Why Scotland and Catalonia Should not Become Independent in a Globalised World

1 WHY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

BRAND EU European Union Brand Centre

BRAND EU Why Scotland and Catalonia Should not Become Independent in a Globalised World Anna Möller - Loswick, Research Fellow Gold Mercury International

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500 million people.

One Brand brandeu.eu

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2 WHY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

Contents 1. Introduction

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2. Catalonia, Scotland and the Principle of National Self-Determination

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2.1. Democracy and the Principle of National

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Self-Determination 2.2. The Principle of National Self-Determination

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in International Law

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3. Negative Consequences that Could Follow from Independence

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3.1. Ejection from the European Union

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3.2. A Risk of Destabilisation of Europe

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3.3. Issues with Economic and Monetary Policy

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4. Federalism Arrangements – An Alternative to Independence

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5. Conclusion

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6. Bibliography

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3 WHY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

1. Introduction The struggles for independence in Scotland and Catalonia are more current than ever: a referendum on whether Scotland should be independent from the United Kingdom will soon take place on 18 September 2014 and Catalonia’s aspiration to vote on independence later this year in November has resulted in heavy resistance from Spain’s central government (Tierney, 2013:359; The Independent, 3 January 2014). These events can be seen in the light of the recent financial crisis in the European Union, which has increased sub-nationalist and secessionist aspirations in many member states (Atanasiu, 2013:45). Nationalists in Scotland and Catalonia have been able to leverage these sentiments to raise support for the independence movements (Reuters, 29 January 2013) - but is independence a desirable outcome?

The question of whether national self-determination, defined here as ‘the establishment of a sovereign and independent state’ (Nanda, 20002-2001:307), is a viable solution to national divisions, has received considerable scholarly attention and is highly disputed within the academic world. Some scholars defend the principle, such as Harry Beran (1987) who grounds this claim on a majoritarian conception of national self-determination, whereas others argue against it such as Amitai Etzioni (1992-1993:21-32) who asserts that secessionist movements threaten the democratic foundations of modern states.

This paper argues against independence for Scotland and Catalonia and will support this position with two primary arguments. Firstly, a theoretical discussion on the principle of national self-determination will be conducted and it will be contended that the liberal conception of democracy cannot be used to justify independence. It will also be demonstrated that international law cannot be used to justify independence of Catalonia. Secondly, a policyoriented argument will be put forward, which states that independence is not a desirable solution due to the negative consequences that could follow in terms of Scotland and Catalonia’s ejection from the European Union, the risk of a destabilising separatism in Europe and a disintegration of the European Union, and the potential issues presented in economic and monetary policy.

Finally, federalism and greater devolution will be presented as an alternative and more desirable solution to claims of national self-determination.

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2. Catalonia, Scotland and the Principle of National Self-Determination In this section, the principle of national self-determination will first be examined through the framework of democracy and it will be argued that the arguments for independence of Scotland and Catalonia are unconvincing. Thereafter, it will be argued that support for independence of Catalonia cannot be found in international law.

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2.1. Democracy and the Principle of National Self-Determination The liberal conception of democracy can easily be used to promote the right of independence for Catalonia and Scotland. Liberals grant individuals the right to decide their political relationships and this determines the way that issues of representation, secession and sovereignty are addressed. Following the logic of individuals’ right to exercise their political relationships, territorially concentrated groups would thereby have the right to secede (Beran, 1984:26).

Two liberals who have emphasised that secessionist struggles should be settled according to the majority rule are Daniel Philpott (1995) and Abraham Lincoln (Beran, 1984:26) who contend that a group that forms a majority in a territorially concentrated area should have the right to secede. Following the logic of liberal democracy, Scotland and Catalonia would have the right to become independent if However, this maximalist referendums were to be held in both regions and approach to national the outcome of the referendums worked in favour self-determination has been for the nationalists.

criticised for simplifying the very complex reality of secessionist struggles and for not taking the many dynamics involved into account.

However, this maximalist approach to national selfdetermination has been criticised for simplifying the very complex reality of secessionist struggles and for not taking the many dynamics involved into account. David Miller (1998:67-68) has pointed out that a minority group in a state that forms a majority in a geographically specified area can have dual identities, which means that they identify themselves both with their own group as well as with the larger community. This is the case in both Catalonia and Scotland; most Scots regard themselves primarily as Scottish but still have a strong sense of ‘Britishness’ through political behaviour and shared historical memory (Keating, 2009:175). In Spain, there is a major cultural overlap between Catalonia and the rest of the country and most Catalans regard themselves as both Spanish and Catalans (Miller, 1998:67-68).

