”

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Endnotes 1

Brian Vachon, A Time to be Born (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972), 4-5.

David Di Sabatino, The Jesus People Movement: An Annotated Bibliography and General Resource (2nd ed.; Lake Forest: Jester Media, 2004). 3

Theodore Roszak, The Making of a Counter Culture: Reflections of the Technocratic Society and Its Youthful Opposition (Garden City: Doubleday 1969), 1-41, 82, 137, 253. 4

Francis Schaeffer, Escape from Reason (Downer's Grove: InterVarsity, 1968), 54.

David Di Sabatino, “The Spiritual Sixties and the Jesus People Movement,” History of the Jesus Movement (1999). [http://one-way.org/jesusmovement/ index.html]. Accessed January 17, 2010.

The hippie movement sought religious encounters through non-institutional religious experience, occult transcendence, avoiding affiliation with “organized” religion.

oug Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity and the New Left in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 223. 8

A Grad Student Questions a Jesus Freak,” Ted Wise Interview (1997) [http://www.one- way.org/jesusmovement/index.html]. Accessed January 17, 2010.

Ibid.

Preston Shires, Hippies of the Religious Right (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 91. 11

Julian Wasser, “The New Rebel Cry” Jesus is Coming!” Time, June 21, 1971, 59.

David W. Stowe, No Sympathy for the Devil (East Lansing: n.p. [2008?])

Shires, 45, 109, 113, 119, 129, 149, 150, 154, 155.

James J. Farrell, The Spirit of the Sixties: The Making of Postwar Radicalism (New York: Routledge, 1997), 82. 15

Farrell uses Edgar Brightman's definition to describe Personalism (Farrell, Spirit, 82)

Doug Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity and the New Left in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 150, 151.

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Duane Murray Oldfield, The Right and the Righteous: The Christian Right Confronts the Republican Party (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1996), 16.

Farrell, Spirit, 256, 258.

James Davidson Hunter, Evangelicalism: The Coming Generation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993), 41.

Alex R. Schaefer. â&#x20AC;&#x153;Evangelicalism, Social Reform and the US Welfare State, 1970- 1996,â&#x20AC;? Religious and Secular Reform in America: Ideas, Beliefs and Social Change, ed. David K. Adams and Cornelis A. Van Minnen (New York: New York University Press, 1999), 254. 21

Glenn Kaiser, Interview by Shawn David Young, Digital Recording. Chicago, IL, 11 March 2009. 22

John Herrin, Interview by Shawn David Young, Digital Recording. Chicago, IL, 10 March 2009. 23

Ibid.

David K. Fremon, Chicago Politics Ward by Ward (Indiana University Press, 1988), 69. 26

Ibid., 124.

Ibid., 303-307.

Herrin, Interview, 2009.

Farrell, Spirit, 68.

Jon Trott, Interview by Shawn David Young, Digital Recording, Chicago, IL, 11 March 2009.

Kaiser, Interview, 2009.

Preston Shires, Hippies of the Religious Right. (Waco: Baylor University Press, 2007), 113, 129. 34

Herrin, Interview, 2009.

Trott, Interview, 2009.

Herrin, Interview, 2009.

Trott, Interview, 2009.

Shawn David Young

Thomas Frank, What's the Matter with Kansas: How Conservatives Won the Heart of America (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2004), 28.

George M. Marsden, Religion and American Culture (Belmont, CA: Wadsworth/Thomson Learning, 2001), 116.

Ibid., 122.

Ibid., 126, 127.

Ibid., 128.

Godfrey Hodgson, The Myth of American Exceptionalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 1-29.

Randall Balmer, Thy Kingdom Come: An Evangelical's Lament: How the Religious Right Distorts the Faith and Threatens America (New York: Basic Books, 2006), 147.

Farrell, Spirit, 123.

Ibid., 28.

Jon Trott, jon@jpusa.org, private email message to Shawn Young, January 15, 2010.

Marsden, Religion, 248, 249.

Farrell, Spirit, 35.

Ibid., 142.

Herrin, Interview, 2009.

Otto Jensen, Interview by Shawn David Young, Digital Recording, Chicago, IL, 10 March 2009.

Glenn Kaiser, Interview by Shawn David Young, Digital Recording, Chicago, IL, 11 March 2009. 54

Howard Zinn, â&#x20AC;&#x153;Marxism and the New Left,â&#x20AC;? in Dissent: Explorations in the History of Radicalism, ed. Alfred L. Young (DeKalb: Northern Illinois Press, 1968), 371.

International Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, January – March 2016 Rajeev Kumar

PROBLEM OF ENVIRONMENTAL CRISIS AND HAZARD MITIGATION: A PANACEAL APPROACH OF BUDDHIST JATAKA IN THE MODERN AGE RAJEEV KUMAR Senior Research Fellow, Dept. of Philosophy Panjab University, Chandigarh, India-160014 The advancement of modernity has resulted in an un-mindful uses of natural resources and the degradation in ethical values. Humankind is beset with many environmental problems due to ignorance, greed and lack of respect for the Earth’s living beings, further in the name of progress and modernization unplanned and immoderate developments have led to much environmental catastrophes. Jataka or Birth stories of Lord Buddha’s previous birth are the store-house of teachings, morals and practices of Buddha’s actions in the past lives. It is not like comical creation but a treasure of reality, reason and practice. My research paper mainly concern with the solution of environmental crisis in the light of Jataka. Jataka dealt with middle road way of solution and it is easy in use and left no side-effects.

or the last two millennia, human beings never faced a truly serious threat to their existence as a species. But now, as we start the third millennium, the ever-deepening crisis in the global environment raises the real possibility of human extinction. If environmental destruction cannot be reversed, it is more than likely that the earth will degenerate, leaving the global ecosystem in ruins and making it impossible for our species to survive. The Technological Revolution which has split the atom, put men on the moon and performed heart transplants has also created an unprecedented danger of environmental self-destruction. For many years environmental policies were limited to conservation practices that emphasized the wise development and use of natural resources. As part of the environment, human beings are interdependent with ISSN 1352-4624 http://fssh-journal.org

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other living organisms as well as with the air, water, and soil. Our activities cannot be separated from our surroundings. Peter Douglas gives following heinous effects of this environmental crisis upon the society, Ecology and the Planet: • Global destruction of Forests and Phytoplankton in the oceans, these capture carbon dioxide-59% land, 41% oceans-hold moisture and soil, preserve species, moderate the environment and give off oxygen. • Worldwide soil erosion and desertification, causes: raising reefs, limbering, used of wood for fuel, clear cutting for crops or profit. • Worldwide burning of fossil fuels, primarily oil and coal, and burning of wood in the third world. • Harming of forests, Lakes, and their ecosystems by acid rain. • Proliferation of nuclear waste hazards, and massive amounts of other toxic waste. • Worldwide shrinking of fresh water supplied through pollution and diminishing aquifers • Spreading Ozone holes resulting from long lasting Chlorofluoro Carbon gases. • Flooding of coastal areas worldwide as the ocean levels rise: displacing hundreds of millions and burying portion of the world's prime agricultural lands • Global destruction of the environment though both massive military production and wars. • Massive migrations, starvations, wars, refugees, and economic chaos result from overpopulation. • Social and economic chaos in the "Third World" countries to first world lending institutions. These above results are sufficient to destroy the ecology of the planet, breaking the balance of pace of natural phenomena and finally extinction of humanity form the Earth. From the above

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description, This is clear that Humanity in dangerous position, because there is no humanity beyond Environment. The world around us is becoming more complex, not only in developed countries but also developing countries. The global population is expected to increase from 3.5 to between 6 and 7 billion. Recent studies suggest that by the year 2075 the global population could grow to 30 billion. Beyond the problems of population growth and resource availability are the related problems of environmental deterioration. Resource use and depletion obviously cause modification of the environment. All too familiar are the scarred landscapes which frequently are left by land developers, strip miners, and highway builders who proceed with little or no regard for erosion or siltation control. The natural environment comprises the entire basis for food production through water, nutrients, soils, climate, weather and insects for pollination and controlling infestations. Land degradation, urban expansion and conversion of crops and cropland for non-food production, such as Bio-fuels, may reduce the required cropland by 8â&#x20AC;&#x201C;20% by 2050, if not compensated for in other ways. In addition, climate change will increasingly take effect by 2050 and may cause large portions of the Himalayan glaciers to melt, disturb monsoon patterns, and result in increased floods and seasonal drought on irrigated croplands in Asia, which accounts for 25% of the world cereal production. The combined effects of climate change, land degradation, cropland losses, water scarcity and species infestations may cause projected yields to be 5â&#x20AC;&#x201C;25% short of demand by 2050. Increased oil prices may raise the cost of fertilizer and lower yields further. If losses in cropland area and yields are only partially compensated for, food production could potentially become up to 25% short of demand by 2050. This would require new ways to increase food supply.

Rajeev Kumar

HAZARD MITIGATION AND JATAKA Hazard mitigation refers to any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to human life and property from hazardous conditions. Hazard mitigation is “any action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to human life and property from natural hazards”. Natural hazard mitigation is defined as a sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate the long-term risk to people and property from natural hazards and their effects. In more specific words, Hazard mitigation is defined as any sustained action taken to reduce or eliminate long-term risk to life and property from a hazard event. Mitigation planning is a process for systematically identifying policies, activities and tools that can be used to implement those actions. This process has four steps: organizing resources, assessing risks, developing a mitigation plan, and implementing the plan and monitoring progress. The essential steps of Hazard Mitigation are: • • • •

Hazard identification, Vulnerability analysis, Defining a hazard mitigation strategy and Implementation of hazard mitigation activities and projects.

Human desires (Trsna) vis-à-vis the environment have manifested themselves in automobiles, chemicals and other industrial products and material substances, as well as in the transformation and destruction of nature through deforestation, depletion of natural resources, and development projects. What is important to note here is that the consequences of unbridled human desires appear in concrete form in the environment. Everything is somehow connected. Therefore, the very principles of bio-diversity and symbiosis of nature and living things are primary in maintaining our world. It has to be recognized, furthermore, that the concerns of ecology are essentially modern ones, and the ecological problems

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we face today such as greenhouses gases and global warming are only intelligible against the background of a scientific understanding of the world. The environmental view of Buddhism is a life-centric one, and is life-independent or Anthropo-independent too. Both subject and its environment have a mutually interdependent and an interconnected relationship. Until Buddhism updates its ancient cosmology it is not clear how it will take part in a dialogue which is conducted in the vocabulary of modern science. Although there are certainly many Buddhists today who have an excellent knowledge of science, it seems to me that the intellectual core of the tradition still conceives of the natural world in pre-modern terms. In Buddhism all phenomena are understood basically in terms of ‘Dependent Origination’ (Pattitya-Sammupada),’ the idea of the interdependence and interaction among all existences. Perception of them takes place in the context of the three areas set forth by the doctrine of the ‘three realms of existence’: the area of mind vs. body; the area of the self vs. others (i.e., human society); and the area of human race vs. natural ecosystem. The doctrine of ‘Dependent Origination’ shows that everything in the ecosystem is equal in value. Because all living things and non-living things have the Buddha-Nature, they are regarded as having an equal dignity and an intrinsic value. Though environmental ethics will be expanding the concept of rights from human rights into the rights of nature, the doctrine of ‘Dependent Origination’ in Buddhism argues that human rights are based upon the rights of nature. Jataka or ‘Birth Stories of Lord Buddha’s Previous lives’ have a substantial view-point towards the Environmental Crisis and Hazard Mitigation because Jataka are the manifestation of Lord Buddha himself through the Previous Birth and Buddha revealed and experienced these problems and accidents in their previous lives. Practicality of Jataka is undoubtly because this is practical in nature; it deals with the daily practical issues and problems. Jataka is the store-house of Buddhist thoughts and ideology.

