International Public & Corporate Communications Quarterly Digest of Public Affairs News Issue # 1 - 2012
FOREWORD In this issue:
This newsletter is aimed at providing Public Affairs practitioners with a short selection of recently published stories, papers, etc. which may be useful to remain abreast of new trends or to stimulate a debate on the opinion expressed by the authors. External sources are linked and any copyright remains with the authors.
Spotlight on:
e-mail is 40 years old In 1971 Ray Tomlinson was part of a small group of programmers who were developing a time-sharing system called Tenex. He was making improvements to a local inter-user mail program called SNDMSG. Singlecomputer electronic mail had existed since at least the early 1960's. SNDMSG allowed a user to send a message to other users' mailboxes. The missing piece was that the protocol had no provision for appending to a file; it could just send and receive files.
Should STRATCOM ‘control’ Public Affairs? p. 2 New definition of Public Relations p. 7 Essential media tips: -
Is the standard news release passé? p. 9
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5 Ways to Reinvent the News Release with Search Engine Optimization
The US Army Reserve’s 10 rules for social media practitioners p.11 The Future of Influence in Warfare p.13
It remained to provide a way to distinguish local mail from network mail. Roy chose to append an ‘at’ sign and the host name to the user's (login) name to indicate that the user was "at" some other host rather than being local. The next release of the protocol went out in early 1972 and was soon replaced with a file transfer protocol having specific mail handling features. A small evolution that changed our life.
Media monkeys By engin SELKUK
edited by ComIPI www.comipi.it
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Should STRATCOM "control" PA? By Franco Veltri A couple of months ago an Italian colleague, Gianluca Manfredelli, started a discussion on LinkedIn. He asked a very simple question: “Do you agree that STRATCOM should "control" PA in the information campaign? STRATCOM aim at achieving an effect. PA's goal is to gain the public support through "the truth." So, what kind of credibility can STRATCOM-controlled PA obtain, then?” I doubt Gianluca was expecting to trigger opinions from so many experts, most of whom with a very high reputation and solid experience in the PA field. Those who are on LinkedIn may wish to read the entire discussion. I will copy here part of the most significant comments in an attempt to summarize the entire thread. It is important to note that the LinkedIn group discussing this issue is called “Military PAO.” That has confined the debate within the military environment. That was indeed appropriate: the debate mainly applies to the military, as in the civilian world SC is a notion with a different connotation. The term ‘strategy’ has a broader meaning while in the military it is associated to decisions made at the highest levels in the hierarchy. That contributes to the problem faced in bringing the concept down to operational and tactical level. In terms of statistics, none of the commentators directly supported the idea of SC having ‘command’ over PA (of note, there was even a debate about the acronym for Strategic Communications: should it be SC? StratCom? I chose the first, only because it is shorter). There was however a large consensus on the need to assure proper ‘coordination’ of all activities that ‘communicate,’ including actions.
PAO will contribute to this through release of information, truthfully, timely, accurately, but often have the disadvantage of having to work through the "filter" of the media (although not the case when using own internet sites or Social Media). But PAO's still have to make choices every day on what subjects to report on and when, what to make press releases for, where to send Combat Camera Teams, where (and if) to embed journalists, etc. By making these choices consciously, PAO can indeed actively support the COM in reaching his objectives. And it would be very useful to the COM if PAO efforts are indeed coordinated with other means so it is (also) in line with the StratCom Policy. Which is where the role of StratCom comes in...”
“The point of taking action is to achieve an effect. Whether the action is delivering ordnance, denying enemy use of computer networks, releasing information to the public, moving supplies into a theater, or whatever action you desire, it all is to support the objective. If you weren't already using a process to coordinate such things before someone came up with the new moniker "SC," you weren't doing it right. If it takes calling it "SC" to make you feel like you're thinking great thoughts and aligning everything in support of the objective, then good for you. “
“Strategic communications is a command function, which the commander may choose to delegate, just as the commander delegates any other staff function. For strategic communications to function effectively, all staff functions must participate in supporting roles in which they are the experts.
PA is no different. It is not a matter of controlling PA or PA controlling strategic communications. It is the staff functioning together to effect the "commander's intent" in an orchestrated, symbiotic manner so that the “For the COM to reach his objectives, he will end result is that the command as a whole need to achieve certain effects, whether it is in a knows what it's mission is, communicates what Here are a few significant comments, starting with those recommending a closer coordination.
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domestic environment or in an operation. Gaining/maintaining Public Support could very well be one of these effects.
the command mission is, and conducts the mission harmoniously by coordinating, supporting, and effecting the commander's intent.”
effort to successfully establish communication processes. StratComm should not "lead" public affairs. However, it often helps guide their efforts as it leads similar efforts across the entire staff.
More importantly, StratComm goes beyond Some criticized PA’s reluctance to be integrated public affairs and media. It includes into the overall communication process: communicating through plans and policies, face “Until the PA community can effectively to face, through briefing and demonstrations recognize that it can contribute toward and actions. StratComm is the process of operational imperatives (objectives), the strategically communicating to identified community will not be a fully participating audiences...” function in the planning cycle. IO messages as they are called above are nothing more than attributable calls to action. If we are to be “I see Strategic Communications much like any successful as global communicators, we must Op Plan. A commander of troops in battle has a recognize the opportunities and challenges that plan and part of that plan is knowing what his lie before us. “ assets are and the most effective use of those assets against the enemy (audience if you will). If his mission is to take out a mechanized “…the PA community needs to quit arguing over brigade, he is not going to send a rifle squad. the "inform" doctrine and hierarchy. Strategic A strategic communication plan or strategic communication is not defined by echelon, but by communications is no different. Your weapon the alignment between communication (message) and method of employment objectives, tactics and results. Through strategic (channel) has to be in line with your intent communication - even at the tactical level - the (mission) and target (audience).” PA community will be recognized as a leading contributor to the campaign plan. By providing "communication effects," we will be invited to Finally, many advocated the absolute need to the table.“ protect the credibility of PA and not to lose sight of the primary PA mission in a democratic society: to inform. These reasons by themselves Many view SC mainly as a process and a would prohibit any integration with other planning function at strategic level: information operational tools: “STRATCOM should be a part of PA as a “…too often STRATCOM are confused with a planning function and should not control PA. I genuine, "strategic use of PA". At this point, I do believe that there should be an over arching recognize things can be blurred. But, again, the body to coordinate IO and PA but STRATCOM is problem can be solved or avoided through a not it. STRATCOM is concerned how we fair, clear and mutually useful “coordinated communicate to someone through actions, separation” between STRATCOM and PA, in the words, and images, in order to achieve a desired sense that PA are utterly available for the effect. Break that down to its basic elements STRATCOM aims, as long as PA’s "credibility" is and that is a planning function. “ not jeopardized.”