Secondly, liberal democracy disregards the voice of the minority who prefers to remain with the host state. A Madrid-based poll showed that 52.3 per cent of Catalans would support independence from Spain in a referendum on the matter (CAN, 11 September, 2013). Catalonian independence from Spain would therefore mean that roughly half of the population would be forced to break away from their state. Furthermore, opinion surveys show that Catalans would be less inclined to support independence if this meant that they would

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lose the current economic benefits of being a member of the European Union (Reuters, 16 January 2014), which is the most likely outcome of independence.

In Scotland, a recent opinion poll demonstrated that less than a third of Scots want to leave the United Kingdom (The Telegraph, 6 January 2014), which means that the majority rule currently cannot be used to justify independence.

Even if support for secession would increase heavily, the fact that the minority would be forced Even if support for secession to break from their own state is a serious matter would increase heavily, the fact that should not be taken lightly.

that the minority would be forced to break from their own state is a serious matter that should not be taken lightly.

Lastly, liberal democracy prioritises the right of the seceding group to define their political relationships and therefore disregards the view of the majority nation. As Miller (1998:68-70) rightly points out: ‘...secession does not only involve a political separation, but also a partition of territory’. Following the logic of liberal democracy, the UK and Spain could just as easily be defined as a group in a territorially defined area with the right to decide whether they want to be deprived of a part of their territory. Thus, the liberal, principled and emotional arguments for independent Catalonia and Scotland are unconvincing since they fails to address the complex reality of national disputes as examined above.

2.2. The Principle of National Self-Determination in International Law The cases of Scotland and Catalonia differ vastly in terms of the application of international law. In the UK, the UK Government opposes Scottish independence but is still allowing the Scottish people to vote on the matter (Reuters, 16 January 2014). The Scottish and the UK governments reached a settlement, ‘The Edinburgh Agreement’, in October 2012, which states that if the Scottish people would vote to become independent, everyone would respect this outcome (Tierney, 2013:362-363). Thus, the issue under international law of ‘unilateral secession’ does not apply to the Scottish case since Scotland would be able to secede with the consent of the host state, the United Kingdom. Yet, although the possibility of a lack of agreement between the two governments on Scotland’s independence seems very unlikely, it is still a possibility and should not be disregarded from the discussion completely.

In contrast, the issue of ‘unilateral secession’ is very relevant to the Catalonian case since the Spanish government opposes independence for the region on constitutional grounds (The Economist, 22 September, 2012). A secession of goldmercury.org

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Catalonia from Spain would therefore be a case of ‘unilateral secession’ and it is therefore important to investigate whether international law grants such right to Catalonia.

A range of important international legal documents recognise the principle of self-determination. For instance, the principle is found in the ‘Declaration of Friendly Relations’ and in the UN Charter, which acknowledges the principle of ‘equal rights and self-determination of peoples’ (Charter of the United Nations, 1945: article 1, paragraph 2; UN Friendly Relations Declaration, 1970:article 1, paragraph 7). It could therefore be argued that these documents support the claim for Catalonian independence. However, these documents, as well as other various legal sources, also recognise the principle of sovereignty, which clashes with the principle of self-determination (Woodward, 1995:212).

Since the principle of sovereignty enjoys such widespread support within the international community that it is regarded as a general principle of law (Talbott, 2000:153-155), it seems to override the principle of self-determination.

Nevertheless, there are a few cases where the principle of self-determination overrides the principle of sovereignty. However, they do not apply to the case of Catalonia. The first principle concerns the right of a people to secede, which is governed in a colonial setting and subject to exploitation and domination, recognised by the ‘Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People’ (General Assembly Resolution 1514, 1960). The second principle is that of ‘remedial secession’, which suggests that if a population is subjected to active mistreatment or repression by a state, this group should have the right to secession as a last resort to escape grave human rights violations (Weller, 2009:275; Crawford, 1997). Since Catalonia is located outside the colonial context and the Spanish government does not repress the population, these principles do not apply to the case of Catalonia. Thus, it seems very difficult to find support for independence for Catalonia in international law. goldmercury.org