Rajeev Kumar

Indeed Jataka is a central warehouse of natural teachings, or parables related to nature. As told in the Mahasuka-Jataka---Trees are essentials for the human and good environmental existence, as: “Dumo yada hoti phalpapanno, Bhunjanti nam vihangama sampatanta. Khinanti natvana dumam phalaccaye, Disodisam yanti tato vihangamati”. (Wherever fruitful trees abound, A flock of hungry birds is found: But should the trees all withered be, Away at once the birds will flee). The Nandivisala-Jataka illustrates how kindness should be shown to animals domesticated for human service. Even a wild animal can be tamed with kind words. Parileyya was a wild elephant who attended on the Buddha when he spent time in the forest away from the monks. The infuriated elephant Nalagiri was tamed by the Buddha with no other miraculous power than the power of loving-kindness. Man and beast can live and let live without fear of one another if only man cultivates sympathy and regards all life with compassion. All beings in the Jatakas are able to feel compassion for others and act selflessly to help ease their suffering. In contrast to a Darwinian “Survival of the Fittest,” which is often used to justify our abuse of other species, its stories offer a vision of life in which we are all interconnected, parts of the same web of life, and therefore also inter- responsible, responsible for each other. This compassion is not limited to the animal realm. If we can believe the traditional biographies, the Buddha was born under trees, meditated under trees, experienced his great awakening under trees, often taught under trees, and passed away under trees. Unsurprisingly, he often expressed his gratitude to trees and other plants. The most outstanding feature of the Jataka tales is that they have not been written by basing them on the high, respectable class of society. On the contrary a tree, an elephant, quail, crow, jackal, poor farmer, deer etc. have been made the basis of the stories. The story line has been presented in an extremely simple way. The Jatakas impart certain essential wisdom on how to approach

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situations and solve problems. Several stories suggest that unless a full or deeper understanding of the situation is undertaken, the result will not be just. A partial understanding will allow injustice to reign and morality to be disregarded. The ecological worldview of Jataka has important ethical implications. For to realise that that all things are interrelated is to realise that human beings and their works are intimately related to the non-human world, to nature. It is to realise that human beings are not souls temporarily housed in material bodies, but that we are rather ‘one’ with all things, ‘one’ with nature. To awaken to the ecological relatedness of all things is to be moved to care for nature, for it is to realise that the fate of nature is our fate, the fate of we humans, too. The Jataka teachings did suggest that the world resembled the one portrayed by modern ecological science, and even if, moreover, they did suggest that humans were in some sense ‘one’ with nature, that would not suffice to prove that Buddhism is an eco-friendly religion. According to the Jataka tales, when the Buddha attained enlightenment, he was able to remember his many previous lives, both animal and human. In some of these lives, the Buddha sacrificed his own life for that of animals. The Buddha spent many lives, as a man, animal and god, building up the moral and spiritual perfections necessary for Buddhahood. In Nigrodha- Miga Jataka the Buddha in a former life was reborn as a Deer-king. He offers to substitute his own life for that of a pregnant doe who is about to give birth. In another previous lifetime, the Buddha sacrificed his own life to feed a starving tiger and her two cubs, who were trapped in the snow. He reasoned that it would be better to save three lives than to merely preserve his own. It is better to lose one’s own life than to kill another being. In the Amba-Jataka unable to see animals suffer during a famine, a hermit collects water through which the animals are able to survive.

Rajeev Kumar

STRATEGY OF JATAKA OF HAZARD MITIGATION More precisely Jataka emphasis upon following arguments and logic: • Mitigation tools that seek to control a hazard, and thus reduce risks and losses are also available. As Buddha gives the sermon of ‘Arhat’, ‘Appa Dippo Bhava’ that human is sole responsible for his existence and surroundings. • Organizations need to integrate mitigation into their operating and strategic plans; governments can play a leading role in this integration. As Jataka forces upon the character of King is the ideal for the subject. In the modern time Democracy the Concept of Collective Security and Existence is most popular. • The process of establishing and implementing State and community comprehensive development and land use plans provides significant opportunities to mitigate damages caused by natural hazards. Bodhisattva forces upon the ‘Dharani’ or Earth because The Earth is sole base for all the human activities and enterprises. In the Migga-Jataka Buddha tells about the importance of Earth to hunter. • The design and construction of hazard-resistant structures are perhaps the most cost-effective mitigation measure. In the terms of Jataka Yojatte, Pariyojjatte prevailed and found. • Prevent future losses of lives and property due to disasters. • Historic structures add personality, charm, and a sense of history to many communities. Jataka is the full of experience of Buddha’s previous lives. Above are found in the forms of discourses and sermons delivered by Lord Buddha in many lives and forms. Actually, Buddha experienced many lives and forms such as plants, deer, lion, and mountain, Human form including King, Serivan (trader) and Hunter etc.

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CONCLUSION Buddhism has been known as the friendly religion to environmental issues in terms of deep ecology which initiates a new paradigm. Considering Buddhism as one of major world religions, Buddhists should take responsibilities and roles to play to solve the global problems like the environmental crisis as well as the social economic difficulties. Jataka or The Birth Stories of Lord Buddhaâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s Previous Births, is an ultimate store-house of environmental awareness. Through the application of message these Jatakas we can make this world can make safe and mitigation able. A foundation of Jataka environmental ethics is practical rather than theoretical. And one more thing that the uses and activation is not tough; this easy in uses and left no side-effects. Jataka follows middle road of surgery that neither great pain nor great joy. This is demand of modern time, because man is not preparing for these two extremities.

REFERENCES

David R. Loy, Healing Ecology: What can Buddhism Contribute to our Understanding of the Ecological Crisis. http://www.tricycle.com. Douglas Peter (2001), Global Environmental Crisis: An Optimal View-point, Aliester-Paul Publications: Tuklery. Nelleman C (2009), The Environmental Food Crisis: The environmentâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s role in averting future food crises, Birkeland Trykeri AS: Norway. Peter Harvey (2005), An Introduction to Buddhism: Teaching, History and Practices, New Delhi: Foundation Books Pvt. Ltd. Sahani Pragati (2008), Environmental Ethics in Buddhist Jataka Stories, Routledge: London..

Rajeev Kumar

Yamamoto S. (1998), “Contribution of Buddhism to Environmental Thoughts,” The Journal of Oriental Studies, vol. 8, pp. 144–173.

International Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, January – March 2016 Jan-Erik Lane

THE CRISIS IN THE ISLAMIC CIVILISATION JAN-ERIK LANE Fellow with Public Policy Institute, Belgrade The turbulence and political instability in several key Muslim countries have now global consequences, as thousands of Moslems leave their countries, because they cannot live or even survive there. This must constitute an enormous blame onto the Islamic civilization, harbouring more than 1 billion believers in the prophet Mohammed. Western countries bomb indiscriminately in Syria and Iraq, as a future protection against the new phenomenon of Islamic terrorism. It should be pointed out that the major co-ordination bodies in the Islamic civilisation – the Arab League and the Muslim Conference – have done little to stop the on-going civil wars and the horrific political violence. Similarly, the rich Gulf States offer no help for refugees, as they turn instead to the EU with its protection for human rights. How can we explain these civil wars within the Koranic civilisation? The ultimate reason is the rise of radical Islamic fundamentalism within the Sunni community during the 20th century. And it is not going disappear soon. Could this civilisation implode from within in an unstoppable series of bombings, suicide killings and civil wars?

great crisis of belief in the world’s large civilisation, viz Islam has resulted in the spreading of anarchy in the Middle East as well as in Northern Africa, setting in motions thousands of people eager to avoid the horrific nature of civil war. The crisis of Islam has had enormously negative consequences for many of the Muslim countries in terms of both human casualties as well as the destruction of physical assets. Unprecedented is the scope and ferocity of the civil war within the Muslim civilisation, as entire countries have become ungovernable, terrorised by rebels or militias supported by foreign intervention. The loss in human life and suffering of the Muslims is on an entirely new scale, resulting in a huge number of deaths from domestic

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violence as well as an unprecedented flow of emigrants towards Europe. Yet, there is no coherent response from the Koranic civilisation to quell this disorder and political violence. Since the Muslim civilisation is together with the Christian one the largest in the world, the crisis in Islam has implications not only for Muslim countries but also for the West, harbouring more and more Muslims. It is not just only a simple matter of a youth bulk, young people without employment opportunity or having easy access to ever more lethal weapons furnished from abroad. It is not only the result of military intervention from Western powers, first Soviet Union in Afghanistan, then the Allied attack on Iraq and finally the Western support for the overthrow of Kaddafi. These violent military actions against countries in the Koranic civilisation resulted in dismal consequences and the collapse of the state in several Muslim countries. Yet, it is at the core of Islam that a confrontation of beliefs tales place between not only Sunnis and Shias but also between two Islams, one moderate and one fundamentalist.

OLD AN NEW CONFLICTS The old conflict in the Muslim civilisation, namely Sunni against Shia, originating 632 after Christ with the prophetâ&#x20AC;&#x2122;s death, has been immensely sharpened by the new conflict between moderates and fundamentalists. This simplification excludes several other conflicts that all have an ethnic element involved, such as the Kurdish struggles on various fronts, the clashes in North-western China, the conflicts between Jews or Christians and Moslems, etc. The century old struggle between Sunni and Shia has now worsened in several Muslim countries: Why is it seemingly unresolvable, resulting in so much political violence still today? The rise of the radical fundamentalism aggravates this religious cleavage in Islam. One may employ a simple 2X2 Table to illustrate the distinctions made by means of a few illustrative examples:

67 International Journal of Religious Studies Table 1. Groupings in Islam Moderates

Fundamentalists

Sunnis

Majority

Talibans, ISIS, Boko Haram, AlQaeda, Al-Shabaab, Wahhabism

Shias

Alevis, Ismailis, Zaydis

Khomeini, Twelvers

The Sunni-Shia tension is to be found in the Syrian civil war, the struggle in Iraq and in Bahrain, in the tension between the Gulf monarchies and Iran in Yemen. The emergence of radical fundamentalism as a major political force has occurred in Algeria, Tunisia, Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. For instance, one of the radical groups, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) is a branch of Sunni, opposed to both Shias and moderate Sunnis. The strong support for new Islamic fundamentalism is based upon a new interpretation of The Koran, which entail that there is somehow one and only one “correct” or “original” interpretation that must be institutionalised in state and society –islamisation.

