Global Brief / Spring 2017 by Global Brief Magazine/Institute for 21st Century Questions

Transitions of Power, Place and Prestige

EDITORS’ BRIEF

The times they are a-changin’. But to what end? And will it all end well?

COVER ILLUSTRATION: DOUG PANTON

Jean-Marie Bouissou, who represents Sciences Po (France) in Japan, meditates on the difficult strategic path that awaits Shinzo Abe in the context of the shifting postures of Washington and Beijing. In Tête à Tête, GB speaks with Canadian geokrat Jennifer Welsh, of the European University Institute in Florence about the possible shapes of the world – starting with the EU – five years hence. And then GB discusses Mexico’s bottom lines and likely countermoves with former Mexican president Felipe Calderon. In Query, Stepan Grigoryan and Hasmik Grigoryan of Yereven’s Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation tell us about the state of the seemingly insoluble Nagorno-Karabakh problem, further to last year’s short (second) war in that theatre. GB Associate Editor Michael Barutciski then turns to the vexing problem of how to distribute newcomers to Canada across the territory – more strategically, or according to the needs of the country and its regions. In Nez à Nez, GB Junior Editor Zachary Paikin takes on Liudmila Filippova of the Russian International Affairs Council on the matter of whether a new Arctic Union should be created to bind the Northern powers in law this century. In The Definition, GB asks what a solution to the conflict in Yemen would look like. Kayhan Barzegar of Tehran’s Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies, former Indian top diplomat Hardeep Puri, and the University of Texas at Austin’s Jeremi Suri intervene. In Strategic Futures, former Quebec Premier and Deputy Canadian Prime Minister Jean Charest, Jeremi Suri of the University of Texas at Austin, and Vasily Zharkov of the Russian Academy for National Economy and Public Administration in Moscow conjecture about the shape and look of the US in 2020. In Situ reports come to us from Ottawa, with Frédérick Gagnon of the Université du Québec à Montréal arguing that Prime Minister Trudeau and his government must prepare for any eventuality in the emerging Canada-US relationship. Herbert M’cleod of the International Growth Centre sends in a dispatch from Freetown on what awaits Sierra Leone. Finally, GB is in North Korea’s Cabinet Room to gauge the response of Kim Jong-un and his court to the advent to power of President Trump in the US. George Elliott Clarke, Canadian parliamentary poet laureate, says goodbye in Epigram. Enjoy your Brief. | GB

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does not do fake news. We are neither blog nor op-ed, neither Facebook post nor cathartic tweet. Each issue of GB is a proper book – editorially, artistically, and in the intended duration and punch of its content and message. Our team works tirelessly to deliver to our readers around the world cutting-edge analysis, commentary and ‘proposals’ in order to demystify the complex, affirm the difficult, and crowd out the fake – the pretenders. Each sentence – each fact, name, date and claim – is verified several times over. And then again, for good measure. From the presidential transition in the US to the manifest transition in the international balance of power, confidence and prospect, what still seems fairly plain is that world events, while still largely peaceable, in the grand scheme of history, are increasingly kinetic. This makes them not only difficult to anticipate (we have always been bad at that), but perhaps more critically, difficult to frame intellectually – even for those who profess to carry synoptic vision. GB will not always keep its power dry in this respect, but it promises to remain ever porous, incorporating inputs from the globe entire, in all languages, from the different ideologies and traditions. Perhaps we can then, over time, humbly, triangulate… Razeen Sally of Singapore’s Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy sets us off in the One Pager, tabling different ‘futures’ for global trade in the context of growing populism and protectionism. In the lead Feature, GB Editor-in-Chief Irvin Studin pens an open letter to President Trump, advising on how best to use American power given the world’s myriad problems and pressure points. Zvi Magen and Sarah Fainberg of the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv discuss the future evolution of the increasingly close (but contingent) relationship between Israel and Russia in the Middle East. Irvin Studin returns to his 2010 article in GB to discuss the state of the debate in Canada on the original vision of a country of 100 million people by century’s end – addressing head-on the various very legitimate critiques of the 100 million thesis. Miloud Chennoufi of the Canadian Forces College explains why the Syrian conflict has suddenly taken a turn toward the diplomatic, and how the endgame may play out (or not). Finally,

N O. 2 1

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF & PUBLISHER Irvin Studin

SPRING 2017

D E PA R T M E N T S

MANAGING EDITOR Sam Sasan Shoamanesh ART DIRECTOR Louis Fishauf ASSOCIATE EDITOR Michael Barutciski ASSISTANT EDITOR Marie Lavoie

EDITORS’ BRIEF. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 ONE PAGER

Razeen Sally | Global trading futures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

SENIOR EDITOR & ASSISTANT PUBLISHER

Jaclyn Volkhammer

IN SITU

SENIOR EDITOR Milos Jankovic

Frédérick Gagnon | De la «bromance» au suspense. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

JUNIOR EDITORS

Herbert M’cleod | Sierra Leone’s prospects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48

Zach Battat, Khilola Zakhidova, Misha Munim, Zachary Paikin WEB DESIGN Dolce Publishing PRINTING RJM Print Group

TÊTE À TÊTE Jennifer Welsh | The world five years hence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Felipe Calderon | Mexico’s bottom lines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

ADVISORY COUNCIL

QUERY

Sam Mizrahi, Don Ferencz,

Stepan & Hasmik Grigoryan | A third Nagorno-Karabakh war?. . . . . 22

André Beaulieu, Tim Coates, David Dewitt, Paul Evans, Drew Fagan, Dan Fata, Margaret MacMillan Mailing Address Global Brief Magazine 63 Oatlands Crescent Richmond Hill, ON L4C 9P2 Canada

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Michael Barutciski | Comment répartir les immigrants?. . . . . . . . . . 34 IN THE CABINET ROOM Dusan Petricic | North Korea and US rationality. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 NEZ À NEZ Zachary Paikin vs. Liudmila Filippova Binding the northern powers in law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 THE DEFINITION

“The solution to the conflict in Yemen…”…. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 STRATEGIC FUTURES

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“In 2020, the US …”. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

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EPIGRAM

George Elliott Clarke | Risky transitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

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Global Brief® is published quarterly in Toronto, Canada by the Institute for 21st Century Questions and the Global Brief Society. The contents are copyrighted. Subscription Rates One year (four issues) for CDN $38. Two years (eight issues) for CDN $72. HST or GST applies only to purchases in Canada. Shipping and handling charges apply only to purchases outside of Canada. The Institute for 21st Century Questions The Institute for 21st Century Questions (21CQ) is a vision and strategy tank that, in association with Global Brief magazine, aims to analyze and help provide real-life solutions to – and ambitiously participate in solution-making for – some of the major geopolitical, political and social questions of this new century. www.i21CQ.com

F E AT U RES

OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT TRUMP How to use American power, avoid catastrophe, and save the world BY IRVIN STUDIN

THE RUSSO-ISRAELI CROSSROADS No great power enjoys Moscow’s Mideast networks. But will the Jerusalem axis endure? BY ZVI MAGEN & SARAH FAINBERG

CANADA - POPULATION 100 MILLION, PART II Metaphor and policy for a first-order country and people. Or why Canada must think for itself BY IRVIN STUDIN

LE TEMPS DES DIPLOMATES EN SYRIE La solution ne parviendra à satisfaire dans l’absolu aucun acteur, malgré la responsibilité partagée PAR MILOUD CHENNOUFI

QUE FERA LE JAPON? La place d’honneur, le triangle, la dispersion et le temps qui court PAR JEAN-MARIE BOUISSOU

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Global Trading Futures For the world to avoid closing, the US remains indispensable still BY RAZEEN SALLY

economic nationalists. All are obsessed with trade deficits, China-bashing, and industrial policy to revive American manufacturing. New US protectionism could begin with a spike in anti-dumping and countervailing duties, aimed first at China. Import taxes, euphemistically called a ‘border tax adjustment,’ could be part of a US tax reform package. Other measures that would cause a flood of WTO disputes might follow. To be sure, other players would follow the US protectionist lead, starting with the EU and China. If this happened, it would only accelerate trends since the global financial crisis. Protectionism would no longer be creeping – it would accelerate, affecting bigger chunks of international trade, and disrupting global value chains. That would drive global GDP growth even lower. Still, there are powerful countervailing forces – the most potent of which is existing globalization through global value chains. US companies are woven thickly into these chains, and they will likely lobby against Trump-led protectionism. American producers and consumers will suffer from US protectionism and other countries’ retaliation. The Congressional Republican leadership, some Cabinet members, as well as Republican and some Democrat state governors, could restrain the economic-nationalist impulses of Trump and his senior trade team. A more pessimistic scenario would be a full-blown trade war: unrestrained US protectionism, escalating tit-for-tat retaliation by the EU, China and others, the possible breakup of NAFTA, and the severe disruption of global value chains. This would be a lurch back to 1930s’-style protectionism, de-globalization and depression. For now, this still seems unlikely. A more optimistic scenario would have others take up the baton of open-market trade leadership. The EU might be up for it; China also. International cooperation would be more equally shared. The WTO would be revived. And yet this scenario is doubtful, as both the EU and China have ever bigger internal weaknesses that limit their ability to lead abroad. Absent the US, prospects for international trade cooperation are bleak – not least in the WTO. Outward-looking US leadership is still essential for international trade. Without it, the world economy would be worse all-round – more unstable and less open. That is true for other areas of global economic policy, and indeed for global security. Bref, contrary to gathering conventional wisdom, the US is still the ‘indispensable nation.’ | GB

Razeen Sally is Associate Professor at the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore, and Chairman of the Institute of Policy Studies in Sri Lanka.

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nternational trade is in trouble after the global financial crisis and, with the new Trump administration, the world faces a protectionist onslaught. Here I present three scenarios for international trade – one ‘more likely,’ and the other two ‘less likely.’ Three features stand out in the global state of play. First, global trade growth has slowed markedly. (Some have called this ‘peak trade.’) International trade grew twice as fast as world output in the quarter-century before the global financial crisis. It slumped during the crisis, then picked up, but since 2012 has barely kept pace with global GDP growth. Last year, it hardly grew at all, falling below the rate of world GDP growth. Second, protectionism has increased since the global financial crisis. It has not escalated to 1930s’ heights, nor has it reversed existing globalization. Instead, it has been creeping up – mostly through anti-dumping duties and insidious non-tariff barriers like subsidies, onerous standards requirements and public-procurement restrictions. Third, President Trump has announced the US’s withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). The TPP is the most ambitious trade deal in 20 years, with hard rules for freer trade and foreign investment. Furthermore, it is meant as a geopolitical signal of American re-engagement in Asia – the vaunted US ‘pivot.’ Now these economic gains are foregone. A dangerous missive of US disengagement from Asia has been dispatched. This leaves the field open for China to assume trade leadership in Asia. It is already doing so on infrastructure. China is the leader of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which brings together the 10 ASEAN countries plus six others. But RCEP is shaping up to be a typically ‘trade-lite,’ intra-Asian agreement.While it will eventually remove most import tariffs, it will likely do little to tackle the non-tariff and regulatory barriers that are by far the biggest obstacles to trade and foreign investment in Asia. The ‘more likely’ scenario is that of trade winds blowing in a more protectionist direction, starting in the US. In addition to withdrawal from the TPP, President Trump plans to renegotiate NAFTA, and has threatened high tariffs against China and also US companies that relocate production abroad. He has said that he will ignore the WTO. The US’s other major trade initiative – a free-trade agreement (TTIP) with the EU – is either stalled or dead. Trump’s appointees for senior trade-policy positions are fellow

ONE PAGER

De la «bromance» au suspense

IN SITU

Dans les relations canado-américaines, Trudeau et le Canada doivent se préparer à toute éventualité FRÉDÉRICK GAGNON depuis Ottawa

L Frédérick Gagnon est titulaire de la Chaire Raoul-Dandurand en études stratégiques et diplomatiques, directeur de l’Observatoire sur les États-Unis à la Chaire, et professeur de science politique à l’Université

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du Québec à Montréal.

e 8 novembre dernier, Donald Trump a créé la plus grande surprise des élections présidentielles américaines depuis la victoire de Harry Truman contre Thomas Dewey en 1948. La stupéfaction et l’incertitude se sont emparées de la plupart des grandes capitales du monde depuis: quelle sera la politique étrangère de Trump et dans quelle mesure rompra-t-il avec l’héritage de Barack Obama? Sans surprise, cette question est également sur toutes les lèvres à Ottawa, où l’on sait que les troisquarts des exportations canadiennes vont vers les États-Unis, que des millions d’emplois locaux dépendent de la relation spéciale avec le voisin américain, et que 75 pour cent des Canadiens vivent à moins de 160 kilomètres de la frontière américaine. Alors que le Premier ministre Justin Trudeau voyait en Obama un allié assez naturel pour que l’on parle d’une nouvelle «bromance» canado-américaine, l’arrivée de Trump à la Maison-Blanche s’accompagne d’un inquiétant suspense. Les premières semaines de Trump à Washington ont effectivement démontré que ses relations avec le monde pourraient régulièrement être marquées par un style «anti-diplomatique» – un manque de courtoisie, de retenue et de civilité à l’égard des pays qui ne partagent pas sa vision ou dont les politiques contredisent sa volonté de «redonner toute sa grandeur à l’Amérique» (Make America Great Again). Quelques jours après son arrivée à la Maison-Blanche, Trump a, par exemple, conseillé via Twitter au président mexicain Enrique Pena Nieto d’annuler sa première visite à Washington s’il refusait de payer pour la construction du mur entre les États-Unis et le Mexique (voir l’entrevue Tête-à-Tête avec Felipe Calderon à la page 38). Le Canada a eu plus de chance et n’a pas figuré parmi les premières cibles du 45e président. Cependant, le décret présidentiel de Trump visant à suspendre temporairement l’entrée sur le sol américain aux réfugiés syriens et aux ressortissants de sept pays à forte majorité musulmane a incité Justin Trudeau à se distancier de la Maison-Blanche sur un enjeu où les deux leaders ne s’entendent aucunement. Trois caractéristiques propres à la personnalité de Trump portent par ailleurs à croire que Justin Trudeau et le Canada ne seront pas nécessairement à l’abri du style «anti-diplomatique» du locataire de la Maison-Blanche, et ce, même si leur première rencontre officielle à Washington le 13 février s’est déroulée sans accroche. Ces traits de caractère, perceptibles autant durant l’élection pré-

sidentielle de 2016 que depuis l’arrivée de Trump au pouvoir, étaient déjà mis en exergue dans le livre The Art of the Deal, publié par le milliardaire en 1987. D’abord, Trump a une vision pessimiste de la nature humaine et son parcours d’homme d’affaires l’a incité à concevoir les relations interpersonnelles surtout en termes de compétition. Sans aller jusqu’à dire qu’il est incapable d’empathie pour autrui (on souligne souvent qu’il est un bon père de famille), Trump semble avoir une confiance limitée dans la plupart des gens qui l’entourent, un peu à l’image d’un Richard Nixon. Dans The Art of Deal, le milliardaire n’hésite d’ailleurs pas à concevoir l’existence humaine comme une série de rivalités faisant nécessairement des perdants et des gagnants, où l’on doit davantage viser les gains absolus (pour soi) que les gains relatifs (pour soi et les autres). Pour Trudeau, l’un des principaux défis sera donc de minimiser le risque que le pessimisme et le style compétitif de Trump ne poussent celui-ci à voir le Canada comme adversaire. Le nouveau président dit avoir une bonne opinion du Canada pour l’instant, mais le décalage idéologique entre le jeune leader canadien et lui est évident à plusieurs titres (par exemple, le premier souhaite raviver l’optimisme canadien à l’aide d’expressions comme les «voies ensoleillées» (sunny ways) alors que le second est convaincu que les Américains et le monde traversent l’une des périodes les plus sombres de l’histoire). Le premier ministre et son conseil des ministres devront ainsi trouver un juste milieu entre l’affirmation d’une vision proprement canadienne – qui n’est d’ailleurs pas sans rappeler celle de Barack Obama, un ennemi juré de Trump – et la tentation de critiquer ouvertement le nouvel occupant de la Maison-Blanche ainsi que sa vision. L’habitude de Trump d’opter pour les représailles massives à l’égard de ses détracteurs suggère par ailleurs que Trudeau a probablement peu à gagner d’une attitude de confrontation avec lui. Cette deuxième caractéristique personnelle de Trump est également mise en évidence dans The Art of the Deal, où «The Donald» écrit qu’il n’hésite pas à sauter à la jugulaire de celles et ceux qui le traitent méchamment ou injustement. Les exemples illustrant cette tendance ont abondé depuis que Trump a remporté la présidence. Il a humilié un journaliste de CNN en public, lors d’une conférence de presse, après que le réseau ait relayé des informations selon lesquelles la Russie détiendrait des images compromettantes à son sujet. Trump a également riposté sur Twitter

PHOTOGRAPHIE: LA PRESSE CANADIENNE / JIM LO SCALZO

Obama dans le cadre des accords de Paris sur les changements climatiques? Et si c’est le cas, sera-t-il imité par les autres principaux producteurs de gaz à effet de serre, comme la Chine et la Russie, rendant, de fait, cette entente chère à Ottawa caduque? Trump donnera-t-il suite à sa demande voulant que le Canada et les pays membres de l’OTAN augmentent leurs dépenses en matière de défense et en

fera-t-il la condition sine qua non de la protection militaire que les États-Unis offrent à leurs alliés? Enfin, que dire de cette autre question que nul ne saurait redouter: quelle serait la réaction de Trump à un nouveau 11 septembre ou, pire, à un attentat terroriste en sol américain commis par des individus transitant aux États-Unis par la frontière canadienne? Il ne faut bien sûr pas sombrer dans l’alarmisme ni trop exagérer les risques d’une présidence Trump pour le Canada. Les points de convergence entre Ottawa et Washington restent nombreux malgré tout. À titre indicatif, Trump promet de prioriser l’exploitation des combustibles fossiles en sol américain, mais sa volonté de créer de l’emploi aux ÉtatsUnis porte à croire qu’il pourrait se montrer favorable au développement d’infrastructures américaines permettant d’importer davantage d’hydroélectricité en provenance du Québec, comme par exemple le projet de ligne de transmission électrique du Northern Pass au New Hampshire. Il reste que sur le plan personnel, la «bromance» qui existait entre Trudeau et Obama pourra difficilement se poursuivre avec Trump, en raison, entre autres, du décalage idéologique qui existe désormais entre les habitants de la Maison-Blanche et du 24 Sussex. L’imprévisibilité et le suspense qui ont marqué les premières semaines de la présidence Trump indiquent par ailleurs que Trudeau et le Canada n’ont pas d’autre choix que de se préparer à toute éventualité. | GB

Le président Donald Trump et le Premier ministre Justin Trudeau tiennent une conférence de presse dans la Maison-Blanche à Washington, le 13 février 2017.

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quand l’actrice Meryl Streep et le membre du Congrès John Lewis ont remis sa légitimité en question, les qualifiant respectivement de «comédienne surévaluée» et de «menteur». Il y a fort à parier que le président n’épargnerait pas Justin Trudeau si le premier ministre ou un membre de son équipe tenaient des propos susceptibles de l’insulter. Enfin, un troisième trait du caractère de Trump susceptible de créer des tensions avec Ottawa est que le compromis occupera une part plus négligeable qu’avant dans le modus operandi présidentiel. Dans The Art of the Deal, Trump indique qu’au moins trois ingrédients composent ses méthodes de négociation: placer la barre le plus haut possible même si le but peut parfois sembler exagéré ou irréaliste (think big), se battre jusqu’au bout pour obtenir ce que l’on désire (push and push and push), et prouver à ses partisans que l’on est un gagnant capable de tenir promesse (deliver the goods). Appliquée aux dossiers des relations avec le Canada, cette recette produira parfois des résultats appréciés par certains Canadiens, dont les Albertains en quête de «bons emplois», qui ont vu d’un bon œil la signature d’un décret présidentiel visant à relancer le projet d’oléoduc Keystone XL. Cependant, d’autres Canadiens pourraient au contraire pâtir de la volonté de Trump d’utiliser tous les moyens pour satisfaire ceux qui l’ont élu. En effet, la plupart des observateurs prédisent que Trump n’ira pas jusqu’à abolir l’ALÉNA. Justin Trudeau et ses ministres font valoir, à raison, que les États-Unis profitent considérablement de cet accord (35 États américains ont le Canada comme principal client pour leurs exportations). Cela dit, le vent protectionniste qui souffle sur les États-Unis et qui a permis à Trump de gagner les trois États qui ont fait basculer l’élection de son côté (la Pennsylvanie, le Michigan et le Wisconsin) n’est pas en voie de s’estomper. Le Mexique est certes le plus visé lorsque Trump promet de protéger les emplois américains contre la compétition internationale et la délocalisation des activités productives américaines à l’étranger. Néanmoins, l’expression «Buy American» sera en vogue au cours des prochains mois, voire des prochaines années. Trump a d’ailleurs dit que l’acier utilisé pour construire Keystone XL devra être américain. On peut, en outre, s’attendre à ce que le président soit plus qu’enclin à appuyer ceux qui croient que le Canada adopte des pratiques déloyales, dont des subventions aux entreprises, pour rendre ses exportations attrayantes en sol américain. Le dossier du bois d’œuvre en est un bon exemple. L’arrivée de Trump à la Maison-Blanche soulève une myriade d’autres interrogations pour Justin Trudeau et le Canada. Le 45e président rompra-t-il définitivement avec les engagements pris par Barack

PHOTOGRAPH: UN PHOTO / PAULO FILGUEIRAS

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The World Five Years Hence Meditations by one of the West’s leading geokrats on the present transitions and future turning points

TÊTE À TÊTE

Conversation with JENNIFER WELSH

GB: Where will Italy be, politically, five years from now? JW: It could be where many other countries in Western Europe are – that is, with populist parties in power or with very powerful positions in a coalition government. Given the failure of the constitutional referendum in Italy, there will still be, five years from now, much discussion about the cracks in the Italian political system, the difficulty of forming long-term governments, and what this all means for the creation of public policy in difficult times. Certainly the logic behind parts of what was on the table during the referendum had to do with modernizing parts of the Italian economy and making it easier to put structural changes in place. Five years from now, some believe that Italy may not be in the Eurozone. I am not one of those people. But that is probably more for political than economic reasons. As one of the original members of the European Community, it would take a lot for other member states not to support Italy remaining in the Eurozone. Still, five years hence, Italy’s leadership on some of the common European problems may be less prominent, which would be a shame. Matteo Renzi has also left the political scene for now. He is down but certainly not out. He is a very gifted politician and may well come back in another form. GB: Where will Europe be five years from now?

Jennifer Welsh is Professor and Chair in International Relations at the European University Institute in Florence, and a Fellow of Somerville College, University of Oxford. She is past Special Adviser to the UN Secretary-General on the Responsibility to Protect. In 2016, she gave the CBC Massey Lectures on The Return of History.

GB: Can you characterize the populist movements in Europe, including in Italy? What is driving them? JW: There are two dynamics that are critical here. One is common to all liberal democracies – namely a profound disillusionment with the representative democratic system and the belief on the part of electorates that those who represent them in their institutions have not necessarily had their interests at heart. There may be a belief in these electorates that their representatives have become more beholden to a transnational interest, in the case of anti-EU sentiment, or to corporate interests or the interests of the wealthy. In some sense, then, this is a very democratic pushback against the perception that there has not been sufficient attention paid to the decline in citizens’ relative living standards. We are not talking, in all cases, about absolute poverty but indeed about relative inequality inside these countries. The second dynamic is a fear that is engendered by the very rapid movement of people. It is not the absolute numbers themselves that have always been so decisive, but rather the speed of the change – the velocity of the influx – and the degree to which populations have bought into the notion that this somehow represents a direct threat to them in terms of security (although the data do not support that,

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JW: Five years from now, Europe will either have taken on the very, very deep issues that lie at the heart of the EU – not just Brexit, which is obviously the most pressing issue – or it will be facing what people call variable geometry, involving different levels of engagement with the EU instead of one big, common institution. Major questions like monetary union, immigration policy and the management of migration will either be tackled in a collective way or we will see the development of a core and a periphery to the EU. My sense is that this is one of the most troubling decades for Europe since the interwar period. Populations will therefore have to become much more political in order to address the populist challenge that we are going to see unfold in 2017 in big elections in France and the Netherlands. Indeed, it is hard to predict the future, but it could well go in a very dark direction, where Europe is

really struggling to uphold the values that are at the heart of the European project. The other part to consider is whether Europe will still be the key partner for the US five years from now. While Donald Trump is making significant noises about wanting to have a different relationship with Europe – one that is much more transactional – I believe that the notion of a trans-Atlantic community was already fading before Trump. What we saw over the last five to eight years was a move from a trans-Atlantic community to a partnership, and a partnership is really different. A partnership is far more transactional. I therefore see, over the next five years, a continuation of that move from a community to a far more transactional relationship. And this transition could be quite dramatic under Trump. We do not know, for example, how seriously to take his musings about NATO, and how they will translate into concrete changes in funding and policy.