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3. Negative Consequences that Could Follow from Independence This policy-oriented section examines potential negative consequences that could follow from independence; Scotland and Catalonia would be ejected from the European Union and face a very time-consuming and uncertain application process. Independence could trigger a destabilising separatism in Europe and perhaps also lead to the disintegration of the European Union by creating a domino effect. Scotland in particular, as a result of its independence, could face serious economic difficulties and complexities. In light of these potential negative consequences, is argued that independence is not a viable option for neither Catalonia nor Scotland. goldmercury.org

9 WHY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

3.1. Ejection from the European Union The development of EU integration has made European separatist movements more inclined to actively seek independence since they believe that they would be able to enjoy the benefits of the European Union’s internal market as well as the protections that come from being part of the European Community as independent states (The New York Times, 6 October 2012). Pro-independence politicians in both Scotland and Catalonia are confident that they would be able to enter the union without having to reapply if the regions became independent. Alfred Bosch, a leader of the ERC party, claimed that ‘...when we have a popular mandate, we’ll take it to the international community and we’ll go for independence and ask for international support’ (Reuters, 16 January 2014).

However, the most likely outcome is that both Catalonia and Scotland would be ejected from the European Union and would face a lengthy, costly and uncertain application process if they were to break away from their states.

A situation of secession and then accession to membership by a region of a member state is unprecedented in the history of the European Union and guidelines on how to deal with such situations are not found in the EU treaties (Tierney, 2013:382-384). Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) would therefore most likely apply. The article states that a European country can only become a member of the European Union if such an agreement is consented on unanimously and ratified by all member states after a membership application has been made (Treaty on European Union, 1992:article 49). Yet, it has been argued that article 50 of the TEU could be evoked to support a continued membership of secessionist regions since the article emphasises the importance of negotiations between all member states and EU institutions before separation to decide upon future relationships.

However, article 50 only applies to the withdrawal of a member state and is therefore not applicable to regions (Tierney, 2013:385-387).

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European authorities have also warned that independence would mean ejection from the European Union. Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council stated that: ‘A new independent state would, by the fact of its independence, become a third country with respect to the Union and the treaties would, from the day of its independence, not apply anymore on its territory’ (CNBC, 13 December 2013). Further, there is no guarantee that an application for membership would be a simple matter. Schweiger (2012) claims that opposition from most EU member states is unlikely since the European Union has a long tradition of giving support for regional independence.

However, it is argued here that difficulties acquiring unanimous consent of existing member states can occur, especially if the application process becomes lengthy and complicated, which Tierney (2013:382-384) rightly points out.

Spain’s reaction to membership application from Scotland and Catalonia is especially difficult to predict. Spanish Prime Minister Mariano Rajoy stated in November 2013 A new independent state would, that ‘a region that obtains independence which is by the fact of its independence, part of a nation state of the EU will stay outside become a third country with the EU’ (SVT News, 27 November 2013). In light of this quote, it would not be surprising if Spain respect to the Union and the decided to use its veto as an EU member country treaties would, from the day to prevent Scotland and Catalonia from becoming of its independence, not apply members. This outcome seems even more likely when taking into account Spain’s resistance against anymore on its territory the independence movements in Catalonia and the Basque Country, and its reluctance to recognising Kosovo as an independent state (SVT News, 27 November 2013). This could jeopardise Scotland and Catalonia’s future within the European Union, which would pose unforeseen risks to the new nations’ economic and budgetary development (Reuters, 16 January 2012).

Furthermore, not only would Catalonia and Scotland risk becoming weaker nations after independence, but such development would also most likely have negative effects on Spain and the United Kingdom. Schweiger (2012) warns of the diminished influence a smaller and weaker United Kingdom would have over the political and economic agenda of the European Union if Scotland seceded. Catalonia is one of Spain’s most developed and prosperous regions, representing a fifth of Spain’s national economy, and secession would therefore likely take a heavy toll on Spain’s economy (BBC News, 12 December 2013; Reuters, 16 January 2014).