ISLAMISATION The major fundamental change in Muslim civilisation, its beliefs and values, in the 20th century is the emergence of the idea that there is somehow ONE Islam that can practiced one hundred per cent in all aspects of life. When combined with the old Salafist approach to The Koran, the chief approach of radical fundamentalism appears. The old Salafism of Ibn Taymiyya (dead 1328) glorified the past of Islam – the age of the prophet. However, the golden period of the Islamic civilisation did not take place in early Arabia with its tribal practices. Instead, Islam flourished in the High medieval period and up to the Renaissance in all areas of social life: medicine, astronomy, mathematics, philosophy, trade, art, etc. The blossoming of Islamic civilisation was based upon openness to other

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cultures, free enquiry and sharp argumentative confrontation about basic beliefs. The old Salafist view of the evolution of Islamic civilisation is to look backward, which is of course practically unfeasible in the period of globalisation when all the civilisations are interacting daily in various forms. The new radical fundamentalism adds control, violence and force to the Salafist ideals. The people of Islam – Umma – is to be kept in a state and society, completely dominated by the ideals of ancient Islam, as if there really existed ONE Islam. The concept of jihad receives with a new interpretation as legitimate violence for defending a true Muslim society. “Political Islam” turns old Salafism into a totalitarian political philosophy with terrorism implications. It has been said about the founder of the MB, al-Banna that he wanted to restore the caliphate that had fallen in 1924 in Istanbul. However, the MB in Egypt soon developed a much more radical and comprehensive call for change of state procedures and social practices: Islamisation writ large.

THE THREE THEORETICIANS OF SUNNI FANATICISM The chief theoreticians of modern Islamic fundamentalism – Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj outlined a utopia for a future Islamic state controlling a society structured in accordance with a very strict form of Islamic Law. Radical fundamentalism, like e.g. MB does not accept Wahhabism, as no one can come between the prophet and his community, neither Ali (Shia) or bin Abd al-Wahhab (Saudi Arabia). The new radical doctrine is based on one possible interpretation of the Koran as well as one selection of customs from the Hadith of the Sunna. Yet. In the history of Islam, there have been many interpretations of the Koran. Why would any interpretation be the “correct” one? There exists no criterion for

69 International Journal of Religious Studies selecting the “correct” practices in the Hadith, comprising an enormous amount of doings and sayings of the prophet. “Islamisation” of state and society involves: 1. One unique set of customs is valid in society, according to Sharia; 2. The state must be an Islamic state, oriented towards the enforcement of the Sharia; 3. Religious leadership of government in the form of charismatic personalities, the caliphate; 4. The use of violent means – jihad – to protect the Islam and to further Islamic objectives abroad, also with terror against Moslems.

The endorsement of physical violence has led massively to renewed forms of terrorism in the Islamic civilisation, practised by rebels, called jihadists. As a result, some of the Moslem countries are drowned in lethal rebel attacks on the state as well as on innocent civilians, often Shias but also other groups. Mawdudi saw Islam as threatened by a wave of Westernisation. He criticised the West and the Westernised Muslim elites as degenerate, and he called for a renewal and purification of Islam. He conceived of true Islam as a total comprehensive system and ideology, incorporating society, politics and the state. Mawdudi differentiated sharply between jahiliyyah, which included most contemporary Muslim societies, and true Islam. His goal was an ideological Islamic state based on God’s sovereignty (hakimiyya) and on Sharia. As an explanation for the decline of Muslim power, Mawdudi concluded that diversity was the culprit: the centuries old practice of interfaith mixing had weakened and watered down Muslim thought and practice in that region of India. In his reinterpretation of Islam, he suggested the following: (Q1)” Islam is a revolutionary faith that comes to destroy any government made by man. Islam doesn't look for a nation to be in better condition than another nation. Islam doesn't care about the land or who own the land. The goal of Islam is to rule the entire world and submit all of mankind to the faith of Islam. Any nation or power in this world that tries to get in the way of that goal, Islam will fight and destroy.” (Jihad in Islam)

Jan-Erik Lane 70 (Q2)”It [Jamaat-e-Islami] is not a missionary organisation or a body of preachers or evangelists, but an organisation of God's troopers.” Haqiqat-iJihad, p. 58) (Q3)”In our domain we neither allow any Muslim to change his religion nor allow any other religion to propagate its faith.” Murtadd ki saza Islami qanun main, (Lahore: Islamic Publications Ltd, 1981: 32.) (Q4)”Leaves no room of human legislation in an Islamic state, because herein all legislative functions vest in God and the only function left for Muslims lies in their observance of the God-made law.” (Murtad ki Saza Islami Qanun Mein, p. 32, Lahore Islamic Publications Ltd, 1981)

Thus, Mawdudi sought to purge Islam of what he looked upon as alien elements. Moreover, the social and political ties with Hindus must be severed. Non-Muslims, for Mawdudi, constituted a threat to Muslims and to Islam and must be contained by restricting their rights. Mawdudi and others founded the Jama’at al-Islami Party in Lahore, Pakistan in 1941. Mawdudi based his call to arms against those who reject Islam on Sura 2: 190–193 from the Koran and on the Hadith, “I have been ordered to fight people (al-nas) until they say ‘There is no God but God’. If they say it, they have protected their blood, their wealth from me. Their recompense is with God”. Mawdudi’s objective was jihad until the whole natural universe has been brought under the rule of Islam, as he states, quoted here from Jihad in Classical and Modern Islam (1996): (Q5) “Islam wants the whole earth and does not content itself with only a part thereof. It wants and requires the entire inhabited world. It does not want this in order that one nation dominates the earth and monopolizes its sources of wealth, after having taken them away from one or more other nations. Islam requires the earth in order that the human race altogether can enjoy the concept and practical program of human happiness, by means of which God has honoured Islam and put it above the other religions and laws. In order to realize this lofty desire, Islam employs all forces and means that can be employed for bringing about a universal allembracing revolution sparing no efforts for the achievement of his supreme objective. This far-reaching struggle that continuously exhausts all forces and this employment of all possible means are called Jihad.” (Peters, 1996: 128).

71 International Journal of Religious Studies The idea of islamisation wreaks havoc in Muslim countries. Since he included the Shias in the set of non-believers, he bears responsibility for the tragic civil war in the Koranic civilisation: Mawdudi’s thought shows without doubt that non-Arabs have played a major role in Islamic religion and philosophy. His ideas were taken up by two important Arab scholars, thus continuing the very important and dire Deobandi link in present Islam.

RADICAL SUNNI FUNDAMENTALISM New Islamic fundamentalism has several roots, where one does not preach exactly the same message, but these beliefs and values have come to the forefront as never before: 1. Classic salafism; 2. Saudi Wahabbism; 3. Indian Deobandi.

What unites these different schools or theologies is a set of beliefs and values that now have more adherents than ever before, taught over and over again in the Koranic schools, madrasas, and universities including: 1. Only Sunni Islam is true Islam; 2. Shia Islam is faked Islam; 3. Muslim societies can only thrive through “islamisation”, meaning the literal application of Sharia, subjugation of women, caliphate rule, and jihad against intruders of Muslim societies or their collaborators in Muslim societies and elsewhere.

To understand the new radical fundamentalist Islam, it is vital to point out that Islam has always been is a mosaic of different beliefs, often with people fighting each other. Over the centuries, one finds moderate Islam, rational Islam, Sufi Islam, Shia Islam (several schools), etc. Fanatical Islam is put together in the 20th century by three most important scholars, namely: Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj. Their teachings in books or pamphlets have turned the

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civilisation of Islam into a terrible civil war, the ending of which is impossible to predict. Whole countries have been left completely destroyed: Syria, Libya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali and Northern Nigeria as well as Yemen. As several Muslim countries have fallen into the set of failed states, one would be interested in searching for an explanation of anarchy within the Islamic civilisation. Religious and ethnic cleavages together with rebel fighting has turned countries like Libya, Mail, Nigeria, Somalia, Gaza, Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan into anarchic societies without functioning government. The lack of law and order also plagues Egypt, Bahrain and Bangladesh. Why is there now so much political violence in the Moslem world? The sufferings of ordinary Muslims from government breakdown and sectarian clashes as well as rebel fighting are such that many people have to leave and live elsewhere. The rise of Islamic fanaticism focussing upon Jihad is a crucial piece in this puzzle. “Qutubism” stands for the core of radical Sunni fundamentalism. Qutb is most widely read in the Koranic civilisation – especially his Milestones, but also feared for his violent message. If the idea of islamisation is combined with the notion of the caliphate, the third logical element in the new Islamic terrorism is the re-interpretation of the idea of jihad. In Milestones, Qutb wrote (Beirut: The Holy Koran Publishing House, 1980: 7–15, 286): (Q1) “If we look at the sources and foundations of modern ways of living, it becomes clear that the whole world is steeped in Jahiliyyah (pagan ignorance of divine guidance), and all the marvellous material comforts and high-level inventions do not diminish this Ignorance. This Jahiliyyah is based on rebellion against God’s sovereignty on earth: It transfers to man one of the greatest attributes of God, namely sovereignty, and makes some men lords over others. It is now not in that simple and primitive form of the ancient Jahiliyyah, but takes the form of claiming that the right to create values, to legislate rules of collective behaviour, and to choose any way of life rests with men, without regard to what God has prescribed. The result

73 International Journal of Religious Studies of this rebellion against the authority of God is the oppression of His creatures.”

