Global Brief / Fall 2016 by Global Brief Magazine/Institute for 21st Century Questions

Full Pivots, Semi-Pivots and the Relativity of Pivotry

EDITORS’ BRIEF

Countries pivot all the time, in relative terms. Whether a pivot is deliberate and successful is an altogether separate matter.

COVER ILLUSTRATION: LISA HANEY

rian president Olusegun Obasanjo to discuss the future of Africa’s biggest country and the continent more generally. GB also interviews Janice Stein, founding director of the University of Toronto’s Munk School of Global Affairs, about the foreign posture of Canada’s new (Trudeau) government, and many global issues besides. In Query, GB Managing Editor Sam Sasan Shoamanesh makes the case for an Iranian soft-power strategy as a way for Tehran to position itself, in the wake of the nuclear deal, as a peace-and-security leader in a deteriorating Middle East. Former French foreign minister Hubert Védrine then weighs in on how Europe should react – for its own survival – to the recent Brexit vote. In Nez à Nez, Wolfgang Krieger of the University of Marburg and Barthélémy Courmont of the Université catholique de Lille continue our analysis of the consequences of Brexit by tussling over whether the EU is headed for a breakup. In The Definition, GB looks at Turkey after the events of July. Katerina Dalacoura of the LSE, Andrey Kortunov of the Russian International Affairs Council, and Tel Aviv University’s Eyal Zisser weigh in. In Strategic Futures, Andrew Ratcliffe of Impetus – The Private Equity Foundation, Adrian Pabst of the University of Kent, and Oliver Escobar of the University of Edinburgh look at where the UK will be in the year 2020. In Situ reports come to us from Ankara, with Mitat Celikpala and Sinem Akgul Acikmese, both from Istanbul’s Kadir Has University, explaining Turkey’s foreign policy pivots in the aftermath of the July coup attempt. Ephraim Kam of Tel Aviv’s Institute for National Security Studies reports from Jerusalem on Israel’s uniquely happy security position – and uncertain strategic future – in the context of regional chaos. GB is in Costa Rica’s steamy Cabinet Room to eavesdrop on that country’s difficult calculus in respect of whether to reinvest in a proper national army in the context of its precarious relationship with Nicaragua and the growing instability in Venezuela. George Elliott Clarke, Canadian parliamentary poet laureate, closes the book in Epigram. Enjoy your Brief. | GB

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he global wave of pivots toward China – and to some of Asia more generally – has not been countered, in any purposeful sense, by an equal and opposite wave of pivots (counter-pivots) back to the West. Certainly there have been some, and the extant gravity and seduction of the EU (Brexit notwithstanding) has given life-energy to such counter-pivots. Of course, if Country X is pivoting at far greater velocity toward China than Country Y, then Country Y must, in relative terms, and whether it realizes it or not, be pivoting at some speed away from China and toward the West. The plot thickens when we look at unitary states like Russia and Turkey – both, in strategic terms, hyper-centralized – that can pivot to or away from a given country or region seemingly on the caprice of the leader. Would that the older, democratic federations could pivot in any direction with half as much despatch. GB Editor-in-Chief Irvin Studin triggers this number in the One Pager, exploring the character and intensity of different countries’ pivots to and from so-called algorithmic or argumentative states or regions. In the lead Feature, Bilahari Kausikan, former permanent foreign secretary of Singapore, explores the strategic dances of Southeast Asia’s small and larger states in response to intensifying Sino-American rivalry – especially in the South China Sea, and particularly in the aftermath of the recent ruling of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. P. Whitney Lackenbauer of St. Jerome’s University outlines the contours of a possible forward agenda, tensions notwithstanding, between Canada and Russia – the two Arctic giants – in the High North. Kanti Bajpai of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, returns to GB to assess and categorize the international performance of India’s Modi government two years into its mandate. Irina Starodubrovskaya of Moscow’s Gaidar Institute takes us to the North Caucasus to explain why and how Russian policy and political elites continue to misapprehend this vexing region, and indeed how this can be reversed. Finally, David Skilling of Landfall Strategy Group posits an especial role for small countries in weathering some of the recent and present economic crises. In Tête à Tête, GB breaks bread with former Nige-

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EDITOR-IN-CHIEF & PUBLISHER Irvin Studin

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D E PA R T M E N T S

MANAGING EDITOR Sam Sasan Shoamanesh ART DIRECTOR Louis Fishauf ASSOCIATE EDITOR Michael Barutciski ASSISTANT EDITOR Marie Lavoie

EDITORS’ BRIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ONE PAGER

Irvin Studin | Which way to pivot? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

SENIOR EDITOR & ASSISTANT PUBLISHER

Jaclyn Volkhammer

IN SITU

SENIOR EDITOR Milos Jankovic

Mitat Celikpala & Sinem Akgul Acikmese | Turkish foreign policy . . . . 6

JUNIOR EDITORS

Ephraim Kam | Middle East disintegration: Israel’s concerns. . . . . . 26

Zach Battat, Khilola Davidova, Misha Munim, Zach Paikin WEB DESIGN Dolce Publishing PRINTING RJM Print Group

TÊTE À TÊTE Olusegun Obasanjo | Whither the African giant?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Janice Stein | Trudeau, Turkey and a tour d’horizon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

ADVISORY COUNCIL

QUERY

Sam Mizrahi, Don Ferencz,

Sam Sasan Shoamanesh | What of Iran’s soft power? . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

André Beaulieu, Tim Coates, David Dewitt, Paul Evans, Drew Fagan, Dan Fata, Margaret MacMillan Mailing Address Global Brief Magazine 63 Oatlands Crescent Richmond Hill, ON L4C 9P2 Canada General Enquiries, Feedback & Suggestions globalbrief@globalbrief.ca Subscriptions subscriptions@globalbrief.ca Advertising advertising@globalbrief.ca Article Submissions: submissions@globalbrief.ca

Hubert Védrine | Quelle Europe après le Brexit? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 IN THE CABINET ROOM

Dusan Petricic | Costa Rica revisits the military question. . . . . . . . . 49 NEZ À NEZ Wolfgang Krieger vs. Barthélémy Courmont Les conséquences du Brexit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 THE DEFINITION

“The events in Turkey…” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 STRATEGIC FUTURES “In 2020, the UK will…” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 EPIGRAM

George Elliott Clarke | Wobbling pivots. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

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F E AT U RES

STRATEGY, POWER & CHANGE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA US-China geopolitical competition is playing out amid growing internal changes for key ASEAN states BY BILAHARI KAUSIKAN

CANADA & RUSSIA: TOWARD AN ARCTIC AGENDA Tensions between the Arctic giants should not interfere with common gain in the High North BY P. WHITNEY LACKENBAUER

MODI’S FOREIGN POLICY: HOW’S IT GOING? From Nehruvianism to a neoliberal and hyper-realist hybrid? BY KANTI BAJPAI

RUSSIA’S MOST COMPLEX THEATRE: THE NORTH CAUCASUS Moscow’s awkward domestic dance continues in the region it understands least BY IRINA STARODUBROVSKAYA

HOW ARE THE SMALL COUNTRIES DOING? Why and how small advanced economies are signalling the emergence of new fault lines in the global economy BY DAVID SKILLING

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Which Way to Pivot? Between the argumentative and algorithmic spheres, there may be a hybrid sweet spot this century BY IRVIN STUDIN

paragon, but the least bad arrangement for governing man in the contemporaneous context of authoritarian empires, totalitarian regimes, and monarchies. The great strength of the argumentative states is the richness of the feedback mechanisms to power – including regular elections and a free, critical media. The potentially fatal mistakes of the algorithmic states may happen, incompetence oblige, but they will have certainly been flagged more than once by different sources of feedback. Moreover, transitions of power are more stable in such systems, as compared with the algorithmic systems (see Singapore’s succession challenge), where the narrative underpinning the legitimacy of a new ruling group must not only hold water generally, but specifically when the economic growth promised by the algorithmic elite reverses. The marginal value of individual citizen life also appears to be higher in the argumentative regime, as distinct from the algorithmic temptation to instrumentalize the individual life within the general plan. Of course, the key weakness of the argumentative state, exemplified by the wicked policy stasis in the US legislative branch, is ‘argument’ – that is, the risk of excessive process (and ideologized glorification of process) displacing substantial outcomes. Is there a hybrid governance model round the bend this century for the ‘voyeur’ states pivoting this way and that? What would it look like? Answer: it would take the best of the argumentative and algorithmic worlds, and guard against their conspicuous weaknesses. Former Soviet states like Russia and Ukraine (both still in search of a so-called ‘national idea’), Middle Eastern states like Turkey and post-civil war Syria, Southeast Asian states like Myanmar and Vietnam, African states like the DRC and Chad, and Latin American states like Colombia, would become more decentralized (or federal altogether), and invest in the education and long-term development of bona fide algorithmic (policy) elites. And they would foster the proliferation of feedback mechanisms and estates from the citizens to power to constantly correct and perfect their algorithms and plans. What is the lesson for established argumentative states like Canada, Germany and Italy? Answer: build up better algorithm-making capacity, including the ability to plan, nationally, long term – even in the context of electoral cycles and federal boundaries. As for China, the leading algorithmic state, it seems alive to the need to better consult and engage its population, although this awareness currently goes hand in hand with a reluctance by Beijing to ask questions for which it may not yet be ready to hear the answers. | GB

Irvin Studin is Editor-in-Chief and Publisher of Global Brief.

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or all those countries in the world – perhaps the majority of the world’s states – still trying to find their feet, what are their examples today? Which way should they ‘pivot’? And how far should they pivot – 75 percent? 50 percent? From the young states of the former Soviet space to most of the Middle East, much of Africa, and some of Asia and the Americas, there are well over 100 states in the world – from Turkey and Ukraine at the edges of the EU to the broken states of West Asia and the weak states of Africa – that are actively looking, often promiscuously, for ‘proven’ governance paradigms or models to borrow or import from abroad, or indeed to position themselves – strategically, psychologically or politically – within one of the world’s dominant governing traditions. What are the dominant governing idioms in the world today? There appear to only be two – argumentative states (essentially, Western democracies) and algorithmic states (see my Feature article in the Winter 2013 issue of GB). The algorithmic states are led by China and Singapore – highly centralized, soft-authoritarian, largely de-ideologized (so-called ‘pragmatic’) states with elite planning apparatus at the centre that deploy governing algorithms in various policy spheres, only for these algorithms to be generalized across the country, including through local authorities. The argumentative states are most of the established democracies of the EU, Canada and the US, as well as Australia and New Zealand – that is, states (increasingly, federations) where ‘process’ and constant contestation of political power are emphasized, and where ‘argument’ is often as important as ‘outcome.’ What is the strength of the algorithmic tradition? Results and rapidity, underpinned by a highly filtered governing class – one that, contra its short-termist argumentative analogues, is able to think and plan for the long term. (What is the name of the longterm plan for Canada? It does not exist.) What is the great weakness of the algorithmic tradition? Palace ignorance – to wit, the paucity of feedback mechanisms to power, from the opposition, from the media, and from lay citizens. Weak feedback mechanisms mean that even the smartest centralized algorithmmakers will, uncorrected, eventually make grave mistakes – overinvestment or underinvestment – that could put at risk the entire governing enterprise. As for the argumentative states, if it is still true, in this new century, that democracy is the worst system except for all of the others, then it must mean that there are things in matters democratic that can be improved. After all, for Churchill, democracy was not a

ONE PAGER

Turkish Foreign Policy After the Failed Coup

IN SITU

How relations with Washington and Brussels soured, and those with Moscow were resuscitated MITAT CELIKPALA & SINEM AKGUL ACIKMESE report from Ankara

O Mitat Celikpala is a Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University in Istanbul. Sinem Akgul Acikmese is an Associate Professor of International Relations at Kadir Has University

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in Istanbul.

n July 16th, the Turkish people woke up to a different country – one traumatized by the failed coup attempt the day before. It had only been weeks since commentators had begun to speak of a ‘normalization’ or ‘reset’ of Turkish foreign policy, following the resumption of bilateral ties with Israel (for the first time since the Mavi Marmara incident in May 2010) and Russia (President Erdogan had just sent a letter to President Putin, expressing regrets for the downing of the Russian jet in November 2015). Erdogan spoke of these changes in terms of a ‘win-win’ approach to Turkey’s relations with the world. Prime Minister Yildirim hinted at cautious policy shifts vis-à-vis Iraq, Syria and Egypt. And Foreign Minister Cavusoglu intimated a possible reconciliation with Armenia following his visit to Azerbaijan in July 2016. Just as Turkey was working to mend fences in its turbulent neighbourhood, putschist elements in the Turkish military attempted a violent coup against a democratically elected government. The Minister of the Interior reported that 238 people were killed and 2,797 injured during these events. The Turkish authorities have linked the botched coup to the Gulenist movement – classified by Ankara as a terrorist organization – led by Fethullah Gulen, who has been living in Pennsylvania since the late 1990s. An extensive purge began in the wake of the coup attempt, with 26,000 people placed in custody (according to the Minister of Justice). Those arrested also include military personnel (more than 9,000 soldiers and one-third of the generals and admirals of the Turkish Armed Forces), police officers, judges, prosecutors and governors. There is no question that the failed putsch has severely weakened the country’s military structures – a weakening that began predominantly with the Ergenekon and Balyoz cases investigating coup plots, and resulting in the conviction of hundreds of soldiers. As a consequence, the capacity of the Turkish army to fight against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and ISIS is now significantly diminished. The thwarted coup will have far-reaching strategic consequences for Turkey’s international relations – most notably with the US, the EU and Russia. First, the fact that the US requires clear evidence of Gulen’s involvement in response to Ankara’s formal demand for his extradition portends serious deterioration in the rela-

tionship with Washington. Some senior Turkish officials have accused the US of involvement in the planning of the coup, while Washington has criticized the possible expansion, post-coup, of Turkish state power. For his part, President Obama denied any US involvement in the coup and urged all parties to “support the democratically elected government of Turkey, show restraint, and avoid any violence or bloodshed.” Another indication of the post-coup deterioration in bilateral relations is Turkey’s use of the Incirlik air base – which is important to the US-led coalition’s fight against ISIS – as leverage against Washington. Of course, Ankara had already been at odds with Washington since the 2003 Iraq war, and more recently because of sharp strategic differences in respect of the Syrian theatre, where the US has allied with the PYD-Democratic Union Party and its military arm, the YPG-People’s Protection Units (linked to the PKK). Turkey’s relations with the EU are also newly strained over questions of fundamental values – complicated by the post-coup state of emergency in Turkey, the temporary suspension of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the possible return of the death penalty (outlawed in 2002). Of course, this new clash between Ankara and Brussels takes place against the backdrop of the major refugee deal struck in March of this year. To be sure, the relationship had long been in a stalemate, plagued by a loss of momentum in Turkey’s political reform process, the lack of genuine progress since 2005 in negotiations over EU membership (with only 16 of 35 chapters of the acquis communautaire having been opened to date) and, most importantly, by the growing lack of enthusiasm for the accession process from the political elites and the public in Turkey and in Europe. With the landmark refugee deal, it appeared as if Turkey had another chance to re-energize relations with the EU in the service of its membership objective. And yet the contradictory public discourses in EU member states in respect of Turkey – on the one hand, recognition of Turkey as a strategic partner, and on the other hand, reluctance to move ahead with the accession process (with anti-Turkish rhetoric peaking in the UK’s Brexit debate) – seem to suggest that Turkey-EU relations may only progress, in the foreseeable future, on the basis of a new organizing framework – one already implicitly in place. This framework, if formalized, would

PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / CEM TURKEL

visa restrictions. This productive period in bilateral relations was shattered by the downing of the Russian SU-24 by Turkey last November (although tensions had already been growing over the Crimean annexation and Syria). President Putin described the incident as a “stab in the back.” For their part, Turkish officials argued that the Russian jet’s violation of Turkish airspace, despite multiple warnings, violated Turkey’s airspace policy in respect of Syria. Russia quickly imposed sanctions against Turkey in trade, tourism and construction, and hardened its stance in Syria by increasing its military presence and supporting Kurdish elements against the rebels (Turkmen brigades and jihadist Arab groups) in order to secure the Assad regime. Bref, Russian engagement in Syria effectively shut Turkey out of the Syrian theatre. Turkey soon recognized the strategic and economic repercussions of such a confrontational policy with Russia.The new chapter in the Russo-Turkish relationship, formalized by the visit to Moscow by President Erdogan in August – a symbolic first visit abroad after the failed coup – is marked by re-established diplomatic channels and the restoration of economic and cultural ties. If both sides can now find common ground in the Middle East theatre – particularly in strategies against ISIS – then it will be indeed possible to talk about a genuine normalization of Russo-Turkish relations. What Turkey now requires, after the events of July, is constructive recognition from the world that the country needs solidarity with, and support for, its democracy as it recovers from what, for the Turkish state and the Turkish people, was a catastrophic shock. In order not to isolate Turkey from its transatlantic and Western connections – connections upon which Turkish foreign policy has been based since the creation of the Republic – it is high time for partners to go beyond prejudices and to establish candid ties with Turkey, recognizing the country’s strategic import in the fight against ISIS, in the refugee crisis, and as a NATO ally. Still, it is obvious that Turkey has entered a difficult period with the US and its European allies, and that new tensions might arise as Ankara’s requests for closures of Gulen-affiliated institutions around the world, as well as the extradition of hundreds of Gulenists who fled Turkey to several other countries, multiply. In this context, that Ankara should be pivoting back to its Eurasian connections – and especially toward Moscow – may not be that surprising after all. | GB

The capacity of the Turkish army to fight against the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and ISIS is now significantly diminished.

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be based on three pillars: bilateral trade (effectively conducted within the Customs Union framework since 1996), the migration deal of March 18th (which has succeeded to date in decreasing the number of illegal crossings from Turkey to Greece); and security issues, embedded mostly in the still-evolving NATOEU partnership, to which Turkey could contribute as an important NATO ally. Of course, this new model is imperfect from the outset, as visa liberalization for Turkish nationals travelling to the Schengen zone in return for readmission to Turkey of Syrian refugees is tied to Turkey’s revision of its anti-terrorism framework. The failed coup took place just as Turkey and the EU were in a standoff, with Ankara refusing to change its anti-terrorism framework, and Brussels resisting visa liberalization, thereby risking another cycle of migration flows to Europe. To be sure, it is not realistic to expect any near-term changes in Turkey’s anti-terrorism framework in the aftermath of a coup attempt that has been associated with terrorism. The Turkey-EU relationship is therefore now at a critical juncture. The EU’s valuesdriven conditionality must take into account Turkey’s basic imperatives under its state of emergency, which is not altogether dissimilar from the states of emergency declared very recently in France and Germany. Turkey, on the other hand, while fully respecting the procedural requirements of Article 15 of the European Convention on Human Rights in respect of derogation from the Convention, should refrain from official statements that would jeopardize its halfcentury long relationship with Europe. And critically, when stability is fully restored in Turkey, it will be high time for both sides to reconsider their finalité politique and to work decisively to this end, whatever it may be: full EU membership or, alternatively, strategic partnership without membership. Stuck between a rock and a hard place in its postcoup relations with the US and the EU, Turkey may need to pivot forcefully toward Russia, with which it has a bittersweet history. The last 15 years of RussoTurkish relations saw an anomalous rapprochement, with Ankara and Moscow both putting aside the contentious issues of Cyprus, the war in Georgia, the PKK and terrorism. Both countries prioritized a strategic partnership based on closer economic cooperation, energy interdependence, political exchanges through the High-Level Cooperation Council, and cultural exchanges facilitated by the lifting of the

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PHOTOGRAPH: COURTESY OF OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

On Managing Africa’s Giant GB breaks bread with the former leader of Africa’s largest country

TÊTE À TÊTE

Interview with WITH OLUSEGUN OBASANJO

GB: What do you see as the major policy challenges facing Nigeria over the next 10 or 15 years? OO: They will not be much different from what the challenges have been for Nigeria in the past – the unity of the country, the overall stability of the country, and the security of the country. The health of the economy, as always, will be critical to managing all of these challenges. We also want to see a continued deepening and widening of democracy in Nigeria – in cultural and institutional terms. The goal, over the next decade, is to progress politically to the point where everyone in the country will truly feel that he or she is a Nigerian, and that his or her interests can be taken care of, to his or her satisfaction, within the borders of Nigeria. These are challenges that the government and Nigerian society can definitely meet. GB: What are the key interests of Nigeria today and tomorrow? OO: First of all, Nigeria must be united across its territory. Second, Nigeria has obvious economic and social interests. How can Nigeria ensure that every Nigerian is adequately provided for – in terms of education, health and employment? We want Nigerian businesses that produce locally to get the right price for their products within Africa and also in the world. Then, of course, in the international arena, we want Nigeria to occupy an appropriate place in the division of economic labour – in our West African sub-region, in Africa more generally, and in the world at large. GB: How unified is Nigeria, as a federation, today?

Olusegun Obasanjo was President of Nigeria between 1999 and 2007.

GB: How are relations between Muslims and Christians in Nigeria today? OO: That has not really been a great problem of late. The issue is mainly economic – not social or religious. When economic troubles arise, these dynamics are linked and confused, but it is the economics that is the driver. People are, in economic terms, always looking for hope. Who is taking more? Who is taking what you have? Take, for instance, the issue of nomadic cattle rearers or herders (Fulanis)

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OO: I would say that we are substantially unified, although there are evidently several hotspots in different parts of the country. Of course, there is no country – particularly no big, highly complex country – that can talk of absolute unity across its territory. Is the UK unified today (see the Query article by Hubert Védrine at p. 42, and also Strategic Futures at p. 62)? National unity in Nigeria has to be massaged and managed constantly. Nigeria’s unity must not be taken for granted through passivity, nor should different regions and groups of Nigerians be manipulated against each other – potentially at

great expense to national unity. We are, of course, quite recently united after a civil war. At some point, some people in some regions will feel that they want more out of the national cake. That will not unduly worry me. It is what we are asking for. Instead, what would worry me is if Nigerians said that no matter how big or small the total cake is, they simply do not want the cake at all. Yes, that would worry me. So let me repeat that we are united, although there are people who feel that they give out more than others, and people who want more out of the national cake. These people feel that if they agitate or struggle for this, then there should be mechanisms through which their agitation can be attended to. And my view is that if they have been adequately treated, then their agitation should be laid to rest. But the fact that we have been virtually one country since independence – for almost 60 years – is a huge success. We should not underplay that. We went through a civil war. I remember when people said at the time that Nigeria would not last much longer. And when I became president in 1999, some people – both Nigerians and non-Nigerians – said that I would be the last president of Nigeria. Not only did I complete my two terms of eight years, but there have been three presidents elected after me. That is significant. Between 1999 and today, we have had the longest period of democratic transition, and democratization more generally, since independence. Again, these are significant things. We were almost bankrupt. We paid our debt, and eventually we cleared our debt. We have not done too badly on that front. Our wish now is for Nigeria to maintain a high standard of accountability and a certain stability and potency in managing its economic affairs. Of course, we hope that we are learning from our past mistakes and not repeating them.

and crop farmers in many parts of Nigeria. This is a purely economic issue. Most of the country is Muslim, while most of the native crop farmers are Christian. So when the nomadic cattle move across the farmlands of so-called native crop farmers and there is destruction of their crop farm, then this is evidently an economic event. Then, all of a sudden, the crop farmer becomes essentially Christian and the cattle herder essentially Muslim – that is, the two are now in conflict and compete. Actually, the underlying factor is economic, and perhaps social also. I would not say that these conflicts are universal in Nigeria, but there are certainly conflicts, and there is dissatisfaction, in economic and social terms. Governments, for their part, can help to solve these issues, but they can also exacerbate them if the underlying problems are misdiagnosed, improperly treated or altogether ignored.