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“…it should be understood that Strategic Communication is a process. It is a process of helping subject matter experts identify a problem, then collaborating on a communication process that will inform, educate or move to action identified individuals or audiences, then sets in motion a coordinated
“By its nature and mission, Public Affairs is open and honest communication that does not violate SAPP (Security, Accuracy, Propriety, Policy). Therefore it stands to reason that propaganda or PSYOPS has no place in PA. To try to use PA for either makes PA an ineffective tool (weapon)
and would not be smart Strategic Communications.” “…we must admit whatever name used (PA, IO, PR, etc,), they use messages sent through a channel to a receiver to transfer meaning. The differences arises in how the functions impart knowledge, change attitudes or influence behavior (effects). In principal, PA is restricted from direct persuasion; although, other functions use persuasion as a tool to achieve their effects. There's a thin line between conveying information and persuasion. So when we attempt to blur those lines further by combining functions, we create difficulties for publics attempting to discern the message.”
But, as Admiral Mullen stated, “Good communication runs both ways. It’s not about telling our story. We must also be better listeners.” I believe the debate touched on the core aspect when it addressed the need to look at communications as a ‘two way street.’ This is why I close this summary by citing almost in their entirety the comments made by Prof. Mark Van Dyke, who was my boss at the NATO command in Naples as Chief PIO, is an Associate Professor at the Marist College and is currently
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NATO defines SC as “The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (lnfo Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO’s aims.”
interests, policies, and objectives through the use of coordinated programs, plans, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power.” So, SC involves communication activities like public diplomacy that fall outside the responsibilities of military PA (or PI) and even the military itself. Still, the functions must be coordinated.
Second, who “leads” SC? A 2010 RAND report commissioned by the French Joint Forces Centre for Concept Development, Doctrine, and Experimentation noted that the NATO “Secretary General is responsible for Strategic Visiting Professor of Strategic Communications.” Furthermore, the “Assistant Communication at the Center for Strategic Secretary General for Public Diplomacy is Leadership of the U.S. Army War College. responsible for Public Diplomacy activities, with Mark addressed the issue in a more the exception of the press and the media.” comprehensive way. Here is a compilation of his Finally, the “Secretary General’s spokesperson is posts. responsible for Strategic Communications to the press and media. “First, it’s important to acknowledge that SC is an integrated, or coordinated, communication The RAND report want on to report: “Strategic activity with many leaders. NATO defines SC as Communications command structure is “The coordinated and appropriate use of NATO essentially made up of three levels of communications activities and capabilities – responsibilities.... The first two levels are Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military strategic while the third is operational and Public Affairs, Information Operations (lnfo tactical.” Strategically, NATO HQ (NAC, SECGEN, Ops), and Psychological Operations (PSYOPS), as Military Committee) determines SC policy, appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, messaging, etc. SHAPE then develops SC operations and activities, and in order to concepts, objectives, expertise, and training and advance NATO’s aims.” provides guidance to Force Commanders. The FCs then transmit and execute guidance in the The U.S. DoD defines SC as “focused United form of SC operations on the ground. This States Government efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or means that the senior executive (NATO SECGEN or U.S. SECDEF) leads SC. There are a variety of preserve conditions favorable for the leaders below them that plan and conduct SC. advancement of United States Government
I believe your question is focused more on the operational and tactical level, though, where IO and PA activities intersect. I’m a firm believer that the senior PA leader should report directly to the senior executive in his or her organization. IO should, through its operational chain, also report to the senior executive. Hence, the functions can remain separate but must be coordinated … without necessarily being controlled by one leader (other than the senior executive). Strategically, an example of this would be the coordination of interagency activities in the United States like public affairs/public information (in Defense) and public diplomacy (in State). These activities have their own separate leaders but both ultimately report to the Commander in Chief.
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military or national objectives at a strategic level. Therefore, we must look beyond achievement of effects and as SC experts we must be able to assess and report how these effects (and SC in a broader context) operate along all levels of the spectrum of strategy, operations, and tactics. Otherwise, focusing only on effects relegates us to a tactical level. I’m currently working on SC with Prof. Dennis Murphy (COL, USA, Ret.) and his Information in Warfare Group at the U.S. Army War College, Center for Strategic Leadership. His article “The Future of Influence in Warfare” in the January 2012 Joint Force Quarterly offers a superb explanation of information effects.