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3.2. A Risk of Destabilisation of Europe One of the most important reasons why Scotland and Catalonia should not become independent is the overwhelming risk of destabilisation in Europe and consequently disintegration of the European Union. There are 15 substate nationalist movements in Europe today (Paquin, 2007:55-59) and if the Scots and the Catalans decided on independence, this could quickly trigger a domino effect in other regions with similar claims, which would increase separatist tensions within the European Union. Secessionist trends are manifesting in Flanders in Belgium, in the Basque Country in Spain and in the Szlekler Land in Romania. In Brussels, Scottish and Catalan parties have started to create an alliance with Belgian Flemish parties (Reuters, 29 January, 2013; Atanasiu, 2013:45). If Spain and the United Kingdom, two of the most permanent states in Europe break apart, others could easily follow.

Etzioni (1992-1995:25-34) argues against national self-determination since many breakaway states tend to become less pluralist, less democratic and less tolerant towards minorities. He also contends that the increased ethnic fragmentation and hostility in newly independent states risk leading to violent conflict; he points, for instance, to the fact that the new countries in Yugoslavia are less democratic and more violent. Some would argue that the risk of disputes and violence following Scottish and Catalan independence is minimal since the secessionist movements are peaceful with a civic rather than ethnic nationalism and operate in modern, democratic and economically advanced states (Atanasiu, 2013:45; McRoberts, 2001:186-187). It is true that there is a small risk of violence in the United Kingdom if Scotland broke away, as the United Kingdom is a democratic state, which respects the rule-of law (Paquin, 2007:5559) and has agreed to respect the outcome of the referendum. Further, the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP), the major nationalist party in Scotland, is a conventional political party with no association with violence (Collier & Hoeffler, 2002:7-8).

Yet, the situation in Spain is different and much more volatile. Due to the dispute between the Spanish central government and the Catalan government, a Catalonian vote for independence might result in resentment on a range of issues, which could lead to violence (Reuters, 29 January 2013). Most importantly, Catalonian independence could trigger secessionist demands goldmercury.org

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in the Basque Country, a region in Spain where pro-independence parties won the regional elections in 2012 and where violence has been part of the independence movement; the separatist organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) has used both assassinations and bombings to pursue their goals (McRoberts, 2001:187; BBC News, 12 December 2013).

The Scottish case is not insignificant in this context: even though Scottish independence most likely would run peacefully, it could still destabilise Europe if it was to become a catalyst for other secessionist groups such as the ones in Catalonia, the Basque country and Flanders. Flemish supporters are already making plans to hold a mass march in Brussels in 2014 to support the nationalist campaign in Scotland and during a march for independence in Edinburgh in September last year, Flemish nationalist activists were handing out leaflets to gain support for a ‘petition for self-determination’, which they planned to send in to the European Commission (The Guardian, 30 September 2013).

(1992-1995:25-34)

Etzioni argues against national selfdetermination since many breakaway states tend to become less pluralist, less democratic and less tolerant towards minorities.

Furthermore, the protracted conflict between Serbia and Kosovo may also be exacerbated if success for Catalonian and Scottish nationalists were to trigger separatist demands in Kosovo. Although Serbia and Kosovo are not members of the European Union, an exacerbated conflict could profoundly threaten the stability in Europe. Serbia has been granted EU candidate status and Kosovo is regarded a potential candidate by the European Union (European Commission, 21 January 2014), which makes the cases relevant for the future of the European Union.

The potential consequences outlined above would not only jeopardise the stability in Europe but also pose a threat to the prospects of European integration, if more and more new European states, some less stable and democratic than others, would end up outside the European Union and would risk facing a complicated application process with an uncertain outcome.

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3.3. Issues with Economic and Monetary Policy There then remains a question of the economic situation following secession.

The Scottish National Party planned to enter into a monetary / currency union with the rest of the United Kingdom following independence, and continue to use the Pound Sterling as their national currency. There is strong opposition within the Scottish population and parliament to both the creation of an independent currency, and to joining the Euro (Peterkin, 2014). Catalonia, conversely, wishes to remain a member of the Eurozone, and Catalan President Artur Mas has insisted that Catalonia “will have the Euro as its currency whatever happens”, despite the substantial evidence and arguments to the contrary (CNA, 2013).

Sharing a currency between two independent nations would, in reality, serve the interests of neither.

The issue of currency union, and by extension, the economic situation following independence, is a complex one, with great difficulties involved for both the seceding and for the continuing nation.

