Journal européen des droits de l'homme 2013/4 by Groupe Larcier

2013 | 4

Journal européen des droits de l’homme

Journal européen des droits de l’homme European Journal of Human Rights

European Journal of Human Rights

JEDH | EJHR

n° 4 | novembre 2013 Rédacteur en chef | Editor in chief Olivier De Schutter

561 Dossier

L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: questions émergentes Introduction : l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Trop de voix ? L’intervention préliminaire de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne . . . . . . . . . . . . Les deux vies de Bosphorus : la redéfinition des rapports entre la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et les Parties à la Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . Entre deux feux ou ouvrant la voie ? Les juridictions nationales dans le nouveau paysage européen des droits fondamentaux . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L’attribution de comportement dans le droit de la responsabilité internationale, l’Union européenne et la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme . .

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e accession of the European Union to Th the European Convention on Human Rights: emerging issues Introduction : the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights . . . . . . . . . . . Too many voices ? The prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the European Union . . . . . . . . . . . The Two Lives of Bosphorus : Redefining the Relationships between the European Court of Human Rights and the Parties to the Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . Caught in the Middle or Leading the Way ? National Courts in the New European Fundamental Rights Landscape . . . . . . . . . . The Attribution of Conduct in the Law of International Reponsibility, the European Union and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights . . . . . . . .

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678 Chroniques

678 Columns

706 Actualités

706 news

ISSN : 2294-9313

561 Dossier

- Environnement et droits de l’homme . . . . 678

- Environment and Human Rights . . . . . . . 678

D/2013/0031/490 JEDH-N.13/4 ISBN : 978-2-8044-6749-4

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Rédacteur en chef | Editor in chief : Olivier De Schutter (Louvain). Comité de rédaction | Editorial Board : Mouloud Boumghar (Univ. du Littoral), Eva Brems (UG – Ghent), Emmanuelle Bribosia (ULB – Bruxelles), Laurence Burgorgue-Larsen (Paris 1 – PanthéonSorbonne), Vincent Chetail (IHEID Genève), Olivier de Frouville (Paris 2-Assas), Frédéric Mégret (McGill, Montréal), Jeremy Perelman (Sciences Po – Paris), Julie Ringelheim (Louvain), Sophie RobinOlivier (Paris 1 – Panthéon-Sorbonne), Sébastien Touzé (IIDH – Strasbourg). Secrétaire de rédaction | Editorial secretary : Bruno Hardy.

Comité scientifique | Scientific Board : Philip Alston (New York), Florence Benoît-Rohmer (Venise), Johan Callewaert (Strasbourg), Jean-Paul Costa (Strasbourg), François Crépeau (Montréal), Emmanuel Decaux (Paris) (président), Claudio Grossmann (Washington), Jean-Paul Jacqué (Bruxelles), Koen Lenaerts (Luxembourg), Paul Lemmens (Strasbourg), Jean-Pierre Marguénaud (Limoges), Christoper McCrudden (Belfast), Hélène Ruiz Fabri (Paris), Martin Scheinin (Florence), Alexandre Sicilianos (Strasbourg), Denys Simon (Paris), Dean Spielmann (Strasbourg), Françoise Tulkens (Bruxelles).

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Sommaire / Table of contents Dossier : L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme: questions émergentes The accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights: emerging issues Introduction : the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights Introduction : l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris and Vassilis P. Tzevelekos 561

Too many voices ? The prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the European Union Trop de voix ? L’intervention préliminaire de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne Aida Torres Pérez 565

The Two Lives of Bosphorus : Redefining the Relationships between the European Court of Human Rights and the Parties to the Convention Les deux vies de Bosphorus : la redéfinition des rapports entre la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et les Parties à la Convention Olivier De Schutter 584

Caught in the Middle or Leading the Way ? National Courts in the New European Fundamental Rights Landscape Entre deux feux ou ouvrant la voie ? Les juridictions nationales dans le nouveau paysage européen des droits fondamentaux Monica Claes and Šejla Imamović 625

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The Attribution of Conduct in the Law of International Reponsibility, the European Union and the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights L’attribution de comportement dans le droit de la responsabilité internationale, l’Union européenne et la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme Arman Sarvarian 654

Chroniques / Columns Environnement et droits de l’homme Environment and Human Rights Christel Cournil et al. 678

Actualités / News 706

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Dossier Introduction : the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights Introduction : l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris and Vassilis P. Tzevelekos

Abstract

Résumé

his issue of the Journal includes a special dossier on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. The dossier focuses not on the added value of the accession in filling a protection gap, nor on the modalities of the accession. It is forward-looking : it examines certain new questions that shall emerge following the accession, including the nature of the scrutiny that shall be exercised by the European Court of Human Rights and the questions of attribution and responsibility it shall raise.

e numéro du Journal comprend un dossier spécial sur l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Le dossier met l’accent, non sur les questions classiques de la valeur ajoutée de l’adhésion dans la protection des droits fondamentaux en Europe ou des modalités de l’adhésion, mais sur les questions émergentes de la nature du contrôle effectué par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et de l’imputabilité à l’Union ou aux États membres des violations qui résultent de leur action combinée.

rticle 6 TEU provides that the EU shall accede to the system of human rights protection of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Protocol No. 8 of the Lisbon Treaty opens the way for accession and sets the ‘red lines’ the accession agreement shall not exceed. Undoubtedly, this is not a trivial change of context for the relations of two regional regimes, whose judicial instances have been interacting relatively closely in the past. Thus far, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has been exercising only an indirect “constitutional” control over the EU legal order through scrutiny of the common member states that were implementing EU law within their domestic legal order. The tale of the two European courts, the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) in Luxembourg and the ECtHR in Strasbourg, contains elements of both complementarity and fragmentation, that is, institutional co-operation and competition. The accession of the EU to the ECHR is expected to centralise the European system for the protection of human rights, but also to establish formal (both normative and institutional) hierarchies, apparently putting thereby an end to the story of pluralism, informal judicial dialogue but also implicit hegemonic struggle that is currently taking place between these two judicial authorities in Europe. 2013/4

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Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris and Vassilis P. Tzevelekos

A new era is to begin. Some old problems will be solved ; yet, new ones shall appear. How to better design the accession and what is its added value for human rights protection in Europe ? This has been the theme of the two-day workshop we organised (thanks to the generosity of the British Academy, as well as of the ERC-funded European and National Constitutional law project directed by Monica Claes at Maastricht University) on 16-17 November 2012 in Brussels. Scholars and experts from the EU, the Council of Europe (CoE), as well as from the United Nations (UN), joined their forces to discuss four main strands around which this theme centres : first, questions of autonomy and independence ; second, whether constitutional legal pluralism will recede in favour of the order posited by the accession agreement and what is the role of the respective courts in that respect ; third, how can multiple legal orders be co-ordinated, and how this will shape the common space of human rights protection in Europe ; and, finally, the rather technical question of attribution and allocation of responsibility between the EU and its Member States. The present special issue hosts four contributions that focus on the aforementioned strands respectively. It is designed to shed light on how the relations of the two organisations might evolve after accession, and whether this new structure will bring more coherence, effectiveness and an enhanced level of human rights protection in Europe. The problem of the interrelationship between the ECHR and EU integration is not a new one. Therefore, it is not surprising that there is a plethora of academic literature on the topic. The academic debates commenced in the early years of integration, and have been recurring since ; with landmark events in the evolution of fundamental rights protection in Europe triggering renewed academic reactions. This is what happened when Opinion 2/94 was pronounced on 26 March 1996, on the eve of the opening of the Turin Intergovernmental conference that led, in 1997, to the agreement on the Treaty of Amsterdam ; after the Bosphorus ruling delivered by the ECtHR on 30 June 2005 ; or when the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights became part of EU law with the Treaty of Lisbon. However, what seems to be the final stage in the negotiations concerning the modalities of the EU accession to the ECHR evidently brought the debate once again into the spotlight, and more so than ever. The present special issue aims to contribute to the current debate by tackling key issues of accession as arising from the standpoint of three legal disciplines. From the perspective of EU law, the question posed is how the accession will impact on the EU constitutional order, and what – if any – grounds may or may not justify the logic of exceptionalism, rooted in the existential anxieties of the EU, whereby the EU seeks to secure for itself a privileged, special status within the ECHR system. In this regard, the contribution of Aida Torres Pérez addresses one specific procedural novelty which will place the EU in a distinct position from that of the other ECHR contracting states : the prior involvement procedure as provided for in the Draft Accession Agreement. The author challenges the intro-

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Introduction : the Accession of the European UE Convention on Human Rights

Dossier

duction of this mechanism on forceful grounds and dismisses its double rationale (the preservation of the autonomy of EU law on the one hand and respect for the principle of subsidiarity under the ECHR on the other), while cautioning against over-stretching the idea of a judicial dialogue between Strasbourg and Luxembourg. Given that abandonment of this procedure is highly unlikely, the proposals that are put forward for ensuring that its operation will provide sufficient protection of individuals are of considerable practical importance. From a constitutional law point of view, the special issue wishes to contribute to the recent debates on the concepts of intertwined constitutionalism, multi-level constitutionalism, and constitutional pluralism. It aspires to do so by examining the Bosphorus doctrine and what its fate might be after the accession, as well as by bringing into the debate the ‘third’ and, quite often, neglected judicial actor, namely the national courts, which are actively co-forming the European human rights landscape. Olivier De Schutter’s thought-provoking contribution tackles the first topic, that is, the Bosphorus presumption of equivalent protection. In rejecting a logic affording special treatment to the EU post accession, De Schutter’s starting point is that the continuing existence of the doctrine in its current form is not tenable. However, the author draws inspiration from Bosphorus in order to propose a new approach extending the basics of the doctrine to all contracting parties of the ECHR. This approach finds the domestic level and the ECHR level in a transformed state : away from hierarchy and towards horizontality. Therefore, with his paper De Schutter proposes a shift in the nature of the scrutiny exercised by the ECtHR, from a focus on substance to a strengthened attention on procedure. As concerns the role of domestic courts in the new architecture after accession, Monica Claes and Sejla Imamovic highlight the fact that these are the actors on which the accession is likely to have the biggest impact. The authors initially disentangle the three distinct regimes of fundamental rights protection in Europe, both in terms of substantive rights and enforcement mechanisms in order to illustrate as a next step the position of national courts in the current system, and how that will be further complicated after accession. To the extent that the new architecture is vertical in nature problems may arise in particular from the existence of multiple fundamental rights catalogues accompanied by at times divergent or conflicting interpretations, as well as the uncertainty relating to their respective applicability and implementation. Seen, finally, from the perspective of public international law, the accession will place the EU under the jurisdiction of a regional international court that specialises in the protection of human rights. The question of the responsibility of international organisations is quite old. However, the codification of that area of international law has only been finalised by the International Law Commission (ILC) and its Special Rapporteur on this topic, Judge Giorgio Gaja, in 2011. Inter2013/4

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Vasiliki Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris and Vassilis P. Tzevelekos

estingly, the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organisations (ARIO) also appear to be influenced by the well-known case law of the ECtHR on the responsibility of states that are members of international organisations (including the EU), in cases where their membership to an organisation was linked with a situation resulting in the circumvention of their human rights obligations under the ECHR. The Draft Accession Agreement (and its famous co-respondent mechanism), as well as the judicial practice that will follow will tell if, and to what extent, the logic of ARIO is valued, or whether the ‘special regime’ of European human rights protection will depart from it, thereby establishing an alternative path that better addresses its needs and particularities. With his contribution, Arman Sarvarian examines the consequences the accession of the EU to the ECHR may have in terms of attribution and allocation of responsibility between the EU and its member states. To that end his paper thoroughly analyses the relevant case law of the ECtHR (in cases concerning the EU, but also and mainly the UN), as well as the Draft Accession Agreement and the old debate about the special nature of the EU and the need for it to be exempted from the rules of ARIO and submitted instead to a regime that would be specially designed for it. Although no definitive answers can be given, the paper skilfully identifies a number of thorny points within all three mentioned levels. Dr Vasiliki Kosta Leiden University e‑mail : v.kosta@law.leidenuniv.nl

Dr Nikos Skoutaris University of East Anglia and London School of Economics e‑mail : N.Skoutaris@uea.ac.uk N.Skoutaris@lse.ac.uk

Dr Vassilis P. Tzevelekos University of Hull e‑mail : V.Tzevelekos@hull.ac.uk

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Dossier Too many voices ? The prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the European Union Trop de voix ? L’intervention préliminaire de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne Aida Torres Pérez

Abstract

Résumé

he Draft agreement on the accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) envisages the possibility for the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) to review EU law provisions in light of fundamental rights, before the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) carries out an external review (article 3, § 6). This paper aims at answering the following question : is the prior involvement of the CJEU justified ? First, the grounds that might justify the creation of this mechanism will be critically analyzed : the autonomy of EU law and the subsidiarity of the ECtHR. Next, a range of reasons to oppose this mechanism will be examined. While a fruitful dialogue between Strasbourg and Luxembourg has developed over the years, any attempt to institutionalize it could be exhausting and lead to undesired results. Eventually, it will be concluded that this is an overly complex, time-consuming proceeding that should be abandoned. In any event, since the CJEU’s prior involvement has now been agreed to as part of the package deal on accession, a constructive proposal will be offered in search for a balance between the interests of the EU and individual protection.

e projet d’Accord sur l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme envisage la possibilité pour la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne d’examiner les mesures adoptées par l’Union au regard des exigences des droits fondamentaux, avant que la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme effectue un contrôle d’un point de vue extérieur (article 3, § 6). Cette étude s’interroge sur la justification d’un tel dispositif. Elle procède à une analyse critique des deux motifs avancés à l’appui du mécanisme, fondés sur l’autonomie du droit de l’Union européenne et sur la subsidiarité du contrôle de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme. Elle passe ensuite en revue les arguments opposés à cet investissement préalable de la Cour de justice. Alors qu’un dialogue fécond entre Strasbourg et Luxembourg s’est développé au fil des années, toute tentative de l’institutionnaliser pourrait conduire à des conséquences peu souhaitables. L’étude conclut que le mécanisme proposé est excessivement complexe, de nature à ralentir la procédure, et devrait être abandonné. Cependant, compte tenu de ce que l’inclusion de ce mécanisme dans le compromis est acquise, une proposition est faite en vue de la préservation d’un équilibre satisfaisant entre les intérêts de l’UE et ceux de la protection individuelle.

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Aida Torres Pérez

I. Introduction

espite the lack of formal accession of the European Union (EU) to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the interaction between the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has intensified over time. Notably, the Luxembourg court has drawn inspiration from the Convention as well as the corresponding case law to interpret EU fundamental rights. At the same time, the Strasbourg court has also drawn on EU legal sources in order to interpret Convention rights. Mutual cross-citation has steadily increased. By quoting each other, these courts have reinforced their legitimacy and authority vis-à-vis the member states. Thus, despite momentary tensions, a fruitful dialogue between Luxembourg and Strasbourg has developed.1

In this context, the accession of the EU to the ECHR has been long awaited. Since the seventies, European institutions2 and scholars have advocated the EU’s accession to the Convention.3 Among the main reasons, the search for political legitimacy and coherence stands out.4 In addition, by granting the ECtHR jurisdiction over EU law, accession would enable to overcome current dilemmas when complaints are directed against state action implementing EU law or concluding EU Treaties, such as in Bosphorus5 or Matthews.6 At present, by reviewing sate action within the scope of EU law, Stras* I thank Monica Claes, Andrew Drzemczewski, Alejandro Saiz Arnaiz, Olivier De Schutter, Bruno de Witte, and the organizers of the Workshop on “The EU Accession to the ECHR” (Brussels, 16-17 November 2012), Vicky Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris, and Vassilis Tzevelekos, for their illuminating comments and discussion Financed by MICINN DER2011-29207-C02-01. 1 There is a vast literature on the interaction between the Luxembourg and Strasbourg courts, among others, D. Spielmann, “Human Rights Case Law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Courts : Conflicts, Inconsistencies and Complementarities”, in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford, OUP, 1999, p. 757 ; B. de Witte, “The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights”, in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, OUP, 1999, p. 859 ; F. G. Jacobs, “Judicial Dialogue and the Cross-fertilization of Legal Systems : the European Court of Justice”, Texas International Law Review, vol. 38, 2003, pp. 547, 550-552 ; S. Douglas-Scott, “A Tale of Two Courts : Luxembourg, Strasbourg and the growing European Human Rights Acquis”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 43, 2006, p. 629 ; A. Rosas, “The European Court of Justice in Context : Forms and Patterns of Judicial Dialogue”, European Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 1, 2007, p. 9 ; R. Bustos Gisbert, “Tribunal de Justicia y Tribunal Europeo de Derechos Humanos : una relación de enriquecimiento mutuo en la construcción de un sistema europeo para la protección de los derechos”, in J. García Roca et P. A. Fernández Sánchez, Integración europea a través de Derechos Fundamentales : de un sistema binario a otro integrado, Madrid, CEPC, 2009 ; J. Callewaert, “The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law : a Long Way to Harmony”, European Human Rights Law Review, vol. 6, 2009, p. 768 ; C. Timmermans, “The Relationship between the European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights”, in A. Arnull et al. (eds.), A Constitutional Order of States ?, Oxford, Hart Publishing 2011. 2 Commission of the European Communities, Memorandum, Brussels, 4 April 1979 ; Commission of the European Communities, Communication on Community Accession to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and some of its Protocols, Brussels, 19 November 1990. 3 Among others, I. Canor, “Primus Inter Pares. Who is the Ultimate Guardian of Fundamental Rights in Europe ?”, E.L.Rev., vol. 25, 2000, p. 3 ; R. Harmsen, “National Responsibility for European Community Acts Under the European Convention on Human Rights : Recasting the Accession Debate”, European Public Law vol. 7, 2001, p. 625 ; H. C. Krüger and J. Polakiewicz, “Proposals for a Coherent Human Rights Protection System in Europe”, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 22, 2001, p. 1 ; L. I. Gordillo Pérez, “Un paso más hacia la estabilización de las relaciones interordinamentales en Europa : la incorporación de la UE al CEDH”, Revista Española de Derecho Europeo, vol. 38, 2011, p. 173. 4 O. De Schutter, “L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme : feuille de route de la négociation”, Rev. trim. dr. h., vol. 83, 2010, p. 541. 5 Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Bosphorus Airways v. Ireland, 30 June 2005, Appl. No. 45036/98. 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Matthews v. United Kingdom, 18 February 1999, Appl. No. 24833/94.

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Too many voices ? The prior involvement of the Court of Justice of the EU

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bourg might be indirectly reviewing primary or secondary EU law, without having jurisdiction to do so.7 Furthermore, individuals would be allowed to sue the EU before the ECtHR. Hence, accession would provide an external check for the action of EU institutions in light of Convention rights.8 Since more and more state powers in sensitive fields, such as the area of freedom, security, and justice, have been transferred to the EU, the EU should also be bound by the Convention.9 The Treaty of Lisbon has finally provided for the amendment that the CJEU Opinion 2/94 had requested. Article 6(2) TEU sets forth that the EU shall accede to the Convention. In turn, Protocol 14 has amended Article 59 ECHR to allow for the accession of the EU.10 The path towards accession has proven to be a bumpy road. Negotiations between the European Commission and the Council of Europe started in July 2010. A year later, a Draft accession agreement was reached and published alongside an Explanatory report.11 The extraordinary meeting held on 12-14 October 2011 revealed the lack of consensus among the EU member states. The representative of the European Commission stated that there was a need for further discussion within the EU.12 In June 2012, negotiations between the Steering Committee for Human Rights and the European Commission resumed in an ad hoc group (“47 + 1”). Eventually, at the Fifth negotiation meeting, in April 2013, an agreement was reached on the draft revised legal instruments for accession and the Final Report was published in June 2013.13 Among the most contentious issues one finds the “prior involvement” of the CJEU. Even before the negotiations started, the CJEU published a Discussion document14 in which this Court argued that for the sake of the principle of subsidiary inherent in the Convention and the proper functioning of the judicial system of the Union, 7

T. Lock, “The ECJ and the ECtHR : The Future Relationship between the Two European Courts”, The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals, vol. 8, 2009, pp. 375, 376-381. T. Lock, “EU Accession to the ECHR : Implications for the Judicial Review in Strasbourg”, E.L.Rev., vol. 35, 2010, pp. 777, 777-778. 9 J. P. Jacqué, “The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 48, 2011, pp. 995, 1001 ; S. Sanz Caballero, “Crónica de una adhesión anunciada : algunas notas sobre la negociación de la adhesión de la Unión Europea al Convenio Europeo de Derechos Humanos”, Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo, vol. 38, 2011, pp. 99, 125-126. 10 Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention, in force since 1 June 2010. 11 8th Working Meeting of the CDDH Informal Working Group on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights (CDDH-UE) with the European Commission, Draft legal instruments on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 19 July 2011 http://www. coe.int/t/dlapil/cahdi/source/Docs%202011/CDDH-UE_2011_16_final_enotepdf. 12 Steering Committee for Human Rights (CDDH), Report to the Committee of Ministers on the elaboration of legal instruments for the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 14 October 2011, http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/ CDDH_2011_009_enotepdf. 13 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports_enoteasp. 14 Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010 (hereinafter, CJEU Discussion document). 8

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Aida Torres Pérez

a mechanism must be available to ensure that the CJEU may carry out an internal review before the ECtHR carries out an external review of EU law. This claim was subsequently voiced by the Joint communication from Presidents J.P. Costa and V. Skouris, published after a meeting between both courts in January 2011.15 The Draft revised agreement on the accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter Draft accession agreement)16 has regulated the CJEU’s prior involvement in Article 3(6) : 17 In proceedings to which the European Union is a co-respondent, if the Court of Justice of the European Union has not yet assessed the compatibility with the rights at issue defined in the Convention or in the protocols to which the European Union has acceded of the provision of European Union law as under paragraph 2 of this article, sufficient time shall be afforded for the Court of Justice of the European Union to make such an assessment, and thereafter for the parties to make observations to the Court. The European Union shall ensure that such assessment is made quickly so that the proceedings before the Court are not unduly delayed. The provisions of this paragraph shall not affect the powers of the Court.

While the Draft explanatory report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter, Explanatory report) provides some clues about this mechanism, further uncertainties remain. The discussion about the CJEU’s prior involvement is not merely technical. Rather, this mechanism is intimately linked to the principles of autonomy, subsidiarity, and ultimately the role of Luxembourg vis-à-vis Strasbourg. In the following section, the reasons allegedly justifying the prior involvement of the CJEU will be critically analyzed. Next, several reasons to oppose this mechanism will be examined to conclude that it should be dropped. Finally, since this mechanism has now been agreed to as part of the package deal on accession, a constructive proposal that balances the EU and individual interests will be advanced.

Accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (24-1-2011) http://www.echr.coe.int/NR/rdonlyres/02164A4C-0B63-44C3-80C7-FC594EE16297/0/20 11Communication_CEDHCJUE_EN.pdf. 16 Fifth negotiation meeting between the CDDH ad hoc negotiation group and the European Commission on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Final report to the CDDH, Strasbourg, 10 June 2013. 17 Article 3 of the Draft accession agreement regulates the co-respondent mechanism, which is a new mechanism that allows the EU or the member states to join the proceedings before the ECtHR when a complaint is directed against, respectively, a member state or the EU, in the circumstances set out in the agreement. The CJEU’s prior involvement may only be activated when the EU participates in the proceedings as co-respondent.

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II. Reasons supporting the CJEU’s prior involvement The main grounds justifying the CJEU’s prior involvement are first the principle of autonomy of EU law, and second the principle of subsidiarity of the ECtHR.

A. The Autonomy of EU Law Protocol No. 8 Relating to Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union on the Accession of the Union to the European Convention on the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, sets forth that the agreement relating to the accession “shall make provision for preserving the specific characteristics of the Union and Union law” (Article 1). Even though Protocol No. 8 does not elaborate on those “specific characteristics”, the principle of autonomy is paramount in the EU legal order, and a limit to international agreements concluded by the EU.18 In the landmark case Costa v. ENEL,19 the CJEU grounded the supremacy of EU law on the autonomy of the EU legal order. The CJEU put forward a view of the EU legal order as separate from both international law and state legal orders. In particular with reference to international law, the CJEU upheld the autonomy of EU law in Opinion 1/91, regarding the first draft agreement on the European Economic Area (EEA).20 The notion of autonomy encompasses several dimensions.21 First, autonomy implies that the validity of EU law is not dependent on the rules of any other legal order (domestic or international). According to this notion, the validity of EU law depends solely on the Treaties, as interpreted by the CJEU. Second, interpretive autonomy means that “only the institutions of the particular legal order are competent to interpret the constitutional and legal rules of this order.”22 Thus, the interpretation of EU law corresponds to EU institutions, and ultimately to the CJEU. The prior involvement of the CJEU tends to be justified on the basis of these two notions of autonomy, which will be examined below.

T. Lock, “Walking on a Tightrope : The Draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order”, Common Market Law Review, vol. 48, 2011, p. 1025 ; X. Groussot et al., “EU Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights : a Legal Assessment of the Draft Accession Agreement of 14th October 2011”, European Issues, note 218, 2011, pp. 1, 2 ; Sanz Caballero, op. cit., note 9, p. 109. 19 Case C-6/64, Flaminio Costa v. ENEL, Judgment of 15 July 1964. 20 For an analysis of the external dimension of the principle of autonomy of the EU legal order, see Lock, op. cit., note 18, pp. 1028‑1032. 21 For the notions of original, derivative, and interpretive autonomy see T. Schilling, “The Autonomy of the Community Legal Order-An Analysis of Possible Foundations”, Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 37, 1996, pp. 389, 389-390. 22 Id., pp. 389‑390.

