SECOND FIRST DEPARTMENT
TOPICS: Labor Law § 241(6), Substantial factor
TORRES V. CITY OF NEW YORK 179 A.D.3d 732 January 8, 2020
The plaintiff was injured inside a steel trench box located approximately 10 feet below grade level. An excavator operator lowered a bucket into the steel trench box and crushed the plaintiff’s hand against the inside of the steel trench box. The plaintiff alleged violations of Labor Law § 241(6), specifically, a violation of Industrial code 12 NYCRR § 23-4.2(k), which prescribes that persons shall not be permitted to work in any area where they may be struck by any excavation equipment. The court found that the lower court improperly instructed the jury on the concept of comparative fault and the meaning of the term “substantial factor” requiring a new trial. PRACTICE NOTE: For an Industrial Code violation
to apply to the defendants under § 241(6), the violation must have been a substantial factor in causing the injury.
TOPICS: Labor Law § 200, Labor Law § 240(1),
Labor Law § 241(6), Homeowner's exemption, Supervision CAMPANELLO V. CINQUEMANI 179 A.D.3d 763 January 15, 2020
The plaintiff was injured while removing trees from the backyard of defendant’s property: a single-family dwelling. The defendant/ homeowner’s cousin was operating an excavator to move a downed tree that was situated on top of the tree the plaintiff was cutting. As the plaintiff was using a chainsaw to cut the branches from the downed tree, the excavator moved the top tree causing a branch to snap back and strike the plaintiff. The court affirmed the lower court’s granting of the defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Labor Law §§ 240(1) and 241(6) causes of action pursuant to the homeowner’s exception. The court noted that a homeowner visiting the worksite, providing plans for the area to be worked on, making general decisions, and reviewing the progress of the work ae expected of an ordinary homeowner and do not qualify as “directing or controlling the work.” The court further held that the homeowner did not have liability under § 200 or common law negligence because the evidence showed that the homeowner did not have notice or create the alleged condition.
PRACTICE NOTE: Owners of one- and two-
family dwellings are exempt from Labor Law violations when they contract for, but do not direct or control the work. Owners will also escape common law negligence liability under § 200 if the owner did not have actual or constructive notice of the dangerous condition and did not create the dangerous condition.
PRACTICE NOTE: When the plaintiff’s
comparative negligence is at question dismissal based upon sole proximate cause cannot be granted.
TOPICS: Labor Law § 240(1), Safety devices
VON HEGEL V. BRIXMORE SUNSHINE SQ., LLC TOPICS: Labor Law § 240(1), Recalcitrant worker,
Sole proximate cause
CHAPA V. BAYLES PROPS., INC. 179 A.D.3d 886 January 22, 2020
The plaintiff was injured when an extension ladder that he was standing on slid thereby causing him to fall. The ladder provided to the plaintiff lacked the rubber feet used to prevent slipping. The plaintiff alleged violations of Labor Law § 240(1) and was awarded summary judgment against the defendant upon a finding that the defendant/ owner provided defective equipment, which was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injury. The defendants failed to show that the plaintiff’s conduct in leaning the ladder against the wall was the sole proximate cause of the accident and thus were barred from using the recalcitrant worker defense. PRACTICE NOTE: For a defendant to establish a
recalcitrant worker defense as a complete bar to the plaintiff’s § 240(1) claim, the defendant must establish that the plaintiff’s conduct was the sole proximate cause of the accident.
180 A.D.3d 727 February 5, 2020
The plaintiff was assigned to perform repair work at a restaurant and was injured when the feet of a ladder he was working on slipped causing him to fall to the ground. The plaintiff alleged violations of Labor Law § 240(1) and the defendants moved for summary judgment, which was denied. The court found that the evidence showed that the accident occurred when the feet of the subject ladder, supplied by the owner and lessee, slipped from the wall. The court further noted that there was no evidence that the appropriate safety devices were “readily available” to the plaintiff within the meaning of § 240(1). PRACTICE NOTE: Liability will be imposed on
owners and general contractors when the evidence shows the ladder was inadequately secured and that the failure to secure the ladder was a substantial factor in causing the plaintiff’s injuries regardless of the plaintiff’s own negligence.
TOPICS: Labor Law § 200, Labor Law § 241(6),
Industrial code regulations, Means and methods BOODY V. EL SOL CONTR. & CONSTR. CORP.
TOPICS: Labor Law § 241(6)
MATUTE V. TOWN OF HEMPSTEAD 179 A.D.3d 1047 January 29, 2020
The plaintiff was retained to work on a new construction project and was injured using an electrical circular saw to cut wood. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s Labor Law § 241(6) claim. The court found that the defendants did not establish their entitlement to dismissal and that there were issues of fact as to whether the plaintiff was the sole proximate cause of his accident thereby precluding defendants from a successful motion to dismiss the § 241(6) claim.
180 A.D.3d 863 February 19, 2020
The plaintiff was injured while attempting to cross between two barges at a construction site, when a mooring line from one of the barges caught his leg and pinned it to a pillar. The plaintiff thereafter brought an action alleging violations of Labor Law §§ 200 and 241(6). The court found that the § 200 claim arose out of an alleged defect or danger due to a subcontractor’s methods or materials. However, the general contractor did not bear any responsibility for the manner in which the work related to the plaintiff’s accident was performed, therefore it did not have the supervisory control over the operation required to establish liability under the statute. The court therefore granted summary judgment as to § 200. The court also granted FALL 2020 | 11