This is most relevant with regards to Scottish independence, so this economic section will focus solely on the Scottish case. The Scottish National Party’s plans to form a currency union with the remainder of the United Kingdom are inherently selfdefeating, and this plan could be described as a form of pseudo-independence in the name of security. Control over monetary policy, spending, interest rates, and taxation are arguably of the upmost primacy with regards to the sovereignty of a nation, yet the Scottish National Party would prefer to have the fate of its currency determined by the Bank of England in the United Kingdom; the nation it is voting to leave. Additionally, the Scottish National Party’s plans discount the simple fact that the United Kingdom has no legal necessity to consent to the formation of a currency union, and the Westminster government has expressed clear opposition to this plan (Cramb, 2013). Control over economic sovereignty has always been a particularly fierce issue for the UK government; hence the staunch rejection of the Euro, and so it seems highly improbable that the UK would then decide to concede some of its sovereignty in monetary and fiscal policy to Scotland, following secession.

Nicola Sturgeon, Deputy First Minister of Scotland, believes that this is merely campaign rhetoric displayed by the government to dissuade voters in the referendum, and that the results will play out differently in practice; though this is highly debatable (Sparrow, 2014).

Sharing a currency between the two independent nations would, in reality, serve the interests of neither. The prospect of having monetary policy, taxes, spending, and interest rates determined by another nation (or group of

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On the flip side, the UnitedKingdom would be forced into a substantially riskier proposition; with the continuing UK comprising around 90% of its total GDP in the currency union, and with Scotland bearing around 10%.

nations) is precisely why the Scottish people and parliament are so absolutely opposed to joining the Euro, and yet the reality would be much the same in an equivalent “Sterling Zone”. On the flip side, the United Kingdom would be forced into a substantially riskier proposition; with the continuing UK comprising around 90% of its total GDP in the currency union, and with Scotland bearing around 10% (Carmichael, 2013). Thus, the continuing UK would bear significantly greater risk of having to bail out an independent Scotland if it got into fiscal difficulties (Carmichael, 2013).

Additionally, an independent Scotland would be likely to have a more volatile economy due to its status as a relatively small country by international standards; who typically require greater trade externally to account for a smaller domestic market (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 2014). In addition to this being the case, an independent Scotland also be reliant on some particularly volatile sectors; North Sea oil and gas, and a financial sector which would be approximately 10 times its average GDP (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 2014). This would add significant risk to the continuing UK, in the event of a currency union, while benefitting Scotland through greater security.

Westminster’s stance is that currency unions do not work without close political and fiscal integration, and should always be built on the basis of permanence (Carmichael, 2013). An independent Scotland would have neither of these conditions; having just separated from the UK, and the Scottish National Party have made it extremely clear that a currency union would be more of a temporary, security measure on the way to an independent currency in the distant future, among other potential options (Chief Secretary to the Treasury, 2014).

The Scottish National Party makes the argument that a “Sterling Zone” is a simple common sense proposition – that both UK and Scottish businesses would be harmed if Scotland were to adopt a separate monetary system – due to transaction costs being incurred for trade between Scotland and the UK; who trade substantially with one another (Eaton, 2014). Alex Salmond estimates that without monetary union, transaction costs would harm UK business to the tune of around £500 million a year, and that no businesses on either side would support it; thus making a monetary union a common sense proposition (Eaton, 2014). This is a bone of contention which the majority of Westminster politicians disagree with, as do the Confederation of British

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Industry (who represent over 250,000 private and public sector businesses in the UK) and the Institute of Directors (who support approximately 34,500 businesses). Simon Walker, Director General of the Institute of Directors, said that: “while businesses on both sides of the border would regret new transaction costs resulting from an independent Scotland adopting a new currency, this inconvenience would pale in comparison to the financial danger of entering an unstable currency union” (The Guardian, 17th Feb 2014).

“While businesses on both sides of the border would regret new transaction costs resulting from an independent Scotland adopting a new currency, this inconvenience would pale in comparison to the financial danger of entering an unstable currency union” The Guardian, 17th Feb 2014

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4. Federalism Arrangements An Alternative to Independence Given the complex reality of secessionist struggles and the many negative consequences that could follow from secession, independence for Scotland and Catalonia is not desirable.

If the solution to every ethnic or national division would be national self-determination, then the UN, as stated by Etzioni (1992-1993:28), would quickly end up with thousands of members. It would be very difficult to sustain a relatively efficient, although not perfect world order.