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The principle of autonomy also bans the modification of the EU Treaties by means different from the treaty amendment process.23 Actually, as we will see later on, this notion of autonomy might work against setting up a mechanism for the prior involvement of the CJEU through the accession agreement. Finally, the principle of autonomy implies that the allocation of powers between the EU and the Member States cannot be determined by any court outside the EU.24 The co-respondent mechanism, with all its complexities, partly aims at addressing this concern.25

1. The validity of EU law The CJEU has asserted that the validity of EU law is not dependent of any other legal order. Thus, the validity of secondary EU law can only be decided by reference to primary EU law. Moreover, the CJEU has exclusive jurisdiction to declare EU law invalid.26 Protocol No. 8 rules that the accession shall not affect the competences of the Union or the powers of its institutions (Art. 2). In this context, is the prior involvement of the CJEU necessary to preserve the autonomy of EU law ? After accession, the parameter to decide upon the validity of secondary EU law will still be primary EU law. Thus, the autonomy of the EU legal order as a self-referential system is preserved. With regard to the CJEU’s monopoly on declaring EU law invalid, the CJEU Discussion document argued that : “In order to preserve this characteristic of the Union’s system of judicial protection, the possibility must be avoided of the European Court of Human Rights being called on to decide on the conformity of an act of the Union with the Convention without the Court of Justice first having had an opportunity to give a definitive ruling on the point” (§ 9). Nonetheless, accession would not impinge upon the monopoly of the CJEU, since the ECtHR would not rule on the validity of EU law.27 Therefore, the prior involvement would not be warranted. The function of the ECtHR is to decide on the compatibility between EU law and the Convention. Indeed, Strasbourg lacks powers to declare EU law invalid.28 This is actually taken for granted in the Explanatory report.29 Likewise, the ECtHR does not rule on the validity of national law. In systems of centralized judicial review of legislation, constitutional courts enjoy the monopoly to declare domestic law invalid. The Strasbourg court does not replace constitutional 23

T. Lock, op. cit., note 18, p. 1032. Ibidem, note 7, pp. 781‑782. Ibidem, note 18, pp. 1038‑1045. 26 Case C-314/85, Foto-Frost v. Hauptzollamt Lübeck-Ost, Judgment of 22 October 1987. 27 As is admitted in CDDH-UE (2011)02, p. 3. 28 T. Lock, op. cit., note 8, p. 791. 29 Explanatory report, § 62 : “It should also be recalled that the Court in its judgments rules on whether there has been a violation of the Convention and not on the validity of an act of a High Contracting Party or of the legal provisions underlying the act or omission that was the subject of the complaint” (emphasis added). 24 25

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courts in this function. On occasion, depending on the domestic system, a case might reach Strasbourg without the state constitutional court having had the chance to rule on the validity of domestic legislation. The constitutional court’s monopoly on declaring domestic law invalid does not justify some sort of prior involvement. Admittedly, in practice, if Strasbourg declared a EU provision to be inconsistent with the Convention, that Court would be reviewing EU law, but it would be for EU authorities to decide how to enforce the judgment. In order to avoid future violations, legislative amendments might be warranted, but the ECtHR may not nullify or modify EU law. Thus, this review does not impinge upon the exclusive competence of the CJEU. The review of internal legislation in light of the Convention is inherent to an international human rights’ court monitoring system. In Opinion 1/91, the CJEU declared that the Treaties did not exclude the possibility of concluding an international agreement involving the subordination to a system of judicial control.30 More specifically, since Article 6(2) TEU mandates accession to the ECHR, Strasbourg’s review is already envisaged by the Treaties.31

2. Interpretive autonomy According to the principle of autonomy, an international court may not be given the power to issue binding interpretations of EU law.32 Interpretive autonomy derives from Article 19(1) TEU, which sets forth that the CJEU shall “ensure compliance with the law in the interpretation and application of the Treaties.”33 Also, Opinion 1/91 held that to confer jurisdiction on a court by means of international agreement to decide on the interpretation or application of the Treaties was incompatible with EU law (§ 35). Is the CJEU’s prior involvement required in order to secure the interpretive autonomy of EU law ? Accession to the Convention would not grant the Strasbourg court the power to issue binding interpretations of EU law and thus autonomy would not be undermined.34 Thus, the answer should be in the negative. Generally, domestic law is taken as a fact by the ECtHR. Strasbourg has reiterated that it is primarily for national authorities, and notably the courts, to interpret and apply domestic law.35 In particular, the ECtHR held that this applies also to international treaties.36 30

O. De Schutter, op. cit., note 4, p. 548. T. Lock, op. cit., note 18, pp. 1032‑1033. Id., 1028-1031 ; T. Lock, op. cit., note 7, pp. 389‑390. 33 J. P. Jacqué, op. cit., note 9, p. 1012. 34 T. Lock, op. cit., note 16, p. 1035. 35 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Chamber) Kruslin v. France, 24 April 1990, Appl. No. 11801/85, § 29 (final) ; Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Amann v. Switzerland, 16 February 2000, Appl. No. 27798/95, § 52. 36 Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Slivenko v. Latvia, 9 October 2003, Appl. No. 48321/99, § 105. 31 32

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At the same time, the ECtHR has argued that domestic courts need to interpret and apply the provisions of national law in the spirit of Convention rights. Failure to do so might amount to a violation of the Convention.37 Also, in order to determine whether an interference with a Convention right was “provided by law”, the Court will examine the “quality” of legislation, i.e. whether the law was accessible and forseeable.38 Strasbourg might reach a different conclusion from domestic courts.39 In sum, in order to assess the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention, the ECtHR will rely on the interpretation given by domestic courts. The ECtHR might reach the conclusion that the domestic interpretation is not consistent with the Convention, but the ECtHR would not replace domestic courts in their function of giving meaning to domestic law. In the same way, the ECtHR will rely on the interpretation of EU law given by the CJEU in order to assess its compatibility with the Convention. The controversial situation arises when the CJEU did not have a chance to interpret EU law before the case reaches Strasbourg. There might be doubts as to the meaning of EU law, and in this context the preliminary reference would not be available. Still, even if the CJEU did not intervene in this specific case, it might be that the CJEU had the chance to interpret the EU law provision at stake in the past. Also, since the prior involvement may only be activated when the EU participates in the proceedings as a co-respondent, the Commission could also contribute to give meaning to EU law. In any event, the ECtHR would not acquire the power to issue binding interpretations of EU law, but only to declare whether EU law is compatible with the Convention.

B. The Subsidiarity of the European Court of Human Rights Pursuant to article 35(1) ECHR, applicants need to exhaust domestic remedies before submitting a complaint to Strasbourg. The subsidiary nature of the ECtHR is premised upon the understanding that the first and utmost responsibility for rights protection lies in the states. Thus, state authorities need to be given the opportunity to resolve alleged violations of fundamental rights domestically. Arguably, the CJEU’s prior involvement would ensure the same opportunity for this Court.

37 Eur. Ct. H.R. (3rd sect.), Storck v. Germany, 16 June 2005, Appl. No. 61603/00, §§ 93-99 (final since 16 September 2005). 38 Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Amann v. Switzerland, 16 February 2000, Appl. No. 27798/95, § 55. 39 See the discussion in O. De Schutter, op. cit., note 4, pp. 551‑553.

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The Joint communication distinguishes two situations : direct actions against EU law and actions against state acts implementing EU law. The mechanism for the prior involvement would only be activated regarding the latter. EU acts in breach of fundamental rights should be challenged before EU courts by means of the existing actions. If an EU act allegedly infringed fundamental rights, individuals may bring an action of annulment before the General Court (Article 263(4) TFEU). In case of acts not addressed to them, individuals would need to show “direct and individual concern”, which has been interpreted quite restrictively by the CJEU. In particular, “individual concern” is taken to mean that an act affects the applicants “by reason of certain attributes which are peculiar to them or by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons.”40 After Lisbon, the “individual concern”, which has always been the major obstacle for individual applicants, has been dropped regarding “regulatory acts” that “do not entail implementing measures”. Apparently, the impact of this amendment regarding individual access is rather insignificant.41 In theory, to exhaust judicial remedies, the individual should submit an action of annulment before the General Court, and in its case an appeal before the CJEU. Yet, is the action of annulment an “effective remedy” that needs to be exhausted when the “individual concern” is dubious ? 42 According to the ECtHR case law, there is no need to make use of remedies that are not effective. Furthermore, the question might arise as to whether the EU violates the Convention given the lack of an effective remedy for the violation of fundamental rights (Articles 6 and 13 ECHR).43 In any event, if the action of annulment were dismissed given the lack of “direct and individual concern”, or the applicant succeeded in proving that the action of annulment is not an “effective remedy” that needs to be exhausted, the case would reach the ECtHR without a prior internal review by the CJEU. In this situation, the mechanism for the CJEU’s prior involvement would not be available, since the EU would not have the status of co-respondent. The Joint communication assumes that regarding direct actions there will always be a prior assessment by the CJEU, but this might not be the case. This is not to argue that the prior involvement mechanism should be extended to this kind of situation. It is within the domain of the EU legal order to provide 40

Case C-25/62, Plaumann & Co v. Commission of the European Economic Community, Judgment of 15 July 1963 ; Case C-309/89, Codorniu SA v. Council of Ministers of the European Communities, Judgment of 18 May 1994. In a decision of inadmissibility, the General Court has defined “regulatory acts” as acts of general application of a non-legislative nature, see Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami et al. v. Parliament and Council, Judgment of 6 September 2011, §§ 45-46. 42 N. O’Meara, “A More Secure Europe of Rights ?” The European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and EU Accession to the ECHR”, German Law Journal, vol. 12, 2011, p. 1813. 43 Sanz Caballero, op. cit., note 9, p. 115. 41

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for an effective remedy by relaxing the strained conditions allowing for individual standing. The point here is that the same reasoning could be applied to indirect actions, which will be examined next. Since the actions of the EU and the member states are closely intertwined, individuals may challenge state acts implementing EU law for violating fundamental rights. Note that there is no judicial action available for individuals before EU courts against state authorities. Thus, the action will need to be brought before domestic courts, even if the violation is triggered by obligations under EU law. In case of doubt about the interpretation or validity of EU law, domestic courts may (or must) make a reference before the CJEU. If the preliminary reference were not made, after exhausting domestic judicial remedies, individuals could reach Strasbourg without Luxembourg having had the chance to rule on the validity of the EU law provisions at stake. It is for this kind of situation that the prior involvement is set up and only when the EU has the status of co-respondent.44 The Joint communication already admitted that the preliminary reference cannot be regarded as a legal remedy to be exhausted by the applicant,45 and this is confirmed in the Explanatory report.46 Individuals have no way of compelling domestic courts to make a reference.47 At the same time, the Joint communication declared that “in order that the principle of subsidiarity may be respected…a procedure should be put in place” to “ensure that the CJEU may carry out an internal review before the ECtHR carries out external review.” Is the prior involvement required to preserve the principle of subsidiarity in this situation ? The domestic remedies within the state would have already been exhausted. The EU would participate in the process as a co-respondent and the co-respondent position implies that the applicant does not need to exhaust internal remedies with regard to that party.48 Thus, the principle of subsidiarity does not even apply in this situation. If the co-respondent were a member state, domestic remedies would not need to be exhausted within the state, and no prior involvement for domestic highest courts is envisaged. The principle of subsidiarity might be understood here in a broad sense.49 Given the sui generis structure of the EU, in which member states implement EU law, but there is no “federal court system”, arguably, the CJEU should have a chance to resolve the violation of fundamental rights by EU law, as domestic courts have.50

Explanatory report, § 66. Joint communication § 2. Explanatory report, § 65. 47 T. Lock, op. cit., note 8, p. 791. 48 G. Gaja, “The Co-Respondent Mechanisms according to the Draft Agreement for the Accession of the EU to the ECHR”, http://www.esil-sedi.eu/node/266. 49 The Explanatory report indicates that this mechanism is “inspired” by the principle of subsidiarity, § 66. 50 CJEU Discussion document, §§ 5-6. 45 46

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The EU, however, also enjoys a sui generis mechanism : the preliminary reference. Courts of last instance have the obligation to make a reference if there are doubts about the validity or interpretation of EU law, except for the application of the CILFIT doctrine. If they failed to make a reference, instead of setting up a new and complex mechanism once the case reaches the ECtHR, the remedy should be sought within the EU legal order.51 In the end, one should remember that domestic judges are also European judges.

III. Reasons to oppose the CJEU’s prior involvement In the previous section we have argued that the CJEU’s prior involvement is not required neither by the autonomy of EU law, nor by the subsidiarity of the ECtHR. Below, we will examine the reasons to oppose this mechanism from a technical, individual, and political perspective.

A. Technical complexities From a technical standpoint, this mechanism raises many uncertainties. The Draft accession agreement does not provide a full regulation, and the Explanatory report hardly adds any clues to understand it. The scarce regulation is partly due to avoid interfering with the EU procedural autonomy. As argued above, the principle of autonomy excludes a de facto amendment of the Treaties by way of an international agreement.52 Several proposals as to how this mechanism should be regulated have been advanced.53 The two main possibilities are : a preliminary reference from Strasbourg to Luxembourg or a new procedural mechanism allowing the CJEU to make a prior ruling. Scholars have tended to support the latter.54 The Explanatory report to the Draft agreement seems to confirm this option, but there are still many questions to be answered. i. Who would be the actors entitled to bring the case before Luxembourg ? Several options have been advanced : the Commission ; 55 the Commission and Member States ;56 or more broadly the Commission, the European Parliament, the Council and the Member States.57

J. P. Jacqué, op. cit., note 9, p. 1010. T. Lock, op. cit., note 18, p. 1048. CDDH-UE (2011)02. 54 T. Lock, op. cit., note 8, p. 793 ; Timmermans, op. cit., note 1, p. 159. 55 CJEU Judge Timmermans at the hearing organized by the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs, 18 March 2010, § 9 ; T. Lock, op. cit., note 18, p. 1049. 56 Commission Working document, DS 1930/10, Brussels, 10 January 2011, § 6. 57 Timmermans, op. cit., note 1, p. 159. 52 53

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ii. Would the CJEU’s intervention be compulsory ? Jacqué has indicated that according to the wording of Article 3(6) Draft accession agreement, it seems that once the Union is recognized as a co-respondent, “the reference to Luxembourg would be de jure if the Court of Justice has not intervened earlier in the case.”58 However, there are reasons to think that the prior involvement should not be automatic in cases in which the CJEU did not intervene. On the one hand, it might be that preliminary reference was not made in that specific case, but that the CJEU had already decided in the past about the validity of the EU law provision at stake in light of fundamental rights. Thus, although the CJEU did not intervene in the specific case, this Court already had the chance to assess the compatibility with fundamental rights. On the other hand, it might be that a preliminary reference was made, but for reasons different from the compatibility with fundamental rights. Or maybe the CJEU decided on the basis of specific Charter rights, but afterwards other rights are invoked before Strasbourg.59 Thus, although the CJEU already intervened, the prior involvement could be justified. iii. What would be the procedure before the CJEU ? As suggested, to avoid creating a new procedure, which would require a treaty amendment, the action of annulment could provide an avenue to assess the validity of EU law in light of fundamental rights (Article 263(2) TFEU). However, several obstacles have been pointed out. The annulment action has a strict time limit of two months after the challenged provision has been enacted.60 Also, Article 3(6) Draft accession agreement ensures the participation of the parties involved before the CJEU, and the Explanatory report explicitly mentions the individual applicant.61 The parties before Strasbourg, however, would not automatically become parties in the annulment action before the CJEU. Still, they could participate as interveners pursuant to Article 40 Statute of the CJEU. This article allows the intervention in procedures before the CJEU to member states, EU institutions, and any other person who can establish an interest in the result of a case submitted to the Court. Nonetheless, according to Article 40, “an application to intervene shall be limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the parties.” Thus, the possibility for individual applicants to defend their own interests as interveners would be very much limited. In addition, according to Appendix II (Draft declaration by the EU to be made at the time of signature of the Accession Agreement) to the Final Report to the CDDH,62 the EU will ensure that non-EU member states are entitled to submit statements 58

J. P. Jacqué, op. cit., note 9, p. 1021. Groussot, op. cit., note 18, p. 15. T. Lock, op. cit., note 18, pp. 1050‑1051. 61 Explanatory report, § 66. 62 http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Accession/Meeting_reports/47_1(2013)008rev2_EN.pdf. 59 60

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of case or written observations to the CJEU under the same conditions as the member states in a procedure under Article 267 TFEU. This declaration adds a further difficulty, since non-EU member states may not intervene in the annulment action. Furthermore, the reference to the preliminary ruling procedure only adds to the hybrid nature of the prior involvement mechanism. iv. What would be the function of the CJEU ? The prior involvement gives the CJEU the chance to assess the “compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of the provision of EU law” at stake. In the meeting held in September 2012, at the initiative of the EU, a new clause was added in order to clarify the function of the CJEU : “Assessing the compatibility shall mean to rule on the validity of a legal provision contained in acts of the European Union institutions, bodies, offices or agencies, or on the interpretation of a provision of the Treaty on European Union, the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union or of any other provision having the same legal value pursuant to those instruments.” According to the Meeting report, the representative of the EU explained that this clarification was necessary “since the CJEU could only invalidate EU secondary law, but not EU primary law which it could only interpret.”63 Indeed, this is obvious. What is awkward is the possibility of activating this mechanism with regard to primary law, since the CJEU may not assess its compatibility with human rights. In this way, the prior involvement gets closer to the logic of the preliminary reference. Eventually, this clause has been rightly eliminated from Article 3(6) in the revised agreement. Instead, a clarification has been added to the Explanatory report,64 so that the hybrid nature of the prior involvement -an instrument to assess the validity of secondary EU law or to interpret EU primary law- is confirmed. v. What would be the consequences of the CJEU’s prior involvement for the process before the ECtHR ? According to the Explanatory report, the prior involvement of the CJEU will not affect the powers and jurisdiction of the Strasbourg court and the latter will not be bound by the assessment of the former. One can imagine two scenarios : First, the EU law provision at stake is declared to be consistent with fundamental rights. Since this decision is not compulsory for the ECtHR, the case should continue before Strasbourg. Indeed, the ECtHR might conclude that the EU act is not consistent with the Convention. This outcome would expose the divergence regarding the interpretation of parallel rights and the direct confrontation 63

Second negotiation meeting between the CDDH ad hoc negotiation group and the European Commission on the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights, Strasbourg, 19 September 2012, 47+1(2012)R02, § 10. 64 Explanatory report, § 65.

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between these courts. The divergence could be the consequence of an interpretation falling below the minimum set by Strasbourg, or a different way to strike the balance between different conflicting rights. Second, the EU provision at stake is declared null and void for violating fundamental rights. Then, should the case continue before Strasbourg ? The judgment of the ECtHR should not be disposed of. Even if the EU law provision has already been struck down, the Strasbourg court could decide to grant just satisfaction. On the other hand, it might be that Luxembourg granted better protection that Strasbourg, and thus the Strasbourg court could declare that the Convention had not been breached.

B. Individual interests From the perspective of individual applicants, does the CJEU’s prior involvement further or hinder the interest in the protection of fundamental rights ? For an individual who has managed to file a complaint before the ECtHR, after several years of judicial proceedings before state courts, the referral of the case to the CJEU would further delay the expected decision by Strasbourg. Also, more time will imply greater expense. This concern is acknowledged by Article 3(6) Draft Agreement, as it rules that the EU shall ensure that the CJEU’s assessment shall be made quickly to avoid undue delays. The Explanatory report adds that an accelerated procedure before the CJEU is already available, which might last around 6-8 months.65 As mentioned before, the possibility for individuals to make observations before the CJEU will need to be ensured. The Commission working document insisted on the need for the applicant to be allowed to participate in the procedure before the CJEU for the sake of the equality of arms.66 Indeed, the Explanatory report indicates that the applicant “will be given the possibility to obtain legal aid.” In any event, the need to defend the case before yet another court, which is not a human rights’ court, amounts to an extra-burden for the individual.67 Since the Convention is a system ordained to the protection of individual rights, the accession of the EU should not worsen the position of individual applicants.

Explanatory report, § 66. § 10. L. F.M. Besselink, “The Protection of Fundamental Rights Post-Lisbonote The Interaction between the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and National Constitutions”, FIDE 2012, 39, http://www.fide2012.eu/index.php?doc_id=94. 66 67

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C. Judicial politics and preferential treatment The CJEU’s prior involvement has been forcefully advanced by this Court in the CJEU’s Discussion document and the Joint communication, which reveals the CJEU’s resistance to lose relative power and be put under the authority of Strasbourg. This mechanism would imply granting the CJEU a privileged position in comparison to domestic constitutional or supreme courts.68 On occasions, and particularly in those systems in which an individual complaint before the constitutional court does not exist, such as in Italy, the constitutional court might not have the chance to decide on the compatibility of domestic legislation and fundamental rights. Furthermore, if a Member State decided to participate as a co-respondent in an action directed against the EU, no domestic court would be given the opportunity to assess the compatibility of national legislation with convention rights. The general principle guiding the negotiation process is that the EU should be treated in the same way as other contracting parties, as long as the “specific characteristics” of the Union are preserved. Is there any legitimate reason that would justify a different treatment ? As argued before, the autonomy of EU law would not justify the prior involvement of the CJEU, neither would the subsidiarity principle. If the CJEU were circumvented as a consequence of the failure of domestic courts to make a reference, the solution should not be sought in the process before the ECtHR, but within the EU legal framework.69 Indeed, some states have introduced legislative amendments to allow for domestic courts to examine the compatibility between domestic legislation and Convention rights before the case reaches Strasbourg, such as the United Kingdom with the 1998 Human Rights Act.70 Thus, regarding EU law, the solution should also be sought internally, instead of creating a complex procedure before the ECtHR. Over time, a fruitful dialogue between Luxembourg and Strasbourg has developed, as is acknowledged by Declaration (no 2) on Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union. And yet, now that the ECtHR is given the last word to set a minimum floor of protection, the CJEU claims to have a “first word” when EU law is at stake. The CJEU’s prior involvement, however, might bring too many voices to the fore and lead to undesired results. The prior involvement would increase the risk of collision between Luxembourg and Strasbourg. In case of divergent interpreta68

G. Gaja, “Accession to the ECHR”, in A. Biondi, P. Eeckhout and S. Ripley (eds.) EU Law After Lisbon, Oxford, OUP, 2012 ; De Schutter, op. cit., note 4, pp. 564‑565 ; Groussot, op. cit., note 18, p. 16 ; Besselink, op. cit., note 68, p. 39. 69 J. P. Jacqué, op. cit., note 9, p. 1010. 70 Monica Claes emphasized this argument during the discussion held in the Workshop on “The EU Accession to the ECHR” (Brussels, 16-17 November 2012).

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tions, this mechanism would create open confrontation between the two courts. What is worse, the fact that the CJEU is given a “first word”, might condition the subsequent decision by Strasbourg and hinder a robust review.71 To conclude, the CJEU’s prior involvement is not justified on the basis of the principles of autonomy or subsidiarity. The prior involvement is an overly complex, time-consuming procedure that gives an unjustified privileged position to the CJEU. Hence, it is contended that it should be dropped.

IV. Coming to terms with the CJEU’s prior involvement Since the CJEU’s prior involvement seemed to be non-negotiable, at least from the perspective of the EU, this section will be devoted to drafting a proposal to mitigate the foregoing shortcomings in search for a balance between the interests of the EU and individual protection. In the context of a judicial system for the protection of human rights, the main justification for this mechanism should be to contribute to the effective protection of individuals by striking down EU legal provisions incompatible with fundamental rights and clarifying the allocation of responsibilities between the EU and the member states. First, it is contended that the initiative to bring the case before the CJEU should be given to any of the parties before Strasbourg : the Commission, as the institution representing the EU, respondent states, and individual applicants. Since it has been argued that this mechanism should be abandoned, it might seem contradictory to broaden the range of actors that may activate it. However, once this is set up, it should not be limited to the Commission. Indeed, the Commission might not be willing to activate a mechanism for reviewing legislation previously introduced by the Commission itself.72 The respondent state might argue that the alleged violation was triggered by the obligation to comply with EU law and that no discretion was left for implementing it, such as in Bosphorus. Since this is an issue related to the allocation of powers and responsibilities between the EU and the member states, the prior decision by the CJEU could facilitate the enforcement of a potential condemnatory decision by Strasbourg. Also, individual applicants might be interested in obtaining a prior decision by the CJEU. When the EU participates in the proceedings as a co-respondent, the 71

O’Meara, op. cit., note 42, p. 1828. T. Lock, op. cit., note 8, p. 793.