In the article, he explains: “First, the focus of commander-oriented doctrine must be on Operationally and tactically, you might have information effects, not IO or SC. Both are cells that coordinate information activities, integrating processes that are often much like public relations, marketing, and misunderstood and confused with the individual advertising are coordinated in an integrated capabilities that they integrate. Adding further marketing communication department in the confusion are related processes and capabilities private sector. In these cases, I think the person like the newly minted cyberspace operations. with the greatest degree of knowledge, Information effects, on the other hand, are education, experience and expertise in strategic clearly understood by commanders. Effect is a communication should lead the cell. This means doctrinally accepted term, a part of operational that PAOs (PIOs) must begin to break out of design. Commanders know that they must their “stovepipe,” work more closely with IO and achieve information effects to enable develop expertise in other communication achievement of military objectives. However, functions (like Military Information Support to they may not understand the nuances of IO or Operations/PsyOps) in order to lead. On my own the other related but different concepts. In blog, I have addressed my concerns about PA general, doctrine focused on information effects becoming a stronger leader in integrated must be incorporated into the currently activities like SC (and social media). I invite you understood areas of operational art, design, and to read more at http://bit.ly/naVkps and I science.”I recommend reading the entire article welcome your comments. at http://www.ndu.edu/press/influence-inwarfare.html. …The information effects that you refer to are an important aspect of doctrine in SC. However, … it appears that development of the SC actions are only one element of information concept is out of control on multiple fronts with effect: words and images also create effects. For too many cooks. I'm currently engaged in a that matter, even inaction or the absence of research project at the U.S. Army War College words or images creates effects (e.g., one that is designed to trace the roots of SC as far “cannot not communicate”). I’m reminded of back as we can go (at least hundreds of years by this every time I land in the doghouse with my my estimate). We hope to create a muchwife and she gives me the “silent treatment.” needed body of knowledge that can draw upon Her cold shoulder creates tangible effects! well-established theory and practice and serve as a foundation for a more unified SC concept. I would also add that the point of taking action As you know, SC is nothing new ... but those is not to simply create an effect. The tactical who are unfamilar with integrated effects created by SC are designed to support communication are trying to reinvent the wheel.
I have seen the latest drafts of the DoD Instruction and joint doctrine for SC -- both are overly complicated (the Pub's diagrams for the SC process are mind-numbing). I agree with ADM Mike Mullen's (and John Kirby's) views of SC, expressed in a 2009 Joint Force Quarterly article.
Strong relationships between actors will allow sustained dialog, as opposed to one-way communication like threats and warnings. Threats and warnings can be effective in the short term (e.g., dealing with hostiles, insurgents, activists, etc.) but will disrupt relationships and the ability to dialog or achieve strategic aims in the long term. For more about … I understand the concerns about having PA/PI this read the paper that Jim and Laurie Grunig (symmetrical communication) and IO (PsyOps, presented at the July 1997 Bled PR Research etc.) cohabitate. But in our current world, with Symposium in Slovenia: "Review of a program of so much media convergence, messages can no research on activism: Incidence in four longer be targeted so precisely. Messages from Countries, activist Publics, strategies of Activist PsyOps will often reach unintended audiences, Groups, and organizational responses to including audiences that are supposed to activism." receive PA/PI messages. For me, I would rather have a chance to weigh in and coordinate messages before they are released by an organization. Otherwise, I fear I'll have to engage in damage control after illadvised messages get out of the barn and create unintended effects.
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In the minds of most people, public relations has become institutionalized as a messaging activity whose purpose is to make organizations look good in the media or to sell products, usually through devious means, rather than as a management activity that improves relationships among stakeholders and organizations…..” James Grunig
Look at how the private sector is becoming more integrated in terms of coordination between PR, advertising, marketing, etc. -functions that used to be tucked neatly away from each other in separate silos. No longer. I recall reading a quote from John Iawata of IBM recently: “We have a need for … people who are much more comfortable thinking in terms of integration and 360-degree communications as opposed to just thinking about marketing and PR.” The military should take note. We don't Jim has also written about the topic of messagehave to live together to coordinate and based communication versus strategic integrate communications. communication in the most recent edition of the Central European Journal of Communication. He …Back to points being made about message maintains that PR/PA is a strategic effects. Yes, our words, images, and actions communication function, and that strategic (and how we coordinate these with our vision, communication "should play a major role in mission, objectives) do cause effects. However, organizational governance and management" if you over focus on sending messages you as well as in internal and external messaging. reduce SC to merely tactics. The effects are However, stereotypical views normally associate designed to achieve a strategic goal and, as our field with messaging (the old press agentry such, we must consider SC as a dialog between or even public information models), or "much our organization(s) and key publics ... or twomore talk about messaging, publicity, media way, symmetrical communication (meaning all relations, media monitoring, and marketing actors stand to benefit from the support than about the roles and responsibilities communication; as opposed to two-way of public relations in organizational asymmetrical, which favors some actors over governance." others). And to have a meaningful dialog, we have to use SC to establish and maintain good relationships.
Instead of focusing on messaging, Jim maintained in the article that today's strategic communication professionals must be able to: * "deal with global interactions, relationships, and responsibilities" * "manage relationships among organizations and stakeholders in a global, digitalized world" * and manage activity in a way "that improves relationships among stakeholders and organizations."
experience and lessons learned, how it could work and function. We have started in the German Armed Forces such a project, a field experiment in North Afghanistan using systemic analysis based on a model of the information environment. The intent is to enable InfoOps and the Comms Director at Regional level to give appropriate advice to planners and the commander, to enable planning based on knowledge and linked to measures of effectiveness. In our armed forces, we have overcome the antagony of InfoOps and PSYOPS by combining the operational communication, still an ongoing project. But there is still a deep trench between the IO-world and PA and as we try to build bridges from the IO-side, they are torn down or blocked from the PA side.
One last thing, the only reporting that I've seen on Jim's latest article comes from Tony Muzi, a well-respected Italian PR professional. See Tony's blog post about Jim's article on the Global Alliance for PR and Communication Management blog at http://www.stockholmaccords.org/sustainabilit It is still a long way to go until PA is accepting y/jim-grunig-on-the-accords-food-for-thought. “ the need to coordinate activities in the information environment with IO and others. As While the ‘Military PAO’ group was debating on we have recently seen at a SHAPE meeting with SC, the ‘SC’ Group on LinkedIn was discussing a the communication SMEs of the Rapid Reaction very recent article that appeared on USA Today: Corps, there is still no common view on the U.S. 'info ops' programs dubious, costly. That discussion naming convention of organizations. inevitably covered a core issue: the role of SC at the operational level. Here is a comment made by a German As long as NATO is not specifying the colleague. I believe it captures the practical essence of the implementation of SC at operational level and issue: even below, this hassle will continue.”