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The notion of a trans-Atlantic community was already fading before Trump. What we saw over the last five to eight years was a move from a transAtlantic community to a partnership, and a partnership is really different.

despite individual incidents) or through economic losses incurred in the context of a zero-sum game as more immigrants come in. These two dynamics have come together and are overlain by a mantra of control – that is, as we saw in the British referendum but also in electoral discourses on the Continent, the people need to take back control. They need to take control of their destiny. As national communities, they have given away too much to those who are distant and far away, and to elite policy-makers more generally. That emotion is very human and very natural. There is nothing wrong with it. The desire to take back control is quite hard to argue against. And it has been a very powerful sentiment that the populists have used to increase their fortunes. GB: Where will the UK be five years from now – still in Europe, out of Europe, or in some purgatory in between? JW: I have come to believe that Brexit is very real. I do not say this from a normative perspective, meaning that this is what should be the outcome of all of this. I do actually believe that the British government misplayed its hand at a couple of stages – primarily prior to the referendum itself, by not clarifying the role of referenda in a constitutional democracy in which there are many institutions that have to share power. Still, Brexit is real. I do think that the UK will be out of the EU five years from now, and I do think that it will also be out of the single market. That does not mean, of course, that there could not have been other alternatives. The politicians had room. As much as I admire British institutions, British history and British values, I see this as a dark period. One of the most troubling aspects of the referendum and its aftermath has been the degree to which not just the tabloids, but also elected officials have gone after the judiciary in the UK. That is a very dangerous game. There has been a very worrying erosion of the balance of institutions that make up a contemporary democracy. As such, I do see the UK’s institutional balance – its mixed system – in a weaker place in five years’ time. The damage done by the referendum, in that respect, cannot be completely unravelled. It seems as if decisionmakers made a move to do something – like hold a referendum – without properly considering what the process itself would do. They focussed instead on what the result would be. And yet the case of the UK referendum is so interesting because it has shown us – and especially political figures – what the process for such an event can do to a modern democracy. It can unleash very powerful, destabilizing forces – forces that cannot fully or easily be put back into the bottle. These forces include

xenophobia, anti-immigrant attacks, the discourse of the tabloids, the attacks on the judiciary, and so on. All of these are corrosive. The question of whether the British union itself will still exist five years from now is a really interesting one. My initial hypothesis after the referendum was that Scotland would go next. But now I am a little more circumspect about that. I am not certain that this will happen in the next five years. The politics of this issue are playing out a little bit differently. The area to watch is Northern Ireland because the impact of Brexit on Ireland – North and South – including through the possible creation of a new border, was underappreciated. We now have a political crisis in Ireland, with Martin McGuinness having resigned. Let me add one final point about Brexit. I think that British higher education and universities will be diminished – and this for two reasons. First, all of the university development plans have been based on high numbers of European students coming for study in the UK. Second, there will be a huge impact on British research funding. There is already an impact in terms of researchers on the Continent being told that they should not collaborate with UK researchers. Of course, the UK today builds very little. There is very little manufacturing. Instead, the economy is all about services, and education is a major service sector in the UK economy. This is troubling. The one good thing that might come out of this is that elite British universities like Oxford, Cambridge and LSE may finally become properly global. They have always talked about becoming truly global, but they have not had to do it to date, or have otherwise attempted to do so in a halfhearted way. GB: Where will the US be in two years’ time (see Strategic Futures at p. 62)? JW: It is hard to know. It very much depends on the strength of America’s checks and balances. Obviously, the composition of the Supreme Court is going to change. What we need to remember is that the election was actually very close. So there is still a massive constituency with a different set of political goals and political values. If things go in a healthy direction, we will see the US showing signs of what a democracy should do in a period like this. There will be peaceful and frequent protests, and perhaps civil disobedience in some cases. We could, of course, see other forms of attempts to resist inequality and injustice or to influence change, including mass strikes or violence. It is also possible that the political parties in the US will use this whole train wreck of an election as a wake-up call to reorient reform. But that is harder to see at this point. I was hoping to see in the US PHOTOGRAPHS: COURTESY OF JENNIFER WELSH

what we see in other liberal democracies – that is, some form of party realignment or shakeup in the party system. Right now, however, I am not sure that this will be the outcome. The Democrats may essentially say that they have demographics on their side. They may conclude that they simply have to have a better candidate and a better machine. As for the Republicans, they do not have to learn the hard lessons that they should have learned. They created the monster. Some of this may result in people disengaging from the American political process altogether. Those who speak the loudest in four years’ time will win again. Much will also depend on the behaviour of Congress. We have seen this already with the sanctions on Russia, with Senator John McCain and others coming forward saying, roughly, “This is what we in Congress want to see happen. Never mind what the executive branch believes about what our relationship to it should be.” Bref, if the checks and balances in the US work in a robust fashion, then we will not see a 180-degree turn in American politics. Instead, we will see something that is much more incremental. Having said this, the checks and balances do not extend everywhere. In trade, for instance, we can safely predict a broad push toward greater protectionism – that is, a re-evaluation and possible pulling out of NAFTA. We will, on the other hand, see a much more transactional relationship with Europe and a call for greater burden-sharing. Trump will try very hard to create a great-power condominium with Putin. Will this condominium include China as well? The Chinese dimension is really harder to predict. It is not impossible to imagine some forms of cooperation, despite some of the theatrical moves in respect of Taiwan. But it is clear that the US will try to move toward a much less liberal internationalist agenda. GB: Do you see contradictions between the professed positive disposition of President Trump toward Russia and the antipathy toward China?

GB: Will Trump discover this contradiction? If so, when?

GB: What are the limits of American power over the next four or five years? What can the US do and not do? Which problems can it solve or not solve? JW: There are quite substantial limits to American power. In terms of economic interests, for example, these require a certain degree of international cooperation. With the recent breakdown of the Trans-Pacific Partnership, with the US walking out after huge international diplomatic investment, there is evidently considerable international disillusionment (see the One Pager by Razeen Sally at p. 5). This means that the US will now find it difficult to achieve its economic goals in collaboration with similarly large groupings of states. The US will still be able to achieve certain things bilaterally, given the asymmetry of economic strength that it enjoys vis-à-vis certain other states. It may very well do that in a heavy-handed way. Militarily, what has been interesting about the Obama period is that, even with the world’s largest military, the US has not wanted to exercise, in the post-Iraq and Afghanistan context, that military power. In theory, of course, Trump could behave in the opposite way. But Trump may also feel limited or reluctant in this respect because of beliefs about what American public opinion will bear. Having said that, as we saw with Obama in Libya, Trump does not have to declare war formally or have Congressional approval to take military action. Whether Trump will use military force or whether he will instead prefer to reach diplomatic bargains over things that he does not believe the US should fight for is yet to be seen. If we roll back the clock on Syria, we can run the counterfactual that under Trump, Washington would never have backed the opposition from the beginning, and would never have given the signal that it wanted a different political system (see the Feature article by Miloud Chennoufi at p. 42). Multilaterally – to be sure – we are in a very different and far less collaborative world from the world that Obama had when he came into office. GB: What has driven the changes in the multilateral context? JW: Two things were important. One was the Libya intervention, which had a multilateral mandate and required significant diplomatic muscle to implement. (continued) For the rest of the conversation with Jennifer Welsh,

The case of the UK referendum is so interesting because it has shown us what the process for such an event can do to a modern democracy. It can unleash very powerful, destabilizing forces – forces that cannot fully or easily be put back into the bottle.

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JW: There is a big contradiction, but for reasons that are largely interpersonal, given Trump’s team and his own experience. Trump believes that Russia is a different type of power, but the evidence does not suggest that this is the case. In fact, the evidence suggests that Russia is much more disruptive to American interests than is China – and particularly in international institutions. Russia has been very disruptive at various points inside the UN; China less so. Beijing picks its spots. It is concerned about certain issues. It is much more predictable.

JW: This is so personality-driven. Congress will have a lot to say on both of those relationships. But he will discover it early – to be sure.

please visit the GB website: www.globalbrief.ca

Irvin Studin is

How to use American power, avoid catastrophe, and save the world

Editor-in-Chief and Publisher

BY IRVIN STUDIN

of Global Brief.

OPEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT TRUMP Dear President Trump Let’s skip the niceties and congratulatory notes, as they have already been overplayed and time is short. I see two scenarios for your presidency. The first involves you winning a Nobel Peace Prize. The second involves you triggering a nuclear war. Given the extreme caprice that you have brought to bear on your new post, it would not be risible

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to imagine both scenarios being realized, serially or concurrently, within the same day.

Let’s start with the better scenario. I had long worried that, in the event of a Hillary Clinton presidency, the world would be trending fairly rapidly toward a nuclear conflict – particularly between Russia and the US, with Europe caught in between. North America would not easily survive such a confrontation, and North American cities, from New York to Washington and Toronto, would surely face some description of bombardment. Your presidency has, happily, for now, decelerated this trending. Indeed, it could, given your considerable energy, creativity and improvisational skills, heroically relieve the world of this growing pressure. This is the Nobel Peace Prize scenario. (Of course, as I note below, your presidency could also, paradoxically, accelerate the skid toward a nuclear collision.) Notwithstanding the conventional commentary in the English-language media in general, and the ever-depleting quality of journalism and public discourse in your own country in particular, you would be very wise to bring together, in the nearest future, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin for a trilateral summit that would seek to do the following: first, develop an algorithm for a terminal solution to the Ukraine conflict; second, establish rules of the game for interaction among the powers in the South China Sea; third, set the parameters for a new security architecture in the Middle East (see the considerable writing in GB on this topic by my colleague Sam Sasan Shoamanesh); and, fourth, establish specific military and diplomatic confidence-building measures and processes in the trilateral format (on a worldwide basis). The Ukraine conflict is of the greatest urgency. In my estimation, the Ukrainian state could fail in one form or other within the calendar year. This failure will be less a consequence of Russian intrigue or pressure than of

the extremely weak structural legitimacy and effectiveness of the central government – a government that has not been able to consolidate meaningfully across the Ukrainian population and territory since the 2014 revolution. If the Ukrainian state collapses, including through a coup or broader political and social insurrection, then this will radicalize Russia and, in the reverse direction, Europe, the US and Canada. Russia will almost certainly be forced to undertake a muscular intervention, in the military form, in Ukraine (beyond Crimea and the Donbass). Depending on your reaction in Washington and that of leading European capitals, this could set the basis for a direct military clash between Russia and NATO countries – a dynamic that could escalate with considerable velocity to a nuclear exchange, or indeed a logic that could, through anticipatory ‘gaming’ by Moscow, be preceded by a nuclear assault. In any event, even short of a nuclear conflict, the collapse of Ukraine and the shockwaves that this would send both eastward and westward would likely place irresistible, eventually fatal pressure on the EU and the already-fragile European project. Germany would, within a decade, be let loose into its erstwhile strategic orbit and would spend the rest of this century struggling with the two-border security dilemma with Russia and France that caused both world wars in the century last. How to prevent this degradation? You will need to work directly and quickly with President Putin, in the first instance, as the Ukrainian political class, for all of that society’s intellectual brilliance and cultural charisma, is simply not capable, at the time of this writing, of the requisite strategic reflection and delivery in their current governmental-administrative disposition. The only way to stop, with finality, the bloodshed in

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ILLUSTRATION: DOUG PANTON

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southeastern Ukraine – in the Donbass – as I have described in numerous past interventions in GB and in track 1.5 format in many capitals around the world, is to introduce a peacekeeping force from a neutral, non-NATO, non-postSoviet, country (India, Pakistan, Singapore, or perhaps even, ironically, Israel). Peacekeepers are the only way to staunch the basic and quite classical security dilemma in which the pro-Kiev and rebel forces find themselves – that is, in the absence of trust between both sides, and to the extent that the rebel side is not fully controlled by Moscow, any withdrawal by one side will be met by an advance by the opposite side. In the event, the peacekeeping force should be interposed between the two sides, along the Minsk 2.0 ceasefire lines, and also along key points of the RussoUkrainian border in southeast Ukraine. At least three conditions should accompany the introduction of peacekeepers: first, enshrinement in Ukraine’s constitution of the country’s indissolubility (in the Australian constitutional idiom), and recognition of such in a formal treaty between Ukraine, Russia and any number of guarantor powers; second, affirmation by the UN Security Council of Ukraine’s permanent non-NATO status; and third, maximum removal of non-Crimea-related sanctions against Russia by Western countries. As for Crimea, its status warrants separate treatment and a separate formula, and should not interfere in the general solution algorithm just mentioned. After all, while Ukraine is fairly important in and of itself as a specific theatre of American or Western interest, stabilization of the general European theatre – and of Russia along with it – is by far the more significant strategic objective for your government. Now to China. Understand that Chinese strategic seriousness today is a function not only of that country’s growing economic power and military sophistication, but indeed of a collective understanding among the elites in Beijing that China can under no circumstances be allowed to lose a ‘third opium war’ – as it were – for this would again set the country back a hundred or more years. This means that China, too, would be quick to use nuclear weapons to defend itself if the survival of the government were at stake. North America would be easily within reach – to say nothing of Japan. My humble advice is therefore not to fall on your strategic sword over the South China Sea theatre. You may be able to push Beijing to certain modest, face-saving concessions here, but this is not your core fight – especially given that China may now consider, and perhaps not wrongly, that it, and not the US, has in the final analysis won the Cold War. What of your relationship with Iran? Here you must be sure that you realize what you are getting yourself into. For any military action against Iran would surely precipitate a massive missile launch against Israel by Hezbollah from within Lebanon and Syria, and also missile attacks against Israel from Iran itself. To the extent that Israel would fear being crippled or paralyzed by such bombardment, it has already promised an overwhelming response at least in Lebanon. In extremis, one could conjecture that this could lead to the use of nuclear force – in Lebanon or against Iran itself.

Still, targeting Iran would likely trigger Russia – an ally – to action. And so, just as you will be negotiating a major peace with Russia in the Ukrainian and European theatre, you will inadvertently be stumbling into war with Russia, directly or indirectly, in the Middle Eastern theatre. And here too, the use of nuclear weapons by Russia is not to be excluded – particularly if Israel should use a nuclear weapon, or should you in Washington also threaten to use one.

s you ponder these three, increasingly overlapping theatres – the Russo-Ukrainian-European theatre, the Chinese-East/Southeast Asian theatre, and the Middle Eastern theatre – you should immediately become conscious of the conspicuous limits of American power. You will, in order not to repeat the major strategic mistakes of your immediate predecessor and of several before him, want to avoid morality plays and remain constantly porous to the fancies, considerations and general mentality of your opposite numbers in other major capitals. Of the three great-power leaders, you rule the most lucky and prosperous country, but you are by far the least knowledgeable in world affairs, history, geography and even economics. The better posture is therefore to be open to learning from, and exchanging kinetically with, these other powers in order to find ‘sweet spots’ for problem-solving the major friction points in the world. To be sure, you will not be able to solve most conflicts, and virtually no conflict can be solved perfectly. Even in the Ukrainian theatre, there will be significant ‘interstitial’ dynamics (forces largely or even completely outside of the control of strategic centres in any of the capitals) that, notwithstanding the possible ‘local’ winning algorithm of peacekeepers in concert with the other conditions, may well lead to the eventual ‘general’ collapse of the Ukrainian state and the eruption of hot warfare enveloping Russia and Europe alike. Similarly, in the South China Sea and the Asia-Pacific theatre more broadly, whatever your strategic intervention and skill, there will be plenty of room for miscalculation or military adventure among the various parties, with the future of a nervous, nuclear North Korea weighing heavily on the larger relationships between Beijing, Tokyo and Seoul. The reality of the interstitial can only be addressed by creating new international regimes and institutions, and by improving existing ones. To this end, you would be welladvised to avoid destabilizing the EU at all, and indeed to expend every possible American instrument and lever to consolidate the European project, as it remains the lynchpin of global peace this century. Do not be foolish in exalting the Brexiteers of Westminster, or in excessively exciting the populists of the Continent – for they will drive the world to war soon. Nay, your objective is to tame these centrifugal forces, and to understand that Europe is, for all of its imperfections, the world’s most important and successful peace project. Now, what Europe has accomplished with the EU must be replicated, in tailored forms, in Eastern Europe, Western

domestic American matters in this missive for two reasons: first, most of your domestic policy questions, from healthcare to even border security, are not of serious global import (except for purposes of curious observation, critical or other); and second, although I am a friend of America (and many Americans) and a great admirer of American civilization and achievement, I am perfectly mindful of the fact that the US is not my country, and so I remain diffident before the prospect of telling you how to run your own house – even if I may have some impressionistic ideas about the proper course on some of these issues. But where your decisions and activities, including of domestic provenance, directly affect the state of the global peace, or materially promise to consolidate or destabilize this peace (or order), I cannot refrain from expression. To this end, my greatest domestic fear for your country is the very real prospect – if not probability – of a major terrorist attack on American soil in the coming months. I am certain that this is on your mind also, and I sincerely hope that you and your administration are planning for

You will therefore respect this basic scaffolding of the modern global peace, lest you push it asunder through hubris or what may be termed the ‘corruption of noble intentions.’ such a scenario in the most serene terms. Alas, at the time of this writing, given your caprice and the precarity of your popularity both with the American population and, more importantly, with Congress, I fear the worst. I may be wrong. But a Bataclan-style attack in a major American city like New York, Washington DC, Los Angeles or Chicago could well trigger you to respond with biblical ferocity and theatre. Anti-Muslim pogroms could easily erupt in many parts of the US – so softened is the American body politic today before anti-Islamic rhetoric and policy. You would use this shock to expand the powers of the executive to a quasi-wartime footing. Congress, the courts, the media, and the population alike would be pliant – or otherwise slow to move. And you would relegitimate your presidency. Of course, this relegitimation might not stop at your borders. In the classical style of many political leaders past, democratic and less democratic alike, you may be tempted to launch what Tsar Nicholas II called a “small victorious war” in order to distract the population and consolidate the centre. This war, of course, would be inherently destabilizing – and could potentially be cataclysmic, for you and the planet alike, depending on the adversary you choose to target. As I have written above, you would be wise to choose with great care. Of course, I would far prefer that you not have to choose at all. Better to govern modestly, with due proportionality. In this, I bid you good luck and great success. | GB

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Asia or the Middle East, Asia-Pacific, and even the Arctic. States must be bound between themselves by international law and institutions of trust, constantly evolving in order to preserve legitimacy before their populations, and to reflect the variable geometry of regional interdependence. Just as importantly, a key challenge for American political and legal ingenuity will be to help these various regional regimes invent or find mechanisms or ‘tendons’ – as it were – for flexible and productive (but maximally predictable) interaction among themselves. In other words, these regional blocs ought not to be coal-like in their architecture, but instead sponge-like in their ability to reckon peaceably with other blocs – especially neighbouring blocs, and blocs whose members have different political traditions and constitutional norms. Bref, this means finding institutional modi vivendi between the EU and the Eurasian Union (part of interstitial scaffolding for solving the Ukrainian crisis), but also between the EU and ASEAN, the EU and emerging China-led blocs, the EU and a new Western Asian regime, and indeed countless other permutations of inter-regime collaboration and engagement. You have, at least in your early rhetoric, maligned the UN, and threatened to penalize the institution financially if it does not make decisions or deliver results that are in keeping with your predilections. But you must rethink this posture immediately and decisively – for it would, if generalized among other key states, launch the world into chaos. Remember always that the UN, for all of its inefficiency and kinks, is intended to deliver not de maximis but rather de minimis outcomes in global affairs: not global peace or love, but instead the absence of direct armed conflict between the great powers – tout court. To date, the UN has, surprisingly but spectacularly, delivered on this de minimis goal, even if it has not been successful in eliminating genocides, second-tier conflicts and countless humanitarian disasters and human tragedies. Why has the UN been so successful? Because the genetic logic of the Security Council precludes the possibility that any of the great powers among the P5 can go to war against one or more of the other great powers with international legal sanction. Veto oblige, the US would never allow China to go to war against it under international legal sanction; the same is true of Russia vis-à-vis China or the US; und so weiter… The extension of this genetic logic at the Security Council requires great (nuclear) powers like China and Russia to veto pretensions to international strategic action by any other grouping of countries in theatres that they hold strategically dear. Such uses of veto are nary capricious, and even if they will on occasion be opportunistic or cynical, they provide an essential signal to all aspirants about which interventions could potentially result in the general conflagration that the Security Council in particular, and the UN in general, is intended to preclude. You will therefore respect this basic scaffolding of the modern global peace, lest you push it asunder through hubris or what may be termed the ‘corruption of noble intentions.’ In that case, this would all end in tears – for the US and the entire civilized world alike. A final note – and this one about matters internal to your country. I have deliberately avoided any commentary on

Zvi Magen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, and former Israeli Ambassador to Russia.

No great power enjoys Moscow’s Mideast networks. But will the Jerusalem axis endure?

Sarah Fainberg is a

BY ZVI MAGEN & SARAH FAINBERG

Research Fellow at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv, and a Lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya.

THE RUSSO-ISRAELI CROSSROADS

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WHAT’S NEXT?

ussia’s surprise entry into Syria in September 2015 – in the fifth year of the Syrian conflict – created an unpredictable security situation for Israel right at its borders. Now, after a year and a half of largely successful military coordination and ‘deconfliction’ between Moscow and Jerusalem, Russo-Israeli relations stand at a crossroads. Of course, for all the media excitement, Russia’s insertion into the Syrian battlefield was not entirely new (see the Feature article by Miloud Chennoufi at p. 42). Moscow is a veteran actor in the Middle East in general, and in Syria in particular. Some 15 years ago, Russia’s ‘grand return’ to the region was initiated by President Putin, who capitalized on Moscow’s vast diplomatic and military presence in Syria, Egypt, Iraq and Libya – not to mention its historical ties with the Palestinian national movement from the Cold War period – as a means of challenging the ‘unipolar order’ imposed by the US after the fall of the Berlin Wall, as well as regaining regional power status and promoting Russia’s booming energy and militaryindustrial sectors. Since then, Russia has consistently and actively pursued a ‘multi-vector’ strategy in the Middle East, engaging the principal regional actors with the declared ambition of creating a bridge between the Sunni axis and the Shiite crescent and, on the global stage,

between the West and the Arab-Islamic world. Moscow has also offered to serve as a mediator between Hezbollah and Israel, and indeed between Iran and Israel, in the event of a direct military conflict in the future. Despite several painful setbacks – primarily during the American intervention in Iraq, the Arab Spring, and the NATO-Western intervention in Libya, all of which contradicted or undermined Russia’s positions and interests – Russia has managed to carve out significant channels of influence across the Middle East and North Africa through an expanding network of diplomatic and economic ties, not to mention through its pivotal role in key international fora like the UN Security Council, or groupings like the P5+1 and the Middle East Quartet. Moscow has also shown conspicuous interest in cultivating ties with Jerusalem since its ‘grand return’ to the region. Seen from Russia, Israel is a leading political and military actor in the region, with far-reaching strategic capabilities covering all of Western Asia. It can offer Russia significant credits in its relations with the West. Of course, it is also home to a substantial Russian-speaking diaspora. Indeed, 25 years after the re-establishment of bilateral diplomatic relations, Russia and Israel are arguably peaking in terms of security coordination, high-level leadership visits, as well as economic,

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ILLUSTRATION: JAMES MARSH

technological and cultural exchanges. Having said this, Russia’s moves in Syria, in the Middle East more generally, and in other international theatres, are not always congruent with Israeli interests. While the security coordination apparatus created by Russia and Israel to prevent unwanted friction and clashes has thus far proven effective, Jerusalem cannot assume that Moscow will consistently take Israel’s security interests into account – mainly in respect of the presence of Hezbollah at the Lebanese-Syrian border, and also the future political order in Syria – especially if these contradict Russia’s own interests. To be sure, by rescuing the Assad regime and preserving at least some prospect of Syrian statehood (under a still-to-be-determined formula), Russia contributed to promoting a measure of stability at Israel’s Syrian border. This was naturally welcomed by Jerusalem. And yet Israel still faces pressures from the Russianled coalition operating inside Syria, and specifically views the expansion of Iran’s military presence and ambitions – through the vectors of the resuscitation of the Assad government, the strengthening of Hezbollah’s military capabilities, and Russian facilitation of the training and equipping of Hezbollah forces – as having negative security implications. Ultimately, given the fast-changing security situation in Syria, Lebanon and across the Middle East, and given the ongoing division of zones of influence between Russia, Iran and Turkey in Syria, it is unclear to what extent and how long Russia and Israel will be able to maintain their carefully balanced security and military coordination. Specifically, as the situation in Syria enters what appears to be a political settlement phase, Russia and Israel may encounter some conflicts of interest in respect of Iran and Iranian proxies operating in Syria.