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ECtHR may jointly condemn the EU and the respondent state. Enforcement could be further delayed, if there were disagreements as to who should pay the compensation, or whether the violation was triggered by obligations under EU law. The CJEU’s prior involvement would allow this court, in its case, to strike down the EU law provision at stake. This would make it easier for the individual to ask for individual measures before the state, such as the reopening of judicial procedures. In general, the prior intervention of the CJEU could help to indicate the allocation of responsibilities between the EU and the Member States. Second, the activation of this mechanism should not be compulsory. There is no need to engage with yet another process if none of the parties believes that the CJEU’s decision would be beneficial for the case before the ECtHR. As Timmermans argued, this mechanism should be reserved “to cases where a serious question of conventionality arises.”73 Moreover, the ECtHR’s approval should be necessary to activate this mechanism in order to avoid an abusive use by the Commission or the member states to delay proceedings. For instance, if the CJEU already decided in the past about the interpretation or validity of the EU provision at stake, the prior involvement would not be required. Indeed, pursuant to Article 3(6), the CJEU shall be given the chance to assess EU law if the CJEU “has not yet assessed the compatibility with the Convention rights at issue of the provision of European Union law.” Also, according to what was argued above, this mechanism is not justified to secure the interpretive autonomy of EU law or the CJEU’s monopoly to review EU law. In addition, a case should not be referred when it is clear that there is margin of action for the member states, such as in M.S.S v. Belgium and Greece.74 Admittedly, this kind of assessment might risk interfering with the allocation of responsibilities between the EU and the member states. Thus, the referral may only be refused if it were clear that the member states had discretion in implementing EU law. In any event, the EU would have the chance to defend EU law before the ECtHR, since the EU would participate in the proceedings as co-respondent. In the end, in case of violation of the Convention, according to the revised accession agreement, the ECtHR shall declare the respondent and co-respondent jointly responsible for the violation, “unless the Court, on the basis of the reasons given by the respondent and the co-respondent, and having sought the views of the applicant, decides that only one of them be held responsible.”75 Third, to avoid a treaty amendment, the potentiality of the annulment action should be exploited. The time limit might not be an insurmountable obstacle if 73

C. Timmermans, op. cit., note 1, p. 159 ; T. Lock, op. cit., note 18, argued that the Commission could perform a “filter functionote” Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09. 75 Article 3(7) Draft accession agreement. 74

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it can be argued that the nature and function of the procedure before the CJEU would not change. In addition, according to this proposal, individuals should also be given the possibility to activate the prior involvement. Thus, they would confront the “direct and individual concern” requirement. The CJEU might relax this condition when the action originated in a case before the ECtHR. Actually, it could be argued that the applicants are individually concerned “by reason of circumstances in which they are differentiated from all other persons”, i.e., the process before the ECtHR. Lastly, as to the consequences of the prior involvement, regardless of the outcome of the process before the CJEU, individuals should not be deprived from obtaining a decision by Strasbourg. If the CJEU found no violation, the ECtHR could reach a different outcome. And even if the CJEU declared the EU law provision null and void, the ECtHR should still decide whether just satisfaction needed to be granted. At the same time, in order to avoid activating the prior involvement, greater pressure should be put on domestic courts to make the preliminary reference in cases in which fundamental rights are involved.76 The CJEU could be more rigorous and strengthen the obligation for courts of last instance to make a reference when the individual alleges the breach of fundamental rights.77 The entry into force of the Charter could be an argument to justify the need to refer questions to the CJEU regarding fundamental rights. Also, the ECtHR might strengthen current case law according to which the arbitrary refusal to make a preliminary reference might infringe Article 6(1) ECHR.78 It has been suggested that, as a condition of admissibility, at least individuals should have asked domestic courts to make a reference.79 Nonetheless, individuals should not be burdened with the consequences of the failure to comply with an obligation that corresponds to courts of last instance. Yet, if they did not request the preliminary reference, individual applicants could not activate the CJEU’s prior involvement later on. In this way, a better balance of the different interests at stake would be reached. At the end, the CJEU’s prior involvement should not have the effect of undermining the position of individuals before the ECtHR.

O’Meara, op. cit., note 42, pp. 1830‑1832 ; Sanz Caballero, op. cit., note 9, p. 119. J. P. Jacqué, op. cit., note 9, p. 1019. O. De Schutter, op. cit., note 4, p. 566. 79 O. De Schutter, op. cit., note 4, p. 566 ; T. Lock, op. cit., note 8, p. 792. 77 78

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V. Concluding remarks The Lisbon Treaty encapsulated the political consensus regarding the accession of the EU to the ECHR. The negotiation process, however, has revealed the reluctance of the EU to be placed under the authority of Strasbourg. In any event, accession would not introduce a hierarchical relationship between the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts, as this does not exist between Strasbourg and constitutional or supreme courts.80 Strasbourg will set the minimum floor of rights’ protection for the states and the EU. Still, the CJEU aims at preserving the chance to have a prior say when EU law is at stake. While the prior involvement involves technical complexities, underlying this mechanism one founds deeper concerns about the autonomy of EU law and the role of the CJEU within the multilevel system of rights protection in Europe. Despite the specific characteristics of the EU legal order, the prior involvement cannot be justified on the basis of the principles of autonomy or subsidiarity. A judicial monitoring system at the international level necessarily implies reviewing the action of EU authorities. The ECtHR, however, would not decide about the validity or binding interpretation of EU law. The preliminary reference already gives the CJEU the possibility to assess EU provisions in light of fundamental rights. The domestic courts’ failure to use this mechanism should not burden individuals before the ECtHR. Furthermore, there are reasons to oppose the CJEU’s prior involvement on the basis of technical complexities, the extra-burden for individuals, and the unjustified privileged treatment given to the CJEU. Until now, a fruitful dialogue between Strasbourg and Luxembourg has developed. Convention and EU rights partly overlap in their scope of application to the states. In this context, dialogue has been a suitable avenue to search for common understandings regarding the interpretation of fundamental rights. The CJEU’s prior involvement, however, might force dialogue too much. While dialogue has proven to be a useful tool for the interaction between Strasbourg and Luxembourg, the abuse of it could be exhausting and lead to undesired results. Since it is very unlikely that this mechanism will be abandoned, a constructive proposal has been advanced to strike a better balance among the different interests at stake with the aim of enhancing individual protection. Aida Torres Pérez Professor of Constitutional Law at Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona) e‑mail : aida.torres@upf.edu 80

Sanz Caballero, op. cit., note 9, p. 109.

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Abstract

Résumé

n its 2005 Bosphorus Airways judgment, the European Court of Human Rights established a presumption of compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of measures adopted by the States Parties to the Convention under the control of the Court of Justice of the European Union, when they act in accordance with the requirements of EU law. This article examines the future of the Bosphorus doctrine following the accession of the EU to the ECHR. Maintaining the doctrine in its current form would lead to recognize to one Party to the Convention, the EU, a privileged position, in comparison to the other Parties to the Convention. This, the article notes, would be justified neither legally nor politically. However, if it is not abandoned, a generalization of the Bosphorus doctrine accompanied by its transformation could lead to redefine the relationships between the European Court of Human Rights and the Parties to the Convention. It may lead the Court to shift the focus of its control from the current focus on the outcomes reached to a focus on compliance with cer-

ans son arrêt Bosphorus Airways de 2005, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a établi une présomption de compatibilité avec la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme des mesures adoptées par les États parties à la Convention sous le contrôle de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, lorsque ces mesures sont prises en exécution d’obligations découlant du droit de l’Union européenne. Cette étude examine l’avenir de la doctrine Bosphorus à la suite de l’adhésion de l’UE à la CEDH. Le maintien de cette doctrine sous sa forme actuelle conduirait à reconnaître à une des Parties à la Convention, l’Union européenne, une position privilégiée, par rapport à toutes les autres Parties. Ceci ne serait pas justifié du point de vue juridique, et serait politiquement contestable. Cependant, à défaut de son abandon pur et simple, une généralisation de la doctrine de Bosphorus accompagnée de sa transformation pourrait contribuer à redéfinir les rapports entre la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et les Parties à la Convention. Elle pourrait amener la Cour à faire porter son contrôle

The author would like to thank the participants in the Workshop on “The EU Accession to the ECHR” held in Brussels on 16-17 November 2012 for their illuminating comments and discussions. He is grateful in particular to Andrew Drzemczewski, Bruno de Witte, Robert Harmsen, Giorgio Gaja, Christos Rozakis, Christiaan Timmermans, and to the organizers of the conference Vicky Kosta, Nikos Skoutaris, and Vassilis Tzevelekos. The usual disclaimer applies.

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tain procedural conditions. This would lead to a clearer division of labour between the European Court (clarifying the normative standards) and the domestic courts (applying these standards to specific factual settings). And, if combined with a requirement imposed on national authorities that they provide a justification for the restrictions they impose on human rights based on the best practices that emerge from a comparison across all Parties to the Convention, it may in fact strengthen the architecture of the European system of human rights protection.

sur les conditions procédurales à travers lesquelles les mesures querellées ont été adoptées, plutôt que sur les résultats de ces mesures. Elle pourrait aussi clarifier la répartition des tâches entre la Cour (chargée de développer les standards normatifs) et les juridictions internes (chargées d’appliquer ces standards à des contextes factuels spécifiques). Enfin, une doctrine Bosphorus revue, si elle se combine avec une exigence imposée aux autorités nationales qu’elles justifient les restrictions amenées aux droits fondamentaux au regard des meilleures pratiques que ferait apparaître un examen comparatif des solutions adoptées par les autres Parties à la Convention, pourrait renforcer l’architecture du système européen de protection des droits de l’homme.

I. Introduction

n the 2005 “Bosphorus Airways” case,2 the European Court of Human Rights innovated. It shaped a doctrine expressing its trust in the fact that the EU guarantees a level of protection of fundamental rights equivalent to what the European Convention on Human Rights provides itself, and that it, the Court, could therefore presume that any measure adopted by an EU member State in fulfilment of its obligations under EU law, under the supervision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, is compatible with the Convention’s requirements unless a “manifest deficiency” is apparent. At the time it was developed, the doctrine was well suited to the need to organize the coexistence of two jurisdictions, the European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice, both ensuring respect for Convention rights, but without hierarchical link or coordination between one another. This paper argues that there shall be no argument to justify the survival of the doctrine in its current form following the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, as this would unduly establish the European Union in a privileged position vis-à-vis the other Parties to the Convention. But if it is to die in its current incarnation, the Bosphorus Airways presumption-of-compliance doctrine may resuscitate in an expanded and different guise. Reborn and generalized, it may guide the future relationships between the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts of the Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. This would transform such relationships from their current hier-

Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi v. Ireland, judgment of 30 June 2005, Appl. No. 45036/98 (hereafter referred to as “Bosphorus Airways judgment”).

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archical and vertical mode, to a more dialogical and horizontal mode. In this new understanding, in order to deserve the trust they claim for themselves, domestic courts shall be expected to provide a solidly argued reasoning for the outcomes that they reach, that takes into account the framework set in the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights. According to this model, the conclusions domestic courts reach may differ from those that the European Court of Human Rights would have arrived at itself – that is left open. But the reason why they are to be trusted in reaching such outcomes is because of the tools they use in doing so, meeting a burden of justification that is defined by the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights. The paper proceeds in three parts. The following part briefly recalls the circumstances in which the Bosphorus Airways doctrine emerged, as well as its content. Part III then explores three scenarios following the accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights. In scenario 1, the doctrine is simply abandoned : the European Union comes to be treated as any other Party to the Convention is currently treated, without being granted any privileged position. In scenario 2 on the contrary, the current statu quo is maintained : the Bosphorus Airways doctrine survives, and may even guide the European Court of Human Rights not only in its assessment of measures adopted by the EU member States in fulfilment of their obligations under EU law, but also in its assessment of measures adopted by the EU’s institutions, that currently are beyond its jurisdiction. I argue that scenario 1 is not realistic, and that scenario 2, though perhaps likely, is not desirable. The preferred scenario is scenario 3, in which the Bosphorus presumption of compatibility, under certain conditions that it would be for the European Court of Human Rights to define, extends to all Parties to the Convention that apply directly the Convention rights, with the interpretation authoritatively given to those rights by the that Court. The paper briefly discusses the significance of the transformation in the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts that such an approach would entail. The shift that would occur under that scenario would not mean that the level of scrutiny exercised by the European Court of Human Rights on States parties would be lowered. Rather, the nature of its scrutiny would be transformed : it would be procedural, more than substantive ; focused on the means through which protection of Convention rights is ensured at domestic level, rather than on the outcome in each individual case ; and result in a horizontal and dialogical type of relationship between the European Court and national courts, rather than a vertical and hierarchical relationship. Part IV describes what this “second life” of the Bosphorus doctrine would look like, and how it could in fact strengthen the architecture of the European system of human rights protection. Part V offers a brief conclusion.

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II. The Bosphorus Airways doctrine The European Court of Human Rights has always sought not to obstruct the establishment of international organisations or other forms of international cooperation by the States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, while at the same time ensuring that the progress of such cooperation does not result in States evading their obligations under the Convention. The need for a compromise between these two potentially conflicting objectives is at the heart of the Bosphorus Airways line of case-law. The Convention, the Court has consistently held, “does not exclude the transfer of competences to international organizations provided that Convention rights continue to be ‘secured’. Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer”.3 In order to ensure that human rights continue to be secured even as international organizations are attributed larger competences in areas that might affect the enjoyment of human rights, the Court had to develop a doctrine that would accommodate both the need to allow certain transfers of powers, including transfers through which the member States of the organization renounce any possibility to veto decisions adopted by that organization,4 and the need to ensure that they do not thereby “circumvent” their pre-existing human rights obligations.5 In order to do so, the Court proposed to provide a reading of the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights that could accommodate other obligations States may have incurred by joining an international organization.6 It announced that it would presume the compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of acts adopted by States in fulfilment of the obligations imposed on them as members of an international organization, to the extent that these acts may be adequately reviewed for their 3

Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Matthews v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, Appl. No. 24833/94, § 32. One author has proposed to distinguish on that basis between “transfers of powers” and mere “delegation of powers” : see D. Sarooshi, International Organizations and their exercise of sovereign powers (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005), chapter 5, sect. II, pp. 58‑64. For instance, “the World Health Organization, the Universal Postal Union, and the International Civil Aviation Organization are given powers such that an organ of the organization can adopt binding regulations by majority decision, but in such cases the Member States have an express right to contract out of, or make reservations to, the application of a specific regulation to them, usually before it enters into force” (p. 59 ; reference is made for these examples to A. Chayes and A. Chayes, The New Sovereignty : Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements, Cambridge, Mass, Harvard University Press 1995, pp. 226‑227). In such cases of “delegation of powers”, the risk of pre-existing human rights obligations being circumvented by the State joining an international organization is non-existent : that State always retains a right not to have to comply with a decision, adopted within the organization, that would conflict with such pre-existing obligations. Unfortunately that distinction is not very useful : at best, it provides a terminology to identify with precision the nature of the problem. 5 The notion of “circumvention” is of course borrowed from the final version of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, adopted by the International Law Commission at its sixty-thrid session in 2011, and presented to the sixty-sixth session of the General Assembly (A/66/10, para. 87). According to Article 61 of the Draft Articles, titled ‘Circumvention of international obligations of a State member of an international organization’ : “A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence is relation to the subject-matter of one of the State’s international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation”. The General Assembly commended the ILC for having completed its work on this topic (Res. 66/98, “Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its sixtythird session”, para. 4). 6 The Court has sought to read the Convention, to the fullest extent possible, in the light of any relevant rules and principles of international law applicable in relations between the Contracting Parties, in conformity with Article 31, § 3, (c), of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 23 May 1969 : see Eur. Ct. H.R., Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 21 November 2001, Appl. No. 35763/97, § 55. 4

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compatibility with fundamental rights in the system set up within that organization itself. That, in essence, is the doctrine established in the 2005 ‘Bosphorus Airways’ case (see Box 1), where the Court announced that : State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations [deriving from commitments of a State party to the Convention under a treaty concluded subsequently to their accession to the Convention] is justified as long as the relevant organization [set up by such subsequent treaty] is considered to protect fundamental rights, as regards both the substantive guarantees offered and the mechanisms controlling their observance, in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides (…). By “equivalent” the Court means “comparable” : any requirement that the organization’s protection be ‘identical’ could run counter to the interest of international co-operation pursued.7

Box 1. The background of the Bosphorus Airways doctrine The Bosphorus Airways case concerned the impounding on an aircraft that had landed in Ireland for maintenance works on 17 May 1993. The aircraft was the property of the Yugoslav Airlines (JAT), the national airline of the former Yugoslavia (at the time the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)), which had been leased by a company incorporated in Turkey, Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm. The measure, which led to the aircraft being immobilized in Ireland, was decided in implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 820 (1993) of 17 April 1993, adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The resolution provided that States should impound, inter alia, all aircraft in their territories ‘in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating’ from the FRY. That Resolution had been implemented by EC Regulation 990/93 which entered into force on 28 April 1993 (O.J. L 102/14 (1993)), and implemented in turn in Ireland by the European Communities (Prohibition of Trade with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)) Regulations 1993 (SI 144 of 1993). In a judgment of 30 July 1996 delivered in answer to a referral from the Irish Supreme Court, the European Court of Justice confirmed that Article 8 of EC Regulation 990/93 applied to the aircraft concerned and that the impounding did not violate the fundamental rights of the applicant company. The European Court of Justice took the view, in particular, that the restriction to the right to property of the company was proportionate to the fulfilment of “an

Bosphorus Airways judgment, § 155.

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objective of general interest (…) fundamental for the international community, which consists in putting an end to the state of war in the region and to the massive violations of human rights and humanitarian international law in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina” (Case C-84/95, Bosphorus v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others, [1996] ECR I-3953 (para. 26)). Ireland therefore could assert before the European Court of Human Rights that « the Government considered that Ireland acted out of obligation and that the EC and the UN provided [a protection of fundamental rights equivalent to that provided by the European Convention on Human Rights]. [Ireland] argued that it had complied with mandatory obligations derived from UNSC Resolution 820 (1993) and EC Regulation No. 990/93. As a matter of EC law, a regulation left no room for the independent exercise of discretion by the State. […] The ECJ later conclusively confirmed the applicability of Article 8 of EC Regulation 990/93 and, thereby, the lawful basis for the impoundment. Even if the jurisdiction of the ECJ in a reference case could be considered limited, the ECJ authoritatively resolved the present domestic action. Thereafter for the State to look behind the ECJ ruling, even with a view to its Convention compliance, would be contrary to its obligation of “loyal co-operation” (Article 5, now Article 10, of the EC Treaty – paragraph 82 above) and would undermine the special judicial co-operation between the national court and the ECJ envisaged by Article 177 (now Article 234) of the EC Treaty” (Bosphorus Airways judgment, § 110). Under the Bosphorus Airways doctrine, the measures adopted by a State that implements obligations it is imposed as a member of an international organization it joined after acceding to the European Convention on Human Rights will be presumed compatible with the Convention, if human rights are protected, in the said organization, in a way that can be considered ‘equivalent’ to their guarantee under the Convention : “If such equivalent protection is considered to be provided by the organization, the presumption will be that a State has not departed from the requirements of the Convention when it does no more than implement legal obligations flowing from its membership of the organization”8 – that is, when the State is deprived of any margin of appreciation in the implementation of those obligations. Such a presumption may not be absolute, however. The Court reiterates its view according to which “absolving Contracting States completely from their Convention responsibility in the areas covered by such a transfer would be incompatible with the purpose and object of the Convention : the guarantees of the Convention could be limited or excluded at will, thereby depriving it of its peremptory 8

Bosphorus Airways judgment, § 156.

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character and undermining the practical and effective nature of its safeguards”. It follows not only that the State “is considered to retain Convention liability in respect of treaty commitments subsequent to the entry into force of the Convention”,9 but also that the presumption of compatibility as defined above “can be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. In such cases, the interest of international co-operation would be outweighed by the Convention’s role as a ‘constitutional instrument of European public order’ in the field of human rights”.10 In essence, the Bosphorus Airways doctrine transforms the obligations of the States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, when they transfer certain powers to an international organization, into a due diligence obligation to ensure that Convention rights shall be protected through mechanisms internal to that organization.11 The doctrine is enunciated in general terms by the Court, and it is therefore not necessarily limited to the European Union.12 But it did emerge in a highly specific context : one in which a number of States parties bound by the European Convention on Human Rights decided to establish the European Communities, now absorbed by the European Union, joining a new “legal order” within which a judicial control of compliance with fundamental rights has emerged since the late 1960s.13 Indeed, the approach of the Court clearly was inspired by the attitude of the German Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) towards what was then European Community law. Only after it surmounted its initial hesitations and was convinced that fundamental rights are adequately protected in the legal order of the Community did the German Federal Constitutional Court agree to recognize the supremacy of European Community law, without a scrutiny of its compatibility with the fundamental rights protected under the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz).14 9

Bosphorus Airways judgment, § 154. Bosphorus Airways judgment, § 156. See J. Callewaert, “The European Convention on Human Rights and European Union Law : a Long Way to Harmony”, European Human Rights Law Review, no 6, 2009, p. 768, ici pp. 771‑774. 12 See, for instance, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2nd sect.), Gasparini v. Italy and Belgium, Appl. No. 10750/03, decision (inadmissibility) of 12 May 2009 (where the Court describes its role as being to “determine whether, when they joined the NATO and transferred to it certain sovereign powers, the defending States could have, in good faith, consider that the mechanism for the adjudication of employment disputes internal to the NATO was not in flagrant contradiction with the provisions of the Convention” (author’s translation ; the case exists only in French)). 13 Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419 ; Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle Getreide [1970] ECR 1125 ; Case 4/73, Nold v. Commission, [1974] ECR 491. The Court recognizes not only that the EU institutions are bound to comply with fundamental rights, but in addition that the EU Member States may invoke the need to protect fundamental rights as general principles of law even where this may lead them to derogate from their obligations under EU Law (see, e.g., Case C-368/95, Familiapress, [1997] ECR I-3689 (para. 24) ; Case C-112/00, Schmidberger, [2003] ECR I-5659 (para. 81)). This is crucial, since it renders unlikely, if not impossible, a situation where a State might have to forego its human rights obligations in order to comply with its obligations under EU law. 14 This case-law has been developing in different phases, to which judgments adopted respectively in 1974 (‘Solange I’) (BverfGE 37, 271 (280)), 1987 (‘Solange II’)(BverfGE 73, 339 (379)), 1993 (the ‘Maastricht’ decision) (BverfGE 89, 155 (174)) and 2000 (concerning the market organization for bananas)(2 BvL 1/97, EuGRZ 2000, p. 328 (333)) correspond. The development of this case-law has been abundantly commented upon ; I will therefore be excused for not describing it in detail. The main lesson is that, after initially reserving the right to review secondary EC law against the requirements of the fundamental rights of the German Basic Law, the German Federal Constitutional Court decided in its ‘Solange II’ decision of 1987 that it would abstain from doing so “[s]o long as the European Communities, and in particular in the case law of the European Court, generally ensure an effective protection of fundamental rights as against the sovereign powers of the Communities which is to be regarded substantially similar to the protection of fundamental rights required unconditionally by the Constitution, and in so far as they 10 11

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Nor is this cooptation of the “Solange-in-reverse” doctrine of the German Federal Constitutional Court by the supervisory bodies of the European Convention on Human Rights unprecedented. It is already that attitude of the Bundesverfassungsgericht which had led the European Commission of Human Rights, in 1990 – at the instigation of Henry Schermers and Hans-Christian Krüger, respectively one of its Members and its Secretary –, to develop the doctrine of an ‘equivalent protection’, according to which the monitoring bodies set up by the European Convention on Human Rights should not control acts adopted by States parties as Member States of the European Community in fulfillment of their Community obligations insofar as the legal order of the Community provides for its own system of protection of fundamental rights which can be considered to be generally satisfactory.15 This doctrine has also been relied upon in later cases by the European Court of Human Rights, even before its spectacular reaffirmation in Bosphorus Airways. Most notably, it appears at least implicitly in two judgments the Court delivered on 18 February 1999 where it considered that the application by the German courts of the rule on immunity of jurisdiction of the European Space Agency does not constitute a violation of Article 6, § 1, of the Convention, which guarantees in principle a right of access to a court. Indeed, the Court considered there that, insofar as it corresponds to a long-standing practice established in the interest of generally safeguard the essential content of fundamental rights” ((‘Solange II’)(BverfGE 73, 339 (379)), par. 48). The Bundesverfassungsgericht appeared to be reassured by the development of a case-law of the European Court of Justice ensuring that fundamental rights will be protected within the legal order of the European Union at a level substantially equivalent to that provided by the German Basic Law – this case-law being itself an answer to the doubts raised by certain national constitutional courts about the compatibility of the doctrine of supremacy of EC Law with the protection of fundamental rights under national constitutions –. Consistent with this presumption of compatibility of EU law with the requirements of fundamental rights, the German Federal Constitutional Court now announced that it would henceforth agree to review the compatibility of EU law with those requirements only in situations where the applicant brings forward elements demonstrating that the general level of protection of fundamental rights – beyond the specific case concerned – has not been maintained at the level at which it was found by the Bundesverfassungsgericht to be satisfactory in its ‘Solange II’ decision of 22 April 1987 : constitutional complaints that do not provide evidence of such a gap in fundamental rights protection within the EU legal order shall be inadmissible. See on these developments, inter alia, J. Limbach, “La coopération des juridictions dans la future architecture européenne des droits fondamentaux. Contribution à la redéfinition des rapports entre la Cour constitutionnelle fédérale allemande, la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes et la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme”, R.U.D.H., no 12, 2000, pp. 369‑372. 15 Eur. Comm. HR, M. & Co v. Germany, Appl. No. 13258/87, decision of 9 February 1990, Decisions and Reports, vol. 64, p. 138. The European Commission on Human Rights explicitly states that “the transfer of powers to an international organisation is not incompatible with the Convention provided that within that organisation fundamental rights will receive an equivalent protection” ; noting that the institutions of the European Communities pledged to uphold fundamental rights, most notably in their Joint Declaration of 5 April 1977, and that “the Court of Justice of the European Communities has developed a case-law according to which it is called upon to control Community acts on the basis of fundamental rights, including those enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights”, it concludes that the application by M & Co., a company fined for violation of antitrust rules and which complained that the procedure followed for the imposition of the fine had not complied with its rights of defence, was incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention. The Commission added that, in reaching that conclusion, it “has also taken into consideration that it would be contrary to the very idea of transferring powers to an international organisation to hold the member States responsible for examining, in each individual case before issuing a writ of execution for a judgment of the European Court of Justice, whether Article 6 of the Convention was respected in the underlying proceedings”. In their joint concurring opinion to the 2005 Bosphorus Hava judgment, judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebelsky and Garlicki consider that “the Court clearly acknowledges its jurisdiction to review the compatibility with the Convention of a domestic measure adopted on the basis of a European Community Regulation and, in so doing, departs from the decision given in M. & Co. v. the Federal Republic of Germany by the European Commission of Human Rights”. But this is playing on words : in substance, Bosphorus in fact replicates the very démarche inaugurated in M. & Co. by the European Commission on Human Rights. See also, inter alia, Eur. Comm. HR, Heinz v. the Contracting Parties also parties to the European Patent Convention, Appl. No. 21090/92, decision of 10 January 1994, Decisions and Reports, vol. 76-A, p. 125.