“…The real problem is still unsolved: What's the A good article deepening into influence SC role at levels below strategic? How do we operations was written by Prof. Daniel Murphy. organize ourselves to come to an effective Suggest to read it, at the end of this digest. coordination horizontally and vertically and how do we call the beast? The Theater Commander seems not to be at strategic level but has a need for a well coordinated communication strategy and plan, rooted in sound analysis. I believe we have walked away from So far I have seen many plans, some even called a strategy, but I haven't seen the underlying analysis. Poll's and surveys are important, also atmospherics, but presented in isolation tend to lead to shortsighted conclusions.
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Only a systemic analysis of the information environment might lead to results and insights that allow to develop an integrated operation and communication plan. As we haven't seen such an effort, we can only imagine with all our
the original intent. By organizing to it— creating whole structures around it— we have allowed strategic communication to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking. It is now sadly something of a cottage industry. (Adm. Mike Mullen Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009)
A Modern Definition of Public Relations Posted by Gerard Corbett in March 1st 2012 Following 1,447 votes, hundreds of submissions, abundant commentary and nearly a year of research, we are pleased to announce the winning modern definition of public relations. Based on a public vote, held Feb. 13–26, of three candidate definitions, the profession’s choice for the modern definition of PR is: “Public relations is a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics.” Listed as Definition No. 2 in the public vote, it received 671 votes, or 46.4 percent, of 1,447 total votes. Simple and straightforward, this definition focuses on the basic concept of public relations — as a communication process, one that is strategic in nature and emphasizing “mutually beneficial relationships.” “Process” is preferable to “management function,” which can evoke ideas of control and top-down, one-way communications. “Relationships” relates to public relations’ role in helping to bring together organizations and individuals with their key stakeholders. “Publics” is preferable to “stakeholders,” as the former relates to the very “public” nature of public relations, whereas “stakeholders” has connotations of publicly-traded companies. You can read more about this exciting announcement in Friday’s New York Times advertising column. Page 8
As promised, PRSA will adopt the winning reference definition to replace the 1982 definition of public relations.
“Public relations is a strategic communication process that builds mutually beneficial relationships between organizations and their publics.”
An analysis of the public vote provides some interesting detail. The data can be found here. Voters were unequivocal in their belief that any modern definition of public relations should not include the word “ethics.” When asked whether the word “ethics” should be included in the winning definition, 60.3 percent of those who voted said No. Furthermore, an aggregate of 57.3 percent of voters indicated “No” to including the word “ethics” in any modern definition of public relations. While PRSA firmly believes in the value of ethical public relations practices, as espoused in our Code of Ethics and numerous advocacy initiatives, we respect the profession’s wishes that ethics not be explicitly included in a modern definition. In all likelihood, though, we will eventually include ethics in a values statement about the definition of public relations, as it relates to PRSA and our members’ values. A review of the final word cloud from 927 definitions submitted during the initial crowdsourcing phase shows that the winning definition closely reflects the profession’s perspective of what should comprise a modern concept of public relations. Several key words found in that word cloud are included in the winning definition:
“Public”
“Organization”
“Communication”
“Relationship”
“Builds”
“Mutual”
But don’t take our word for it. We’ve created a Resources page where you can review the data, along with meeting notes from each of the Definition of PR Summits that PRSA hosted and other relevant materials.
generating a comprehensive, modern definition of public relations. The Path Forward This is really a beginning, not an ending. The discussion is a work in progress, and we’ve laid the groundwork for future debate. Learn how you can continue the discussion here.
It’s clear to us that the process should not stop with this announcement. For that reason, we will keep this blog up and What #PRDefined Has Achieved continue to facilitate the discussion. We’ll publish and promote guest posts from anyone who has something to say on the The “Public Relations Defined” initiative has subject; from those who have conducted not only modernized what many considered their own research to those who have to be a medley of dated concepts of public process suggestions to those who simply relations. It has shaped an important feel they have a better definition to offer. conversation about the future of the profession and its value in the 21st-century In a perfect world, this blog will become a virtual water cooler, where we can continue business landscape. to engage professionals on the definition of The initiative motivated public relations public relations. We’re keeping an open professionals to think about their mind. If the definition continues to evolve profession, talk about their profession and through this process, and we arrive at debate how it is they want to define their something better, we will support it. profession. That allowed us to arrive at a Like art and beauty, perhaps the definition definition with some currency. of public relations really is in the eye of the The definition that resulted from this effort beholder. is inclusive, in that it captures the core Gerard F. Corbett, APR, Fellow PRSA, is chair essence of what it is all public relations and CEO of the Public Relations Society of professionals do. We believe that the America. winning definition is true to the research, and accurately reflects the way in which the public relations professionals who participated in this process described what it is they do for a living.
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For that, we thank the thousands of professionals who voted on the candidate definitions, as well as those who voiced their opinions and provided valuable feedback about the process and candidate definitions. We also owe a debt of gratitude to the 12 organizations that partnered with PRSA to make this effort a success. We appreciate the role of our collaborators in
Is the "standard" news release format from the past passe? http://www.linkedin.com/groups?home=&gid=8224 2&trk=anet_ug_hm DOUG Williams
5 Ways to Reinvent the Press Release With SEO
I'm probably the minority voice here, but I just can't help being a contrarian. Anyway, six thoughts, in no special order:
By Vanessa Bugasch, Cision
First, a release still has to be news, and news is conflict, so your lead has to identify heroes and villains, problems and solutions, good consequences and bad consequences, etc. A purely good news lead rarely works; it's not a story, it's a promotion.
Social media has helped transform the press release and given it new life, a vastly larger audience and a huge role in generating traffic to your organization’s Web site. As such, search engine optimization (SEO) is important to the success of today’s press release. Optimized press releases attract consumers and influencers, as well as journalists—and pulls them into your story.