We are quite recently united after a civil war. At some point, some people in some regions will feel that they want more out of the national cake. That will not unduly worry me.

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GB: What is the current situation with Boko Haram?

OO: The national government is now running the military, instead of the other way around. That is a crucial achievement for Nigerian democracy. The handling of the question of national security in respect of Boko Haram is certainly better under the present government than under the administration before it. What is the genesis of Boko Haram? We can see that in the northeast of the country, there is clearly a lack of adequate development compared with other parts of the country. In the southwest and southeast, the level of education (primary, secondary or post-secondary) is almost 90 percent. In the northeast, where Boko Haram is rooted, it is less than 50 percent. Obviously, that is not good. This is not good for the unity of the country or for national stability and security. So when the present administration is able to finally put down Boko Haram, it will have to face the social and economic development of the region head-on. That cannot be swept under the carpet. GB: How significant has the hit to the national budget or national economy been from the drop in oil prices over the last couple of years?

OO: Of course, it has affected us badly. The low price of oil and the low price of other commodities – especially given drops in demand for commodities from China and India – have affected not only Nigeria, but indeed Africa as a whole. Some 10 years ago, we planned, established and built up a very handsome reserve as the price of oil was going up. We maintained that reserve from about 2008 until about three years ago, as the price started going down. We built up the reserve such that when a rainy day would come, we would be comfortable. GB: What are the strategic or economic prospects for the West African region over the next 10 to 15 years? OO: I would expect that West Africa will become more successful and more dynamic in economic terms – particularly if we succeed in regional economic integration, including having a common currency, having stability in the various national economies, and having a harmonized fiscal policy. I really do see a West African common currency. I see more integration. Goods produced in one part of West Africa should be consumed easily and seamlessly in other parts of the region. More integration generally will lead to more regional harmony and better security and stability. GB: Does Nigeria enjoy good relations with all West African countries? OO: Nigeria is mindful of each of its neighbours. I believe that we have very good relationships with all West African countries. Most of our brothers and sisters in West Africa – not all of them – have trusted Nigeria as the leader of West Africa. I think that is clearly a good thing. We are a brother to all in a massive region, and we have played a significant leadership role in maintaining security and stability. We have helped other countries when they have been in need. More generally, Nigeria has made significant inroads in international affairs since independence. I myself was part of the first contingent force – a UN peacekeeping force – sent to the Democratic Republic of Congo. (I continue my work for peace in the DRC to this day.) So we have played a very significant role in Central Africa, but also, naturally, in West Africa (our own region) and indeed in Africa generally. GB: What is Nigeria’s most important bilateral relationship in West Africa? OO: I believe that all of the countries in West Africa are important for Nigeria. I personally have never regarded any country in Africa as unimportant.

We Nigerians have committed ourselves to a very important role in maintaining security throughout West Africa. We did it in Liberia, we did it in Sierra Leone, we did it in Mali, and also in Guinea-Bissau. We have been the peacekeeper – as it were – of West Africa, in spite of our own needs.

These goals are achievable. We need the rest of the world to give Africa the attention that Africa needs and deserves. This applies to the international economic division of labour, strategic and political decision-making, and, of course, the division of resources. In all of these, we need to ensure that Africa is given adequate attention.

GB: How do you see the future of the African continent, from the Nigerian perspective, over the next 10 or 15 years?

GB: How is the African Union doing in terms of its performance on the continent?

OO: The continent of Africa is generally strong. When the financial and economic crisis broke in America in 2007-2008, Africa held up generally well. Even now, we are holding up well – Nigeria included, for the reasons already mentioned. The economic reality in Africa will continue to improve. Politically, too, we have great capabilities and great potential. Democracy – or at least significant tendencies to democratization – is a reality in much of Africa. We still have longstanding presidents in several countries, but these are the exceptions rather than the rule. These exceptions are in the single digits. We have few interstate conflicts – take, for example, the conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea – but still have intrastate conflicts, which are caused principally by inadequate attention paid to socioeconomic development. I see a bright future for Africa. There is a lot that we have to do to ensure security, stability, cooperation, cohesion and unity in each of our countries.

OO: The African Union is there to stay. Of course, as with many big organizations – and international organizations in particular – things can be better. The next stage of African Union activities should prioritize economic integration – continentally and, short of that, regionally. There is also the growing issue of the new great tides of migration through and out of Africa, fuelled by instability in the Middle East (see the Query article by Sam Sasan Shoamanesh at p. 34), North Africa and other parts of Africa. Young Africans are naturally looking for economic opportunity and jobs outside Africa – in Europe and elsewhere. Economics, as I mentioned, dictates a great deal, and these young Africans believe – rightly or wrongly – that they can strike it rich in other parts of the world. Progress in Africa has certainly been slower than one would have wished, but there is almost no disagreement or confusion about the end goals or how they are to be attained. | GB

We still have longstanding presidents in several countries, but these are the exceptions rather than the rule. We have few interstate conflicts, but still have intrastate conflicts, caused by inadequate attention to socioeconomic development.

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GB sits pretty in leading stores on five continents.

Bilahari Kausikan is the former Permanent

In Southeast Asia, US-China geopolitical competition is playing out amid growing internal changes for key ASEAN states

Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of

BY BILAHARI KAUSIKAN

Singapore. He is now Ambassador-at-Large.

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STRATEGY, POWER & CHANGE IN SOUTHEASTASIA

he US and China are groping toward a new modus vivendi with each other and other countries in East Asia. Neither finds it easy. Neither really knows what exactly it wants from the other, or indeed what it must concede to the other. Southeast Asia, where the South China Sea (SCS) has become something of a proxy for these geopolitical adjustments, finds itself uncomfortably at the centre of the process. Washington and Beijing are not looking for trouble. War by design is highly improbable. Despite their bluster, China’s leaders know that war with the US would place the most vital interest of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) – its hold on power – in grave jeopardy. China is not reckless. President Xi Jinping is a ‘princeling.’ The CCP is his patrimony, and he will not gamble with it. But rivalry is intrinsic to any major power relationship, and neither Beijing nor Washington will forswear the pursuit of its interests. The CCP today confronts fundamental questions about itself. The next phase of national reforms must square the circle: give the market a larger role in crucial areas of the Chinese economy to maintain competitiveness, while preserving central political control by the Party. Can it be done? No one really knows. Social and labour unrest are endemic at the local level across China. The national anti-corruption campaign has already unsettled CCP cadres in every sector – the People’s Liberation Army, the security services, state-owned enterprises and, among others, the energy sector.

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ILLUSTRATION: LISA HANEY

But we should not assume failure. Unlike the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union, the CCP has proven to be an extremely adaptable creature. It is, for all practical intents and purposes, the latest and most successful iteration of a series of Chinese political experiments in search of wealth and power to resist Western predations dating from the late Qing dynasty. The CCP defines its role as leading the ‘Great Rejuvenation’ of the Chinese nation after a century of weakness and humiliation. And yet the outcome of this second phase of Chinese reforms (the first phase of market reforms and China’s opening to the world having

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The SCS is the theatre where the CCP can put, without undue risk, some credible shreds of meat on the bare bones of the historical narrative by which it justifies its right to rule.

been launched by Deng Xiaoping), even if completely successful, will be slower growth, as the CCP has itself acknowledged. The ‘Great Rejuvenation’ must therefore be as much, if not more, outwardly as inwardly directed. For a hundred years, the legitimacy of all Chinese governments has been measured by their ability to defend China’s borders and sovereignty. In the SCS, then, the ‘Great Rejuvenation’ is increasingly a revanchist narrative. Beijing insists that areas disputed by others have been Chinese territory since ‘ancient times.’ The SCS is the theatre where the CCP can put, without undue risk, some credible shreds of meat on the bare bones of the historical narrative by which it justifies its right to rule. The US, for its part, defines its interests in the SCS in terms of upholding international law and freedom of navigation. These are important interests, but not of the same order as the CCP’s primary existential interest – to wit, the legitimacy and ultimately the survival of the CCP. Washington has made it clear that the US-Japan alliance covers the Senkaku Islands. It has been ambiguous about the US-Philippines alliance, and hence in effect has made clear that the alliance does not cover the disputed areas in the SCS. The US going to war

in support of its principal East Asian ally, Japan, is credible, if unlikely. The US going to war over rocks, shoals and reefs in the SCS would be absurd. Given the asymmetry of interests, it is doubtful that the US can stop China from continuing its reclamation activities in the SCS, and deploying military assets on the artificial islands that it is creating. But it is doubtful, too, that China can deter the US from operating in the SCS. For to deny access must evoke an American response. The CCP would then face a Hobson’s choice: escalate and risk war or at least serious conflict, which would surely jeopardize CCP rule; or respond weakly, which would expose the hollowness of the ‘Great Rejuvenation,’ thereby shaking national confidence in CCP rule. Beijing will not willingly place itself in such an invidious position. China’s strong rhetoric masks this dilemma. Beijing has carefully kept each action in the SCS below a threshold that must impel a response from even the most reluctant of US administrations. Miscalculations are, to be sure, always possible. If an accident occurs, then the highly nationalistic public opinion that the CCP both cultivates and fears could lead Beijing down a path that it does not wish to travel. Still, the probability of accidents can be minimized. China of late seems to have adopted a more positive attitude toward rules of engagement for unplanned encounters at sea. If we look past the chest-thumping by both sides, the probability of USChina competition in the SCS becoming ritualized is strong. The SCS is already as much a mind game to influence ASEAN as it is a traditional geopolitical contest. As US-China competition settles into a pattern of patrol and protest, Washington must pay more attention to this aspect of the issue.

here is a school of thought that believes that concern about China’s increasingly assertive behaviour will make ASEAN naturally gravitate toward the US. This is true only to a degree. There are new diplomatic opportunities for Washington in Southeast Asia. But small countries fated by geography to live amid great powers do not regard balancing, hedging and bandwagoning as mutually exclusive alternatives. Instead, they see nothing contradictory in pursuing all three courses of action simultaneously. To this end, a senior Vietnamese official once told me that every Vietnamese leader must be able to stand up to China and at once get along with it, and if anyone thought that it was not possible to do both at the same time, he did not deserve to be a leader. To various degrees, this is true of all Southeast Asian countries.

during the Cold War. Instead, it seeks an omnidirectional state of equilibrium that will allow member states to maintain good relationships with all of the major powers of the region in order to avoid being forced or boxed into poor choices. This requires a balance of influence as well as a balance of military power. These balances are related, but not identical. The US is still predominant in ships and aircraft and other military assets, and will likely remain so for some time. Yet the balance of influence, which is a psychological phenomenon or frame of mind, is less stable in Southeast Asia. The US naval presence in the SCS is a vital but insufficient condition to maintain psychological equilibrium. Internal developments within ASEAN are just as crucial an influence on this frame of mind. Bref, what happens on land is as important as what happens at sea. China’s growing economic ties with Southeast Asia and the infrastructure projects planned or already underway – all now subsumed under Xi Jinping’s concept of ‘One Belt, One Road,’ an ambitious vision of a Sinocentric Eurasian order – are binding southwest China and

The metaphor of the American ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance,’ by contrast, connotes discontinuity. That which ‘pivots’ or ‘rebalances’ one way could well swing another way.

Southeast Asia into one economic space. It would be foolish for ASEAN countries to forswear the economic opportunities. However, the integration of Southeast Asia into China’s economic framework must also change how at least some members of ASEAN calculate their interests vis-à-vis China and the US. This is particularly so on mainland Southeast Asia. The dams that China is constructing in the upper reaches of the Mekong River are a new geopolitical reality – analogous to the artificial islands in the SCS – that the five ASEAN countries through which the Mekong runs (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) cannot ignore. Earlier this year, China released more water from its dams when Thailand, Laos and Cambodia were hit by a severe drought. (An old Chinese proverb runs: When

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The US is a welcome presence in Southeast Asia. It was the stability that the US provided that became the foundation of the region’s prosperity. But the American porridge is always going to be too hot or too cold. It is difficult to get the temperature just right to suit the tastes of all countries in a diverse region. Some ASEAN members will fear abandonment, while others fear entanglement. This is one of the burdens of being a global power and offshore balancer. And yet the US has added to its own burdens. The American intervention in Iraq left that country broken. During the Arab Spring, within a mere week, Washington switched from treating Hosni Mubarak as a valued 30-year ally to unceremoniously dumping him. In Southeast Asia, this evoked echoes of how the US had treated Indonesia’s Suharto, another 30-year friend. Washington drew a ‘red line’ in Syria, which quickly faded away as the Obama administration desperately grabbed at the threadbare line thrown to it by Russia. (No one today really believes that a stable political settlement is possible in Syria.) And all of this happened at a time when China was constantly reminding ASEAN in ways subtle and not that the Middle Kingdom was a geographical fact, whereas the American presence in Southeast Asia was only a geopolitical calculation by Washington. In other words, geography does not change, but geopolitical calculations can be revised. The artificial islands that China is building in the SCS may well be of limited military utility. However, they serve an important domestic political purpose for the CCP, and additionally drive home to ASEAN members China’s inescapable contiguity with Southeast Asia. The metaphor of the American ‘pivot’ or ‘rebalance,’ by contrast, connotes discontinuity. That which ‘pivots’ or ‘rebalances’ one way could well swing another way. Washington’s emphasis should have been on the essential continuity of US policy in East Asia over the last 30 or more years. Of course, American politics forces each new administration to stress policy differences with its predecessors even when there are none. But not everyone in Southeast Asia understands the eccentricities of the US system, and this reinforces doubts about American consistency. ASEAN’s basic and enduring purpose is to maintain a modicum of order and civility in relations among its members in a region where these are not to be taken for granted. On this score, ASEAN has not done badly over the last half century. Nevertheless, the organization is divided on the SCS, and will remain so, even if it occasionally comes up with useful statements on this theatre. Evidently, these statements do not change realities on the ground. The US is an irreplaceable element of the regional balance. But the ‘balance’ that ASEAN seeks is not directed against one major power or another, as

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Modern Southeast Asian history can be understood as a continuing struggle for autonomy by the small states of the region in the context of major power competition. This is a powerful motivation that should not be underestimated.

drinking water, remember the source.) This, then, is the geopolitical significance of the new ASEAN Economic Community (AEC), launched in 2015. Modest though its goals may be, it provides something of a balance to the Chinese strategic framework. Without an integration project of its own to widen the options available to its member states, some countries in ASEAN could slip into a fatalistic frame of mind that sees no alternative to China. ASEAN did reasonably well in the first phase of economic integration that started in 2003 and ended in December 2015. How will it do in the next phase? It is too early to tell. Economic integration is always politically painful. ASEAN has dealt with the easy issues, such as lowering tariffs. Some degree of buyer’s remorse at the present level of commitment to the AEC is already visible in all ASEAN members, with the exception of Singapore. Consensus on the more complicated issues that will have to be confronted in the next phase will be more difficult to reach. Some ASEAN members, particularly in mainland Southeast Asia, could well be tempted by Chinese largesse as a politically easier alternative, while paying lip service to the AEC. Even if this does not occur, the political changes underway in several key ASEAN members pose serious complications for moving integration forward. Middle Eastern Islam is exerting a profound influence on Southeast Asia. The texture of the Muslim-majority societies in Malaysia, Brunei and Indonesia is changing as the traditional syncretic and tolerant Islam of the region is being replaced by harsher and more exclusive variants and sectarian tensions. Bref, the Arabization of Islam in Southeast Asia inevitably changes the domestic politics of the affected countries. The effects are most pronounced in Malaysia, where the political space for non-Muslims has significantly narrowed and continues to shrink. The ruling coalition in Kuala Lumpur has lost the support of the majority of Malaysian Chinese, and is unlikely to win it back. Malaysia essentially now has a Malay government and a non-Malay opposition, with a few ornaments of other races on each side, and with race relations increasingly fraught. All of this conspires to make for a potentially explosive situation in Malaysia. The ruling Malay party, UMNO, and the Islamist party, PAS, may well form some sort of political compact that could accelerate the marginalization of non-Muslims. Prime Minister Najib Razak is in no imminent danger of losing power. But he cannot hold office forever. To maintain his hold on UMNO, Najib has had to tolerate a steady move by UMNO’s core supporters to the right, with more economic and other privileges for Malays and a narrower interpretation of Islam. Political effects aside, this has made jihad-

ism attractive to some Malaysian Muslims, just as it has increased protectionist pressures. Najib has nevertheless managed to preserve some space for non-Muslims, has been hard on terrorism, is friendly toward the US, and supports the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). But how Najib’s successor will deal with the political complexities that he will inherit is not yet known to anyone.

n Indonesia, the Islamization of the Muslim population is diffuse and patchy, and less obvious because of the country’s size. The leaderships of the main Muslim organizations are still moderate. But Indonesia is not just a geographical place: it is an idea. Since independence, the idea of Indonesia has been contested between adherents of a secularnationalist Indonesia and those in favour of a more Islam-inspired country. This debate was suppressed by force in favour of nationalism by Indonesia’s first two presidents. Suharto’s fall reopened the debate, and that debate cannot be suppressed again. It will colour Indonesian politics for a long time to come. Indonesia has not yet reached a stable postSuharto equilibrium, and is unlikely to reach one anytime soon. It will not fall apart, but will instead stumble along suboptimally as an incoherent, rent-seeking polity, susceptible to external influences – including that of ISIS, which inspired a terrorist attack in Jakarta in January of this year. Muslim groups have sporadically launched attacks against Christians and other Muslims whom they consider deviant. Politics is increasingly infused by a shrill and petulant nationalism characterized by a strong sense of entitlement and prone to externalizing Indonesia’s own failings. President Jokowi is not personally hostile to the US, and the Indonesian elite is not generally anti-Western. But he is arguably a weak president who leads no major political party, and thus has been unable to pursue consistent policies. Given Indonesia’s fragmented politics, his successor is unlikely to be significantly stronger. No elite can indefinitely remain aloof from its base. Thailand, for its part, has been mired in political conflict ever since former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra was toppled by a coup in 2006. No resolution is in sight. The country’s relationship with the US is uneasy. Despite his wealth, Thaksin was not a member of the traditional Thai elite, and so to create a political base he enfranchised and mobilized the hitherto politically passive rural poor – particularly in his native northeast. The traditional Thai elite based in Bangkok resented and feared this, and therefore moved against him. What the Thai elite essentially wants is impossible: to return to the pre-Thaksin status quo and the old social compact in which the rural poor subordinated

themselves to the monarchy and let the elite run the country. Those enfranchised by Thaksin will not meekly accept being disenfranchised again. However, the elite is unwilling to confront this fundamental reality. The elite evoked the King’s name to remove Thaksin, but the basic electoral arithmetic is against them. The poor in northeastern Thailand will always outnumber the rich in Bangkok. They can be cowed by superior force, but unless the elite is willing to give them a real political role, they will always outvote the elite, whenever given a chance. Thaksin’s proxy parties have won all of the elections since 2006, with the elite having to resort to street demonstrations, judicial manoeuvres, and finally, in 2014, another coup to keep them out of power. The current coup has only frozen the conflict. It is unlikely that a new constitution or a new civilian government will resolve the underlying conflict. (Since 1932, Thailand has had 17 constitutions or charters.) In any case, the military does not seem to be in a hurry to give up power. Nor will royal succession help. A new king will not be able to do more than keep the conflict frozen. He will not be able to re-establish the old social compact, and will not likely be able or willing to create a new compact that provides for a genuine political role for the rural poor.

President Jokowi is not personally hostile to the US, and the Indonesian elite is not generally anti-Western. But he is arguably a weak president who leads no major political party, and thus has been unable to pursue consistent policies. order to create the context within which they may continue their quest for autonomy. In Southeast Asia, as in East Asia as a whole, economics and trade is strategy. In particular, the US and its allies should pursue a more ambitious and coordinated economic strategy as a supplement to the current overreliance on military instruments. Such an approach must include ratification of the TPP as soon as possible, and a bolder approach to infrastructure investment. The US could form consortia with allies like Japan, South Korea and Australia to undertake infrastructure and other projects that may not be commercially viable for individual companies. This will require some form of investment guarantees from Washington and other capitals. There is no reason to exclude China from such consortia. Indeed, the US and China working together would go a long way to reassure Southeast Asia. It was, on this logic, a strategic mistake for the US and Japan to have stayed out of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Fortunately, it is not an irreversible mistake. | GB

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yanmar and the Philippines have new governments. Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy has no experience of governance, and it is not clear that it has reached a stable accommodation with the Burmese military. Aung San Suu Kyi has so far behaved imperiously – more like a Burmese queen than an elected leader – and has not displayed much interest in policy. She has not given any indication of which economic or foreign policies her government would pursue, except in broad generalities. It is anybody’s guess what the new policy agenda of Rodrigo Duterte, the new Philippine President, will be, or even whether he has a defined policy agenda, as his statements to date have been inconsistent or vague. The governments of Singapore, Brunei, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, for their part, are stable, although political change in the last of these could be sudden and disruptive if Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen should go the way that all flesh eventually must. Still, these countries will not by themselves be able to move the AEC decisively forward. In general, the US cannot influence internal developments in ASEAN member states. Any attempt to do so would only further complicate already complicated situations, and would in all probability

only redound to US disadvantage in the ongoing competition for influence with China. Beijing, for its part, has been more successful than Washington in its natural attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of various ASEAN states – even if there has been some pushback. First, China is geographically contiguous to the region, and so cannot be ignored. Second, China generally comes with gifts, including infrastructure projects and generous aid. Modern Southeast Asian history can be understood as a continuing struggle for autonomy by the small states of the region in the context of major power competition. This is a powerful motivation that should not be underestimated. The states of Southeast Asia have a record of internal resilience, and while the immediate prognosis – that of growing Chinese influence – is not one that may inspire great confidence among regional states, they should not be written off as inevitably ‘lost’ to China. The US must stay engaged – on land as well as at sea – in

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CANADA & RUSSIA TOWARD AN ARCTIC AGENDA P. Whitney Lackenbauer is

n July 26th of this year, in Laos, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Stéphane Dion sat down for his first formal meeting with Russian counterpart, Sergey Lavrov. It may prove to be a watershed moment in bilateral relations. After the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Canada’s previous Conservative government, led by Stephen Harper, had adamantly refused to talk with anyone from the Kremlin until Russia left the peninsula. Although Canada’s new Liberal government continues to denounce Russian military involvement in Ukraine and Syria, it has indicated its desire to renew a dialogue on potential cooperation in “areas critical to our national interests,” such as space, counter-terrorism and the Arctic. The Arctic is a natural area of focus for the two countries. Canada and Russia are the geographical giants, spanning most of the Northern circumpolar world. The region plays strongly into both countries’ identity politics, with leaders often invoking sovereignty and security frames to drum up support for investments in this frontier of destiny. The purported need to protect sovereign territory and resources from foreign encroachment or outright theft, backed by explicit appeals to nationalism, produces a siege mentality that encourages a narrow, inward-looking posture. Although the end of the Cold War seemed to portend a new era of deep cooperation between these two Arctic powers, lingering wariness about WHITNEY LACKENBAUER geopolitical motives and a mutual lack of knowledge about the other’s slice of the circumpolar world are conspiring to pit Canada and the Russian Federation as Arctic adversaries. While these Arctic neighbours will continue to find themselves on different sides in an era of renewed great power rivalry, this general state of competition does not portend Arctic conflict. Instead, the circumpolar world provides room for substantive cooperation and collaboration in areas of common interest, as long as there is political will to avoid holding circumpolar cooperation hostage to broader geostrategic rivalry (see the Query article by Alexander Sergunin and Valery Konyshev in the Fall/Winter 2016 issue of GB). The key audience for confrontational rhetoric on Arctic issues in both countries is domestic. In official policy and statements, however, the Russian and Canadian governments follow a pragmatic line and pursue their maritime and continental shelf claims

Professor of History and Co-Director of the Centre on Foreign Policy and Federalism at St. Jerome’s University, Waterloo.