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the good working of international organizations and fits within a “trend towards extending and strengthening international cooperation in all domains of modern society”,16 applying a rule on immunity of jurisdiction of international organizations is permissible under the Convention, insofar as “the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the Convention”.17 It thus recognized that the setting up of remedies within the internal structures of the European Space Agency could ensure compatibility with the requirements of Article 6, § 1, of the Convention, although the immunity of jurisdiction of the ESA implied that it could not be sued before the domestic courts of Germany. The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights leading to the Bosphorus Airways judgment seeks to ensure that the Convention will not constitute an obstacle to further European integration by the creation among the Member States of the Union of a supranational organization – a development which, as the representatives of the European Commission argued in their submissions to the Court in that case, would be seriously impeded if the Member States were obliged to verify the compatibility with the European Convention on Human Rights of the acts of Union law before agreeing to apply them, even in situations where they have no discretion to exercise at the implementation level. But the Court stops short of stating that, as the Member States have transferred certain powers to a supranational organization, the European Union, their international responsibility could not be engaged for situations resulting directly from the application of European Community acts. The Convention remains applicable to such situations, and the States parties remain fully answerable to the supervisory bodies it sets up. But the nature of the inquiry of the European Court of Human Rights will be quite decisively influenced by the circumstance that the alleged violation has its source in the application of an act adopted within the European Union. The Court considers that, insofar as the legal order of the European Union ensures an adequate level of protection of fundamental rights, and unless it is confronted with a “dysfunction of the mechanisms of control of the observance of Convention rights” or with a “manifest deficiency”,18 it may be allowed to presume that, by complying with the legal obligations under this legal order, the EU Member States are not violating their obligations under the ECHR. But this raises two concerns. First, it will be noted that the Court considers that a protection may be ‘equivalent’ to that provided by the European Convention on Human Rights although it remains internal to the international organization concerned. But, however adequate the remedies available to individuals within the European Union legal order may be when they complain about violations of

Eur. Ct. H.R., Beer and Regan v. Germany, judgment of 18 February 1999, Appl. No. 28934/95, § 53 ; Eur. Ct. H.R., Waite and Kennedy, judgment of 18 February 1999, Appl. No. 26083/94, § 63. Both judgments were decided by a unanimous Court. 17 Beer and Regan v. Germany judgment, cited above, § 58 ; Waite and Kennedy judgment, cited above, § 73. 18 Bosphorus Airways judgment, § 166.

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their fundamental rights,19 this in effect obliterates the added value that a form of judicial control external to the legal order concerned might represent. This assimilation of both forms of monitoring, respectively internal and external to the legal order concerned, may not be justified. Indeed, it is doubtful whether this approach is compatible with the general international law of human rights, where it is traditionally emphasized that the object and purpose of international human rights treaties is not only to impose substantive obligations on the States parties, but also to submit them to monitoring mechanisms ensuring a collective enforcement of these obligations.20 That was the concern expressed by six judges of the European Court of Human Rights in the Bosphorus Airways case. While expressing their agreement with the operative part of the judgment, these judges filed a joint concurring opinion in which they questioned whether the protection of fundamental rights in the EU legal order could truly be said to be “equivalent” to that provided by the European Court of Human Rights under a full review, since “it remains the case that the Union has not yet acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights and that full protection does not yet exist at European level”.21 A second deficiency of the doctrine developed by the European Court of Human Rights in Bosphorus Airways is that it allows for the possibility that a member State of an international organization will not be considered responsible for a violation of its international obligations, even where that State has transferred powers to an international organization which the organization then exercises by adopting measures which would constitute a violation of the international obligations if they had been adopted by the member State itself. It will be sufficient for a State, in order to avoid being found internationally liable, to show that it has been taken by surprise : if the said violation could not have been reasonably anticipated, the mere fact that competences have been attributed to the international organization in a domain in which the State had accepted certain international obligations cannot, by itself, trigger the international responsibility of that State.22 In other words, the obligation to ensure, when an international 19

Obviously, the Bosphorus Airways doctrine would not apply where there are no remedies available to the aggrieved individual because the the EU’s judicature, for instance, where the alleged violation results from the adoption of a legislative act (see, for this restrictive understanding of the conditions of admissibility of direct actions for annulment under Art. 263 al. 4, TFEU, General Court, Case T-18/10, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami and Others v. Parliament and Council, judgment of 6 September 2011, para. 56 ; at the time of writing, an appeal is still pending before the Court of Justice of the EU (Case C-583/11 P), however AG J. Kokott supports the interpretation of the General Court in her opinion delivered on 17 January 2013), or concerns an area over which the Court of Justice lacks jurisdiction : see O. De Schutter, “L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme : feuille de route de la négociation”, Rev. trim. dr. h., July 2010, pp. 535‑571. 20 For instance, the Human Rights Committee states that the object and purpose of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is not only to “create legally binding standards for human rights by defining certain civil and political rights and placing them in a framework of obligations which are legally binding for those States which ratify”, but also “to provide an efficacious supervisory machinery for the obligations undertaken” (Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 24 : Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 4 November 1994 (CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6)). 21 Joint concurring opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebalsky, and Garlicki, to the Bosphorus Hava judgment of 30 June 2005. 22 Article 61 of the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations (“Circumvention of international obligations of a State member of an international organization”) provides that “A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State’s international obligations,

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organization is established, that it will not exercise its competences in a way which would result in violations of the international obligations of States if the measures adopted were attributable to them, is not an obligation of result : it is, to borrow from a distinction familiar in tort liability law, a mere obligation of means. What is required from the State is that it has acted with due diligence, making the transfer of powers to the international organization conditional upon human rights being secured within that organization, by the adoption of measures reasonably well suited to achieve that end. In order for a State to escape international responsibility, it is therefore enough that it has sought to ensure that the international organization will not exercise its powers in violation with the international obligations of that State, even if it appears retrospectively that, in fact, the precautions taken were not sufficient. Of crucial importance, the liability of the State will thus be limited whether or not the State has reserved the right to veto the decision within the internal decision-making procedures of the organization, or to block the implementation of the decision.23 Is this satisfactory ? The Bosphorus Airways doctrine was articulated by the European Court of Human Rights only following a long and searching examination of the level of protection of human rights achieved within the legal order of the European Union, and only after it was reassured that the European Court of Justice was faithfully applying the Convention, taking into account the case law of the European Court of Human Rights in its interpretation of the requirements of fundamental rights.24 Indeed, the Court distinguishes the Bosphorus Airways situation from Pellegrini v. Italy – where Italy was found to have violated it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation” (para. 1). The commentary to Draft Article 61 makes it clear that a State will not be considered responsible if it transferred powers to the international organization in good faith, without being able to anticipate that such powers might lead to the commission of acts that, if they were the State’s own, would engage its responsibiity (“International responsibility will not arise when the act of the international organization, which would constitute a breach of an international obligation if done by the State, has to be regarded as the unintended result of the member State’s conduct”) (International Law Commission, Commentary to the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, adopted by the ILC at its 3118th meeting on 5 August 2011 and included in the Report of the ILC to the 66th session of the General Assembly (and in the Yearbook of the ILC, 2011, vol. II, part 2)). This is relevant, since the ILC cites as authority the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in the Waite and Kennedy and Bosphorus Airways cases. 23 In the terms suggested by Sarooshi, the presumption established by the Bosphorus Airways doctrine applies both where powers are delegated to the international organization, while the State retains the possibility to “contract out” any particular decision adopted by the organization or to refuse to take part in the implementation of the decision, and where powers are transferred, the State agreeing to be bound by particular decisions of the organization even against its will. The attribution of powers to the EU belongs of course to the second category : although the EU Member States may invoke the need to protect fundamental rights as general principles of law even where this may lead them to derogate from their obligations under EU Law, the invocation of this exception remains placed under the ultimate supervision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, which in that sense retains the final word. See, for a detailed discussion of these issues of State responsibility, O. De Schutter, “Human Rights and the Rise of International Organisations : The Logic of Sliding Scales in the Law of International Responsibility”, in J. Wouters et al. (eds), Accountability for Human Rights Violations by International Organisations, Intersentia, Antwerp-Oxford-Portland, 2010, pp. 51‑129. 24 Currently, the European Court of Justice, just like any supreme or constitutional court of the States parties to the Convention, applies the Convention taking into account its interpretation by the European Court of Human Rights. For example, see among many others Case C-249/96, Grant [1998] ECR I-621 ; Case C-185/95, Baustahlgewebe [1998] ECR I-8417 ; Connolly, Case C-274/99 [2001] ECR I-1611, and Karner, Case C-71/02, judgment of 25 March 2004. For a further elaboration, see O. De Schutter, “L’influence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes”, in G. Cohen-Jonathan and J.‑Fr. Flauss (dir.), Le rayonnement international de la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant-Nemesis, 2005, pp. 189‑242.

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the right to a fair trial guaranteed in Article 6, § 1, of the Convention for having enforced a judgment delivered by the Vatican courts in violation of the rights of defence of the applicant25 – on the basis that ‘enforcement of a judgment not of a Contracting Party to the Convention [as was the case in Pellegrini26] (…) is not comparable to compliance with a legal obligation emanating from an international organization to which Contracting Parties have transferred part of their sovereignty’.27 The implied suggestion is that, when States parties to the European Convention on Human Rights co-operate with one another, or implement decisions of international organizations offering an equivalent level of protection of human rights, they may subject the acts of the other States or emanating from such international organizations to only minimal review ; instead, where they cooperate with States not parties to the European Convention on Human Rights, or when they implement secondary legislation adopted within international organizations not offering a protection of human rights at a level similar to that guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights, there could be no presumption that the measures adopted in the framework of such co-operation comply with the requirements of the Convention, and a strict scrutiny of such compliance therefore would be required. Though certainly not immune from critique, the Bosphorus doctrine played a useful role in defining the modalities of the cooperation between the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European Court of Human Rights. The Court of Justice is tasked with preserving fundamental rights in the EU legal order : as long as it does so, upholding the Convention rights taking into account the interpretation given to those rights by the European Court of Human Rights, its findings shall be trusted ; only where “manifest deficiencies” appear – or, of course, where the Court of Justice has not been able to exercise its control – shall such findings be questioned. At times, the presumption does appear to enlarge the margin of appreciation of the Court of Justice, which seems to be recognized a freedom to adapt the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights to the specific exigencies of EU law, beyond what would be tolerated from even the highest domestic courts.28 But it also has a disciplining function : in 25

Eur. Ct. H.R. (4th sect.), Pellegrini v. Italy, judgment of 20 July 2001, Appl. No. 30882/96, § 40. The Holy See is not a Contracting Party to the European Convention on Human Rights. 27 Bosphorus Airways judgment, cited above, § 157. 28 The Kokkelvisserij case illustrates this. The applicant association complained under Article 6, § 1, of the Convention that its right to adversarial proceedings had been breached as a result of the refusal of the ECJ to allow it to respond to the Opinion of the Advocate General, in violation, allegedly, of the interpretation by the European Court of the Human Rights of that provision (see especially Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Kress v. France, judgment of 7 June 2001, Appl. No. 39594/98, § 76, where the Court concluded that Article 6, § 1, ECHR had not been violated by the practice of the Conseil d’État, the highest administrative court in France, of allowing the Government Commissioner to deliver his submissions after the oral proceedings are closed, only because “the parties may reply to the Government Commissioner’s submissions by means of a memorandum for the deliberations, a practice which – and this is vital in the Court’s view – helps to ensure compliance with the adversarial principle”). By a majority vote, the European Court of Human Rights dismissed the application as manifestly ill-founded. It recalled that the presumption established under Bosphorus “applies not only to actions taken by a Contracting Party but also to the procedures followed within such an international organisation and hence to the procedures of the ECJ”, and reiterated in that regard that “such protection need not be identical to that provided by Article 6 of the Convention ; the presumption can be rebutted only if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient” ; it then noted that “the procedure before the ECJ was accompanied by guarantees which ensured equivalent protection of the applicant’s rights”, giving particular weight to the possibility of the ECJ “to 26

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order to deserve this trust, the European Court of Justice must be irreproachable, and it is likely that it has been a particularly diligent student of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, not despite of, but rather because of, the division of labour established by the Bosphorus doctrine.

III. The future of the Bosphorus Airways doctrine : three post-accession scenarios Shall the Bosphorus Airways doctrine survive the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights ? It shall continue to apply, in principle, to international organizations other than the EU, which some States parties to the Convention have joined. With respect to those organizations, the Court in the future will continue to distinguish, as it currently does, between (i) the acts adopted by the international organization itself, for which the member States incur no responsibility and which, as the organization is not a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Court of Human Rights considers to fall outside its jurisdiction ratione personae;29 and (ii) the acts adopted by the States parties to the Convention, particularly as they establish the international organization or transfer certain powers to be exercised by the organization : such acts remain subject to the supervision of the European Court of Human Rights, which shall examine, in particular, whether in establishing the organization, the States concerned have been acting “in good faith”, or instead have “circumvented” their preexisting international obligations. The more delicate question however, is whether the Bosphorus doctrine shall continue to apply for the benefit of the European Union itself, once the EU shall have acceded to the European Convention on Human Rights. In theory, three scenarios are possible. order the reopening of the oral procedure after the Advocate General has read out his or her Opinion, if it finds it necessary to do so”, and that “a request for reopening submitted by one of the parties to the procedure is considered on its merits”. The Court concluded that it “cannot find that the applicant association has shown that the protection afforded to it was “manifestly deficient” because it did not have an opportunity to respond to the Opinion of the Advocate General” ; the association “has therefore failed to rebut the presumption that the procedure before the ECJ provided equivalent protection of its rights” (Eur. Ct. H.R. (3rd sect.), Cooperatieve Producentenorganisatie van de Nederlandse Kokkelvisserij UA v. The Netherlands, dec. of 20 January 2009, Appl. No. 13645/05). 29 See, e.g., Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th sect.), Boivin v. France and Belgium, and 32 other member States of the Council of Europe, dec. of 9 September 2008, Appl. No. 73250/01 (inadmissibility of an application filed against the States parties to the 1960 International Convention relating to Co-operation for the Safety of Air Navigation establishing Eurocontrol, for a decision of that organisation validated by the Administrative Tribunal of the International Labour Organisation) ; or, for an example concerning the EU, Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th sect.), Connolly v. 15 Member States of the European Union, dec. of 9 December 2008, Appl. no. 73274/01 (challenging a decision by the European Commission imposing a disciplinary sanction on the applicant, a public servant with the Commission) ; Eur. Ct. H.R. (2nd sect.), Gasparini v. Italy and Belgium, Appl. No. 10750/03, decision (inadmissibility) of 12 May 2009, cited above ; Eur. Ct. H.R., Galić v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 22617/07, dec. (inadmissibility) of 9 June 2009 ; Eur. Ct. H.R., Blagojević v. The Netherlands, Appl. No. 49032/07, dec. (inadmissibility) of 9 June 2009 ; Eur. Ct. H.R., Beygo v. 46 Member States of the Council of Europe, Appl. No. 36099/06, decision (inadmissibility) of 16 June 2009 ; and comp. with Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th sect.), Chapman v. Belgium, Appl. No. 39619/06, decision (inadmissible) of 5 March 2013 (where the domestic courts of the defending State had applied the doctrine of immunity of jurisdiction in a case concerning an employee of the NATO). We return to this situation below, when exploring the second “post-accession” scenario : see text corresponding to notes 44-47.

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Scenario 1 : the EU loses its privileged position A first possibility is that the presumption established by Bosphorus shall be abandoned. After all, the presumption aimed to ensure a harmonious coexistence between the requirements imposed under EU law and the requirements imposed under the European Convention on Human Rights, in a context in which the former was not subordinated to the latter : the doctrine therefore appeared necessary in order to avoid a situation where the EU member State concerned would be imposed inconsistent international obligations. Following the EU’s accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, this justification shall lose much of its weight : since the EU shall have become a party to the ECHR, any inconsistency between the obligations following for the EU member States from their membership in the Union and the requirements of the Convention shall have to be resolved in favor of the latter, and there should be in principle no reason to grant the EU a treatment more favorable than that granted to any other Party to the Convention. The first scenario is therefore one of normalisation : though with some minor institutional adjustments, the EU will simply appear as one more Party to the Convention – the forty-eighth –, without any difference in the nature of the supervision exercised.30 Under this scenario, in a situation such as that presented in Matthews or Bosphorus Hava, it will be the European Union itself, not the EU Member State implementing EU law by adopting measures that are the immediate cause of the violation, that will in fact have to adopt the measures required to avoid the repetition of such a violation.31 The European Union will be approached by the European Court of Human Rights as any other party to the Convention : the acts adopted by the Union would be subject to the same level of scrutiny than the acts adopted by any other Party to the European Convention on Human Rights.32 Since the sole purpose of the doctrine of ‘equivalent protection’ – requiring that a lower level of scrutiny be applied – is to facilitate the compliance by States with commitments 30

Paul Mahoney has sought to defend the current, pre-accession, deference to the assessments made by the Court of Justice of the European Union, as one that should be maintained post-accession, by asserting : “The general rationale underlying the Strasbourg Court’s approach in the Bosphorus case will continue even after accession by the EU to the ECHR, since the EU, as an international organisation, will not lose its specificity in relation to the ECHR Contracting States and so will never be in a position where it can be assimilated, purely and simply, to a Contracting State. … The EU pursues a general aim broadly comparable to that assigned to the ECHR by the Council of Europe, namely to create a European, supranational “space” governed by political democracy and the rule of law. By reason of those parallel supranational tasks, there exists a certain overlapping of competence vis-à-vis the States between the EU and the ECHR, which in itself creates a relationship different from that between the ECHR and the States. This different relationship must have some incidence on the nature of the external control that the Strasbourg Court will be called on to exercise over the legal acts of the EU after the latter’s accession to the ECHR” (P. Mahoney, “From Strasbourg to Luxembourg and Back : Speculating about Human Rights Protection in the European Union after the Treaty of Lisbon”, Human Rights Law Journal, vol. 31, no 2-6, 2011, p. 73, at p. 79). This is a heroic (and of course, well-informed) attempt, but it remains at the level of a petitio principii : it is guided, more by the unmatched experience of the author within both European jurisdictions, and his understanding of the nature of the relationships that have been established between them over the years, than by legal argument. 31 Although the determination of which Party to the ECHR shall have to adopt measures to put an end to the violation shall be determined within the legal order of the European Union itself, and not by the European Court of Human Rights. 32 The only difference between how the European Court of Human Rights will approach the EU and how it will adjudicate claims against other Parties to the Convention would result from the division of competences between the Union and the Member States. But this is of course a division that the European Court of Human Rights may conveniently ignore, as the co-respondent mechanism allows it to arrive at a finding of joint responsibility.

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they have made in the context of a supranational organisation such as the EC/EU, without setting aside their responsibilities under the Convention, there would be no reason either to extend that privilege to the Union itself, nor even to maintain that privilege for the benefit of the member States following accession.33 Though plausible in theory, this scenario is not very likely in practice. It would certainly not seem to be the expectation of the Court of Justice of the European Union. Indeed, soon after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon finally providing an indisputable legal basis for the accession of the EU to the ECHR, the Court of Justice insisted on the need to ensure that it should be provided an opportunity to intervene, prior to the European Court of Human Rights having to decide whether a particular application of EU law is in violation of the Convention, in order to allow it to pronounce itself on any alleged incompatibility with the Convention, where such decision concerns the application or implementation of EU law.34 The motives animating the Court of Justice can be discerned if we recall the two arguments it puts forward in favor of its position.35 The Court first refers to the principle of subsidiarity, according to which “it is for the States which have ratified the Convention to guarantee that the rights enshrined in the Convention are observed at national level and for the European Court of Human Rights to verify that those States have in fact complied with their commitments. It is thus primarily for the national authorities and the national courts to prevent or, in default of prevention, examine and penalise breaches of the Convention”.36 The Court of Justice draws the consequence that “the Union must make sure, as regards acts of the Union which are susceptible to being the subject of applications to the European Court of Human Rights, that external review by the Convention institutions can be preceded by effective internal review by the courts of the Member States and/or of the Union”.37 However, this does not follow. The principle of subsidiarity does not require any particular mode of judicial review, in the legal order concerned, of the measures alleged to violate the ECHR. At most, it expresses a preference for any violations to be remedied at domestic level, so that the intervention of the international supervisory mech33

It is clear that this is the sole reason for the development by the European Court of Human Rights of the doctrine of “equivalent protection”. This is consistent with the approach of the Court, which is to read the requirements of the Convention within the broader framework of public international law, and to seek, to the fullest extent possible, to avoid imposing on States conflicting international obligations (see for instance at para. 148 of the Bosphorus Hava judgment : “The Court has also long recognised the growing importance of international co-operation and of the consequent need to secure the proper functioning of international organisations (…). Such considerations are critical for a supranational organisation such as the EC. This Court has accordingly accepted that compliance with EC law by a Contracting Party constitutes a legitimate general interest objective within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (…)”). Such a rationale disappears once the European Union itself will have become a Party to the Convention. No risk of the EU Member States being faced with conflicting international obligations will then exist, since Union law itself will have to comply with the Convention, not out of its own volition, but as a matter of international law. 34 Discussion document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Luxembourg, 5 May 2010. 35 For a more detailed critique, see O. De Schutter, “L’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme : feuille de route de la négociation”, Rev. trim. dr. h., July 2010, pp. 535‑571. 36 May 2010 Discussion document, para. 6. 37 Ibid., para. 7.

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anism should be limited to the (in principle exceptional) circumstances when such remedies have failed to effectively protect the victim. But it remains for each Party to decide how the Convention rights shall be guaranteed, by organizing a system of effective remedies. As the Court of Justice itself acknowledges in its May 2010 Discussion document, “the system established by the Convention does not lay down, as a condition of admissibility of an application to the European Court of Human Rights, that in every case a court of supreme jurisdiction must first have been asked to rule on the alleged violation of fundamental rights by the act in question”.38 It may be desirable to ensure that the Court of Justice of the European Union shall have the possibility to review any act adopted by the EU member States in the scope of application of EU law before the European Court of Human Rights assesses whether the said act results in a violation of Convention rights. This is not, however, a requirement under the European Convention on Human Rights. Nor is this a requirement under EU law. Here also, the argument of the Court of Justice of the European Union – its second argument – fails. It is well-established – and it follows from the principle of uniform application of EU law across the EU – that national courts of the EU member States cannot themselves declare an act of the EU to be invalid : that is an exclusive prerogative of the Court of Justice of the European Union.39 According to the Court, it would follow that “[t]o maintain uniformity in the application of European Union law and to guarantee the necessary coherence of the Union’s system of judicial protection, [and because] it is […] for the Court of Justice alone, in an appropriate case, to declare an act of the Union invalid”, “the possibility must be avoided of the European Court of Human Rights being called on to decide on the conformity of an act of the Union with the Convention without the Court of Justice first having had an opportunity to give a definitive ruling on the point”.40 This argument too is unconvincing. It attributes to the European Court of Human Rights powers it does not have. When that Court finds a particular measure to be in violation of the Convention rights, it may declare so in the operational part of its judgment. But the European Court of Human Rights is not a constitutional court or a court of cassation : it remains to the State party which has been found to be in violation of the Convention to decide, in accordance with its own, domestic constitutional procedures, how to comply with the said judgment. It is therefore to the State authorities to adopt the measures the judgment may call for – for instance, to disapply a particular legislative provision, to amend or to annul it, to interpret in a way that shall reconcile its operation with the requirements of the Convention, or to modify certain policies that have been found to be inconsistent with such requirements. The European Convention on Human Rights does impose on the Contracting Parties that they execute the judgments delivered in the cases 38

Ibid., para. 11. Case 314/85, Foto-Frost [1987] ECR 4199. May 2010 Discussion document, paras. 8-9.