Second, adjectives and breathless intensifiers ("historic!" or "unprecedented!") are proven credibility killers. Avoid them in the first paragraph specifically, and throughout the piece in general. Third, think A Story and B Story. All releases generally have a lead and an off-lead -- the two main points you want to make. Identify them going in. Fourth, understand that people generally stop reading a release after the fourth paragraph. So if you want a template, try this: First paragraph, A Story; second paragraph, B Story; third paragraph, restatement of importance of A Story (saying it a different way as lead-in for your quote); fourth paragraph, quote.
http://www.prnewsonline.com/free/5-Ways-toReinvent-the-Press-Release-With-SEO_16005.html
To get the biggest bang out of SEO, you may need to change the way you write your release. Some basic, traditional best practices still apply, but here are five tips to keep in mind to optimize your releases: 1. Choose the Right Keywords
Search engines think like your audience. Before you begin to write, know the keywords or phrases that will drive them to the news release and motivate them to click through to pages on your Web site. Do basic keyword research on sites like Google Fifth, make your quotes sound like a person, not AdWords, Wordtracker or Keyword a piece of wood, and have them communicate Discovery. strategic messages, not facts or self-serving drivel.
Sixth, and with all respect to Tom and others, don't buy into the whole "writing for SEO" thing. I have been using the straight-news, inverted pyramid style in releases for years, and they keep my client on the first page of Google - often the first entry -- in an industry and profession where there are a million firms just like theirs.
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At the end of the day, whether releases still matter isn't the issue. They do. The issue is knowing how to write them effectively.
2. Use Your Heads Use one to two keywords in the headline and subhead. Search engine spiders read left to right, so take that into account as you compose your headlines and your first paragraph. Use no more than 200 characters in the summary or subhead. 3. Optimize From the Top Down Spiders also read from the top down. Using keywords in the first two paragraphs makes a much bigger impact than using them
lower down. As you write, think in sound bites, like 140-character tweets.
communications goals are, and what’s your desired “end state.” Having a Facebook page is not a social media strategy; it’s a 4. Don’t Over-Link reactionary effort to “keep up with the As with keywords, don’t overdo anchor Jones.” Communications plans are a key text, as it causes confusion and dilutes the part of any corporation’s strategy and social impact of the links themselves. Offer two to media is not immune to this step. three links for a 400-word press release. 2. Integrate with all other media. Don’t 5. Use Multimedia work in a vacuum. Continually ask how you Research shows that press releases with can integrate with the other media (your pictures, video and other multimedia get at media team, outreach/events team, least 80% more search traffic than text-only executive communications, etc). If your releases. They’re usually more appealing senior executive is doing a media interview, and interesting, too. You’d be surprised he should be plugging your social media how easy it is to create your own video or sites, and if the chief of corporate policy is add visuals that support your product, sending an internal communications message or campaign. directive she should be “asking for feedback” via your internal social media Vanessa Bugasch is senior vice president of channels. Never miss an opportunity to plug global marketing , a provider of PR and promote your sites through all your software, services and tools. You can follow organization’s media executions and her on Twitter: @vanessabugasch. outlets. 3. Plan for success, not for failure. Ask yourself, “What happens if we are successful?” If your defined end state is an The Army Reserve’s 10 rules for social active community of followers then you media practitioners must have the community management team in place before you start. By creating By Lt. Col. Andrew Morton http://www.prdaily.com/Main/Articles/The_Army_R content that’s engaging, you’ll develop an eserves_10_rules_for_social_media_practi_10998.as audience that’s active. You must have a px plan to sustain the needs of your community before you start.
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1. Develop a “plan on a page.” Before you sign up for Facebook , Twitter, LinkedIn or any platform, you must evaluate whom your audience is (internal and external), what your organization’s key
4. Decentralize your efforts. Social Media is not an “empire,” it’s a “republic.” That means having two to three people in one room as your sole moderators, content creators and strategists is a recipe for failure—that is, it’s not sustainable. You have to train each of your departments to be capable of providing content, being able to engage when necessary, and to have an understanding of these requirements in today’s environment (for example, no three-day waiting period for HR to get back to you on a relevant question that your
followers are asking). This decentralization requires training, trust and tact. 5. Curate content that’s “real and relevant.” If you are trying to get people to understand what it’s like to work for your organization don’t have your chief of communications tell them in a packaged piece. Get an employee to tell his or her story candidly. Whether it’s video or blogging, people want to know what it’s like from those who live it. Finding the right storytellers is easier than you may think. Once you’ve established internal channels for people to share their thoughts on work policies and practices, you will start to see many stories that are ready for use within your external audience.
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training program that gets each of your content managers proficient. Then, have a plan to react to these “mishaps,” but don’t make “hanging people that work for you from the rafters” step one. If you do, you create a zero-defects mentality and that stifles initiative. Good social media practitioners are never afraid of getting fired.
9. Develop user-engagement policies that are reasonable and enforceable. Don’t make it impossible for someone to engage on your sites with arbitrary regulations and procedures. At the same time, make sure that people understand this is not their teenage daughter’s Twitter account. Establish engagement standards; make them clearly understandable and 6. Don’t practice Web 1.5. Don’t treat your enforceable, and don’t be too quick to corporate presence within social media as a moderate. If you’ve built a community of direct extension of your “brand ground”— users strategically and with a solid content that is, your corporate website. You must management plan, it will keep people in foster real and responsive posts, and foster check more successfully than you, if you engaging dialogue (within a certain allow them. decorum of course). If you try and repurpose that one-way dialogue that typical 10. Collaborate, borrow, copy and steal. websites promote, you will lose credibility Use every possible good idea and lesson and stifle your growth. learned. Lean on others in the space setting the standard. Look for examples of 7. Develop measurements and monitoring engaging content, effective moderation, capability. You cannot manage what you and efficient platform management. When don’t measure and cannot measure what the Wizard’s curtain is pulled back, the dirty you don’t monitor. There are great “out of secret is that no one is an expert in every the box” analytical tools or you can part of social media. No one. Even if customize your own “monitoring someone was an industry expert so much of dashboard” to identify measurable return the medium is constantly changing. To be on investment and seek out those who are successful you have to look at what talking about your brand. everyone else is doing and apply what’s going to work in your organization. 8. Trust your subordinates, but train them. And have a crisis communications plan to In summary. Social media is not a device, a deal with mistakes. Mistakes will be made platform, or a medium. It’s a culture. Most in social media. Posts will be taken out of of the mistakes people make in executing context. The wrong word may be used at within the space are not linked to platform the wrong time, or moderation may be seen management (for example, how to use the as arbitrary by your audience. These things newest feature on Facebook). Mistakes are happen. First, develop a standardized made when an organization treats the
venue as if it were “theirs.” Yes, you’re absolutely responsible for your organization’s sites. However, you don’t always get to be in the driver’s seat. Embrace the ride and glean as much as you can about your brand and people’s perception of your brand by listening to what your followers are saying.