Why tensions between the two Arctic giants should not interfere with common gain and collaboration in the High North BY P.

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A popular ‘race for resources’ narrative has fed anxieties about the potential for interstate conflict, fuelled by imaginary resource disputes and sovereignty challenges. These ideas weigh heavily upon Russian and Canadian minds.

in the region in compliance with international law – while highlighting that, as sovereign states, they will not be pushed around by neighbours that might encroach on their respective jurisdictions. This serves as a convenient pretext to invest in more robust military capabilities to protect territory, natural resources, and national interests. The precise nature of the threats to each country’s Arctic realm remains ambiguous, however, with alarmist narratives regularly conflating regional dynamics with grand strategic considerations. Bref, growing great power competition between Russia and the West does not arise from Arctic issues or probable conflicts. The myth of Arctic resource or boundary wars is pure fantasy, conjured by political and media commentators seeking simple, sensational frames to grab public attention. Accordingly, the long-term goal of a stable and secure circumpolar world, where each Arctic littoral state enjoys its sovereign rights, must not be lost in hyperbolic rhetoric geared toward domestic audiences for shortterm political gain. Unfortunately, a deep history of mistrust means that Cold War narratives are easily resurrected whenever either side declares its right to assert sovereignty, and rattles its sabres to show resolve. As newspaper editor Robert Keyserlingk told the Empire Club of Canada in 1949, “We have actually stretching across the Arctic a veritable ice curtain, which is impenetrable.” Polar projection maps unfurled after WW2, which showed Canada sandwiched between rival superpowers, made the circumpolar neighbourhood a cause for concern. Deep ideological divisions and strategic realities dictated that prospects for Russo-Canadian collaboration in the Arctic would remain frozen for decades. Scientific cooperation, however, began to draw open the ice curtain separating the two countries beginning in the mid-1960s. Reciprocal political visits showed that the high politics of the Cold War need not freeze out other forms of collaboration, such as research (including in the social sciences and issues concerning northern indigenous peoples) covered by the 1984 Canada-USSR Arctic Science Exchange Program. Mikhail Gorbachev’s landmark Murmansk speech in October 1987 called for the Arctic to become a “zone of peace,” opening new opportunities for political, economic and environmental agendas previously subordinated to national security interests. Inspired by this vision, Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney proposed an international Arctic Council that would draw Russia into the new world order. Bilateral relations began to thaw. In 1992, Mulroney and Yeltsin issued a Declaration of Friendship and Cooperation, then a formal Arctic Cooperation Agreement.

Canada, in particular, embraced broader interpretations of security with environmental, cultural and human dimensions, promoting a vision of circumpolar stewardship, stable governance and human capacity-building. At the turn of the new millennium, “The Northern Dimension of Canada’s Foreign Policy” – a major foreign policy statement – set four objectives for Canadian circumpolar engagement: to enhance the security and prosperity of Canadians, especially northerners and Aboriginal peoples; to assert and ensure the preservation of Canada’s sovereignty in the North; to establish the circumpolar region as a vibrant geopolitical entity integrated into a rules-based international system; and to promote the human security of Northerners and the sustainable development of the Arctic. Traditional security threats were notably absent, and working with Russia to address northern challenges, such as cleaning up Cold War environmental legacies and funding Russian indigenous peoples’ participation in the Arctic Council, formed a core priority. “Perhaps more than any other country,” the document declared, “Canada is uniquely positioned to build a strategic partnership with Russia for development of the Arctic.”

evelopments over the last decade have both reinforced and challenged this polar partnership. The acute impacts of global warming in the Arctic, dreams of increasingly navigable sea routes, boosterism surrounding oil and gas deposits in the offshore, uncertain boundaries, and heightened interest from non-Arctic states have thrust the region into the international spotlight. A popular ‘race for resources’ narrative has fed anxieties about the potential for interstate conflict, fuelled by imaginary resource disputes and sovereignty challenges. These ideas weigh heavily upon Russian and Canadian minds. With a Russian economy heavily dependent upon oil and gas, it comes as no surprise that senior officials in Moscow should emphasize that “the Arctic must become the basic strategic resource base of Russia.” Canadian politicians harbour similar visions when they declare their country an emerging “Arctic power,” trumpeting “the immense promise of the North,” as Harper did in committing to “unleash the tremendous potential of this region” and its “vast natural resources – to create jobs and prosperity for the benefit of Northerners and all Canadians.” With so much at stake, symbolism can easily be mistaken for substance. In the West, Artur Chilingarov’s flag planting exploit at the North Pole in August

tainty and distrust, and misrepresenting the Arctic as a highly contested space, we tend to overlook the positive patterns and norms of behaviour, and also the strong cooperative frameworks that guide regional relationships. Last October, Justin Trudeau’s Liberals swept into power in Canada. While the main substantive elements of Canada’s Arctic policy are likely to remain intact and will continue to focus on domestic issues, the political tone and emphasis have changed. Building on Trudeau’s promise that Canada would have a more “compassionate and constructive voice in the world” after a decade of Conservative rule, Stéphane Dion has called for renewed engagement with Russia, despite Canada’s ongoing displeasure with Russian foreign and defence policy. While the Harper Conservatives had suspended almost all bilateral contact with Russia after the Crimean annexation, Dion stressed that this position deviated from the less extreme actions of the US and other G7 partners. “We also need to think about our national interests because Russia is our neighbour in the Arctic,” Dion explained. This revised stance provoked debate among Canadian commentators, some of whom worried that it would send the wrong signals to an increasingly assertive and unpredictable President Putin. But deterrence and more open dialogue are not incompatible strategies, and Canada’s intention to resume cooperation with Russia in areas of common ground is an eminently sensible one. To do so, both countries should send clear messages that their military investments in the Arctic are defensive in nature, that they do not anticipate conventional military threats to their territorial integrity in the region, and that they will strive to insulate relationships on Arctic issues from geopolitical tensions elsewhere. Canada’s announcement in July 2016 that it will lead a 1,000-strong NATO battle group in Latvia to deter Russia from aggression in the Baltics does not contradict this logic. In fact, it legitimates the idea that Canada can show resolve against Russian aggression in one theatre, while seeking to ‘reset’ the bilateral relationship on issues of common interest in another theatre. To facilitate constructive circumpolar dialogue, both countries should strive to reinforce the Arctic Council as the primary high-level international forum for dialogue on Arctic issues. To ensure that it does not become another stage for geopolitical grandstanding, however, both countries should firmly resist calls to expand the Council’s mandate to include military security issues. Similarly, calls for NATO to adopt an explicit Arctic agenda or to include Sweden and Finland as members are sure to inflame Russian sensitivities about Western encirclement.

Canadians and Russians still lack deep knowledge of one another as Arctic actors. Addressing this unfamiliarity is foundational to any constructive engagement. The Arctic theatre offers a stage for these Arctic citizens to become better acquainted with one another.

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2007 and Russia’s announcements of reinvestments in military capabilities to defend its Arctic interests aligned with a burgeoning awareness of a resurgent Russian nationalism. The resumption of long-range bomber patrols, coupled with the announcement of new fleet units, airfields and special Arctic brigades protected by S-400 missile systems, pointed to a renewed ‘militarization’ of the region. On the other side of the pole, the Harper government also proclaimed a ‘use it or lose it’ strategy framed by aggressive rhetoric predicated on potential sovereignty threats and the need to protect Arctic resources. Was a new Arctic Cold War emerging, with Russia and Canada as the main protagonists? Hardly. While the possibility of Arctic conflict attracts media attention, the dominant international messaging from both countries since 2008 has stressed cooperation. The existing governance framework in the region is robust and compatible with state sovereignty, the Arctic Council remains the premier international forum for dialogue on regional issues and for scientific collaboration, and the Arctic states consistently reiterate and demonstrate a common commitment to international law in the region. Even the most obvious potential friction points, such as competing claims to extended continental shelves up to the North Pole, are much more exciting in theory than in legal and political reality. Misconceptions abound. The outer limits of the Canadian and Russian extended continental shelves in the Arctic Ocean are sure to overlap on the basis of scientific evidence, but they will be defined through diplomacy. There is no defence component to this issue, and relative capabilities to assert control over resources have no bearing on the outcome. In fact, both Russia and Canada stand to gain the most if the delineation process unfolds in conformity with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). And it will. Just as overenthusiastic commentators prematurely forecast an Arctic resource rush and the imminent opening of new Arctic transit routes, so too have many prematurely heralded the end of the cooperative, post-Cold War Arctic regime. The governance and legal structures in place – both international and regional – remain very much intact, from the Arctic Council to UNCLOS and myriad bilateral agreements between Arctic states. Recent achievements like the mandatory Polar Code through the International Maritime Organization, the Arctic search and rescue agreement, measures to address oil pollution, as well as the creation of new institutional mechanisms (e.g. the Arctic Coast Guard Forum), point not to an unravelling of regional cooperation but to its quiet persistence and entrenchment. By fixating on potential conflict, highlighting uncer-

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The evolving Arctic security environment is too readily conflated with grand strategic issues – such as RussiaNATO relations, the rise of China, global energy security, and global climate change mitigation – that are best assessed through a global rather than a regional lens.

Provoking the bear by prodding its known insecurities will only encourage it to bite. Fortunately, Russia has, in strategic terms, few good reasons – and deep economic and political disincentives – to lash out at its neighbours militarily in the Arctic theatre. First and foremost, the ‘resource rush’ anticipated a decade ago now appears overblown. The global collapse of oil and gas prices, coupled with increasing supply, has rendered most Arctic resources grossly uneconomical, with dramatic impacts on the near- to medium-term future of the Arctic offshore as a viable resource frontier. Self-interest dictates that, if Russia wants access to the necessary foreign capital and technology to exploit its offshore energy reserves – something that it considers essential to maintaining its energy superpower status, and something that is clearly complicated by the current sanctions regime against Moscow – it cannot afford to clash with its Arctic neighbours. Perpetuating the narrative of an unstable region is likely to kill any remaining appetite for large-scale foreign investment. Although the prospects of Arctic sea routes becoming imminently accessible to regular commercial traffic and ultimately competing with established routes for global maritime trade have foundered on the shoals of harsh environmental, technical and economic realities, issues related to the governance of navigation and shipping in Arctic waters remain high priorities for both Moscow and Ottawa. Russia’s vigorous efforts to develop and commercialize the Northern Sea Route as a wholly integrated international shipping route connecting Europe and Asia have yielded disappointing results – not least for reasons of poor infrastructure – while domestic cargo traffic continues to grow and facilitate state-funded industrial revival efforts. For its part, Canada officially claims to be ‘open for business’ in the Arctic, but has done little to encourage international shipping through the Northwest Passage, choosing instead to prioritize sovereignty as the principal pillar of its Arctic foreign policy. Both countries, however, have comparable interests in upholding their respective legal positions on the status of their Arctic waters, adopting and enforcing navigation and shipping standards through national legislation and international regulation, and developing enhanced search and rescue capabilities. Coupled with emergency preparedness, and prevention and response issues more generally, Moscow and Ottawa can sell these to their populations as human and environmental security imperatives benefiting from international collaboration. While policy-makers and academic commentators are predisposed to dream up ‘new’ initiatives that suggest innovation, history also offers strong examples of priority areas where Canada and Russia can further their respective Arctic agendas by working together – most obviously by strengthening

partnerships in science and research, including cold weather construction, transportation technologies, and measures to address air pollutants, prevent oil pollution, and protect biodiversity. Russia is hardly considered a global leader in climate change mitigation efforts, and the Trudeau government’s aspirations to have Canada become one remains a work in progress. Nevertheless, both countries face similar challenges in terms of local adaptation to climate change and management of impacts on ecosystems, food and water security, public health and infrastructure.

o promote these activities, the two countries should also resume engagement through the Arctic and North Working Group of the Canada-Russia Intergovernmental Economic Commission, a key conduit for bilateral discussions that Canada suspended in March 2014. Although the dream of an ‘Arctic bridge’ sea route linking Eurasian and North American markets through the Port of Churchill may have faded, as has the prospect of a ‘Northern Air Bridge’ connecting Winnipeg and Krasnoyarsk, other opportunities to promote subnational cooperation and sustainable economic development should be explored. In particular, Ottawa and Moscow should encourage the activities of the recently formed Arctic Economic Council to facilitate Arctic business-tobusiness relationships, promote best practices in environmentally and socially responsible development, and foster grassroots initiatives that can help build healthy, resilient Arctic communities with diversified economies. The countries have a solid history of sharing best practices in sustainable development – particularly in terms of Indigenous peoples, capacitybuilding, and governance. “No relationship is more important to me and to Canada than the one with Indigenous Peoples,” Trudeau highlighted in his mandate letters to each of his Cabinet ministers last fall. In an era of ‘truth and reconciliation,’ Canada will place the highest priority on ensuring that its activities in the Arctic acknowledge, protect and promote Indigenous peoples’ rights – and, by extension, will insist that other Arctic stakeholders do the same. Partnering with Canadian Inuit groups, who have been strong proponents of the Russian Association of Indigenous Peoples of the North and its participation in the Arctic Council, Ottawa should resume its technical assistance for initiatives designed to share indigenous best practices with Russian counterparts. This can contribute to regional and local entrepreneurship, as well as improved indigenous governance systems. It cannot proceed, however,

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without basic assurances and trust that this is not intended to undermine the Russian state or Russian industrial and resource development. In practice, the existing multilayered governance regime in the Arctic serves the interests of Canada and Russia well. Both countries have a similar stance on the primary rights and roles of Arctic states in regional governance, rooted in international recognition of Arctic state sovereignty and sovereign rights. Of course, as mentioned, Canadians and Russians still lack deep knowledge of one another as Arctic actors. Addressing this unfamiliarity is foundational to any constructive engagement. The Arctic theatre offers a stage for these Arctic citizens to become better acquainted with one another – perhaps correcting misconceptions and ensuring that blanket characterizations derived from disagreements or divergent interests in other parts of the world are not misapplied to circumpolar relations, and conversely, presenting the possibility of growing familiarity through the Arctic medium facilitating the resolution of disagreements in other theatres. To begin, rather than conceptualizing the Arctic as an ‘interstitial theatre’ that will experience increased contestation between Arctic states in the years ahead (as Irvin Studin anticipated in his Feature article in Fall/Winter 2016 issue of GB), analysts could emphasize that Canada and Russia have vested interests in a stable, secure and sustainable circumpolar world. Appropriately situating the Arctic in the resurgent great power rivalry between Russia and the West requires both nuance and clarity. The evolving Arctic security environment is too readily conflated with grand strategic issues – such as Russia-NATO relations, the rise of China, global energy security, and global climate change mitigation – that are best assessed through a global rather than a regional lens. The most acute Arctic challenges facing regional actors are not generated by great power competition, resource ownership questions, outstanding (and usually well-managed) boundary disputes, or different applications of international law. Instead, they relate to community-level security and safety, the practical challenges associated with adapting to climate change, assurance that Arctic shipping and resource development will be conducted safely, and outlining what sustainable development looks like across a spectrum of economic sectors. Bref, Canada and Russia should return to cultivating the positive image of an Arctic region where peace, cooperation and stability continue to prevail. If an ice curtain continues to distort each side’s views of the other, it is time for both, as Arctic neighbours, to pull the blinds and get to know their opposite number. For the circumpolar neighbourhood is safe by comparison with nearly every other regional theatre – which means that political developments and divergent strategies in other parts of the world should not preclude Arctic cooperation where this serves national and regional interests. | GB

Middle East Disintegration: Israel’s Concerns

IN SITU

The Jewish State has never been so secure, and its neighbourhood so unpredictable EPHRAIM KAM reports from Jerusalem

T Ephraim Kam is a Senior Research Associate at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv. He previously served as the Deputy Head of the Research Division, IDF Military

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Intelligence.

he turmoil in the Middle East is affecting, directly or indirectly, the security and stability of all of the states in the region. In Syria, Iraq, Libya and Yemen, the central government does not control the entire territory of the country. The power and legitimacy vacuums in these states have enabled jihadist organizations to penetrate into significant territories, and to use these as a base for conducting attacks against rivals or local populations. As a consequence, the level of violence in the region is extremely high. Hundreds of thousands of civilians have been killed in fighting – most of them in Syria and Iraq, but also in Libya, Yemen and Egypt. Millions of civilians have been displaced – including half of Syria’s 23 million population – and many have become refugees in other countries. Bref, acute uncertainty reigns in the Middle East today, and no one knows when the deterioration will end. Countries that have not been affected by the turmoil might face disasters in the near future. Leaders of Middle East states do not know whether they – or indeed leaders of neighbouring states – will survive, and therefore face serious difficulties in policy planning and implementation. Israel is among the few countries in the region that has not been directly affected by the general deterioration. Its regime is stable, it has no power vacuum, and the new militant Islamist organizations have not penetrated into its territory. It enjoys significant military and technological superiority over its regional rivals. By contrast, the Arab world is suffering from strategic weakness. Arab leaders are preoccupied with their survival and domestic problems, and face difficulties in advancing inter-Arab policies or organizing Arab coalitions in order to deal with regional problems. Moreover, part of the Arab threat toward Israel has disappeared. Many erstwhile Syrian military capabilities have been destroyed in that country’s civil war. Iraqi military power, of course, disappeared in toto after the First Gulf War and the American occupation in 2003. And for the time being, Israel has managed to deter non-state organizations from launching substantial attacks against Israeli targets. Having said this, the Middle East crisis has created certain challenges for Israel. Indeed, the jihadist organizations – especially ISIS and Jabhat Al Nusra (affiliated with Al Qaeda) – are currently fighting against each other in Syria, as well as against the Syrian army and the Assad regime. For them, the armed struggle against Israel can wait. Still, Israel remains

a very important enemy for these groups, and they may well direct their attacks against it before long. Once jihadist organizations decide to launch attacks against Israel, it may be difficult to deter them – not only from Syria, but also from the Sinai Peninsula, and perhaps even from Jordanian territory. The unrest in Jordan is still limited, and the Hashemite regime is stable. However, a threat to its stability will negatively affect Israel’s security, as its survival is a critical asset and strategic interest for Jerusalem. Moreover, any material deterioration of stability in Saudi Arabia, if it occurs, will endanger the stability of all of the moderate states in the Middle East, including Israel, and create a major setback for the US and for Western governments. In the short run, of course, the most severe threat to Israel’s security is terrorism or asymmetric attacks. The most dangerous organization, in this respect, is Hezbollah, acting mostly in south Lebanon. Hezbollah has a small army, combining terrorist and military capabilities, and is equipped with sophisticated weapons. Above all, it has a huge arsenal of 130,000 rockets, with ranges that cover the entire territory of Israel. Few countries around the world have such a huge arsenal. Over the last decade, Israel has succeeded in deterring Hezbollah from attacking its territory. Moreover, since 2014, Hezbollah has been deeply involved in the fighting in Syria, suffering hundreds of casualties in that theatre. However, under Iranian influence, Hezbollah has been working to open a new front against Israel from the Syrian Golan Heights, whence it might well launch a rocket offensive against Israel at some point in the future. For its part, Hamas has not tried to provoke Israel from the Gaza Strip since Operation Protective Edge was carried out in mid-2014. Still, it is not clear how long Hamas will be deterred, and whether the suffering of the population in Gaza will induce Hamas to resume the firing of rockets and mortars. More importantly, Hamas continues to dig and construct cross-border attack tunnels, which penetrate from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory, with a view to abducting and killing Israeli civilians and soldiers. In response, Israel is developing a technological system to detect the tunnels. The Palestinian organizations – especially Fatah, but also Hamas and Islamic Jihad – maintain a ceasefire in the West Bank as well. And yet, since October 2015, a new threat has emerged – the socalled ‘knives uprising.’ This uprising is not organized by any particular organization, though Hamas has

PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / DAN BALILTY

highest levels.This dialogue includes the unprecedented establishment of a joint senior military committee to coordinate Russian air attacks in Syria. (Evidently, the improved relationship with Russia is not an alternative to Israel’s special relationship with the US.) In June of this year, Jerusalem and Ankara agreed to resume normal diplomatic ties (see the In Situ article by Mitat Celikpala and Sinem Akgul Acikmese at p. 6), ending a six-year deterioration following the Israeli naval operation against the Turkish ship Mavi Marmara on its way to Gaza. The improvement will probably not bring back the close defence contacts that existed between the two countries in the 1990s.

(Turkish officials have emphasized that the severe domestic crisis in Turkey will not negatively affect the improved bilateral relationship with the Jewish state). No less important are Israel’s relations with Egypt and Jordan. The two Arab states share significant common interests with Israel in the context of the present regional instability, including in respect of threats created by the Islamist organizations. Indeed, relations between Israel and the two governments – especially with Egypt, and particularly in terms of military cooperation against jihadist attacks – are in principle better than ever. Bref, Israel’s current security concerns are limited. However, these challenges may well grow in future – above all, due to the implications of the Iranian nuclear threat, the missile-cum-rocket threat to Israel’s home front, and also further regional deterioration. The severity of these threats will depend largely on Israel’s counter-measures, including its preservation of strategic superiority, its deterrence capabilities, its domestic resilience, and also its cooperation with various partners. | GB

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, left, former Israeli President Shimon Peres, centre, and Israeli President Reuven Rivlin are seen during a ceremony at the Peres Center for Peace in Jaffa, July 2016.