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that they are parties to ; it is up to them however, to decide by which means these judgments shall be complied with, under the supervision of the Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers. To use a distinction now out of fashion in international law : theirs is an obligation of result, not an obligation of conduct. Consider the example of an EU regulation, applied by the national authorities of an EU member State in circumstances that allegedly result in a violation of Convention rights, leading the victim of the alleged violation to challenge the said measure before the domestic courts, and finally – after these courts have denied the claim – to file an application before the European Court of Human Rights. The EU regulation would remain in place even following a final judgment by that Court that it has been applied in violation of the Convention. Of course, in accordance with Article 46 of the Convention, such a judgment will require the member State concerned, or the EU as its co-defendant, to adopt measures that execute the judgment. But that is not to say that the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights is self-executing : in particular, it is neither required under the ECHR, nor allowed under EU law, for the domestic courts of the member State concerned (nor indeed for those of any other State) to strike down or disapply the contested regulation at their own motion. Implementation problems may occur, particularly where the EU measure at stake must be amended in order to comply with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, which may require the consent of EU member States to which the judgment was not addressed and may be reluctant to reopen a compromise solution negotiated within the Council : this is illustrated by the problems the United Kingdom faced when it had to implement the 1999 judgment delivered in the case of Matthews, concerning the organization of elections for the European Parliament in Gibraltar (see Box 2). But such problems may occur precisely because the judgment of the Strasbourg court is not self-executing, and instead leaves entirely in place the contested EU regulation.

Box 2. The execution of the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights finding a violation in the implementation of EU law When the European Court of Human Rights arrives at the conclusion that the Convention has been violated, the State party against which the application has been filed may find it difficult to comply with that judgment, although it has a legal obligation to do so under Article 46 ECHR. In Matthews v. the United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights found the United Kingdom in breach of Article 3 of the First Additional Protocol to the Convention, for having denied the applicant the possibility to take part in the election for the European Parliament as she was a resident of Gibraltar.41 But

Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Matthews v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 February 1999, App. No. 24833/94.

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this situation – while it fell under the territorial jurisdiction of the United Kingdom – flowed from an annex to the Act Concerning the Election of the Representatives of the European Parliament by Direct Universal Suffrage of 20 September 1976, which was attached to Council Decision 76/787, signed by the President of the Council of the European Communities and the then member States’ foreign ministers, together with the extension to the European Parliament’s competences brought about by the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union on November 1st, 1993. Since the violation had its source in EU law – specifically, in primary EU law (the EU Treaties) –, the United Kingdom alone could not in principle decide to comply with the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. The United Kingdom therefore negotiated a means through which it would be allowed to comply with the Matthews judgment of the European Court of Human Rights. When the 2002 Council Decision was adopted, amending the 1976 Act,42 the following declaration of the United Kingdom, reflecting a bilateral agreement concluded between that Member State and the Kingdom of Spain, was formally recorded in the minutes of the Council meeting of 18 February 2002 : ‘Recalling Article 6(2) of the Treaty on European Union, which states that the Union shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, signed in Rome on 4 November 1950 and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of Community law, the UK will ensure that the necessary changes are made to enable the Gibraltar electorate to vote in elections to the EP as part of and on the same terms as the electorate of an existing UK constituency, in order to ensure the fulfilment of the UK’s obligation to implement the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Matthews vs UK, consistent with the law of the European Union.’ Having secured that agreement, the United Kingdom adopted the European Parliament (Representation) Act 2003 (EPRA 2003). This Act finally did provide for the enfranchisement of the Gibraltar electorate for the purposes of European Parliamentary elections as of 2004, ensuring compliance with the Matthews judgment four years after it was delivered.43 This action was taken unilaterally by the United Kingdom, after a failure to secure the unanimous

Council Decision 2002/772/EC, Euratom of 25 June 2002 and 23 September 2002 amending the Act concerning the election of the representatives of the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, annexed to Decision 76/787/ECSC, EEC, Euratom, O.J. L 283 of 21 October 2002, p. 1. 43 Section 9 of the EPRA 2003 provides that Gibraltar is to be combined with an existing electoral region in England and Wales to form a new electoral region. In accordance with that provision, the United Kingdom authorities combined Gibraltar with the South West region of England by the European Parliamentary Elections (Combined Region and Campaign Expenditure) (United Kingdom and Gibraltar) Order 2004.

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agreement of the Council to an amendment to the EC Act on Direct Elections of 1976 to provide for its application to Gibraltar. However, whereas Spain has agreed that the United Kingdom could take measures to conform itself with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, it had reservations about the fact that the EPRA 2003 extended the right to vote in European Parliament elections to persons who are not United Kingdom nationals for the purposes of EU law.44 This, Spain considered to constitute a violation by the United Kingdom of its obligations under EU law. In July 2003, Spain therefore filed with the Commission a complaint pursuant to Article 227 EC against the United Kingdom with a view to the Commission bringing infringement proceedings against the United Kingdom before the Court of Justice because of the alleged incompatibility of the EPRA 2003 with Community law. The Commission denied this request, stating that Annex I to the 1976 Act must be interpreted in the light of the European Convention on Human Rights and that it is sufficiently open to enable the UK to include the Gibraltar electorate in the UK’s electorate in European parliamentary elections, according to its national electoral system. Spain then chose to file a direct action against the United Kingdom, alleging that the UK had violated its obligations under EC law by extending the right to vote to European elections to the residents of Gibraltar, who are not citizens of the United Kingdom. The European Court of Justice rejected this claim in a judgment of 12 September 2006.45 It took the view that ‘in the current state of Community law, the definition of the persons entitled to vote and to stand as a candidate in elections to the European Parliament falls within the competence of each Member State in compliance with Community law, and that Article s 189 EC, 190 EC, 17 EC and 19 EC do not preclude the Member States from granting that right to vote and to stand as a candidate to certain persons who have close links to them, other than their own nationals or citizens of the Union resident in their territory’. As to the argument that the United Kingdom would be in breach of Annex I to the 1976 Act and of the Declaration of 18 February 2002, the European Court of Justice considered that, in the light of the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in Matthews v. the United Kingdom, “the United Kingdom cannot be criticised for adopting the legislation necessary for the holding of such elections under conditions equivalent, with the necessary changes, to those laid down by the legislation applicable in the United Kingdom” (para. 95). This episode illustrates the difficulties an EU member State may be facing, when found to have acted in violation of the European Convention on Human. Rights in the implementation of EU law, where it would only be possible to

The EPRA 2003 provided (under section 16(5)) that all residents of Gibraltar above 18 years of age who were qualifying Commonwealth citizen or a citizen of the EU, would be allowed to vote at the European parliamentary elections. 45 Case C-145/04, Kingdom of Spain v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.

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avoid such violation by securing an amendment of EU law itself. Ireland would have faced a similar difficulty if, in the case of Bosphorus Hava Yolları Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Şirketi, the European Court of Human Rights had concluded that the Convention had been breach by the impounding of the aircraft leased by the applicant company. I conclude that neither the argument based on the subsidiarity of the international judicial control exercised by the European Court of Human Rights, nor arguments based on the logic of EU law itself – including the monopoly of the Court of Justice on findings of validity of EU law –, fully explain the insistance of the CJEU that it have a say on the alleged incompatibility of the measure adopted by the EU with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, prior to any involvement of the European Court of Human Rights. The motives of the Court of Justice probably reside elsewhere : in its hope, or its anticipation, that once it shall have made its own determination, the European Court of Human Rights will simply defer to that assessment, consistent with the Bosphorus doctrine described above. If this is indeed its expectation, it becomes highly unlikely that the first scenario – that of “normalisation”, in which the doctrine would be simply abandoned – will materialize : in such circumstances, judicial realpolitik generally trumps arguments of principle. Indeed, we may expect the opinion that the Court of Justice shall deliver on the draft Agreement providing for the EU’s accession to the ECHR to reflect its understanding that the Bosphorus doctrine shall be maintained : the doctrine may be seen as part of the implicit package deal that allowed the negotiations to be finalized.

Scenario 2 : the preservation of the statu quo If the conclusion above is correct, the reason why the Court of Justice of the European Union has insisted on being given a chance to review the compatibility with Convention rights of an act adopted in the field of application of EU law, before such assessment is made by the European Convention on Human Rights, is because it expects that, as regards the relationship between the EU legal order and the European Convention on Human Rights, nothing of importance will change. The Court of Justice places its hopes in what is our second scenario : the doctrine of ‘equivalent protection’ will continue to be relied upon by the European Court of Human Rights when examining the compatibility of measures adopted by the EU with the European Convention on Human Rights – whether these have their source in primary or secondary Union law –. While this second scenario is not implausible, it would be both legally unjustified and politically inopportune. Indeed, once the Union will have acceded to the Convention, the need to reconcile potentially conflicting international obligations of the EU Member States (as having to comply both with Union law and with their obligations under the Convention) will have disappeared ; in addition, 2013/4

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while the doctrine may have been useful until now for evaluating the obligations of the EU Member States under the Convention, its rationale cannot plausibly be extended to evaluating the obligations of the Union itself – for there are no potentially conflicting obligations that the EU is imposed, that might represent an obstacle to its full implementation of the Convention rights. This scenario would also be politically inopportune. Since it would not align the status of the Union with that of the other Parties to the Convention, it would be sending the wrong signal to the public opinion ; and it would only partly address the problems justifying the accession of the Union to the Convention in the first place. There are two versions of this second scenario. According to the « weak » version, the presumption of compatibility established under Bosphorus Airways would benefit the EU member States, in order to ensure that their national courts shall not be obliged either to depart from the interpretation of EU law imposed by the Court of Justice of the European Union, or to prioritize the obligations imposed under the European Convention on Human Rights. According to the “strong” version, the presumption would extend to acts adopted by the institutions of the Union, in which the EU member States have taken no part – such as decisions or regulations adopted by the European Commission. This scenario deserves a word of explanation.46 Currently, acts that are adopted by an international organization without any implication of the States parties to the Convention are considered by the European Court of Human Rights to lie outside its jurisdiction : where applications are filed against specific decisions of organs of international organizations in the adoption of which the member States have played no role (as opposed to applications alleging a “structural deficiency”, that the States having established the organization should have prevented), the Court simply treats them as incompatible ratione personae with the Convention – which is to say, such applications are in reality challenging a conduct adopted not by the States parties to the Convention that have joined the organization but by a distinct international legal subject, the international organization, that is not itself a party to the Convention. The case of Boivin v. France and Belgium and 32 other member States of the Council of Europe provides an illustration.47 In this case, the applicant was challenging a decision of its employer, the European Organisation for the Safety of Air Navigation (“Eurocontrol”), to cancel his appointment to a post within the organization and then to deny him an appointment, after his name was not included on the list of qualified candidates drawn up by a Selection Board. Boivin took his case to the International Labour Organisation Administrative Tribunal, the sole body having competence to settle disputes between Eurocontrol and its staff 46

See further X. Groussot et L. Pech, “La protection des droits fondamentaux dans l’Union européenne après le traité de Lisbonne”, Questions d’Europe no 173, Fondation Robert Schuman, 14 juin 2010 ; and F. Benoît-Rohmer, “Bienvenue aux enfants de Bosphorus”, Rev. trim. dr. h., 2010, pp. 19‑37. 47 Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th sect.), Boivin v. France and Belgium and 32 other member States of the Council of Europe, dec. (inad.) of 9 September 2008, Appl. No. 73250/01.

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according to Article 5, § 2, of Eurocontrol’s Statute, challenging the cancellation of his appointment and seeking compensation for the injury caused to him : though he did obtain some compensation, he failed to obtain the annulment of the impugned decision concerning the appointment. He then applied to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging that the ILO Administrative Tribunal had violated a number of procedural rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights. The Court found that the application was incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention. It reasoned that Eurocontrol has a legal personality separate from that of its member States, and is not a party to the Convention : neither Belgium nor France played any role in the adoption of the decision that allegedly caused the violation. The Court analogized the situation of Mr Boivin to that of the applicants in the 2007 cases of Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway,48 where, distinguishing Bosphorus and Matthews, the Court took the view that the respondent States’ responsibility could not be engaged on account of the impugned acts and omissions of NATO troops deployed in Kosovo or of the UN mission to Kosovo (KFOR and UNMIK), as such acts were “directly attributable to the United Nations, an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective”. The Court considered that Boivin was in a similar situation – challenging in fact acts that were not those of the member States of Eurocontrol, because addressing a “structural deficiency” these States should have prevented, but discrete acts adopted by the ILO Administrative Tribunal (ILOAT), without the States being implicated in the adoption of such acts. “[In] reality”, said the Court, “the applicant’s complaints were directed essentially against the relevant judgment of the ILOAT concerning his individual labour dispute with Eurocontrol”. It continued : The Court would point out that the impugned decision thus emanated from an international tribunal outside the jurisdiction of the respondent States, in the context of a labour dispute that lay entirely within the internal legal order of Eurocontrol, an international organisation that has a legal personality separate from that of its member States. At no time did France or Belgium intervene directly or indirectly in the dispute, and no act or omission of those States or their authorities can be considered to engage their responsibility under the Convention. In this respect the instant case is to be distinguished from previous cases where the international responsibility of the respondent States has been in issue, for example that of the United Kingdom in the Matthews case (cited above – decision not to register the applicant as a voter on the basis of an EC treaty), that of France in the Cantoni case (15 November 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996‑V – enforcement against the applicant of a French law implementing an EC Directive), that of Germany in the Beer and Regan and Waite and Kennedy cases ([GC], Nos. 28934/95 and 26083/94, 18 February 1999 – denial of access to the German courts) or that of Ireland 48

See Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Behrami and Behrami v. France, dec. of 31 May 2007, Appl. no. 71412/01 ; and Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway, dec. of 31 May 2007, Appl. no. 78166/01.

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in the above-mentioned Bosphorus case. Unlike in those cases, in all of which the State or States concerned had been involved directly or indirectly, in the present case the applicant cannot be said to have been “within the jurisdiction” of the respondent States for the purposes of Article 1 of the Convention.

The Court concluded on these grounds that the violations of the Convention alleged by Boivin therefore could not be attributed to France and Belgium. As to the possibility of finding Eurocontrol itself to be responsible, the suggestion was given short shrift by the Court : “since this international organisation is not a party to the Convention its responsibility cannot be engaged under the Convention”. The Court currently takes the same position where the acts allegedly resulting in a violation of Convention rights are adopted by organs of the EU, through procedures in which the member States play no role. In Connolly, the applicant was a public servant of the European Commission, who had been subjected to disciplinary proceedings for having published a book denouncing certain practices within the EU institutions, while on short leave from his institution.49 He was dismissed as a result. He challenged that decision before what was then the Court of First Instance of the European Communities (CFI), and later, in cassation proceedings after the CFI rejected his action for annulment, the European Court of Justice. His requests to be given an opportunity to respond to the views expressed in the opinion presented to the European Court of Justice by the Advocate General were rejected by the Court. Connolly then turned to the European Court of Human Rights, alleging violations both of freedom of expresssion and of his right to a fair trial, as guaranteed under Article 6, para. 1, of the European Convention on Human Rights, as he considered that he had not been given a fair opportunity to challenge the reasoning of the Advocate General, which is presented after the proceedings are closed. The Court considered that the situation was similar to that of Boivin. It concluded that the application was incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention, because the impugned measures were adopted by bodies of the EU, rather than by the EU member States as States parties to the Convention. Neither the decision to dismiss the applicant, nor the alleged violations of his procedural rights in the proceedings before the European Court of Justice, could be imputed to the member States : La Cour note que seuls les organes communautaires, à savoir l’AIPN [autorité investie du pouvoir de nomination], le TPICE et la CJCE, ont eu à connaître du contentieux opposant le requérant à la Commission européenne. Elle constate qu’à aucun moment l’un ou l’autre des États mis en cause n’est intervenu, directement ou indirectement, dans ce litige, et ne relève en l’espèce aucune action ou omission de ces États ou de leurs autorités qui serait de nature à engager leur responsabilité au regard de la Convention. On ne saurait donc dire que le

Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th sect.), Connolly v. 15 member States of the EU, dec. of 9 December 2008, Appl. No. 73274/01.

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requérant, en l’espèce, relève de la « juridiction » des États défendeurs au sens de l’article 1 de la Convention. La Cour estime qu’en conséquence les violations alléguées de la Convention ne sauraient être imputées aux États mis en cause dans la présente affaire. Quant à une responsabilité éventuelle de l’Union européenne, elle rappelle que cette organisation internationale n’a pas adhéré à la Convention et qu’elle ne peut donc voir sa responsabilité engagée au titre de celle-ci.

In clear contrast to the Boivin and Connolly line of cases, are cases where the applicant challenges not the decision adopted by the international organization itself, but a structural feature of the procedures through which human rights are protected within the organization, for which the member States – who have established the organization and are its “fathers” – may be held responsible. Thus, in the case of Gasparini, the applicant had sought to rely on the internal procedures established within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) to challenge the consequences of a decision by the North Atlantic Council concerning the prorata of wages that would go to paying pensions. After he failed in his attempt, he turned to the European Court of Human Rights, challenging the compatibility with the procedural rights guaranteed under the Convention of the procedures themselves. This, the Court noted, concerned an alleged “structural deficiency” of NATO’s internal procedures : as such procedures are defined by the North Atlantic Council in which the NATA member States’ representatives are sitting, the States themselves may be held responsible for such a deficiency.50 It matters not that the application failed : what is striking is that the Court examines the substance of the application filed by Gasparini, asking specifically whether the NATO member States had acted in good faith, or whether instead they should have suspected that the system they were establishing within the organization was not sufficiently “rights-proof”. Following the accession by the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, it would fall upon the European Court of Human Rights to examine, in cases such as Connolly, whether the EU has been acting in accordance with the requirements of the Convention. There is no logical reason why the presumption of compatibility with these requirements, as established by Bosphorus, should apply to such cases : there is here no risk of the addressee, the European Union, being imposed conflicting international obligations, or being able to comply with the European Convention on Human Rights only at the expense of deepening the process of integration – especially not since all the EU member States are also parties to the European Convention on Human Rights. And just like there is no reason to apply the presumption to the EU itself, there is no reason to apply it to the EU member States implementing EU law, even in circumstances where they have no margin 50

Eur. Ct. H.R. (2nd sect.), Gasparini v. Italy and Belgium, dec. of 12 May 2009, Appl. No. 10750/03, (inadmissible) (cited above ; decision available only in French).

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of appreciation, because the very possibility of EU law having to be implemented despite its incompatibility with Convention rights is excluded in principle, as a result of the EU having become a party to the Convention. This is why the second scenario, the closest to the statu quo, should be avoided : it would confirm the current privileged position of the EU member States when they act in accordance with obligations imposed under EU law and under the supervision of the Court of Justice of the European Union, when the current justification for that privilege shall have disappeared. The real problem with this scenario, however, is not that it allows the European Court of Human Rights to rely on a presumption of compatibility with the Convention in certain circumstances : it is that these circumstances are reserved to some parties, and denied to others, when there is no principled justification for that difference in treatment. The next scenario is one in which the doctrine is maintained, but the differential treatment removed.

Scenario 3 : Bosphorus generalized Our third and final scenario is that the doctrine of ‘equivalent protection’ will expand further : the privilege which is currently granted to the EU member States when they act in implementation of requirements of EU and under the supervision of the Court of Justice of the European Union would not be denied to them ; rather, it would be extended to all situations which comply with a same set of (strictly defined) conditions. As noted by six juges of the European Court of Human Rights who filed a joint concurring opinion in Bosphorus Hava, the “general abstract review of the Community system” to which the Court proceeds in that case, which leads it to conclude that the EU offers a protection of fundamental rights “equivalent” to that of the system of the European Convention on Human Rights, is one “to which all the Contracting Parties to the European Convention on Human Rights could in a way lay claim”.51 The argument is put forward there to question the attitude of the European Court of Human Rights towards situations where States are merely fulfilling obligations incurred under EU law, under the supervision of the European Court of Justice. But it could as well be invoked to justify an extension of the Bosphorus doctrine beyond its current scope of application, under certain well-specified conditions. The third scenario would establish a Bosphorus-like presumption in any situation where, at national level, a protection ‘equivalent’ to that provided by the European Court of Human Rights is ensured. The conditions for such “equivalence” would have to be clarified by the Court, but one could easily think of a set of requirements including, at a minimum, the direct application of the Convention rights by the domestic courts before which a claim was fined by the alleged victim, an interpretation of the Convention systematically based on the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, or the adop51

Joint concurring opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Traja, Botoucharova, Zagrebalsky, and Garlicki, to the Bosphorus Hava judgment of 30 June 2005, at para. 3.

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tion of appropriate measures to ensure that claims based on Convention rights are processed without unreasonable delays. Beyond those elementary conditions, other requirements, concerning for instance the relationship between substantive rules applied by domestic courts and the procedural requirements that define the scope of their powers or measures ensuring that the European Convention on Human Rights is taken into account preventively, in the formulation of generally applicable regulations (rather than merely on an individual and ad hoc basis, at the request of aggrieved litigants), could be included.52 This new and strengthened version of the doctrine would clearly manifest the principle of subsidiarity in the system of the European Convention on Human Rights – i.e., the principle according to which the protection of the rights and freedoms of the Convention must primarily take place at national level, the intervention of the European Court of Human Rights being only justified where those internal mechanisms have failed to prevent violations from occuring or, if they do occur, from being remedied.53 The principle of subsidiarity, it is worth emphasizing, does not assert that the European Court of Human Rights should somehow renounce fully exercising its role in scrutinizing measures adopted at domestic level. Rather, it insists on the domestic authorities having to do their part in strengthening the protection of individual rights : though the principle of subsidiarity does not, as such, require a direct application of the Convention in the domestic legal order, its aim is to ensure that the individual shall not have to wait to file a claim at the international level in order to be able to denounce a violation of the Convention. Similarly, in line with the principle of subsidiarity thus understood, this third scenario would allow the European Court of Human Rights to develop a case-law providing strong incentives to the States parties to the Convention, to strengthen the protection of Convention rights within their domestic legal order. It could do so, inter alia, by enhancing the status of the European Convention of Human Rights at national level. Today, all member States of the Council of Europe allow their courts to apply directly the European Convention on Human Rights in the disputes they are asked to adjudicate.54 But the modalities can vary significantly from State to State.55 For instance, courts in different States may or may not accept that, in cases of conflict with the national Constitution, the Conven52

Some of these conditions could be set seeking inspiration from Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the improvement of domestic remedies (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 May 2004, at its 114th session). In any event, the Bosphorus doctrine in its new incarnation would only apply to situations that have been reviewed by domestic courts on the basis of the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights, as interpreted by the Strasbourg Court. 53 For an in-depth discussion of the principle of subsidiarity under the European Convention on Human Rights, see O. De Schutter, “La subsidiarité dans la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme : la dimension procédurale”, in M. Verdussen (dir.), L’Europe de la subsidiarité, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2000, pp. 63‑130. 54 See, for studies comparing the status of the European Convention on Human Rights in different national legal orders, R. Blackburn and J. Polakiewicz (eds), Fundamental Rights in Europe. The ECHR and Its Member States, 1950-2000, Oxford Univ. Press, 2001 ; H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights : The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, Oxford Univ. Press, 2008. 55 See for a comparative overview G. Martinico and O. Pollicino, The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws. A Constitutional Comparative Perspective, Europa Law Publ., Amsterdam, 2010.

