TRENDS

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Many people who gathered on Jan. 6 remained peaceful and may never have intended to participate in the violence themselves. However, there were individuals and groups present that expressly stated the above objectives both before and after Jan. 6.

This includes social media discussions by accounts seen as leaders within far-right organizations (i.e. not by unknown potential ‘infiltrators’ of these groups).

Figure 5. Individual supporting domestic terrorism (Telegram)

Figure 6. Individual supporting domestic terrorism (Telegram)

Claim: These protestors can’t be far-right or pro-Trump because those individuals support law enforcement.

Response: There are several frictions between and within far-right and pro-Trump groups at the moment. One of these includes attitudes toward law enforcement. While many Trump supporters support them, there are increasingly groups of pro-Trump supporters and the far-right that do not. In addition to the above Figure 4, G4S has identified a large number of conversations that highlight negative sentiment toward police and other law enforcement.

Figure 7. Examples of Negative Sentiment Towards Police (Telegram / Proud Boys)

Fragmenting Groups

Despite the calls on social media for some type of violent altercations, the breach of the U.S. Capitol, while on some level successful for those participating in the violence, did not ultimately appear well coordinated. In reviewing video footage and first-hand accounts, once the protestors were inside there was little coordinated effort about what to do next or where to go. Most of the iconic photos from inside the capitol showed individuals wandering around, taking selfies and stealing items. There is no unifying organization or ideology among these groups, which makes identifying the threat a challenge. The emerging threat of political violence demonstrates evolving group dynamics both within and among various alt-right groups,such as Proud Boys, the III%ers, Oath Keepers,and multiple white supremacist groups.

There are serious divides amongst those who reject violence versus those that support it, individuals and groups who support President Trump and those who do not, those who no longer support law enforcement versus those who adamantly do and those who are motivated primarily due to race and specifically white-supremacy and/or anti-Semitism versus those who are not.

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President Trump’s most recent statements (see above, Situation Update), in combination with the bipartisan and widespread negative labeling of the Jan. 6 events,including insurrection, terrorism and extremism, has decreased the likelihood of peaceful, pro-Trump supporters continuing to attend protests at least outside of their local groups. There are also pro-Trump supporters who are now more emboldened and desperate to take action, seeing Jan. 6 as a failed mission and expressing interest in acting before it’s ‘too late.’ Some of these individuals have formed conspiracy theories around Trump’s most recent statements against violence.

Figure 8. Proud Boys Disavowing Trump (Telegram)

Meanwhile, G4S has identified a significant number and entire groups of more radical pro-Trump supporters who view Trump’s recent statement and inaction as a betrayal. Many of these individuals are expressing strong frustration that the Jan. 6 violence did not go further and continue to express interest in facilitating more widespread violence.

Far-right, including white supremacist groups are actively encouraging members to recruit and indoctrinate the aforementioned individuals toward their ideologies.

The combination of the above factors has made it likely that pro-Trump supporters committed to remaining peaceful are less likely to attend large, nationwide protests, but that the overall risk of political violence continues to be very high and may even have increased since Jan. 6. These acts of violence are more likely to be isolated acts of violence, akin to lone-wolf terrorism or supported by local, smaller groups. As such, they may occur with little or no warning

Figure 9. Discussions of ‘Lone Wolf Attacks’ and Calls for Violence (4Chan)

Characteristics

G4S emphasizes that the individuals and groups posing a risk of political violence are not unified in one ideology or movement, and there are many calls for individuals to act on a local level. This results in a less predictable situation, as an individual’s characteristics may significantly change the type and sophistication of attack they could plan and execute (i.e. the access they have through their employment or their knowledge set.)

Common characteristics in recent acts of political violence, property destruction and thwarted political violence schemes include:

Violent actors are self-starters. Individuals will interpret statements from online sources, media or politicians for themselves and decide how to take action; Actors look for opportunity. These may include easy or nearby targets, public figures whose office and residences are easily located and government buildings; Actors operate within an echo chamber. The digest of online material and limited news sources provide clues about areas of grievance and the individuals who are targeted; and Actors are mostly untested. Despite the purposeful dress and accessorizing of military gear and weapons, most participants are untested in their fabled “fight against tyranny” or the government or vote-steal, etc. Gaining experience and membership after each event, they are in a ‘learn-as-you-go’ mode, and despite G4S Corporate Risk Services

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some members having military or law enforcement experience, this does not mean they operate as a cohesive unit or have a unified mission or standard operating procedure. One troubling outcome of the breach of the U.S. Capitol is that it appears to have emboldened some individuals. Members of these groups who are also members or former members of military and law enforcement also pose a higher risk in this regard.

Changing Platforms

Social media platforms are removing far-right and extremist content, including calls for violence at a significantly accelerated rate. This and especially the social media app Parler being offline (at least temporarily) has put the locations of far-right and extremist groups’ communications in flux, and they are evolving on a daily rate.