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R 18

ussia initially framed its Syrian gambit as a military operation targeting jihadist groups across the country posing a threat both to the Assad regime and to Russia’s national security. (Domestically, of course, Moscow has long sought to contain the expansion of radical Islam and militant groups in the North Caucasus and other Muslimpopulated regions of the Russian Federation – not to mention Russian citizens who travel abroad to fight or train with groups like ISIS.) Seen from Israel, however, Russia is driven by a larger spectrum of motivations, including a desire to resurrect itself as a leading regional power, and also to challenge and diminish the standing of the US – in particular, by filling the regional vacuum recently created by Washington through a combination of hesitation and restraint. Moscow may also wish to deflect

international attention from other zones of tension with the West – most notably in Ukraine and Eastern Europe (see the Feature article by Fyodor Lukyanov in GB’s Fall/Winter 2016 issue). Not unrelatedly, Russia seeks to translate its military and diplomatic achievements in Syria into leverage against future Western concessions, including the revocation of Western economic sanctions and Western recognition of Russia’s national interests in its ‘near abroad.’ In Jerusalem’s assessment, then, Russia is pursuing a web of regional and global objectives through its military and diplomatic activities in Syria. Its first tactical goal is to establish a durable zone of influence along the Mediterranean shore of Western Syria in order to secure Russian bases in the region (Moscow plans to keep the modernized naval base in Tartus and the Hmeimim air base southeast of Latakia) as a bulwark from which to advance Moscow’s broader regional and global (strategic) interests. Clearly, Russia wants to guarantee the survival of the Assad government in order to maintain a friendly regime in the Middle East. Finally, Russia seeks to lever its military and diplomatic gains in Syria and vis-à-vis other regional actors in order to jump-start a reconciliation process with the West on terms that are favourable to Moscow. A year and a half after Russia’s first Syrian offensive, what has Russia achieved, and how has this affected its relations with Israel? First and foremost, Russia’s gambit has created a new strategic reality in Syria by reversing the catastrophic position of the imperiled Assad regime and revitalizing Iran, Hezbollah and the different Shiite militias operating in Syria. From all of this, Russia has emerged as the leading mediator in the still-fragile political process on the Syrian question – all the while bolstering its status as a regional power broker through constant diplomatic initiatives and upgrading its relations with the actors in the theatre. Another key move in Moscow’s regional policy has been its surprise reconciliation, as of last summer, with Ankara following a crisis sparked by the Turkish downing of a Russian fighter jet in the fall of 2015. Bref, over the course of its Syrian intervention, Russia has essentially succeeded in strengthening and deepening relations with all of the region’s key powers – Iran, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Israel, and also Egypt – even if many of these states have different and often divergent interests, and in many cases privilege a different endgame in Syria. With the exception of ISIS and Jabhat Fateh Al Sham, Moscow also has strong relations with the leading non-state actors in the Middle East. Nevertheless, at the time of this writing, Russia has still not succeeded in achieving some of its main objectives, including the lifting of economic sanctions and the alleviation of strategic pressure

from the US and NATO in Eastern Europe and across the former Soviet space. Thus far, the EU and the US have largely disapproved of Russia’s actions in Syria, with Washington suspending negotiations with Moscow over the Russian-backed bombardment of Aleppo, having accused Moscow of committing war crimes. In late 2016 and into early 2017, US and EU economic, political and individual sanctions targeting Russia and Russians were extended in time and widened in scope, while US-NATO military training and exercises, deployment of military equipment and troops in Eastern Europe, and military rhetoric reached levels unseen in the post-Soviet period.

Seen from Russia, Israel is a leading political and military actor in the region, with far-reaching strategic capabilities covering all of Western Asia. It can offer Russia significant credits in its relations with the West. particularly by way of attempted juxtaposition with failed American attempts at such mediation. Russia’s latest effort in this regard was the Moscowhosted intra-Palestinian (Hamas-Fatah) reconciliation conference of January 15-17, 2017 – one day after the Paris peace conference. Still, Moscow’s numerous intra-Palestinian reconciliation efforts have thus far delivered few tangible results. And if Jerusalem has often shown irritation with Moscow’s support of Palestinian moves in international fora, it has nonetheless been more open, in recent years, to Moscow’s initiatives than to moves initiated by Washington, Brussels or Paris. Future changes in Moscow’s positions in the Middle East will be contingent on the decisions of the Trump administration. Major uncertainties hang over Washington’s policies on Russia, Israel, Syria and the broader Middle East – all of which will durably impact Russo-Israeli relations. At present, there appear to be three scenarios for the possible evolution of the US administration’s behaviour vis-àvis Russia. The first is a continuation of the posture and policy of the Obama administration – that is, continued, if not increased tensions between the US

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ow, in the context of the coming to power of Donald Trump, Russia’s presence in the Middle East is on the threshold of change. First, in the aftermath of the Russian-supported battle in Aleppo – the biggest military victory for Assad over the past six years – there has been a decisive reorientation of the civil war in favour of the political and territorial survival, in one form or other, of the Assad regime. Second, and related, Russia appears to be transitioning from the military stage of its operation in Syria to that of political process, with the goal of translating its military achievements in the region into diplomatic achievements that are likely to bolster the country’s regional and global standing. Third, over the course of the last year, Russia has engineered a new tactical triangular alliance in respect of Syria, comprising Russia, Iran and Turkey, and based on a common minimum denominator of ending the fighting and jump-starting a political process. Together, under Russia’s auspices, these countries aspire to be the leading forces in the political settlement and the principal designers of a future Syrian order (and perhaps beyond). Despite some cracks (including Iranian opposition to Russia’s interest in US participation in the recent Astana talks on the Syrian conflict), and at least for the time being, Iran has acted as Russia’s partner in the war in Syria, while Turkey has shifted from an initial position of opposition to Russian intervention in Syria – specifically because of the prospect of Kurdish autonomy in a potential Syrian federal solution in which Assad is preserved – to a position of tactical partnership based on mutual interests in the Syrian theatre. Meanwhile, Moscow has used the window of opportunity provided by the transition of power in Washington to engage both Tehran and Ankara intensively in trilateral, triangular talks – a format enshrined in the ‘Moscow Declaration’ of December 20th, 2016, in which the three countries offered to be coordinated guarantors in ending the civil war, in fighting ISIS, Jabhat Fatah

Al Sham and other extremist groups, in preserving Syria’s territorial integrity, and in developing a political solution between the Assad government and the rebels. The three countries further advanced their cooperation in the January 2017 peace talks in Astana, Kazakhstan between representatives of the Assad regime and the armed opposition. The peace talks have to date not yielded any critical breakthrough or achievement. Having said this, it appears increasingly that Russia’s future steps on the Syrian questions will involve cooperation with the US – something that will further require Moscow to take Israeli interests into account. Besides the Syrian battlefield, another active element of Russia’s Middle Eastern involvement is the Palestinian question. Capitalizing on its historical ties with the Palestinian national movement, Moscow has sought to play a leading mediation role between the Israelis and the Palestinians, as well as between the Palestinian factions themselves –

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Full RussoAmerican cooperation in the general international system would have farreaching consequences for the regional order in the Middle East and in other theatres like Ukraine, Georgia, Central Asia, the Arctic and the AsiaPacific region.

and Russia in the Middle East after a short-lived yet once again disingenuous ‘reset.’ The second scenario involves a limited number of policy changes toward Russia by the new administration, consisting of carefully choreographed moves to deliver reciprocal concessions. These limited policy changes would ease tensions between Washington and Moscow, and lead to increased cooperation between the two powers in the Middle East. The third scenario is that of full Russo-American cooperation in the general international system, which could evidently have far-reaching consequences for the future regional order in the Middle East – not to mention in other theatres like Ukraine, Eastern Europe, Georgia, Central Asia, the Arctic (see the Nez à Nez debate at p. 56), and in the Asia-Pacific region. Of these three scenarios, the second scenario – that of specific (not general) understandings and compromises between Washington and Moscow – dovetails most precisely with the early declared intentions of both candidate Trump and Trump as president. If this turns out to be the case in practice, then measures will be taken by both Moscow and Washington early in the first term of the new administration in order to reduce bilateral tensions while advancing bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism in particular. Having said this, the prima facie strong anti-Iranian positions of the new administration and the US Congress may well militate against deep and sustained American rapprochement with Russia in the Middle East. It follows that the new administration may eventually attempt to drive a wedge between Moscow and Tehran in the Syrian arena – a development that would manifestly serve Israel’s interests. Back to the Russo-Israeli crossroads. For now, relations between Moscow and Jerusalem are very positive in the security realm, but also in economic, technological and cultural terms. Israel has largely maintained a neutral position on Ukraine, and Russia ‘closed its eyes,’ as it were, during Israel’s 2014 Operation Protective Edge in Gaza, as well as in the wake of a number of military actions attributed to Israel at the Syrian-Lebanese border and inside Syria. As mentioned, the security coordination framework or deconfliction mechanism stood up by Moscow and Jerusalem to prevent friction between the two sides has thus far proven to be reliable. Russia is acutely aware of Israel’s deterrence capabilities in Syria and in the region at large, and has worked to make sure that its military coordination with the Israeli Defence Forces goes smoothly. And Israel is manifestly interested in avoiding clashes with a great power. Bilateral trade between Israel and Russia reached US$3.3 billion in 2015 – an increase of 73 percent from 2014. Exchanges have been particularly active in terms of Israeli arms sales, with Israel selling search drones to Russia in late 2015. Russia has also

sought Israeli know-how in nanotechnology and cyber-security. Russian exports to Israel, in turn, have been led by oil and precious metals. Russian artists are regular guests on the Israeli cultural scene, and Russian television channels are widely broadcast in Israel, supported by a thick network of Russianspeaking Israeli television channels and electronic and print media. Diplomatically, over the past year, there were four high-level Israeli visits to Russia by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and President Reuven Rivlin. And Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev visited Israel in November of last year. (President Putin last visited Israel in 2012.)

f course, Russian intervention in the region may in principle lead to some new future opportunities for Israel, but this seems increasingly unlikely today. Instead, what is more probable is that Moscow will try, at a time of its choosing, to promote understandings between Israel and other regional actors close to Moscow. Moreover, the evolution of relations between Israel and Russia will be conditioned by both regional events and the broader tensions between the global powers. Regionally, Israel faces the challenge posed by the Russian-led coalition operating in Syria, which includes Israel’s most bitter enemies, and views the consolidation of Iranian interests in Syrian territory and the military buildup of Hezbollah as important threats. Israel is also concerned by the bolstering of Russia’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities over Syria. Given the lack of clarity in the new US administration’s policy vis-à-vis both Russia and Israel, mutual consideration by Israel and Russia for each other’s interests in respect of Syria will continue. Russia clearly wishes to avoid damaging its relationship with Israel, and will certainly continue to contain any potential military conflict with Israel, which is in the interest of all parties. Still, from the standpoint of Jerusalem, the Russian presence and activism in the Middle East require Israel to carefully monitor Russian actions in the region, in addition to developments pertaining to Moscow’s relations with regional entities and international players. For its part, Israel has made it plain that it intends to maintain freedom of action in the Syrian theatre. On this logic, Moscow’s continued support for Iran and Hezbollah suggests the potential for future clashes between Russia and Israel. Bref, Jerusalem has no choice but to continue to articulate its objectives in the evolving Syrian order, impose its rules of the game as best as it can, and manoeuvre independently to protect its interests. And this Israel knows how to do. | GB

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participate in solution-making for – some of the major geopolitical, political and social questions of this new century. Headquartered in Toronto but partnering, in a variety of languages, with leading public/ government, private and social enterprise organizations and formations around the world, 21CQ seeks to navigate the entire value chain of activities

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Nagorno-Karabakh: Can it Ever be Solved?

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The second Nagorno-Karabakh war erupted in 2016. A third one is much in the cards. BY STEPAN GRIGORYAN & HASMIK GRIGORYAN

Stepan Grigoryan is Director of the Analytical Centre on Globalization and Regional Cooperation in Yerevan, Armenia. Hasmik Grigoryan is a doctoral candidate at the UCD School of Politics and International Relations in

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Dublin, Ireland.

he history of the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh (NK) goes back to WW1 and the events following the demise of the Russian Empire. Both Armenia and Azerbaijan declared their independence in 1918. In 1922, after the establishment of the Soviet Union, a new Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, with a nearly entirely Armenian population, was created and incorporated into the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR). Bref, in seeking to tame the independence movements of the South Caucasus, the Bolsheviks effectively planted a time-bomb for future territorial disputes between Armenians and Azerbaijanis. The Karabakh conflict returned to the international fore in 1988, as the Soviet project approached its end. That year, the Supreme Council of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast declared its intention to secede from the Azerbaijan SSR, and to seek incorporation into the Armenian SSR. At the time, Armenians accounted for some 80 per cent of the NK population. The secessionist push was met with a ferocious response, starting with pogroms and interethnic clashes, which deteriorated into all-out war by 1992. (The Soviet Union had dissolved by 1991.) The ceasefire agreement signed in May of 1994 reflected the fact that the new NK forces, supported by what was by then the Russian army, controlled most of the territory of NK and also seven adjacent regions of Azerbaijan proper. Manifestly, Azerbaijan, supported by Turkey, did not recognize the secession of NK, and insists to this day that the issue must be solved according to the international legal principle of the territorial integrity of states and the inviolability of borders (based on the post-Soviet borders of each of the former Soviet Union’s 15 constituent republics). In 1994, the OSCE Minsk Group was established to settle the conflict. The group today includes eight countries (Belarus, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Finland and Turkey, as well as Armenia and Azerbaijan). Since 1997, the group has been led by the US, Russia and France. It has tabled serious options for resolution of the conflict – since 2007, on the basis of the socalled Madrid principles of territorial integrity, the right to self-determination, and peaceful conflict resolution – as well as a number of critical tactical steps like the withdrawal of troops from territories around NK, defining the status of NK, the return of

refugees to their places of residence, and the deployment of peacekeepers. Of course, the fact that the NK representatives themselves do not formally participate in these negotiations poses a serious problem for the prospect of terminal resolution. Ceasefire violations ramped up from early 2012, coinciding with a halt in the negotiations between Yerevan and Baku, and the scale of hostilities grew. Heavy artillery was reintroduced into the theatre, and sniper activity intensified. Against a background of rising military budgets, remilitarization of the NK theatre, and more heated rhetoric between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a new (second) Karabakh war broke out on April 2nd, 2016. It lasted only four days, but both parties suffered: hundreds of Armenian and Azerbaijani servicemen were killed, as well as some civilians from Karabakh villages. What were the principal reasons for the resumption of hostilities in NK after 22 years of fragile ceasefire? The first one was, as mentioned, the growing militarization of the South Caucasus. Russia was supplying modernized weaponry to both Armenia, its ally in the conflict, and, paradoxically, Azerbaijan – a country that had been growing its own military budget considerably on the strength of previously high oil and gas prices. The second reason was the aforementioned termination of tangible negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group. Third, Azerbaijan had long been – and remains to this day – very unhappy with the military and political status quo in respect of NK (a discontent that forms a dominant part of the legitimating narrative of the Aliyev government). This discontent sharpened after 2012, with Baku demanding the withdrawal of Armenian forces surrounding NK as a precondition to any progress in negotiations on a final settlement. Fourth, there was a clear absence of political will from the Armenian government to solve that country’s multiple internal problems, leading to instrumentalization of the NK conflict. Fifth, the decline in oil and gas prices from 2014 critically limited Azerbaijan’s capacity to solve the Karabakh problem on the strength of financial and material advantages over Armenia. This meant that Baku, for purposes of diverting public attention, was just as inclined as Yerevan to instrumentalize tensions at the line of contact. Finally, the weakening of Turkey in the international arena in the years leading up to the second NK war unnerved Baku.

PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / EPA / DMITRY LOVETSKY

ings among foreign ministers since, a new meeting between the presidents has not yet been scheduled. Indeed, at the time of this writing, Armenian and Azerbaijani policies appear to be pushing in opposite directions, betraying little interest or urgency in privileging a quick solution to the conflict. Bref, as many of the reasons for the outbreak of the second NK war remain apposite, the probability of resumption of full hostilities is fairly high. The basic

stances of Armenia and Azerbaijan remain mutually irreconcilable: Azerbaijan insists on immediate troop withdrawal from the regions surrounding NK, while Armenia insists on a referendum in NK to determine its political status. It seems, presently, that it would be more important and useful to introduce incident-investigation mechanisms (which would pose as a serious deterrent against those who wish to precipitate further deterioration of the situation in the Karabakh conflict zone), and to withdraw snipers from the line of contact. Thereafter, it should be possible to resume negotiations under the OSCE Minsk Group, placing emphasis on the elaboration and consolidation of confidence measures between the belligerents. Meanwhile, joint humanitarian, research and economic projects should proceed, and contacts between members of civil society on all sides should intensify. In the short run, the conflict seems insoluble. Hostilities, while likely to erupt again before long, are unlikely to spread beyond the immediate theatre – other things international held constant, of course. Still, educating new generations of Armenians and Azerbaijanis through more porous ideologies and tolerance of, and curiosity vis-à-vis, the other side may one day pave the way to the preparation of a serious plan to resolve the Karabakh conflict. | GB

President Vladimir Putin of Russia meets with President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan (left) and President Serzh Sargsyan of Armenia (right) to discuss the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, St. Petersburg, Russia, June 2016.

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The response of the international community to the new war was immediate. Then US Secretary of State John Kerry called on Azerbaijan and Armenia to refrain from escalation, and demanded that the parties immediately return to negotiations. France, Canada and many other Western countries expressed similar positions. Georgia offered to become an intermediary in organizing peace talks between the presidents of the two countries. For his part, President Erdogan of Turkey openly sided with Azerbaijan, stating that his country would “support Azerbaijan until the end,” while Russian president Vladimir Putin called on both parties to end the fighting. The OSCE Minsk Group convened an extraordinary meeting on April 5th, 2016. All of the major international organizations – from the UN to the EU, CIS and CSTO – made statements urging the cessation of hostilities. The Minsk Group organized a meeting in Vienna on May 16th, 2016 between the presidents of Armenia and Azerbaijan. The meeting allowed for resumption of dialogue between the two countries. A joint statement was made in which both presidents agreed to observe the ceasefire established back in 1994, and articulated their commitment to the peaceful settlement of the conflict – including through the introduction of mechanisms to investigate specific incidents prior to, and during, the fighting. On June 20th, at the initiative of President Putin, the presidents of Armenia, Russia and Azerbaijan met in St. Petersburg to discuss the NK problem. A joint statement from the meeting repeated the essential elements of the Vienna statement – although nothing was mentioned about the introduction of incident-investigation mechanisms. The priority must now be for Armenia and Azerbaijan to return to formal, official negotiations. Recent months have seen attempts to restore such talks, but these have proved inadequate for purposes of pushing both sides to the table. One noteworthy problem is that the ceasefire agreed in 2016 was not identical to the one brokered in 1994 – to wit, the 2016 version did not included the signature of the representative from NK. Moreover, the 2016 truce did not last long. Skirmishes at the border have become ever frequent. The said mechanism to investigate ceasefire violations exists on paper, but has still not been actualized. The results of the St. Petersburg meeting have largely remained a formality. Despite a flurry of meet-

Metaphor and policy for a first-order country and people. Or why Canada must think for itself. BY IRVIN STUDIN

ince I wrote “Canada – Population 100 Million” in GB’s Spring/Summer 2010 issue, a bona fide national debate has taken hold about the merits and demerits of Canada having a total population of 100 million by the end of this century. The Globe & Mail, Canada’s leading broadsheet, devoted an entire week to the 100 million thesis, coming out strongly in favour (see the excellent writing on this topic by Doug Saunders). So too, some time later, did the National Post, led by important interventions from Andrew Coyne and Terence Corcoran. A host of national and international papers and news outlets on several continents have also covered the concept, and many followup articles, hostile and supportive alike, have been written in a variety of platforms. A new, ambitious think tank called the Century Initiative, based in Toronto, was launched last year with the express goal of promoting the goal of 100 million Canadians by century’s end. There followed formal advice to the Prime Minister and Cabinet from the Government of Canada’s Advisory Council on Economic Growth to the effect that Canada, primarily for reasons economic, should increase its annual immigration rate from the current 300,000 to 450,000 – a quantum that coincides exactly with the estimated demographic intake needed for Canada to reach a population of 100 million by the year 2100. For a number of reasons – some perhaps anticipated below – the 450,000 immigration quantum has for now been resisted, at least formally, by Ottawa. This remains the case even in the context of what I have called, in several public interventions, a unique strategic opportunity for Canada to profit from the present political instability and discontent in the US by ‘seducing,’ without undue sentimentality,

CANADA POPULATION

100 MILLION PART II

Irvin Studin is Editor-in-Chief and Publisher

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of Global Brief.

leading Americans in industry, culture, science and sport to immigrate to Canada. In point of fact, the peculiar spectacle of the 2016 American election, the unusual new US presidency, and the general political and social malaise in that country should force Canadian leaders, and with them the Canadian population at large, to resolve to develop the institutional structures and cultural and economic resources that will allow Canada to properly ‘think for itself’ sooner rather than later. But ‘thinking for ourselves’ is more than just pious proclamation – for Canada does not, and indeed cannot, at the time of this writing, really think for itself at the standard of a ‘first-order’ or ‘term-setting’ country or people. Instead, the goal of ‘thinking for ourselves’ is a strategic project, with both metaphorical and policy tentacles, as the country maps out its next 150 years. It is, in this sense, effectively identical with the 100 million project. And so, seven years after the original volley in GB, I thought it sensible to update some of my reflections on the 100 million thesis, to clarify some of the intentions of the original piece and, perhaps most importantly, to address the several powerful and legitimate strands of criticism that have been, and may still, be levelled at the 100 million thesis.

100 Million As Metaphor Before I address the policy side of the debate about 100 million at t = 2100, let me treat the dimension that was largely neglected or even misunderstood in the Canadian (national) reaction to the original GB article – to wit, that the 100 million construct is as much about metaphor as it is about policy, and perhaps even more metaphor than policy. After all, I am, for all practical intents and purposes, indifferent between a Canada at 75 million by the year 2100 and a Canada of 120 million. In both scenarios – and the country will quite possibly at least hit the first scenario even at medium-variant population growth projections – Canada, if it still exists by century’s end (no certainty by any stretch), will probably be more populous than any European

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ILLUSTRATION: TIM ZELTNER

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I am, for all intents and purposes, indifferent between a Canada at 75 million by the year 2100 and a Canada of 120 million. If Canada still exists by century’s end, it will be more populous than any European state.

state with the likely exception of Russia (if Russia still has its current borders – also no certainty). For Canadians today, the prospect of Canada becoming ‘bigger’ than any European state and, by implication, the second largest state in the West after the US, is unfathomable. It is not a permissible scenario in the national imagination as presently constructed – an imagination still built on colonial scaffolding that readily subordinates, with few exceptions, to the imaginations of ‘big’ or ‘authoritative’ nations and societies like the US (first and foremost), the UK (not even twice as populous as Canada), France and so on. As this subordination is largely instinctual in the Canadian mentality (a badly neglected word in Canadian policy discourses), it is difficult to say whether it finds deliberate affirmation and consolidation in the behaviour of Canada’s political, economic, cultural and intellectual leaders, or whether they too are simply products of the same colonial narratives and idées fixes. The metaphor of 100 million is therefore squarely aimed at the Canadian psyche and mentality. It removes any objective excuses for Canadians to think of their country as ‘small,’ and makes ridiculous the present national proclivity – again, with some important exemptions – to benchmark downward: why can Canada not be more like Norway (population 5 million)? But seldom: why can Canada not be more like Germany, France, Japan or the UK? An example of this colonial, self-subordinating mentality in action: if we are brutally honest with ourselves (and Canadians, like all nations, have a self-defensive escapism, masked in patriotic dogmas, about these truths), then we might ask: why is it that Mark Zuckerberg goes to Harvard and creates Facebook, ultimately revolutionizing the way in which many people network and communicate around the world, or that Sergey Brin and Larry Page go to Stanford and build Google, while many of even the best and brightest of Canadian students, in the top Canadian schools, fix as their initial ambition not to create a Facebook or Google, but instead to work for them? Or, alternatively, to bring Facebook or Google or some other venture of apparently superior progeny to Canada? The Americans at last build a highly respectable national soccer league, and instead of building one ourselves, we add a few Canadian representatives within an American structure and call it a job well done. (There are, predictably, hardly any Canadians playing in the three professional ‘Canadian’ teams that are implanted in the American structure.) The Americans make the NBA the world’s premier basketball league, and instead of investing heavily in our own Canadian national league (granted, there is some heroic, improbable work being done to this end), we wish only to be part of their imagination – again, the superior imagination, as we see it. Even in our own truly

national sport – hockey – we settle for seven teams out of a total of 30 teams in a league run principally from New York. Witness Canadians, and even the Prime Minister, every four years (including in 2017), waiting with baited breath, colony-like, to hear whether the NHL commissioner, from his perch in Manhattan, decides to allow NHL players – starting with Canadian NHL players – to play in the Olympic Games. In other words, the defending Olympic champions, the Canadians, must wait to see whether an American will veto the ability of the Canadian national team to represent the country and defend Olympic gold – perhaps one of the only national undertakings that psychologically binds the country from coast to coast to coast. Question: why not build our own leagues? Answer: because we are not yet a ‘builder’ nation. This is not a question of economics tout court – it is a question, first and foremost, of mentality. And in this world, and in this century, international life will continue to be marked by two types of peoples: the builders and, in the alternative, those who live on the terms of the builders. For now, we Canadians continue to be happy – even if unconsciously so – to live on the terms of builder nations that we generally deem to be superior. The good news is that while the Canadian mentality is still, in the general, beset by colonial instincts, suppositions and narratives, there is, outside of perhaps our remarkable juridical classes and some of our mining and resource talent, at least one type of Canadian whose psyche is world-beating without conditions or qualifications: the Canadian hockey player. One need only enter a Canadian hockey rink in any part of the country – small town or big city – to understand that Canadian hockey players form in an altogether different brew, and develop and refine a mentality that is fierce, uncompromising, and second-to-none (that is, utterly anti-colonial) when juxtaposed with that of other nations. The question is: can this same hockey player mentality be transferred to other areas of Canadian life and performance – to commerce, the arts, the sciences, politics, geopolitics, and indeed other sports? The 100 million construct as metaphor is an attempt to push us in this direction. It bets that the Canadian of the Canada at 100 million, at century’s end, will sooner have the mentality of the hockey player than not – and not just in matters hockey. And, of course, that the country will, for many of the reasons articulated in the 2010 article, need and profit from such a mentality.