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tion rights shall prevail ; they may be authorized to disapply even clear legislative mandates in order to apply provisions of the Convention, or they may be prohibited from doing so;56 they may be under a duty to raise ex officio the issue of compatibility with Convention rights in legal proceedings, or this question shall only be raised at the initiative of the parties;57 they may or may not apply the provisions of the Convention, or all of them, to relationships between private parties, where protecting the rights of one of the parties would imply imposing correlative obligations on other parties.58 Moreover, even where its provisions are directly applied, the Convention can only be invoked before national courts in accordance with the procedural requirements imposed, for instance, under statutes of limitations defining the maximum time that may have elapsed between the moment when the alleged violation took place and the commencement of legal proceedings based on that event, under rules of evidence, or under other rules defining the conditions of access to court – only a small portion of which shall be included among the minimum requirements imposed as part of the right to an effective remedy under Article 13 of the Convention.59 Finally, moving beyond the role of courts in enforcing Convention rights and to other actors within the domestic legal system, the attention paid to the requirements of the Convention by parliamentary committees or by the Executive differs widely from State to State : human rights proofing of legislation or policies remains the exception rather than the rule, and the inclusion of human rights in impact assessments, even when such assessments are performed, is variable;60 not all pieces of legislation or policy frameworks that could impact human rights are preceded 56

In the United Kingdom for instance, the Human Rights Act 1998 allows the domestic courts since 2 October 2000 to apply Articles 2 to 12 and 14 of the Convention, as well as Articles 1 to 3 of the (First) Additional Protocol, and (since the Human Rights Act 1998 (Amendment) Order 2004 (S.I. 2004/1574)) Article 1 of the Thirteenth Protocol, together with Articles 16 and 18 of the Convention. But where an Act of Parliament cannot be interpreted in order to ensure compliance with the Convention, courts can only make a declaration of incompatibility, without being authorized either to strike down the legislative provision found to be incompatible, or to disapply such provision ; the principle of parliamentary sovereignty remains unaffected. See, inter alia, D. Hoffman and J. Rowe, Human Rights in the UK. An Introduction to the Human Rights Act 1998, Longman, 3rd ed. 2006, pp. 64‑65. 57 In the 1996 case of Ahmet Sadik v. Greece, Judge S.K. Martens famously opiniated that “in those cases where domestic courts, under their national law, are in a position to apply the Convention ex officio, those courts must do so under the Convention. That is an obvious demand of the effectiveness both of the Convention as a constitutional instrument of European public order (ordre public) and of the ‘national human right systems’.” (Eur. Ct. HR, Ahmet Sadik v. Greece, judgment of 15 November 1996, partly dissenting opinion of judge Martens, joined by judge Foighel, § 11). He was not followed on this point by his fellow judges. 58 It is notable that, while, as seen above, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has sought to encourage the member States to improve the effectiveness of the remedies available, at domestic level, to the alleged victims of violations of the Convention (Recommendation Rec(2004)6 of the Committee of Ministers to member states on the improvement of domestic remedies (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 May 2004, at its 114th Session), its recommendations have addressed none of these points. Here, the principle of procedural autonomy of the States seems to prevail. 59 It is of course telling that Article 13 ECHR is not listed among the provisions of the Convention listed by the Human Rights Act 1998 as provisions that the United Kingdom courts may rely on in their development of the common law or in their interpretation of legislation : thus, they will not be tempted to expand their powers in order to ensure that aggrieved individuals turning to the courts have access to effective remedies. 60 See Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, Recommendation Rec(2004)5 to member states on the verification of the compatibility of draft laws, existing laws and administrative practice with the standards laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 12 May 2004 at its 114th Session) (identifying a range of good practices to ensure that “there are appropriate and effective mechanisms for systematically verifying the compatibility of draft laws with the Convention in the light of the case-law of the [European Court of Human Rights]” ; that “there are such mechanisms for verifying, whenever necessary, the compatibility of existing laws and administrative practice, including as expressed in regulations, orders and circulars” ; and ensuring “the adaptation, as quickly as possible, of laws and administrative practice in order to prevent violations of the Convention”).

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by a consultation of stakeholders ; not all Council of Europe member States have an independent national human rights institution, and the practice even of the existing institutions is highly uneven. The list could be made longer, and each of its items could be discussed at length. But the point made is a simple one : were the Bosphorus presumption-of-compatibility doctrine to be expanded into a rule applicable across the full range of situations covered by the Convention, the Court could seize upon this opportunity to impose strict conditions on the Parties who claim to be worthy of benefiting from the doctrine – or, more likely, for an equivalent doctrine, inspired by Bosphorus without replicating it exactly. That is clearly the direction encouraged by the Brighton Declaration adopted at the 19-20 April 2012 High-Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights. Reiterating concerns already expressed by similar conferences in the past,61 the Brighton Declaration addresses a number of recommendations to the member States of the Council of Europe in order to ensure the “full implementation of the Convention at national level”, including the establishment of national human rights institutions ; the adoption of “practical measures to ensure that policies and legislation comply fully with the Convention, including by offering to national parliaments information on the compatibility with the Convention of draft primary legislation proposed by the Government” ; “the introduction if necessary of new domestic legal remedies, whether of a specific or general nature, for alleged violations of the rights and freedoms under the Convention” ; or providing information and training on Convention rights to judges and lawyers, and to public officials.62 The Declaration also emphasizes that, according to the principle of subsidiarity, it is first and foremost to the national authorities to ensure that the Convention is complied with : “the Convention system is subsidiary to the safeguarding of human rights at national level and […] national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions”.63 It proposed inserting a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation as developed in the Court’s case law in the Preamble of the Convention, as well as the possibility of providing the Court with a competence to deliver “advisory opinions upon request on the interpretation of the Convention in the context of a specific case at domestic level”.64 Most importantly for our purposes, however, the Declaration favors a stricter application of the existing criteria that determine whether an application shall or shall not be considered admissible and examined on the 61

Particularly the High-level conferences convened at Interlaken on 19 February 2010 and at Izmir on 27 April 2011. See High-Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights Brighton Declaration, 19-20 April 2012, para. 9. 63 Ibid., para. 11. 64 Ibid., para. 12, d). See now Protocol (No. 16) to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 2 October 2013, providing for this possibility ; the Protocol shall enter into force three months after the tenth ratification is received. The reference to the principle of subsidiarity has been inserted into the Preamble of the Convention by Protocol (No. 15) Amending the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, adopted on 24 Juin 2013. 62

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merits, and even an amendment to Article 35(3) of the Convention in order to strengthen the conditions of admissibility of individual applications. Following the latest amendments to that provision by Protocol No. 14,65 Article 35(3) now reads : The Court shall declare inadmissible any individual application submitted under Article 34 if it considers that : a) the application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, manifestly ill-founded, or an abuse of the right of individual application ; or b) the applicant has not suffered a significant disadvantage, unless respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and the Protocols thereto requires an examination of the application on the merits and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal.

The High-Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights “affirms” that “an application should be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35(3)(a), inter alia, to the extent that the Court considers that the application raises a complaint that has been duly considered by a domestic court applying the rights guaranteed by the Convention in light of well-established case law of the Court including on the margin of appreciation as appropriate, unless the Court finds that the application raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention ; and encourages the Court to have regard to the need to take a strict and consistent approach in declaring such applications inadmissible, clarifying its case law to this effect as necessary”.66 This is a plea to the Court to consider that an application shall not be examined on its merits if the alleged violation has already been duly examined at domestic level, by a court applying the provisions of the Convention and taking into account the case law of the Court, unless there is a need for the Court to intervene (“the application raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or application of the Convention”). In practice, following this suggestion would imply a shift in the nature of the control exercised by the European Court of Human Rights : instead of examining each application on its merits, essentially re-examining how the various rights and interests were balanced by the domestic court, the European Court would consider whether the domestic court applied the rights stipulated by the Convention, accompanied by the interpretation authoritatively provided to these rights by the European Court. 65

Protocol No. 14 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, amending the control system of the Convention (CETS No. 194), adopted in Strasbourg on 13 May 2004, and entered into force on 1 June 2010. 66 Brighton Declaration, para. 15, d). The Declaration also “concludes” that “Article 35(3)(b) should be amended to remove the words ‘and provided that no case may be rejected on this ground which has not been duly considered by a domestic tribunal’ ; and invites the Committee of Ministers to adopt the necessary amending instrument by the end of 2013” (para. 15, c)). See now art. 5 of Protocol (No. 15), referred to above, inserting this change into Article 35 ECHR.

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The control would be less substantive, and more procedural ; it would assimilate the role of the European Court of Human Rights more to a court of cassation, limited to ensuring that the law is correctly applied, but leaving it to the domestic court itself to assess the facts and to decide the outcome of the balancing act that human rights courts are commonly required to perform. It is striking however that, in contrast to the third scenario explored here, nothing of significance is said about the conditions that the domestic judicial proceedings should comply with for such proceedings to be trusted : that is, the Brighton Declaration takes the view that, provided the individual has access to effective remedies in the domestic legal order, and provided the domestic courts apply faithfully the case law developed by the European Court of Human Rights, it would be unnecessary to superimpose a review at international level to the judicial review that took place at national level. In contrast, the suggestion here is that, whereas a shift in the nature of the control to be exercised by the European Court of Human Rights may be justified provided a set of conditions are fulfilled, this should not result in a lower level of scrutiny, potentially at the expense of the protection of the rights of the individual. It is the opposite : because remedies at national level are more accessible to the individual and can provide more immediate protection, insisting on such remedies being strengthened as a condition for the European Court of Human Rights to trust the protection of individual rights as it is ensured within the national legal order may in fact improve the level of such protection, rather than undermine it.

Box 3. The nature of the judicial control exercised by the European Court of Human Rights and the workload of the Court Though it may be thought that the extension of a renewed and strengthened version of the Bosphorus doctrine would allow the European Court of Human Rights to find manifestly ill-founded a range of applications the substantive merits of which, currently, it must examine, thus diminishing its workload – certainly a major motivation explaining the insistence of the Brighton Declaration on a fuller reliance on national remedies against violations of the Convention –, it is unclear whether this will result in fact. The question of the ability of the Court to manage its case-load is not a minor part of the discussion concerning its working methods. By 31 October 2012, at the time when a first version of this paper was presented, 135,350 applica tions were pending before the Court – a decrease of 11 per cent in comparison to the beginning of that year, but still a very high number.67 The importance of this figure can be seen if we compare it to the pace at which applications are

See the Tables of statistics available from the website of the Court (the figures cited are from the “General Statistics” for 2012).

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disposed of judicially : in 2011, 52,188 applications could be decided, which represents a significant increase of 27 per cent in relation to 2010 (41,182), but still means that every month during 2011, approximately one thousand more applications were received than could be disposed of. The backlog is mounting. The following chart, established by the services of the Court, illustrates this : 160000

151600 139650

140000

119300

120000

97300

100000 79400 80000

66500 50000

60000 40000 20000 0

29400 12600 15900

56800

38500

19800

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Applications pending before a judicial formation, 1999-2011. Source : European Court of Human Rights, Analysis of Statistics 2011, January 2012, p. 7.

In large part thanks to the entry into force of the Protocol No. 14 to the Convention, the first impacts of which were being felt in 2012, the situation has improved since : in reviewing its statistics concerning that year, the Court could proudly announce that on average, 1,900 more cases were disposed of each month than were allocated to the Court, so that “for the first time since 1998, the stock of allocated applications pending before the Court decreased over the year, by 16% from 151,600 to 128,100”.68 But, however serious we rate the problem of the case-load of the European Court of Human Rights and of its ability to manage it, would a “Bosphorus-bis” doctrine make a difference ? The answer would obviously depend on the version of the doctrine that would ultimately be retained. Though blindly trusting that the outcomes of procedures conducted before certain courts shall be fully in line with the requirements of the European Convention on Human Rights might represent an economy of judicial resources, as the European Court of Human Rights could content itself with examining whether no “manifest deficiency” is apparent in the case which it is presented, such a gain would be erased once we move beyond this most extreme version

Eur. Ct. H.R., Analysis of Statistics 2012, January 2013, p. 4.

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of the doctrine, to require from the Court that it examines whether the procedures followed in the domestic legal order concerned have complied with a set of conditions that justify deferring to the assessment reached by the relevant national jurisdictions. The approach examined here, under the third of the three scenarios explored, would not represent a significant gain in this regard : it would shift the focus of the review by the Court, without truly facilitating its task. The Court would still have to examine the procedure that was followed to arrive at the particular outcome that is alleged to constitute a violation ; it would have to verify whether the domestic courts relied on its established case-law ; and it would have to examine whether the domestic courts have met the burden of justifying that their assessments took into account the best practices developed in other member States of the Council of Europe, as regards how to reconcile the requirements of fundamental rights with competing policy objectives.

IV. The second life of Bosphorus In fact, though it would be made more explicit if a new version of the Bosphorus doctrine were to expand in the future, this evolution would simply deepen what largely corresponds to the current approach of the European Court of Human Rights. The nature of the scrutiny exercised by the Court already depends, to a significant extent, on how the domestic courts have reached their decision in the particular case that it is presented with : the “how” matters as much, it might be argued, than “what” outcome has been reached. It is important to note, however, that once the procedures followed at domestic level are assessed, it is less the degree of scrutiny exercised by the European Court that evolves (for example, from a “strict” scrutiny to an “intermediate” level of scrutiny or to a mere “rationality review”, to borrow from the categories of Equality Clause jurisprudence in American constitutional law), than the kind of scrutiny that is exercised : instead of the Court performing anew the balancing act that will lead it to arrive at its own conclusions as to the existence of a violation, essentially replicating what the domestic jurisdictions have done, the European Court shall examine whether the arguments put forward by the domestic court are consistent with its case law and with the nature of the claims put forward. The focus is on the quality of the arguments offered, rather than on the conclusions reached. The result is that the relationship between the domestic courts and the European Court of Human Rights is more dialogical and horizontal, than based on judicial fiat and vertical.69 There follows a strong incentive for domestic courts to 69 This approach is expounded and richly illustrated in Charles F. Sabel and O. Gerstenberg, “Constitutionalising an Overlapping Consensus : The ECJ and the Emergence of a Coordinate Constitutional Order”, European Law Journal, vol. 16, Issue No. 5, 2010, pp. 511‑550.

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provide consistent, and substantive, reasons, for the conclusions they reach, so as to convince the European Court of Human Rights that they have considered all the dimensions of the case, without neglecting any major aspect, and have provided the kind of detailed response to each of the arguments presented by the alleged victim of a violation, commensurate with the quality of these arguments themselves. This new approach, based on mutual trust between the European Court of Human Rights and national jurisdictions of the Parties to the Convention, would present three defining characteristics. First, it would lead to emphasize compliance with certain procedural rules that national authorities, including courts, would have to comply with, as a condition for the trust they would claim to deserve. Second, it would redefine the European Court of Human Rights as a standard-setter, defining the parameters that should be taken into account by the domestic courts applying the Convention, but leaving it to these courts to apply those standards to the specific facts they are presented with. Third, it would encourage collective learning, and the rapid adoption of best practices, provided the justifications required from national courts are understood to include what other national authorities have done when confronted with similar problems, if the solutions they arrived at have ensured a better preservation of the rights at stake. The following sections describe the approach proposed, and highlight the key advantages that can be expected from this shift in perspective.

1. The procedural turn At present, there is already a strongly dialogical dimension to the relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts of the States parties to the Convention. This dimension enters the case law, most explicitly, through the channel of the margin of appreciation doctrine.70 According to the classic formulation of this doctrine, carried over from one case to another, “by reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the national authorities are in principle better placed than an interna70

The literature, on this point also, is overwhelming. We owe the most extensive studies of the subject to H.C. Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence, London/ The Hague/Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publ., 1996 ; J.G.C. Schokkenbroek, Toetsing aan de vrijheidsrechten van het Europees Verdrag tot bescherming van de Rechten van de Mens, WEJ Tjeenk Willink, Zwolle, 1996 (pp. 11‑241) ; and E. Kastanas, Unité et diversité. Notions autonomes et marge d’appréciation des États dans la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 1996. Significant early studies of the subject were made by R. Higgins, “Derogations under Human Rights Treaties”, British Yearbook of International Law, vol. 48, 1976-1977, pp. 281‑320, at pp. 296‑30 ; R. St. J. Macdonald, “The Margin of Appreciation in the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights”, in Le droit international à l’heure de sa codification. Études en l’honneur de Roberto Ago, Milan, Giuffré, t. III, 1987, pp. 187‑208 ; and from the same author, “The Margin of Appreciation’, in F. Matscher, R. St. J. Macdonald and H. Petzold (dir.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights, London/The Hague/ Boston, Martinus Nijhoff Publ., 1993, pp. 83‑124. Among the more recent contributions see, inter alia, in addition to the special issue dedicated to this issue by the Human Rights Law Journal in 1998 under the title “The Doctrine of the Margin of Appreciation Under the European Convention on Human Rights : its Legitimacy in Theory and Application in Practice” ; Y. Arai, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Jurisprudence of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights”, Neth. Q. H.R., 1998, pp. 41‑61 ; E. Brems, “The Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 56, 1996, pp. 240‑314 ; T.H. Jones, “The Devaluation of Human Rights Under the European Convention”, Public Law, 1995, pp. 430‑449 ; P. Mahoney, “Universality versus Subsidiarity in the Strasbourg Case Law on Free Speech : Explaining Some Recent Judgments”, E.H.R.L.R., 1997, pp. 364‑379 ; J. Callewaert, “Quel avenir pour la marge d’appréciation ?”, in P. Mahoney, H. Petzold, F. Matscher and L. Wildhaber (dir.), Protection des droits de l’homme : la perspective européenne. Mélanges en hommage à R. Ryssdal, Köln, Carl Heymanns, 2000, pp. 147‑167.

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tional court to evaluate local needs and conditions”.71 Although it is often misunderstood, the doctrine is not a blank authorization given to national authorities, including courts, to do as they please, in areas that are particularly sensitive and in which, therefore, great weight should be recognized to domestic public opinion.72 The doctrine of the margin of appreciation simply recognizes that national authorities may be better placed to make certain factual assessments, including those that enter into play in balancing of interests analysis, but using the framework of analysis that the case law of the European Court of Human Rights provides. Indeed, whenever the Court invokes the doctrine, it hastily adds that the choices made at national level remain to be monitored, for their compliance with the Convention, at the international level. By relying on this doctrine, the Court does not abdicate its role. Instead, as already suggested above,73 the doctrine is a mechanism for the allocation of decision-making between the international and the national level. In matters pertaining to the Convention, the assessments made by the national authorities shall be deferred to, to the extent that the procedures followed at national level may be presumed to ensure an adequate compliance with the Convention. Thus understood, the doctrine of the national margin of appreciation could create an incentive for legislative and executive authorities to better take the Convention into account in their law- and policymaking procedures, and for the domestic courts to pay a greater attention to the requirements of the Convention and the evolving international case-law providing it with an authoritative interpretation. In accordance with the principle of subsidiarity of international judicial supervision, the “wide margin of appreciation” could benefit national authorities where, for instance, human rights impact assessments have been performed prior to the adoption of legislation or the implementation of certain policies, or where decisions were preceded by consultations of stakeholders ; or where the Convention is directly applied by national jurisdictions, taking into account the relevant case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. Far from deferring to the evaluations of the domestic authorities, the Court would thus put more pressure on those authorities to implement fully the requirements of the Convention in the decisions they adopt. Consider for instance the case of Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom. There, the applicants challenged before the European Court of Human Rights the imple71

Eur. Ct. H.R., Buckley v. the United Kingdom judgment of 25 September 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-IV, § 75. The case concerned a land planning policy that adversely impacted the possibility for Roma families living in caravans to find suitable accommodation places where to stay. The full quote is : “It is not for the Court to substitute its own view of what would be the best policy in the planning sphere or the most appropriate individual measure in planning cases… By reason of their direct and continuous contact with the vital forces of their countries, the national authorities are in principle better placed than an international court to evaluate local needs and conditions. In so far as the exercise of discretion involving a multitude of local factors is inherent in the choice and implementation of planning policies, the national authorities in principle enjoy a wide margin of appreciation”. 72 See, for a more detailed analysis of this point, O. De Schutter and Fr. Tulkens, “The European Court of Human Rights as a Pragmatic Institution”, in E. Brems (ed.), Conflicts Between Fundamental Rights, Intersentia, AntwerpOxford-Portland, 2008, pp. 169‑216. 73 See above, text corresponding to notes 50-56.

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mentation in 1993 of a new scheme for regulating night flights at Heathrow. The scheme replaced the earlier system of movement limitations with a regime which gave aircraft operators a choice, through a quota count, as to whether to fly fewer noisier aircraft, or more less noisy types. The 1993 Scheme accepted the conclusions of the 1992 sleep study that found that, for the large majority of people living near airports, there was no risk of substantial sleep disturbance due to aircraft noise, and that only a small percentage of individuals (some 2 to 3%) were more sensitive than others. On this basis, disturbances caused by aircraft noise were regarded as negligible in relation to overall normal disturbance rates. It was agreed, nevertheless, that the new scheme was susceptible of adversely affecting the quality of the applicants’ private life and the scope for their enjoying the amenities of their respective homes, and thus their rights protected by Article 8 of the Convention. The Court noted that it was faced with two versions of the extent to which the margin of appreciation doctrine should apply : “on the one hand, the Government claim a wide margin on the ground that the case concerns matters of general policy, and, on the other hand, the applicants’ claim that where the ability to sleep is affected, the margin is narrow because of the “intimate” nature of the right protected”.74 In effect, the Court chose to define whether the government has overstepped its margin of appreciation by examining the decision-making procedure that was followed, asking in particular which procedural safeguards had been included allowing various stakeholders to have their views heard. It found that the decision concerning the new schemes for night flights at Heathrow was based on various studies and studies allowing ample room for participation for the communities, and grounded on solid evidence. It concluded that it was unable to “find that, in substance, the authorities overstepped their margin of appreciation by failing to strike a fair balance between the right of the individuals affected by those regulations to respect for their private life and home and the conflicting interests of others and of the community as a whole”, nor that there have been “fundamental procedural flaws in the preparation of the 1993 regulations on limitations for night flights”.75 This example is not isolated : the case law of the Court offers other examples of situations where the procedural safeguards built into decision-making processes were determinative of the question of whether the authorities had overstepped their margin of appreciation.76 A first characteristic of the approach proposed here is therefore that it would lead to impose on domestic authorities that they comply with a number of safeguards, 74

Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Hatton and Others v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 2003, Appl. No. 36022/97, § 103. Ibid., § 129. See, e.g., Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Chapman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 18 January 2001, Appl. No. 27238/95, (concerning a Gypsy by birth, who had been travelling constantly with her family during her youth, and continued to live in caravans with her husband and children after her marriage, but was subsequently denied the permission to station caravans on the land she had purchased due to land planning requirements, the Court notes in § 114 that “proper regard was had to the applicant’s predicament both under the terms of the regulatory framework, which contained adequate procedural safeguards protecting her interests under Article 8 and by the responsible planning authorities when exercising their discretion in relation to the particular circumstances of her case. The decisions were reached by those authorities after weighing in the balance the various competing interests. It is not for this Court to sit in appeal on the merits of those decisions, which were based on reasons which were relevant and sufficient, for the purposes of Article 8, to justify the interferences with the exercise of the applicant’s rights”). 75 76

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ensuring that the trust in the decisions that they adopt is not blind, but instead grounded on these authorities complying with a number of conditions. This procedural turn leads the European Court of Human Rights to assess whether certain procedural safeguards have been complied in the adoption of the impugned decision (the “how”) rather than to focus on the outcomes (the “what”).77 This may in fact strengthen, rather than weaken, the protection of human rights at the level of each State.

2. The division of labour between international and national courts A second characteristic is that the European Court of Human Rights would remain in charge of shaping the normative framework, establishing the standards that the national authorities should take into account in making their assessments. Here again, the existing doctrine on the margin of appreciation may serve as a departure point. Though the doctrine is often misunderstood, it is relevant to note that its use is limited to the evaluation of facts (of what is required in a particular situation) ; it does not extend to the interpretation of the requirements of the Convention (which it is the role of the European Court of Human Rights to supervise).78 Rather, it is when the national courts appear to have faithfully applied the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights that they are “trusted” in assessing particular factual situations, within the margin of appreciation that is left to them. Importantly however, it is not enough for national courts to restate the well-established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, in order for their appreciation of the consequences to be drawn in particular factual settings to be deferred to. Consider for instance the case of Schüth v. Germany.79 The applicant in that case was complaining that he had been dismissed from his job as an organist and choir master by his employer, the Catholic parish church, after having left his wife to live with another woman, for breach of his duty of loyalty under the Church regulations. Asked to decide whether this resulted in a violation of the right to respect for private life as guaranteed under Article 8 ECHR, the European Court of Human Rights first recalled that the question of whether church-based organizations could require from their employees that they comply with certain duties of loyalty, as a condition for their employment, had been addressed by the Federal Constitutional Court in 1985. The Federal Constitutional Court had 77

See also R. Harmsen, “The (Geo-)Politics of European Union Accession to the European Convention on Human Rights : Democracy and Distrust in the Wider Europe”, in V. Kosta, N. Skoutaris and V. Tzevelekos (eds), The Accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights, Hart Publ., 2013 (in press) (noting the potential “jurisprudential reorientation in which the ECtHR shows more explicit awareness and places greater weight on the ‘deliberative quality’ of national decision-making”, in essence shifting “to a role in which it scrutinised decision-making procedures more closely, while variably calibrating the scope and intensity of its substantive determinations in function of the extent to which questions of the balancing of fundamental rights had appropriately figured in prior national deliberations”). 78 See in particular J. Callewaert, “Quel avenir pour la marge d’appréciation ?”, op. cit., at p. 163. 79 Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th sect.), Schüth v. Germany, judgment of 23 September 2010, Appl. No. 1620/03 (final on 23 December 2010).

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essentially upheld the validity of the “loyalty clauses” in such employment relationships on the basis of the right of religious societies to manage their affairs autonomously within the limit of the general law, the Selbstbestimmungsrecht enshrined in Article 137, § 3, of the Weimar Constitution, a provision that the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949 had maintained in force.80 A few years later, when asked whether this position was compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights, the European Commission on Human Rights answered in the affirmative.81 Thus, when in 2010, the question again arose in Schüth v. Germany, the European Court of Human Rights could “observe[…] that the Federal Employment Tribunal, in its judgment of 12 August 1999, referred extensively to the principles established by the Federal Constitutional Court in its judgment of 4 June 1985”.82 The Court added however “that the Employment Appeal Tribunal merely stated that it did not disregard the consequences of dismissal for the applicant” but that it “failed, however, to explain the factors it had taken into consideration in that connection when weighing up the interests involved” although in the Court’s opinion, “the fact that an employee who has been dismissed by a Church has limited opportunities of finding another job is of particular importance”.83 It concluded that the dismissal of the applicant resulted in a violation of the right to respect for private life, because of its disproportionate consequences, because the domestic courts had not passed the test of deliberative justification required in this architecture : The Court is therefore of the view that the employment tribunals did not sufficiently explain the reasons why, according to the findings of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the interests of the Church far outweighed those of the applicant, and that they failed to weigh the rights of the applicant against those of the employing Church in a manner compatible with the Convention.84

The wording used suggests the nature of the control exercised by the European Court of Human Rights. It is not substituting its own judgment to that of the German courts ; nor is it repeating the weighing of the interests performed by these courts. Rather, the European Court examines whether the domestic courts have appropriately justified, in the light of the guidelines that can be derived from the existing case-law, the conclusion that they have reached : the finding of violation follows from the finding that, in some important respects, the arguments put forward have been found lacking. The European Court of Human Rights expresses its disagreement, not with the outcome per se, about which it may be said to be agnostic, but with the method by which the outcome was reached.