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encouraged it. Instead, the attacks are carried out by young, unaffiliated Palestinians who, motivated by social media, decide independently to stab Israelis both inside Israel and in the West Bank. The impact of these attacks has been limited, and their number has dropped significantly (although not irreversibly so). Still, it is more difficult to collect intelligence about the intentions and activities of – and therefore to prevent attacks by – young Palestinians previously unknown to the security services. In the longer run, the main threat to Israel comes from Iran’s potential nuclear capability. The nuclear agreement, concluded with Iran in July 2015, has negative and positive aspects. The positive aspect is that the limitations imposed by the agreement on Iran’s nuclear programme postpone the timetable needed for acquiring nuclear weapons (see the Tête à Tête interview with Janice Stein at p. 38), as long as Iran does not violate the agreement. On the other hand, when these limitations are removed, after eight to 10 years, Iran will be allowed to develop a huge enrichment programme, in which it could in principle enrich any amount of uranium, including weapons-grade uranium. At this future stage, it would be far more difficult to prevent Iran from developing nuclear weapons, if Tehran decided to move in this direction. And the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Iran would create the most severe threat to Israel’s security. Even without an extant nuclear capacity, Iran still has a large arsenal of ballistic missiles – the largest arsenal in the Middle East. This arsenal – in addition to Hezbollah’s huge arsenal of rockets, supplied by Iran – has created the most significant threat to Israel’s home front. The principal Israeli answer to this threat has been the standing up of a qualitative anti-missile defense system, though its interception capability in the event of a massive missile attack is still not clear. Against the background of these threats, there have, to be sure, been recent improvements in Israel’s international posture. On the one hand, the relationship between the Obama administration and Netanyahu government has been tense – mostly due to disagreements in respect of the Palestinian and Iranian issues. Both issues may affect the relationship between Jerusalem and Washington in the future, though much depends on the nature of the next US administration. (The infrastructure of security cooperation between the two governments has not been damaged, and will likely continue to develop in the future.) On the other hand, Israel has managed to improve its relations with other governments. Israel has an ongoing dialogue with the Russian government, at the

ILLUSTRATION: LOUIS FISHAUF

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From Nehruvianism to a Neoliberal and Hyper-Realist Hybrid? BY KANTI BAJPAI

here is India’s foreign policy two years into Narendra Modi’s term as prime minister? The answer is that Modi has built on Manmohan Singh’s and Atal Behari Vajpayee’s policies, but has pushed ahead to make some key changes. While these changes were signalled quite early in his premiership – indeed within the first six months of taking office – the extent of the changes has now become far more clearly visible. Bref, Modi is moving India from a Nehruvian to a more neoliberal and even hyper-realist posture. Modi obviously brings a huge amount of energy to foreign policy, travelling roughly once a month. During his visits, he is indefatigable, addressing legislatures, meeting with the diaspora, visiting sites of local cultural and social importance, and attending the usual round of official meetings. He projects his personality as integral to the future of India and its foreign policy in a way that no Indian prime minister since Jawaharlal Nehru has done – dressing carefully, choosing symbolic gestures with great attention (including the kinds of gifts he brings), and turning on the charm in his personal and public interactions. A particular feature of Modi’s trips abroad is his use of Hindi rather than English for speeches and even for smaller official meetings. Modi is manifestly trying to convey – and not too subtly – that he represents the ‘authentic’ India, in identity and cultural terms, and that he is proud of his native heritage. Beyond the more personal and idiosyncratic elements of his foreign policy approach, where does Modi stand in terms of Indian strategic thought? In the Winter 2013 issue of GB, I identified three major schools of grand strategic thought in India: Nehruvianism, neoliberalism and hyper-realism. Nehruvians are wedded to the ideas of India’s first prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in seeing non-alignment as the key to India’s security. In practice, non-aligned India tilted away from the US and the West toward the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and remained suspicious of an imperialist America after 1990. Nehruvians remain opposed to any formal alliances. They see China and Japan – in partnership with India – as being the core of any Asian security system, and put their faith in diplomacy before force in dealing with rivals. Neoliberals are associated more closely with Prime Minister Narasimha Rao (1991-1996) and his pragmatism in building closer relations with the US and putting economics at the centre of Indian strategy. Rao enunciated India’s Look East policy and deepened India’s economic and diplomatic engagement with China. His successors, Atal Behari Vajpayee and Manmohan Singh, hewed closely to neoliberalism, though Vajpayee made India a nuclear weapon power in 1998 and placed more emphasis than Manmohan on the use of force. For instance, in 2001-2002, he mobilized India’s military along the border with Pakistan after Islamic militants attacked India’s parliament. In 2008, after the Mumbai terrorist attacks, Manmohan turned instead to diplomacy to deal with Islamabad, seeking to isolate it internationally.

Kanti Bajpai is the Wilmar Chair of Asian Studies, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore.

MODI’S

FOREIGN POLICY HOW’S IT GOING?

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Hyper-realists, by contrast, believe that India, like any other country, must invest in alliances if necessary, but in the end must build its own military strength (see Cabinet Room at p. 49). They regard China as the biggest threat to India, and would build a coalition in Asia and beyond, if not a formal set of alliances, to strengthen India’s position vis-à-vis its northern neighbour. Bref, hyper-realists urge India to be more attentive to a balance-of-power approach in international affairs. I had suggested in my past GB article that India was transitioning from Nehruvianism to neoliberalism. Where does Modi stand? Is he a Nehruvian, a neoliberal, or a hyper-realist? Two years into his term, it is quite clear how he and his national security adviser Ajit Doval see some key challenges to India’s security – particularly in the immediate and extended neighbourhood. They identify three key challenges: China, asymmetric and unconventional conflict, and border management. The prime minister himself has been careful not to mention China as a threat, for that would be too provocative. Doval, on the other hand, has not been shy about naming China explicitly as a threat. China is a challenge not just because the border quarrel remains unresolved, but also because it is a formidable power and its influence is nearly everywhere – and especially in India’s immediate and extended neighbourhood. Modi has also made it plain that he regards terrorism, insurgency and other forms of unconventional war – including cyber-war – as being the future of conflict. Beyond China and unconventional conflict, India must deal with the problem of vulnerable borders with Pakistan (and Kashmir), Myanmar (insurgents to and from India’s eastern neighbour), and Bangladesh (illegal migration). I focus here on India’s China problem, since this is undoubtedly the greatest concern for New Delhi. China impacts India’s relations with Pakistan and the smaller states of South Asia (from Afghanistan to Sri Lanka and the Maldives), its influence in the rest of Asia, its border security, its internal security, and its maritime security. It also impacts its nuclear programme – for instance, China’s refusal to let India into the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) prevents India from engaging more deeply in the global nuclear trade. Modi’s aphorism for dealing with China is that India will not “lower its eyes” before China, but

will not stare China down either. It will look China straight in the eye. During his visit to Singapore in 2015, Modi did not mention China when he repeated this aphorism, but it was reasonably clear that he was referring to how he intends to deal with the Middle Kingdom. This way of dealing with China is evident, too, in Doval’s various remarks on security. Doval has noted that while the two Asian giants are in contention over territory and influence, they have much in common, can cooperate on common challenges, have a 5,000-year history of peace, and will settle their differences through negotiations.

n terms of actual policy, Modi has given expression to his approach in a number of ways. On the one hand, he has said that he wants to deepen the economic relationship, including encouraging Chinese investments and manufacturing in India. When Xi Jinping visited India in September 2014, the Chinese promised up to US$20 billion in investment funds over five years. Modi, in return, promised to make available land in Gujarat and Maharashtra for two industrial parks for Chinese companies. He has gone along with China on the BRICS Development Bank in accepting that the headquarters would be in Shanghai. In return, Beijing agreed that the first chairman of the Bank would be an Indian. Modi also quickly brought India into the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Moreover, he has made it a point to schedule a bilateral meeting with Xi on the sidelines of almost every ‘minilateral’ conclave that the two have attended together. Having said this, Modi has taken a number of steps to signal a tougher stand. During his trip to Japan in late 2014, just days before Xi came to India on his first official visit as president, Modi went out of his way to deride China, saying that some of today’s powers, in their expansionism and aggressiveness, were behaving like 17th or 18th century European powers. When Xi came calling, Modi told the Chinese leader that progress on the border was essential if relations were to deepen. He repeated the need for quicker resolution of this dispute when he visited Beijing in May 2015, arguing that progress in the border talks was vital if economic and other aspects of their relations were to flourish. This suggests a reversal of the position held by India since 1998 – to wit, that normalization of diplomatic, economic and social relations between the two countries would lay the foundation for a border settlement. In the military confrontation in Ladakh, during Xi’s visit, Modi sent nearly 1,000 additional troops to bolster India’s position there. India has also thus far refused to join China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) initiative, arguing that Beijing had not included New Delhi in the shaping of the idea. Looking beyond these initial moves, Modi has

taken a number of steps – some symbolic and some more tangible – to signal that India will be more assertive vis-à-vis China. First, Modi’s outreach internationally is in large part about projecting India in relation to China. New Delhi does not want to allow the international diplomatic space to go uncontested in China’s favour. The message is simple: a democratic, economically surging, demographically attractive, and non-aggressive India, at peace with those around it, is an alternative to China. This is clearly an exercise in Indian soft power. Second, Modi has made a clear shift in alignment toward the US. Inviting President Barack Obama to be India’s guest at the Republic Day Parade in January 2015 was unprecedented – no US president had ever been accorded this honour. Before this, Modi had made a quite successful first visit to Washington in September 2014, just days after Xi’s trip to India. While the visit was low on substance, it was high on symbolism. Modi, long denied a visa to the US after the 2002 Gujarat riots, dined at the White House. He also held a huge rally with local Indians and attended a music concert in Central Park, where he appeared on stage. Among his first foreign policy deliverables was a deal with the US on the Doha round of trade negotiations, which only weeks earlier New Delhi had effectively stalled. More important was the deal on nuclear liability, with the common pool insurance solution providing a way out of the corner into which India had painted itself with its 2010 nuclear liability bill.

Two years into his term, it is clear how Modi and his national security adviser Ajit Doval see some key challenges to India’s security – particularly in the immediate and extended neighbourhood.

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hile there continue to be differences with the US over Pakistan, Afghanistan, conventional weapons sales, Ukraine, Russia, intervention, and climate change, Modi has reached out to Washington as perhaps no Indian prime minister has done before. Dealing with China is a common concern. The US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region, made public during Obama’s visit, was, in its insistence on freedom of navigation and the rule of law, clearly aimed at China (see the Feature article by Bilahari Kausikan at p. 12). This was not the first time that India and the US had jointly made such remarks, but embedding those words in a vision document was intended to send a message to Beijing and East Asian states about the evolving partnership with Washington. Thus, the joint statement issued at the end of the visit stressed that the two sides were in agreement on India going beyond Look East, to Act East, and that New Delhi and Washington would increase their cooperation in the region. Moreover, in

the aftermath of the Permanent Court of Arbitration ruling on the South China Sea this past July, New Delhi repeated its stand that “India supports freedom of navigation and over-flight and unimpeded commerce, based on principles of international law as reflected notably in the UNCLOS.” In April of this year, India and the US made progress on the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA). The agreement, when signed, will allow both sides to obtain supplies, spare parts and services from each other. (It does not, however, include basing rights.) This is the first time that New Delhi has inked such a far-reaching military agreement with the US. More recently, in June of this year, Modi made a fourth visit to the US in two years. During the visit, he addressed the US Congress for the first time. The visit was also notable for designating India as a Major Defence Partner of the US for the Defence Technology and Trade Initiative, cybersecurity cooperation, and US support of India’s application to the NSG (in the face of Chinese opposition). At the heart of defence technology collaboration with the US is American help for India’s aircraft carrier project. Interestingly, New Delhi will be simultaneously cooperating with Moscow on its nuclear and other submarines, and with Washington on its carriers. Third, Modi’s focus on visiting the immediate and extended neighbourhood with such regularity is intended to remind those closer to home that India can be a friend and partner, and that China is not the only economic or security game in town. In South Asia, Southeast Asia, Central Asia, and the Indian Ocean states of Mauritius and Seychelles, in dealing with the economically more needy states, Modi has come with a package of development and technical aid, lines of credit, and infrastructure and connectivity initiatives. He has also attempted to promote bilateral trade and investment. Virtually everywhere in the region – even in more advanced Southeast Asia – Modi has tried to sell Indian capabilities in satellite, cyber and information technology. Of course, this is not the first time that India is putting together these kinds of economic and technological packages, but Modi’s visits and his speeches have advertised India’s initiatives as never before. Arguably, too, Modi has been far more aggressive than his predecessors in presenting India as a security provider. While he did not emphasize this in his South Asian visits – in order not to reinforce fears of a hegemonic India – he has, in the extended neighbourhood, been fairly direct. Again, it is not that Modi has invented these initiatives de novo. India has had defence agreements with all of the major states of Southeast Asia going back to at least the early 1990s. Likewise, India has been the mainstay of security in Mauritius and Seychelles since the 1980s. Indian involvement in Central

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While there continue to be differences with the US over Pakistan, Afghanistan, conventional weapons sales, Ukraine, Russia, intervention, and climate change, Modi has reached out to Washington as perhaps no Indian prime minister has done before.

Asian security is also not new, and can be traced back to the days of Taliban rule in Afghanistan in the late 1990s. Thereafter, the Manmohan Singh government had worked to build links between the armed forces and security bureaucracies in Central Asia to deal with the issue of terrorism and to balance against Chinese influence. Still, Modi, with his far more public utterances on the subject, has underlined India’s desire to be involved in providing security. Everywhere he has been in the extended neighbourhood, including Japan, South Korea and Vietnam, he has flown India’s defence manufacturing flag, renewing or signing new defence cooperation agreements to institutionalize high-level political and bureaucratic interactions, military exercises, military exchanges, and training of personnel. India, Modi has suggested, is interested in building its own defence industry through collaboration in co-producing specific systems, as well as through the export of its own existing weapons systems. For instance, New Delhi has repeated its interest in buying and possibly co-producing Japan’s Soryu submarine and US-2 amphibious aircraft. India also seems to be edging closer to promising the BrahMos cruise missile system to Vietnam, provided Moscow agrees to go along (as the missile is being developed with Russia). There is also little doubt that Modi has made a number of changes in Indian foreign policy with a security focus aimed squarely at China. The first change consists in the expansion of India’s naval exercises. After some initial hesitation, in July 2015, Modi invited Japan to join the Malabar naval exercises as a permanent member. India usually holds these exercises with the US. Japan has participated from time to time. After Modi’s visit to China in May 2015, he ordered that Japan be invited as a permanent member of the exercises. The US urged him to also invite Australia. This he did not do, although he did start a bilateral India-Australia naval exercise for the first time, held in the same month as the Malabar exercise. The second change that Modi has brought about has been to forge a formal, long-term defence agreement with Australia. New Delhi has traditionally held Canberra at arm’s length. Australian suspicion of India’s naval expansion in the 1980s and its non-proliferation stance on India’s nuclear programme irked New Delhi, which in turn saw Australia as an uncritical follower of the US. While the Manmohan Singh government had tentatively begun the process of defence cooperation, Modi has been far more enthusiastic about the strategic convergence with Australia, and is keen to bring India, Japan and Australia together. For the first time, a trilateral India-Japan-Australia security dialogue was held in June 2015. The third change has been to increase India’s

role in the Indian Ocean. Modi has built on earlier Indian policies, but there are signs of more ambitious engagement with the regional states. New Delhi is trying to put in place the Coastal Surveillance Radar System involving Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles – begun by the previous government – and is trying to cobble together a maritime security group comprising India, Sri Lanka, Maldives and Seychelles. (In the 2015 Sri Lankan presidential elections, New Delhi made quite public its preference for the eventually victorious opposition candidate, Maithripala Sirisena, encouraging opposition groups to coalesce. This came after Chinese submarines docked at Sri Lankan ports in September and November 2014.) Ajit Doval has referred approvingly to the Indian Ocean as a Zone of Peace (IOZP) – an idea that India more or less abandoned in the 1970s. IOZP envisioned regional and littoral states taking the lead in ensuring security and stability in the Indian Ocean. In addition, the increased cooperation with Australia, including in the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), presages a new coalition to deal with Indian Ocean security even as the US navy relocates assets to the Asia-Pacific region. Modi has also undertaken a review of maritime capabilities and policies, and is attempting to launch a singlepoint maritime agency in India.

here, then, is India’s Modi in terms of our original grand strategy triptych of Nehruvianism, neoliberalism, and hyperrealism? First of all, Modi seems to have clearly identified China as India’s biggest grand strategic challenge. This is consonant with the thinking of the hyper-realists, who see China as India’s greatest security threat. Second, like so many other states in Asia and the rest of the world, Modi’s India is engaging China economically. Bilateral trade runs to approximately US$70 billion annually. India is beginning to attract Chinese investment. Between 2000 and 2015, Chinese investment was estimated to be just over $1 billion. Between 2015 and 2018, it will likely rise to between $5 billion and $10 billion. India is a member of the BRICS Development Bank and the AIIB. It may soon also be a member of the proposed Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Development Bank. Here Modi seems to be close to the thinking of the neoliberals, who see the road to security through trade and other economic interactions. Third, in the defence and security sphere, more than any of his predecessors, Modi has moved India from non-alignment to alignment with the US and

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a range of Asian and Indian Ocean states in an effort to strengthen India’s bargaining position with China. New Delhi does not expect war with China. Nor does it expect anyone – not even the US – to come to India’s aid if there is war. What it is hoping is that, with India in a broad coalition, Beijing will be more sensitive to New Delhi’s concerns and will settle various matters – preeminently the border conflict – sooner rather than later, and on terms more favourable to India than Beijing appears to fancy at present. This is suggestive of a more neoliberal and hyper-realist sensibility than a Nehruvian sensibility in grand strategy. Neoliberals in India have supported a strong relationship with the US, and hyper-realists argue for a coalition strategy against China – with or without the US. Bref, Modi is transitioning India from a Nehruvian to a hybrid neoliberal-cum-hyper-realist grand strategy. Question: Is Modi’s China strategy working? In particular, is a more aggressive coalition-building strategy causing Beijing to rethink its stand on the border conflict, its support of India’s neighbours – particularly Pakistan – against India, and indeed India’s membership in the NSG and on the UN Security Council? Answer: It is too early to tell. But it is telling that China continues to underline that there is a huge dispute over territory in Arunachal Pradesh (or South Tibet, in Chinese terminology). Moreover, after promising India $20 billion in investments in September 2014, it offered $46 billion to Pakistan just a few months later. China is promising to build the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with those funds – through territory that India claims as part of Kashmir. Most recently, China balked at India’s bid for NSG membership, arguing that unless India signs the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and unless Pakistan becomes a member of the grouping on the same terms, New Delhi should not be allowed into the club. Will Beijing’s responses deepen or soften Modi’s inclinations? That is the question for the years ahead. Modi has shown, over the course of his political career, that he is a deeply strategic politician. He plots a course carefully, and proceeds with determination. It seems clear enough that he has identified China as India’s main foreign policy and security challenge. It is also clear that while he will continue to engage China and stand by the various modes of engagement that the two sides have forged over the years – regular summit meetings, border negotiations, confidence-building along the border, and growing trade and investment ties – he will deepen his efforts at coalition-building and balance of power manoeuvring in order to improve his bargaining hand. And he will attempt to bring coalition pressures to bear on Beijing, as he did during India’s campaign for membership in the NSG in May and June of this year. He has already warned China that there must be progress toward a border settlement if Beijing wants a healthier, comprehensive relationship with New Delhi, and that growing trade and investment will not substitute for a settlement. He will continue to remind China of this, playing for the long term. | GB

What of Iranian Soft Power?

QUERY

Why, post-nuclear deal, a strategy of softer seduction could position Tehran as a peace-and-security leader in the region BY SAM SASAN SHOAMANESH

Sam Sasan Shoamanesh is Vice-President of the Institute for 21st Century Questions and Managing Editor

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of Global Brief.

hile much is made of Iran’s hard power, the recent nuclear deal hints at the prospect of the country’s untapped soft power being far more central to its long-term success in the 21st century. As the 13th-century Persian poet, Jalal adDin Muhammad Rumi, wrote: “Raise your words, not voice. It is rain that grows flowers, not thunder.” To be sure, in Iran’s conflict-ridden neighbourhood, the military instrument is critical to deterring would-be aggressors. The devastating 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war taught Iranians this lesson at great cost in blood and national treasure. And yet hard power will not win the permanent admiration of Iran’s neighbours, build lasting alliances, or indeed help Iran to leaven its relative isolation. As the Arab states of the Persian Gulf annually increase their military spending – largely in direct response to Iran’s military capabilities – and with Tehran duly taking countermeasures, an acute security dilemma dictates the geopolitical logic of the region, fuelling instability and insecurity. The Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (the Iran nuclear deal), concluded in July 2015 between Iran, the P5+1 and the EU, which received UN Security Council backing through Resolution 2231 and resulted in the lifting of economic sanctions on Iran, was not only a major success for Iranian diplomacy, but also boosted Iran’s soft-power credentials as a real player in the preservation of international peace and security (through peaceful means). That deal has created a golden opportunity internationally – and political space domestically – for the government in Tehran to devise and implement a comprehensive strategy to project soft power in a way that both mitigates the regional security dilemma and serves the national advantage. Since the founding of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has relied heavily on its unique Shia character as the basis of its soft power to galvanize support from pockets of Shia populations in a Sunni-dominated Middle East and Central Asia. This policy has been deliberate and strategic, with clear ideological underpinnings. While it has had its successes – including Iran’s manifest clout today in Lebanon and Syria, or in Iraq after Saddam Hussein – its net effect is, by definition, limited in scope (and geography), constraining Tehran’s

ability to generate long-term strategic dividends. Indeed, relying on the Shia character for softpower projection is arguably inconsistent with the Constitution of the Islamic Republic, which requires the government to formulate its foreign policy on the basis of “fraternal commitment to all Muslims,” and its general policies “with a view to cultivating the friendship and unity of all Muslim peoples.” Moreover, just as it limits the full reach of Iran’s soft power beyond the Shia world, this approach also plays directly into sectarian divisions in the region. This is manifestly self-defeating, as it not only complicates Iran’s already difficult security environment, but also further isolates the country within its own geopolitical space. Given Iran’s historical role, as well as its linguistic and cultural ties, in the ‘Greater Iran’ region – encompassing the Caucasus (see the Feature article by Irina Starodubrovskaya at p. 44), West Asia, Central Asia, and stretching to parts of South Asia – the country has the potential to exert soft power to a ‘natural market’ – as it were – to advance its national interests. On this logic, the country can acquire greater influence regionally if, in addition to religious bonds, it skillfully invokes common historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties with neighbouring states. Part of this push can involve, over time, a de facto reversal of some of the consequences of the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) – that is, closing the artificial gap that these Russo-Persian war capitulations created between Iranians and their brethren from the Caucasus over the last two centuries.

resident Rouhani’s carefully worded Nowruz message in March of this year is an example of such soft power in action. In a letter addressed to the heads of state of nine neighbouring countries, he stated: “Nowruz is a festival of moderation and the most ancient dynamic tradition in our common history.” He went on to encourage “the countries of the Nowruz Zone to establish better and further relations with each other, in addition to friendship and reconciliation and create modern conditions for peaceful coexistence based on the historic nuclear agreement between Iran and the P5+1 and the lifting of sanctions.” Much more such public

On this logic, the country can acquire greater influence regionally if, in addition to religious bonds, it skillfully invokes common historical, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties with neighbouring states.

