FIRST DEPARTMENT
TOPICS: Labor Law § 240(1), Standing orders,
TOPICS: Labor Law § 241(6), Slip/trip and fall,
TOPICS: Summary judgment, Labor Law § 240(1),
SAAVEDRA V. 111 JOHN REALTY CORP.
MOONEY V. BP/CG CENTER, LLC
UTIERREZ V. 610 LEXINGTON PROP., LLC
The First Department affirmed a finding of summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, who established a prima facie case of Labor Law §240(1) violation with undisputed evidence that his accident occurred when the scaffold on which he was working collapsed. The defendants failed its sole proximate cause defense because, even if as they contend, the plaintiff was instructed not to use scaffolds belonging to other trades working at the site of his accident, “an instruction to avoid an unsafe practice is not a sufficient substitute for providing a worker with a safety device to allow him to complete his work safely.”
An order granting the defendants summary judgment under Labor Law § 200 was unanimously affirmed. The plaintiff alleged personal injuries when he knelt on a screw lying on the floor of a construction site where he was installing cabinets. The record demonstrates that the defendants neither created or had notice of the condition of the floor nor exercised any control over the manner and means of the plaintiff’s work. The defendants were not liable under Labor Law § 241(6). The plaintiff cited Industrial Code §231.7(e)(1) or (e)(2). However, a single screw upon which the plaintiff knelt does not constitute “an accumulation of dirt and debris.”
The plaintiff claimed he fell when he lost control of a cement form that was being handed down to him from a scaffold above by other workers. In contrast, the defendants submitted evidence that the plaintiff lost control of the material when he was scratched by a nail and that he was being handed a plywood cover rather than the heavier cement form claimed by the plaintiff. The court awarded the plaintiff summary judgment on his Labor Law § 240(1) claim since both versions of the incident fell within the ambit of § 240(1).
Sole proximate cause 115 N.Y.S. 3d 303 January 7, 2020
PRACTICE NOTE: An instruction to avoid unsafe
work practices is not sufficient for compliance with § 240.
TOPICS: Labor Law § 241(6), Masonite, Integral
Accumulated debris 117 N.Y.S. 3d 206 January 14, 2020
PRACTICE NOTE: In order for the plaintiff to
establish a § 241(6) violation based upon a violation of Industrial Code § 23-1.7(e)(1), the plaintiff must prove that his accident was caused by accumulated debris or scattered materials.
part of the work
KRZYZANOWSKI V. CITY OF NEW YORK 118 N.Y.S. 3d 10 January 14, 2020
The plaintiff, a painter, alleged a Labor Law § 241(6) violation when walking down a hallway at a worksite and tripping upon wooden boards that were laying on the floor. He alleged that the boards were a tripping hazard and a violation of Industrial Code §23-1.7(e)(1) because the defendants failed to provide him with a passageway free of obstructions. The defendants argued that there could be no liability because the boards were Masonite and not scattered materials or debris. The boards were purposely laid out upon the floor each day as being “an integral part of the work.” The court found the defendant’s testimony insufficient to establish as a matter of law that the Masonite boards were a protective floor covering integral to the work. The plaintiff’s motion was denied because he failed to establish that the boards were accumulated debris or scattered materials and not protective covering purposely placed on the floor while there was ongoing construction. PRACTICE NOTE: In Masonite cases alleging a
violation of Industrial Code §23-1.7(e)(1), the plaintiff must prove that his accident was caused by accumulated debris or scattered materials.
TOPICS: Bi-state entities, Labor Law § 241(6),
Labor Law § 200
ROSARIO V. PORT AUTHORITY OF NEW YORK AND NEW JERSEY 114 N.Y.S. 3d 219 January 16, 2020
The court properly rejected the Port Authority’s arguments that it is a bi-state entity created by a federally approved compact and that it cannot be held liable under Labor Law §§ 240 or 241(6) for injuries the plaintiff sustained while working in a building owned by the Port Authority. The court stated that the Compact Clause of the U.S. Constitution is not implicated by the application of such state workplace safety statutes to the Port Authority worksite located in New York, which does not encroach upon federal supremacy. PRACTICE NOTE: The Compact Clause does not
impact workplace safety statutes as they apply to bi-state entities.
Gravity-related risk 179 A.D.3d 513 January 16, 2020
PRACTICE NOTE: It has been a long standing
rule that summary judgment on § 240(1) will be granted even when there is more than one version of events if both versions are a violation of the Labor Law.
TOPICS: Hazardous openings, Stairwell,
Barricades, Gravity-related risk, Sole proximate cause, Comparative negligence, Protective equipment, Supervisory control, Burden of proof SOTARRIBA V. 346 W. 17TH ST., LLC 118 N.Y.S.3d 90 January 28, 2020
The plaintiff, an electrical worker, fell through an unprotected stairwell opening and struck the concrete floor. The plaintiff claims he fell off a ladder, however, the defendants claim the plaintiff lost his balance while climbing over a four-foot-high barricade blocking access to the stairwell. The court found that the plaintiff was entitled to Labor Law § 240(1) despite a conflicting version of events because the plaintiff was not provided with adequate protection to prevent his fall into the unguarded stairwell opening. Further, contrary to the defendants’ contention, the plaintiff’s conduct was not the sole proximate cause of his injuries in their version of the facts because even if the plaintiff were negligent for choosing to climb over the barricade, his negligence would only raise an issue as to comparative negligence, which is not a defense to a Labor Law § 240(1) claim. PRACTICE NOTE: In a sole proximate cause case, the
court will first examine whether the defendant was compliant with § 240(1) in providing adequate fall protection as opposed to the worker’s comparative fault, which is not a defense to a § 240(1) claim.
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