2 BvR 1703/83, 1718/83 and 856/84, judgment published in the Reports of Judgments and Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court, vol. 70, pp. 138‑173. Eur. Comm. HR, Rommelfanger v. Germany, Appl. no. 12242/86, dec. of 6 September 1989, Decisions and Reports, vol. 62, p. 151 (the case concerned a medical doctor employed in a hospital depending on the Catholic Church, who had made declarations in favor of the freedom of women to choose abortion). 82 Schüth v. Germany judgment, cited above, § 60. 83 Id., § 73. 84 Id., § 74. 81

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The Two Lives of Bosphorus

Such an approach may represent a significant gain in legitimacy in the implementation of the standards of the European Convention on Human Rights. This is both because of the active role the actors most immediately concerned shall have played in its adoption (if, among the said conditions, are procedural conditions related to whether the decision was reached by national authorities taking into account all relevant viewpoints), and because it will be a decision better informed by the realities of the circumstances in which the alleged violation occured – the unique constellation of facts that no predefined grid could have anticipated. Both input legitimacy (the perception that the procedure has been fair to all participants) and output legitimacy (the acceptability of the result) are strengthened. This in turn may improve enforcement of the decision, both because, as co-authors of the solution that is reached, all the participants involved may perceive that they have an interest in the implementation, and because the decision will not be seen as “foreign” or imposed from above.

3. The “deliberative polyarchic” element There is finally a third characteristic to this new approach, that may make it particularly attractive. This charactertic, however, does not simply leads to make explicit what is already implicit in the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. It goes beyond the current approach. It does so by seeing the establishment of a more dialogical relationship between courts as an opportunity to encourage the national authorities to develop innovative solutions to questions raised by the application of the Convention for which the member States of the Council of Europe have not defined a common solution. Indeed, one of the main justifications of the doctrine of the “margin of appreciation” today is that it avoids imposing uniform solutions throughout the member States, at least where no single solution is imposed by the requirements of the Convention.85 The doctrine therefore may both promote diversity, and encourage the search for the best techniques through which to reconcile conflicting claims made on the national authorities : by deferring to the appreciation of the national authorities about what responses are required by the situations they are confronted with, the reliance by the Court on the “margin of appreciation” may favor the search for solutions which, once they are identified and found to be compatible with the requirements of the Convention, may benefit other States, who may seek inspiration from local experiments. We enter into an architecture that J. Cohen and Ch. Sabel have labelled “deliberative polyarchy”, in which “the very different circumstances in which problems arise suggest a need for differences in solution, while the commonality of problems indicates a need to discipline local solutions against those adopted elsewhere : the aim is not to achieve uniformity, but to pool information, identify best practices, and compare solutions across locations”.86 It 85 See the references cited in that respect by S. Van Drooghenbroeck, La proportionnalité dans le droit de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Prendre l’idée simple au sérieux, Bruxelles, F.U.S.L. / Bruylant, 2001, pp. 497‑503. 86 J. Cohen and Ch. F. Sabel, “Global Democracy ?”, New York University Journal of International Law and Politics, vol. 37, No. 4, 2005, pp. 763‑797, at p. 781.

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Olivier De Schutter

is the contention of this paper that courts may participate in what is, in essence, a joint and co-ordinated search, that shall not necessarily lead to common or uniform solutions, but shall increase the burden weighing on each jurisdiction to justify the solutions it prefers in the light of other, alternative solutions developed by other jurisdictions facing similar circumstances. This greater “freedom” left to the national authorities thus comes at a price, and it is not unconditional. For the choices that they are allowed to make depend upon these choices being justified, and it will be for the European Court to assess whether the justifications provided are sufficiently convincing : not taking into account solutions developed by other jurisdictions that achieve a better conciliation between the requirements of fundamental rights and the public policy objectives that lead to certain restrictions being imposed, could be seen as a deficiency that is “manifest” enough to trigger the intervention of the European Court of Human Rights. This would imply, for instance, a doctrine of proportionality according to which domestic courts would assess the restrictions imposed on human rights, not only based on the classical test (asking in essence whether the legitimate aim could be achieved by less restrictive means), but also taking into account solutions developed elsewhere (and therefore asking the author of the challenged measure whether such solutions have been considered, and if they have not been adopted, why). Thus, one specific justification that could be required from the national courts claiming the benefit of trust, is that when confronted to an allegation of violation of Convention rights resulting from the adoption of a particular measure by national authorities, they examine whether the same objective could have been achieved at a lesser cost to the rights concerned – i.e., with less severe limitations being imposed on the said rights –, by examining how other States have been addressing the same issue. The greater diversity of solutions adopted across the Council of Europe member States then could be transformed into an asset : far from constituting an obstacle to the adoption of uniform solutions, it would become a condition for collective learning to take place. This is what Cohen and Sabel call “deliberative coordination”, which they describe as “deliberation among units of decision-making directed both to learning jointly from their several experiences and improving the institutional possibilities of such learning – a system with continuous discussion across separate units about current best practice and better ways of ascertaining it”.87

V. Conclusion There is an analogy between the shift proposed here in the nature of the control exercised by the European Court of Human Rights, and a similar shift proposed 87

Cohen and Sabel, “Global Democracy ?”, op. cit., at p. 781.

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The Two Lives of Bosphorus

a generation ago, in the debates concerning judicial review in domestic constitutional law. We now understand better that judicial control exercised on the basis of certain constitutional norms, is not necessarily opposed to democratic self-determination based on the principle of majoritarian decision-making : “representation-reinforcing” theories of judicial review and the New Public Law Movement have shown since the 1980s that this opposition was in many cases a false one, based both (as public choice theory was emphasizing at the same time in political science) on an idealization of the democratic process and on a misunderstanding of the reasons, based on democratic failure, why the intervention of courts might be required to uphold the social compact.88 For very similar reasons, we now must acknowledge that there is no necessary tradeoff between a strong monitoring role of the European Court of Human Rights, and a greater space for deliberation at domestic level, based on the comparison of the best practices developed in the full range of Council of Europe member States. It would be neither legally justified nor politically opportune to maintain the Bosphorus doctrine in its current form, as a doctrine that places the European Union in a privileged position, and that, instead of treating the Court of Justice of the European Union as a constitutional court comparable to any other, somehow inexplicably defers to its assessments more generously than to similar assessments made by its national counterparts. But if, for obvious political reasons, Bosphorus must have a second life, then it is time perhaps to transform it into something that would be both more promising and more theoretically sound. It can become a doctrine by which the European Court of Human Rights expresses its confidence in the decisions reached by independent courts established within the different legal orders that it supervises, provided certain procedural conditions are met, and provided these courts faithfully base their decisions on the body of jurisprudence gradually developed by the European Court itself, and meet the test of justifying their decisions taking into account the best practices available across all Parties to the Convention. If this is what the second life of Bosphorus looks like in a few years time, the accession of the EU to the European Convention on Human Rights will appear, in retrospect, as having accelerated a shift towards a new relationship between the European Court of Human Rights and the domestic courts : one that is more respectful of decision-making at national level, that strengthens the legitimacy of international judicial control of human rights, and that leads to a richer and more deliberative breed of case-law. The wide diversity across the member States of the Council of Europe will appear then not as a liablity, but as an asset ; the principle of subsidiarity will be seen as a tool to strengthen rights, rather than used as a pretext to weaken them ; and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation will be considered as a first but still 88 See J. Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust. A Theory of Judicial Review, Harvard Univ. Press, 1980 ; and, for major contributions to drawing the implications from public choice theory on constitutional law, the review by D. A. Farber and Ph. P. Frickey, “The Jurisprudence of Public Choice”, California Law Review, vol. 65, 1987, p. 873 and the followup volume by the same authors, Law and Public Choice : A Critical Introduction, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1991, as well as W. N. Eskridge and G. Peller, “The New Public Law Movement : Moderation as a Postmodern Cultural Form”, Michigan Law Review, vol. 89, 1991, p. 707.

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Olivier De Schutter

under-theorized attempt to build an architecture in which courts do not compete against one another, but instead enter into a dialogue with one another based on a sound division of labour between them. It is such a future that this paper has outlined. Olivier De Schutter Professor at the University of Louvain (UCL) and the College of Europe. e‑mail : olivier.deschutter@uclouvain.be

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Dossier Caught in the Middle or Leading the Way ? National Courts in the New European Fundamental Rights Landscape Entre deux feux ou ouvrant la voie ? Les juridictions nationales dans le nouveau paysage européen des droits fondamentaux Monica Claes and Šejla Imamovic´

Abstract

Résumé

n the debate on the legal issues surrounding the accession of the European Union to the European Convention of Human Rights, the spotlights are usually on the European Courts, while one set of actors tends to be overlooked : national courts. Nevertheless, as things stand now, national courts are first in line when it comes to fundamental rights protection, both in the context of the EU where individuals generally challenge measures adopted by the EU indirectly, by challenging their implementation at domestic level, and in the context of the ECHR, which requires domestic remedies to be exhausted first, with the Strasbourg Court offering only subsidiary protection. National courts are truly the key actors in the complex web of fundamental rights protection in the European Union. This will not change after accession of the EU to the ECHR. In this contribution, we place the national courts at the centre of our analysis. While the draft Accession Treaty does not contain provisions concerning the national courts specifically, the changes in the human rights landscape are likely to have an impact on their activities. This article aims to provide a first exploration of that impact.

e débat concernant l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme met généralement l’accent sur le rôle des juridictions européennes, sans prêter guère d’attention au rôle des juridictions nationales. Or celles-ci sont en première ligne dans la protection des droits fondamentaux, aussi bien dans le contexte de l’Union européenne où les individus contestent généralement les actes de l’Union indirectement, en mettant en cause leur mise en œuvre au plan interne, que dans le cadre de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, qui exige un épuisement des voies de recours internes avant l’introduction d’une requête auprès de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme, conformément à la subsidiarité du contrôle de celle-ci. Le juge national est dès lors au centre du système européen de protection des droits fondamentaux, et tel sera encore le cas suite à l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la CEDH. Cette étude place les juridictions internes au centre de son analyse. Tandis que le projet d’Accord relatif à l’adhésion ne contient pas de dispositions consacrées spécifiquement aux juridictions nationales, les modifications apportées au paysage d’ensemble auront un impact sur leurs activités. C’est cet impact dont l’article tente une première évaluation.

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Monica Claes and Šejla Imamović

I. Introduction

he European human rights landscape is changing.1 In the EU context, this is witnessed for instance by the fact that the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights has acquired the same legal value as the EU Treaties (article 6 TEU), and has been given centre stage in the case law of the Court of Justice as well as in EU policy and law-making.2 Moreover, for the first time in history, the European Union has a Commissioner who is responsible for fundamental rights, and who takes this task very seriously.3 In the context of the ECHR, reform of the enforcement system has been on the agenda since the 1990s when the number of contracting parties dramatically increased. The focus is on improving compliance with the case law of Strasbourg and on reforming the Court. In several European countries also, the domestic architecture of human rights protection has been re-designed, often in order to accommodate the new role for European rights domestically,4 or re-arrange responsibilities between ordinary and constitutional courts in that light.5 Europe’s complex fundamental rights landscape is evolving, and these changes occur both within each of the systems making up the complex European fundamental rights system, and between them. Also, more than ever before, the legitimacy of European fundamental rights protection is threatened, with politicians in several member states –most conspicuously the UK- calling for the return of human rights protection to where it supposedly belongs : at home.6 The very existence of European human rights bills and the architecture of the European protection mechanism are put into question again.7

In this contribution, we use the terms ‘human rights’ and ‘fundamental rights’ interchangeably. S. Iglesias Sánchez, “The Court and the Charter : the impact of the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty on the ECJ’s approach to fundamental rights”, C.M.L.Rev., vol. 49, 2012, p. 1565. Commission Communication, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by the European Union, COM(2010)573 final of 19 October 2010, stating that that the strategy should lead to the creation of a “fundamental rights culture” at all stages of the procedure for drawing up new proposals ; Draft Council Conclusions on the role of the Council of the European Union in ensuring the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, Council Document 6387/11 of 11 February 2011 ; Resolution of the European Parliament of 15 December 2010, Fundamental rights in the European Union (2009) – Effective implementation after the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, P7_TA-PROV(2010) 0483. For a critical analysis see I. De Jesus Butler, “Ensuring compliance with the Charter of Fundamental Rights in legislative drafting : the practice of the European Commission”, E.L.Rev. 2012, 37(4), pp. 397‑418. 3 See Viviane Reding’s webpage on the Commission’s website : “I have set myself the following objectives : (…) Be the Guardian of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, which is now legally binding on the Union. I will make sure that the Charter becomes the compass for all EU policies and that EU Member States respect it whenever EU law is implemented. I will work to create a strong and coherent European area of fundamental rights and will apply a “zero tolerance policy” when it comes to violations of the EU Charter”. 4 Thus, Sweden and Finland have amended their constitutions to allow for constitutional review of statutes, in order to remove the discrepancy that had arisen with the incorporation of the ECHR and the ensuing review powers of the courts. The discrepancy between the jurisdiction to review of compatibility with Treaty rights and the absence of such jurisdiction in the light of constitutional rights was considered undesirable ; see e.g. the contributions to the Symposium on Nordic Juristocracy in International Journal of Constitutional Law, 2011, 9(2), p. 449. 5 In France, the respective roles of the ordinary and constitutional courts has been rearranged by the introduction of the question prioritaire de constitutionnalité, see e.g. F. Fabbrini, “Kelsen in Paris : France’s constitutional reform and the introduction of A Posteriori constitutional review of legislation”, German Law Journal, vol. 9, no. 10, p. 1297. On the Belgian case see J. Velaers, “The protection of fundamental rights by the Belgian constitutional court and the Melki-Abdelhi judgment of the European Court of Justice”, in M. Claes, M. De Visser, P. Popelier and C. Van de Heyning, Constitutional Conversations in Europe, Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012, p. 323. 6 See e.g. “A great day for British justice : Theresa May vows to take UK out of the European Court of Human Rights”, Daily Mail, 2 March 2013. 7 Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights ? – The Choice Before Us, 18 December 2012. For an analysis see C. O’Cinneide, “Human rights law in the UK – is there a need for fundamental reform ?”, E.H.R.L.R. 2

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Caught in the Middle or Leading the Way ?

This contribution focuses on one specific reform to the overall European human rights architecture that is underway, namely accession of the EU to the ECHR. Debated for decades, accession appears in a different light today, as it is now included in article 6(2) TEU after the Lisbon Treaty as an obligation rather than a choice. In principle, accession of the EU to the ECHR concerns only the relationship between the EU and the ECHR. It is little wonder then that the focus of scholarly attention has been on the question as to how this accession will affect the relations between Strasbourg and Luxembourg. Indeed, the current draft Accession Treaty does not even mention national courts, and they feature only marginally in the draft explanatory report to the accession agreement.8 Nevertheless, it is likely that the new architecture will affect the functioning of the national courts in the context of fundamental rights protection. Indeed, they are the main judicial actors in the enforcement of human rights, both in the context of the EU and in the system of the ECHR, and, of course, with respect to national fundamental rights catalogues. National courts form part of the EU judicial system, as is expressed, somewhat mysteriously, in article 19 TEU. They are, as it is often stated, ‘the common courts of EU law’, and individuals and undertakings should in most cases involving EU law, first turn to the national courts. As is well known, direct access to the Luxembourg courts is very restrictive for individual applicants. The same goes when individuals or undertakings claim that their EU fundamental rights have been infringed in a case coming within the scope of EU law, either by the EU acting through its institutions and organs or by the member states acting as agents of the EU. No special procedure has been provided for the protection of fundamental rights in the EU, as is the case for instance in certain domestic systems (Verfassungsbeschwerde or amparo)9 or before international courts (in an individual complaint procedure, such as in the case of the ECtHR), so in the large majority of situations they have to bring their case before national courts. When it comes to the protection and enforcement of ECHR rights, the Strasbourg mechanism is subsidiary only to the domestic systems, and it becomes operational only after national remedies have been exhausted (article 35 ECHR). As has been stressed recently in the Interlaken Declaration and its aftermath, the task of ensuring respect for the rights enshrined in the Convention lies first and foremost with the Contracting States rather than with the Court.10 The national courts play a crucial role in this context. As stated in the Note by the Jurisconsult of the ECtHR in the Interlaken Follow-Up “Foremost among the State authorities 2012, 6, p. 595. On the debate in the Netherlands, see J. Gerards, “The Prism of Fundamental Rights”, EUConst., vol. 8, no 2, 2012, p. 173. 8 In marginal number 57 of the explanations, explaining that ‘exhaustion of local remedies’ does not include the preliminary reference procedure, as it is not in the hands of the applicant. See further below. 9 The German Verfassungsbeschwerde and the Spanish amparo are constitutional complaints, procedural avenues which grant individuals who claim that their fundamental rights have been infringed direct access to the constitutional court, after the exhaustion of all ‘ordinary’ judicial remedies. On access to constitutional courts, see generally V. Ferreres Comella, Constitutional Courts and Democratic Values : A European Perspective, Yale University Press, 2009 ; M. De Visser, Constitutional review in Europe. A Comparative Perspective, Oxford, Hart, 2013, forthcoming. 10 High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human Rights Interlaken Declaration 19 February 2010, Izmir Declaration 26-27 April 2011, and Brighton Declaration 19-21 April 2012, available on the website of the European Court of Human Rights. The role of national courts in the ECHR system was chosen as the theme of the 2012 Dialogue between Judges : “How can we ensure greater involvement of national courts in the Convention system ?”, available on the website of the ECtHR.

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Monica Claes and Šejla Imamović

bound by these obligations are the courts, as befits the role of the judiciary in a State based on the rule of law. The courts, which are invested with the conventional attributes of judicial function (jurisdiction, the power to pronounce the law, and imperium, the power to command), and are subjected in principle to guarantees of independence and impartiality, are best placed to ensure respect for the individual rights guaranteed by the Convention”.11 Finally, with respect to the protection of fundamental rights included in domestic constitutions and legislation, it is evident that the “natural” judicial forum is national courts, in the manner defined by the domestic system, so either as part of ‘ordinary procedures’ before the ordinary courts, or by a special procedure of constitutional review before a constitutional court. In sum, fundamental rights protection in the complex and multi-sourced European legal space involving EU, ECHR and national constitutional law, is first and foremost a national responsibility, and places national courts at the centre. Now, the co-existence of two12 European fundamental rights regimes and of two European courts is often considered problematic, since it may lead to uncertainties and inconsistencies about human rights standards in Europe.13 This is due especially to a lack of procedural connections and clear hierarchy between these two institutions. As a consequence, national courts may find themselves caught between conflicting decisions of Luxembourg and Strasbourg, if they should hold divergent interpretations of the scope and standards of protection or differing views on how the balance should be struck between fundamental rights and other interests. National courts are then faced with conflicting treaty obligations.14 To be sure, divergent case law is problematic only to the extent that decisions actually lead to conflicting treaty obligations and that complying with the decision of the Court belonging to one system, would lead the State to violate the other European order. To what extent this is a real threat is not so evident today, given that each of the two European systems subscribe to the aim to achieve harmonious interpretation (see e.g. article 52 (3) Charter), as well as the fact that both Strasbourg and 11

Note by the Jurisconsult of the ECtHR, Interlaken Follow-Up, para. 11, available on the website of the ECtHR. At least two : we leave aside other treaty-based regimes, and concentrate on the most developed ones in EU and ECHR context. 13 S. Douglas-Scott, “The European Union and Human Rights after the Treaty of Lisbon”, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 11, 2011, p. 645. For an early account, see R. Lawson, “Confusion and Conflict ? Diverging Interpretation of the European Convention of Human Rights in Strasbourg and Luxembourg”, in R. Lawson and M. de Blois (eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, Dordrecht, Nijhoff, 1994, p. 219. Note however, that the issue at the time was diverging interpretation of one document only, the ECHR. On the complexity of European human rights protection generally, see P. Popelier, C. Van De Heyning and P. Van Nuffel, Human Rights Protection in the European Legal Order : The Interaction Between the European and the National Courts, Cambridge, Intersentia, 2011. 14 On conflicting treaty obligations in this context see the contributions in the special issue of the Utrecht Law Review, 2013, “EU and ECHR : Conflict or Harmony ?” ; I. Canor, “Primus inter pares. Who is the ultimate guardian of fundamental rights in Europe ?”, E.L.Rev., 2000, p. 3 ; J.‑P. Puissochet, “La Cour européenne des Droits de l’Homme, la Cour de justice des Communautés européennes et la protection des Droits de l’homme”, in P. Mahoney, F. Matscher, H. Petzold and L. Wildhaber (eds.), Protecting Human Rights : The European Perspective – Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal, Cologne, Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2000, p. 1139 ; and D. Spielmann, “Human rights case law in the Strasbourg and Luxembourg courts : conflicts, inconsistencies, and complementarities”, in P. Alston (ed.), The EU and Human Rights, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999, p. 757. 12

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Caught in the Middle or Leading the Way ?

Luxembourg aim to ensure the greatest cohesion possible.15 The CJEU regularly draws on the case law of Strasbourg, while the latter has at times made reference to the EU Charter, even though the latter document has no status in ECHR law.16 Neither of these courts has an interest in challenging the legitimacy and authority of the other. In practice, therefore, diverging and conflicting case law, once considered a real threat, does not seem to materialise very often. Nevertheless, it cannot be excluded. On the contrary : given increased EU activity in areas which are more sensitive to human rights issues, such as in the area of freedom, security and justice (including criminal law and asylum), and the enthusiasm with which Luxembourg has embraced the Charter, the chances of divergence may well rise. What seems more of a genuine problem for the national courts today is that they find themselves in an ever more complex institutional and procedural environment. While each of these systems may offer their own unique tools, avenues and enforcement mechanisms to individuals,17 the very complexity of the system may become a threat in itself. This is true not only for the individuals who may not know who to turn to in order to have their rights protected,18 but also for the judges operating the system.19 Fundamental rights protection in Europe today involves navigating an interlocking maze of related, but distinct, legal systems. Many questions still remain open, for instance with respect to the scope of application of the Charter,20 or its relationship with national constitutions.21 This complexity in itself may threaten a smooth operation of the European system(s) of rights protection, and is a cause for concern.

See e.g. CJEU president Skouris at the occasion of the celebration of the anniversary of the ECtHR where he stated that there was a need to seek consistency for ‘Clearly, no one would understand why courts with jurisdiction in the area of protection of human rights would adopt – or base their decisions on – divergent legal approaches’, Dialogue Between Judges 2009, Fifty Years of the European Court of Human Rights Viewed by its fellow International Courts, available at the ECtHR website. This is a somewhat puzzling statement, because it does not pay attention to the fact that the ECHR provides a minimum level of protection only, and does not prevent States to offer stronger protection (article 53 ECHR). It can only be interpreted such that what is allowed to an individual Contracting Party should also be allowed to States acting jointly, such as in the case of the EU. The aim of coherence with the ECHR should not have a stiffening effect. The need for “parallel interpretation” is also stressed in the Joint Communication of the Presidents of the CJEU and the ECtHR. 16 See e.g. Case C-60/00, Mary Carpenter v. Secretary of State for the Home Department [2002] ECR I-06279 ; Case C-94/00, Roquette Frères SA v. Directeur général de la concurrence, de la consommation et de la répression des fraudes, and Commission of the European Communities [2002] ERC I-09011 ; Case C-109/01, Secretary of State for the Home Department v. Hacene Akrich [2003] ERC I-9607 ; Case C- 400/10 PPU, McB v. L.E. [2010] ERC I-08965 ; Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Nada v. Switzerland, 5 October 2012 (Appl. No. 10593/08). 17 M. Dawson, E. Muir and M. Claes, “Enforcing the Rights Revolution in the EU : the Case of Equality”, European Human Rights Law Review, 2012, p. 276. 18 This confusion among citizens on the function and scope of the Charter and on the tools available to the European institutions has also been highlighted by the Commission in its 2011 Report on the application of the EU Charter, Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions – 2011 Report on the Application of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, COM(2012) 169 final. 19 This is evident for instance in the reports of the 23rd Colloquium of the Association of Councils of State and Supreme Administrative Jurisdictions of the European Union, available at http://www.aca-europe.eu/en/colloquiums/colloq_en_23.html See also the questions referred in Case C-571/10, Kamberaj [2012] ECR I-0000 ; Joined Cases C-188/10 and C-189/10, Melki and Abdeli [2010] ECR I-5667 ; Case C-314/08, Filipiak [2009] ECR I-11049 ; Case C-399/11, Melloni [2013] ECR I-0000, which all relate to the relationships between the various sources of rights, and the courts involved in protecting them. 20 Recently the CJEU has shed some light in Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, n.y.r. holding that the applicability of European Union law entails applicability of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Charter, in other words : the scope of the Charter is on par with the scope of EU law. 21 See recently Case C-399/11, Melloni [2013] ECR I-0000.