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There are other less drastic, and therefore preferable ways of dealing with national divisions. One potential option for Scotland and Catalonia could be federal arrangements, which would imply a division of the state into selfgoverning units, a federal executive and a directly elected federal legislature (Keating, 2009:134-135). The United Kingdom has already taken a very important step towards federalism when the Scottish Parliament was created (Laffin & Thomas, 1999:89) and a federal arrangement would go in line with the longstanding Catalan tradition of seeking stronger autonomy without separating from Spain (Keating, 2009:177). Catalonia and Scotland already have significant self-governing powers in areas such as education, health and justice (The Economist, 24 November 2012; Government’s Programme for Scotland), and it would therefore be better to continue down that road than to turn to secession as a solution. Federal arrangements would give the regions more autonomy without breaking away from their host states, which would promote integration, representation, and democracy, rather than disintegration in Europe.

This is not to say that it would be easy to achieve; Scotland faces a dilemma where more self-governance would risk reducing its influence in the centre (Keating, 2009:171-172) and Spanish Prime Minister Rajoy has so far been unwilling to accommodate any of Catalonia’s demands (The Telegraph, 20 September 2012). Yet, Yet, federalism is a much federalism is a much less drastic solution than less drastic solution than secession and if successful, a federal arrangement secession and if successful, in Scotland and Catalonia could serve as a paradigm for other countries where separatist a federal arrangement in claims are prevailing.

Scotland and Catalonia could

serve as a paradigm for other countries where separatist claims are prevailing.

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5. Conclusion This paper has argued against independence for Scotland and Catalonia and has based this position on two major themes; the principle of national self-determination within the framework of democracy and international law, and possible negative consequences that could follow from independence.

In the first section, a theoretical discussion on the principle of national selfdetermination was conducted and it was argued that the liberal version of democracy cannot be used to justify national self-determination for Catalonia and Scotland since it ignores the complex reality of secessionist struggles. It was also argued that there is no support for Catalonia’s independence within international law.

Secondly, this paper has analysed possible consequences that could follow from independence and has concluded that the risks simply are too great, not only in terms of Scotland and Catalonia’s future within the European Union but also in terms of wider implications for the stability of Europe and European integration, as well as the economic concerns which Scotland would face following has independence.

European history taught us that unity means peace while nationalism and fragmentation leads to destruction.

Finally, federalism has been put forward as an alternative and more desirable solution to claims of national self-determination since it would give Catalonia and Spain more autonomy without jeopardising stability of Europe. In a world that is becoming increasingly globalised and interdependent, further destabilisation and disintegration is not the way to solve the financial and economic crisis in Europe. The road to stability and growth must be more integration and cooperation rather than disintegration.

European history has taught us that unity means peace while nationalism and fragmentation leads to destruction.

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6. Bibliography Atanasiu, Mirela (2013) ‘Perspectives of the European Union – Between Political Integration and Disintegration’, Strategic Impact, No 1, p.40-48 BBC News (2013) Tom Burridge, ‘Spain to Block Catalonia Independence Referendum’, BBC News, 12 December 2013, Retrieved 27 January 2014 http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25353086 Beran, Harry (1984) ‘A Liberal Theory of Secession’, Political Studies, pp.21-31 Beran, Harry (1987) The Consent Theory of Political Obligation, (London, Croom Helm) Carmichael, Alistair (2013) ‘Why a currency union would be bad for Scotland and the UK’. Gov.uk. 26 November 2013, retrieved 20 February 2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/news/why-a-currencyunion-would-be-bad-for-scotland-and-the-uk Catalan News Agency (2013) ’52% of Catalans Support Independence from Spain, According to a Madrid-Based Media’, Catalan News Agency, 11 September 2013, Retrieved 1 February 2014 http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/52-ofcatalans-support-independence-from-spain-according-toa-madrid-based-media Catalan News Agency (2013) ‘That Catalan President guarantees that Catalonia “will have the euro as its currency whatever happens,”’ Catalan News Agency, 19 September 2013, Retrieved 18 February 2014 http://www.catalannewsagency.com/politics/item/ the-catalan-president-guarantees-that-catalonia-willhave-the-euro-as-its-currency-whatever-happens Charter of the United Nations (1945) Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice, San Francisco

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Chief Secretary to the Treasury (2014) ‘Scotland Analysis: Assessment of a Sterling Currency Union’. Gov.uk.