Qutb rejected all forms of study of religions, or a faculty of religion at Western universities. There is only ONE true religion in the world! His most important achievements to Moslems were his reinterpretation of traditional concepts such as hakimiyya, jahiliyyah and takfir as well as the caliphate, turning them into contemporary revolutionary concepts in his Islamic ideological system. (Q2) “The Islamic civilisation can take various forms in its material and organisational structure, but the principles and values on which it is based are eternal and unchangeable. These are: the worship of God alone, the foundation of human relationships on the belief in the Unity of God, the supremacy of the humanity of man over material things, the development of human values and the control of animalistic desires, respect for the family, the assumption of the vice regency of God on earth according to His guidance and instruction, and in all affairs of this vice-regency, the rule of God’s law (Sharia) and the way of life prescribed by Him.” (Milestones)

Qutb is one of the most widely read Islamic writers whose works have been translated from Arabic into many other languages. With the crackdown on the Muslim Brotherhood following the 1954 assassination attempt on Nasser, Qutb was arrested and spent 10 years in prison. He was freed in 1964, but re-arrested in1965, tortured and executed in 1966. While in prison he wrote his greatest work, an eight-volume tafsir of the Koran, Fi Zilal al-Quran. Towards the end of his imprisonment he wrote Milestones (Ma’alim fil-Tariq) that has become the key manifesto of radical Islamic groups. Qutb endorses Mawdudi’s idea of islamisation and applies it in the union of secular and religious power, the old caliphate notion: (Q3) “Humanity will see no tranquillity or accord, no peace, progress or material and spiritual advances without total recourse to Allh. This, from the Qur’nic point of view, can mean only one thing: the organisation of all aspects of human life in the Qur’n. The alternative would be corruption, regression and misery.”(In the Shade of the Koran)

“Holy terror” is a term for “holy assassination” and was propagated by Muhammad Abd al Salam Faraj (1954–1982) in his

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booklet, The Neglected or Absent Duty. Faraj arrived at this jihad (holy war) duty by considering and rejecting non-violent options. Let me take a few quotations (Q) from Faraj: (Q1) “Hence the implementation of Islamic law is incumbent upon the Muslims. Therefore establishing the Islamic State is obligatory upon them because the means by which the obligation is fulfilled becomes obligatory itself. By the same token, if the state can only be established by fighting, then it is compulsory on us to fight. Besides the Muslims were agreed upon the obligation of establishing the Khilaafah, the declaration of which depends on the existence of the core, which is the Islamic State.” (p. 20) (Q2) “So fighting in Islam is to raise Allah’s word highest, either offensively or defensively. Also, Islam was spread by the sword, but only against the leaders of kufr, who veiled it from reaching the people, and after that no one was forced to embrace it. It is obligatory upon the Muslims to raise their swords against the rulers who are hiding the truth and manifesting falsehood, otherwise the truth will never reach the hearts of the people.” (pages 51-52) (Q3) “As for the Muslim lands, the enemy resides in their countries. In fact the enemy is controlling everything. The enemies are these rulers who have snatched the leadership of the Muslims. Thence Jihad against them is fardh ‘ayn. Besides, the Islamic Jihad is now in need of the effort of every Muslim. And it should be borne in mind that when Jihad is fardh ‘ayn (an individual obligation), it is not required to seek permission from one’s parents for the to march forth as scholars said: ‘it becomes like praying and fasting.’” (p. 61) (Q4) “And what if the scholars of the Salaf saw our scholars of today-except those upon whom Allah has shown Mercy - who have inclined to these tyrants, beautified their actions to them, made fair their murders of the Muslims, the mujahedeen (upholders of Tawheed - Oneness of Allah), weakening their honour by issuing fatwa (legal verdicts) after fatwa to make their thrones firm, and safeguard their kingdoms, by labelling everyone opposed to them as a rebel or khaariji (one of the extreme deviant sect of the khawaarij)? Such that some of them have titled the Nusayri (worshippers of ‘Ali, we seek refuge in Allah!) ruler (previous) of Syria as the Ameer ulMu’mineen (chief believer). They covered the deen for the people until they turned a blind eye to the tyrants; the exchangers of Allah’s law, those who govern the slaves of Allah with that which Allah did not reveal- what if the scholars of the salaf saw this group which has sold its deen for worldly gains which will disappear, makes fair seeming for them what they do, and permits the murder of every truthful Muslim and the

75 International Journal of Religious Studies murders of Sayyid Qutb, Khalid al Islaambouli, and his brave associates are not far from us.â&#x20AC;? (p, 108)

It should be emphasized that the books and pamphlets of the three scholars who made this revolution in Islam have been circulated and read in all Muslim countries and large communities. Actually, many of the insurgents met each other in Cairo, prisons or universities where they had access to the key new literature: Ben Laden, Azzam, al-Zawahiri and al-Zarqawi as well asal-Baghdadi.

SUNNIS VERSUS SHIAS, MODERATES AGAINST FANATICS The conflicts among Muslims are essentially of two types religiously, bypassing ethnic tensions: 1. Sunnis versus Shias 2. Jihadists versus moderate Sunnis and Shias.

The first conflict dates back to the origins of Islam, due to the complete lack of any political philosophy in The Koran. There is not a single word about the political future of the Islamic community â&#x20AC;&#x201C; the Umma, when the prophet dies. The Koran builds upon Jewish religion with the claim of being its ultimate culmination of the tradition from The Bible with its monotheism and the long series of prophets: Abraham, Moses, Jesus etc. It shares the Jewish opinion that Jesus could not have been the son of God, and it never mentions the real creator of Christianity, namely Paul. The Koran is the re-instatement of the Old Testament writ large plus the claim that Mohammed is the last of the prophets stating the final revelation of God to the humans. Without the Old Testament, no The Koran. But it says nothing about the world to come when the Prophet is no longer alive. Mohammed ruled on the basis of charismatic authority, breaking tribal leadership prevalent on the Arabian Peninsula. This unique combination of political and religious power goes under the name of the caliphate. It has two profound problems:

Jan-Erik Lane 76 1. How is the caliph to be chosen? 2. What are the basic rules of the exercise of his power?

There exists still no solution to these two basic problems of any rulership, one thousand and almost four hundred year after the Prophet. The outcome is the political instability all over the Muslim civilisation. Over the history of Islam, the Koran has received different interpretations. Actually, the text war put together long after the death of the prophet and there exist competing collections of verses–the basic unit of the Koran. Whether the verses constitute the words of God has been a contentious issue with this religion, resulting in political violence in the 9th century. Although this position is generally regarded as blasphemy today, it is undeniable that the distance between the Salafist on the one hand and the rational interpretations on the other hand is large, to say the least. This implies strictly the question of scepticism: How to identify the “correct” interpretation of the Koran? It leads to crucial questions about legal and political authority in the Muslim civilisation. One way out of the dilemma of widely different interpretations of a key religious text that attempts to establish the norms of society is to have some form of authority lay down the “correct” interpretation and then proceed to enforce it by all kinds of means. The problem of interpretation received an early and, as it was thought, final solution with the figh: Islamic jurisprudence would codify what Islam stands for in a set of precepts that could not be denied nor neglected. However, this legalistic approach though highly influential upon later development after 800-900, did not success in arriving at consensus. Thus, there are 4 schools of jurisprudence within Sunni and another school within Shia. Their differences reflect the basic fact about a lack of underlying consensus in the Islamic civilisation, as Sunni schools differ from the Shia school and the Sunni schools differ among themselves as to doctrine and dogmas.

77 International Journal of Religious Studies The close connection between religious dogma and political power became one of the hallmarks of Islam, as it never established an independent church, like Christianity. It was up to the successor of the prophet to maintain religious order and uphold its stated norms in society. Thus, the question of interpretation of the Koran became intimately linked with the successor problem: Who is to be the Caliph (Sunni) or the Imam (Shia)? Islam does not contain like Christianity or the religions of India a much elaborated theology. The core of Islam is the set of 5 duties, nothing more. When they are respected, the believer will receive the salvation. This minimalist approach leaves much open to disagreement. And diversity of opinion on religious matters has become typical of Islam. One may ask why this diversity today is conducive to so much political violence within this civilisation, as religious tensions have subsided in the other civilisations of the world. One only has to bear in mind the enormous fighting within Christianity between Catholics and Protestants or the struggles between sects in Hinduism to recognize that there is nothing especially prone to conflict about the Koran. It is the interpretations of the text and the social practices based upon these interpretations that count.

RELIGIOUS ISSUES The Muslim civilisation holds a carpet of religious diversity where many groups are involved with a bewildering system of beliefs - just to mention a few: 1. There are at least four kinds of Shiism: twelvers in Iran and Syria, seveners in Lebanon, Syria and India, fivers in Oman as well as the many Shiites in Turkey, called Alevis; 2. Muslim brotherhood belongs under Sunni like ISIS and Al Qaeda; 3. Sunni harbours old Salafism, new fanaticism as well as Islamic rationality.

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The main difference between Sunnis and Shias is the concept of tawdid, or oneness, which the Sunnis endorse but the Shias reject in favour of adding Ali to Mohammed as prophet. In addition, it is true that there exist sharp differences between the moderates and fanatics. They range over a number of aspects of Islam besides the principal solution to the successor question, such as: 1. Division of public and private; 2. Division of mundane and sacred; 3. Acceptance of modernisation.

It holds generally that average Sunnis tend to be more pragmatic than the average Shias in Iran. Thus, modernisation, secularism, the market economy and democracy is more supported in Sunni majority countries than in Iran, although this may only be a result of the Shia theocracy in Tehran that does not allow free and fair elections. Yet, this stylised picture of the Sunni countries as more moderate than the Shia ones is nothing but a simplification that hides complexity of religious opinions. Religious beliefs are conducive to violence when they concern the distribution of valuable assets in scare supply. The control of these real assets â&#x20AC;&#x201C; money, power, taxes, premises, land â&#x20AC;&#x201C; is what human beings ultimately fight about, when the conflicts are not solvable through negotiation. Religious creed is a tool for exercising power over human beings, which is why people with different creeds collide when they happen to share the same territory and the same community. It is true that religious emotions may give the conflict between religious groups a special fervour and intransigence, but what is decisive is the access to the control over human beings. However, issues in religious theology can only be resolved by argument, if ever. The most difficult questions that religious groups pose and answer differently concern matters that are metaphysical, such as:

79 International Journal of Religious Studies 1. Is God one or three? 2. Could Jesus be the son of both Joseph and God? 3. Whom did Mohammed leave power to: a believer, his entourage?

Or just his gender Ali? 1. 2. 3. 4.

Is jihad a religious duty for all Moslems? Is Buddha a God or the God? Is Krishna really the incarnation of Vishnu? Can people receive luck by means of bhakti?

The list above about the mysteries in religion could be made much, much longer. It is all a matter about creed, or religious belief, not reason, or deductive or inductive argument. When people disagree about the answer to such metaphysical questions, they can employ the sword to find a speedy but always temporary solution, like Alexander at Gordon. But conflict cannot settle the matter, only offering a most short lived â&#x20AC;&#x153;solutionâ&#x20AC;?. However, resort to the sword gives access to the real assets that people collide about: power, prestige, money, land, etc. Religious purity is no doubt essential to some people with strong religious creed. However, it is one thing for these people to be able and have the right to practice this purity, and quite another matter to attempt to impose it upon other people with different minds.

RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE IN MUSLIM CIVILISATION For an external observer, the tension between Sunnis and Shias appears like a relic from the past. Why can these two Muslim beliefs not co-exist? Since the ideas of the caliphate or the imam are long out of date, Muslim countries having some form of modern constitution, honouring religious tolerance, especially among its own Koranic communities. During the so-called golden period of Islam during the medieval ages when there was great diversity of opinion, a solution

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to the question of reconciling faith with reason was formulated that could have befitted Islam much, if it has been widely endorsed, leading to religious tolerance. The rise and growing strength of Muslim fundamentalism in an age of globalisation, modern economics and the triumph of the natural sciences is enigmatic. It is widely believed that Islam is somehow responsible for this global paradox, but it would be a fatal mistake to equate the religion of Islam, one of the three great monotheistic traditions, with unreason. All the world religions have had to take a stand on the relationship between reason and faith: How to handle any conflict between the two? And all the great religions of the world today have devised a modus Vivendi between reason and faith, except Islamic fundamentalism. This is all the more astonishing as Islam was the first of the major religions to work out a tenable solution of how to respect faith while fully employing the faculty of reason and observation. Before Christianity came up with various solutions to this fundamental problem – with Thomas abs Aquino, John Locke and Baruch Spinoza – there was the theory offered by In Rushed or Averroes. It makes him the greatest of medieval philosophers. The Decisive Treatise of Averroes sums up the entire debate about reason and faith in the Moslem civilisation with the emerging schools of philosophy and jurisprudence since the Koran was codified around 700 after Christ. Drawing upon the various contributions by inter alia Farabi, Avicenna and Ghazali as well as many other more like the Azelites, Averroes formulates his position in a few striking arguments about faith and reason. Muslims have to live with two meanings of the Book of God, the literal and the allegorical. So is the case with Jews and Christians, as stated much later by Spinoza. The only conclusion of the predicament of faith and reason is religious tolerance, as with Locke' Letter on Tolerance (1699). The Koran like the “Sainte Bible” contains beautiful tales, which when not in accordance with scientific reason can only be

81 International Journal of Religious Studies told in their literal meaning as exactly that: stories, as first emphasize by Spinoza in Tractatus Teologico Politicus (1677). Yet, the first philosopher to realise the double truth â&#x20AC;&#x201C; faith and reason â&#x20AC;&#x201C; was none other than Averroes from Marrakech. The Sunni-Shia clash is a zero-sum conflict with no predictable outcome. This makes it meaningless, as there could only be losers. The conflict between Sunnis and Shias has no victor or loser, but only human misery. It can go on for one hundred more years, but with no decisive outcome except human suffering. Why cannot Islam accept such a minimum of tolerance that Sunnis and Shias can live side by side, with their separate shrines?

THE PRECEPTS OF THE KORAN What could be a better place to look for an answer than the Holy Book or the Book of God, viz The Koran. It states a few rules that are pertinent to the question: 1. No Muslim may kill another Muslim; 2. Muslims who are right guided will enter Paradise on judgement day; 3. Muslim who turn infidels will suffer the same fate as all infidels, namely to burn in Hell; 4. Muslims who have been misguided can repent their sins and perhaps receive God's mercy; 5. A right guided Muslim accepts fully the consequences of the five duties.

One finds several places in the Koran where these principles are expressed. How they are to be interpreted depends upon who is to be considered a Muslim, what it entails to be seen as an infidel and what a rightly guided behaviour stands in details. Islam harbour diversity of opinions in relation to the coherence among the 5 rules above, resulting in major schisms and the formation of several sects. Thus, the Sunnis divide themselves in four schools of jurisprudence as well as in modernists and fundamentalists. The Shias constitute a most diverse lot, from Iranian and Iraqi fundamentalists with their

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own school of jurisprudence to modernists in e.g. Turkey, Syria and India. In addition, there is the group of Sufis among the Sunnis and Shias. Now, in relation to the crucial question above, one must ask whether the Sunni-Shia civil war or the jihadists’ attacks on Muslims can be motivated by these 5 rules of Islam. Salafists claim that Shiism is a blasphemy, because it violates ONENESS (tawdid), regarding Ali and his descending family as somehow a saint besides Allah. Jihadists under the influence of MB sharpen this rejection of Shiism as magic, but jihadism also looks upon moderate Sunnis and Shias as targets of political violence, aimed at islamisation. The expansion of the concept of infidel to cover not only adherents of other religions but also Muslims with a different faith than Salafism was re-innovated in the 20th century by Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj – the ideological fathers of Islamisation and radical massive terrorism. When a Moslem country adheres to the Islamic interpretation of these ideologues of fundamentalists, then peace and political stability is not feasible. They stand for an Islam that is as uncompromising with modernity and reason, as also Khomeini’s Shia Iran. In Islam today, the French saying holds: Les extremes se touchent. And they extended to the scope of jihad fighting to include all kinds of infidels, Moslem or others, with deadly repercussions. Jihad as the hidden duty (Faraj) is allowed against anybody who opposes the islamisation of society (Mawdudi) or the state (Qutb). The political philosophy of radical fundamentalism is not derived from The Koran, but constitutes a 20th century dismal innovation in general Islamic philosophy. In traditional Islamic philosophy with its great representatives during the medieval ages, the focus is upon the relationship between religious faith and reasonable belief. It covers a large range of issues about the origins of universe and life and the nature of human volition and destiny. Political Islam is a recent ideology with

83 International Journal of Religious Studies no basis in The Koran, emerging in the 20th century out of India (the Deobandi school), Pakistan and Egypt. One is amazed to read about the number of Muslims volunteering to fight for the ISIS, as it offers a road map to death and humiliation. Young people may be attracted by the conception of a “martyr”, but it is all make belief. When people die, they do not exist anymore, neither as spirits waiting for the resurrection nor as travellers to some “Paradise” in the Cosmos.

SHARIA LAW In presentations of the main features if Islamic Law, it is never underlined sufficiently that Sharia is basically private law. Islamic Law developed outside of Western law – Roman Law and Common Law – as the tool for Islamic jurisprudence (figh) to create a minimum of order in the Muslim Empire, growing rapidly after the death of the Prophet, both westward and eastward. The new societies adhering to Islamic faith needed a fundamental set of rules for the behaviour of the Umma, i.e. the private life of the faithful concerning family, marriage, daily activities, business and commerce. Sharia Law provided this institutionalisation with its four schools of jurisprudence. None of them considered public or constitutional law at any length. It was simply assumed that the caliph or the iman would be a man rightly guided. When the Arab heritage was mixed with other non-Muslim traditions, the assumption remained that the khan, sultan or king (emir) would be right guided. Like Roman Law, Sharia Law spells out the implications of various forms of private contracts, which had to be respected ultimately due to divine sanction (Haegerstroem, 1953). One may draw a parallel to Roman Law, which was also basically about private law, including criminal law. Corpus Juris Civilis did not regulate public power, which rested in the hands of an Emperor, who made law through “constitutions”, meaning

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commands. The concept of constitutional law as restrictions upon the state emerged in the 16th century in Calvinist Europe. Several Muslim countries imported foreign constitutional law in the 19th and 20th centuries, but public law in Moslem countries never succeeded to establish political order, i.e. rule of law. Rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.â&#x20AC;? (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/pdf/rl.pdf). When public law started to develop, covering both constitutional law and administrative law, it targeted much what is now called rule of law or the Rechtsstaat (Reiss, 1991). It did not call for democracy or the universal franchise, because its goal was law and order under the legal framework. The rule-of- law regime offers constraints upon political power, whether be it the power of political leaders or that of bureaucrats. It counteracts a number of vices that political power often succumbs to, including: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Arbitrariness; Corruption and embezzlement; Nationalisation of property; False accusations and unreasonable search and seizure; Detention without accusation; Politicised court rulings.

Thus, a country which that honours rule of law upholds rules that restrain politicians and bureaucrats in an effort to promote the outcomes (a) â&#x20AC;&#x201C; (f) that, which would be beneficial for both economic life and political liberty. Where the rules of rule of law are observed, one would not always find democracy. In general it holds that democracy implies rule of law, but the opposite may not hold. Thus, the rule of law set of rules anticipated the democratic regime from a historical perspective, in both the UK and in Continental Europe (Lane 2011).

85 International Journal of Religious Studies And on the contemporary scene, one finds countries with considerable amount of rule of law, although they do not practise competitive democracy with free and fair elections that may be contested by any political party whatsoever. A political regime that runs according to rule of law would satisfy a few conditions that constrain the exercise of political power. Rule of law entails that power is be exercised according to the following precepts concerning due legal process and judicial accountability: Legality (nullum crimen sine lege); Constitutionality (lex superior); Rights and duties: negative human rights (habeas corpus); Judicial independence: complaint, appeal, compensation. The theory of good governance is based upon the hypothesis that a government adhering to these precepts will be more successful in enhancing socio-economic development than a government that fails to respect these principles. Modern constitutions were basically imported from the West during the 19th and 20 centuries. But they most often were replaced by naked power or authoritarian constitutional documents. Even more important is the Islamic law lacks the fundamental notions of individual rights under the rule of law framework that became such a vital part of both English law (Common Law) and FrenchGerman-Swiss Law (Civil Law). The institutional deficit in Muslim countries goes back to the so-called Golden Age, as neither the Prophet nor the jurisprudence created anything like constitutionalism. Islamic law deals with private law matters, theft, property, inheritance, marriage, religious matters like the wagf, etc. The worldly matters are left to chance with the restriction that the caliph, sultan, emir, king, imam, etc, must never be an infidel.

DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL INSTABILITY IN MUSLIM COUNTRIES One should make a clear distinction between political stability and democracy in relation the Arab Spring movement. Certainly,

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the groups involved strived for overthrowing authoritarian rule and military dictatorship, but hardly more than half of the people taking to the streets were democrats. A significant portion was made up of the Muslim Brotherhood, which searches for the re-creation of the caliphate. Thus, we have the following classification of Muslim countries: Diagram 1. Political Stability versus Democracies: Countries Today with Large Moslem Populations Political Stability

Political Instability

Democracy

Turkey, Albania, Tunisia

Bangladesh, Syria, Lebanon, Pakistan, Iraq, Nigeria, Mali, Afghanistan, Libya, Somalia, Kenya, Indonesia, Mindanao

Dictatorship

Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Oman, Kuwait, UAE, Jordan, Morocco, Brunei,

Egypt, Bahrain, Iran, Algeria, Central African Republic, Malaysia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan

Diagram 1 shows that political instability and the lack of law and order characterizes much of the Muslim civilisation today. In the quest for political reforms in the Muslim civilisation, the focus has been exclusively upon the introduction of democracy, bypassing the horrors of political instability and neglecting the absence of law and order. The Arab Spring failed almost everywhere except Tunisia, simply unleashing political violence, anarchy and anomie. When an authoritarian regime falls in the Moslem World, then it is replaced by anarchy or anomie, i.e. warring rebel groups and fighting clans. The crucial importance of â&#x20AC;&#x153;clanismâ&#x20AC;? for Arab societies and other Moslem states has never been adequately theorised. The sufferings of Muslims in countries with anarchy or anomie have become so huge that one cannot

87 International Journal of Religious Studies bypass that democracy efforts may fail and result only in political instability at an enormous price in lives, casualties and possessions. The worst is the warring rebel and â&#x20AC;&#x153;claniqueâ&#x20AC;? society. Political stability as law and order may be identified with the notion of rule of law in the World Bank Governance Project. Government would face the task of upholding a set of minimum rights to due process of law, personal integrity and material possessions Figure 1 displays how this minimum kind of rule of law, not comprising the democratic regime, varies around the globe, according to the WB, mentioning a few Muslim states. Figure 1. Rule of Law: Political stability as law and order

Source: Sources: Kaufmann, D. A. Kraay, and M. Mastruzzi (2012) Worldwide Governance Indicators; World Bank (2012) World Bank Databank.