ILLUSTRATION: ALINA SKARINA

(through the Yiwu-Tehran train), the Iran-Azerbaijan agreement on trade and joint ventures to build hydroelectric plants and cooperation in respect of (increasingly scarce) water resources, as well as the International North-South Transport Corridor currently being explored between Russia, India, Iran and Central Asian states. Tehran should now look to extend similar projects to its Arab neighbours in the Persian Gulf, as well as to other states in the region and to other regional theatres – in full recognition of the fact that, with investment in political relationships and the necessary infrastructure, Iran could realistically become the region’s principal international transit hub. As I have argued in past issues of GB (see my Feature article in the Fall 2012 issue), the Middle East

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diplomatic seduction is required. Tehran should also capitalize on the momentum of the Iran nuclear deal to forge a network of states friendly to its interests, and to provide them with the necessary incentives to remain invested in such friendship through strategic partnerships, common projects, and financial cooperation. The tripartite agreement between Iran, India and Afghanistan, concluded this past May, to position the Iranian port of Chabahar as a transport and trade corridor is a case in point of a major national initiative that fits well into a larger soft-power push by Tehran. Such economic intermeshing may even lead to a common security regime over time, further integrating this triad. Other examples include efforts to revive the Silk Road trading route connecting Iran to China

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Part of this push can involve, over time, a de facto reversal of some of the consequences of the Treaties of Gulistan (1813) and Turkmenchay (1828) – that is, closing the artificial gap that these RussoPersian war capitulations created between Iranians and their brethren from the Caucasus over the last two centuries.

is in dire need of a reengineering of the regional order through new institutions and structures that will enable it to better manage and avoid interstate conflict, and also to create opportunities for regionwide collaboration and integration. Of course, short of a comprehensive regional governance regime, Iran and Egypt were, in the 1970s, the first countries in the region to call for a Middle East Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone. The recent Iran nuclear deal, then, arguably sits within this tradition of working toward a nuclear-free zone, and provides Tehran with an opportunity to champion the idea of a new regional security architecture based on the concept of common security, free of weapons of mass destruction and anchored in a non-aggression pact. This would, of course, be a long-term vision with undeniable challenges. In the immediate term, therefore, Iran should seek the support of regional partners to establish a standing regional security forum to discuss issues of strategic concern, including the threat from ISIS, cross-border terrorism, and internally displaced populations. Bref, Tehran should not be shy in positioning itself conspicuously as a leader in the promotion of regional peace and stability.

urning to cultural and people-to-people diplomacy, given Iran’s rich literary and artistic tradition, it stands to reason that the country’s filmmakers, actors, musicians, writers, poets, craftsmen, artists and athletes should be better known and celebrated in the world than they are today. They are worthy of funding and support in their own right, but for strategic purposes, they are a major source of untapped Iranian soft power in the region and internationally. On this same logic, the promotion and mainstreaming of the Persian language abroad should be prioritized by strategists in Tehran. While some efforts are already underway in this regard, they need to be bolstered. Moreover, one of the other central pillars of Iran’s cultural diplomacy should also be continued commitment to inter-religious dialogue, building on past initiatives such as the Dialogue Among Civilizations, introduced by former Iranian president Mohammad Khatami. An effective soft power strategy would also require the agents of this crucial work to be conversant in the tongues of their audience. Many countries around the world – and particularly some of the most strategically astute countries – already profit from the competitive advantage of competence in a multitude of tongues. The more languages the Iranian knows, the more effectively she or he can make an imprint beyond Iranian borders. While preserving Persian as the official language and script of the country, it is in Iran’s interests to invest in a national languages strategy that will generate a

critical mass of Iranians fluent not only in Persian but also Arabic (beyond grades six to 11), Turkish and other languages of the region. The English language should be taught earlier – ideally from the primary school level, as prescribed by countless pedagogical studies around the world. We might therefore eventually envisage an Iran where the average Iranian, in addition to Persian, also masters Arabic, Turkish, English and at least one other foreign tongue – say, French, Russian, Spanish, Chinese or German. Iran’s ability to maximize its soft-power potential also surely rests on the quality of domestic governance – that is, its ability to keep its own house in order and ensure the general well-being and happiness of its citizens. Easing rigid state regulation of, and restrictions on, the private lives of Iranians, and taking steps to protect, and be seen to protect, human rights will be crucial not only for greater social cohesion and harmony – and ultimately, a stronger, united Iran – but also for Tehran’s ability to credibly project soft power abroad. In this same vein, Iran’s multiethnic, linguistic and religious diversity should also be seen as an important part of the country’s soft-power toolbox. Iran should fully embrace this diversity not just for its intrinsic virtues, but also to ensure internal stability, and to demonstrate to the world that the country has an open and tolerant society. With a number of militant organizations, conceived on ethnic lines – and often supported by external elements – operating in Iran and posing a threat to national security and unity, Tehran’s countermeasures should include a targeted strategy of winning the hearts and minds of the country’s ethnic minorities in order to strengthen their loyalty to land and country. Where legitimate, the government should properly address the grievances of these minorities. Intense and active consultation with minority groups should form part of this strategy of redress. The socioeconomic health of ethnic minorities in the aftermath of the lifting of sanctions is one area in obvious need of attention by Tehran. So too is the opportunity to create new programmes to meaningfully celebrate Iran’s multiethnic and multilingual population – something anticipated by Article 15 of the Iranian Constitution. Bref, diminishing internal discord in the country can only help Iran to more sustainably project influence beyond its borders, and also to parry disruptive forces and designs from outside the country. And while there is no substitute for hard power, which clearly has its place in Iranian strategy, the soft power dimension is for now underplayed and underappreciated in Tehran. But a proper national soft power strategy and push may be just the energy that the country and the region need to reckon with some of the vexing challenges of this early new century. | GB

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TÊTE À TÊTE

Trudeau, Turkey and a Tour d’Horizon GB sits down with one of North America’s most esteemed international affairs analysts Interview with JANICE STEIN

GB: How is the new Trudeau government in Ottawa doing thus far in international affairs? JS: The Trudeau government is doing brilliantly so far in rebranding Canada. I have never seen a rebranding performance as effective as that of Justin Trudeau in his first year. He has put Canada on the map. He is a sought-after companion by leaders around the world – in part because he represents a generational shift to almost all of the G7 and many of the G20 leaders. He speaks for a generation that has not yet been empowered with leadership. In a PHOTOGRAPH: COURTESY OF JANICE STEIN

quite astonishing way, Canada is the first country to really go through a generational change in leadership. So, by all reports – and not from his Canadian team, but from people in Washington, Berlin, Tokyo and other capitals – there really is great interest in the prime minister. On the substantive issues, of course, it has been not quite a year yet. Where has Trudeau made his mark? On environmental policy, he has certainly changed the conversation for Canada. Now he has to deliver domestically, and that is not in place yet. But he has really embraced an environmental agenda – quite differently from the way in which Stephen Harper really lagged badly and was dragged reluctantly into the conversation. The second big change is Trudeau’s genuine embrace of an Indigenous peoples’ agenda. That is an issue in all circumpolar countries, as well as several others, including Australia. This is probably the worst stain on Canada’s record, and Trudeau is moving in a sincerely committed way to do what he can. We do not yet know what that is going to look like in policy terms, as there has been no delivery yet, but clearly it is a big change for people looking at Canada from the outside. GB: What are the weaknesses of the new government? JS: It is too early to tell. The weaknesses will be exposed when we see the divergence between objectives and delivery. Most of the issues are not yet out of the policy shops in Ottawa. GB: What have been the surprises in the Trudeau foreign policy agenda?

Janice Stein is founding director of the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.

GB: What about risks for the Trudeau foreign policy agenda? JS: One area where there clearly are risks is Ottawa’s renewed commitment to peacekeeping. Peacekeeping was part of the mandate letters for both the foreign and defence ministers. The minister of defence is now actively talking about this commitment, and there are two potential deployments that are on the table and are likely to go forward. As we commit to deploy, we have to look at the size of our army. We just made an open-ended commitment to Latvia, with no exit strategy. There is now active talk of participating in what is close to a classical peacekeeping mission in Colombia, because there is a real peace process there. But the other mission that the minister of defence is talking about is in Mali. Frankly, that is not a peacekeeping mission. It is a commitment to assist the government in Bamako as it struggles with an Al Qaeda- and ISISled insurgency. There is a real risk of casualties, as the minister of defence himself has acknowledged. We have to bear in mind that we have a small land force. We also have huge procurement challenges in two critical areas for Canada – in naval and air capabilities. The big question is: where is the infusion of funding that will allow us to move forward on both navy and air force procurement decisions at the same time as we ramp up deployments abroad? When our forces are deployed internationally, the army legitimately says that it needs to be appropriately equipped. Our forces need the right kit. Our soldiers are in the field, and the Canadian public understands and appreciates that. So this could be an area of considerable vulnerability for the Trudeau government. GB: How is the new foreign minister, Stéphane Dion, doing thus far? JS: Again, it has been less than a year, but he has had to make one basket of particularly important decisions on the export of arms to Saudi Arabia and Thailand. For this particular minister of foreign affairs, this is not an area of great comfort, because Dion has a strong record of commitment to human rights. This is a very difficult issue for the Canadian public and for the government to figure out, because if Canada truly wishes to be part of global supply chains and to preserve some industrial capability – rather than purchasing everything that our forces

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JS: A key surprise is Trudeau’s policy posture toward Russia. Trudeau seemed to be signalling a policy of engagement early on, but when you look at what the government has done in practice to date, there is much less difference between this prime minister and the last one than many people had anticipated. Trudeau went to the NATO summit in Warsaw and made a major commitment to deploy forces in Latvia – something that certainly does not endear Ottawa to Moscow. He then went to Kiev and used language that was encouraging of the Ukrainian government. A second major surprise is the Trudeau government’s position on China. We will know much more about this in the fall, when Trudeau visits Beijing. On the South China Sea, the Permanent Court of Arbitration recently ruled firmly in favour of the Philippine side (see the Feature article by Bilahari Kausikan at p. 12). That lays down the gauntlet for all of the major powers to either endorse the ruling or not. If Trudeau is going to China, and the Chinese foreign minister is returning to Ottawa, then this may well mean that there is an agreement in the

works on certain deliverables in the relationship. It is not clear yet what those deliverables are. There is a fairly measured tone coming out of Ottawa now on a free-trade agreement with China. That, again, is not that dissimilar from what we heard from the Harper government.

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There are huge procurement challenges in two critical areas for Canada – in naval and air capabilities. The big question is: where is the infusion of funding that will allow Canada to move forward on both navy and air force procurement decisions at the same time as it ramps up deployments abroad?

will need over the next generation – then we must have a military manufacturing capacity inside the country. If we do not export, then we are clearly not going to have that capacity, as our domestic market is too small. So it is misleading to think about such decisions as being only about human rights. Human rights are certainly part of the issue. Jobs also. But this is part of a much larger industrial strategy for Canada. We have to decide: do we just want to buy off the shelf globally, and therefore take ourselves out of the business completely?

Chinese will react with some anger to the recent ruling and attempt to reinforce their position in the South China Sea. That will be a major foreign policy challenge for any US president. The second decision point is Russia and that country’s behaviour. The new US president will, as with Obama today, need to walk and chew gum at the same time – deal with the Ukraine situation and the NATO buildup in Eastern Europe, just as he or she engages in deep negotiations with Moscow for a joint strategy for Syria, and possibly for other theatres in the Middle East.

GB: What should we be watching for in the US election?

GB: What about America’s strategy for Europe?

JS: There has never been an election like this in the US. It is utterly astonishing. There has never been a candidate who is as unqualified as Donald Trump to be president. I am astonished by the behaviour of the Republican leadership. The entire Bush family stands out because it has refused to endorse Trump. In my view, that is exactly the right strategy. I am mystified that Paul Ryan and other Republican leaders could endorse him. For the Republican Party, this election is about what that party stands for the morning after a potential Trump loss. Those people who endorsed him and those people who are going to run with him will bear a heavy responsibility. GB: What if Trump wins? JS: That is possible. The experts in American politics give that a low probability right now, because the electoral college calculus is overwhelmingly biased in favour of Hillary Clinton. That said, campaigns matter. Debates matter. What happened to Hillary Clinton in respect of her behaviour in the State Department is deeply damaging to her. The director of the FBI said that if she were an employee of the State Department, she would lose her job and would be ineligible for security clearance. People hear that and ask themselves, “Is there a trust issue here?” The American public is clearly saying that there is indeed a trust issue. So it is a mistake to assume that this is a foregone conclusion. It would, of course, be catastrophic to have Donald Trump as president. This would be the most unqualified, inexperienced and poorly prepared person in a position to use the world’s most dangerous weapons. By all accounts, he does not like briefings. He shoots from the hip, over and over. It is terrifying to much of the rest of the world to watch this election. GB: What are the big international decisions that the next US president will need to make? JS: They are legion. The first one will be in respect of China, because it is entirely conceivable that the

JS: That is an enormous challenge, because we have a splintered Europe. I do not think that any US president has really had to deal with such fractures in Europe for the past four decades. Of course, there is not much that an American president can do. A new president can certainly encourage the Germans to be forthcoming with Britain, and to resist a punitive strategy. I suspect that is why the British government is delaying invoking article 50 of the Lisbon Treaty (see Strategic Futures at p. 62). Still, as we saw with Barack Obama when he tried unsuccessfully to influence British voters, Europe will make its own decisions. The UK will make its own decisions. This is going to be a long process. It is going to consume the next two to three years. Europe will be looking inward rather than outward. The kind of support that an American president might wish to get from Europe on major foreign policy issues will not be there. This is really a continent turning inward at the very time when there are big challenges in Eastern Europe, in the Middle East, and in Asia. GB: How should the next American president interpret the recent events in Turkey (see the In Situ article by Mitat Celikpala and Sinem Akgul Acikmese at p. 6, as well as Definition at p. 60)? JS: The attempted coup was a tragedy for the Turks. Turkey is a vitally important country at the nexus of Europe and Asia, bordering the volatile Middle East. It is also in the midst of a vital struggle to lead the way to a democratic political system that is compatible with its rich Muslim and Ottoman heritage. Even before the coup, Erdogan was seeking to rewrite the constitution in order to consolidate power in the office of the president. His Islamic party was joined by the secular opposition in resisting the coup, but Erdogan is now using the coup as an excuse to crush any opposition inside the military, the judiciary, the media and the universities.The next US president will have only limited leverage, and can only urge Erdogan to end the state of emergency and restore civil liberties. Here, too, the US is only a bystander at a critical moment in history.

GB: What about other conflicts and decision points in the Middle East? JS: Obama’s nuclear agreement with Iran was certainly one of his signature achievements (see the Query article by Sam Sasan Shoamanesh at p. 34). History will confirm this. Obama is underappreciated for the leadership and courage that he showed. There is no question that he prevented what could have been one of the worst wars in the region – a war with Israel and Saudi Arabia lined up on one side, and Iran lined up on the other. It would have been devastating. There would have been city-to-city warfare of an order of magnitude that the Middle East has really not seen since the Iran-Iraq war in the 1980s. We sometimes misunderstand how devastating conventional war could be between a country the size of Iran and a country with a concentrated population like Israel. It would have been a catastrophe – an absolute catastrophe. I think that Obama has not gotten the credit he deserves. GB: Would Israel not potentially use a nuclear weapon were it overwhelmed in a conventional war or by missiles? JS: I am not convinced that this would be the case, because Israel’s missile defences are quite good. Its offensive capability is real. A nuclear strike would truly be a last resort. Israel would have to be on the verge of total defeat – a truly Samson option. GB: What about the Syrian theatre? JS: In Syria, Obama followed a logic that is very clear, although the consequences are troubling. Obama said that the war in Syria would only have escalated had the US intervened with ground forces. So that was off the table. The second alternative was to arm militia forces. Obama refused to do that. The limited evidence that we have already shows the leakage of weapons that happens when militias are armed at a distance. The ongoing civil war has led to a massive refugee exodus from Syria, which has overwhelmed Europe. That refugee exodus – those visuals of people marching through European fields – is responsible more than anything else for spooking the British public. These are the unexpected consequences of the Syrian crisis and associated decision-making in distant capitals.

JS: The Libyan intervention was a case where, under the doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect, the US mobilized allies and promised Russia that this would be a limited intervention designed to protect

GB: Is there anything that a new American president can do in the Middle East? JS: Obama is already changing gears. There are all kinds of rumours and leaks about a collaborative strategy with Russia in which the two countries would establish a joint intelligence centre, a joint command structure, and intelligence-sharing targeting Al Nusra (now apparently Jabhat Fatah Al Sham). Targeting Al Nusra in Syria is entirely legitimate if you think that the major problems are Islamist forces in this part of the world. However, it plays to the advantage of Assad. So what the next American president inherits is a strategy that has effectively given up on forcing Assad to leave – that is, a transition will only happen way down the road. For its part, Europe will buy into any arrangement that will halt the refugee flow. And Turkey, now preoccupied with the aftermath of the attempted coup, and struggling with a demoralized military, will be less vociferous in its opposition to Assad. GB: What is the future of Israel (see In Situ article by Ephraim Kam at p. 26)? JS: As a result of Netanyahu’s policies toward Palestine, the Israeli government is under tremendous pressure from the EU. This really matters because Israeli research and science funding, which is at the core of Israel’s strategy for economic success, comes overwhelmingly from the EU. Having said this, over the last two or three years, as a result of ISIS and the war in Syria and the rivalry with Iran, Israel, in functional terms, has, for the first time in its history, very good relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. It has excellent relationships with Jordan. It has repaired its relationship with Turkey. And it has excellent relations with Egypt. There is deep military cooperation between the two countries in the Sinai Desert. In terms of the regional picture, then, this is probably the time of greatest historical security for Israel. It only faces one conventional threat now – on one border. In the past, it always faced multi-front wars. Israel today faces a moderate to serious conventional threat from Hezbollah, at its northern border with Lebanon. Hezbollah has about 130,000 missiles and rockets, which it can use to effectively reach any part of Israel and paralyze the local population and the economy. (continued) For the rest of the interview with Janice Stein,

The kind of support that an American president might wish to get from Europe on major foreign policy issues will not be there. This is really a continent turning inward at the very time when there are big challenges in Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and Asia.

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GB: Was the Libyan intervention not critical to these consequences?

civilians. However, the intervention very quickly escalated to regime change, infuriating Russia and provoking a change in policy in Moscow with which we are all living today.

visit the GB website at: www.globalbrief.ca

Quelle Europe après le Brexit?

QUERY

Vers une Union repensée pour assurer la pérennité du mode de vie européen dans le monde de demain PAR HUBERT VÉDRINE

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Comme si la liberté, l’ouverture, le bonheur, l’espoir et l’amitié entre les peuples en Europe, ne dépendaient que de la seule forme d’intégration communautaire forcée des deux dernières décennies. Mais c’est un autre débat…

e Brexit peut s’analyser de deux façons: une aberration britannique à circonscrire au plus vite, ou bien le symptôme extrême d’un mal perceptible dans toute l’Union, voire le décrochage des peuples par rapport à la construction européenne (voir Strategic Futures à la page 62). En France, depuis le vote du Brexit, les milieux dirigeants, qui s’attachent à l’objectif presque mythologique d’une «Union sans cesse plus étroite», sont pour le moment sur la ligne de l’absurdité britannique. Le Royaume-Uni se séparerait d’une Europe qui, jusqu’ici, marchait bien, pour des raisons populistes, démagogiques et des mensonges des partisans du Brexit. Et donc ils voudraient que Londres enclenche dès que possible la sortie, avec l’article 50 (bien que la nouvelle première ministre, Theresa May, ne l’entend pas ainsi). Cela ne serait donc qu’un problème britannique. Pour ces élites françaises, l’évidence que l’Union s’est mêlée trop, de tout, et de n’importe quoi, abusivement et lourdement, comme le dit Jean-Claude Juncker lui-même, que trop de promesses exagérées ont été faites au nom de l’Europe et se sont retournées contre elle, est niée. C’est seulement la ligne suivie qui aurait été mauvaise (la fameuse «austérité», en réalité assez limitée mais obligatoire pour mettre fin à un endettement toujours aggravé) et mériterait d’être corrigée, et non pas l’abus de décisions détaillées et trop intrusives du niveau européen (du fait de la Commission, du Parlement, de la Cour, et des États membres euxmêmes), finalement confiscatoires de la démocratie. Ceux-là défendent l’idée d’une «relance» à l’identique – c’est-à-dire d’une intégration renforcée de la zone euro. Cette ligne est dominante dans les milieux financiers, mais pas seulement: création d’un ministre des finances de la zone euro, d’un trésor, d’un budget, etc. (sans même préconiser un contrôle accru des parlements nationaux). Problème politique: on ne voit pas en quoi ce surcroît d’intégration enthousiasmerait les eurosceptiques, ou en quoi cela calmerait les euro-allergiques, sans même parler des anti-européens. L’accord de l’Allemagne n’est même pas assuré pour une relance de ce type qui réduirait les pouvoirs de son ministre des finances. Et si au bout du compte cela impose un changement de traité, serait-il ratifiable? Rien n’est moins sûr. Bref, on peut prédire que cette idée de relance autiste, fondée sur plus d’intégration dans la zone euro, ne trouvera pas l’accord des 27 surtout englués dans la gestion du Brexit, avec un nouveau

gouvernement britannique déterminé à avancer à son rythme (pas de déclenchement de l’article 50 avant le début 2017) et à défendre ses intérêts, et risque de provoquer un désenchantement ultérieur accru des Européens par erreur de diagnostic sur l’origine du rejet, et erreur de réaction. Une autre approche, apparemment plus novatrice, circule, notamment à Paris et dans d’autres capitales: celle de «recentrer» l’Europe sur les sujets «qui intéressent les gens»: on cite la sécurité, la défense, la croissance, l’emploi et l’immigration. C’est déjà un progrès d’écouter «les gens». Mais chaque point se discute. La sécurité? Cela constituerait à refonder un Schengen viable et contrôlable. C’est indispensable et cela devrait être sans doute la priorité qui s’imposera avec une harmonisation réelle des critères. La défense? Ce serait très nouveau si tous les pays d’Europe sont prêts à hisser leur budget de la défense à deux pour cent du PIB pour constituer ensuite le «pilier européen» de l’alliance atlantique. Véritable révolution! Sinon, on parle surtout de coopérations industrielles entre Européens, très souhaitables bien sûr, mais dont on connaît les difficultés de mise en œuvre. L’immigration? Il s’agirait de gérer les flux avec les pays de départ, et de transit même si cela ne les enthousiasme pas – ce qu’on aurait dû faire depuis longtemps. Mais parler de croissance et d’emploi: à force de prétendre que l’Europe va s’occuper d’encore plus de choses et finalement de tout, de créer de nouvelles attentes ne va-t-elle pas passer aux yeux de l’opinion pour responsable de tout, ne va-t-on pas aggraver ce qui a nourri la frustration et le mécontentement général des peuples européens? N’est-ce pas contradictoire avec l’aspiration des peuples à une démocratie plus proche? Ce serait une pompe aspirante, soit le contraire exact du principe de subsidiarité. Donc par empilement, et accumulation, une dépossession accrue des démocraties nationales – surtout si rien n’est fait au préalable pour restituer des compétences au niveau national et stopper la furie normalisatrice, des partenaires de la codécision communautaires, Commission et Parlement, paradoxalement poussés par les gouvernements nationaux aveugles qui demandent, France en tête, plus de réglementation détaillée dès qu’ils croient que cela les aide contre des concurrents. Ce «plus d’Europe», quoique mieux présenté et mieux fondé que la simple et automatique poursuite de l’intégration, est voué lui aussi, au bout du compte, à un échec probable, en tout cas à des déceptions

PHOTOGRAPHIE: LA PRESSE CANADIENNE / AP / KAMIL ZIHNIOGLU

seront nombreux à ce sujet (être durs ou accommodants avec le Royaume-Uni?). Mais ils devraient aussi fixer rapidement les contours d’une nouvelle subsidiarité rétroactive, retirer certaines missions à la Commission, réduire le nombre de ses fonctionnaires (33 000), et assigner après cela quelques rares nouvelles missions clefs (sécurité, influence, préparation de l’avenir) à cette Union repensée essentiellement pour assurer la pérennité du mode de vie européen dans le monde de demain, ce qui permettrait à la démocratie de retrouver son espace et sa légitimité au sein de chaque État membre. Mais cela suppose que les États membres s’auto-disciplinent et cessent de pousser la Commission à régle-

menter «plus» et de s’insurger quand ce sont d’autres États membres qui le font. Cette Europe-là aurait des chances d’être à nouveau écoutée, comprise et soutenue par les peuples. Mais, pour le moment, ce n’est pas l’hypothèse la plus probable. Toutes les énergies européennes vont d’abord être consacrées en vérité à gérer les suites compliquées du Brexit. À cet égard, le Royaume-Uni saura plus vite ce qu’elle veut que les dirigeants de l’Union. Les tensions qui en découleront seront fortes pendant un temps indéterminé. Parallèlement, le système européen va tout faire pour éviter une remise en cause sérieuse et persévérer à l’identique, avec quelques changements cosmétiques. Il faut souhaiter qu’il n’y parvienne pas et que les gouvernements qui se soucient de l’avenir de l’Europe reprennent la main, car sinon ce serait une occasion perdue. | GB

Hubert Védrine est ancien ministre des Affaires étrangères de la France.