Information plays a prominent role in the history of U.S. warfare. From Winfield Scott’s courting of the Catholic Church in Veracruz in 1847 to George Creel’s Committee on Public Information in World War I, military and civilian leaders have long understood that information, and the influence it produces, can significantly enable the success of Lt. Col. Andrew Morton is the chief of online military operations. That is no different and social media for the United States Army today. In fact, it is apparent from both Reserve. You can find the Army Reserve on current military operations and the Facebook. environment in which they occur that information and influence as applied to military success will become increasingly important while significantly more complex in the future.
The Future of Influence in Warfare By Dennis M. Murphy http://www.ndu.edu/press/influence-inwarfare.html ABSTRACT
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Enemies realize the potency of influence and will increasingly bend information to sway both friendly and hostile publics. To prevail in future conflicts, the Nation must not only be more adroit at telling its own story but also predictive about adversary inclinations and methods of using misinformation. We have progressed since 9/11, but the need remains to more fully exploit the tools of influence, especially through focused intelligence support. General Stanley McChrystal called strategic communication vital to securing the operational center of gravity in Afghanistan, which he identified as popular support. There as elsewhere, success comes through changing behavior through influence; thus, Americans must understand the environments they operate in as well as the thinking of enemies and host populations.
Afghan National Army and Civil Order Police officers speak to Maiwand district villagers in Kandahar Province during clearing operation in area U.S. Army (Daniel P. Shook)
First, consider importance. It seems clear that success in Afghanistan hinges on the ability to change behavior through influence. General Stanley McChrystal’s initial assessment of the situation there, published in August 2009, stated, “Strategic Communication makes a vital contribution to the overall effort [battle of perceptions] and more specifically to the operational center of gravity: the continued support of the Afghan population.”1 The transparency of the information environment and increasing access to information through any number of means, from satellite television to the Internet, portend that
military operations will not only have the ability to shape the information environment, but also in turn risk being shaped by it. Next, consider complexity. In a recent Small Wars Journal article, Lee Rowland and Steve Tatham, in their presentation on target audience analysis (TAA) and measures of effectiveness, make a strong case that influence operations are a complex business: “TAA— when undertaken properly—is an extremely complex process and whilst its methodology is comparatively simple, its implementation is most certainly not.”2 A discussion of the human behavior model in an article published in early 2010 in Parameters concludes the same: “A deep understanding of the human behavior model, specifically culture and how it informs emotion, is critical to obtaining behavior change that is driven by perception and attitude.”3 Noted communication researcher Steven Corman joins the chorus when he describes a shift in academic thought on influence from one of “simplistic . . . to pragmatic complexity.”4
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The U.S. Government, and the military in particular, has gradually recognized the value and urgency of information to affect national security since the attacks of September 11, 2001. Significant debate since then has informed the evolution and viability of concepts such as information operations (IO), strategic communications (SC), and public diplomacy.5 In fact, the military has moved beyond the apprentice stage to what could arguably be termed journeyman status as it relates to applying information to enable achievement of its objectives. But the importance and complexity of future inf luence operations will require master status. The U.S. military will achieve such mastery by getting its doctrine right; by
building its intelligence capability to focus on enemy use of information as a weapon of choice; and, most importantly, by creating an organizational culture that embraces the criticality of using information to influence across the spectrum of future conflict. Getting Doctrine Right The concepts of IO and SC (the primary military influence processes) and their application have evolved in fits and starts over the past 10 years. Much debate in the midst of conflict has surrounded the meaning of these terms, the similarities and differences between them, and the responsibilities for each beyond theory and in practice.6 Add to this the recent emergence of cyberspace operations, and the confusion is understandable. Still, progress, while appearing glacial to many, is occurring. A new and clearer definition of information operations has been approved by the Department of Defense. A “Strategic Communication Capabilities Based Assessment” has been completed.7 Both of these efforts will lead to military doctrinal publications and directives that afford the opportunity to provide clarity and, more importantly, move these concepts to an understanding that enables mastery of the craft of applying information in order to influence. An example of progress was reflected in the theme of the 2010 Worldwide Information Operations Conference: “Mainstreaming Information Operations, Normalizing Doctrine and Operations.”8 In other words, how do you take IO out of the ether, where it appears as a new, bright, shiny object, and place it squarely into the realm of routine and recurring military operations? The same challenge exists for strategic communications and cyberspace operations. The answer to that question lies squarely in getting the doctrine right. In fact, if the military does
not get the next iteration of influencerelated doctrine correct over the next 2 years, the progress previously described will be significantly muted. Doctrine is what drives the conduct of military operations. It is guidance that (as noted on the inside cover of all joint doctrine publications) “is authoritative [and] as such will be followed except when, in the judgment of the commander, exceptional circumstances dictate otherwise.”9 Once doctrine is written and codified, Soldiers, Sailors, Marines, and Airmen read it and follow it. It becomes “truth.” Given that this is the case, defining the correct audience for the doctrine is critical since the future of information in warfare should focus on movement to mastery of the concept. One may understandably default to the influence practitioner as the obvious audience for this doctrine. But the most important audience is the commander. The progress previously described is reflective of IO or SC staffs who really understand how to achieve effects in the information environment after 10 years of practice in war. What is lacking, however, are commanders who understand the concept sufficiently to provide appropriate guidance, resources, and advocacy for those same IO staffs, which makes all the difference in the world.10
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First, the focus of commander-oriented doctrine must be on information effects, not IO or SC. Both are integrating processes that are often misunderstood and confused with the individual capabilities that they integrate. Adding further confusion are related processes and capabilities like the newly minted cyberspace operations. Information effects, on the other hand, are clearly understood by commanders. Effect is a doctrinally accepted term, a part of operational design.11 Commanders know