Political instability in several Moslem countries mean today not only day-to-day turmoil and assassinations, police brutality, lack of legal integrity, arbitrary court decisions, unlawful detentions, torture

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etc. It also involves something even worse, namely the new feudal order of conflicting rebel groups, heavily armed and most brutal. They fight government but also each other, using terrorist methods. In so far as the new anarchy and political instability in the Islamic civilisation is religiously motivated, it only makes the life of Moslems miserable. Figure 2 shows that the framework of rule of law is not well established in the Koranic civilisation. Figure 2. Rule of Law in Muslim Countries

The Koran is constitution free, with no mentioning of the idea of rule of law. The Koran only outlines a set of rules of the private behaviour of his community, especially regarding marriage, heritage and sex, with somewhat special rules for the Prophet. When these rules were worked out in the Islamic jurisprudence (Figh) by adding

89 International Journal of Religious Studies rules from the sayings and doings of the Prophet (Hadith), In no schools of Islamic jurisprudence does one find public institutionalism, as they all whether Sunni or Shia concentrate upon private behaviour. As a matter of fact, The Koran launches no political philosophy at all, which could have outlined the rules of political rulership in the Muslim civilisation. The Koran is one hundred per cent religion, with little philosophy and no politics in the sense of institutionalism.

CONCLUSION The amount of political violence has reached a level and intensity in the Muslim civilisation that hurts ordinary people in a manner that has no similarity what so ever in other global civilisations. It gives rise to the question about the religious cleavages in Islam and their implications for political violence and state stability. Jihadism introduces a so-called war of attrition into country, a most lethal phenomenon that involves fighting over a long time period until one party is exhausted. It seems as if the Muslim civilisation may implode from inside, leaving numerous countries in civil war, anarchy, anomie, rebellion, attacks against innocents, women and children, looting by rebel groups and destruction of valuable material assets. Three responses have been suggested to the Muslim civilisation decline: 1. Jahiliyyah: the concept for "ignorance of divine guidance" or "the state of ignorance of the guidance from God" or "Days of Ignorance. It would spell the demise of the Muslim civilisation and the end to all the hope among Moslems for a better life in human dignity. 2. Western modernisation: democracy (Held, 1995). It has been tried in several Muslim countries, but only Tunisia seems to be successful. When coupled with the main religious cleavages it may even augment political violence and constitute cull de sac. 3. Institutionalisation of legal-rational authority with government found upon rule of law.

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Under a feasible rule of law regime with the recognition of The Koran, there is no need for so incredibly much political violence in the Muslim civilisation, leaving Muslims and other groups with peace, the hope of prosperity and religious co-existence of Sunnis, Shias and moderates as well as fundamentalists. When the other civilisations in the world power ahead towards higher levels of well-being, parts of the Islamic civilisation destroys for itself, failing to protect the life and assets of its Islamic believers. The French would say: Ca sert a Quoi? Or The Romans would ask: Cui bono? The search for the true Islam, as with the Salafists, or the Islamisation of state and society, as with the jihadists, is a meaningless effort – not feasible without incredible costs. It has very negative consequences for the entire Muslim civilisation, resulting in endless political violence and the deaths of innocent civilians as well as massive destruction of assets. The leadership in Moslem states and Muslim international organisation must start facing up to the task of making Moslems countries peaceful, tolerant and respecting the rule of law. Sunni fanaticism, inspired by Mawdudi, Qutb and Faraj has become a scorge on the Koranic civilisation. Their teachings must be taken up and rebutted in the schools and universities in Muslim countries or larger communities. Reading the Koran, one phrase keeps returning: “God is merciful”.

REFERENCES Adamson, P. and R. C. Taylor (2004) (eds) The Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Adib-Moghaddam, A. (2014) A Critical Introduction to Khomeini. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Al-Tamany, S.MS. (2014) Averroes, Kant and the Origins of the Enlightenment: Reason and Revelation in Arab Thought. London: I.B. Tauris

91 International Journal of Religious Studies Averroes, The Decisive Discours. http://people.uvawise.edu/philosophy/phil205/Averroes.html) Calvert, J. (2010) Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. New York: Columbia University Press. Calvert, J. (2010) Sayyid Qutb and the Origins of Radical Islamism. New York: Columbia University Press. Ellis, M., Emon, A.M. And Glahm, B. (2010) (eds) Islamic Law and International Human Rights Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fakhry, M. (2004) A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Colombia U.P. Fakhry, M. (2004) A History of Islamic Philosophy. New York: Columbia University Press, Hägerström, A. (1953) Inquiries into the Nature of Morals and Law. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wicksell. Hallaq (2010) An Introduction to Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Hallaq (2010) An Introduction to Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Held, D. (1995) Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance. Stanford: Stanford U.P. Jackson, R. (2010) Mawlana Mawdudi and Political Islam: Authority and the Islamic state. London: Routledge. Kamali, M.H. (2008) Shari'ah Law: An Introduction. Oneworld Publications Kamali, M.H. (2008) Shari'ah Law: An Introduction. Oneworld Publications Kaufmann, D., Kraay,A. and M. Mastruzzi, (2010) “The Worldwide Governance Indicators: Methodlogy and analytical issues”.

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World Bank Policy Working paper No 5430. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1682130 Khatab, S. (2009) The Political Thought of Sayyid Qutb: The Theory of Jahiliyyah. London: Routledge. Lane, J-E. (2011) Constitutions and Political Theory. Manchester: Manchester U.P. Leaman, O. (2009) Islamic Cambridge: Polity Press

Philosophy:

Introduction.

Leaman, O. (2009) Islamic Cambridge: Polity Press

Philosophy:

Introduction.

Malthaner, S. (2011) Mobilizing the Faithful: Militant Islamist Groups and Their Constituencies. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Nasr, S.H. (2006) Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy. New York: State University of New York. Nasr, S.H. (2006) Islamic Philosophy from Its Origin to the Present: Philosophy in the Land of Prophecy. New York: State University of New York. Rapoport, Y. and Ahmed, S. (2010) (eds) Ibn Taymiyya and his Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Rapoport, Y. and Ahmed, S. (2010) (eds) Ibn Taymiyya and his Times. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Roy, O. (2006) Globalized Islam: The search for the new Ummah. New York: Colombia U.P. Roy, O. (2009) The Politics of Chaos in the Middle East. Oxford: Oxford U.P. Shabbir, (2007) The Quran and the Secular Mind: A Philosophy of Islam. London: Routledge.

93 International Journal of Religious Studies Shabbir, (2007) The Quran and the Secular Mind: A Philosophy of Islam. London: Routledge. The Koran (1995) London: Penguin. Winter, T. (ed.) (2008) The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Winter, T. (ed.) (2008) The Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wohlman, A. (2013) Al-Ghazali, Averroes and the Interpretation of the Qur'an: Common Sense and Philosophy in Islam. London: Routledge. Wolrd Bank (2012) Governance Project: http://info.worldbank.org/ governance/wgi/.

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International Journal of Religious Studies Vol. 4, No. 1, January â&#x20AC;&#x201C; March 2016 Akil N Awan

ANTECEDENTS OF ISLAMIC POLITICAL RADICALISM AMONG MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN EUROPE AKIL N AWAN University of London In light of our current ambit, we will focus principally upon those motifs that signal a heightened state of religiosity, namely: (1) intensificationtransitions from a state of nominal or moderate to strong (er) adherence, commitment, or affiliation within the same religious tradition, e.g., those individuals who undergo born again experiences, or simply become more "practicing" as the process is referred to in the contemporary British Muslim idiom; and (2) adoption or transition-a move from no tradition or one tradition to another, e.g., conversion to Islam, or conversion within Islam (denominational switching-a move from one branch, sect or school to another). There are numerous extraneous factors that can lead to a predisposition for TREs. In Pape's (2005) comprehensive study of suicideterrorism reveals that suicide bombings are virtually always a liberation strategy in response to occupation that places the community over and above the self; that is why the occupied communities often call them martyrs and consider their actions to be altruistic.5 The notion of community here is expanded beyond its traditional ambit to that of the Ummah (the global community of believers), which is central to Islamist discourse, and indeed, the Islamo-jihadist movement's actions and rhetoric constantly, and rather shrewdly, invoke the specter of a global community.

ecent years have witnessed a rapid proliferation of radical Islamist activity in western Europe, from MI5's claim in 2006 of 30 incipient "terror plots" and 1,600 individuals under surveillance, to actual terrorist atrocities in European cities, the most infamous and deadly of which included the transport network bombings in Madrid in 2003 and in London in 2005. Concomitantly, both the media and the wider social discourse ISSN 1352-4624 http://fssh-journal.org

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have been rife with self-appointed punditry and a plethora of commentators pontificating on European radical Islam's putative causal factors and remedies. This paper will attempt to address the complex issues by providing a fuller, more nuanced understanding of some of the causes and antecedents of Islamic political radicalism among western European Muslims.