100 Million As Policy The most vociferous strands of public critique of the 100 million thesis have related to the environment, broadly put, as well as to the manifest challenge of

integrating many more new Canadians into Canadian society. I address these critiques below. However, in my analysis, these critiques are less compelling than two other potential lines, which have to date been little discussed in the public debate: on the one hand, legitimate concerns about the future of Quebec in the context of a Canada at 100 million; on the other, uncertainty about how Canada’s indigenous peoples, in all their diversity, will react to, or fare, in such a Canada. Let me take up these last two critiques before I turn to what I think are the less threatening first two lines.

Critique 1 – The Future of the Quebec Question

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The argument ‘from Quebec,’ as it were, against the 100 million thesis would essentially go something like this: the constitutional bargain at the heart of Canada, even if never perfectly or definitively articulated, is that the Canadian federation will protect Quebec’s distinct language (French), religion (Catholicism), system of law (civil code) and culture (via the educational system), in exchange for which French Canadians (or their dominant political unit) will remain loyal to the institutions of a country in which the majority is English-speaking. A cognate, arguably quasi-constitutional element of this bargain is that the demographic weight of Quebec in Canada – or the proportion of the Canadian national population represented by Quebec – will not be significantly diminished over time. Such demographic erosion would, from the Quebec perspective, compromise that province’s capacity to play a leading role in preserving its unique institutions. If Canada were to reach 100 million by century’s end, this would mean that Quebec’s population – assuming the preservation of the demographic weight it enjoys today – would be more than 20 million (or over 20 percent of the Canadian population). At first blush, this quantum might seem an extraordinary leap from the current Quebec population of eight million. And yet, for the province’s vast territory – a territory larger than that of France – such a population increase would, over the course of almost a century, seem far from absurd (provided we take care of some of the environmental and integration challenges discussed below). The more surgical question would be as follows: even if Quebec’s demographic weight is preserved, would all or most of these new Québécois necessarily speak French? If the essential protection bargain is to be preserved, then the answer should be a resounding yes. (Of course, immigrants may speak French as a first, second or even third language.) And if this is the case, it should affect the choice of source countries for immigrants to Quebec, as well as the provincial and federal resources devoted to language training for newcomers. (We discuss source

countries and regions below in the context of the integration critique.) Quebec may actually find that, with more than 20 million mostly French-speaking people in the province, it will begin to enjoy many of the economies of scale and scope that will benefit Canada as a whole in the context of its own much larger population. And this will mean that Quebec will have a larger capacity to protect its language, culture and institutions than it has in the current context of 8 million people (ageing and shrinking) out of a Canadian population of 36 million. But let me go further: the rest of Canada should also participate in bolstering the protection bargain. Indeed, Canada will be compelled to participate should the country’s increased population actually fail to result in 20 million or so Québécois – that is, if Quebec ends up with, say, 15 or 14 million in a Canada of 100 million. What could Canada do? Answer: launch a national languages strategy, today, to promote full French-English bilingualism among all young Canadians, outside of and within Quebec. This would lead to future generations of Canadians who, even while not residing in Quebec, are able to read literature coming out of Quebec (or to read what the Québécois read), consume news and music and films of Québécois provenance, understand Quebec political and cultural debates beyond the surface level (today’s reality), form deep friendships and networks with French-Canadians across the territory of Quebec, and, to be sure, freely and frictionlessly move, inter-provincially, to Quebec to work and live (thus compensating for any demographic imbalances from the larger immigrant intake). For now, such deep friendships and networks between English-speaking Canadians outside Quebec and French-speaking Québécois are, even in this early new century, more the exception than the rule. Some of the brightest and most networked young professionals in English Canada, for lack of full bilingualism and facility with Québécois culture, today have a rolodex that includes precious few francophone Québécois. This fatally compromises their ability to understand many of the core debates in Quebec society and increases the costs of any intervention, even if well-intentioned, in such debates – especially in periods of potential unity crisis. (It also makes it unlikely that these non-French-speaking Canadians can successfully move to Quebec to work and live.) Bref, if one has poor networks and little French, then how is a non-Québécois to play a meaningful role in supporting the protection mandate at the heart of Canadian constitutionalism? More broadly, how can we form a reasonably common political imagination in the country if most Canadians are not speaking the same language, as it were – or, in other words, speaking each other’s language? As I have written before, Canada’s national lan-

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A cognate, arguably quasi-constitutional element of this bargain is that the demographic weight of Quebec in Canada – or the proportion of the Canadian national population represented by Quebec – will not be significantly diminished over time.

guages strategy should stress French-English bilingualism as a baseline standard, but should go beyond this. It should aim to have nearly all future educated Canadians become functionally trilingual – this in a world in which bilingualism is increasingly no great trophy. Most educated Europeans and Asians from leading countries are increasingly at ease in three or more tongues. If French-English bilingualism is key to Canadian national unity and the protection bargain underpinning it, then competence or fluency in at least one more tongue would help future Canadians compete effectively – and win – in an increasingly complex world in which Canada has not one international border (with the US), but indeed four: America (or the Americas) to the south, China to the west, Russia to the north (across the Arctic), and Europe to the east. We may call these new borders, and therefore Canada’s geopolitical ‘game’ this century, ACRE. And this game would seem to dictate that more Canadians should be able to conduct business meetings in a third tongue like Spanish, Mandarin (or another Asian tongue), Russian and any number of other European languages – not to mention Arabic, Persian, Hindi and others. As I note below in respect of the potential Aboriginal critique of 100 Million, we might even imagine adding an Aboriginal tongue to the roster of third or fourth languages that Canadians could acquire in the context of the national languages strategy. Finally, as it approaches 100 million people, Canada should, beyond languages, be working extra hard to bolster knowledge of civil law and the Quebec Code civil among the country’s jurists. Today, while, as mentioned, Canada trains some of the world’s best lawyers in some of the world’s best common law faculties, these lawyers – who inevitably form the talent pool from which are drawn our justice ministers, deputy ministers and Supreme Court Justices – are, with few exceptions, not even superficially versed in the country’s ‘other’ legal system. This is a failure of policy and imagination in Canada, and one with material consequences for the protection bargain with Quebec: it means that Canada’s English-speaking legal classes do not fully appreciate how Quebec’s jurists and legal commentators think, and how Quebec forms many of its constitutional-political ‘asks’ in respect of the federal project in Canada – for starters, the preference in Quebec for explicit language (a civil code preference) rather than implicit understanding (a common law preference).

Critique 2 – The Aboriginal Argument The Aboriginal critique may be similar to the Quebec one in the sense that Canada’s indigenous peoples would also become understandably anxious if their demographic weight were to shrink markedly in favour of newer Canadians. They might fear that

their economic and political weight in the country might, as a result, shrink, and that Aboriginal issues would become marginalized – or, some might say, even more marginalized than today. And yet, unlike with Quebec, there is, strictly speaking, no constitutional or even quasi-constitutional requirement or expectation that the Aboriginal demographic weight in Confederation be preserved. (Note that, at present, by natural increase, the Aboriginal demographic footprint in Canada is actually growing, not shrinking.) There are, to be sure, other constitutional strictures, like duty of care and consultative obligations for the Crown, that have arisen through the growing body of Supreme Court jurisprudence on Aboriginal law, but these have little to do with demography and everything to do with natural resources, land and treaty rights. So what’s to be done to address legitimate Aboriginal concerns about a much larger Canada in which the demographic weight of indigenous peoples, both in the aggregate and possibly also at the level of certain individual nations, will be smaller? The answer must begin with the brutal premise that the Aboriginal people in Canada still live as history’s losing people; that is, most of the Aboriginal population in Canada is descended most recently from people who in their legal, social, economic, organizational and geopolitical interactions with non-Aboriginals – principally European settlers and their descendants – were, over time and for a variety of reasons, stripped of territory, prestige, rights and the underpinnings of social and material well-being. In some cases, they were plainly outmanoeuvred; in others, they were tricked; and in others still, they were assimilated, killed or sickened by extra-continental diseases. The cumulative effect of these blows was historical defeat for the majority of the First Nations to the white man – a defeat that, compounded by the century-plus-long residential school regime, has mercilessly conditioned the logic of the relationship between indigenous people and what would become Canadian governments and Canadian society. To this day, Aboriginal people have generally not been relieved – in their own minds or in the minds of the winning majority – of the status of Canadian history’s losing people. This is not a merely formal status; it is a properly psychological-spiritual one. It means that, to a large extent, the negative drag of the Aboriginal question today continues to be psychological-spiritual in nature, and that a good part of the answer to this Aboriginal question must deal frontally with this reality. The creation over time in Canada of a formally bilingual, bicultural and binational state points the way forward on the Aboriginal question. Canada’s success to date in responding to the challenge to internal unity and cohesion posed by the linguis-

indigenous populations of these countries have anything resembling the upside suggested for New Zealand’s Maori on the score of most indicators of socioeconomic well-being. There would seem to be one signal reason for this difference: the Maori fought the colonizing white man more or less to a strategic draw in the mid-19th century. While its interpretation (and implementation) remains contested, the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi, the founding constitutional document of the New Zealand state, reflects this broad logic of strategic parity between settler and native. As such, the constitutional-political development of the New Zealand state has, in the main, been in the direction of making the Maori the constitutional-political equal of the white man in New Zealand – that is, self-respecting and respected by New Zealand’s majority, including linguistically and in national rituals and symbology. By contrast, a deep spiritual and psychological disorientation prevails today among many members of Canada’s First Nations. This disorientation, or spiritual anomie, stems from strategic loss in history. It conduces to an insufficiency of self-belief and self-confidence, reinforced by a general and painful disrespect or outright misapprehension (at best, indifference) by and from the white majority. If we accept this premise, then the challenge for Canada must be to appreciate this spiritual-cultural disorientation and, over the medium and long term, to launch a process that aims to consciously rehabilitate and resuscitate its Aboriginal people into co-equals in the political stewardship of the country. Indigenous history and tradition themselves arguably anticipate this path for Canada. Brutal and not infrequent wars took place among the many powerful indigenous confederacies prior to contact with the Europeans. These wars yielded winners and losers – changing but, critically, often still preserving the relationships between the belligerent nations. The victor nations became the ‘big brothers’ in the relationship, assuming a responsibility to look out for the ‘younger brothers’ – that is, to protect them from their remaining enemies and to rebuild or reconstitute them so that they could become allies. In other words, victory led to protection and resuscitation of the defeated, which led, for purposes of survival, to reasonable co-equality in alliance. Clearly, part of this push to co-equal status in Canada for the Aboriginal people will involve making the binational logic at the heart of Canadian constitutionalism far more porous for purposes of Aboriginal representation, control of territory and governing responsibilities. This will require us to reimagine the internal borders and identities of Canada in ways that are more eclectic than the very Cartesian 10 provinces-plus-three territories paradigm that predominates in most Canadian

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tic and cultural differences between the Englishspeaking majority and the French-speaking minority has been premised on the idea that the endgame consists not in perfect harmony or amity between the tribes, but depends instead on how a historically victorious majority can rehabilitate and resuscitate defeated minorities into political and even cultural co-equals – co-equals who are equally invested in the continued existence of the state. Historically defeated, the French Canadian in Canada, and in Quebec especially, today walks with his or her shoulders held high, properly self-respecting and in turn respected by the English-speaking majority as politically equal and as hailing from a culture that is just as prestigious as the Anglo-Saxon culture of the historical victors in North America. The French language is today not only studied in all of the schools of English-speaking Canada, but also held in equally high regard in official national institutions and, just as importantly, in the minds of most Canadians. An Anglophone can therefore become prime minister of Canada while being a rank naïf in international affairs, but not without more or less mastering (and respecting) the French language. The rehabilitation or resuscitation of the French Canadians in Canada from historical (geopolitical) losers to political and cultural co-equals did not happen overnight. It took at least a few generations of conspicuous pushes in policy and constitutional reform – propelled also by the heroism and strategy of many intellectuals and political actors from French Canada in general, and Quebec in particular. While there continues to be (and always will be) great debate in Canada and in Quebec about degrees of respect, dignity, constitutional power and division of responsibilities, the character of the French Canadian or Quebec question by now has precious little to do with historical tragedy and the lower extremes of basic material and social well-being for French Canadians and the Québécois. Instead, it is, in its sweet spot, a question about how to govern between centre and region, or between the general and the local. Of the four major Anglo-Saxon democracies with large indigenous populations – Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand – it is New Zealand that has enjoyed the greatest success in the relationship between its indigenous peoples (mostly the Maori) and the white majority. Unlike indigenous people in the other three countries, the Maori in New Zealand are highly represented in the professions, in the national army, in sports (most famously dominating the All Blacks rugby union team and inspiring its haka) and in politics, where the national parliament designates specific seats exclusively for Maori representation. To be sure, the Maori also suffer from many of the social dislocations of indigenous people in the other three countries; however, in no case do the

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Unlike with Quebec, there is, strictly speaking, no constitutional or even quasiconstitutional requirement or expectation that the Aboriginal demographic weight in Confederation be preserved.

school textbooks and therefore in the psyche of most Canadians. Indeed, in a country of 100 million, with Aboriginals – in all their diversity – as co-equals in governance, the internal political geography of Canada will acquire the manifestly complex, eclectic form and appearance befitting a continent-sized country with a large population spread across its territory. (Of course, this eclectic internal political geography will also interact dynamically with Canada’s ‘ACRE’ borders this century.) As suggested above, the vector of culture – far more than rights or economics – must dominate in the resuscitation of the Aboriginal people. A pivotal aspect of this cultural game surely must be the stimulation, revival and mainstreaming of Aboriginal languages. Through the aforementioned national languages strategy, renewed study across Canada in provincial schools of, say, Cree, Ojibway, Inuktitut and Michif – to take but four major Aboriginal tongues – would not only give Canadians a better understanding of Aboriginal realities and mentalities, but also lend prestige to the Aboriginal cultures that were relegated to the peripheries of Canadian society. Aboriginals, in turn, would be given an opening and an audience for the proliferation of books, magazines, blogs, films, radio and television shows across Canada and internationally in tongues that have renewed currency (and prestige). We might then imagine a Canadian prime minister, in the year 2100 (and likely earlier), easily mastering English, French, Mandarin and Cree – all in the larger context of the Aboriginal people having become co-equals in the governance of Canada and equally invested in the continued existence and success of this Canada. A final critical caveat is in order: empowering Aboriginals to become co-equals in governing Canada – the third party, as it were, in what was originally a binational or two-party constitutional compact – may both raise their standard of living and make them far more invested and effective in securing the success of Canada this century; at the same time, however, it could make governing this Canada very difficult. In extremis, if this transition from the extant binational to a de facto or, more complex still, de jure trilateral logic is not managed with world-historical skill, Canada could trend toward the ungovernable. The Aboriginal question would suddenly take on strategic characteristics, over and above its current internal and moral colours: Aboriginals would have effective or even constitutional-legal veto powers in respect of many aspects of Canadian governance that are critical to the advancement of core Canadian strategic interests, including rapid and efficient exploitation and distribution of natural resources (including in the North and the Arctic), population and settlement patterns for Canadians and new Canadians, control of specific territories (say, for purposes of national

sovereignty or territorial integrity), and various species of infrastructure projects needed to continue to build and bind this country. In other words, in solving the moral dimension of the Aboriginal question, Canada will be increasingly confronted with it at a strategic level. And dealing with it at this level will require an evolved mindset among Canadians and their governing classes, as well as new tools in the toolkit.

Critique 3 – The Environmental Argument Will a population of 100 million not result in a Canada that is dirtier, less effective in stewarding its natural beauty, and more damaging to the global commons – perhaps in terms of greenhouse gas emissions and the national ‘carbon footprint’? At the surface level, there is no doubt that many more people in Canada will mean more pressure on Canada’s resources, its green spaces, its air quality, and its oceans, lakes and rivers (indeed, our water supply). Similarly, we might presume that it will become more difficult to preserve the cleanliness of Canada’s streets and cities and, of course, to stave off significant increases in national carbon emissions (even if these will continue to be a very small proportion of global carbon emissions, and at the severe risk of underestimating industrial transformations in favour of ‘green’ energy and technologies over the course of this century). And yet we might counter as follows: domestically, more people will result in a larger economy (that is, more aggregate wealth) and indeed in far greater national business competition and innovation (where Canada today starts from a position of weakness vis-à-vis leading developed countries). Greater national wealth (and demographic density) will give the country the resources to make large-scale investments that today escape us in large part due to insufficient population – to wit, high-speed rail (or its technological equivalent at century’s end) connecting urban centres, the creation and regular upkeep of huge national parks across the country’s territory, the protection of endangered species, space exploration and research, and considerable expenditure on the cleaning and revitalization of brown fields, polluted waters, and depleted forests. Huge investments can be made in environmental science to make Canada the global leader (with no qualifications attached to this avocation) in this field, developing and attracting the world’s best scientists to the country and to its scientific and academic institutions. A greater population with a more competitive ‘hockey mentality’ will produce more world-beating Canadian companies and bring huge vitality to Canadian invention and innovation in the service of environmental goals: green energy, clean air and water, medicine, fisheries, efficient transport and communications, materials science,

and far better embeddedness of Canadian nature into our daily lives. These companies will bring cutting-edge products and services to Canadian society just as they will revolutionize the ways in which many societies around the world interact with nature – for the better. That is what the world’s best companies do. And a Canada at 100 million will be producing many more of the world’s leading (‘termsetting’) companies. While Canada’s carbon footprint will surely be larger (though not necessarily far larger as a proportion of global emissions), this same Canada will have much greater diplomatic weight in international affairs – weight supported by a far larger economy. With its world-beating companies, Canada will suddenly be able to not only affect the terms of international negotiations in ways that are foreign to the country today, but indeed also lead many of these international negotiations on environmental questions (again, lead without qualifications). Canadian assets, including new, higher-order Canadian thinking, will be shaping international discourses and debates and deals on the questions that today matter a great deal to Canadians in respect of the Canadian and the global commons, but in respect of which the country – for lack of population, punch and the right mindset – is ill-prepared and ill-equipped for impact. This will change at 100 million, and the favourable impact of the change will, in the net, significantly outweigh the aggregate impacts of the environmental pressures that will accompany a far larger and energetic Canada.

Critique 4 – The Integration Argument

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How is Canada to integrate an additional 64 million people – even if this influx is spread over the course of 80 or more years? Answer: strategically, skillfully, and with great patience. A few basic presumptions or bottom lines ought to inform this integration imperative for Canada as it builds toward 100 million. These bottom lines are, in my judgement, critical to the stability of Canada (or to preventing its destabilization) in constitutional and social terms as its demographic volume and diversity expand: 1. As noted, the proportion of the national population enjoyed by Quebec should be reasonably (even if not absolutely) stable as the population grows. 2. While the ethnic and religious majority/minority ratio in Canada will be diminished over time as the country approaches 100 million, the majority should never become a clear or conspicuous minority (for that would likely create revolutionary conditions in the country). 3. There should be very deliberate and careful distribution of new populations across the country’s regions, cities and towns. (See the elegant treatment of this challenge in the Query article

by Michael Barutciski at p. 34.) Bearing this in mind, let us consider the integration imperative from both the upstream (selection) and downstream (on-the-ground) dimensions. Upstream, integration turns on the source countries for Canadian immigrants and the selection criteria for these immigrants. Today, the conventional wisdom is that the only growth markets for sources of Canadian immigrants are in those parts of the world in which populations continue to grow – that is, Asia, first and foremost (South Asia, Southeast Asia, and West Asia), but also Africa. Europe, on this logic, is generally considered a shrinking source of immigrants because of the continent’s ageing populations and, until recently, general geopolitical and economic stability (even if the European economy has been weakened somewhat since the 2008 economic crisis). Strangely, the US, the massive country to Canada’s south – with a population of almost 323 million – hardly enters the Canadian imagination when we consider possible future sources of immigration. Today, the US provides just over 8,000 permanent residents to Canada per annum, or as little as three percent of Canada’s annual intake of permanent residents. And yet, historically, the US has been one of the major sources of Canadian immigrants, both before and after Confederation. Is 8,000 migrants per annum all that Canada can attract from its giant neighbour? Considering that Americans are, among all nationals, most likely to integrate rapidly into Canadian society, it would seem that Canada should be far more activist and aggressive in headhunting and attracting its American brethren to relocate to Canada. This recruitment campaign should, for the general American population, be all the more aggressive when the US undergoes periods of great political crisis and division, as is manifestly the case at this time of writing (see my Open Letter to President Trump at p. 12). For the brightest and most talented Americans, Ottawa should, on an ongoing basis and in concert with Canadian provinces, cities, companies and institutions, be floating carefully crafted recruitment packages to bring these people north – all to the benefit of Canada. The minister of immigration and his or her team should, in this respect, be on the phone regularly with some of these top people in order to bring to bear on this process the prestige of government, and to communicate to targeted recruits the seriousness of the state in bringing the best of the world to Canada – systematically. The same recruitment algorithm should be applied to various European countries – the nationals of which, after the Americans, are most susceptible to rapid integration into Canadian society. In particular, Canada should not be shy about targeting nationals from countries in crisis – present or anticipated – or periods of conspicuous systemic weakness (consider

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A greater population with a more competitive ‘hockey mentality’ will produce more world-beating Canadian companies and bring huge vitality to Canadian invention and innovation in the service of environmental goals.

Greece and the UK in today’s EU, or previously Spain, Portugal, Ireland and Italy, and perhaps France before long). To be clear, there is nothing virtuous about Canadian immigration assuming an impersonal, passive or transactional posture in its advertising or recruitment when there is an opportunity for Canada to acquire differential advantage in attracting superior immigration candidates who are likely to fit into Canadian society with minimal friction. Bref, when the next Eurozone crisis or political or geopolitical crisis or interethnic crisis hits a European state, one arm of the Canadian state should busy itself with helping our friends and allies, while another arm of the state should be wooing some of the disaffected, lost or anxious of that crisis – all for Canadian advantage. The strategic posture ought to be that Canada will always help the neediest and most desperate, but will not hesitate to steal the best and brightest. Let us now turn to the downstream dimension of integration. Everyone will move to Toronto, goes the cry. In other words, Toronto would become a city of 30 million. But why should this be so? Why is the present national imagination so small? Surely, at 100 million, there will be new cities in Canada, and new major ones at that. Toronto may well become a city of 10 or 12 million, but so too will there be new major centres in the Canadian north – if not in the three territories, then in northern Quebec and Ontario and the northern Prairies (all to respond to the growth in the strategic and economic importance of the Arctic space) – as well as in the Canadian west and east. This is only natural: about a century ago, Montreal (population nearly half a million) was larger than Toronto (population 400,000), while Ottawa, at less than 100,000 people, was a village. If there will be new cities, and more importantly, if Canada will need new cities and population centres in particular parts of the country (again, for strategic and economic reasons), it will behoove Canadian governments – in particular, Ottawa – to be more strategic and deliberate in ensuring that new Canadians populate many different parts of the country, and not just the present three or four largest cities in the country. How can this be done? On the one hand, evidently, Ottawa and the provinces, municipalities and business concerns must be far more aggressive in seducing immigrants (and also incumbent Canadian citizens) to decide to settle or resettle in Canadian cities and towns that require more people – starting, evidently, with the Maritimes, the Prairie provinces and the North. (I know of very few countries that have managed, strategically and economically, a major ‘new’ international border without a significant demographic presence to support such management.) On the other hand, the Government of Canada and the provinces should be far more courageous

in saying what would seem uncontroversial to many new Canadians, but is not at all broached in Canadian policy discourses – to wit, that part of the bargain of coming to Canada is that there may be a need for you to live or be based in a particular part of the country x for at least y years. There is nothing constitutionally controversial about requiring people (including as a condition for certain benefits or employment or status) to relocate between two points within a particular province. But in my assessment, as I wrote in The Strategic Constitution – Understanding Canadian Power in the World, a constitutional defence can also be made for requiring new Canadians – for instance, before they become permanent residents or citizens – to live or be based in city or town x for y years. Of course, this area of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (section 6) is largely unlitigated, but the state could, if serious, by combining such a requirement with a possible incentive package for new Canadians to live in particular parts of the country, make a persuasive argument that this is defensible on strategic, economic and other grounds – all part of the overall push to populate the land. Will there be pogroms, as it were, between older and new Canadians – that is, will there be major social tensions relating to integration challenges for these many new Canadians? Answer: surely there will be some tensions along the way, as there have always been in the course of integrating new Canadians over Canada’s first 150 years – degrees of discrimination, alienation, and even some fighting – particularly in parts of the country that have been less exposed to immigration. However, the longer-term tendency in Canada has always been toward the exceptional and efficient absorption of newcomers into the body politic – provided the aforementioned three bottom lines are observed (in relation to the Quebec question, the basic majority/minority structure, and the distribution of the population). More complex will be whether the overall Canadian population at 100 million, for all its evolved dynamism and hardened mentality, will be one that is still willing to ‘fight’ for the country. What will a ‘Canadian’ be at 100 million? Around which idea of Canada can we unite this large, diverse mass of humanity spread across a continent-sized country? If the ‘Canadian’ is still, as I once argued, a political construct – that is, if Canadian identity is largely politically negotiated – then this will likely be even more true in a country with a far larger and more complex population. A country of this scale, whose people are Canadian because of Canadian politics, will surely need significant political leadership, major political projects, and an expansive, flexible political imagination in order that it have citizens who remain agreeable about continuing to do things together. | GB

Analyser. Former. Diffuser. 4 observatoires 30 chercheurs en résidence Un réseau international de 100 chercheurs associés Une expertise bilingue

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www.dandurand.uqam.ca facebook.com/ChaireRaoulDandurand/ twitter.com/@RDandurand/

Comment orienter les immigrants vers les régions?