that they must achieve information effects to enable achievement of military objectives. However, they may not understand the nuances of IO or the other related but different concepts. In general, doctrine focused on information effects must be incorporated into the currently understood areas of operational art, design, and science. Second, IO, SC, and cyberspace operations are still terms that will be used. This proposed doctrine need not go into excruciating detail about the specific staff processes that they portend, but it must describe the relationship between them. Some specific examples of what this doctrine should include are worthy of discussion. First, and arguably foremost, is the importance of considering influence in the development of commander’s intent. Commander’s intent drives both the planning and execution of military operations. It defines command ownership of the operation. A commander’s intent that includes a desired information endstate (a defined attitude or behavior change for critical audiences at the conclusion of the operation) will drive the military course of action development, analysis, and selection. That is, the military actions will be undertaken in a fashion to achieve the standard operational endstate in a way that also allows the desired information-effect endstate to be achieved. Branch planning should also be considered in terms of influence. Branch plans answer the question, “What if?” Given that our enemies routinely use influence to enable success, we should plan for an immediate response to their influence operations through branch planning in order to minimize our reaction time. Additionally, it is important to do a side-by-side comparison of the operational art,
design, and science aspects of kinetic operations as compared to influence operations. This should clearly point out the requirement for an information end state (the art), resources necessary for understanding the complexity of both human behavior and measuring influence effectiveness (the science), and the longterm nature of achieving influence effects (the design). When the Joint Publication Information Effects in Joint Military Operations is available, it will go a long way toward normalizing future influence operations. It buys informed and educated commanders. That in turn makes the life of the influence staff easier since the commander can now provide appropriate guidance, resources, and advocacy. And that moves information in warfare to a level of mastery not previously seen or practiced. Still, that mastery requires an acute understanding of the enemy, who chooses to vote routinely with information effects as his asymmetric weapon of choice. Know Thine Enemy In the apprentice stage of employing influence operations, the commander and staff are proactive in considering the information environment and the required information effects in the planning process. Counterinsurgency, as a population-centric military operation, has driven commanders, over time, to focus on information effects during planning in both Iraq and Afghanistan. In the journeyman stage, the commander and staff both plan to achieve their own information effects and quickly shift to being “proactively reactive” regarding unpredictable circumstances in the information environment.
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That is, consideration is also given in the planning process to the fact that unforeseen situations can, and often do,
occur that have potentially adverse information effects on coalition forces. (Collateral damage, Abu Ghraib photos, and staged enemy disinformation come to mind.) Recognizing this, the commander and staff develop processes to immediately react to those instances if and when they occur. Information playbooks and battle drills are examples that are prepared to plan for the unforeseen but expected information wildcard as a result of branch planning.12
Participants at town hall meeting discuss methods for locals to practice their religion conveniently in Kandahar Province, Afghanistan U.S. Army (Courtney Russell)
But in order to achieve mastery in influence operations, one must move from being proactively reactive to becoming predictive. This is a critical task, and certainly not an easy one since it speaks to the complexity of the information environment. Consider the importance of being able to predict an information effect planned by the enemy versus reacting to an unanticipated information wildcard employed by the enemy. Rowland and Tatham note that “an unintended incident . . . will have an immediate information effect on [the] target audience and a much slower return to below stasis.”13 In other words, even if coalition forces are doing a good job achieving planned and intended information effects, the unexpected incident not only adversely impacts operations for the short term, but also
never allows a return to the effects achieved before the incident. (One step forward, two steps back.)
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So, how does one become predictive in order to cut the legs out from under enemy information effects? The answer lies in the often-overlooked but longterm Achilles’ heel of influence operations: intelligence support. A highly publicized report coauthored by Major General Michael T. Flynn, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization intelligence director in Afghanistan, points out current intelligence f laws: “Our intelligence apparatus still finds itself unable to answer fundamental questions about the environment in which we operate and the people we are trying to protect and persuade.”14 Only when the Intelligence Community develops the skill sets, a pipeline of experts, and, most importantly, organizational focus toward influence operations will coalition forces have a chance of being predictive regarding enemy use of information. The enemy has a well-established modus operandi (MO) using information as his strategic weapon of choice. In fact, American-born-turned-enemy propagandist Zachary Chesser recently made that MO rather simple to understand by laying out the 10 most effective ways to conduct enemy inf luence operations.15 That is not to say that predictive information analysis is always easy. As previously noted, intelligence based on the human behavior model, social psychology, cultural anthropology, and emotion is inherently difficult. But intelligencegathering and analysis focused on both open sources and traditional and more complex sources will move friendly influence operations from proactively reactive and allow the possibility of being predictive and proactively disruptive before the fact.
The shifts to commander-focused information effects doctrine and intelligence focus on enemy influence operations work hand-in-hand toward forcing a change in organizational culture in support of fully integrated planning and execution of influence operations. Organizational Culture In 2009, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen stated, “We have allowed strategic communication to become a thing instead of a process, an abstract thought instead of a way of thinking.”16 It is this inherent “way of thinking” that defines the organizational culture of the U.S. military today, and in terms of wielding influence through SC, Admiral Mullen sees a basic f law. This is not surprising since researchers note that organizational culture changes in a fairly slow, evolutionary manner.17 What commander-centric information doctrine and intelligence support to information effects provide, however, are forcing functions to drive an organizational culture that embraces information effects as an inherent part of military planning and execution.