February 2014, Retrieved 20 January 2014 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/279454/CM8815_2901849_ SA_SterlingUnion_acc.pdf CNBC (2013) Catherine Boyle, ‘After Scotland, Another European Breakaway?’, CNBC, 13 December 2013, Retrieved 30 January 2014 http://www.cnbc.com/id/101270869 Collier, Paul and Hoeffler, Anke (2002) ‘The Political Economy of Secession’, Development Research Group, The World Bank Cramb, Auslan (2013) ‘Walk away from the UK and you walk away from the pound, Salmond warned’ The Telegraph, 24 Nov 2013, retrieved 13 February 2014 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/ scotland/10471293/Walk-away-from-the-UK-and-youwalk-away-from-the-pound-Salmond-warned.html Crawford, James (1997) ‘State Practice and International Law in Relation to Unilateral Secession’, Report to Government of Canada concerning unilateral secession by Quebec, University of Cambridge Eaton, George (2014), ‘Salmond didn’t even come close to rebutting Osborne’s currency threat,’ The New Statesman, 17 February 2014, retrieved 18 February 2014 http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2014/02/ salmond-didnt-even-come-close-rebutting-osbornescurrency-threat Etzioni, Amitai (1992-1993) ‘The Evils of SelfDetermination’, Foreign Policy, No.89, pp.21-35 European Commission (2013-2014) ‘Enlargement’, European Commission Website, Retrieved 2 February 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailedcountry-information/kosovo/index_en.htm

20 WHY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

General Assembly Resolution 514 (1960) Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and People, UN Yearbook, 40, GA Resolution 1514 (XV) Government’s Programme for Scotland (2013-2014) ‘Empowering Scotland: the Government’s Programme for Scotland 2013-14’, The Scottish Government, Retrieved 2 February 2014 http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2013/09/8177/4 Etzioni, Amitai (1992-1993) ‘The Evils of SelfDetermination’, Foreign Policy, No.89, pp.21-35 European Commission (2013-2014) ‘Enlargement’, European Commission Website, Retrieved 2 February 2014 http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/detailedcountry-information/kosovo/index_en.htm Keating, Michael (2009) ‘Scotland and the Future of Union’, in Michael Keating, The Independence of Scotland: Self-Government and the Shifting Politics of Union, (New York, Oxford University Press) Laffin, Martin and Thomas, Alys (1999) ‘The United Kingdom: Federalism in Denial?’, The Journal of Federalism, 29 (3), pp. 89-107 McRoberts (2001) Catalonia: Nation Building Without a State, (Canada, Oxford University Press) Miller, David (1998) ‘Secession and the Principle of Nationality’, In Margaret Moore, National SelfDetermination and Secession (Oxford University Press) Nanda, P. Ved (2000-2001) ‘Self-Determination and Secession under International Law,’ Denver Journal of International Law and Policy, Vol.29, No.4, pp.305-326 Paquin, Stéphanie (2007) ‘Globalization, European Integration and the Rise of Neo-Nationalism in Scotland, Nationalism and Ethnic Politics, 8(1), pp.55-80 Peterkin, Tom (2014) ‘Poundland: Independent Scotland’s currency options,’ The Scotsman, 2 February 2014, Retrieved 19 February 2014 http://www.scotsman.com/news/poundland-independentscotland-s-currency-options-1-3290270