QUERY

L’affectation géographique des immigrants représente un enjeu majeur pour le Canada PAR MICHAEL BARUTCISKI

Michael Barutciski est rédacteur adjoint

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de Global Brief.

es développements en matière de transport et de technologie ont entrainé ces dernières années une plus grande mobilité internationale. Il n’est donc pas étonnant qu’il y ait un fort débat autour de divers aspects des politiques d’immigration et d’intégration. Il y a pourtant une question qui n’attire pas suffisamment d’attention, bien qu’elle joue un rôle important dans l’opinion de la population d’accueil. Il s’agit de la bonne répartition géographique des immigrants, surtout en dehors des grandes régions métropolitaines du pays d’accueil, afin d’empêcher une concentration non équilibrée et une perception de ghéttoïsation. En tant que pays qui accueille les immigrants avec enthousiasme, le Canada se distingue parmi les nombreux pays occidentaux où l’immigration est devenue un sujet controversé: au lieu de diminuer le niveau (déjà élevé) d’admissions, le gouvernement fédéral cherche actuellement à l’augmenter. Certains membres du conseil des ministres fédéral encouragent une augmentation dramatique, bien au-delà de l’augmentation significative proposée récemment par un comité distingué qui conseille le ministre des Finances sur la croissance économique. Bien que le Canada représente un exemple intéressant pour ceux qui veulent s’ouvrir à l’immigration et à l’idée (paradoxale?) de la diversité comme force nationale, il connaît des difficultés considérables par rapport à la répartition territoriale équilibrée des «nouveaux arrivants». Avec la grande majorité des immigrants qui s’installent dans les grands centres urbains naît un sentiment de saturation chez de nombreux résidents de villes comme Toronto et Vancouver. Nous savons que le même problème affecte non seulement les autres pays d’immigration tels l’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande, mais également plusieurs membres importants de l’Union européenne qui font face à des mouvements anti-immigration. L’établissement en dehors des grandes régions métropolitaines représente un défi important pour les gouvernements qui veulent maintenir l’appui de la population locale tout en renforçant leur position démographique avec l’immigration. Dans le contexte canadien, les solutions viendront par l’utilisation des programmes provinciaux d’une manière qui reconnaisse l’importance de la distribution démographique comme enjeu stratégique. Cet enjeu est tel qu’il ne sera pas abordé de manière

efficace en traitant l’immigration comme une simple question économique à court terme. Il faudra aussi explorer d’autres options qui soulèvent des questions compliquées en matière de libertés civiles si les taux de rétention demeurent faibles en région. Pour ceux qui analysent l’immigration sous l’angle positif de la contribution potentielle à la société d’accueil, le Canada est impressionnant dans son ambition. Comme l’a souligné le ministre de l’Immigration quand il a présenté son rapport annuel au Parlement l’automne dernier: «Peu de pays dans le monde peuvent égaler le Canada dans l’importance qu’il accorde à l’immigration et à l’intégration des immigrants dans ses collectivités». Il y a, néanmoins, un élément central du modèle canadien de sélection des immigrants économiques qui n’est pas suffisamment apprécié par les promoteurs du libéralisme. Le gouvernement rassure constamment (de manière implicite) la population d’accueil du fait qu’il contrôle les frontières et que les immigrants servent les intérêts du pays étant donné qu’ils sont choisis selon un système de points attribués en fonction de leurs capacités d’intégration et de contribution économique. Même s’il existe toujours une tension entre les intérêts économiques à court terme (par exemple, la main-d’œuvre pour des postes vacants et l’augmentation du nombre de contribuables) et ceux à long terme qui favorisent des travailleurs flexibles avec des critères plus larges (par exemple, la formation scolaire, l’expérience de travail et les connaissances linguistiques), la flexibilité du système permet d’accentuer différents facteurs selon les circonstances socio-économiques du pays. Dans cette logique pragmatique, il est à noter qu’il n’y a pas de quotas d’admissions au Canada, contrairement à l’idée répandue par les médias et par nombreux commentateurs. Selon la loi canadienne, le ministre de l’Immigration doit soumettre au Parlement des cibles de planification chaque année. La nuance dans la terminologie est importante car elle permet (et encourage même) des ajustements pour tenir compte et profiter des circonstances internes ou externes. Par exemple, les cibles pour la catégorie humanitaire ont été ajustées récemment afin d’admettre plus de 30 000 réfugiés syriens. La partie la plus innovante du modèle canadien d’immigration est sans doute la sélection des immigrants économiques à partir d’un système basé

sur des points. Ce système a été introduit au Canada en 1967. En tant qu’outil politique, non seulement il renforce la notion que le gouvernement contrôle la sélection des immigrants, mais il laisse l’impression que la sélection n’est pas discriminatoire car le «concours universel» est théoriquement ouvert à tous. Depuis 1971, la majorité des immigrants au Canada vient de pays non-européens. Le système a été imité par la suite en Australie (1973), en Nouvelle-Zélande (1991), en République tchèque (2003), à Singapour (2004), à Hong Kong (2006), au Danemark (2007) et au Royaume-Uni (2008). Selon Statistique Canada et le Conference Board du Canada, la démographie canadienne est en train de changer, principalement à cause du vieillissement de la population. Comme nos sociétés libérales ne semblent pas trop inquiètes par les taux de natalité qui sont inférieurs à la moyenne nécessaire pour se reproduire, le gouvernement mise essentiellement sur l’immigration afin d’éviter une décroissance démographique. Les niveaux d’immigration sont tellement élevés (250 000 à 300 000 nouveaux résidents permanents par an) que la population totale augmente de façon significative malgré le fait que le Canada fasse partie des pays de l’OCDE à faible fécondité.

PHOTOGRAPHIE: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS

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e problème provient du fait que les immigrants s’installent principalement dans les grandes régions métropolitaines, de la sorte que les petites municipalités et les régions rurales à travers le pays ont peu de contact avec la nouvelle diversité introduite par ces immigrants venus de tous les continents. Selon Statistique Canada, «La propension des nouveaux immigrants canadiens à s’établir en régions métropolitaines, ainsi que leur natalité, a contribué, depuis plusieurs décennies, à concentrer la diversité ethnoculturelle dans les milieux métropolitains». Le contraste socio-culturel entre les grandes villes et les régions se fait sentir de plus en plus, contribuant ainsi à des clivages politiques déjà observés lors de scrutins électoraux. Il est difficile d’imaginer que la cohésion (sociale et nationale) ne soit pas affectée par une telle situation démographique. Dans ce contexte délicat, les projections statistiques suggèrent que la majorité blanche d’ascendance européenne est en train de se faire remplacer dans certaines métropoles par des «minorités visibles» (terme officiel au Canada, régulièrement contesté par le Comité onusien pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale). Il s’agit d’une situation inédite, impliquant une expérience sociale d’intégration «multiculturelle» selon un modèle canadien qui a été présenté comme «postnational» par son premier ministre actuel. Selon Statistique Canada, les immigrants (et leurs

enfants nés au Canada) constitueront environ 70 et 78 pour cent des résidents de Toronto et Vancouver en 2031. En revanche, ils constitueront moins de 10 pour cent des résidents de Trois-Rivières (Québec) ou Saint-Jean (Terre-Neuve). De même, les «minorités visibles» représenteront 60 pour cent des résidents de Toronto et Vancouver en 2031, bien que leur proportion sera inférieure à cinq pour cent dans les petites municipalités comme Trois-Rivières, Saint-Jean et Sudbury (Ontario). Peu importe si les Canadiens veulent ou non avoir un pays de 100 millions d’habitants à la fin du siècle, Ottawa doit reconnaître que l’affectation géographique des immigrants représente un enjeu majeur. Le soutien de la population, même pour les niveaux actuels qui sont historiquement élevés (et qui mèneront à une population de 53 millions en 2100), dépend de l’établissement des immigrants en dehors des grandes régions métropolitaines. En ce sens, le «programme des candidats des provinces» a eu un effet positif sur la redistribution territoriale selon les statistiques des dernières années. En outre, certaines provinces sont en train de profiter des nouveaux volets du système «Entrée express» afin d’augmenter leur part en immigrants et ainsi de réorienter les nouveaux arrivants vers des endroits sous-représentés (par exemple, les Prairies et les Maritimes). Cependant, il reste le problème de la rétention des intéressés, comme l’a récemment souligné le Conseil économique des provinces de l’Atlantique. Bien que la capacité d’accueil existe, il faut retenir les immigrants si l’on veut avoir un effet démographique important sur le long terme. La rétention représente un défi distinct où les communautés locales doivent tout faire non seulement pour attirer et pour recruter, mais aussi pour intégrer durablement. Le taux ne doit pas être un taux de 100 pour cent, mais il doit s’améliorer par rapport aux résultats des dernières années qui suggèrent que la moitié des immigrants ne restent pas longtemps dans les régions. Les solutions existent si l’on souhaite orienter de manière générale les immigrants vers les régions. Dans un premier temps, le gouvernement fédéral devrait inciter davantage les immigrants à s’installer en région plutôt que dans les métropoles. Si Ottawa prend au sérieux ce défi démographique qui com-

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Si le problème de la rétention s’avère difficile à surmonter, le gouvernement fédéral devrait explorer des moyens plus coercitifs. Les défenseurs des libertés individuelles vont naturellement (et avec raison) préférer que l’approche soit incitative plutôt que coercitive.

promet l’avenir des régions et qui creuse un fossé entre la diversité culturelle des grandes villes et l’homogénéité des petites municipalités, les buts de la planification devraient être ajustées pour mettre l’accent sur les besoins des régions qui reçoivent traditionnellement moins d’immigrants. Autrement dit, il faut utiliser les programmes existants qui permettent d’orienter les immigrants vers les régions. Le gouvernement a déjà eu de bons résultats avec ces programmes. Il serait donc question de les accentuer davantage. Étant donné que la liberté de circulation est protégée par l’article 6 de la Charte canadienne des droits et libertés, il n’est pas certain que les immigrants vont s’installer durablement en dehors des grandes villes, car le problème de leur rétention est bien réel. Cependant, même si le taux de rétention demeure stable, le nombre plus large d’immigrants arrivés temporairement en région aura pour résultat qu’un plus grand nombre d’entre eux choisira d’y rester. Sur le plan politique, le fait de stabiliser le nombre d’immigrants qui s’établiront à Toronto ou à Vancouver dès leur arrivée aurait l’avantage d’apaiser les préoccupations de nombreux Canadiens qui considèrent que ces villes sont déjà saturées (ou le seront bientôt). Il ne s’agit pas d’une attitude anti-immigration; bien au contraire, car le rééquilibrage dans la destination initiale des nouveaux arrivants aurait un effet positif sur l’ouverture de la population nationale à l’égard de tout projet d’expansion démographique. Si le problème de la rétention s’avère difficile à surmonter, le gouvernement fédéral devrait explorer des moyens plus coercitifs. Les défenseurs des libertés individuelles vont naturellement (et avec raison) préférer que l’approche soit incitative plutôt que coercitive. Pourtant, si le modèle canadien des droits humains a su attirer l’attention des constitutionnalistes à travers le monde, c’est justement parce qu’il tient compte des préoccupations de la collectivité et qu’il ne reflète pas un libéralisme absolu. Comme l’a suggéré le co-auteur d’un rapport important sur les accommodements raisonnables au Québec, le philosophe Charles Taylor, les dossiers des immigrants qui s’engagent à vivre temporairement en région devraient être traités de manière prioritaire. La sélection serait conditionnée à leur acceptation de s’installer en région. Par conséquent, leur statut de résident permanent serait assorti d’une limitation temporaire à la liberté de circulation prévue dans la Charte. Celle-ci prévoit dans son article premier une possibilité d’imposer des «limites qui soient raisonnables et dont la justification puisse se démontrer dans le cadre d’une société libre et démocratique». D’où l’importance que les objectifs à long terme concernant la stratégie démographique soient exprimés officiellement par le gouvernement. L’aspect coercitif représenterait une mesure qui

serait possiblement contestée devant les tribunaux, mais le gouvernement pourrait se défendre en démontrant que les moyens indirects n’avaient pas atteint l’objectif important concernant la dispersion territoriale de l’immigration. Selon cet argument, le gouvernement aurait, certes, pris des mesures qui enfreindraient de manière minimale et temporaire les droits des immigrants, mais ce afin d’atteindre des objectifs légitimes.

ême si la plupart de ces immigrants déménagent aussitôt qu’ils obtiennent la citoyenneté (normalement après environ quatre ans de résidence permanente), le pays sera en meilleure position par rapport aux objectifs à long terme. L’immigrant ayant habité quatre années en région sera mieux intégré et sera mieux accepté dans les grandes métropoles, comme ce fût le cas pour de nombreux immigrants qui ont aidé à «construire» le pays au 20e siècle. Le Canada se distingue par sa volonté d’innover et d’être chef de file en matière d’immigration. La distinction est telle que le pays doit se permettre d’explorer des projets ambitieux dans un contexte international où les migrations sont sources de controverses et la xénophobie est en train de se répandre. L’idée de tripler le nombre d’habitants à 100 millions d’ici la fin du siècle s’inscrit dans ce contexte national où l’immigration est perçue généralement comme un atout permettant le développement du pays. Dans la mesure où l’immigration est analysée parfois sous ses angles moins positifs, le débat tourne souvent autour de la tension entre protection des droits des travailleurs natifs et l’intérêt des employeurs d’avoir une offre croissante de maind’œuvre immigrante (généralement moins chère). Un gouvernement courageux utiliserait consciemment la dispersion géographique des immigrants pour aborder ce problème en soulignant que les immigrants sont prêts à jouer un rôle économique négligé par la population native. Cela contribuerait grandement à ce que l’interaction des marchés libres et l’immigration ne soient pas perçues de manière négative. On ne gère pas les complexités migratoires avec du dogmatisme, mais plutôt avec l’art du compromis et une vision sophistiquée de la raison d’État qui cherche à équilibrer constamment les intérêts nationaux avec les libertés civiles. La dispersion des immigrants vers les régions représenterait une telle approche si elle trouvait le juste milieu entre incitation et coercition. Elle permettrait ainsi de limiter un des facteurs importants de polarisation de nos sociétés et les problèmes de cohésion nationale qui n’iront qu’en s’aggravant si on laisse le libre établissement des immigrants continuer sans aucune intervention de l’État. | GB

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TÊTE À TÊTE

Mexico’s Bottom Lines GB sits down with Mexico’s former president to discuss his country’s possible counter to the new US administration Conversation with FELIPE CALDERON

Felipe Calderon was the President of Mexico between 2006 and 2012.

GB: What is your reaction to what is happening in the US? FC: It appears that this is going to be one of the worst eras in living memory for American society and government. Of course, this will also be one of the worst eras in recent history for the relationship between Mexico and the US – and, I dare say, between the US and the rest of the world. For all intents and purposes, we now have an American president who, from his first days in office, has made decisions more emotionally than rationally. We are seeing clearly how protectionism and nationalism are returning with a vengeance to the most powerful nation in the world. This will affect much of the world economy, and also the development of very specific countries – in particular, Mexico. Let us see what will happen in the next few months, but thus far each day has been very, very bad for the global landscape.

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GB: What should Mexico’s response be to the proposed new ‘wall’ between the US and your country?

FC: There are two issues that concern me most. One is the wall itself and the more general antiimmigration policy that President Trump is planning to carry out. The other is the impact of changes to the trading relationship – that is, changes to NAFTA. First and foremost, Mexico must reject – and must continue to reject – the very idea of building a wall, as that is a hostile act. This is not the kind of behaviour that one would expect from a neighbour, a friend and an ally. Beyond that, however, if you are going to build anything on your own territory, it is patent nonsense to demand that your neighbour pay for it. It is completely unfair, completely illegal, and therefore completely unacceptable. So Mexico must reject, by all and any means, such pretense and pretensions. As for the broader issue of immigration, it is important to note that the net rate of immigration of Mexican workers to the US over the last six years has been either neutral or negative. The number of Mexican workers travelling back to Mexico from the US is today larger than the number of Mexican workers going to the US. Perhaps President Trump does not know this, but it is obviously important that he be advised properly in this regard. Bref, this situation will be tough for Mexico in the short term, but I hope that things

can change in the medium term, because American society and the US economy need immigrants – not only Mexican immigrants, but immigrants from all over, for a wide variety of critical needs. This means that Trump must address this problem in a different way, because to try to prevent and stop immigration by decree will ultimately prove impossible. After all, nearly 60 percent of the workers in the US agricultural sector are immigrants. Many more are probably without papers. The same is broadly true in the service sector. As for trade, this issue is even more serious and difficult than the wall. But again, Mexico needs to react properly and robustly. Mexico should use all of the instruments available under NAFTA and under the rules of the WTO. The US cannot unilaterally establish a tariff of as much as, say, 20 percent, because such an action is a direct violation of the rules of the free-trade agreement and also of WTO rules. Mexico has the right to defend itself – in US courts or through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. And so we must do that. According to the rules of the WTO or NAFTA, Mexico can retaliate. To this end, I would suggest a selected, targeted retaliation policy in which we can penalize the US with specific tariffs on certain products, targeting directly all of those states and regions in which Trump has significant support. I remember that we did so when I was president, when some members of the US Congress blocked support for some parts of the trilateral treaty – in particular, for transportation. We established selective retaliation on some 90 American products, including pistachios from California, and other products from states like Pennsylvania and Washington. We got the very same representatives who were blocking support for the free-trade agreement to reverse these actions. In short, we won. So it is eminently possible to apply such strategies to today’s trade conflict with the US. It is clear that what Trump is doing is putting into question the entire American relationship with Mexico. As such, Mexico must consider rebalancing the entirety of its relationship with the US. What does this mean? If the US wishes to block us on immigration or trade, then let us also talk about national security. Mexico is a key ally of the US in national security matters. Trump cannot take for granted the support of Mexico in national security matters. Let me tell you that when I was president,

Mexico must consider rebalancing the entirety of its relationship with the US. What does this mean? If the US wishes to block us on immigration or trade, then let us also talk about national security.

PHOTOGRAPH: FROM THE OFFICE OF FELIPE CALDERON

But again, if Trump keeps up this aggressive attitude and posture toward Mexico, then we need to reconsider our collaboration with the US on drugs and organized crime. To be sure, organized crime is the more complex, underlying issue, because it involves the takeover of local territory and government – something that leads to delinquency, kidnapping, extortion and, of course, proliferation of the drug trade. But, building on my logic of Mexican reconsideration and recalibration, perhaps Mexico should adopt the rules of several states in the US in order to allow or regulate the use of drugs for medical or even recreational use.

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we had a criminal – a terrorist – on Mexican territory who was plotting to assassinate the Saudi ambassador to the US. Mexico helped to stop the plot. Mexico does a great deal of work, in very close collaboration with American agents, to fight the most-wanted criminals associated with organized crime in drug cartels in Mexico. Mexico, like Canada, was crucial to the US after 9/11. Bref, we have a safe border – regardless of what Trump and his people are saying. And Mexico has contributed immensely to this very safe border. It follows that this new president should definitely want to have Mexico as an ally on security.

GB: What is the Mexican reply to the American political claim that the wall is a response to illegal migration or crime and drugs across the border?

We passed from authoritarian centralism to some kind of neofeudalism with true impunity. Yes, Mexico had a democratic transition, but not a real federal transition.

FC: It is clear that Mexico and Mexicans are among the most important scapegoats for President Trump. He is blaming us – Mexican workers and also Mexican products – in order to explain, in a very simplistic and false way, the various problems of American society. This is a cheap strategy. After all, he does not have enough courage to confront China. Surely, he understands that the trade deficit with China is some five times larger than the deficit with Mexico. And yet he prefers to bully Mexico because we are closer, and also not as strong as China in economic and strategic terms. The case of the wall is very much the same. Mexican immigrants and immigrants from all over the world have contributed very substantially to the prosperity of the US. One cannot explain the development of the US as the still-leading economy of the world without the contribution of immigrants. Now, the wall is completely useless. We know that there are several parts of our border where a wall would be completely useless. We have some 3,200 kilometres of border, and there may be physical barriers – including rivers and deserts – for over 1,000 kilometres of that border. More fundamentally still, the problem of immigration is not about walls. The only way in which you can reduce or even nullify immigration is by creating opportunities in the source countries. In Mexico, we were able to create such opportunities in recent years. We grew twice as much as the US for many of the years of my presidency. We were able to create jobs, and also to offer education and health services for the Mexican people. To be clear: the more jobs Trump destroys in Mexico, the more immigrants American society will receive. President Trump needs to understand that very simple logic – and more than him, the people who supported him in the election need to understand it.

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GB: Given the current pressures, what are some measures that Mexico can take, in terms of economic planning over the next 10 years, to increase the well-being of Mexican citizens?

FC: That is a great question. Mexico must think much more about its own world than obsess about the Trump wall. Hopefully, the Trump wall never will be built. We know that it is difficult, and that it will be extremely expensive. We know that no one will want to pay for it. It is a certainty that the Mexican people will not pay a single penny for such an absurd project. But the Americans will also not want to pay. Meanwhile, domestically, we in Mexico will need to straighten out our macroeconomic

fundamentals. We need to reduce our deficit quickly, which requires reducing public expenditures in some areas – expenditures that have grown excessively in recent years. The government has already increased taxes in a very aggressive way. We need to persevere in order to meaningfully cut the deficit – even to zero – in the short term. We will need to do this in order have credibility once again in the international financial markets, and to provide more stability to the Mexican peso. Furthermore, regardless of what will happen with President Trump, Mexico must grapple with what is the country’s most serious challenge – namely, the rule of law problem. Mexico must be a rule-of-law country. For this to happen, we need to overhaul or rebuild our security and justice institutions. We need to fight corruption, which is spreading to both local and federal levels of administration, and affecting the work of many agencies. We need to establish a clear culture of enforcement. And, of course, we need to demand more commitment and responsibility from our elected representatives. Third, Mexico has many trading opportunities. If some 80 percent of our total exports go to the US today, then this trade intensity exists for a very simple reason: it is easy to export from Mexico to the US, as the countries are next door to each other. But we can also export to Europe. We have a free-trade agreement with the EU. Of course, I would like to say the same about the UK, but I do not know when that country will resolve its status. Still, the fact is that we can export all over the world. Mexico has become quite a competitive country for manufacturing. When I left office, Mexico was the fourth largest exporter of vehicles in the world. Mexico was the largest country in terms of the number of aerospace companies investing in the country. We are quite competitive in electronics, flat screens, and mobile phones. We can compete and trade with the rest of the world – not only with the US. That is why the government and the productive sectors must set about training exporters, priming them, and supporting and financing them in order to diversify our markets. Of course, if there is anything like a mass deportation of Mexican people, then we will need to consider temporary relief programmes for these people. But let me emphasize that the Obama administration, too, was tough on immigration with us. It deported record numbers of people. So I am not expecting that Trump will be able to deliver much more than that – not only because the US agencies have already done whatever they could, but also because the Obama administration left the economy at near full employment (less than five percent unemployment). As such, if Trump deports massive numbers of poor workers, then the American economy, and specific

sectors within it, will suffer significant losses. Let me refer you to recent interventions from the US agricultural sector – major companies like Tyson and Cargill – asking President Trump to “take care,” because Mexico is a great market for the US, and for these companies in particular. After all, Mexico will be the fifth, sixth or seventh largest market in the world by the year 2050. It is a very promising market for any company in terms of consumption power. It follows that people will pay dearly for losing it. I therefore believe that there is a strong chance that leading American companies may deter or prevent, or will otherwise start to act in order to stop, such irrational, extreme experiments in policy. GB: What is the strategy that Mexico can deploy over the next 10 years to seriously tackle narcoviolence and the absence of rule of law in several parts of the country?