Many far-right groups have continued to focus on Telegram, and communications are also continuing on 4Chan and individual websites. With Telegram channels being removed on an individual basis, groups and individuals with larger followings are continually posting ‘backup’ channels in case theirs is removed. There are also frequent posts on these channels advising followers on changing settings on their phones to ensure that apps can’t be deleted without their consent. Meanwhile, specifically followers of QAnon are moving more toward Gab.

Figure 10. Proud Boys Telegram Channel Advising Followers Of Backup Channel (Telegram)

There are also increasing references to organizing outside of social media to form local (physical) groups as well as deep web (including dark net) communications, and references to other alternative means of communication online.* * As this report is open to the public, G4S has removed specific sources, links and names throughout the report that could lead potential supporters of these movements toward them. If you work within security leadership for your organization, G4S can provide further details. Contact information is available at the end of this report.

Disinformation

In addition to far-right individuals and groups actively distributing factually inaccurate information to their followers,for example, widespread conspiracy theories, G4S has identified posts actively encouraging infiltration and disinformation campaigns against groups that they view as opposed to their ideologies and beliefs, such as Black Lives Matters. G4S identified multiple incidents of far-right groups distributing repositories of URLs for these groups on platforms such as Telegram.

Targeting

Government Assets and Individuals

Across the far-right social media discussions and planned events that G4S reviewed, the most frequent targets for proposed violence and/or are government buildings and individual politicians. While there have been specific plans identified for capitol buildings (see Planned Protests), and this remains a significant concern, G4S cautions against only expecting and preparing for the same types of violence as on Jan. 6. This is especially the case due to the varied membership and groups involved. Moreover, a common discussion across disparate groups in recent days has been advice to avoid these types of protests — even calling the planned, armed “Million Militia March” the “Million Martyr March” due to the likelihood of being arrested. Several groups go further, recommending that supporters target elsewhere, while law enforcement is focused on government assets and particularly focused on Washington, D.C. (see Soft Targets, below).

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Figure 11. Post recommending targeting elsewhere while law enforcement is focused in D.C. (Telegram)

Media and Social Media

The media has been a long-standing target for grievance amongst pro-Trump groups as well as far-right individuals who do not support President Trump. This negative attitude and focus on the media has been further propelled and significantly escalated in recent weeks, particularly with multiple social media platforms removing President Trump from their platforms and accelerating their removal of content that is deemed extremist or condoning violence. G4S identified increasing calls to target media, and particularly social media, offices, assets and leadership. Far-right groups are sharing information on large political contributions.

Figure 12. References to Media and Big Tech Being Identified As Discussed Targets (Twitter)

Counter-Protesters

In recent months, one of the highest risks for violence at protests occurred when protestors met counterprotestors. There have been multiple cases of serious violence between groups. This includes fist fights, stabbings and vehicular rammings. G4S assesses that this is almost certainly going to continue. Moreover, as white supremacist ideologies increase amongst some groups, there is a risk of more targeted attacks on racial groups or based on anti-Semitism. These types of attacks have been proposed on far-right forums, including the targeting of Black Lives Matter protestors.

While G4S did not identify any discussions specifically referring to this, there may be an elevated risk of white supremacist attacks on Jan. 18, Martin Luther King Jr. Day, due to the current elevated tensions and rhetoric on white supremacist forums.

Soft Targets and Local Targets

References to “soft targets” and “local targets” are increasing at a rapid rate. Soft targets refer to potential targets that are not well protected (i.e. compared to hard targets, such as military or law enforcement assets.) Posts that specifically refer to soft targets are not tending to recommend the same specific examples. However, these have included offices (such as social media and big tech headquarters or data centers), public utilities and

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individuals’ homes. G4S recommends heightened vigilance looking for insider threats for businesses that have made political statements or are otherwise associated with a political stance.

G4S has identified particularly concerning posts recommending that far-right followers target soft targets and local targets on dates when law enforcement is expected to be focused elsewhere.

Figure 13. Post recommending targeting soft targets on the local level. (Parler) Figure 14. Post recommending targeting soft elsewhere while law enforcement is focused in the Capitol. (Parler) 11 U.S. Political Violence Risk Assessment Individuals

One of the most significant trends G4S has identified is an increasing call to target individuals as representatives of their beliefs or companies. This is most notably being seen in calls to commit violence against politicians, but has also been identified against individuals who are viewed as having “betrayed” President Trump, been involved in alleged voter fraud, leadership figures in media and social media companies and other individuals who are listed due to racial or anti-Semitic reasons. Personal details, including home addresses and e-mail addresses for these individuals are being shared in far-right groups and websites when they’ve been identified.

Figure 15. Post Referring to “Enemies List”.

Figure 16. Post Calling For, And Threatening, Assassinations (Parler)

Protests targeting individuals are not limited to far-right groups. Potentially as a result of more people working from home during COVID-19, G4S has started to identify a slight increase in protests in general being organized in front of individuals’ homes and individuals being identified and harassed in public (for example, at airports.)

Law Enforcement

While less common, there is an upward trend in posts suggesting violence toward law enforcement. Some farright individuals have expressed feeling betrayed by the reaction of law enforcement on and since Jan. 6 (see also above, Figure 4, and 7.)