Le président français François Hollande participe à une réunion au palais de l’Élysée avec le président du Conseil européen Donald Tusk (Paris, juin 2016). G LO B A L B R I E F • FA L L 2 0 1 6

tant les résultats seront éloignés des espérances. Une réaction plus radicale est possible pour enrayer le décrochage des peuples même si les gouvernements ne semblent pas s’orienter dans ce sens. «Tenir compte des peuples», comme on l’entend, cela signifierait d’abord, avant toute autre proposition, que les gouvernements convaincus (c’est indispensable), à commencer par la France et l’Allemagne, s’ils étaient d’accord, imposent à la Commission et au Parlement, par une «subsidiarité» massive et drastique (on ne décide au niveau européen que ce que l’on ne peut pas décider efficacement en dessous), une authentique diète normative stoppant la surenchère dans la réglementation – un arrêt de la réglementation «à outrance», pour reprendre l’expression de JeanClaude Juncker. Que les États qui ont eux-mêmes, tout à tour, la France largement en tête, alimenté cette fuite en avant, dans des règlements ultra détaillés, ou pour faire passer via «l’Europe» des textes au niveau national s’auto-disciplinent. Il est vrai que seule la Commission en a fait sa raison d’être. Mais cela ne change rien au problème politique et à la nécessité politique de le résoudre pour enrayer la désaffection des peuples. On peut comprendre que la Commission européenne et le Parlement européen ne puissent soutenir une t e l l e a p p ro ch e q u i t o u ch e à l’essence-même, même si la lucidité de Jean-Claude Juncker et de Frans Timmermans et le bon sens du président Donald Tusk doivent être salués. On peut comprendre également que deux ou trois générations qui avaient fini par faire de l’intégration européenne le combat de leur vie, en France notamment, après que toutes leurs autres croyances se soient effondrées ou aient été balayées par l’évolution du monde, se sentent totalement perdues, et luttent de toutes leurs forces contre toute remise en cause de ce système. Comme si la liberté, l’ouverture, le bonheur, l’espoir et l’amitié entre les peuples en Europe, ne dépendaient que de la seule forme d’intégration communautaire forcée des deux dernières décennies. Mais c’est un autre débat… C’est pour cela qu’il me semble que pour enrayer la désaffection croissante des peuples européens envers la construction européenne, dont le Brexit n’est que le signe le plus spectaculaire et le plus perturbant, les gouvernements les plus déterminés devraient saisir l’occasion du Conseil européen informel convoqué à Bratislava à la mi-septembre. Certes, ils auront à négocier le Brexit et les désaccords

As the world focusses on its moves internationally, Moscow’s awkward domestic dance continues in the region it understands least BY IRINA STARODUBROVSKAYA

RUSSIA’S MOST COMPLEX THEATRE

THE NORTH CAUCASUS Irina Starodubrovskaya is Director of the Centre for Political Economy and Regional Development in the Gaidar

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Institute in Moscow.

f asymmetrical federalism remains topical in Russia, then it applies most directly to the complex North Caucasus region. The North Caucasus is distinct from other Russian regions in multiple ways – for some observers, because of its deeply archaic nature, the adherence of most of its population to Islam, its susceptibility to conflict, and the prevalence of violent social practices. Of course, some might contend that there is little that is fundamentally unique about the region, as clannism, corruption, limited upward mobility, and a predisposition to violent dispute resolution are present in many parts of contemporary Russia. The truth, of course, lies somewhere between these two camps. The North Caucasus macro-region is indeed very different from most other Russian regions, though it is not internally monolithic: the larger constituent republics are Dagestan (population of approximately three million) and Chechnya (population of 1.4 million), while the smaller republics, each with populations of less than 500,000, are Ingushetia and Karachay-Cherkessia. Multiethnic (with Avars, Dargin, Kumyks and Lezgin) and very Islamized, Dagestan is different from the ethnically homogeneous and more traditional (though also Islamized) Chechnya and Ingushetia. The Northeast Caucasus, which includes these three republics, is different from the Northwest Caucasus, which includes Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia, and North Ossetia-Alania. The most distinct province is Stavropol Krai, which is culturally much closer to other Russian regions, and where diverse values and ethnic groups often collide due to regular migration into the province. For purposes of public policy, no less important than the particularities of North Caucasian societies

PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / SERGEI GRITS

Friday prayer at the mosque on Kotrova Street in Dagestan’s regional capital Makhachkala, Russia, November 2015.

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is the need for these not to be supplanted by myths and stereotypes that have been built up over time in the Russian public and policy understanding. For now, public policy in contemporary Russia is in many ways still based on unsophisticated representations of the North Caucasus – perceived as depressed, primitive and inhabited by a passive population. Indeed, the key defect of present-day Russian public policy in the North Caucasus is that it does not take account of the not inconsiderable internal resources of the region – to wit, the existence of centres of economic development and modernization (including in the underground economy), an active, young and increasingly urban population, and also a proper culture of dialogue in the resolution of conflicts. There are arguably four dominant Russian policy stereotypes of the North Caucasus

that must be corrected in order to make the national policy approach to the region more effective.

Stereotype 1: The North Caucasus is a depressed region with high unemployment and no resources for investment.

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The key defect of present-day Russian public policy in the North Caucasus is that it does not take account of the not inconsiderable internal resources of the region – to wit, the existence of centres of economic development and modernization (including in the underground economy).

he policy approach taken by Moscow envisages the development of the Caucasus through private investment from outside the region, accompanied by significant state guarantees as compensation for the high investment risks. Moscow presumes that such development – starting with the regional tourist industry – can create jobs and otherwise decrease the tensions in the region. In reality, this policy approach has run into serious problems of implementation. While external investments (external to the Caucasus, but still largely Russian) have flowed into some of the North Caucasian provinces – first and foremost, to Stavropol Krai and the republics of the Northwest Caucasus – these investments have been unable to substantially change the economic situation on the ground. For its part, the Northeast Caucasus has seen no real external investment projects, except those launched strictly for demonstration purposes and delivered by politically motivated local oligarchs. What happened? The push to deliver large-scale projects with outside investment significantly increased conflict between private investors and local residents. Lands proposed for the projects belonged to local residents. Thus, instead of giving local people sources of survival and reason for hope, the investments were seen by these people as a threat – that is, as presenting the prospect of expropriation, as well as the sudden need to compete with new and more powerful economic actors. This led, predictably, to public protests, resulting in the delay or termination of certain projects. Bref, the North Caucasus is not a stagnant, depressed region. But if the economic processes in the North Caucasus are highly differentiated across the different territories, and if there are some areas of economic dynamism and modernization in both the official and underground economies, then it follows that external investors will often enter into competition with internal projects. In this context, the chief problem of the macro-region is not so much its depressed state and unemployment as the lack of protection for entrepreneurs and workers, the precariousness of labour and income, and the absence of social guarantees combined with widespread black market activity – not to mention ineffectual institutional mechanisms for insuring against agricultural risks. There are therefore no long-term economic incentives for private investors, resulting in a public preference for quick-

spend projects and conspicuous consumption. Economic policy for the Caucasus should, as a matter of priority, operate on the basis of the internal resources of the region, including support for local economic projects at the level of municipal governments, the removal of barriers to accelerated economic development based on the self-organization of local communities, support for the existing tourism infrastructure, and support for small- and medium-sized businesses and start-ups. Moreover, a policy of careful legalization of the underground economy must be developed, based on negotiations and consultations with local business groups and associations.

Stereotype 2: The core problems in the North Caucasus have an ethnic character – or, interethnic tensions are the foundation of the conflict potential in the region.

n Russian public policy, ethnicity is typically taken to be something fixed and unalterable. The conflicts in the Caucasus region are therefore seen as inevitably springing from the very nature of things, as it were. There really is no precise strategic framework to address the ethnic issues in the region, but instead a deference to quite general sociological concepts and constructs, the creation of state organs responsible for national policy in strictly functional terms, as well as organs trading in extreme forms of intervention, including through the use of force in conflicts that reach a ‘hot’ stage. What are the real factors that strengthen or weaken interethnic tensions in the North Caucasus – that is, what are the factors that are so poorly appreciated by Russian policy-makers? First, power and property are the foundation of nearly all of the conflicts between ethnicities in the region. The absence of normal democratic mechanisms for transitions of power, the absence of strong property rights protections, and especially the non-susceptibility of land questions to regulation, all lead to heightened tensions. Land problems are aggravated by the extant moratorium on the privatization of land. Land conflicts are most characteristic of Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria, where highly discretionary administrative decision-making in respect of land and abuse of power are relatively common. In Dagestan, flat lands are also used for the migration of highlanders (gortsy), which leads to increased tension between incumbent residents and newcomers or settlers, along ethnic lines. At the same time, in Karachay-Cherkessia, where land reform was undertaken and there is, exceptionally, no moratorium on land purchases, such conflicts are less common – although, of course, at the end of the 1990s, there were extremely sharp (prima facie

Stereotype 3: Intra-Islamic conflict in the North Caucasus is linked to the fact that the Islam that is traditional to this region is unlike the radical variant imported from Arabia (the adherents of which are, or will become, terrorists or supporters of terrorists).

ussian public policy is based, on the one hand, on unconditional support for socalled traditional, official Islam and, on the other hand, the suppression of alternative Islamic currents. This suppression sometimes even includes maltreatment of people based on their appearance (e.g. women in hijabs and men with beards). The results of this policy approach are mixed. Terrorist activity in the North Caucasus has been largely crushed, including through special operations and clampdowns. However, it is not obvious that this outcome is sustainable – for one thing, there has been a massive exodus of North Caucasian youth to Syria. Ultimately, the price that will be paid is high: bloated state security forces, massive infringement of citizens’ rights based on people’s religious beliefs, marginalization of large numbers of young people, and underground radicalization as a reaction to violent repression. What is the reality of the relationship between conflict and Islam in the region? First, there are important internal factors driving North Caucasian youth to reject traditional Islam in favour of more fundamentalist strands of Islam – specifically, the profound shifts in the nature of social relations in the North Caucasus, intergenerational conflicts, the erosion of traditional sources of authority in the region, social protest, and the tendency of the younger generations to search for a fairer system of rules and norms in the absence of social and professional upward mobility. To be sure, not everyone in the North Caucasus who has switched to Islamic fundamentalism is radicalized. Instead, the believers arguably fall into three categories, depending on how they see their place in contemporary society, how they conceive of their future goals, and how they wish to achieve these goals: first, Muslims who wish to live according to Islam at home and in their family life, observing all of the rules, but without pursuing any political goals; second, Muslims working to stand up a caliphate in the long run, by peaceful means, and only when the necessary conditions are in place; and third, Muslims who wish to create the caliphate immediately, by violent means. Evidently, having a uniform policy approach, based on force and involving massive infringements of citizens’ rights, for all three groups leads only to increased protest and radicalization – even if the use of force is manifestly legitimate against the

Land conflicts are most characteristic of Dagestan and KabardinoBalkaria, where highly discretionary administrative decisionmaking in respect of land and abuse of power are relatively common.

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interethnic) internal conflicts over political power in Karachay-Cherkessia. Second, many of the interethnic conflicts – once again, interethnic in form, but essentially about land – are the long-term consequence of the deportations of the Stalin period and the less well known compensatory repopulations in which the residents of other territories were resettled by force to take the place of deported people. When those deported returned, tensions erupted among conflicting claimants – most famously in the Prigorodny district of North Ossetia and in lands in and near Dagestan’s Khasavyurt district, where Chechens are trying to re-establish the Aukhovsky district (which existed prior to their deportation). Of course, these are very complex problems for which the path to resolution is not yet apparent. Third, in the cities of the North Caucasus – especially in the larger cities of Chechnya and Dagestan – ethnic identity is starting to fade due to the high rate of urbanization. It is being supplanted by urban identity, and often by Islamic identity. This transformation is not fully appreciated and incorporated into policy – that is, the new supra-ethnic character and consciousness of these urban communities are not taken into account. To regulate interethnic conflicts, the central policy task is surely the resolution of land questions. This is a manifestly complicated task, given that a significant part of the land is already allocated through corrupt practices (with the allocation acquiring ‘legal’ status). At the same time, the land is in many cases used according to customary law and unofficial norms, on the basis of decisions made by local communities. Migration also causes problems. In Dagestan, for example, there are more than 200 unregistered population settlements as a result of highlander migration to flat lands. Questions have been raised about settlement legalization, against which the residents of flat lands began to protest publicly from the start of the 1990s. Of course, national movements exploit all of these problems – typically without any interest in a peaceful resolution. Policy here should be restarted from scratch. For it is impossible to change the general present equilibrium in land relations – specifically, to bring these into the legal sphere – without a rapid escalation of conflict. An alternative process should review land relations on a case-by-case basis – that is, gradually, on the basis of compromises and non-zero sum solutions, levering the authority of the state, but without direct pressure on the relevant parties. Given that regional level officials often belong to particular ethnicities and may even represent the interests of these minorities in a conflict, this process should be curated by the authorities at the level of the North Caucasus federal ‘okrug,’ which sits between the federal and regional levels of Russian government.

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The use of force is manifestly legitimate against the third of these three groups, and especially against those involved in violent or terrorist activities, or who call for armed struggle against the Russian state.

third of these groups, and especially against those involved in violent or terrorist activities, or who call for armed struggle against the Russian state. Overall, however, public policy in this area must be significantly transformed, putting at its core not pressure by force, but rather measures to advance civic agreement and consensus. Some attempts were made at such a policy posture in various Caucasian republics, but they were inconsistent and ultimately negligible in impact. The policy settings must be based on the following: sustained protection of the principle of freedom of conscience in Russian law (as guaranteed by the Constitution); development of civic dialogue, including intra-Islamic dialogue; the creation of robust institutions for the reintegration of fighters into civilian life; the establishment of credible civilian control and oversight over force operations; guarantees against religious discrimination in employment and mobility rights; and inclusion of Muslim youth in different mechanisms and processes of socialization. The region also requires a sophisticated policy revamp for its Sharia courts. While Sharia courts should not be suppressed, guarantees in respect of the life and health of Russian citizens should be fully protected, and attempts to violate these guarantees on the basis of Sharia law should be stopped. The primacy of Russian law must be strengthened by increasing its efficiency and fairness – a major challenge today in the North Caucasus, given that the professionalism of Russian courts in the region is low, and corruption is widespread.

Stereotype 4: Clannism and corruption in the North Caucasus can be overcome by political will, using the legal mechanisms currently available.

his was the governing ideology of the last major ‘cleansing’ campaign targeting abuse of power, when a large number of criminal charges were laid against members of the political elites in the region – especially in Dagestan. What was partly broken in this and past similar campaigns was the link between guerrilla fighters (militant groups) and North Caucasian elites, leading to a weakening of the armed or underground resistance. However, given the structure of Caucasian societies, such initiatives will not have enduring systemic effects. The overwhelming majority of the residents of the North Caucasus tend to solve their problems with the help of clan-related mechanisms, including through influential relatives. Although the growth of cities and economic development of the region will gradually break down the universality of these mechanisms, this will not happen quickly. Clan-based practices and corruption are common to North Caucasian elites. The high degree

of ‘closedness’ – largely preserved from the Soviet period – is particularly characteristic of elite groups in Dagestan and Kabardino-Balkaria. The situation is different in Chechnya, where elites changed as a result of social shocks and wars, and where the principle of ‘loyalty in exchange for social mobility’ remains du jour. In the Chechen context, of course, authoritarian rule militates against the recruitment of the most talented and capable into the elites. Indeed, the most educated youth try to leave the republic. The character of the North Caucasian elites not only freezes the development of the republics, but also holds the federal government hostage, with huge grants from Moscow to the region accumulating primarily within the elite groups. Cuts in these grants from Moscow, if significant, could lead to social disturbances, provoked by these very groups. This leads to the vexed question of whether there needs to be a wholesale ‘renewal’ of North Caucasian elites as a prerequisite to regional development. For one thing, free elections in the North Caucasus could to some extent improve the situation, but would almost certainly result in the reshuffling of the same political class. Indeed, the key ‘real’ opposition to the old elite is an Islamized youth, whose integration into political power would come with its own – granted, sometimes exaggerated – political risks. Large-scale educational programmes, along the lines of the selective kadroviy rezerv programme launched by the Russian government in 2008, are critical for the creation of a community of highly talented North Caucasian youth – indeed, to create a future regional elite – with modern skills and a broad outlook, capable of developing their own views on the challenges and strategic prospects of the North Caucasus. These programmes should include the study of modern administrative methods, immersion in new cultural contexts, linguistic training, and also practical exposure to the cultures, economies and public systems of other countries, at both the national and local levels. Bref, the fundamental weakness of contemporary Russian policy settings in the North Caucasus consists in the fact that they do not recognize and do not properly account for the internal resources of the region. Incorrect diagnostique leads to incorrect and often counterproductive policy moves in practice. The decrease of conflict potential, the introduction of democratic political mechanisms, and credible guarantees of rights and freedoms for people of all religious and ethnic groups – all of these are part of a revised institutional framework that can lighten the inevitable problems of transitioning to a more modern, urbanized society in the North Caucasus, and form the basis for proper use of the human, economic and natural potential of the region. | GB

IN THE CABINET ROOM

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ILLUSTRATION: DUSAN PETRICIC

David Skilling

Why and how small advanced economies – the canaries in the coal mine – are signalling the emergence of new fault lines in the global economy

is Director at Landfall Strategy Group

BY DAVID SKILLING

in Singapore.

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HOW ARE THE SMALL COUNTRIES DOING?

he norms, ideas and institutions that have provided the foundation for the global economic system for decades are under great pressure. Consider the protectionist rhetoric in the US presidential campaign, the growing challenges facing European integration – most obviously in the Brexit vote – and the increasingly explicit role of geopolitics in shaping international commerce, including trade agreements such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). All of this may not yet amount to a reversal of globalization, but it is a marked step away from the hyperglobalization of the past 25 years – a period of very strong growth in cross-border trade and investment. To better understand the emerging fault lines in globalization and the potential for disruptive change, it is instructive to look at the experience of small advanced economies – that is, countries like New Zealand, Singapore, the Nordics, the Baltic states, Switzerland, the Netherlands and Israel. As I noted in the Spring/Summer 2013 issue of GB, such small advanced economies have long served as a good barometer of the health and functioning of the global economic system. Because

they are acutely exposed to the global economy, global dynamics show up cleanly and quickly in these countries. To be sure, small advanced economies have prospered in an era of intense, rules-based globalization. However, recent small-country experience suggests a much more challenging political economy of globalization. Small countries are reflecting a global context that has much in common with the 1970s – a period of slowing, volatile growth, domestic political unrest, and a fluid international economic system. For the most part, small advanced economies are responding quickly and creatively to this emerging environment. And yet the scale and nature of the new fault lines in the global economic system, as well as the potential for rupture, commend themselves to an aggressive watching brief. Small advanced economies are pointing to the emergence of three fault lines in the global economy: increased domestic economic and political pressures from globalization; challenges to existing models of regional economic integration; and, finally, a more explicit interaction between international economics and politics.

Domestic Pressures. Small advanced economies benefited enormously from the intense processes of globalization over the past 25 years. The high, growing exports and outward investment shares,

7 WIDE x 9.685 HIGH

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ILLUSTRATION: FLAVIO MORAIS

Relative to larger economies, small countries have managed globalization well. This policy approach has helped to sustain solid public support for openness and globalization.

as well as the successful activities of small-country multinational companies, have supported strong economic performance by small countries. The strategic posture of most small countries is deeply outwardly oriented, aimed at building positions of competitive advantage through high-quality policy settings and investments in innovation and public goods like education and strong social insurance systems. Relative to larger economies, small countries have managed globalization well. This policy approach has helped to sustain solid public support for openness and globalization. Nevertheless, the experience of globalization in small countries is changing in ways that are weakening public support for openness and requiring different policy approaches. For example, strong migration rates are placing pressure on labour markets and infrastructure in several small countries. Some governments are responding with increasingly tough stances on migration, with referenda in Switzerland on restricting migration, and Singapore imposing tighter controls on migration. In Europe – from Austria to the Nordics – this trend has been exacerbated by large refugee inflows from the Greater Middle East. Similarly, ultra-loose monetary policy in the US and the Eurozone is having disruptive spillover effects on small economies, leading to strongly appreciating exchange rates (Switzerland and New Zealand), rapidly appreciating property prices (the Nordics and New Zealand), and low or negative inflation rates (Singapore and Sweden). This is creating significant complications for small-country policy-makers as they try to deliver strong growth rates, low (targeted) inflation, and general financial stability. From Switzerland to Israel, then, and from Singapore to New Zealand, small countries are intervening more actively in foreign exchange markets and establishing restrictions on foreign ownership. There are also indications of increased smallcountry resistance to international liberalization in the service sectors. In New Zealand, for example, there has been a surprisingly high level of protest against specific aspects of the TPP deal – such as the investor-state dispute settlement mechanism – as well as against liberalization in a general sense. Bref, the instinctive small-country support for globalization is weakening as global engagement presents increasingly material challenges and risks to growth, employment and asset prices. That these behaviours are observed consistently across quintessentially open small economies that have profited substantially from globalization suggests structural changes in attitudes toward globalization. This is, in other words, more than concern about globalization from the usual suspects or discontents. Small-country governments are responding with a more managed approach that allows them

to exercise more policy discretion in areas that are economically or politically important. Of course, this is a tough balancing act. And in larger countries, from France to the UK and the US, there is frequently a less calibrated response, with greater protectionist sentiment, as governments respond to global forces that are reaching further inside national economies.