GB: Is Mexico a bona fide federation today? How are the relations between the central government and the states today as compared with other federations? FC: I have not experienced other federations intimately, but the problem in Mexico is that we had a very centralized political regime in the authoritarian era. When the transition took place in 2000, significant power disappeared from the hands of the president and reappeared in the hands of the governors. (continued) For the rest of the interview with Felipe Calderon,

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FC: One key vector must be to fight the cartels. In the past, the policy was always more or less to allow these groups to do whatever they wanted. That is why organized crime – not only for narco-traffic purposes, but organized crime more broadly – started to take over the control of police forces. This happened first at local levels – in the very small towns and villages – but afterwards also at the federal and national level. In my time in office, I discovered cases of organized crime taking over gubernatorial offices, with the local police working for the criminals instead of the citizens. This happened in my own state of Michoacan. We did not have the judicial elements in place to go to trial, but afterwards many details emerged to the effect that one of the governors had been talking in a video with the leader of the criminals in his state in order to reach an agreement. Indeed, there have been several trials in the US involving several witnesses explaining how the Zetas organization takes control of local police forces. There is an order of arrest out now for the former governor. Nevertheless, the basic point is that we need to confront the criminals. The second, arguably far more important axis of the strategy involves a complete overhaul, if not repeal, of Mexico’s security and justice institutions. To this end, for instance, in my time in power, we created a new process for getting into the police corps. Any candidate wishing to be a member of the federal police would need to pass a toxicological exam, a socio-economic exam, a psychological exam, and a polygraph exam. They would need to pass these exams every one or two years, depending on their professional responsibilities. The same regime would apply to the army and the navy. And I believe that the same must happen for the office of the attorney-general

and any agency associated with law enforcement. The other thing that we emphasize today is the importance of the local level, given that Mexico has a very complex federal system. When I was president, we had a budget to address local reforms – including reform of the security sector – even as we had to tackle leakages in local budgets due to corruption. Let me give you three examples of this reform work. One is the case of Tijuana, where we had started to repeal the municipal police of Tijuana. The criminals declared publicly that if the government continued to remove policemen associated with them, they would kill two policemen a week among the new recruits. And they started to do so. This was a very, very difficult path, but we continued to clean up the police. Eventually, crime in Tijuana decreased by more than 70 percent from its peak. Now look at Ciudad Juarez. It was considered the most violent city in the world. However, there we deployed what we should call the third axis of our strategy – that is, the rebuilding of the social fabric through the provision of opportunities for education and services, sports and cultural events for children and young people. Indeed, Ciudad Juarez was a key case study for this social dimension of our strategy. We were ultimately able to reduce crime from crisis proportions within two years. And the same thing happened in Monterrey, in the state of Nuevo Leon. In all three examples, the message is that success is possible, but you need to be severe, you need to have determination, and there must be political will to reform. But I want to stress that Mexico’s problems are not about drugs as such. That would be a conceptual mistake in understanding the situation. The key problem that Mexico has had from the beginning of this century is criminal takeover of local police forces, local mayors, and even governors – and beyond that, takeover of parts of Mexican society. That is precisely why such strong intervention must come from government both to prevent and eventually fix the problem.

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Une solution diplomatique ne satisfera personne dans l’absolu, malgré la responsabilité partagée dans ce drame. PAR MILOUD CHENNOUFI

LE TEMPS DES

DIPLOMATES EN SYRIE

Miloud Chennoufi est professeur de relations internationales au Collège des Forces

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canadiennes.

l est de nouveau question de diplomatie en Syrie. L’accord conclu par la Russie, la Turquie et l’Iran a servi de prélude à la conférence de consolidation du cessez-le-feu à Astana (Kazakhstan) tenue en janvier. Les négociations politiques doivent avoir lieu ultérieurement et auront pour but de mettre un terme définitif au conflit. Comment expliquer la réhabilitation de la diplomatie alors que quelques mois auparavant, seule la voie des armes était envisagée? L’intensité des opérations à Alep et l’anticipation de massacres à grande échelle dans une guerre censée se poursuivre sur le rythme de bombardements russes acharnés ne laissaient pas présager la possibilité d’un cessez-le-feu (voir l’article Feature de Zvi Magen et Sarah Fainberg à la page 18). Certes, la guerre civile syrienne qui a fait des centaines de milliers de morts, des millions de réfugiés,

L’ambassadeur syrien à l’ONU et chef de la délégation syrienne, Bachar Al Jaafari (à droite), discute avec un membre de sa délégation pendant les négociations à Astana, au Kazakhstan (janvier 2017).

PHOTOGRAPHIE: LA PRESSE CANADIENNE / AP / SERGEI GRITS

tant à 2012. Moscou avait alors eu recours aux Elders, un groupe diplomatique de seconde voie (track two diplomacy), et avait proposé par leur intermédiaire un cessez-le-feu suivi d’un plan consistant à résoudre le conflit par voie de négociations et surtout d’une transition souple garantissant au président Assad une sortie honorable à terme. On ne sait pas quelle aurait été la réaction de Damas dès lors que l’initiative a été sabordée avant même qu’elle ne fasse l’objet d’un débat formel au Conseil de sécurité.

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et a semé terreur et désolation à l’échelle de toute une nation, n’est pas encore finie. Il n’en demeure pas moins que l’offensive diplomatique actuelle recèle quelque chose de particulier qui mérite d’être compris et qui, plus que les initiatives précédentes, a davantage de chances d’aboutir si les nombreux acteurs de ce conflit parvenaient à la conclusion qu’une solution politique négociée est inévitable. À vrai dire, les architectes de l’initiative actuelle n’ont fait que reprendre une initiative russe remon-

Martti Ahtisaari, ancien président de la Finlande, fut chargé par les Elders de discuter de la proposition russe avec les représentants des puissances occidentales au Conseil de sécurité. Il explique: «Il n’y a pas eu de résultat parce que tous ceux-là [les membres occidentaux du Conseil de sécurité] et plusieurs autres acteurs [l’opposition syrienne et ses soutiens régionaux] pensaient qu’Assad allait tomber dans les semaines qui suivaient et que, par conséquent, nul n’était besoin de faire quoi que ce soit». À l’époque, le conflit était encore jeune. Il n’avait pas encore pris l’envergure d’une crise humanitaire dévastatrice, l’une des plus sévères depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale. Comme c’est souvent le cas dans les conflits de cette nature, la question de la maturité du conflit est cruciale. Elle se mesure par la durée du conflit, par le nombre de victimes, par l’ampleur de la destruction, et surtout par l’appréciation des acteurs quant à leur capacité à remporter une victoire militaire décisive. Dans le conflit syrien, c’est surtout le dernier élément qui

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Si l’opposition syrienne n’a pas réussi à gagner, ce n’est pas du fait de la puissance de feu du gouvernement syrien et de son allié russe, mais parce qu’elle n’a jamais réussi à convaincre les Syriens qu’elle représentait une alternative crédible.

a fait dérailler toutes les initiatives diplomatiques, et pas seulement celle des Elders. Cette logique de la solution militaire dominait sur chacun des trois niveaux du conflit. À l’échelle nationale, le gouvernement syrien a fait le pari de la force aveugle, reflet de sa nature répressive, mais en résonnance aussi avec la volonté d’une opposition qui, tôt dans le conflit, s’est engagée dans une insurrection armée avec l’espoir que le scénario libyen d’une intervention militaire occidentale se répéterait. Au niveau régional, l’Iran et le Hezbollah libanais n’ont pas hésité à voler au secours de Damas; ils comprenaient que les positionnements dans la région vis-à-vis du conflit étaient déterminés par l’animosité de Riyad à l’égard de Téhéran, et par la volonté de la Turquie et du Qatar d’établir un ordre islamiste sunnite, ce qui revenait à réduire l’influence régionale de l’Iran à néant et à le rendre vulnérable aux pressions extérieures. Au niveau international, le soutien russe au gouvernement syrien explique dans une large mesure l’incapacité de l’insurrection

de gagner la guerre, alors que cette insurrection nourrissait l’espoir que la rhétorique belliqueuse de la France, du Royaume-Uni et des États-Unis et leurs appels répétés au changement de régime en Syrie se traduiraient par une intervention armée.

ans la structure à trois niveaux du conflit syrien, seuls les Russes ont maintenu depuis le début une position favorable à l’action diplomatique, quitte, dans un premier temps, à jeter leur poids militaire derrière le gouvernement syrien pour l’imposer. À la lumière des récents développements à Astana et de la promesse de reprise des négociations politiques, il est clair que l’intervention militaire russe en Syrie depuis l’automne 2015 n’avait pas pour objectif exclusif de permettre à l’armée syrienne de gagner la guerre, mais de renverser les rapports de forces sur le terrain afin d’obtenir l’engagement d’acteurs clés du conflit dans une logique diplomatique. Ce renversement de la situation sur le terrain militaire syrien (niveau national) s’est accompagné de changements sur les deux autres niveaux également. C’est précisément la réorientation opérée par la Turquie, acteur régional de premier ordre dans le conflit, et la défaite d’Hillary Clinton aux élections présidentielles américaines, qui ont consolidé la position russe et ont conduit au processus diplomatique actuel. L’évolution de la position turque sur le conflit a été particulièrement spectaculaire parce qu’Ankara avait tout misé sur un changement violent de régime en Syrie. Au début du soulèvement syrien, avant la militarisation, les Turcs espéraient une chute rapide du président Assad et l’arrivée au pouvoir de leurs protégés, les Frères musulmans syriens, une force politique sunnite qui aurait permis à la Turquie d’acquérir une influence néo-impériale au MoyenOrient, en réminiscence de la domination ottomane que les Turcs avaient exercée sur la région pendant quatre siècles et qui n’a jamais cessé d’animer les islamistes au pouvoir à Ankara. Mais Assad n’est pas tombé. Les Turcs auraient pu en conclure que leurs calculs étaient erronés. Mais c’est l’intervention de l’OTAN en Libye qui leur a laissé croire que le même scénario pouvait se répéter en Syrie. Pour cela, le soulèvement syrien devait se militariser. La Turquie, comme tous les autres acteurs extérieurs à la Syrie qui ont soutenu la militarisation, n’avait pas d’autre choix que de s’appuyer sur les seuls groupes prêts à prendre les armes contre Damas, à savoir les islamistes arabes sunnites. C’est d’ailleurs de là que le problème de la non-représentativité de l’insurrection armée syrienne s’est aggravé, alors qu’il se posait déjà au niveau des structures politiques de l’opposition syrienne installée à l’étranger.

Bref, si l’opposition syrienne n’a pas réussi à gagner, ce n’est pas uniquement du fait de la puissance de feu du gouvernement syrien et de son allié russe, mais parce qu’elle n’a jamais réussi à convaincre les Syriens qu’elle représentait une alternative crédible – c’est-à-dire inclusive. Pendant les premières années de la militarisation, la Turquie espérait toujours une intervention armée de l’OTAN, qui n’a jamais eu lieu. La stratégie turque a ensuite évolué vers la reproduction de celle que les États-Unis, l’Arabie saoudite et le Pakistan avaient adoptée en Afghanistan contre les Soviétiques durant les années 1980: soutenir les groupes religieux les plus extrémistes sans tenir compte des risques que ces mêmes groupes se retournent ensuite contre leurs bienfaiteurs. Voilà pourquoi la Turquie fut pendant des années la base arrière de l’insurrection islamiste syrienne, y compris pour des groupes comme Daesh et Jabhat Al Nosra (affiliée à Al Qaeda). Non seulement cette stratégie n’a-t-elle pas permis d’obtenir la chute d’Assad, puisqu’elle a poussé les alliés de celui-ci à intensifier leur soutien militaire, mais elle a surtout eu deux conséquences désastreuses sur la Turquie. D’une part, des critiques acerbes ont obligé le gouvernement turc à reconsidérer le soutien qu’il accordait aux groupes les plus radicaux, ce qui s’est traduit par une vague d’attentats meurtriers sur le sol turc. D’autre part, pour avoir nourri la guerre civile en Syrie, la Turquie a renforcé sans le vouloir la position politique et militaire des Kurdes syriens, ceux-là mêmes que les autorités turques soupçonnent d’être le prolongement des séparatistes kurdes de Turquie. Sans être les alliés du gouvernement syrien, les Kurdes ont affronté sur le terrain militaire les groupes extrémistes et sont de ce fait devenus les alliés des puissances occidentales que la Turquie voulait, mais sans succès, amener à reproduire le scénario libyen. C’est ainsi que la Turquie a fini par s’engager militairement dans le conflit, attaquant tantôt Daesh, tantôt les Kurdes. Mais cela n’a fait que provoquer encore plus d’attentats en Turquie, commis notamment par les Kurdes. Ankara a fini par se rendre à l’évidence: la voie qu’elle avait empruntée était sans issue. L’alternative fut la voie diplomatique que lui offrait Moscou. D’où son engagement en faveur d’un cessez-le-feu, puis de la conférence d’Astana.

Malgré l’attitude sceptique de la nouvelle administration américaine à l’égard de l’opposition syrienne, Trump n’a pas cessé d’évoquer la possibilité de créer des zones protégées à l’intérieur du territoire syrien. même jusqu’à proposer une partition de la Syrie, mais sans l’avouer. Comme le note Joshua Landis, fin connaisseur du dossier syrien, «ils refusent d’avouer qu’ils veulent la partition de la Syrie. Ils préfèrent parler de régions autonomes. Mais en fin de compte c’est pratiquement la même chose». Ce n’est pas du tout le fruit du hasard si l’offensive syro-russe contre les quartiers d’Alep détenus par les insurgés a précisément eu lieu à un moment où l’élection de Clinton demeurait encore possible. Il fallait créer un rapport de forces sur le terrain qui allait rendre le plan de Clinton impossible autrement qu’à travers l’appui des groupes extrémistes. L’élection de Donald Trump a rendu caducs les calculs de la Turquie et de l’insurrection qu’elle soutenait, et a conforté les Russes dans leur position. C’est la raison pour laquelle l’opposition syrienne armée a accepté le cessez-le-feu et a envoyé une délégation à Astana. Le communiqué qui a sanctionné la conférence d’Astana et qui a été approuvé par la Turquie et les groupes insurgés fait écho au renversement des

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i quelque doute persistait dans l’esprit des dirigeants turcs quant au bien-fondé d’un changement radical de cap, le résultat des élections américaines l’aurait dissipé. Les partisans d’un changement violent de régime, que ce soient les insurgés syriens ou leurs soutiens régionaux ou

internationaux, œuvraient systématiquement pour l’échec des initiatives diplomatiques précédentes, notamment le cessez-le-feu obtenu à l’été 2016 par John Kerry et Sergueï Lavrov, parce qu’ils étaient certains que Hillary Clinton allait devenir présidente. Ce calcul, qui a longtemps ignoré la maturité du conflit, s’appuyait sur la croyance juste que Barack Obama était le seul obstacle à une intervention militaire occidentale en faveur de l’insurrection. La stratégie consistait donc à faire durer le conflit jusqu’à l’arrivée au pouvoir de Clinton. Celle-ci était en effet peu disposée à soutenir quelque solution diplomatique qui ne se contenterait pas d’être le couronnement d’un changement de régime, fidèle en cela à sa position sur l’Irak et sur la Libye. Et elle pouvait compter sur un quasi-consensus bipartisan à Washington – un consensus favorable à l’usage systématique de la force comme moyen de premier choix dans la politique étrangère des États-Unis, surtout lorsqu’il est question du Moyen-Orient. Les points de vue les plus «ambitieux» allaient

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Si les négociations politiques de l’après-Astana venaient à se concrétiser, elles devraient trouver une solution à un autre problème – celui de la place des Kurdes.

rapports de forces sur les trois niveaux du conflit. Il reflète clairement la vision commune de Moscou et Damas sur l’avenir de la Syrie, même si les propos relatifs à la démocratie future ne correspondent pas du tout à la réalité du gouvernement syrien. Il est ainsi question que les signataires (la Russie, l’Iran et la Turquie) «réaffirment leur engagement en faveur de la souveraineté, de l’indépendance, de l’unité et de l’intégrité territoriale de la République arabe syrienne comme État multi-ethnique, multireligieux, non-confessionnel et démocratique». Or, les intentions de tous les groupes armés de l’opposition, y compris Jaiche Al Islam, dont le leader Mohammed Allouche est le chef des négociateurs de l’opposition à Astana, ont toujours été de renverser le gouvernement en Syrie en vue de construire un État théocratique exclusif. Et il n’est pas du tout sûr que la conférence d’Astana les fera changer d’avis. D’ailleurs, pour Allouche, la conférence d’Astana n’a pas d’autre objectif que celui de trouver un mécanisme pour consolider le cessez-le-feu, mais que les négociations politiques ne peuvent commencer qu’avec le départ d’Assad. Mais bien évidemment, cette demande ne figure plus comme condition de résolution du conflit aux yeux des sponsors de la conférence d’Astana, voire même d’autres acteurs qui, comme les États-Unis, n’étaient pas présents. Le fait que l’opposition insiste sur son maintien montre bien que les négociations subséquentes ne pourront aboutir que si l’opposition comprend qu’en termes de rapports de forces, elle n’est pas en mesure de faire prospérer une telle position. Mais là n’est pas la seule difficulté. À Astana, seuls certains groupes armés étaient présents. L’opposition politique organisée dans la Coalition nationale des forces de l’opposition et de la révolution syriennes, n’était pas présente. Sa participation est cependant prévue dans les négociations futures. L’on sait que cette coalition est sous l’influence de la Turquie et qu’elle bénéficie d’un soutien en Europe et aux ÉtatsUnis. Mais elle n’a jamais réussi à apparaître comme une alternative crédible, et ce pour trois raisons. La première a trait à sa représentativité. Ses structures sont dominées par les Frères musulmans, même si des représentants d’autres courants politiques, laïc notamment, y sont présents. La deuxième est que la Turquie n’est pas le seul à avoir de l’influence au sein de la coalition. Le Qatar, l’Arabie saoudite et dans une certaine mesure les pays occidentaux y ont également leurs relais, ce qui ne peut que rendre extrêmement complexe l’émergence d’une parole et d’une stratégie unifiées, au-delà de la volonté de voir Assad quitter le pouvoir. La troisième raison est que l’opposition armée (celle qui était présente à Astana, mais plus encore celle qui ne l’était pas) ne reconnaît pas l’autorité politique de la coalition. L’Arabie saoudite, le Qatar, mais aussi les États-

Unis, le Royaume-Uni et la France, ont également des relais sur le terrain militaire. Jusqu’à présent, aucun de ces États n’a exprimé d’opposition au processus d’Astana. Il est cependant peu prudent d’en conclure qu’ils se soumettront sans faire valoir leurs intérêts dans le conflit. Il ne faut pas oublier que l’un des groupes armés salafistes les plus puissants, Ahrar Al Sham, ne s’est pas rendu à Astana et il est impossible de savoir si ses dirigeants accepteront les résultats des négociations sans la pression d’États qui sont eux-mêmes d’obédience salafiste, comme l’Arabie Saoudite et le Qatar. Par ailleurs, malgré l’attitude sceptique de la nouvelle administration américaine à l’égard de l’opposition syrienne, Trump n’a pas cessé d’évoquer la possibilité de créer des zones protégées à l’intérieur du territoire syrien – un point de vue que partagent les Européens sous prétexte de considérations humanitaires, et que l’opposition armée a toujours défendu, mais uniquement comme tactique militaire de contrôle des territoires. Quelles que soient les intentions des uns et des autres, la création de telles zones nécessitera une implication militaire qui, le cas échéant, ne sera en rien différente d’une intervention. Or, une intervention militaire à l’heure actuelle serait fondamentalement contraire à la logique d’Astana. Rien ne garantit en effet que ces zones protégées ne se transforment, chemin faisant, en zones autonomes, en contradiction totale avec «l’unité et l’intégrité territoriale» de la Syrie sur laquelle la déclaration d’Astana a si fortement insisté.

i les négociations politiques de l’après-Astana venaient à se concrétiser, elles devraient trouver une solution à un autre problème – celui de la place des Kurdes. La Turquie cherche à les exclure et elle a même obtenu des Russes et des Iraniens qu’ils ne soient pas présent à Astana. Mais il sera particulièrement difficile de les exclure de futures négociations, non seulement parce que leur présence sur le terrain militaire est impossible à ignorer, mais aussi et peut-être surtout parce que cette présence militaire est nécessaire dans le combat contre Daesh et Al Qaeda, les deux groupes que tout le monde aimerait exclure des négociations. En somme, parce que le conflit syrien a atteint sa maturité depuis quelque temps déjà, le récent cessez-le-feu et la conférence d’Astana ont ouvert une fenêtre d’opportunité pour une résolution politique. Comme c’est souvent le cas dans des conflits aussi meurtriers, la solution sera de nature consensuelle: elle ne parviendra à satisfaire dans l’absolu aucun acteur, mais elle permettra de mettre un terme à une effusion de sang dont tout le monde est finalement responsable. | GB

IN THE CABINET ROOM

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ILLUSTRATION: DUSAN PETRICIC

Sierra Leone’s Prospects

IN SITU

Reforms must reckon with a small market, high informality, and general policy incoherence HERBERT M’CLEOD reports from Freetown

Herbert M’cleod heads the International Growth Centre’s offices in Sierra Leone

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and Liberia.

n the two-year period preceding the 2014 Ebola outbreak, Sierra Leone experienced the most dramatic spikes in its annual GDP growth rate since its civil war ended in 2002. This growth, reaching as high as 20.7 percent in 2013, was driven primarily by the extractive sector, led by iron ore and offshore oil prospects. However, when commodity prices fell sharply, and the devastating Ebola epidemic hit, the country suffered a devastating downturn, notwithstanding the increases in official aid transfers during the Ebola period. The value of the national currency, the Leone, dropped by almost 40 percent against major currencies, public expenditures on development programmes plummeted, and inflation rose to double digits (11.5 percent). Several development projects were suspended or cancelled. GDP growth declined to 4.6 percent in 2014, and -20.6 percent in 2015. A modest recovery of 4.9 percent has been estimated for 2016. Even if the largely exogenous factors of Ebola and falling commodity prices drove this latest economic downturn, the fundamentals of the country’s political economy have not changed in the post-civil war period. Regulation and management of natural resources remain weak, and the overall growth strategy remains unclear. Bref, unless the quality of the country’s economic and political governance is tackled decisively, the future of Sierra Leone remains bleak. The economy will continue to display bursts of growth followed by sharp declines. And the consequences for living standards and societal stability in the context of a young population and widespread underemployment will be significant. The government response to the downturn has thus far consisted of austerity measures aimed mainly at managing the revenue shortfalls and reducing expenditures, as well as the launch of a major economic diversification initiative to enhance productivity in agriculture, forestry and fisheries, and involving investment in energy, water supply and roads. A widely publicized post-Ebola presidential priority programme is approaching its end. It has consisted of a team “recruited to coordinate and drive delivery” in four and eventually seven sectors. Finally, and more recently, there has been a national drive to promote the “made in Sierra Leone” brand as a rallying call to increase domestic production for local consumption, and to replace expensive imports. But will these government programmes and strategies, combined with those of Sierra Leone’s major development partners like the World Bank, the EU, the African

Development Bank, and the UK’s DFID, lead to outcomes that are markedly different from what the country has experienced to date in its post-independence history? Let me propose that three seldom-discussed vectors of reform should be considered in order for the country to make meaningful progress: first, overcoming the small size of the economy (and its high production costs); second, reckoning with the economy’s informality; and third, addressing policy incoherence. With a population of seven million – most of which is below the poverty line of two dollars a day – the domestic market for goods and services is small. To be competitive, local manufacturers must privilege export markets even as they produce for the domestic market. But high local production costs make this difficult. Businesses have therefore concentrated on commercial trading, infrastructure, small service-sector operations, and production of raw materials for exports. Given the small market, local manufacturing plants in Sierra Leone must typically privilege exports in order to absorb excess output from the optimal plant size, or otherwise face the prospect of suboptimal production. The result is sluggish growth, with the exception of raw materials exports (which are highly vulnerable to commodity price fluctuations) and a limited number of manufactured products. It is therefore not surprising that Ghana – with population of 27 million – currently exports 383 non-raw materials products, while Sierra Leone exports only 31 products (including raw materials). Early efforts at industrialization in Sierra Leone in the 1960s and 1970s quickly grounded to a halt due to high unit production costs, with local firms also regularly undercut by imports (including some smuggled goods). After the country’s independence in 1961, the national industrial strategy emphasized import substitution through light manufactured products such as soap, pharmaceuticals, cigarettes and plastics. However, because these sectors were not organically linked to the rest of the economy, they produced limited spillover effects. Foreign direct investment by international firms with established export networks has a long history in Sierra Leone – predating independence – but it has only recently shown some promise. Once again, however, the high production costs in the country continue to discourage many players. While much publicity is given to the country’s low position in the ease of doing business rankings (148th in 2017), the more critical factor in investment decisions and for

PHOTOGRAPH: JORGE LUIS RODRIGUEZ

by Parliament, filtering down through the country’s administrative structures. Finally, a review of the new policies adopted over the last decade reveals a trend of growing incoherence, open-endedness and contradiction. For instance, the legislative acts governing the management of the environment and the minerals sector contain provisions that are, notoriously, interpreted differently by the institutions responsible for each sector, leaving mining companies confused about precisely what should be done. Comparable lack of clarity can be found in local content policy and in the country’s decentralization legislation and practices. The projects of donors are often introduced as a matter of priority and with funding attached – only for these to be dropped after a few years. Consider the President’s Recovery Priorities programme for post-Ebola economic recovery: not only did this initiative – heavily funded by an international donor – marginalize the government’s national five-year plan (the Agenda for Prosperity), but it sidelined the National Ebola Recovery Programme, which was developed after extensive stakeholder consultations, and undermined the fledgling Mass Drug Administration (MDA) national monitoring system. A strong case can be made for standing up a national development planning commission, with clear mandates and strong safeguards to protect its neutrality from undue political influence. Such a commission should perform the role originally envisaged for the strategy and policy unit at State House – to wit, a clearing house for policies, a formal think tank for the government, the unit responsible for the overall national development strategy, and a source of experienced development specialists. To be sure, a route to prosperity for Sierra Leone through natural resources is available – even if it will be long and winding. But using natural resources to accelerate the pace of economic progress is only feasible if the other insidious obstacles are overcome. Defining a pathway to sustainable growth must start by recognizing the severe constraints imposed by size and by taking measures to mitigate the high costs of production – for starters, by pursuing policy harmonization and joint planning for private sector expansion within the MRU. The country’s markets and decision-making processes must be pushed – slowly but surely – into the formal realm. Lastly, Sierra Leone needs a national development commission that is protected from political interference in order to unwind the policy incoherence that afflicts many of the country’s initiatives. | GB

Freetown must give far greater attention to placing a trade agenda at the heart of the Mano River Union, comprising Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, with a combined market size of nearly 45 million people.

