GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
The Utility and GLOBAL GOVERNANCE POLICY SERIES
Purpose of the Coup st D’état in 21 Century Global Governance
Keywords: Global governance> peace and security> military coup> coup d’état> guardian coup> democracy> corruption> dictators> Niger> Zimbabwe> Thailand> Nigeria> UN Security Council.
March 2010
A critical analysis of the general consensus regarding armed revolution following February’s coup in Niger
10 MINUTES
GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
Introduction Niger, officially named the Republic of Niger, is a landlocked country in Western Africa, named after the Niger River. It borders Nigeria and Benin to the south, Burkina Faso and Mali to the west, Algeria and Libya to the north and Chad to the east. Niger is a developing country. Much of the non-desert portions of the country are threatened by periodic drought and desertification. The economy is concentrated around subsistence and some export agriculture clustered in the more fertile south, and
On Thursday the 18th of February 2010 a military coup was staged, deposing (and imprisoning) the President of Niger, Mamadou Tandja. The following day, a military junta called the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy laid claim to power. This junta, under the leadership of Major Salou Djibou, will (according to their statements) lead a transitional government and hold democratic elections to reinstate civilian leadership. They have stated that they want Niger to be “an example of democracy and of good governance.”
the export of raw materials— especially uranium ore. Nigerien society reflects a great diversity drawn from the
long independent histories of its several ethnic groups and regions and their relatively short period living in a single state.
GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
Salou Djibo (born 15 April 1965) is a Nigerien military officer. Following the military coup of 18 February 2010, he became head of the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy and thus de facto leader of Niger.
This type of coup, known as a “guardian coup” sees a military force remove a leader from power in order to protect the state. In Niger’s case, the people were left with few options. Whilst President Tandja was democratically elected for both of his terms since 1999, he would not relinquish power when it was time for him to step down. According to a number of statements he made, he was initially very willing to step down at the end of his second term until some of his constituency held demonstrations, asking him to stay on. Soon after that he said: “the people have demanded I remain”, following which he planned a referendum designed to overrule the national constitution’s term limitations. When these moves were contested, he dissolved the national assembly, disbanded the government and announced his intention to rule by decree (in other words, as a dictator). So one must ask: “what else is one to do?” A guardian coup can remove a leader such as this from power and set the country back on the path towards healthy, sustainable governance. If he was left in power he may have eventually taken a path similar to Zimbabwe’s Mugabe - fiercely holding on to power at the cost of the citizenry. Furthermore, Niger is a state suffering from major food shortages and is in an economic doldrums. A large chunk of the state forms part of the Sahara desert and they only have one resource worth noting, uranium. In other words, the state can ill-afford taking any steps backward. Of course a coup is exactly that, but one hopes only for the short-term.
Mamadou Tandja (born 1938) is a Nigerien politician who was President of Niger from 1999 to 2010. He was President of the National Movement
of the Development Society (MNSD) from 1991 to 1999 and unsuccessfully ran as the MNSD’s presidential candidate in 1993 and 1996 before being
elected to his first term in 1999. While serving as President of Niger, he was also Chairman of the Economic Community of West African States from 2005 to 2007. Following a constitutional crisis in 2009, which was caused by Tandja’s efforts to remain in office beyond the originally scheduled end of his term, he was ousted by the military in a coup d’etat in February 2010.
GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
The word “hopes” naturally raises the obvious question: will the Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy (CSRD) be willing to relinquish power in the next few months? We have many cautionary tales in Africa alone (out of 85 examples) that tell us not to assume that the CSRD will peacefully hand over power when the time comes. Most recently, we have the tragic example of Guinea - Conakry. This is a state that has only ever known violent repressive regimes and similarly violent power transitions. The most recent coup was represented as a guardian coup. However, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara (who is the head of their current junta) removed democratic institutions and then announced his intention of running in the elections, which he was supposed to be facilitating. This generated fears that he would not let go of power and sparked protests. The junta responded violently and massacred 160 people, also raping and mutilating many citizens in the streets. Recent events (a failed assassination attempt against Camara which has left him wounded) may change the outcome, but Guinea is an excellent example of a guardian coup being nothing of the sort. This could probably be classified as a tyrannical coup (generally called a “veto coup”), centred on the suppression of human rights to maintain power. And yet the guardian coup does exist. Niger has played host to four coups to date since their independence. One of the previous coups, led by Daouda Malam Wanke was exactly that. Wanke ruled only for a few months, just long enough to oversee an election and then step down. His transitional leadership was born out of the assassination of his predecessor (Ibrahim Barc Mainassara) who was by all reports a despot. So in this case, Wanke removed a bad leader and allowed the people to pick a new one. It is however ironic that the leader that the people chose was President Tandja, who has now also been removed by a coup.