Army and Marine information support operations team with Afghan National Army soldier clear compound to conduct census patrol in Marjah, Halmand Province U.S. Marine Corps (Christopher M. Carroll)
Within military organizations, the commander sets the tone, establishes the command climate, and drives the organizational culture. A commander
who embraces and emphasizes the value of information effects to military success will drive the unit to a similar recognition. Doctrine that focuses on and directs commanders to provide initial guidance on desired information effects will result in planning and execution reflective of organizational change. A commander who identifies an information end state in his intent implies to the staff and subordinates that information effects are important to mission success and must be considered throughout the planning, execution, and assessment processes. Intelligence support follows this commander-driven change. With an information end state defined, the intelligence staff determines most likely and most dangerous enemy influence courses of action. The staff then wargame against these scenarios and, in doing so, increases the opportunity to both predict the enemy’s use of information and plan to prevent it from ever occurring. Other standard military decision making processes will follow with a routine consideration of influence on mission accomplishment. Priority Intelligence Requirements will necessarily consider collecting on the environmental factors that portend enemy influence operations. The Commander’s Critical Information Requirements will raise timesensitive influence activities to the commander’s level for action, both to exploit friendly effects and blunt enemy effects.
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Commander-centric doctrine on information effects, accompanied by intelligence support enabled by appropriate resources and focus on enemy influence activities, will drive organizational culture. If and when that occurs, the military will be well on its way to mastery in planning and executing influence operations and deterring and
defeating the primary source of enemy power. The information environment is a complex system that will become increasingly important to the success or failure of military operations in the future. Progress has been made since 9/11 to both exploit information effects to enable success and to counter enemy asymmetric use of information as a strategic weapon of choice. But the criticality of information as power in future warfare means that if the U.S. military hopes to routinely succeed, it must master influence operations across the spectrum of operations. Commandercentric doctrine will help jump-start that mastery by allowing the commander to provide the appropriate and necessary guidance, resources, and advocacy to influence operations. Intelligence support must simultaneously shift focus from kinetic order-of-battle analysis to a balanced approach that considers collection and analysis of influencerelated enemy capabilities as well. As this command-directed and -focused planning and execution evolve, they will trickle down to the individual Soldier, Sailor, Marine, and Airman. When they inherently and proactively consider any and all of their actions in light of their influence effects, inculcation of the organizational culture toward and true mastery of influence operations will be achieved. In a world where information is ubiquitous and increasingly impacts military success, that cannot happen soon enough. JFQ Note 1.
2.
Stanley A. McChrystal, Headquarters, International Security Assistance Force Memorandum, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” Kabul, Afghanistan, August 30, 2009, D−1. Lee Rowland and Steve Tatham, “Strategic Communication and Inf luence Operations: Do We Really Get ‘It’?” Small Wars Journal, August 3, 2010, available at
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
<http://smallwarsjournal. com/blog/journal/docs-temp/483tathamrowland.pdf>. Dennis M. Murphy, “In Search of the Art and Science of Strategic Communication,” Parameters 34, no. 4 (Winter 2009/2010), 111. Steven R. Corman, Angela Trethewey, and st Bud Goodall, “A 21 Century Model for Communication in the Global War of Ideas,” Consortium for Strategic Communication, Report #0701, April 3, 2007, 9. Information operations, strategic communications, and public diplomacy are related concepts that all in some way focus on informing, educating, and inf luencing audiences. Still, their nuanced differences remain difficult for the nonpractitioner to grasp, as evidenced by a U.S. Department of Defense front-end analysis in summer 2010, examining the lexicon and definitions of information operations and strategic communication, among others. See Dennis M. Murphy, “The Trouble with Strategic Communication(s),” IOSphere (Winter 2008) for a detailed explanation of the lexicon and comparison of the terms information operations (IO) and strategic communication (SC). The new definition of IO is an outcome of the Department of Defense front-end analysis (see note 5). The “Strategic Communication Capabilities Based Assessment” was conducted by U.S. Strategic Command during 2009–2010 and considered SC from doctrinal, personnel, and organizational perspectives, among other considerations. The Worldwide Information Operations Conference is an annual event bringing together an international audience of approximately 500 IO practitioners, academics, and contractors to focus on both the progress and future of IO. See Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3– 13, Information Operations (Washington,
About the Author Professor Dennis M. Murphy serves as the Director of the Information in Warfare Group in the Center for Strategic Leadership at the U.S. Army War College
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DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 13, 2006), i, among others. 10. The author has taught on the topics of IO and SC at the U.S. Army War College for the past 6 years. Over that period, senior military leader-students have increasingly recognized the importance of information effects to warfighting success. However, they anecdotally offer that even with successive tours of duty in combat zones, it takes an initial 4 months, on average, for commanders to put into place effective tactics, techniques, and procedures to compete in the information environment. 11. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 5–0, Joint Operation Planning (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, August 11, 2011), III– 18. 12. Again, this should be planned using current military paradigms. In this example, branch planning is the appropriate mechanism. A branch answers the question “What if ?” in military plans. See Joint Publication 5–0, II– 18. 13. Rowland and Tatham, 6. 14. Michael T. Flynn, Matt Pottinger, and Paul D. Batchelor, “Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan,” Center for a New American Security Working Paper, January 4, 2010. 15. Jared Brachman, “The Internet Jihad,” Foreign Policy, available at <www.foreignpolicy. com/articles/2010/10/11/the_internet_jihad>. 16. Michael G. Mullen, “Strategic Communication: Getting Back to Basics,” th Joint Force Quarterly 55 (4 Quarter 2009), 2. 17.Christine A.R. MacNulty, Transformation from the Outside In or the Inside Out (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Center for Strategic Leadership, 2008), 22.
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