The busy Eagan Street market in Freetown, Sierra Leone.

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product expansion is the cost of doing business. On this score, airfares in West Africa are on average twice those of East Africa for comparable distances, Internet rates are more than double those charged in East Africa and in southern Africa, and the cost of electricity in Sierra Leone is US$0.25 per kilowatt-hour, as compared with US$0.179 in Rwanda. To overcome Sierra Leone’s small-market problem, Freetown must give significantly greater attention to placing a trade agenda at the heart of the Mano River Union (MRU), comprising Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea and Côte d’Ivoire, with a combined market size of nearly 45 million people (bref, half the size of Ethiopia, and roughly the size of Kenya). For now, unlike other successful international country groupings around the world, trade issues have been subordinated in the MRU’s work to high-political themes like peace and security. Sierra Leone, if only for its own purposes, should lead the charge in opening the markets of all four countries to the private sector. The general and deep informality of Sierra Leone’s economy is undertreated in the literature and in policy. And yet over 80 percent of the population effectively operates in the informal sector, with most of the labour force underemployed and less than 10 percent of the population having a bank account. The consequences of this informality range from exclusion of segments of the population from taxation, illicit activity in remote areas, expanding criminal gangs in densely populated areas, and marked inequality in the provision of – and access to – social services. Of course, informality does allow for a certain degree of economic flexibility and creativity, but in Sierra Leone these positive effects are decisively outweighed by the insidious impacts of informality on decisionmaking, reinforcing corruption and restraining the overall growth of functioning markets. In public policy, there has been a re-emergence of the pre-war practice of using informal networks as fora for public decision-making on issues that should otherwise profit from transparent dialogue and the inclusion of expertise from various quarters outside of partisan and ethnic groups. To be sure, Sierra Leone’s constitution allows for the appointment to the cabinet of qualified candidates outside of the ruling party. This provision was used in the government of 2007-2012, and to a limited extent opened up space for policy-making to outside professionals. But that space has since closed. Internecine squabbles within the political opposition in Parliament have also virtually closed the door to effective checks and balances on the executive by the legislature. It is, as a consequence, rare for a proposal from the executive to be turned down or even significantly modified by Parliament today. Still, there must be a return to increased formality and expertise in national policy-making in Sierra Leone, and this effort must be spearheaded by both the government and

La place d’honneur, le triangle, la dispersion et le temps qui court. PAR JEAN-MARIE BOUISSOU

QUE FERA LE JAPON? Jean-Marie Bouissou est directeur de recherche et représentant de Sciences Po au Japon. Son dernier ouvrage est

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Géopolitique du Japon.

hinzo Abe dirige le Japon depuis 2012. Sauf imprévu, il continuera jusqu’en 2021. Pendant cette période, Abe entend arracher l’économie nippone à la langueur qui l’accable depuis un quart de siècle. Ses résultats ne sont pas encore probants. Il veut aussi «en finir avec l’après-guerre» – ce qui, pour la droite nationaliste dont il est le porte-drapeau, signifie enterrer définitivement la question des crimes commis par les armées impériales, et amender la Constitution dictée en 1947 par le vainqueur américain. Abe a imposé une «réinterprétation» de son article 9, qui permet désormais aux forces armées du Japon de soutenir celles de ses alliés si des attaques contre celles-ci représentent aussi une menace directe pour l’archipel. Mais il a lourdement échoué en prétendant régler à sa manière le douloureux problème des comfort women avec la Corée du Sud. La troisième mission d’Abe est d’assurer au Japon une «place d’honneur» dans le monde. L’expression «place d’honneur» (meiyo aru chii) figure dans le préambule de la Constitution japonaise comme un but national. Elle reflète une vision de l’ordre international comme une stricte hiérarchie, dont la puissance dominante constitue «le centre du monde». Le Japon n’a jamais prétendu l’être. Ce qu’il a toujours cherché, y compris pendant son aventure impérialiste (1895-1945), c’est d’occuper un rang suffisant pour dissuader les inférieurs de l’agresser, tout en le mettant à l’abri des empiètements de la puissance dominante, et qui lui permet soit d’être jugé digne de ses bienfaits, soit d’être laissé tranquille par elle, comme à l’époque d’Edo (1604-1868). Un monde sans centre désoriente le Japon. La vie était simple pour lui dans l’Asie organisée autour de l’empire du Milieu. Quand l’Occident a détruit ce centre, l’archipel a dû repenser en catastrophe son positionnement dans le monde. L’affaire s’est terminée par une défaite écrasante. Les États-Unis se sont imposés à lui comme nouveau centre de ce «monde libre» auquel sa défaite l’avait intégré. Il a su en tirer d’énormes bienfaits, en termes de sécurité et de croissance économique, jusqu’à indisposer son protecteur, qui le lui fit savoir sans ménagement dans les années 1980-1990 – notamment en le contraignant, sous peine de

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ILLUSTRATION: DAVID PLUNKERT

sanctions, à démanteler les «obstacles structurels» qui protégeaient son économie. Aujourd’hui, avec l’effondrement des blocs, le grand retour de la puissance chinoise, et les errements stratégiques des États-Unis, le Japon retrouve son cauchemar d’un monde dépourvu de centre. C’est alors qu’en matière de relations internationales Abe est un réaliste, pour qui seuls comptent l’intérêt national et les rapports de force. Les maîtres du moment – Trump, Poutine et Xi Jinping – le sont aussi, tout comme, en Asie, l’Indien Modi et le Philippin Duterte. À défaut de s’entendre, on se comprend. Abe devrait donc être à l’aise. Pourtant, il vient de connaître coup sur coup deux échecs révélateurs. En 2015, Abe a cru en finir avec les comfort women moyennant 100 millions de yens: 750 000 euros pour qu’on n’en parle plus, et que disparaissent les statues érigées ici et là en leur mémoire. Toutes proportions gardées, c’était comme si une Allemagne mal

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Abe pourrait freiner le dérapage géostratégique: a minima, en restant fidèle au principe d’une seule Chine; fermement, en refusant de participer au blocus des ilots chinois; avec éclat, en refusant l’usage du territoire japonais pour certaines opérations des forces américaines.

repentie demandait à la France de fermer le Mémorial de la Shoah pour le prix d’un (bel) appartement parisien. Soit ignorance, soit mépris pour cet aspect des choses, Abe avait superbement ignoré la charge émotionnelle de cette question en Corée. Face au tollé que souleva son offre, il la décupla précipitamment. La présidente Park signa, mais l’affaire a tourné à la débâcle: affaiblissement et chute de Park, gel des négociations économiques et de sécurité entre Tokyo et Séoul, et rappel de l’ambassadeur japonais en décembre 2016. Le même mois, autre échec cinglant face à Poutine. Abe rêvait d’obtenir un geste sur les «territoires du Nord» en échange d’investissements japonais en Sibérie. Les conversations préliminaires laissaient peu d’espoir. Abe, refusant de s’avouer battu, organisa néanmoins un face-à-face avec le maître du Kremlin à Nagato, sa petite ville natale de province, en lui vantant «les spécialités locales, les onsen et le beau cadre naturel». Poutine le paya d’un camouflet, en ne lâchant rien (voir le débat Nez à Nez à la page 56). Les nationalistes japonais aiment à penser que les vertus traditionnelles de leur pays sont un puissant élément de soft power. Selon eux, c’est l’admiration

du monde entier pour l’omotenashi qui a permis à Tokyo d’obtenir les Jeux Olympiques de 2020. À Nagato, Abe était peut-être légèrement dupe de cette rhétorique, mais surtout prisonnier de son style diplomatique. La politique étrangère est le seul domaine où les chefs de gouvernement japonais ont toujours joui d’une certaine liberté de manœuvre, parce que les parlementaires, face auxquels ils sont faibles, ne s’y intéressent guère. Depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les inflexions majeures de la diplomatie nippone ont toujours été l’œuvre d’un premier ministre. Abe a encore plus de liberté que ses prédécesseurs, car il exerce sur sa majorité une autorité sans précédent, et peut inscrire son action dans la durée. Abe déploie un activisme exceptionnel. En trois ans et demi, il a visité 92 pays différents, contre 78 en quatre ans et demi pour Hollande, et seulement 58 en huit ans pour Barack Obama. Abe a aussi repris le style de son mentor Junichiro Koizumi, premier ministre de 2001 à 2006. Koizumi est l’homme qui a acclimaté le populisme moderne au Japon, y compris en matière diplomatique. Ses deux face-à-face à Pyongyang avec Kim Jong-Il (voir Cabinet Room à la page 47), en 2002 et 2004, sont un modèle du genre: effet de surprise, dramatisation, posture du leader résolu, succès aussitôt proclamé, puis passage immédiat à une autre séquence. Dans le seul mois de décembre 2016, Abe a ainsi enchaîné quatre séquences fortes. Droit dans ses bottes nationalistes, il est allé au clash avec Séoul pour une statue. Incarnation des vertus nationales, il a offert sans sourciller le meilleur de l’omotenashi à un Poutine malpoli. Pétri de bonne volonté, il s’est recueilli à Pearl Harbour en prétendant être le premier dirigeant nippon à le faire, quitte à être démenti sur ce point. Hyper-réactif et intrépide, il s’est précipité pour être le premier dirigeant étranger photographié avec le sulfureux Trump, à peine élu. Discorde avec Séoul? Humiliation à Nagato? Piques médiatiques à Pearl Harbour? Rien qu’une photo à Trump Tower et à Mar-a-Lago? Peu importe: chaque coup de communication sitôt fait, Abe est déjà ailleurs – aux Philippines, en Australie, en Indonésie et au Vietnam du 12 au 18 janvier. Mais à ce jeu, le risque de dispersion est grand… L’équation géostratégique du Japon est simple: il est pris dans une relation triangulaire avec deux pays, dont chacun peut exercer une influence décisive sur son destin. La Chine et les États-Unis ont pour lui une importance économique vitale. La première est la principale menace dans son environnement immédiat, les seconds le protègent, tout en lui reprochant de retirer tout le profit de leur relation. Dans ce jeu, le Japon a beaucoup perdu avec la fin de la Guerre froide, dans laquelle son protecteur ne pouvait pas le lâcher. Il court désormais un double risque: être abandonné si les deux géants s’entendent

sur leurs intérêts nationaux en comptant les siens pour rien, ou être pris au piège s’ils s’affrontent, et que son protecteur l’entraîne dans un conflit où il aura tout à perdre: «Quand les éléphants se battent, ce sont les fourmis qui meurent». Face à la Chine, le Japon ne saurait user de la force pour se défendre sans être assuré du soutien des États-Unis (voir Strategic Futures à la page 62). Ce soutien dépend de la perception que ces derniers ont de la menace chinoise pour leurs propres intérêts. Si l’approche réaliste agressive de Trump envers Pékin se concrétise, l’archipel pourrait bénéficier d’une garantie de sécurité renforcée; mais il devra la payer de concessions économiques, et d’un risque accru d’être entraîné dans un conflit où il serait géographiquement en première ligne. La stratégie internationale d’Abe repose donc sur trois piliers dont la solidité n’est pas à toute épreuve. La capacité d’action militaire du Japon. Abe a fait beaucoup pour l’accroître: assouplissement des contraintes constitutionnelles, augmentation du budget (+7,5 pour cent depuis 2012) et accroissement des capacités de projection. L’industrie d’armement est désormais autorisée à exporter, mais elle doit encore apprendre à le faire en 2016 (la France lui a raflé un énorme contrat de sous-marins en Australie). Pour ses armements essentiels, l’archipel reste dépendant des États-Unis, qui ont même parfois le doigt sur la gâchette à la place des Japonais. Enfin, la majorité des Japonais risque fort d’être tétanisés si la perspective d’être entraînés dans un conflit se précisait.

L’alliance américaine résistera certainement aux tensions récurrentes autour des bases américaines

En champion du libre-échange, Abe pourrait se rapprocher activement de l’Union européenne, qui n’a elle non plus rien de très bon à attendre de Trump. L’opinion publique japonaise ferait à Abe une place d’honneur dans l’histoire.

Quelles options pour Abe? Bien évidemment, le risque de l’effondrement démographique menace tout ce qu’Abe entend bâtir. Natalité en berne, le Japon pourrait perdre jusqu’à 40 millions d’habitants d’ici à 2060. Sa population vieillit massivement. Bizarrement, Abe l’accepte. Il entend seulement limiter la perte à 25 millions – ce qui donnerait un Japon de 100 millions d’habitants, dont près de 40 pour cent auraient plus de 65 ans. Moins de 50 pour cent seraient au travail, et la moitié d’entre eux aurait plus de 50 ans. Aux élections, le poids des personnes âgées sera écrasant. Quels risques un tel pays sera-t-il disposé à prendre? Qu’en sera-t-il du dynamisme national? Comment recrutera-t-on l’armée? Comment sera-t-elle financée quand les dépenses sociales siphonneront l’argent public? En Asie, l’élection de Trump peut entraîner le pire: au plan géostratégique, tentative d’interdire à la Chine l’accès aux ilots qu’elle a fortifiés en mer de Chine du Sud, dénonciation du principe d’une seule Chine, retour de forces américaines à Taiwan et réplique chinoise; au plan économique, guerre commerciale mettant à mal tous les protagonistes. Le pire n’est jamais sûr, mais c’est de cette hypothèse qu’il faut partir, tout en postulant que les enjeux et les risques sont tels que le réalisme imposera au final un deal sino-américain. Abe pourrait freiner le dérapage géostratégique en refusant d’y associer le Japon: a minima, en restant fidèle au principe d’une seule Chine; fermement, en refusant de participer au blocus des ilots chinois; avec éclat, en refusant l’usage du territoire japonais

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La quête tous azimuts d’alliances contre la Chine. Abe courtise assidûment la Russie et l’Inde, malgré les réserves occidentales envers leurs dirigeants. Il arrose de crédits les républiques d’Asie centrale. Tout autour de la mer de Chine du Sud, il distribue gratifications économiques et garde-côtes d’occasion, et signe des accords de sécurité plus ou moins élaborés (Philippines, Vietnam, Indonésie). Mais ces alliés potentiels sont aussi réalistes qu’Abe. Duterte court de Pékin à Tokyo, dit à chacun ce qu’il veut entendre, et Abe lui promet l’équivalent de huit milliards d’euros. L’Indonésie partage ses contrats de TGV entre Chinois et Japonais. Et ni l’Inde ni la Russie n’a le moindre intérêt à une croisade antichinoise. (Dans ces démarches, Tokyo peut servir de proxy à Washington auprès de pays qui ont une relation difficile avec les États-Unis, pour des raisons historiques (Vietnam) et de droits humains (Philippines), ou tenant à une importante population musulmane (Indonésie).)

d’Okinawa. Mais Trump entend la faire payer plus cher, financièrement et en termes de soumission aux intérêts nationaux américains. Peu lui importent ceux du Japon, comme le montre le retrait américain du Partenariat transpacifique (PTP). C’est un camouflet majeur pour Abe, qui a fait ratifier le texte aux forceps, dans l’espoir de contraindre ainsi les entreprises nippones aux réformes structurelles qui leur répugnent.

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pour certaines opérations des forces américaines. En prenant ces risques pour modérer l’affrontement des géants, le Japon d’Abe acquerrait une légitimité et une autorité inédites sur la scène internationale. Il accéderait à cette place d’honneur dont il rêve, qui lui permettrait de se proposer, voire de se poser, en leader des autres fourmis d’Asie menacées d’être piétinées dans le combat des éléphants. Dans le même temps, Abe proclamerait son attachement au libre-échange, prenant la tête d’un PTP à 11, sans les ÉtatsUnis, comme l’Australie l’a demandé. L’engagement du Japon, qui représente 44 pour cent du PIB des 11, conditionne toute cette tentative. En champion du libre-échange, Abe pourrait se rapprocher activement de l’Union européenne, qui n’a elle non plus rien de très bon à attendre de Trump. Et l’opinion publique japonaise ferait à Abe une place d’honneur dans l’histoire. Toutefois, le Japon paierait probablement cher le deal réaliste final entre Trump et Xi. Vomi par le premier et jugé faible par le second, il risquerait fort de les voir s’entendre sur son dos. Abe ne semble pas disposé à courir ce risque. Il a immédiatement rejeté la proposition australienne d’un PTP à 11. Il a réussi à être le premier dirigeant du monde reçu officiellement par Trump dans sa residence de luxe Mar-a-Lago. Quant à l’Union européenne, en bon nationaliste, Abe n’y voit qu’une construction contre-nature, dont il n’attend rien. Le plus probable est donc qu’Abe suivra prudemment les ÉtatsUnis (sauf sur le principe de la Chine unique?), en pariant sur le

réalisme des deux géants pour se tester sans aller trop loin. Cela ne surprendrait pas à Pékin, et ne lui déplairait pas forcément, car prendre seule la mesure de Trump avec ses propres forces porterait au zénith son influence régionale. Pékin pourrait aussi remercier Abe d’avoir enterré le PTP, laissant ainsi le terrain libre pour avancer en Asie les pions économiques chinois (par exemple, la nouvelle Banque asiatique d’investissement dans les infrastructures). Et il ne serait pas illogique que les deux puissances voisines négocient en bilatéral pour minimiser les dégâts du protectionnisme trumpiste par une plus grande ouverture mutuelle de leurs économies. Paradoxalement, Trump pourrait ainsi, à terme, rapprocher Xi et Abe. Mais en ne rompant pas l’accord de sécurité avec les États-Unis, ce dernier aurait conservé la garantie de sécurité américaine pour l’archipel. Le Japon aurait ainsi sauvé les meubles des deux côtés – au risque, toutefois, qu’un imprévu dans les frictions entre forces américaines et chinoises dégénère en quelques missiles perdus; auquel cas le Japon courrait assurément plus de risques que les États-Unis. Dans le temps qui lui reste, Abe aura un agenda écrasant: une, voire deux élections législatives, et un scrutin senatorial; la Coupe du monde de rugby et les Jeux Olympiques; amender la Constitution, son ambition suprême, ce qui impliquerait un référendum très risqué; redémarrer le parc nucléaire, toujours presque entièrement arrêté; se réconcilier avec Séoul; et, bien entendu, arbitrer les luttes féroces pour sa succession. | GB

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NEZ À NEZ Binding the Northern Powers in Law A bona fide Arctic Union should be created. PROPOSITION:

ZACHARY PAIKIN vs LIUDMILA FILIPPOVA

Zachary Paikin is a Junior Editor of Global Brief.

Liudmila Filippova is Program Manager at the Russian International Affairs

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Council in Moscow.

ZP (in favour): At this important crossroads in global geopolitics, the world’s circumpolar countries should band together to advance regional integration by forming an Arctic Union. This institution would not be as profoundly interconnected as the EU, but would still possess a number of important innovations to distinguish it from the existing Arctic Council. These would include an enhanced mandate that focusses on security-related issues, increased promotion of intercultural exchanges between member states, the creation of more institutions of higher learning in the region, more frequent ministerial meetings, the establishment of a permanent administrative capital (including a larger secretariat and a commission that can propose joint policy initiatives), and possibly the formation of a development bank to fund environmental, scientific, education, infrastructure and indigenous-related projects in the region. There are three important reasons for which this is the appropriate time to broaden the scope of regional cooperation in the global north. First, Russia’s 2014 seizure of Crimea and the resulting Western sanctions have made it abundantly clear to the Kremlin and to the Russian people that Russia is not a part of the West. Recent events in Ukraine – including the war in the Donbass – represent the culmination of two and a half decades defined by rival conceptions of order between Moscow and the liberal West. Russia clearly believes that it was excluded from the European security (and even economic) framework after the end of the Cold War. Left out, it has not always felt that it had a stake in preserving it. An Arctic Union that includes a focus on high-level issues like regional security would help to reintegrate Russia into international society as an equal and legitimate partner, thus reducing the risk of geopolitical conflagration in other regions. Second, deteriorating relations between Russia and the West, if left unaddressed, could result in the permeation of the Arctic by powers external to the region. For instance, if an insecure Moscow feels compelled to deepen its geopolitical cooperation

with Beijing, it could opt to invite China to play a more substantive role in Arctic affairs. This would represent a lost opportunity for Arctic states to pool their resources, speak with one voice, and thus enhance their clout in dealing with the rest of the world. It would also pose a threat to the collaborative spirit that has characterized the circumpolar region’s inter-state relations in recent decades – a spirit that has largely been the consequence of the conscious insulation of the Arctic from extraregional geopolitical issues. The conclusion here is clear: act now to strengthen regional cooperation, or risk opening a Pandora’s box of issues in the years and decades ahead. Finally, the Arctic Council was established at a time of unqualified American unipolarity. At the time, as Washington was embarking (consciously or not) on a project designed to transform the foundations of global order, the US did not wish to be constrained by an institution that included a security-related mandate. Today, the new American administration has proposed a different approach – one that includes repairing a damaged relationship with Moscow, as well as redefining American interests and grand strategy in an increasingly polycentric world. Bref, the global geopolitical situation has changed significantly in the 20 years since the Council’s creation, and international institutions must adapt to the challenges of today and tomorrow. An Arctic Union would represent a bold step forward in this regard, and would help to lock great powers into a legal regime and peaceable logic, which in turn could set the tone for comparable 21st-century regimes in other regional theatres. LF (opposed): Amid global geopolitical turmoil, what the Arctic really needs is strengthened regional governance. However, the creation of a new regional institution – to wit, an Arctic Union – will not serve this cause. The basic reasons for the Arctic Union’s irrelevance at the time of this writing include improper timing, the sensitivity of security-related issues, the proven record of the Arctic Council to date, and indeed the reasonable prospects for the Arctic Council to evolve into a stronger, more effective institution. In the 1990s, Canada’s initiative in creating the Arctic Council met with strong resistance from two Arctic nations – the US and Russia. The US, the sole superpower and the only global policeman at the time, carried the burden of international obligations and showed little enthusiasm for a new Arctic institution. For its part, Russia suffered from reduced global standing and economic weakness, and thus did not feel secure at the prospect of interacting directly with five NATO members in the context of the proposed institution. As such, the compromise that was the Arctic Council could not have deviated

PHOTOGRAPH: US NAVY / CREATIVE COMMONS

and consider forming a security union – even in the Arctic – with predominantly NATO member states. Moreover, Canada, which is a definite driving force in the Arctic, does not seem to have particularly strong strategic reasons to advocate passionately for a new institution that may erode the value of the Arctic Council (which is of Canadian genesis, to begin with). For its part, the Arctic Council has far exceeded expectations and managed to adopt a central role in regional governance. Inclusion of non-state actors – particularly indigenous peoples – has been an asset for this high-level forum. And yet putting security issues on the agenda of a new Arctic Union would militate against the involvement of non-state actors. Besides, again, there is a prevailing view that the Arctic Council has been a success precisely because security issues have been excluded from its mandate. What’s more, although Russia and the West may disagree on the Crimean question, Russia has thus far been a responsible player in the Arctic and fully compliant with international law. Currently, there is no potential for military conflict in the region, and making security issues a part of political discussions in respect of that theatre may well yield the reverse effect. Instead of building trust, it may paradoxically issue in rising public hysteria about a ‘global war’ over the Arctic. By contrast, restricting international

Ice Camp Sargo, located in the Arctic Circle, served as the main stage for Ice Exercise (ICEX) 2016, housing participants from four nations over the course of the exercise.