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Philpott, Daniel (1995) In Defense of Self-Determination, Ethics, 105(2), pp.352-385 Reuters (2014) Fiona Ortiz, ‘Catalonia Defies Madrid With Push For Independence Vote’, Reuters, 16 January 2014, Retrieved 27 January 2014 http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/16/us-spaincatalonia-idUSBREA0F0QT20140116 Reuters (2014) Peter Apps, ‘Could Scottish, Catalan Independence Vote Reshape Europe?’, Reuters, 29 January 2013, Retrieved 27 January 2014 http://uk.reuters.com/article/2013/01/29/uk-europepolitics-independence-idUKBRE90S0J320130129 Schweiger, Christian (2012) ‘Scottish Independence and Relations With the EU’, e-International Relations, 21 July 2012, Retrieved 1 February 2014 http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/21/scottish-independenceand-relations-with-the-eu/ SVT News (2013) Jim Smith, ‘Spanish PM Says Independent Scotland Would ‘Stay Outside the EU’, SVT News, 27 November 2013, Retrieved 2 February 2014 http://news.stv.tv/politics/250628-mariano-rajoy-saysindependent-scotland-would-stay-outside-the-eu/ Sparrow, Andrew (2014), ‘George Osborne’s speech on Scottish independence,’ The Guardian, 13 February 2014, Retrieved 15 February 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/blog/2014/feb/13/ george-osbornes-speech-on-scottish-independencepolitics-live-blog The Economist (2012) ‘Catalonia: Europe’s Next Independent State?’, The Economist, 22 September 2012, Retrieved 28 January 2014 http://www.economist.com/node/21563347 The Economist (2012) ‘Centrifugal Spain; Umbrage in Catalonia’, The Economist, 24 November 2012, Retrieved 28 January 2014 http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21567088-eventhough-spectre-secession-unwelcome-distraction-spainstill-needs

21 WHY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

The Guardian (2013) Severin Carrell ‘Europe’s Nationalists Seek Solidarity with Scotland’s Independence Campaign’, The Guardian, 30 September 2013, Retrieved 2 February 2014 http://www.theguardian.com/politics/scottishindependence-blog/2013/sep/30/scottish-independencemarch-european-nationalists

Treaty on European Union (1992) Treaty on European Union – Maastricht Treaty, European Union

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The Independent (2014) Sarah White, ‘Catalonia Seeks Support from EU for Independence’, The Independent, 3 January 2014, Retrieved 31 January 2014 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ catalonia-seeks-support-from-eu-forindependence-9037906.html The New York Times (2012) Steven Erlanger, ‘Europe’s Richer Regions Want Out’, The New York Times, 6 October 2012, Retrieved 29 January 2014 http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/07/ sunday-review/a-european-union-of-more-nations. html?pagewanted=all The Telegraph (2012) Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, ‘Spain Risks Break-Up as Mariano Rajoy Stirs Catalan Fury’, The Telegraph, 20 September 2012, Retrieved 2 February 2014 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/ financialcrisis/9556803/Spain-risks-break-up-as-MarianoRajoy-stirs-Catalan-fury.html The Telegraph (2014) Simon Johnson, ‘30pc back Scottish Independence as Referendum Phoney War Ends’, The Telegraph, 6 January 2014, Retrieved 1 February 2014 http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/politics/10551995/30pcback-Scottish-independence-as-referendum-phoney-warends.html Tierney, Stephen (2013) ‘Legal Issues Surrounding the Referendum on Independence for Scotland’, European Constitutional Law Review, No.9, pp.359-390

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UN Friendly Relations Declaration (1970) Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, New York

ABOUT THE AUTHOR Anna Möller-Loswick Research Fellow Gold Mercury International Anna has an MSc in Conflict Studies from the London School of Economics and a BSc on Political Science from Uppsala University, Sweden. Anna’s research includes subject on secession and separatism, War and Peace Studies, Conflict Analysis, International Law and the Use of Force, Gender and Militarisation, Middle Eastern Politics and Ethnic and Religious Violence. Her work includes reports on: “War, Peace and National SelfDetermination: Should Kosovo become independent,” “Third-Party Management of Spoilers during the Implementation of Peace Agreements: a Comparative study of Liberia and Sierra Leone”. Her experience includes the UN Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Sexual Violence in Conflict in New York and Assistant Attaché, the Security Policy Group, Permanent Mission of Sweden to the United Nations, New York, USA.

22 WHY SCOTLAND AND CATALONIA SHOULD NOT BECOME INDEPENDENT IN A GLOBALISED WORLD

“The EU urgently needs a shared understanding of how to realise its ambitious agenda. It needs to identify the measures required to adapt to the global era, and the costs and implications of standing still. In short, it needs to communicate a common vision of how Europe can secure its future. The choice we face is therefore clear: build on the strengths of the EU and use its collective weight to become an assertive and relevant player in the world, or cultivate fragmentation and contemplate the possibility of absolute decline in a world where the rules are defined by those who matter.

From the independent Reflection Group Report “Project Europe 2030” presented to the European Council on May 8th 2010.

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Enrique Barón Crespo Former President of the European Parliament

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