THE ROLE OF RELIGION A cursory reading of the biographies of many of the individuals implicated in terrorist acts points to one glaring, inescapable commonality; their political radicalization, culminating in terrorism is somehow inextricably linked to, or perhaps even contingent upon, the complex phenomenon of sudden or increasing religiosity. This in no way infers that an intensification in religious praxis or sentiment somehow results in a predilection for extremism and violence. Rather, the crux of the problem appears to lie with the misappropriation of religious labels for violent ends, which in itself is neither new nor confined to the Islamic tradition. Nevertheless, these are rendered moot points, for whatever the theological justification behind such actions (or perhaps a lack thereof) it remains an indelible sociological fact that these individuals considered themselves to be "true Muslims," and indeed Islam provided part of the raison d'etre for their acts of terrorism. The growth of religiosity, along with its concomitants, can perhaps be better understood within the broad interpretational framework of Transitional Religiosity Experiences (TRE), which encompasses five key motifs, namely adoption, intensification, transition, attenuation, and defection. In light of our current ambit, we will focus principally upon those motifs that signal a heightened state of religiosity, namely: (1) intensification-transitions from a state of nominal or moderate to strong (er) adherence, commitment, or affiliation within the same religious tradition, e.g., those individuals who undergo born again experiences, or simply become more "practicing" as the process is referred to in the contemporary British

97 International Journal of Religious Studies Muslim idiom; and (2) adoption or transition-a move from no tradition or one tradition to another, e.g., conversion to Islam, or conversion within Islam (denominational switching-a move from one branch, sect or school to another). The change undergone may be sudden, entailing the contentious phenomenon of "snapping" or sudden personality change, identified by Conway and Siegelman's (1978) seminal study, but has a far greater propensity to be gradual, becoming manifest over prolonged periods of time (Buckser and Glazier 2003). These experiences are not necessarily mutually exclusive, and individuals may undergo multiple TREs throughout their lives, as is illustrated by the examples of Asif Hanif and Sajid Badat (Dodd et al. 2003; Johnson et al. 2003). Both cases reveal an initial, fairly gradual intensification experience during adolescence or early adulthood, which was then followed some years later by a secondary, quite sudden transition experience that resulted in or led to radicalization. This tentative pattern may in fact explicate the ubiquitous lag phase witnessed between a rise in religiosity and the manifestation of radical Islamist inclinations. To put it another way, increasing religiosity per se, particularly through intensification experiences, is unlikely to result in radicalization and often requires some further catalyst such as an abrupt transition experience. The immediate consequences of TREs can be highly significant to the issue of potential radicalization, and relate principally to the two primary ways in which individuals choose to (re) construct their life narratives following the experience. The first paradigm does not engage in any level of polarization between the pre and post TRE phases of life; such cases maintain contextual continuity. Indeed, individuals adopting this viewpoint often fail to differentiate between life phases, choosing instead to view both as belonging to a continuum in which events transpire without fundamentally fracturing the overall life story. Although this first paradigm typically accounts for the vast majority of TREs in general, it is curiously absent from the experiences of radical Islamists and so of little relevance to our present study. Conversely, the second paradigm employs the TRE as a pivotal point in the narrative in order to

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construct a harsh dichotomy between the two life-phases, a process I refer to as contextual bifurcation. The past life and all that it entailed is now diametrically opposed to the present life. Indeed, the more severe the distinction between the two phases, the more likely the individual will be to consider the change wrought to be genuine and meaningful. Often the individual's recollection of preTRE life is marked by confusion and crisis that is then seemingly resolved through acceptance of a totalitarian vision of Islam, a system of unflinching moral absolutes. Indeed, anything that fails to conform to this perceived moral clarity (including other Islamic viewpoints) is to be shunned and condemned, and this perspective is facilitated by an almost Manichean separation of reality into good and evil, represented by the Islamic concepts of halal and haram respectively. This view is also typically characterized by the severing (or at least weakening) of familial and social networks, though the disavowal of parents, siblings, wives, and children, which also signifies a break with the past.

ANTECEDENTS OF TRES TREs do not occur in complete vacua, and in addition to substantive spiritual desires, yearnings, and experiences, are as much a product of ambient social, cultural, and political milieux, which therefore also need to be accorded credence as factors that are integral to this process. Consequently, a holistic understanding of the antecedents of TREs is central to the study. There are numerous extraneous factors that can lead to a predisposition for TREs. Diverse socio-economic factors are most often-cited and typically include high levels of unemployment, poor job prospects, low educational attainment, a disproportionately high prison population, and poor housing facilities, compounded by the presence of endemic and often institutionalized racism and Islamophobia (Office for National Statistics 2003; Trades Union Congress 2005; Peach 2004; Strategy Unit 2003; Department for Education and Skills 2003; European Monitoring Centre on Racism

99 International Journal of Religious Studies and Xenophobia 2003). Indeed many of the biographies of radical Islamists point to an ambience of socio-economic deprivation. Some have suggested that terrorist acts can be viewed as an extreme variant of violent urban protest,1 being deeply-rooted in years of cumulative deprivation, marginalization, and grievances against the British state (Farrar 2005). The joint report produced by the FCO and Home Office (2004) corroborates this finding by suggesting that the poor and jobless are considered to be particularly susceptible to exploitation and recruitment by extremists. Similarly, criminal activity also appears to be associated with a significant proportion of Islamists prior to their radicalization. Radicals such as Richard Reid, Mukhtar Said Ibrahim, and Mohammed Bouyeri are all thought to have developed strong Islamist views while in prison, which may suggest that the espousal of violent Jihadism may in fact constitute a form of recidivism that supplants more conventional modes of criminality. Despite the presence of very real socio-economic deprivation in many of the areas from which radical Islamists hail, we must nevertheless contend with the striking incongruity that a significant proportion of these individuals were not particularly deprived or marginalized. Indeed, some attended private schools, were university graduates or working professionals. However, by focusing on individual circumstances and achievements, we not only do a great disservice to the genuinely impoverished communities from which they hailed, and which held a profound resonance for them, but we also fail to apprehend the communal nature of radicalIslamist discourse. Khan, in his posthumously released "martyrdom" testament, repeatedly invokes a communal identity in which he identifies the subjugation of "my people" and "my Muslim brothers and sisters" as being principle among his grievances. Instead the one unifying thread among all these narratives is not necessarily poverty, but the complete divorce between all of these men and conventional political processes (Farrar 2005). Young Muslims can often experience a twofold disaffection, in which they experience exclusion from both mainstream politics and society,

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and from minority community politics (as alluded to later). Political impotence, such as that witnessed in the wake of unprecedented anti-war marches and demonstrations that nevertheless failed to avert the course of the Iraq war, can lead to disillusionment with 2 democratic principles and processes, as is illustrated by the examples of Hussain Osman or Mohammed Bouyeri. Potentially, this may result in a retreat to Islamism as advocated by groups such as Hizb ut-Tahrir, who decry the notion of democracy and positively reveled in the failure of conventional political activism in 3 preventing the Iraq war.

IDENTITY CONSTRUCTION One particularly significant antecedent of TREs appears to be the presence of unresolved issues vis-a-vis identity construction. For radical Islamists, the most salient elements of this contested identity construction may be considered to equate to the abstractions of majority culture (mainstream or host society), minority culture (ethnic or parental), and religion. Admittedly, this facile demarcation is in many ways specious, for none of these elements are diametrically opposed to one another, and there is considerable interaction and overlap between their spheres of influence. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that they may simply reinforce the validity of a Tebbit test or its trite post 7/7 equivalent, "are you British or Muslim?" iterated ad nauseam in the media recently, they do offer a convenient means of approaching the subject.

MINORITY CULTURE For converts, the notion of an ethnic or minority culture may appear paradoxical, and although some converts may view parental culture in highly parochial terms that renders it discernible from a more general notion of mainstream culture, the vast majority will perceive an inevitable conflation between majority and minority cultures, rendering the latter term somewhat redundant. Conversely,

101 International Journal of Religious Studies minority culture has a far greater bearing upon identity constructions in the experiences of first generation migrants, for whom it occupies the position of majority culture prior to their migration. Their sentiments vis-a-vis minority culture are largely contingent upon the degree and duration of embedment within the said culture prior to displacement, and the underlying reasons for that displacement, i.e., whether or not the dislocation was voluntary. Subsequent to their displacement, their experiences often mirror those of the final grouping. Second and subsequent generation members of migrant communities are much more ambivalent towards the notion of a minority culture. Those who choose to affirm its validity can do so in one of two main ways; they may construe their ethnic culture as a symbol of political mobilization and belonging (Song 2003). Others, however, retain identifications with parental culture through the atavistic expression of ethnic cultural components such as language, cuisine, dress, or music. However, even in cases where individuals attempt a nostalgic reconciliation with their roots, it typically entails the adoption of a distinctively diasporic expression of that culture (such as Asian hiphop or Bhangra music), which may not necessarily be deemed authentic, nor grant cultural legitimacy. However, the predominant paradigm for radical Islamists by far appears to be the staunch repudiation of one's minority culture and can occur for a variety of reasons. Individuals may deem the community and culture associated with parents to have exerted a serious stultifying effect on their aspirations and prospects for the future. Consequently, a sense of powerlessness and a lack of selfdeterminism may ensue, which the individual perceives to be the result of excessively moralizing influences, overbearing familial control, and conservative social and sexual mores, which combined with inflated parental expectations and an unattainable study or work ethic, seek to stifle creativity, experimentation, and freedom of choice. The problem may be compounded further by the presence of tribal or clan-based power structures, epitomized by the South Asian biraderi and commensurable systems in other cultures, which

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can have the ostensive effect of divesting youth of any real tangible control over their own lives. The socio-political impotence that may be imposed by the biraderi was poignantly illustrated by the Labour "postal voting" fraud in Birmingham in the 2003 elections (Kennedy 2005; Akhtar 2003). A slew of reports following the "race riots" of 2001 in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford, primarily involving young British Muslim men of South Asian descent, all drew attention to precisely this sort of cumulative marginalization of youth voices by decision-makers and community leaders (Cantle 2001; Clarke 2002; Ouseley 2002; Ritchie 2001; Denham 2002). More recently, the Home Office Report (2005) Preventing Extremism Together Working Groups, precipitated by the events of July 2005, also arrived at a similar conclusion. The loss of minority culture may also correlate to a profound sense of alienation from one's family and is often precipitated by a breakdown in communication, particularly with parents, who are therefore unlikely to be made privy to issues of utmost importance in their children's lives. Indeed, in the numerous cases presented before us, none of the families appear to have been cognizant of the paths upon which their children were embarked, and for many, the disavowal of their children's actions were preceded initially by vociferous doubts over their culpability, evincing a state of profound shock and denial. One of the charges routinely leveled at minority culture by radical Islamists is that the traditions and customs associated with it seek to adulterate their pristine vision of Islam. This is hardly surprising, considering that prior to their TREs most individuals possess only a rudimentary grasp of their parental faith, which rarely extends to religious praxis of any sort. Consequently, when they do begin to tentatively explore their religious heritage, the discovery of "extraneous" material interjected into the Islamic canon can appear as something of a revelation, providing them with an authentic vehicle to forge an alternative Islamic identity to that bequeathed by parents (Lewis 1994; Roy 2004). The growing attraction of an austere Wahhabism or Salafism among diasporic

103 International Journal of Religious Studies Muslim youth that condemns many ethnic customs and norms as bidah (reprehensive religiousinnovation) is testament to this fact. But perhaps the most damning indictment of minority culture for many radical Islamists is that it holds little or no relevance in the diaspora. There is no "myth of return," no solace to be found in a nostalgic struggle for the homeland (or it is at least reframed in supra-national terms that renders its parochialism anachronistic), and ethnic languages become defunct through neglect while English assumes the role of lingua franca. Moreover, ambient cultural racism (Modood 2005) serves to negate any intrinsic worth thought to reside in ethnic traditions and customs, while concomitantly those very same traditions and customs are exposed as subverting authentic Islam. By virtue of this two-pronged attack, minority culture can effectively become obsolete.