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far from the establishment of an international forum that operates by consensus, does not require large financial or organizational contributions, and keeps security issues outside of its mandate. The current situation is somewhat similar. The new US administration appears more preoccupied with pressing domestic challenges than with foreign policy issues. This, incidentally, may explain some of the alleged affinity of President Putin for President Trump. A new Arctic institution is the last thing on Washington’s strategic mind right now. As for Moscow, the Ukrainian crisis has confirmed to its strategic classes that Russia was never perceived as being a part of the West – that is, the security (and economic) architecture created after the end of the Cold War was never truly inclusive of Russia. NATO’s enlargement to the east, despite the collapse of its primary rival – the USSR – gave Russia the feeling of an ever-present threat close (and ever-closer) to its borders (a perception and threat assessment that precedes the Putin government). Meanwhile, any kind of rapprochement between Russia and the former Soviet republics – its closest neighbours and manifest areas of strategic interest – was condemned as lacking legitimacy and as dictated unilaterally by Moscow. It is therefore far less likely, under the current sanctions regime and amid the crisis of confidence between Russia and the West, that Moscow would have a change of heart

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Deteriorating relations between Russia and the West could result in the permeation of the Arctic by powers external to the region. If an insecure Moscow feels compelled to deepen its geopolitical cooperation with Beijing, it could invite China to play a more substantive role in Arctic affairs.

efforts to the resumption of meetings between the chiefs of staff of the eight Arctic states, under the aegis of the existing Arctic Council, could have a positive impact on regional security. Finally, there is no reason for which the Arctic Council may not itself evolve into an institution with a more expansive mandate in terms of intercultural exchanges and scientific collaboration, an enlarged bureaucracy, and possibly its own development bank. The Arctic Council presently has a permanent secretariat and a limited budget. Moreover, Canada’s chairmanship of the forum resulted in the establishment of the Arctic Economic Council, which is intended to facilitate business contacts and economic development in the region. In addition, both Arctic and non-Arctic states anticipate a legally binding agreement on regional scientific collaboration, which should be signed in Fairbanks by the end of the US chairmanship of the Council this year. In other words, there is a good chance that a de facto ‘Arctic Union,’ sans security mandate, may be just around the corner simply by virtue of the natural (‘organic’) development of the Arctic Council. ZP: You are right to uphold the role that non-state actors, including indigenous peoples, currently play within the Arctic Council’s framework. However, it is wrong to suggest that putting security issues on the table would necessarily sideline these groups. The UN, for instance, is an international institution that tackles high-level security issues while simultaneously working to advance indigenous rights. Its attempts to develop international legal norms on the latter front, as codified in the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, is a case in point. In fact, adding new dimensions to institutional cooperation in the Arctic could ultimately provide new avenues for non-state entities to participate in the circumpolar regional framework. To strengthen Arctic security is to enhance it for all of its inhabitants. This is a highly opportune time to develop an institutionalized security framework for the Arctic. As Georgetown University’s Angela Stent has noted, relations between the US and Russia have been troubled in recent decades partially due to a dearth of serious institutional links between the two countries, relying as they have on little more than good personal chemistry between the occupants of the White House and the Kremlin. Never in the post-Cold War era has there been an American president more open to cooperation with Moscow than Donald Trump, which would suggest that his administration may be more amenable to the idea of an Arctic Union than those of many of his predecessors. And even if Washington fails to look favourably upon the creation of an Arctic Union at first, it should be

remembered that the US had to be dragged kicking and screaming into the Arctic Council two decades ago. As you rightly note, that initiative has been a resounding success. Although many of the members of the Arctic Council are NATO states, circumpolar countries have so far been largely successful in shielding the region from the effects of geopolitical disputes in other theatres (see the Feature article by Miloud Chennoufi at p. 42). For instance, following the arrival to power of the Trudeau government in Canada, Ottawa and Moscow managed to compartmentalize their disagreement over the status of Crimea and hold a conference on how to strengthen their cooperation in the Arctic (building directly on the major tracktwo conference in Toronto, organized by the Institute for 21st Century Questions, GB, and the Canadian Forces College in the summer of last year). Another reason for which Russia-West ties have suffered in the post-Cold War era is that Moscow has felt as if Washington has all too often treated it as a junior partner in top-level international decision-making. Far from being apprehensive, Russia and Russians – according to a 2011 Ekos survey, over 80 per cent of them – would warmly welcome the possibility of participating in a security-related Arctic institution as an equal, respected partner. Canada, for its part, requires some form of pooling of sovereignty or resources if it wishes to increase its international clout. The choice for Arctic states here is therefore manifest: develop a common security framework that enshrines their role as the custodians of the region, or risk having the regional agenda permeated by external actors such as China or a broader coalition of NATO states. In the latter scenario, Arctic states would at best see their regional influence diluted, or worse still, have the geopolitical climate in their own backyard poisoned by confrontation and containment strategies. Times change, and institutions must change with them. The Arctic Environmental Protection Strategy was ultimately superseded by the Arctic Council when it became clear that a more comprehensive framework for circumpolar cooperation was required. Entities like the EU, through their development of common security and defence policies, are today making it clear that even soft power-oriented actors must possess at least a modicum of hard power. The creation of an Arctic Union would represent an important symbol – not only to the effect that circumpolar countries are serious about speaking to the world with a united voice on issues of the highest order, but also that institutionalized cooperation has a bright future in an increasingly uncertain world. LF: I must object to three basic statements that you have made. First, though the election of Donald

the situation in the region has direct implications for the national security of both countries, and the national interests of the two states in the Arctic coincide in a number of aspects. If Russia and Canada manage to come up with a joint initiative, other Arctic players will certainly consider it. In addition, Russia could and should work more intensively with Finland during its upcoming chairmanship of the Arctic Council. Bref, this is no time for a traditional security institution in the Arctic region. The extensive security agenda suggested by the proposed Arctic Union may well disunite the Arctic states. Besides, I am convinced that the gradual evolution of the Arctic Council is a viable alternative to an Arctic Union. To be sure, the Arctic Council should before long develop a law enforcement role in the region, and its mandate should incorporate many additional non-military security issues. But real military issues should be discussed in other single-purpose fora and formats. ZP: I agree that there exist structural constraints that will limit the scope of a Russo-American rapprochement. These range from the domestic, such as the presence of numerous Russia-wary voices in the halls of power in Washington, to the international, including the closer ties that Beijing and Moscow have established in recent years. But international affairs function in relative terms. The question is not whether the conditions are perfect for the establishment of an Arctic Union, but rather whether they will ever be better than they are today. Indeed, Washington does not have the same level of strategic interest in the Arctic as Ottawa and Moscow. But this is precisely why the region is fertile ground for a new institution. Deep American engagement is not necessary at the outset when it comes to the creation of an Arctic Union. Quite the opposite: America’s lesser focus on circumpolar affairs allows Canada and Russia to take the lead in shaping the region’s future. As you note, these two Arctic coastal giants share many interests, including the desire to have their sovereignty over strategically valuable sea lanes recognized. International relations in the world’s northernmost region are naturally less developed than in theatres across the globe where states have been interacting for far longer. The Arctic region can thus be understood as possessing a normatively ‘thin’ character. This means that, unlike elsewhere where ideological and other alignments place constraints on states’ strategic options, Canada and Russia have far greater marge de manoeuvre in the Arctic. (continued) To read the rest of this debate, visit the GB website

Currently, there is no potential for military conflict in the region. Making security issues a part of political discussions in respect of that theatre may yield the reverse effect. Instead of building trust, it may issue in rising public hysteria about a ‘global war’ over the Arctic.

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Trump as US president certainly offers a window of opportunity for the improvement of Russia-US relations, it is still questionable whether President Trump is open to cooperation with Moscow in an entirely unprecedented way. For one thing, while Trump demonstrates a more pragmatic (less ideological) approach toward NATO, he is still committed to increasing US military capabilities. In particular, anti-missile deployment close to Russia’s borders has been a well-known stumbling block in Russia-US relations. Ivan Timofeev, a leading Russian analyst affiliated with the Russian International Affairs Council and the Valdai Discussion Club, is on the record in forecasting that Trump will likely support the modernization of the US nuclear arsenal and further development of an anti-missile defence system in Europe. He will, as such, need to work hard to prove his deal-making skills and persuade the Kremlin that these actions do not pose a threat to Russia’s national security. Second, the importance of interpersonal relationships between heads of state for Russia-US relations is often overstated. In the past, there were instances of Boris Yeltsin and Bill Clinton getting along, as with Vladimir Putin and George W. Bush, and even Vladimir Putin and Barack Obama. Still, initial optimism did not prevent the eventual deterioration of Russia-US relations once a crisis emerged and clashes of interests became more evident. Of course, the personal chemistry between the presidents of Russia and, say, Turkey or China might well matter immensely for Moscow-Ankara or Moscow-Beijing relations, given the clear topdown structures of the strategic decision-making systems in these countries. In the US, however, the president must constantly reckon with a system of constitutional checks and balances. This means that even if President Trump proves to have affection for President Putin, Congress, which currently does not have many supporters of Russia among its members, will most probably put any US-Russia rapprochement on hold. Third, as mentioned, there is no clear indication that President Trump will pay significant attention to Arctic governance issues. Outside of Alaska, the Arctic still appears to be of marginal interest in US foreign policy circles. It was the US chairmanship of the Arctic Council that finally brought the region to President Obama’s attention. Moreover, Trump’s election campaign seemed to suggest that he aims to reduce his country’s spending on security institutions. He is therefore unlikely to look favourably on the creation of an Arctic Union – at least at the outset. Overall, the future development of the Arctic will depend largely on the advancement of RussiaCanada, rather than Russia-US, relations. The Arctic is a part of Russia’s and Canada’s national identities,

at: www.globalbrief.ca

THE DEFINITION “The Solution to the Conflict in Yemen… … is to initiate an immediate cease-

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A regional settlement that includes Russia and Iran on the side of the Houthis and Saleh, and the US and Gulf states on the Hadi side, is one way to give enough confidence to local actors to the effect that peace is possible.

fire with the help of the international community, and start the peace negotiations in a multilateral context in order to establish an inclusive government in the war-torn country. The Yemeni crisis is an internal, multi-party conflict that started after the Arab Spring in 2011. It is rooted in the expectations of the people and different political factions for change, and growing opposition to the corrupt regime of President Ali Abdullah Saleh. Subsequently, the failure of Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi, Saleh’s Deputy, to adjust the political transition to the country’s new political and social realities led to intense political divisions within Yemen. The turning point in the Yemeni crisis, however, can be attributed to Saudi Arabia’s intervention through air raids, which began in March 2015 in support of forces loyal to the incumbent regime. This intervention intensified the conflict and pushed the country toward civil war. Yemen has since been divided into two parts – Northern (Sanaa) and Southern (Aden), governed respectively by Shiite Houthis (officially named Ansar Allah) and forces loyal to Mansur Hadi. The chaos and instability created in Yemen have in turn proved to be fertile ground for Al Qaeda (AQAP) and ISIS to expand their operations from the war-torn country. Some inaccurately speculate that the conflict in Yemen is mostly the result of a proxy geopolitical war between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the broader Middle East. However, Iran’s role and influence in the conflict have been greatly exaggerated. To be sure, Iran supports the institutionalization of the Houthis’ place in the political equation in Yemen, according to their share of population. In reality, Iran’s role manifests itself more in the form of political, media and humanitarian support rather than military aid. This is to be contrasted with Riyadh’s robust engagement in the Yemeni conflict. There are two perspectives among Iranian strategists in respect of the significance of Yemen. The first sees Yemen as an important Arab country in the Arabian Peninsula, with significant geostrategic importance – especially given that it gives Iran access to the Mediterranean coast, reaching Syria and Lebanon through the Bab al-Mandab Strait. On this logic, a friendly government in Yemen will bolster Iran’s strategic influence in the region. The

argument holds, therefore, that Iran should take a proactive policy in order to influence the future structure of the government in Yemen. The second, more dominant perspective accepts the vital and traditional interests of Saudi Arabia in Yemen, but based on the principles of Iranian regional policy – that is, to support the demands of the people, and especially of Shiite groups in the region who have traditionally been excluded from meaningful political participation and power-sharing, and to seek the establishment of an inclusive government comprised of all political factions – Sunni and Shiite alike – in the country. In fact, the government of President Hassan Rouhani has preferred to take a low engagement policy in Yemen in order to avoid any possible conflict with Saudi Arabia that could lead to further regional instability and a more robust US presence in the region. To this end, the foreign minister of Iran, Mohammad Javad Zarif, has repeatedly called for dialogue and proposed a peace plan to solve the Yemeni crisis. The reality is that the military intervention by Saudi Arabia has complicated the internal conflict in Yemen. Riyadh’s main justification for bombing Yemen is to restore the balance of power in the country – out of Iran’s influence and in favour of Saudi Arabia. This intervention was welcomed by the US, the UK, France and Saudi Arabia’s regional allies. Yet, despite all of the intelligence and military support provided by these countries, Saudi Arabia has not yet achieved its goal of controlling Yemen or taming it to its advantage. The main reason for this failure is that Riyadh ignores the fact that this is a multi-layered conflict, and that the Houthis’ continued resistance is based on deep-rooted aspirations. The conflict in Yemen can be resolved. A key move to this end involves Western countries ending their support of the Saudi military intervention, and also increased pressure on the Saudi monarchy to understand the necessity of change in the country. Riyadh must accept the fact that Yemen cannot return to its pre-Arab Spring form and reality.” Kayhan Barzegar is Director of the Institute for Middle East Strategic Studies in Tehran, Iran, and the Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations in the Science and Research Branch of Azad University.

... cannot be left in the

Hardeep Puri is a former Indian diplomat who served as

…is to help foster a Yemeni state with sufficient legitimacy to permit a sustained rebuilding process. An inclusive regional agreement may be the best path to do so because Yemeni leaders do not trust one another. Of course, regional leaders do not agree either, but there may be no other path to peace. The Saudi-backed coalition argues that Abd Rabbuh Masour Hadi is the legitimate leader of Yemen, and that he should return to the capital Sanaa by force if necessary. Hadi was the vicepresident of Ali Abdullah Saleh, the longtime ruler of Yemen who resigned under pressure from the Arab Spring protests and from the Gulf states worried about Yemen’s stability. In the eyes of Hadi and his Gulf backers, peace begins only with the surrender of the Houthis and the Saleh forces in Sanaa and the reinstallation of the Hadi government (now in Aden). On the other side, the Houthis, backed by Iran, argue that a negotiated settlement should begin with the formation of a national reconciliation government that includes the Houthis, Saleh and those aligned with Hadi. The national reconciliation government would oversee military disengagement and the rebuilding of a single national military under its command. Peace would begin with a political settlement and then proceed to military disengagement. (continued)

Permanent Representative of India to the UN in Geneva and also in New York. He is the author of Perilous Interventions:

For the remainder of Charles Schmitz’s response,

The Security Council and the Politics of Chaos.

please visit the GB website at: www.globalbrief.ca

PHOTOGRAPH: THE CANADIAN PRESS / AP / HANI MOHAMMED

Newly recruited Houthi fighters ride in the back of a military vehicle in Sanaa, Yemen, January 2017.

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hands of the conflict’s willful perpetuators. A solution is urgently needed. The US administration under President Trump and the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres must spearhead a new initiative to bring all of the warring sides to the negotiating table. An immediate cessation of hostilities is required in order to provide long overdue assistance and relief in what is one of the greatest humanitarian crises of our time. The route to sustained stability requires active engagement of all stakeholders in the conflict and a complete abandonment of the ‘no negotiations’ stance that has all too often plagued the conflict. The oscillating role of the US in Yemen – from backing the governments of former President Ali Abdullah Saleh and current President Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi to then supporting the Houthis and, finally, backing the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthis – has cemented the leading world power as the necessary but absent leader in the peace process. Although US involvement in the conflict was initiated by its misguided mission to subdue the threat of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), its promiscuous approach to alliances among the warring parties in Yemen means that, ultimately, the US must be heavily involved in the negotiations. The unlawful intervention of Saudi Arabia and its allies in Yemen – a blatant violation of international law, and a catalyst for the significant civilian death toll – should be a trigger for swift action by the UN Security Council. The Council has demonstrated its failure to date in this regard, but still has ample opportunity to prove its effectiveness. A new US administration and a new UN Secretary-General should not be seen as tabulae rasae. According to the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, to date, well over 4,000 civilians have been killed and more than 3.3 million displaced as a result of the violence in Yemen. The burden of responsibility for the fate of those remaining alive does not disappear with the change in leadership in either the US or the UN. When faced with such numbers, all roads are eliminated, except for the one that serves the cause of peace. The US and UN must pave the way to this end goal.”

STRATEGIC FUTURES “In 2020, the US … …se préparent à une élection

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Emerging from a deep recession in 2018-2019, the country will seek to rebuild its diplomatic, economic, cultural, and especially military presence across the globe. Washington’s key partners will be somewhat different from earlier years: Berlin, New Delhi, Beijing and Tehran.

présidentielle dans un contexte étonnant. L’économie a connu une forte embellie dont l’ampleur a surpris les économistes. La renégociation de l’ALENA aura été un franc succès pour les trois pays. Sur le plan de la politique extérieure, la nouvelle alliance entre les États-Unis et la Russie aura permis de mater de manière décisive les mouvements terroristes. Le partenariat entre les États-Unis et la Chine aura permis aux deux pays de faire une percée historique dans le combat contre les gaz à effet de serre tout en relançant la machine économique mondiale. Personne n’aurait osé prédire que nous en serions à un bilan présidentiel aussi brillant sauf que, dès le lendemain de la destitution de Donald Trump et son remplacement par le vice-président Mike Pence, ce dernier s’est rapidement mis en action». Jean Charest est associé au bureau de Montréal de McCarthy Tétrault LLP, ancien premier ministre du Québec et ancien vice-premier ministre du Canada.

…will in all probability still be reckoning with the fact that its economic and social problems will not have been solved in the context of the right-wing, populist agenda. This will lead to a political crisis in which the left will seek to exact a decisive revenge for its collapse in the fall of 2016 – something that will likely intensify or otherwise reinforce the fast-growing polarization of American society, and impose even greater stress on the country’s norms and institutions. In any case, even if the protectionism of Trump may lead to short-term benefits for his supporters, we can expect further long-term weakening of American global dominance. Against this background, Europe and the UK (post-Brexit) face the challenge of fundamentally reviewing the principles of their politics and geopolitics – principles that have endured for the last 70 years. Post-WW2 Europe – to begin with, Western Europe, and then post-Cold War Europe, including its Eastern parts – focussed on the partnership with, and the support of, the US as the main liberal force in the world, able to support global democratic trends and insure all of Europe against possible counter-trends or tendencies, as well as against external aggression. It is increasingly apparent that this 70-year period is ending – and not only because of the recent

pronouncements of President Trump in respect of the funding of NATO. As such, it will be essential for Europe to find non-standard, effective approaches and answers to its evolving challenges without compromising European identity and values. If it did so in fashioning the Westphalian consensus for the early modern international order, then I am reasonably optimistic that Europe can strategically adapt to the pressures of the first half of the 21st century. Ideological flexibility, pragmatism and a deep appreciation of Europe’s interdependence with its neighbours can help to restore both the internal balance of European society and the strategic legitimacy of the continent on the basis of strengthened internal institutions and a multi-vector foreign policy. To be sure, the most promising foreign policy vector involves the development of a strategic partnership between the EU and China – up to and including a possible Sino-European association agreement. Of course, other powerful international players could try to spoil such closer ties. To this end, the biggest threat to Europe comes from Russia and the Middle East. The future of Europe is largely dependent on the ability to resist this threat in the context of the weakening participation of its strategic ally in Washington. In the medium term, Russia promises to be stable and boring. This is the unified current view of experts inside Russia. In the opinion of many of these same experts, Russia may well have strengthened its positions in recent years specifically because it did not receive a contrary response or rebuff from the Western alliance. However, it is absolutely clear that this strengthening carries with it significant limitations – especially in the long term, and specifically in strategic terms. Indeed, the principal problem remains the dependence of the Russian economy and the state budget on world oil prices. (This problem is unlikely to be addressed persuasively, in the foreseeable future, by the Russian government acting on its own.) As long as fortune favours the government in Moscow , it can keep the domestic and international situation under control. However, this picture can change at any moment, including by the end of the current decade. Such surprises or shocks in Russia are always very sharp and sudden, and no one in Russia believes that they will occur until they actually materialize. Bref, the Russian political system is still properly characterized by weak institutions and a values vacuum, which makes it inherently unstable. The protracted and expensive conflicts in neighbouring Ukraine and in the Middle East show

both the reach and the limits of Russian power. Still, excessive weakness in the Russian state and, worse still, any future disintegration of the Russian state, à la USSR, would fatally contradict the basic interest of most reasonable people in global stability, even if such a scenario would accelerate and consolidate the rise of China to the centre of global affairs. Understanding this potential future – one quite self-evident in the context of classical balance-of-power frameworks – could well motivate the leadership of the US and its allies to support the status quo in Western Europe and a continuation, to a limited extent, of sectoral partnerships with Moscow. Such partnerships will be essential in order that Russia remain stable and predictable as a great power this century.” Vasily Zharkov is Head of the Department of Political Science in the Moscow School of Social and Economic Sciences.

…the U.S. will look to restore the

ILLUSTRATION: DAN PAGE

Jeremi Suri is the Mack Brown Distinguished Chair for Leadership in Global Affairs at the University of Texas at Austin, where he is also a professor in the Department of

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relationships and institutions weakened during the 2016 wave of global populism. Emerging from a deep recession in 2018-2019, the country will seek to rebuild its diplomatic, economic, cultural, and especially military presence across the globe. Washington’s key partners will be somewhat different from earlier years: Berlin, New Delhi, Beijing and Tehran. Experiencing further moves toward democratization and open market activities, Iran will become, once again, a key US partner in the Middle East. The precipitous decline in the Rus-

sian economy and population will make Moscow a second-rate actor behind these growing powers. The region of greatest new opportunity and challenge in 2020 will be the Arctic, where melting ice has opened up major trade routes and spurred energy exploration. The US will work closely with Canada and Norway to restrict Russian claims and protect an ‘open seas’ area. Of course, the US will expect special privileges for commercial and military shipping, causing recurring conflicts with Ottawa and Oslo. The opening of the Arctic will raise new insecurities, but it will contribute to economic growth and cooperation – especially between Canada and the US. For the first time, in 2020, Americans will begin to give climate change top priority in their foreign policy deliberations. Rising sea levels will trigger coastal flooding around Miami, San Diego and New York. Rising temperatures will reduce crop yields from Midwestern farmers. Following a series of extreme weather events, with numerous deaths, the US government will finally move toward a carbon tax, advocacy for international environmental treaties, and cooperative remediation among the largest countries. The third decade of the 21st century will be the greenest decade, in aspiration, in American history.”

History and the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs.

EPIGRAM

Risky Transitions The times they are a-changin’. But for better or for worse? BY GEORGE ELLIOTT CLARKE

J George Elliott Clarke is the Poet Laureate of Canada. His newest book is Canticles I (MMXVI), an epic poem exploring slavery and resistance, imperialism and

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rebellion.

ust as US President Barack Obama was peacefully ceding his office to the incoming, blustering, President Donald Trump on January 20th, 2017, West African troops were invading The Gambia to depose President Yahya Jammeh, who had lost his nation’s December 2016 election. The action was mandated because Jammeh had refused to step aside for his elected successor, Adama Barrow, who had to be sworn in as Gambia’s president – in Senegal. But shifts in power almost always expose raw nerves and/or bleeding hearts, and can spur on megaphone sloganeering (propaganda) that can then degenerate into real horrors: assassinations, civil wars, coups, crises, destabilizations, etc. And so it has always been. Recall Julius Caesar’s ‘whacking’ via literal backstabbing in 44 BCE. Immediately, civil strife wracked the Roman Republic. Its rebirth as the Roman Empire only happened once the slain Caesar’s designated heir, Augustus, crushed all rivals and crowned himself emperor. Then again, despots face mortal danger in passing on command. Few die naturally, still fewer get to retire at liberty and pen memoirs, and even fewer get to choose their successors. Thus, as quickly as Mao Zedong, skipper of the People’s Republic of China, entered his mausoleum in 1976, the hitherto much maligned ‘capitalist roaders’ seized command, and rebooted the nation to serve as the cheap-labour manufacturer for the consumerist West. Mao’s actual devotees got demonized as ‘The Gang of Four,’ blamed for the turmoil of The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), and jailed. Yep, that is terrible, but at least they did not end up with icepicks in their brains. Such was Leon Trotsky’s fate, however, having lost a power struggle with Joseph Stalin, after the latter took control of the still-new Union of Soviet Socialist Republics following the 1924 demise of its founder, Vladimir Lenin. In contrast, when Fidel Castro, leader of revolutionary Cuba, withdrew from its presidency in 2008, he was able to hand power – laterally – to his brother, Raul. Family ties proved critical in establishing succession. Democracies do better at changing leaders, but even here there are snags. When US President John F. Kennedy took over from Dwight Eisenhower in 1961,

he inherited – and then actualized – a disastrous plan to invade Cuba. He lost face; others lost their lives. To go from authoritarianism to democracy ain’t easy either. Example one is Myanmar’s kid-glove moves to curb the military’s self-asserted, overseer role and so assure Nobel Peace Prize Laureate Aung San Suu Kyi of the tacit ability to govern without feeling guns aimed at her head. Putsches create, however, notorious instability. Witness the July 2016 would-be coup d’état against Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan. Though the Turkish rebels who undertook the gambit argued that they were defending civil society against Islamists, their defeat gave Erdogan a reason to purge and/or imprison thousands. The debacle of the Turkish putsch had the same effect, ironically, as the successful putsch in Egypt in 2013: increased repression and democracy at risk. The most stable form of government allowing for orderly transitions is monarchical – especially constitutional monarchies. Even so, the monarch had best be enlightened, willing to be mainly merely a figurehead, lest he or she end up before a firing squad or being slid under a guillotine. Certainly, Louis XVI was guillotined in 1793 as the French Revolution unfurled, finding it necessary to transition through terrorism to attain Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité. Revolution entails generally a policy of ‘emancipation’ via extermination of alleged enemies, and as was true for the fledgling USA (Patriots cannonading Loyalists), so was it true for Haiti, Russia, Cuba and so on, right on down to Cambodia and Iran. Violent liberations tend to falter, sadly. So, though the Civil War ended American slavery in 1865, the transition to ‘freedom’ for African Americans took, really, a century to be realized. In the meantime, the ex-master-race organized white-hooded and/ or police-badged terror, presided over viciously enforced segregation, and lynched thousands of ex-slaves and their descendants all the way up to JFK’s administration. The challenge of transitions is maybe best summed up by Nobel Literature Prize Laureate Bob Dylan, who sang, at the dawn of the radical 1960s, “the times they are a-changin’.” For sure. But for better or for worse, and for whose benefit and at what cost? | GB