Regional Integration Challenges. An important driver of globalization over the past few decades has been regional integration: 70 percent of European trade is intraregional in nature, as is 50 percent of Asian and 60 percent of North American trade. Formal regional arrangements in Europe, Asia and the Americas, such as the EU, ASEAN and NAFTA, together with the connective tissue of regional supply chains and infrastructure networks, have shown that globalization remains heavily regionally organized. Small countries have long placed regional economic integration at the centre of their economic strategies. In Europe, of course, the Benelux countries were the founding nations of the six-member European Economic Community. Subsequently, other small European countries became very active participants in the EU. For its part, ASEAN is a central element of Singapore’s external strategy. Indeed, only two small countries have developed into advanced economies without deep integration into their respective regional economies: New Zealand (for geographic reasons), and Israel (for geopolitical reasons). But for the overwhelming majority of small countries, regional economic integration is a strategic imperative. In this context, it is striking that small countries have been at the forefront of resisting more intensive European regional engagement. Northern European economies like the Netherlands have long been signalling frustration with Brussels on issues such as the patchy application of economic and fiscal rules, as well as the bailouts of countries like Greece. Other recent examples include Iceland suspending EU membership negotiations, the latest ‘No’ vote in a Danish referendum in 2015 on removing that country’s opt-out from several EU home and justice policy matters, the 2014 Swiss referendum vote to impose limits on immigration, and Finland’s foreign minister suggesting in December of last year that Euro membership had been a mistake for Finland. The Austrian presidential election result in May of this year – now to be rerun this fall – was another signal of increased nationalism in a small European country. Tighter regional integration is being challenged by a desire for greater domestic policy autonomy to respond to issues in ways that reflect the local context, as well as by associated concerns about the political legitimacy of decision-making at the centre of very large economic blocs. There is little small-

economy appetite for formal European integration – that is, into an economic or fiscal union, or into some deeper federal framework. Instead, there is a consistent view in small northern European countries on EU reform that emphasizes a looser model of integration based on the primacy of nation-states, clear rules, and a liberal approach. Small economies are not decoupling from their respective regions in response to these emerging political pressures, but are instead trying to alter the balance between domestic and regional-level policy autonomy. By contrast, larger economies are more disposed to push for a more centralized model with institutions such as an economic and fiscal union, or to completely separate in a quest for national sovereignty (as reflected in the UK’s Brexit vote). Small economies, in turn, see both of the latter approaches as containing fundamental dangers. Although post-Brexit opinion polls in several small countries confirm ongoing strong support for EU membership, the small-economy experience clearly indicates that there are fault lines emerging in regional integration. If this pressure is not well managed by the EU member states, both individually and collectively, it could quickly lead to institutional unravelling that weakens the global economy.

Geopolitics. The liberal, rules-based global eco-

A careful release of pressure through calibrated policy may lead the global economy to a better, more sustainable position. Alternatively, growing pressure could cause fault lines to rupture – causing significant damage. stated source of value of the TPP for Washington is to set the rules of the game on a basis that is acceptable to the US, and to represent the economic arm of the pivot to Asia. And yet many small-economy members of the TPP value the agreement principally for economic reasons, and do not wish it to become part of a binary strategic choice between Washington and China (see the Feature article by Bilahari Kausikan at p. 12). Small countries are also affected by the apparently increased willingness or disposition of large countries to take unilateral action – a trend that poses significant long-term risks to an open global economy. For example, the US tendency toward extra-territorial jurisdiction on tax and financial sector issues has impacted small economies like Switzerland. And the increasing noise in the US in respect of imposing sanctions on ‘currency manipulators’ or countries with sustained current account surpluses is another example of the potential unilateral use of power in the global economic system. For its part, Russia’s annexation of Crimea

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nomic system that has prevailed over the past several decades has helped to separate international commerce from the projection of political or strategic power. However, the demarcation between international economics and politics is arguably becoming less clear. The weakening of multilateral institutions means that trade liberalization increasingly occurs on a regional or bilateral basis, which elevates political considerations. And the transition to a multipolar world, in which major economic players like the US and China have differences in their strategic preferences, exposes the functioning of the global economy to geopolitical considerations and calculations: consider, in Asia, overlapping trade deals like the TPP and ASEAN’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, or new development institutions like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). To be sure, these developments create specific exposures for small advanced economies. This is most apparent in the negotiation of trade agreements, where the ability of small countries to secure agreements is constrained by their limited domestic market size. More importantly, of course, these negotiations also necessarily expose small advanced economies to the strategic predilections and caprices of larger countries. For example, New Zealand signed a free-trade agreement with China in 2008, partly on the back of Wellington’s early willingness to grant China ‘market economy’ status at

the WTO. However, New Zealand has not secured a bilateral deal with the US, reflecting the challenged relationship with Washington since Wellington took New Zealand out of the ANZUS alliance in the 1980s. Small countries can also be squeezed by larger countries. I have written in GB about the risk exposures inherent in the asymmetric relationship between small and large countries such as New Zealand and China (see my In Situ article in the Fall/ Winter 2015 issue of GB). This is true in many other bilateral relationships – for example, between China and several of the ASEAN countries. Small advanced economies increasingly have to deliberately balance economic and broader strategic interests, which invariably imposes economic costs. Moreover, small advanced economies are often exposed to the spillover effects of strategic economic competition between large countries. Increasingly, international economic engagement by large countries, through vectors like the TPP and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP), is framed in geostrategic terms. For instance, a primary

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Small advanced economies point to three fault lines in the global economy: increased domestic economic and political pressures from globalization; challenges to existing models of regional economic integration; and a more explicit interaction between international economics and politics.

sent clear signals to smaller NATO border countries like Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, to neutral small countries like Sweden and Finland, and indeed to small-country members of the Eurasian Economic Union like Armenia. Better than most, small advanced economies appreciate the impact that geopolitical frictions are already having on globalization, and indeed how marked a change this is from the past few decades. Small countries in Asia, such as New Zealand and Singapore, and in Europe, such as Finland and the Netherlands, have first-hand experience of these emerging challenges. They are responding through a combination of strategic balancing and hedging, even if major exposures remain. Small advanced economies around the world – the canaries in the mine, as it were – are reflecting the emergence of new fault lines in the global economy. The impact of the pressure from moving tectonic plates depends significantly on how it is managed by national government policy-makers. A careful release of pressure through calibrated policy may lead the global economy to a better, more sustainable position. Alternatively, growing pressure could cause fault lines to rupture – causing significant damage. For the most part, small advanced economies are remaining open, responding to domestic economic and political challenges even as they manage international economic integration. This is reminiscent of the ‘embedded liberalism’ aspiration of the design of the original Bretton Woods system, in which an open, liberal international economic system was designed to be consistent with a measure of domestic political autonomy. For at least a few decades after 1945, this system underpinned rapid growth in cross-border trade and investment while retaining reasonable political legitimacy. Positively framed, this may suggest that the basic structure of the global economic system can be maintained even with a more challenging political economy. Indeed, this small-country policy response may be relevant to larger countries in terms of how to reckon with the new fault lines. And yet the smallcountry experience also suggests a less encouraging set of implications. The depth of current concern in small-economy capitals in Asia and Europe about the outlook for the global economic system – with the rise of protectionism, the weakening of regional integration, and the use of political power in the international economic system – should be understood and taken seriously. The type of global economy that develops will – to be sure – rest heavily on how large countries respond to these emerging pressures. But large countries place less weight on the external economy, and have fewer imperatives to balance domestic political concerns with international engagement in a way that preserves openness.

It seems unlikely that a Bretton Woods 2.0 will emerge – at least not in the foreseeable future. Postcrisis international coordination has been patchy, with domestic interests consistently privileged over the global system. The US and China do not at present have aligned interests or perspectives, and international institutions such as the IMF and G20 are not well-placed to lead a new consensus. There are, instead, indications of a tilt toward more inwardly oriented policies in large advanced economies (the US) and emerging markets (China and Russia). And Brexit is an ominous warning sign that public support for a liberal, open system may be weakening quickly, and that the system is more fragile than it has been assumed to be. Bref, there is a growing likelihood of rupture along the new fault lines. Although, absent future great wars, it is not possible to put globalization back in the bottle, it can be diminished considerably. The 1970s, as mentioned, provide a useful historical analogy. Four decades ago, economic and political stress after the ending of a period of sustained global growth led to the dismantling of the Bretton Woods exchange rate system, the rise of protectionism, and competitive international behaviour (OPEC, as well as competitive devaluations). Today, the potential for similarly costly developments is high. Indeed, the protectionist dangers of a possible Trump presidency in the US, uncoordinated loose monetary policy leading to currency wars, and the unwinding of the EU project – now further complicated by the growing instability in Turkey and also Ukraine, both at the edges of the EU – are all readily identifiable risks. Taken further, the prospect of system-wide protectionism and tariff competition, the development of competing rather than open regional blocs, and the ‘weaponization’ of international economic policy, are all plausible. In this febrile environment, black swan events are perhaps more likely. In response, large-country decision-makers, as well as those in global institutions such as the IMF, would do well to better involve small countries in these policy debates. There is much that can – and should – be learned from small countries in terms of how to better manage globalization in these more challenging times. And small countries can play a valuable part in highlighting the costs and risks of inwardly oriented policies, as well as challenging larger economies to perform a global stewardship role. From a small country perspective, the global economy is as complex and challenging as it has been in decades. It is no time for complacency, nor is it time to assume that the world will proceed in a linear fashion. States, both large and small, should take note of these small-country experiences and prepare for disruptive change as pressure continues to build along new fault lines. | GB

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NEZ À NEZ Les conséquences du Brexit Le Brexit représente un coup fatal à l’Union européenne PROPOSITION:

WOLFGANG KRIEGER vs BARTHÉLÉMY COURMONT

Wolfgang Krieger est professeur d’histoire moderne et de relations internationales à l’Université de Marburg, en Allemagne.

Barthélémy Courmont est maître de conférences à l’Université catholique de Lille, directeur de recherche à l’IRIS et rédacteur en chef de Monde chinois,

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nouvelle Asie.

Wolfgang Krieger (pour): La faute principale que commettent la plupart des journalistes et des commentateurs, mais aussi les dirigeants européens, est de croire que le Brexit est un problème de mentalité britannique – c’est-à-dire une mentalité qui n’aurait jamais compris ni voulu cette coopération étroite qu’on appelle «l’Europe». Or, en réalité, c’est plutôt la machine politique de l’UE actuelle que les Britanniques refusent. En 1973, ils adhèrent à «la Communauté», autrement dit au marché commun, pour se retrouver, moins de 20 ans après, dans une «Union» (traité de Maastricht) avec, encore quelques années plus tard, la monnaie unique (l’euro), qui représente «le fédéralisme par la petite porte» (Margaret Thatcher). En réaction, les gouvernements britanniques de l’ère conservatrice (Thatcher et John Major) ont obtenu des exceptions à chaque étape de cette course vers une Europe où les États membres abandonnent une bonne partie de leur souveraineté au profit de Bruxelles. Surtout, Londres refuse l’euro. Mais les gouvernements socio-démocrates suivants (Labour) de Tony Blair et de Gordon Brown acceptent la souveraineté (au moins partielle) de la justice européenne sur la justice britannique, ainsi que la libre circulation des personnes entre les 28 membres, qui a pour conséquence une forte vague migratoire vers le Royaume-Uni. C’est cette «immigration» qui déclenche le mouvement populaire du Brexit. Vu les batailles de plus en plus féroces entre les «in» et les «out» au sein du parti conservateur, le premier ministre David Cameron prend le risque d’un référendum en espérant que les militants du Labour apportent leur aide pour parvenir à une majorité en faveur du maintien «dans l’Europe». Mais le contraire se produit: le Brexit obtient ses meilleurs scores dans les fiefs électoraux du Labour. (Ce parti-là est à bout de souffle.) Les bureaucrates de Bruxelles de même que les autres membres de l’UE refusent de donner à Cameron un coup de main en accordant par exemple une exception sur «l’immigration», de peur que d’autres pays puissent suivre le même exemple au moment où les

crises du Moyen-Orient déversent leurs victimes par centaines de milliers vers l’Europe. C’est donc un processus très complexe qui produit cette majorité du Brexit. La politique politicienne se mélange avec les convictions politiques de longue durée. Et voilà pourquoi je pense que le Brexit va affaiblir ou même casser cette «Europe» qui est devenue une idéologie plutôt qu’une construction politique répondant aux besoins de ses membres (les 28), de ses peuples et de notre temps. Les institutions de Bruxelles sont entre les mains d’une classe politique et bureaucratique imprégnée d’une idéologie des années 1950 (avec quelques vieux ancêtres dans les années 1920), qui n’est plus à la hauteur des besoins politiques, économiques et socio-culturels de l’après-Guerre froide en Europe. C’est un peu comme le socialisme de Karl Marx, appliqué à la lettre en Russie, en Chine et ailleurs dans le monde sans respecter les besoins et les conditions de ce monde de l’après-Marx. On ne connaît que trop les résultats de ce socialisme qui avait toujours raison, qui était «scientifique» et sans alternative. Il fallait y croire contre toute évidence, même lorsqu’il conduisait à l’abîme. La même chose est en train de se produire en Europe. On continue avec cet «acquis communautaire» qui nous tire vers le fond. On veut répondre à toute crise par une Europe encore plus centralisée, dirigée par Bruxelles au point d’y voir une pensée unique (voir l’article Query d’Hubert Védrine à la page 42). Barthélémy Courmont (contre): Il est indiscutable que le marché commun auquel le Royaume-Uni a adhéré en 1973 n’a plus grand-chose à voir avec l’UE que les électeurs britanniques ont rejetée en majorité à l’occasion de ce référendum. Il suffit d’ailleurs de voir la montée en puissance de forces politiques hostiles à l’UE dans d’autres pays de l’Union pour constater qu’il ne s’agit pas tant d’une exception britannique que d’un problème relatif à la perception des institutions européennes dans les différents États membres. Il est également évident que le contexte actuel, et la manière avec laquelle les médias le couvrent, notamment les questions migratoires, ont eu un impact décisif sur le vote des Britanniques en renforçant un sentiment de peur de perte d’identité. Les partisans du Leave ont su exploiter ce sentiment de peur, notamment en opposant de manière quasi systématique le drapeau européen à l’Union Jack, comme si être État membre de l’UE signifiait ne plus avoir d’identité nationale – des méthodes que d’autres partis populistes et anti-européens, comme le Front national en France, pratiquent régulièrement. Cependant, l’ancrage de Londres aux institutions européennes en a toujours fait un cas à part. Justifiant son refus de voir le pays qui l’avait accueilli pendant la Seconde Guerre mondiale rejoindre la

PHOTOGRAPHIE: LA PRESSE CANADIENNE / ISOPIX / REX / SHUTTERSTOCK

d’enterrer la construction européenne trop rapidement. La même question s’était d’ailleurs posée au début des années 1990, quand le Royaume-Uni avait rejeté l’euro, et cela n’a pas empêché la monnaie unique de devenir une référence très rapidement. À moins que les dirigeants européens ne cèdent à la panique et fassent ainsi le jeu des mouvements populistes, l’UE survivra au Brexit parce qu’elle ne perd pas un membre à part entière. Elle pourrait même en sortir renforcée, à condition de communiquer de manière plus systématique sur les bienfaits de l’intégration, aux niveaux économique mais aussi politique ou sécuritaire. Dans l’une de ses ultimes sorties sur l’Europe et le risque d’une marche arrière, François Mitterrand notait que «le nationalisme, c’est la guerre». Plus que jamais, c’est cette philosophie qui doit dominer au sein de l’Union, à un moment où la tentation nationaliste est nourrie par la peur et les incertitudes. L’UE n’est pas dirigée par quelconque force extérieure et autoritaire, mais par ses États membres. En la quittant, le Royaume-Uni s’engage dans une voie incertaine (voir Strategic Futures à la page 62), mais tourne surtout le dos à ce qui a partiellement participé à son identité depuis quatre décennies. C’est ce message que les partisans du Remain, David Cameron en tête, ont été incapables de faire passer. Gageons que les errements de l’ancien premier ministre britan-

Un migrant participe à une grêve de la faim pour protester la fermeture de la frontière hongroise (Horgos, Serbie, juillet 2016).

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Communauté Économique européenne en 1963, Charles de Gaulle fit cette remarque intéressante liée à l’opportunisme des Britanniques. Il mentionna la tentative de Londres de saboter la construction européenne en incitant les «petits» membres fondateurs à ne pas s’associer au couple franco-allemand, avant de réaliser le gain potentiel pour l’économie britannique, et de demander l’adhésion. Ajoutant que cette attitude conduirait certainement à un réexamen des gains pour les Britanniques tôt ou tard, selon les évolutions de la Communauté, il fit un examen qui résonne 50 ans plus tard comme prémonitoire. De Gaulle avait ainsi compris que les Britanniques étaient Européens plus par opportunisme que par conviction réelle, et le Brexit s’inscrit ainsi dans la continuité du «I want my money back» de Margaret Thatcher, traduisant une position singulière et à certains égards malsaine au sein des institutions européennes. Pour cette raison, si on ne peut sous-estimer l’impact du Brexit sur l’UE, il ne faut pas tant parler d’une crise des institutions que d’un mouvement populiste touchant un pays ayant toujours gardé ses distances avec Bruxelles. Si un des membres fondateurs venait à suivre l’exemple britannique, en particulier la France ou l’Allemagne, on pourrait alors parler de la fin de l’UE. Mais compte tenu de la position singulière de Londres, il est exagéré

nique, dont on retiendra un bilan catastrophique, serviront de leçon aux autres dirigeants européens.

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Le vrai danger est ailleurs: c’est celui d’une négociation avec Londres qui serait conduite dans l’esprit de la pensée unique de Bruxelles, telle que l’on trouve chez les eurocrates et même au Parlement européen.

WK: D’accord. En 1963, de Gaulle ne voulait pas de Royaume-Uni au sein du marché commun – surtout parce que les Britanniques étaient trop liés au Commonwealth et aux Américains. Mais il ne faut pas oublier que de Gaulle voulait «une Europe des patries», donc le contraire de l’actuelle UE. En 1966, au sein de l’OTAN, c’est de Gaulle qui fait ce qu’ont fait les Britanniques aujourd’hui. Il quitte les structures contraignantes (intégration du commandement militaire), mais demeure lié aux autres membres par le traité de 1949. De la même manière, les Britanniques veulent rester dans l’Europe sans se soumettre à l’UE. Tout cela n’a rien à voir avec cette vielle idée de François Mitterrand selon laquelle «le nationalisme, c’est la guerre». C’est à l’est de l’Europe actuelle que se trouve ce genre de nationalisme, là où les pays baltes, l’Ukraine et les autres anciennes républiques soviétiques se sont libérées de Moscou. Par la suite, l’UE en a accepté certains comme États membres. Et alors? Cette «Europe élargie», n’a-t-elle pas beaucoup profité de ce genre de nationalisme? Le nationalisme, au sens d’une véritable souveraineté nationale, peut être ainsi une force libératrice qui conduit les peuples vers la démocratie et vers l’économie de marché. Dans la même logique, les mouvements souverainistes dans les anciens pays membres de l’UE – en France, aux Pays-Bas, en Italie et aussi au Royaume-Uni – peuvent être analysés comme une expression démocratique légitime même si des éléments d’une droite extrême et xénophobe s’en servent dans un autre but. Il me semble que la nouvelle première ministre Theresa May a bien compris qu’il faut séparer ces deux mouvements politiques. C’est pourquoi elle dit «Brexit is Brexit» au lieu de faire comme les dirigeants français qui, en 2005, ont choisi d’ignorer la majorité du «non» (au traité dit «constitutionnel») pour imposer les mêmes règles par la voie d’un accord intergouvernemental (traité de Lisbonne de 2007). Mais la stratégie de Theresa May, qui se dirige vers un consensus durable avec les 27, ne réussira que si l’on abandonne cette politique autoritaire d’un européisme à l’ancienne avec ses vielles idées. Des phrases simplistes comme celle de Helmut Kohl affirmant que «l’euro, c’est la paix» ont fait leur temps. Qu’on pose la question aux Grecs, par exemple, et aux chômeurs diplômés en Europe du sud où les errances de la politique de Mario Draghi ont créé le chaos absolu. Voilà cette pensée unique de Bruxelles qui ressemble à une religion politique plutôt qu’à une politique réaliste nécessaire pour maîtriser les enjeux européens. On connaît trop bien les échecs de la crise

bancaire (en Grèce et ailleurs), des relations avec l’Ukraine, de la crise des réfugiés musulmans, et de la faillite du système de Schengen. Il y a bien d’autres exemples encore. À chaque fois, il fallait soi-disant agir en dehors de «l’Europe» pour endiguer les problèmes le mieux possible. En même temps, et ceci est largement nouveau, on peut de moins en moins cacher cette vérité gênante d’une bureaucratie bruxelloise qui ne respecte pas la volonté des peuples européens et qui se prend pour le nombril du monde. Si le Brexit risque de faire exploser l’UE, ce n’est pas parce que des solutions plus amicales n’existent pas. Au contraire, il est possible d’imaginer une solution où le Royaume-Uni resterait dans le marché commun ou presque. Une politique de réconciliation est donc possible. Le vrai danger est ailleurs: c’est celui d’une négociation avec Londres qui serait conduite dans l’esprit de la pensée unique de Bruxelles, telle que l’on trouve chez les eurocrates et même au Parlement européen. Ces esprits doctrinaires sont un peu comme les notables de 1788-1789 qui prennent le risque de briser l’État des Bourbons plutôt que de céder le moindre de leurs privilèges. On connaît la suite. BC: En 1963, de Gaulle ne voulait pas du RoyaumeUni parce qu’il voulait d’une Europe indépendante des États-Unis, et dans laquelle l’adhésion serait pleine et entière, pas à la carte. Son positionnement dans l’OTAN s’inscrit dans cette ligne d’indépendance, mais la comparaison s’arrête là: l’organisation militaire atlantique ne saurait être comparée au projet européen. Considérer que de Gaulle serait opposé aux avancées européennes effectuées depuis sa mort est le message que martèlent les eurosceptiques français, Front national en tête, qui n’hésitent pas à s’accaparer l’héritage de celui qu’ils ont combattu, et sans la peur du ridicule de travestir sa pensée. Dans le cas de cette phrase restée célèbre de Mitterrand, c’est un peu la même chose. Certes le contexte de l’époque, dans la première moitié des années 1990, indique que les pays d’Europe centrale et orientale étaient les principaux concernés par les dérives du nationalisme. Cependant, il serait illusoire de croire que seuls les États libérés du communisme sont menacés par le nationalisme, et qu’il subsisterait ainsi une sorte de rideau de fer, opposant des sociétés «matures» et résolument débarrassées de ces vieux démons, et d’autres encore fragilisées. Le nationalisme frappe à la porte de toutes les sociétés (et pas uniquement en Europe) et pose dans tous les cas la question du rapport à l’autre, semant ainsi les germes de la guerre. Le nationalisme, à ne pas confondre avec le patriotisme en ce qu’il est un rejet de l’autre, a été le principal ennemi des sociétés européennes depuis la révolution industrielle, et c’est juste-

nationaux», qui ne veulent plus rien dire dans un espace aussi intégré que le nôtre. À ce titre, je suis d’accord sur le fait que c’est à l’interne que les problèmes doivent être réglés en priorité, et non à l’extérieur de l’UE. Mais aujourd’hui, Brexit oblige, le Royaume-Uni est passé de l’autre côté, et s’il est indispensable de mettre sur pied une politique de bon voisinage, il ne faut pas négocier une union au rabais, mais au contraire faire preuve de fermeté et de détermination. C’est sans doute à ce prix (qu’on pourrait qualifier de suicide assisté du Royaume-Uni) que l’UE sera sauvée et sortira renforcée de cette crise. À l’inverse, si Bruxelles accepte les doléances de Londres pour maintenir le Royaume-Uni, mauvais élève, dans l’UE, cette dernière sombrera. Ce n’est pas être autoritaire, mais plutôt une stratégie qui consiste à couper les mauvaises branches pour redonner de la vigueur. Et c’est de vigueur dont l’UE a besoin actuellement. WK: L’idée d’un «nationalisme (qui) frappe à la porte de toutes les sociétés» n’explique pas grand-chose à notre sujet. Cette «Europe» de Bruxelles est surtout menacée par trois choses: premièrement, son incapacité stratégique à trouver des réponses efficaces aux très grands problèmes de sécurité extérieure et intérieure face à des menaces multiples et à la faillite économique et démocratique des pays à l’est et au sud de l’UE; deuxièmement, ses vieilles idées des futurs «États-Unis d’Europe», voire sa vision idéologique de la politique européenne et de la place de l’Europe dans le monde; et troisièmement, son incapacité à comprendre qu’en démocratie, la politique se fait par un dialogue constant avec le peuple, plus précisément avec les électeurs qui demandent la liberté de prendre des décisions sur les sujets qui sont importants à leurs yeux. Le Brexit et les autres mouvements eurosceptiques à travers l’Europe sont avant tout des expressions de cette volonté démocratique que les eurocrates ne comprennent pas. Ils pensent que le Parlement européen suffit pour désaltérer cette soif démocratique. Mais, en réalité, ceci n’est pas un parlement comme les parlements nationaux. Car le vote d’un Luxembourgeois vaut neuf fois plus que celui d’un Allemand. Non, c’est une addition de délégations nationales au sein d’une organisation internationale – pas plus. Par conséquent, les taux de participation aux élections européennes sont bien inférieurs aux élections nationales – à savoir, entre 20 et 40 pour cent au lieu de 60 à 80 pour cent pour les scrutins nationaux. Les députés européens sont souvent des personnalités qui ont été écartées du jeu national par leur parti politique d’origine. (continué) Pour la suite du débat, voir le site de Global Brief :

À moins que les dirigeants européens ne cèdent à la panique et fassent ainsi le jeu des mouvements populistes, l’UE survivra au Brexit parce qu’elle ne perd pas un membre à part entière. Elle pourrait même en sortir renforcée.