The Supreme Council for the Restoration of Democracy, led by Salou Djibo, is a military junta that staged a coup in Niger on 18 February 2010, deposing President Mamadou Tandja. The CSRD has stated that its objective is to make Niger an example of “democracy and good governance.”
During the two days following the coup, thousands of people demonstrated in the streets to support the military government and its stated intention of installing democracy.
GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is one of the principal organs of the United Nations and is charged with the maintenance of international peace and security. Its powers, outlined in the United Nations Charter, include the establishment of peacekeeping operations, the establishment of international sanctions, and the authorization of military action. Its powers are exercised through United Nations Security Council Resolutions.
We cannot reliably (at this stage) make a prediction as to what the CSRD’s leadership will look like. They have already begun to make a number of moves that suggest their motives are honourable and that they want everyone to be clear on that fact. One good example is that none of the CSRD members nor members of the interim government will stand in the elections when they are held. But either way, let us assume for the sake of argument that they are being genuine and that they do intend to hand over power soon in a peaceful and fully representative fair election. Does this justify the coup to begin with? The case that would be made by the UN or France (both which have denounced it) is that a unilateral move for regime change which does not act within the confines of a state’s laws cannot be accepted, especially when that regime change is violent. The acceptable route would possibly first involve peaceful protests, and then the application of international diplomatic pressure followed by economic pressure and if all else fails maybe a final UN Security Council sanctioned regime change by an appointed coalition force. This coup was illegal, unilateral and contained elements of violence. Further, the general character of coups is that they are destructive to the state and its future sustainability. This results in the expedience that all coups should be condemned in hopes that this form of regime change will end. But comparing this principle to the case of Niger’s potentially beneficial coup, one is then in effect saying that the defence of this principle is more important than the state’s future. The people of Niger would disagree. Let us return to that line of argument later. It is important to analyse the evolving nature of the coup d’état. Most phenomena in international relations transform over time (beyond the application of new technologies), and perhaps the same may hold true for coups. If coups evolve and become a more sustainable form of regime change, then it would be important for actors like the UN to reconsider their stance on the subject.
GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
In order to test the possibility of whether coups may be evolving into a more sustainable solution for regime change (compared to the past) we have looked at the last decade as a sample. The coups considered are only the successful ones and include examples from all over the globe: Ecuador, Guinea – Bissau, San Tome and Principe, Central African Republic, Haiti, Nepal, Togo, Thailand, Fiji, Mauritania and Guinea - Conakry. By looking at three potential indicators for coup justifiability, we can systematically judge them. The first indicator would have to be based on a judgement regarding the regime they are removing. It can be determined by deciding if the deposed leader should be replaced (for example as a result of dictatorial policies, incompetence or corruption). The second indicator is the methods used by the coup leaders (such as the level of violence or the degree of consent and support). And the third factor to consider is probably the most important in that it concerns the coup’s final outcomes. The coup must pave the way for a return to a more sustainable and democratically elected government.
Kumba Ialá (born 15 March 1953), is a Guinea-Bissau politician who was President of Guinea-Bissau from 17 February 2000 until he was deposed in a military coup on 14 September 2003.
The unfortunate truth is that in looking at the last decade’s coups, there do not seem to be many “justifiable” ones. That fact alone pretty much concludes the argument. Other than the coup in Niger under examination here, the only coup that one may view as potentially contributing to sustainability was the 2003 coup in Guinea – Bissau. This was an example of a bloodless coup that removed a reportedly incompetent administration and oversaw elections less than a year later. However, with this exception aside, there does not seem to be much of a change in the nature of coups. This high percentage of destructive coups in the last decade indicates that for the most part, they are a detriment to global sustainability. One possible trend worth noting, however, is that there does seem to be a change in military ideology. Some examples indicate that more military leaders seem to be showing a respect for the principle that civilians should have final control over the military. This was seen in Wanke’s and the Guinea – Bissau coups (discussed above) and a very recent case in Nigeria: A state that has seen more than its fair share of coups and military dictatorships, Nigeria seems to be showing a rising (and promising) sense of responsibility among military leaders. In Nigeria’s most recent crisis, President Yar ‘Adua was absent for a prolonged period of time (due to illness) and unrest began to rise in the leaderless state. For a time, the civil service could not make a choice about his succession, there were communal riots in Jos (which saw hundreds dead) and the Niger-Delta militants ended their ceasefire with the government (threatening new attacks on the region’s oil infrastructure). The outlook was bleak, and there was a great deal of talk about whether a military coup would be a viable solution. Yet even under these conditions the military confirmed their loyalty to Yar ‘Adua. This may of course have more to do with Yar ‘Adua’s influence as opposed to military concern about civilian rule, but at least it indicates a certain robustness of the civilian leadership in relation to the military.
GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
The 2006 Thai coup d’état took place on Tuesday 19 September 2006, when the Royal Thai Army staged a coup d’état against the elected caretaker government of Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The coup d’état, which was Thailand’s first non-constitutional change of government in fifteen years, followed a year-long political crisis involving Thaksin, his allies and political opponents and occurred less than a month before nation-wide House elections were originally scheduled to be held.
The 2006 Thailand coup was also taken into account in the above pool of examples. The coup had many of the hallmarks of a “justifiable coup” in that it involved the removal of a corrupt Prime Minister (recently forced to pay $1.4 billion back to the government by a Thai court ruling) and that it was done very peacefully (comparisons were even made to 1989’s Velvet Revolution). It was also popularly received (though not universally so) and was geared towards the development of democracy. However, the coup took place just one month before scheduled elections. The previous elections in April were deemed unfair and new elections were to be held in October. But even if there were concerns over the fairness of the October elections, they would have been a more accurate reflection of national will than a coup. But whatever one decides about the justifiability of the coup, the Thai case also showcases a respect by the military for the civilian end-client. This indicates changing times; that the Thai military realise that they cannot rule the country. Instead they wish to protect it, even if they have to protect it from its own government. This one element of military ideology may indicate a future change in the outcomes of coups and definitely indicates the utility of educating military leaders on political principles. In fact, if the military could develop a function to protect democratic principles, they could serve as a final (and possibly legal) balance to civilian authority when it is needed. Of course this is rather dangerous; the military is just as prone to corruption and there are already checks and balances in place for a state’s executive branch. Either way, we have concluded that coups for the most part are destructive and that a principle of always condemning them is sensible. We do however require some guidelines for dealing with them once they have occurred so that we can foster the return to normalcy. The majority of juntas and coup leaders will most likely not be very cooperative in this regard. In the case of the few positive coups, the task will just be easier. In truth, not much needs to change in policy. With both types of coups we still have the same objective, it is just a question of how difficult it would be in practice. So it is a difference of degree rather than kind. In the case of Niger, the CSRD will hopefully drive the transition in the right direction and they will need assistance in this regard. An official condemnation by the international community does not affect the CSRD very much. They do not require international recognition, as they do not plan to set up formal diplomatic relations. All that they require will be aid for the hungry people of Niger and assistance in the electoral process. And this will always be made available (at least in principle) to any state that requires it.
National Emblem of Thailand, depicting dancing Garuda with outstretched wings.
GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
There was one other problem mentioned above. What does one do in the case of a state like Zimbabwe? There are many states around the globe which have a destructive leadership in place and no legal means for the populace to replace them. There is not even a viable opposition in place that could remove President Mugabe from power (by force or otherwise). In the case of Afghanistan, the UN Security Council nominated a NATO coalition to remove the Taliban from power, which would imply that violent regime change can be justified in extreme circumstances and may be executed by foreign powers. The relatively similar regime change in Iraq was however not sanctioned by the UN and is therefore less legal, leaving it still mired in controversy. This means then that a precedent is in place. A major legal principle in the application of law is that it must always be consistent. Therefore, if the UN has determined that the Taliban should be removed from power, they need to take the same measuring stick to other states. Minimum values should be determined and if a state’s administration does not live up to them, then the UN can intervene. This is of course not really a possibility, and would create more chaos than it resolves, but it does outline that the law according to the UN is first and foremost qualified by pragmatism. Therefore an official standpoint on Niger’s CSRD will hopefully be tempered by tentative informal assistance to help them move Niger in the right direction. As for Zimbabwe, no solutions are forthcoming. The cynical amongst us might conclude that there would be a more decisive international intervention if the state were richer in resources or if they had a WMD programme. It may be that resources and fear are the true driving forces behind internationally driven regime changes.
Andre Lotz, Research Fellow of Gold Mercury International, contributed to this paper.
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GOLD MERCURY INTERNATIONAL Global Governance Policy Series: The Utility and Purpose of the Coup D’état
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Published in June 2010.
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