MAJORITY CULTURE One of the more striking aspects of radical Islamism in the West is the degree to which its proponents are often ensconced within the majority culture prior to their radicalization. Indeed biographies of many radical Islamists are rife with details alluding to an espousal of secular, Western lifestyles that are wholly appropriated from the host culture. Not only does the espousal of majority identities appear to be the norm, but often include elements that are anathema to their own minority cultural expectations and norms. Enculturation of this sort is perhaps to be expected of converts and second or subsequent generation British Muslims who, by virtue of being raised in a pervasively British environment, imbibe many of its values and cultural norms. However, even the more recent arrivals appear to have displayed a remarkably rapid embedment in majority culture. The portrait then of many radical Islamists prior to their radicalization is one of comfortable immersion in popular, mainstream youth culture and laxity in religious praxis, but also, critically, retention of some vestige of minority cultural and religious

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identity. At best, such examples illustrate that an individual is particularly adept at traversing cultural spheres, however, at other times and points in the individual's life (such as those induced by crisis, or changes in circumstances or commitment), it may also point to a cultural schizophrenia of sorts that cannot reasonably be sustained for any prolonged period of time. Identity is not a static construction and as self-categorization theory contends (Oakes et al. 1994; Turner et al. 1987). The self may be defined at different levels of abstraction depending upon differing circumstances; at times it may be in terms of individual uniqueness, while at others, in terms of specific group membership. The salience of a communal identity may, for example, arise during periods of perceived group crisis, evoked by events such as the Iraq war, the Palestinian Intifada, or the global war on terrorism. It is in these instances that individuals become more prone to reassessing what religious identity means to them, either as reconstruction in part of the lost minority identity or as a response to pressing questions and challenges from a pervasively non-Muslim environment. Moreover, this new interest in religion may also stem from a gradual disillusionment with majority culture, particularly in light of its perceived hedonism, rampant capitalism, and the general imposition of conflicting core valuesystems from the host society, which may render the individual unwilling or unable to perpetuate assimilation into the predominant paradigm. This leaves the individual in something of a quandary; a distinct lack of identification with both minority and majority cultures, as a result of being unable or unwilling to fulfill either group's normative expectations, gives rise to a dual cultural alterity. In the absence of an appealing cultural paradigm from either group, the individual simply resorts to a cultural entrenchment that assumes a religious hue by default (due to a lack of viable alternatives), thus transforming religion from religion per se into an anchor of identity. Consequently, religion not only provides an emphatic rejoinder to Western identity, but is also interpreted de novo, without the perceived cultural accretions of the Islam

105 International Journal of Religious Studies associated with their parental or ethnic identity, thereby constructing a legitimate identity outside both minority and majority cultures.

ANTECEDENTS OF RADICALIZATION As indicated earlier, TREs, including those that occur suddenly and entail contextual disjuncture of some form, do not imply, ipso facto, the presence of radical Islamist proclivities. Some individuals may even be drawn to the austere, puritanical forms of Salafism or Wahhabism (that provide the principle ideological basis for global jihadism), but nevertheless eschew violence of any form themselves. Clearly something beyond a simple TRE must transpire if an individual is to be drawn to radical Islamism. How then does one progress from a TRE to Islamo-jihadist inclinations? A number of factors appear to be instrumental to this process. A recent survey of Muslim students (FOSIS 2005) found that 83% were unhappy with British foreign policy, principally in Iraq, Israel/Palestine, Afghanistan, and the alliance with the U.S.-all areas in which Muslims are perceived to be the victims of Western aggression and persecution. Within such a widespread sea of discontent, the presence of a small minority who may countenance the articulation of that discontent through violent means is eminently plausible. For these putative latent radicals, any new perceived provocation, such as the occupation of Iraq, or the lurid excesses witnessed at Guantanamo Bay or Abu Ghraib, may serve as a casus belli that sanctions the recourse to jihadism. The International Institute of Strategic Studies (2004) in its Strategic Survey 2003/4 reported that the Iraq conflict had resulted in an acceleration of recruitment with up to 1,000 foreign jihadists having infiltrated Iraq, highlighting the role of political events in the incubation and catalysis of radicalism. One of the potential consequences of socio-economic deprivation, political disaffection, and the gradual lack of identification with minority and majority cultures referred to earlier, is the manifestation of a state of anomie. This absence of values and

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standards, with the concomitant feelings of alienation and purposelessness, are not necessarily alleviated by the recourse to TREs. Instead, the individual turns to the espousal of radical Islamism, which serves as an emphatic rejoinder to the banality and inane humdrum of daily life. In its stead, this new worldview provides, perhaps for the first time, a sense of being part of an elite group that compensates for the shortcomings of one's own petty existence. Moreover, sacralized violence and ultimately martyrdom provide a conduit for these otherwise seemingly implacable feelings of dejection, with the individual spurred on by the vainglory of being included among the alumni of the shuhada (martyrs). Given the amorphous and egalitarian nature of Islamic ecclesiastical structures and the fluidity of its jurisprudence, the conspicuous absence of a clearly delineated religious hierarchy can also pose a serious problem (Hefner 2005). The problem is further compounded by the fact that the traditional ulama (religious scholars) are no longer considered to be the ultimate repositories for moral authority and guidance they once were. With the advent of globalization and an age of virtual fatwas,4 it can prove increasingly more difficult for the uninitiated to discern the authentic and eminently trustworthy from those who are not. It is in this context that we should seek to understand Shahzad Tanweer's adulation of Osama bin Laden, whom he considered to be "his personal hero" (McGrory and Hussain 2005). It is easy to understand why a figure like bin Laden, who strikes a compelling pose as the classic warriorcleric, is considered eminently more trustworthy, more genuine, more rightly-guided than "mainstream" scholars, is perceived to be corrupted by complicity with and subservience to secular or despotic regimes. Indeed, his pariah status grants him autonomy from the political machinations, internecine conflicts and worldly affairs within which mainstream scholars are seen to be embroiled, granting him a potent legitimacy not based on scholarly erudition. This very same process that equates dissidence (against the state, Western hegemony, or secularism) with probity also grants legitimacy to notorious fringe scholars in Britain such as Omar Bakri

107 International Journal of Religious Studies Mohammed, Abu Hamza al-Masri, and Abu Qatada, who have been instrumental in at least some of the radicalizations witnessed. Far more important than fringe scholars, is the self radicalizing efficacy of the Internet, particularly on the growing phenomenon of jihadist web sites, forums, and blogs that provide not only the ideological treatises, and theological "evidences" underpinning the culture of jihad, but also the means through which to carry it out. For a comprehensive account of the role of virtual jihadist media in radicalization, see Awan (2007). One of the oft-overlooked aspects of radical Islamism is the degree to which humanistic aspirations underlie the changes in worldview associated with incipient radicalism. Empathy for fellow Muslims inculcate many potential radical Islamists with a sense of duty and justice, which finds effective expression through the conduit of jihadism. According to interrogators, would-be suicide bombers are always sincerely compassionate to those they see themselves as helping (Atran 2004)-a point corroborated by Durkheim's sociological taxonomy of suicide, through which "martyrdom operations" are also considered to be altruistic in nature (Durkheim 1897; Stack 2004). Pape's (2005) comprehensive study of suicide-terrorism reveals that suicide bombings are virtually always a liberation strategy in response to occupation that places the community over and above the self; that is why the occupied communities often call them martyrs and consider their actions to be altruistic.5 The notion of community here is expanded beyond its traditional ambit to that of the Ummah (the global community of believers), which is central to Islamist discourse, and indeed, the Islamo-jihadist movement's actions and rhetoric constantly, and rather shrewdly, invoke the specter of a global community. It is easy to conflate all jihadist acts and actions under the singular rubric of terrorism, however, even among radical Islamists themselves there exist degrees of acceptability (see Haykel 2005). Causes associated with national struggles for independence against repressive regimes, such as those of Chechnya, Kashmir, and

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Palestine enjoy widespread sympathy and consequently have far greater legitimacy than for example, khilafah movements or the global jihadism of al-Qaeda. In the same way, conflict with military occupiers is not accorded the same inviolable taboo status as violence against civilian populations. It appears that many potential radicals, with romanticized and earnest, but largely inchoate notions of defending the Ummah and championing the cause of the oppressed, can have their (often laudable) empathies diverted (due to a lack of accessibility to the principle cause) or manipulated to deadly effect. They may not wish to participate in more controversial operations, however, by that point they have long crossed the Rubicon. In other scenarios, mere may be a gradual progression to increasingly more hardline radicalism that transcends the individual's initial largely humanistic aspirations. The small number of Britons who struck out to join the Iraqi insurgency (Leiken and Brooke 2005), which is viewed as a legitimate movement against Western occupation, just as earlier British Jihadists traveled to the theatres of conflict in Chechnya, Kashmir, Afghanistan, and Bosnia before them (Taarnby 2004), will inevitably return to their host societies. These survivors, brutalized by the ravages of war and possibly suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder, may prove incapable of slipping back into mainstream society, and consequently may more easily resort to more extreme or taboo modes of violence. The paths and motivations then to Islamic political radicalism among British Muslims are many and varied, with no simple cause and effect calculus appearing to be tenable. Rather, socioeconomic deprivation and political disaffection potently combined with the dual cultural alterity experienced by diasporic Muslims, can lead to an entrenchment that takes on a religious hue by default. In light of this deculturation, identification and loyalty is transferred from the majority and minority cultures to the Ummah exclusively. In times of group crisis (such as that imposed by perceived Western aggression), humanistic aspirations and a state of anomie may

109 International Journal of Religious Studies compel the individual to undertake altruistic violence in the hope of liberating his community (Ummah), and himself (from a banal existence), through his own sacrifice. Notes 1. Such as the "race riots" of 2001 in Oldham, Burnley, and Bradford, or the more recent disturbances involving French youtii in Paris and Lyon. 2. Conversely, the potent efficacy of the Madrid bombings in precipitating the withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq serves to legitimize alternate means. 3. Hizb ut-Tahrir ran an intensive campaign in the run-up to the Invasion of Iraq, employing the slogan "Don't Stop the War-Except through Islamic Politics." See www.khilafah.com/home/category.php?DocumentID =6108&TagID=28. 4. A number of Islamic web sites offer online fatwa databases and the provision of Q&A fatwa sessions. see for example www.islam-qa.com and www.islamonline.net/English/index.shtml. See also Gary Bunt (2003). 5. The large number of U.S. troops stationed in the Arabian Gulf, particularly in the hijaz, was seen as occupation by al-Qaeda and their supporters, and indeed their removal constituted the earliest articulated demand by Osama bin Laden. see, "The Ladinese Epistle: Declaration of War (I)," MSANEWS and "Declaration of War Against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places."

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