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ment parce qu’elles y font face que les institutions européennes ont connu tant de succès auprès des générations qui ont souffert de la guerre, comme Mitterrand, de Gaulle, Kohl et tant d’autres. Les plus jeunes générations doivent savoir par où l’Europe est passée, sans quoi elles pourront être tentées par le nationalisme et le rejet de l’autre qui est systématiquement accusé de tous les maux. Mais la question fondamentale n’est pas là. Bien entendu, le rejet des institutions européennes est un choix démocratique qu’il convient de respecter. Je suis d’accord sur le fait que le rejet de la Constitution par la majorité des électeurs français en 2005 a été ignoré de manière brutale et dangereuse par les autorités, qui n’ont fait qu’alimenter des partis politiques surfant sur la vague souverainiste. Mais qu’est-ce que le souverainisme, sinon une utopie, ou un travestissement du nationalisme? Souverainisme s’appuyant sur quels référents? Sur quelles institutions légitimes? Au nom du souverainisme, l’Espagne est-elle plus légitime que la Catalogne, le RoyaumeUni que l’Ecosse, la Belgique que la Flandre? Ce qui est ici proposé par les eurosceptiques comme l’opposé du souverainisme, le fédéralisme, est un projet politique. On peut y être hostile, mais opposer une utopie à un projet politique, c’est tromper les électeurs. Et c’est exactement ce que Nigel Farage et ses camarades ont fait aux Britanniques. C’est aussi ce que le Front national tente de faire en France. Il n’y a donc pas de débat politique réel autour des orientations de l’UE (ce qui est, je le reconnais sans peine, très dommage), mais une opposition entre une utopie et un projet politique. Si l’UE veut sortir de la crise causée par le Brexit, ce que je pense elle sera capable de faire, elle devra bien entendu intégrer l’idée selon laquelle plusieurs voies sont possibles. L’UE n’étant pas un corps étranger (comme l’UKIP l’a présenté à tort), ce n’est pas l’affaire des eurocrates mais des dirigeants des États membres et de leurs ressortissants. Face à cela, quel est le projet politique de ceux qui au Royaume-Uni ont quitté le navire tels des rats une fois le Brexit voté? Quel est le projet politique de Theresa May, sinon de chercher à sauver un Royaume-Uni confronté à ce qui pourrait être sa plus profonde crise depuis le 17e siècle, de maintenir (forcément par le dupe et le mensonge) les Écossais et les Irlandais? Le Brexit est une utopie sans lendemain, l’UE est un projet politique, confronté à des défis multiples certes, mais qui a fait ses preuves. C’est pourquoi il faut la maintenir. Comment procéder dans ces conditions? D’abord en revenant aux essentiels et en consolidant nos acquis, plutôt que de chercher une fuite en avant. Pour cela, il faut rappeler la finalité du projet européen, et donc la définir sans tabou. C’est un effort auquel tous les États membres doivent participer, en acceptant de laisser de côté leurs «intérêts

www.globalbrief.ca

THE DEFINITION “The events in Turkey… …set off an explosive series of devel-

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Internal instability and purges in the army and the security forces do not bode well for Turkey’s ability to deal with the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi turmoil at its doorstep. However, they may also push Turkey to negotiate in Syria.

opments, and significantly complicated the saga surrounding its strongman, Recep Tayyip Erdogan (see the In Situ article by Mitat Celikpala and Sinem Akgul Acikmese at p. 6). A coup was attempted by sections of the armed forces, but it failed through a combination of its own organizational shortcomings, the fending off by the army and security forces, and popular mobilization against it. Firm culpability for the attempted coup is yet to be established. Diehard Kemalist elements may have been behind it, but the government was quick to point the finger at Fethullah Gulen, who leads a religious association with deep historical roots in the country, and with whom, since 2013, the AKP government has been locked in a power struggle. The implications of the attempted coup for Turkey’s domestic politics will be – in the medium term, at least – damaging and destructive. The act itself, albeit illegal and unpopular, was a symptom of the powerlessness felt by segments of Turkish society against the seemingly inexorable rise of Erdogan and the stranglehold that his party has put on the country. Turkey has always been steeped in conspiracy theories, but the divisions and hatreds of the past few years have exacerbated them. The government feared a coup and it has happened, stunning most Turkey observers who believed that the era of military intervention was long gone. This will only increase the government’s paranoia. Tens of thousands of army and security personnel, civil servants, teachers and academics were immediately suspended from their jobs for no other reason, it seems, except being associated in some fashion with government opposition. This egregious violation of the letter and spirit of the rule of law does not bode well for the future of democracy in Turkey. However, that the attempted coup will augment Erdogan’s power may in the long run play a part in his undoing. The fact that all of the political parties in Turkey, and most of the population, took a stand against the coup will probably be seen by him as providing carte blanche for his political ambitions – to a stronger presidency, for example, and to other ways of amassing power – but in fact it only reveals rejection of military solutions to the country’s problems. The president does have robust support in the country, but not all who vote for him are diehard enthusiasts. Erdogan is not the AKP, and Turkish

politics cannot be reduced to his person and fate. Following a period of instability and score-settling, a return to normality may well reveal a more unified political class and a more mature electorate. We must remember that the power struggle currently gripping the country after the coup between the government and its opponents – above all the alleged Gulenist conspirators – is but one problem facing Turkey. The Kurdish issue – the country’s longest and deepest challenge – is unresolved and currently wreaking havoc. More concentration of power in the executive and in Erdogan personally will surely make it more difficult to address the complex set of problems facing Turkey – including the economy – and this will have a political cost in the long run. As for Turkey’s foreign policy and external relations, the attempted coup presents grave dangers, but also possible opportunities. Internal instability and purges in the army and the security forces do not bode well for Turkey’s ability to deal with the Syrian civil war and the Iraqi turmoil at its doorstep. However, they may also push Turkey to negotiate in Syria – something that may have been in the cards already in the weeks before the attempted coup and the thaw in Turkey’s relations with Russia and Israel. The tension with the EU over the death penalty, and with the US over Fethullah Gulen’s extradition, will most probably die down as nerves begin to calm. Turkey is in the throes of many struggles – ethnic, political and ideological alike: between the AKP/ Erdogan and their opponents, between Turks and Kurds and, in the eyes of many, between Islamism and secularism. But the overriding issue, subsuming all of the above and defining the country’s domestic politics and foreign relations, concerns democratic institutions and the rule of law. The establishment of a democratic and liberal model of resolving conflict, negotiating differences and reaching consensus is the only way for these struggles and others to be resolved. The attempted coup and the backlash that it has unleashed are a step backward in the country’s democratic evolution, but Turkey can still snatch victory from the jaws of defeat.” Katerina Dalacoura is Associate Professor of International Relations at the London School of Economics.

…demonstrate once again the dangerous fragility of the state system in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. The hundred years following the collapse of the Ottoman Empire did not produce a stable and lasting modus vivendi among the former constituent parts of that empire, or indeed within those parts. Turkey used to be the cornerstone of political stability and economic progress in the region, serving as a model of modernization for many

neighbouring countries. But the country has turned out to be vulnerable to domestic upheavals, on top of being a major target of international terrorism. The apparent ease with which President Erdogan was able to handle the attempted coup should not mislead anyone: the political future of today’s Turkey remains highly uncertain, the country is deeply divided on many critical matters, and the aftershocks of recent events will be felt in the entire region for many years to come. What can external powers do to mitigate the turmoil in the region? To be sure, any external involvement is likely to have only a marginal impact on key regional countries like Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, a new concept of regional collective security proposed by the international community might help to limit the international repercussions of domestic crises like the one that took place in Turkey, and provide for a regional ‘straitjacket’ capable of preventing the proliferation of instabilities (see the Feature article by Sam Sasan Shoamanesh in GB’s Fall 2012 issue). The ‘P5+1’ formula that turned out to be surprisingly efficient in dealing with the Iranian nuclear question could be considered as a model here (with appropriate modifications). In any case, it is critically important to ensure that all of the external players are not part of the problem, but indeed part of the solution in the region. This has not always been the case to date. The failed coup may well accelerate the recent Russian-Turkish détente – especially in light of new complications in the relationship between Ankara and Brussels. The consolidation of Erdogan’s personal power, ongoing purges in Turkish universities, the media and the judiciary, and suggestions that Turkey might reinstate the death penalty – all of these developments only serve to deepen the differences between Turkey and the EU. Moscow therefore appears to be an important partner of convenience for Erdogan. However, the key question remains: can Moscow and Ankara reconcile their positions on such complex matters as Syria, the Kurds, Armenia and, among other files, Crimea? To be sure, both Recep Tayyip Erdogan and Vladimir Putin need more Russo -Turkish cooperation, but in order to embark on this path they will have to demonstrate flexibility and a degree of humility, which neither can claim as a principal asset.” Andrey Kortunov is Director General of the Russian

…opened the gate to a much deeper and significant coup or – to be more precise – a significant revolution. This time, the revolution is being carried out by Recep Tayyip Erdogan himself. Erdogan did not hesitate to seize the opportunity to establish his new sultanate by reconnecting Turkey to its PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / ALI AKSOYER / DHA

Journalists are escorted to court in Istanbul, after being detained following Turkey’s failed military coup, July 2016.

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International Affairs Council in Moscow.

Muslim and Ottoman roots and erasing the legacy and secular ideology of the founder of the Turkish republic, Kemal Ataturk. In his efforts to establish his sultanate, Erdogan is seeking to secure his position and to eliminate any political opposition that might stand in his way. One after another, Erdogan has been taking over all of the bases of power and influence in Turkey, beginning with the judicial system, moving to the media, academia and the education system, and finishing with the police and security forces. Tens of thousands of his opponents have been removed from their positions and/or arrested. It is no wonder that some Turks believe that the failed military coup was no more than a show staged by Erdogan himself. The fact that the Turkish government has failed to present a coherent and clear account of the attempted coup only bolsters those who believe that this may have been a conspiracy organized by Erdogan. The failed coup taught us what we already know about Turkey and its president. There is no real opposition in Turkey that can resist the government’s moves to change the character of the Turkish republic. The opposition camp is divided and lacking true leadership. In addition, even those who oppose Erdogan probably prefer his version of democracy to a military regime. Erdogan’s reputation has turned on his ability to stabilize the Turkish political system and the country’s economy, as well as on his personal charisma. In recent years, however, it seemed as if he had lost his touch, and more and more Turks were tiring of him. The failed coup has therefore played right into his hands. Erdogan’s regional policy was based on the principle of ‘zero problems.’ Yet in recent years, instead of zero problems, Turkey found itself with zero friends, due to its provocative policies vis-à-vis Egypt, Israel, Russia and Syria. In an effort to ease regional pressures on Ankara, Erdogan recently normalized relations with Israel and Russia. But the coup will now force Erdogan to focus on Turkey’s domestic challenges, and the regional arena will likely have to wait.” Eyal Zisser is Vice Rector of Tel Aviv University.

STRATEGIC FUTURES “In 2020, the UK will... …be having its first general election There seems to be an emerging consensus in London, Berlin and Paris that the UK could be given some kind of associate membership. That could involve a seven-to 10-year emergency brake on inward migration and restricted access to welfare benefits.

since leaving the EU. Prime Minister Theresa May will resist pressure for an early election because there is little appetite for further upheaval after the Brexit decision (and because the 2011 Fixed-Term Parliaments Act makes it much harder to call a snap election). She will trigger Article 50, formally beginning negotiations for the UK’s exit from the EU, in mid2017, to give the country enough time to prepare for the two years of negotiations, while allowing time for the dust to settle between exit and the 2020 election. The UK’s deal with Europe will not include freedom of movement for EU citizens (or UK citizens into the EU), and so will be on considerably worse trading terms than the UK currently enjoys. Trade agreements with the rest of the world will still be under negotiation, with the US agreement still not finalized. The UK will still be united, with an improved devolution deal for Scotland trumping renewed calls for Scottish independence. Domestically, Theresa May will pursue a radical economic and social agenda focussed on reuniting the nation after the divisions of Brexit. She will be surprisingly interventionist in the economy, backing an active industrial policy to boost the economies of the English regions outside of London, and taking advantage of historically low interest rates to borrow for capital spending on infrastructure. She will also steal the left’s clothes by taking a radical approach to tackling inequality – pledging to eradicate the gap in educational attainment and jobs between young people born into poor families and their better-off peers.” Andrew Ratcliffe is CEO of Impetus – The Private Equity Foundation, and past Deputy CEO of the Tony Blair Africa

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Governance Initiative.

…not have left the EU altogether. Pulling the UK out of the single market would significantly disrupt the economy and hurt the blue-collar workers who voted en masse for Brexit. A trade deal with the rest of the EU will take many years to negotiate. The last thing that the EU needs is another economic shock, and the UK is a key export market for the biggest countries, Germany

and France. It is therefore in the general interest of all EU member states for the UK to retain full access to the single market. At the same time, the UK will not be a full member of the EU in 2020. Rather, there seems to be an emerging consensus in London, Berlin and Paris that the UK could be given some kind of associate membership by then. That could involve a seven- to 10-year emergency brake on inward migration and restricted access to welfare benefits, consistent with the policy approach that Germany and other member states pursued following the EU’s eastern enlargement in 2004. While the governments of Poland, Hungary and other central and eastern European countries might object, such an emergency brake and other safeguard measures are already part of EU treaties, and also help the newer members to limit brain drain. Bref, the Brexit vote offers an opportunity to build a new European settlement by 2020 that will work for all EU countries – not just the UK. Amid the growing crisis of legitimacy, the EU will need to reconnect the supranational institutions in Brussels much more closely to nations, regions and even localities. If such a transformation will not happen by 2020, the dynamic of disintegration could bring down the whole EU. The first reform should be to recognize the Council as the supreme executive power of the EU, and to restore the Commission to its original role of a European civil service that acts as a secretariat to the Council in an advisory function, overseeing the implementation of common regulations and mediating among competing national and sectional interests. Second, the judicial activism of the European Court of Justice could be curtailed by further limiting the cases that it hears and restricting its power to that of an arbiter – not a missionary that serves to transfer competencies from member states to the Commission. Third, the European Parliament will continue to lack legitimacy until it is reconnected with national political classes. The lower chamber of elected members could be supplemented by an upper chamber composed of representatives from national parliaments, professions, regions and cities (by fusing the EU’s existing Regional Committee with its Economic and Social Committee). A Parliament

that represents European society – not just individual constituents – can command greater civic assent, while also better exercising its primary purpose of scrutinizing legislation and holding the executive to account. All of these reforms are unlikely to be in place by 2020, but unless there is a new settlement on offer the EU could well break up.” Adrian Pabst is Reader in Politics at the University of Kent, and Director of the Centre for Federal Studies. His latest book Liberalism and the Human Future.

…have negotiated its exit from the EU, but will continue to be entangled in the institutional, political, legal and economic repercussions of Brexit across the British Isles. The European question will reverberate for decades – in waves – and perhaps will be revisited, in one way or another, after generaPHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / JAMES GLOSSOP

Oliver Escobar is Lecturer in Public Policy at the University of

British Prime Minister Theresa May, left, meets with First Minister of Scotland Nicola Sturgeon at Bute House in Edinburgh, Scotland, July 2016.

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(co-written with John Milbank) is The Politics of Virtue: Post-

tional change in England and EU consolidation across the continent. By then, it will become clear that the cracks in the EU edifice, highlighted during the 2016 referendum, have their analogues in the very foundations of British political establishment. During the referendum debate, Brexit supporters glossed over decades of absent industrial policy, half-hearted social policy, and widening social and economic inequalities in order to blame the EU for the failures of successive power elites at Westminster and Whitehall. Without the convenient symbolic resource of an ‘external foe,’ future British governments will receive more surgical scrutiny, and the democratic deficits of the UK’s institutional settlement will become an open wound. There will no longer be a dispute over whether the crisis of public services in many parts of the UK has anything to do with the EU or immigration. And there will be a unique opportunity for institutional reform that may bring about the kind of democratic innovations advocated for many decades by participatory and deliberative democrats. In this context, Scotland will have to find its own way, and it may be outside the orbit of the rest of the UK – unless there is substantial appetite to boost the current timid efforts to formulate a viable British federalism. Otherwise, the question of Scotland charting its own course to independence will not be a question of ‘if’ but ‘when.’ At the moment, Scotland leads the UK in terms of its aspiration to redefine the relationship between citizens and government. And the Scottish government has chosen to develop a very different narrative about immigration, social democracy and European citizenship. I would therefore be surprised to look back, in 20 years’ time, to see a Scotland that is still part of the UK. Tectonic changes and reforms await.” Edinburgh, and also co-director of What Works Scotland.

EPIGRAM

Wobbling Pivots On pacific pivoting, and not wobbling into war BY GEORGE ELLIOTT CLARKE

I George Elliott Clarke is the EJ Pratt Professor of Canadian Literature at the University of Toronto, and the seventh Parliamentary Poet Laureate. His newest book of

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poetry is called Gold.

n her history of China since 1800, The Wobbling Pivot (2010), Professor Pamela Kyle Crossley disputes American poet and translator Ezra Pound (1885-1972) and his belief that Cathay was, classically, a study in social harmony and political stability. Indeed, far from being the “Unwobbling Pivot” viewed in Pound’s translations of Confucius (et al.), China has also pivoted – wobbled – from (among other tendencies) Mao Zedong’s rewriting of Leninist revolutionary theory to Deng Xiaoping’s rebooting of Fordist capitalist praxis. Then again, one nation’s pivot can seem, to another, a wobble. Thus, France’s Gaullist pivot to the late Soviet Union, the East Bloc, and Maoist China in the mid-1960s could have signalled to the White House and Whitehall alike that France was a wobbly ally. For that matter, Great Britain’s pivot toward the Dominion of Canada, 1898-1948, to urge the latter’s annexation of the English-speaking Caribbean colonies was a tacit admission of the Empire’s wobbly position vis-à-vis the emergent, transatlantic superpower, the US, following triumphs in the Spanish-American War, WW1 and WW2. To glance at the atlas and the history book is to view pivotal situations and wobbly outcomes. Thus, Turkey is pivotal to the Occident as a NATO state whose military can challenge Russian naval plays. Turkey is pivotal, too, for controlling refugee flows from the eastern Levant into southeast Europe. Plus, it is central to the bombing runs against ISIS combatants (those jihadists with iPads) in Syria, Libya and Iraq. In contrast, Europe is extremely wobbly – waffling – on Turkey’s admission to the EU. Likely because the EU, being tacitly Christian, is a palimpsest of the Holy Roman Empire, and looks askance at accepting even a secular Muslim state as a member. Moreover, the failed recent military coup attempt in Turkey and the successful 2013 military coup in Egypt suggest that what was pivotal for coup leaders in both contexts was the de facto integration of their armies with the US military, thanks to weapons provided, training received, and bases (and biases) shared. Too, the pretext in both cases was the same: to turf a democratically elected president for vaunting Islam over secularism, for ‘corruption’ and/or ‘autocratic behaviour.’ The result? Wobbly democracies in both Turkey and Egypt, with both being propped up by arms. (As if 2011’s ‘Arab Spring’ never happened…)

The pivotal decision of the George W. Bush US administration (2001-2009)? To invade Iraq in 2003 with the aid of the ‘Coalition of the Willing’ [echoing the title of Leni Riefenstahl’s Nazi propaganda film, Triumph of the Will (1935)]. This catastrophic blunder, undertaken in reckless disregard for facts, as opposed to suspect ‘intelligence,’ cost the lives of tens of thousands of innocent civilians, virtually bankrupted the US Treasury, and – worst of all – destabilized the Middle East (and perhaps Europe by extension). (How pivotal – for human rights – it would be were Western leaders accused of war crimes, such as ‘B.Liar,’ also dispatched to sit, right beside indicted African despots, in glass boxes in The Hague.) Furthermore, this foreign policy fiasco – this colossal failure of Realpolitik – has helped feed the viral candidacy for US President of the assuredly wobbly ‘Delirium Tremens.’ Never have so many been so harmed by the wobbly thinking of so few. A century after the mid-point of the first great European – and world – war, the US, Germany, and Russia remain pivotal states, while the UK remains wobbly (as the Brexit vote confirms). Now, China has become pivotal, and so too may India. When the 20th century dawned, it was supposed to ‘belong to’ Canada. Well, that did not happen. Maybe this time? In the next century, too, the African and South American continents may well become pivotal as new alliances are forged and new lynchpins found. Unquestionably, though, nations that wish to pivot, but not to wobble, ought to ensure that their stance is on firm footing and on sound principles, lest they find themselves tripped up by booby traps of treachery or dragged down by the quicksand of unforeseen events. In basketball – that Canuck-invented sport – the pivot is the point when a player, having recovered the ball from the sidelines, attempts to pass or shoot it to a teammate in the clear, so that the fellow player and/or others may move the ball to within striking distance of the opposing team’s net (basket). Global strategists should heed the subtle, military bent of the metaphor, and conduct national or regional ‘pivoting’ as dexterously and as pacifically as possible, so that nation not tilt against nation, nor any region wobble into war against another. | GB