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In addition, critical voices lament the proliferation of fundamental rights catalogues and human rights legislation in itself, as well as the ensuing increased role of both national and European courts in sensitive areas, leading to what some refer to as the “juridification of politics”.22 This may in turn affect the legitimacy of courts as well as fundamental rights themselves.23 In short, more catalogues and more forums of protection do not in and of themselves lead to a higher level of protection, and the proliferation of rights and the rise of court intervention seems to be approaching a critical point in some circles.24 It is against this background that accession will take place. Accession of the EU to the ECHR will further complicate the fundamental rights architecture in Europe, and it is likely to give rise to more litigation and therefore more involvement of courts at all levels in ever more cases. Accession will of course directly affect the relationship between Strasbourg and Luxembourg, and designing this relationship is one of the most delicate dossiers on the negotiating table.25 Yet, each of these courts also has a specific relationship with national courts. So how will accession affect the dynamics in the tri-partite relationship between national courts and each of the European Courts ? This paper is structured as follows. The next section revisits the prevailing complex and multi-sourced system of fundamental rights protection in the European space, analysing the co-existence of several layers of fundamental rights protection, which draw from catalogues situated in different legal orders, each organising their relationships with the other catalogues and defining the rules of engagement with those, and each coming with their own ultimate authority with respect to the interpretation of the rights, and jurisdiction to decide whether or not a particular right has been infringed or not. The third section takes the national courts’ perspective and discusses the problems national courts are currently facing in the complex European systems of fundamental rights protection. Section four identifies and discusses the elements in the accession debate which may impact the national courts. Section five then discusses these issues from the perspective of national courts.

See the recent publication C. Maas (ed.), Juridification in Europe. The balance of powers under pressure ?, The Hague, European Liberal Forum, 2012. See e.g. M. Cartabia, “The Age of ‘New Rights’”, Straus Working Paper 03/10 ; J. Gerards, “The Prism of Fundamental Rights”, EUConst, vol. 8, no 2, 2012, p. 173. 24 The most obvious examples include the fierce debate on the ECtHR and the HR Act in the UK, see e.g. famously Lord Hoffmann, “The Universality of Human Rights”, Judicial Studies Board Annual Lecture 19 March 2009, and much less nuanced versions of his criticism in the media and the political debate, leading to the recent Report of the Commission on a Bill of Rights, A UK Bill of Rights ? – The Choice Before Us, 18 December 2012. On the debate in the Netherlands, see J. Gerards, “The Prism of Fundamental Rights”, EUConst, vol. 8, no 2, 2012, p. 173. 25 There is a burgeoning literature on the consequence of accession for the relationships between Luxembourg and Strasbourg. See e.g. T. Lock, “End of an epic ? The draft agreement on the EU’s accession to the ECHR”, Yearbook of European Law, 2012, T. Lock, “Walking on a Tightrope : The Draft ECHR Accession Agreement and the Autonomy of the EU Legal Order”, C.M.L.Rev., vol. 48, 2011, p. 1025 ; N. O’Meara, “‘A More Secure Europe of Rights ? ’ The European Court of Human Rights, the Court of Justice of the European Union and EU Accession to the ECHR”, German Law Journal, vol. 12, 2012, p. 1813 ; J. P. Jacqué, “The Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”, C.M.L.Rev., vol. 48, 2011, p. 995. 23

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II. A web of fundamental rights regimes : a three dimensional view Fundamental rights protection and policy in the European legal space feature human rights bills originating in different regimes, national, EU and ECHR. 26 They each organise their own machinery for enforcement, whereby use may however be made also of actors and mechanisms belonging to another regime. Thus, both the EU and the ECHR involve national courts in the enforcement of the fundamental rights they proclaim, in addition to the role their own regime-specific actors play. Furthermore, each regime, national, EU and ECHR, has its own ‘final interpreter’ and each has its own conception of the relationship with the two other regimes. Finally, relations between the regimes and their actors are often described in terms of dialogues, but these dialogues are organised differently in each cases. This section structures these various pluralities along three axes : (A) the level of the norms and their actors and mechanisms, (B) the prevailing rules of conflict and (C) the infrastructure for dialogue and conflict prevention.

A. Three regimes and their enforcement mechanisms 1. National constitutions and national fundamental rights policy All member states have their own constitutional fundamental rights catalogue, usually in constitutional form.27 Fundamental rights legislation and policies complement the protection offered by constitutional catalogues.28 The enforcement mechanisms differ from one state to the next, and usually contain a mix of hard law and soft law instruments and mechanisms. In more and more member states, moreover, the ECHR and other Treaties form part of the domestic fundamental rights system. Thus, in the Netherlands, France, Belgium, for instance, all courts enforce ECHR rights even as against primary legislation, and even though they are precluded from reviewing the constitutionality of such legislation. In these cases, the ECHR functions as a substitute (Netherlands) or complementary constitution (Belgium and France). In other countries, the ECHR serves merely as an aid to interpret domestic standards.29 Yet, overall, it is fair to say that there is a clear evolution towards a stronger and more direct impact of the ECHR in domestic legal orders, including also in the role of courts.30 26

The term ‘European legal space’ is used to denote the complex of legal regimes applicable on the territory of the Member States of the EU, including mainly, but not only, the ECHR and EU law (in the entire space), and the national law of each of the Member States within their territory. It is not an official term, in contrast to e.g. the ‘area of freedom, security and justice’. 27 The classic exception is the UK, for the simple reason that it lacks a constitutional document of the ‘higher law’ type that most member states possess. Nevertheless, the Human Rights Act fulfils a role that is very much comparable to that played by national constitutional bills of rights. 28 This roughly coincides with the distinction between negative and positive effects of fundamental rights. We do not develop this point further here. 29 See e.g. for Germany Chr. Tomuschat, “The Effects of the Judgments of the European Court of Human Rights According to the German Constitutional Court”, German Law Journal, vol. 11 no 05, 2010, p. 513. 30 Comparative analyses can be found in H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights : The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, Oxford, Oxford Univ. Press, 2008 ; G. Martinico and O. Pollicino (eds), The

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2. ECHR Despite the fact that the ECHR has its own international machinery in place, with the ECtHR playing a key role in the supervision of compliance by the contracting parties, domestic authorities including courts have a primary role in the protection of the rights the ECHR seeks to protect. Only when the domestic remedies have been exhausted and the domestic courts have not (been able to) redress the alleged breach, does the international system come into play.31 The Convention system does not impose specific techniques for domestic implementation and enforcement : it is the end result that counts. In this respect, the ECHR differs greatly from EU law. 32 Accordingly, it should not come as a surprise that there are significant divergences in the positions of national courts regarding the application of the Convention and the Strasbourg case-law. The role and function of the ECHR and their relationship with national sources is different in different Member States. Increasing domestic ownership of the ECHR and the involvement of national courts is high on the agenda of the Council of Europe today, and several initiatives are in place and are being developed to this end, witness for instance the Brighton Declaration and its follow-up.33

3. EU fundamental rights regime The EU regime of fundamental rights builds on the existing national and ECHR systems and taps into them. At the outset, it was especially the common constitutional principles of the member states which served as sources of inspiration in the formulation of general principles of EU law.34 Gradually, this role was taken over by the ECHR, while today, the EU Charter serves as the preferred document for the EU institutions including the CJEU.35 Nevertheless, the Charter does not replace the other sources, as is evident from article 6 TEU. Furthermore, and in addition to the sources mentioned in article 6 TEU, Charter, ECHR and general principles, the EU has adopted a substantial body of fundamental rights legislation, especially in the areas of equality and non-discrimination. In terms of enforcement, the usual mechanism, techniques and procedure apply, with pride

National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2010. 31 This is expressed in the fact that applications are admissible only after exhaustion of local remedies, and is usually referred to as the subsidiary nature of the ECHR enforcement mechanism. 32 Comparative analyses can be found in H. Keller and A. Stone Sweet (eds), A Europe of Rights : The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems, Oxford, OUP, 2008 ; G. Martinico and O. Pollicino (eds), The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2010. 33 The Future of the European Court of Human Rights and the Brighton Declaration, AS/Jur (2012) 42. 34 The story does not need recounting here. See e.g. B. de Witte, “The Past and Future Role of the European Court of Justice in the Protection of Human Rights”, in P. Alston, The EU and Human Rights, Oxford Univ. Press, 1999, Ch. 27. 35 See e.g. Reding in her 2010 speech ; S. Morano-Foadi and S. Andreadakis, “Reflections on the Architecture of the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon : The European Judicial Approach to Fundamental Rights”, European Law Journal, vol. 15, no 5, 2011, p. 595.

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of place of the national courts, and the European Courts acting as the ‘ultimate interpreter’ of the EU fundamental rights.36

B. The relationship between the regimes and the respective rules of conflict Each of the three regimes, national, ECHR and EU provides for a final (judicial) interpreter of the applicable fundamental rights standards. Each also has its own conception of its relations with the other systems. These conceptions overlap to a large extent, but there are differences too.

1. National systems In national systems equipped with a constitutional court, that court will usually be recognised as the final interpreter and guarantor of constitutional rights. This is undisputed for instance for the Bundesverfassungsgericht, as its decisions, including those concerning constitutional fundamental rights, bind all public authorities in the land.37 When it comes to the relationship between constitutional rights and other fundamental rights regimes, a diverse picture emerges. In some states, the Constitution gives an indication, and grants supra-constitutional (the Netherlands) or constitutional rank to the ECHR. Article 10.2 of the Spanish Constitution, for instance, provides that constitutional provisions relating to the fundamental rights and liberties must be construed in conformity with international treaties thereon ratified by Spain. In other countries, where the Constitution is silent on the matter, case law gives an indication of the nature of the relationship between the respective systems. Thus, the Belgian constitutional court adds the constitutional and conventional systems together and maximizes the protection of human rights by requiring that a limitation to a human right which is guaranteed both by the Constitution and by an ECHR provision, meets both the formal standards laid down in the Constitution and the material standards laid down in the ECHR.38 The German constitutional court, on the other hand, has famously held that “The Basic Law accords particular protection to the central stock of international human rights. This protection … is the basis for the constitutional duty to use the ECHR in its specific manifestation when applying German fundamental rights too … As long as applicable methodological standards leave scope for interpretation and weighing of interests, German courts must give precedence to interpre36 M. Dawson, E. Muir and M. Claes, “Enforcing the Rights Revolution in the EU : the Case of Equality”, European Human Rights Law Review, 2012, pp. 276‑291. 37 We do not discuss here the question as to whether these decisions can be effectively overturned by constitutional amendment. 38 See P. Popelier, “Report on Belgium”, in G. Martinico and O. Pollicino (eds), The National Judicial Treatment of the ECHR and EU Laws. A Comparative Constitutional Perspective. Groningen, Europa Law Publishing, 2010, p. 81 ; M. Bossuyt and W. Verrijdt, “The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment”, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 7, no 3, 2011, p. 362.

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tation in accordance with the Convention”. Yet, this means “taking notice of the Convention provision as interpreted by the ECtHR and applying it to the case, provided the application does not violate prior-ranking law, in particular constitutional law”.39 Lord Bingham, for his part, has stated in Ullah that “The duty of national courts is to keep pace with the Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time : no more, but certainly no less”.40 With respect to EU law, the current position in many member states today is that the primacy of EU law is accepted, even over the constitution, except in cases where certain core elements of the domestic constitution are at stake. These core elements come under different guises, such as ‘les conditions essentielles de l’exercice de la souveraineté nationale’ or ‘l’identité constitutionnelle’ (in France),41 as ‘i principi fondamentali del nostro ordinamento costituzionale, o i diritti inalienabili della persona umana’ (in Italy),42 or the ‘grundgesetzlichen Identität’ which may include also balances struck in the context of fundamental rights (in Germany).43 Nevertheless, these so-called controlimiti are reserved for exceptional cases : only in cases of manifest infringement of the constitutional standards or when it is proven that the EU system has sunk below an acceptably similar level, the constitutional courts would regain control over EU law. Once the core bone of contention in the relationship between the CJEU and national constitutional courts, the area of fundamental rights has now become much less of a “battlefield”, and constitutional courts leave the responsibility for the protection of fundamental rights in ‘normal cases’ to the CJEU. Also, the stakes are different now : while in the early days the national misgivings concerned the absence of a fundamental rights catalogue and the general inadequacy of the EU’s approach to human rights, the issue now concerns usually a particular conception of how the balance it to be struck in concrete cases, which deviates from the national approach.44

2. The ECHR The Strasbourg Court is the ultimate interpreter and ‘the supreme guardian’ of the ECHR. Nevertheless, it allows a (variable) margin of appreciation to the national authorities. The ECHR imposes a common minimum standard of protection only, and allows (wide) divergences when it comes to the protection of human rights in concrete cases. Finally, Article 53 ECHR encourages States to go beyond the minimum standards arising out of the Convention and Strasbourg case-law. Since 39

Bundesverfassungsgericht, Order of the Second Senate of 14 October 2004, 2 BvR 1481/04, Görgülü. R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator [2004] INLR 381. This mirror principles has now been challenged. See e.g. B. Hale, “Argentoratum Locutum : Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme ?”, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 12, no. 1, 2012, p. 65, and see R v. Horncastle and others (Appellants) (on appeal from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division) [2009] UKSC 14. 41 Conseil constitutionnel, Decision no 2006-540 DC of 27 July 2006 (Loi relative au droit d’auteur et aux droits voisins dans la société de l’information). 42 Corte costituzionale, Sentenza no. 183/1973, [1974] 2 CMLR 372 (Frontini). 43 Bundesverfassungsgericht, 2 March 2010, 1 BvR 256/08, 1 BvR 263/08, 1 BvR 586/08 (dataretention). 44 This is developed in more detail in M. Claes and B. De Witte, “The Role of National Constitutional Courts in the European Legal Space”, in A. Mazmanyan, P. Popelier and W. Vandenbruwaene, The role of courts in a context of multi-level governance, Cambridge,Intersentia, 2012, p. 79. 40

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the ECHR is an international agreement and the Strasbourg court an international court, it should be clear that from the ECHR perspective national law could never be given precedence. With respect to the EU, the current conception of the relationship between ECHR and EU law is defined by the fact that the EU is not internationally bound by the ECHR, while all its member states are. The current state of play is known, and a mere reference to the landmark cases will suffice : Bosphorus, Kokkelvisserij, MSS v. Greece and Belgium.45 In short, the member states remain bound by the ECHR when acting under EU law, but since the EU has a system of human rights protection that can be considered both substantively and procedurally to offer equivalent protection, the presumption is that a State has acted in accordance with the ECHR when it does no more than implement EU legal obligations. The presumption can however be rebutted if, in the circumstances of a particular case, it is considered that the protection of Convention rights was manifestly deficient. Moreover, EU member states cannot simply assume that their partners in the EU comply with the ECHR and international obligations : when exercising discretionary powers under EU law, they remain fully bound by the ECHR.

3. EU law Neither the Charter nor article 6 TEU imposes a hierarchy between the three sources of EU fundamental rights (Charter, general principles drawn from common constitutional traditions and ECHR). Article 52 (3) Charter does state that for Charter rights which correspond to ECHR rights, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as in the ECHR, be it that EU law may provide more extensive protection. The latter essentially coincides with what is stated in article 53 ECHR : the protection offered by the ECHR provides only a minimum standard of protection, and does not prevent States from offering a higher level of protection under national law or another treaty. Article 52 (4) proclaims that for Charter rights resulting from common national constitutional traditions harmonious interpretation will be sought. Where no harmonious interpretation can be achieved, divergences and conflicts may arise. In the ECHR-EU relationship this would only be problematic if the ECHR would offer better protection, in other words, when the EU would fall below the ECHR minimum standard. While the possibility of such situation occurring should not be excluded, one may expect that this should not occur all too often. In such case, the EU would be infringing not only the ECHR but also its own Charter, given what is provided in article 52(3) Charter.

Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland, 30 June 2005, Appl. No. 45036/98 ; Eur. Ct. H.R. (3rd sect.), PO Kokkelvisserij v. The Netherlands, 20 January 2009, Appl. No. 13645/05 ; Eur. Ct. H.R. (GC), M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09. See also the Factsheet on the ECtHR case-law concerning the European Union, December 2012, available on the website of the ECtHR.

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With respect to the relationship between EU fundamental rights (drawn from various sources) on the one hand and national constitutional rights and the ECHR respectively on the other, several rules and doctrines apply. Under Internationale Handelsgesellschaft national courts are precluded from setting aside EU law with reference to national constitutional rights. This follows from the principle of primacy, and has been consistently repeated since.46 This does not mean that national constitutional rights play no role in EU law. On the contrary : Internationale Handeslgesellschaft came with the promise that fundamental rights would be protected in the EU qua general principles of EU law, and the common constitutional traditions of the member states would play an important role in defining these.47 In addition, EU law to some extent allows space for the protection of national fundamental rights that are not common to the member states, or for specific national preferences with respect to the balancing in a concrete case. Several techniques are available in EU law to achieve that result : leaving the final decision and balancing to the national courts, the mechanism of derogations in internal market law, or more recently, national identity (article 4(2) TEU).48 It is important to stress however, that this space exists only in so far as the EU allows it, and it is patrolled and supervised by the CJEU.49 It is not for the unilateral decision of the member states and their courts. In this respect therefore, the EU rules of conflict do not match those propounded by many national constitutional courts, which impose limits to the primacy of EU law with reference to national constitutional rights. The most controversial provision in this respect is article 53 of the Charter which provides that : Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States’ constitutions.

The text is reminiscent of article 53 ECHR.50 So, does this parallel imply that the member states are free to apply a higher –national- standard of protection, which would result in allowing for an exception to the primacy of EU law ? Does article 53 of the Charter accordingly detract from Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, which 46

Case C-11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft mbH [1970] ERC I-1125. In practice, this turns out not to be the way in which EU fundamental rights have been formulated. Much more often, the CJEU has taken recourse to the ECHR as a source (of inspiration). 48 Case C-279/09, DEB [2010] ECR I-13849 ; Case C-571/10 Kamberaj [2012] ECR I-00000 ; Case C-36/02, Omega [2004] ERC I-09609. 49 See on this M. Claes, “Negotiating Constitutional Identity Or Whose Identity Is It Anyway ?”, in M. Claes, M. De Visser, P. Popelier and C. Van De Heyning, Constitutional Conversations in Europe. Actors, Topics and Procedures, Cambridge, Intersentia, 2012, p. 205. 50 “Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the human rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Contracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a party”. 47

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states that the validity or the effect of EU law within a member state cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to constitutional rights ? Despite the similarities between the texts of both articles 53 and their shared aim of preventing a devaluation of protection of the rights the relevant document seeks to protect, there are important differences as well. Article 53 Charter contains the illusive but important phrase ‘in their respective fields of application’. According to the Explanations to the Charter, the provision was intended to maintain the level of protection already afforded within their respective scope by Union law, national law and international law, whereby, owing to its importance, mention was made of the ECHR. Presumably, therefore, the provision was meant merely to indicate that the Charter should not lead to a devaluation of the level of protection each of these systems allow in their own field. Also the context and the system within which both articles 53 apply are very different. Thus, the ECHR concerns human rights only, and the Strasbourg machinery offers only subsidiary supervision and a minimum level of protection. In addition, it does not require a specific method of implementation or domestic effect, but is concerned with the end result. EU law is different in all these respects : it pursues not only the protection of fundamental rights,51 but also the attainment of an internal market and other objectives. This may restrict the margin of manoeuver on the part of national authorities in the choice of methods to protect fundamental rights and balance them with other interests. While the EU system does accept some variation and diversity in the local or national protection in the context of EU law, the leeway is not unlimited. Finally, EU law does impose a particular method of implementation and effectiveness in the domestic legal orders, via the direct effect and primacy of EU law. The question of the meaning of article 53 of the Charter in the relationship Charter rights – constitutional rights, has now been dealt with by the CJEU in the case of Melloni upon a reference from the Spanish Constitutional Court.52 The Court insisted on the primacy, uniformity and effectiveness of EU law : Article 53 of the Charter did not allow a Member State to disapply EU legal rules which are fully in compliance with the Charter where they infringe the fundamental rights guaranteed by that State’s constitution.

C. Dialogues between courts : the infrastructure The infrastructures and channels for dialogue between the European Court of Justice and the national courts on the one hand, and the European Court of 51

Which could until recently be considered as ancillary only, see P. Eeckhout, “The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and the Federal Question”, C.M.L.Rev., vol. 39, no 5, 2002, p. 945. 52 See the early analysis by J. Bering Liisberg, “Does the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights Threaten the Supremacy of Community Law ? Article 53 of the Charter : a fountain of law or just an inkblot ?”, Jean Monnet Working Paper 4/01, and A. Torres Pérez, “Constitutional Dialogue on the European Arrest Warrant : The Spanish Constitutional Court Knocking on Luxembourg’s Door ; Spanish Constitutional Court, Order of 9 June 2011”, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 8, 2012, p. 105.

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Human Rights and national courts on the other are very different, and hence, so are the dynamics and synergies between the actors involved. EU law provides for a preliminary reference procedure, while no such direct channel for communication exists between the ECtHR and national courts. In order to foster good relations with the national courts, the ECtHR does invite highest judges to Strasbourg every year for the opening of the judicial year and the “Dialogue between Judges”. Yet, the absence of a procedural mechanism linking national courts directly to the ECtHR is today felt as a lacuna and Draft Protocol 16 now aims to introduce system under which national courts could apply to the Court for non-binding advisory opinions on legal questions relating to interpretation of the Convention and the protocols thereto, in order to foster dialogue between courts and enhance the Court’s “constitutional” role.53

III. The Role Of National Courts In The Existing European Web Of Fundamental Rights Regimes National courts thus play a key role in all three systems of fundamental rights protection, national, ECHR and EU. Taking the perspective of the national courts (both ordinary and constitutional courts), the European human rights architecture could be summarised as follows. National courts are under a constitutional obligation to ensure that national authorities do not infringe constitutional rights. What this entails in a concrete case varies and depends on whether national law allows the courts to review legislation, annul decisions, award damages, give injunctions to public authorities etc. Complementing or sometimes replacing this constitutional protection, national courts may also, depending on the approach adopted in national law, be mandated to ensure that the ECHR is complied with. Again, the concrete powers of the national courts to enforce the ECHR domestically, where available, vary, depending on the national system. Thus, in the UK the courts are under a strong statutory obligation to seek consistent interpretation, and they can make a declaration of incompatibility, but they cannot set aside an Act of Parliament, let alone annul it. In other countries, such as Belgium and the Netherlands, all courts can set aside Acts of Parliament for breach of the ECHR, while in Belgium the constitutional court in addition has jurisdiction to annul such legislation. The concrete powers of the judge may thus vary, whether she enforces national or ECHR rights. Thus, in some states, the ordinary courts can set aside legislation for infringement of the ECHR, while they are precluded from doing so when the same legislation violates the Constitution. Where the judicial powers are similar under the Constitution and the ECHR, it may often not matter whether the court applies the constitution or the ECHR : there seems to be convergence in the scope and meaning of ECHR and constitutional rights, and the ECHR allows for higher levels of constitutional protection. Where the protection 53

See Draft Explanatory report to Protocol No. 16 (DH-GDR(2012)020), available on the website of the Council of Europe.

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offered by the ECHR is higher, the national law will have to be adapted, which may also require the courts to adapt their interpretation of fundamental rights and the possibility to deviate from them. In cases coming within the scope of EU law, the picture becomes more complex. The court will first have to decide whether EU law and the Charter apply (article 51 Charter). It will then have to decide on the scope and meaning of the Charter provisions, taking due account of the ECHR and national constitutional traditions (article 52 Charter). At the same time it will have to take account of the obligations under the ECHR. A divergence between the ECHR standard and the EU standard may occur.54 If EU law and the Charter demand a higher level of protection than the ECHR, no problem occurs : the national court can comply with both international obligations, without violating one or the other. The opposite situation would be more problematic, namely when the level of protection offered by EU law and the EU Charter would fall below the standard imposed by the ECHR and the Strasbourg Court. In such a situation, the national court would truly find itself caught in the middle, and abiding by EU law would force it to violate the ECHR. Yet, it does not seem very likely that this situation will indeed occur, given the commitment in the Charter to comply with the Convention standards and the clear policy of the EU and its Courts to take account of the ECHR and the Strasbourg case law. This leaves us with the third type of conflicting obligations,55 namely where it is the national constitution that imposes a higher standard rather than the EU or the ECHR.56 The ECHR does not have any difficulty with that type of situation : it provides only a minimum and allows for higher levels of protection. This is different in the context of the EU : the primacy of EU law does not allow member states to offer higher protection if such would lead to the member state not complying with its obligations under EU law. Now, in many cases, EU law provides for techniques and mechanisms which do allow the member state to offer the protection warranted by the national Constitution. Secondary legislation may provide for exceptions based on constitutional choices. More common are techniques of justified deviations, for instance in the context of internal market law (with Schmidberger and Omega as the most famous examples),57 or by the application of article 4(2) TEU. Yet, in all these cases, the exception is provided by EU

A recent example can be found in Joined Cases C-71/11 and C-99/11, Germany v. Y and Z, judgment of 5 September 2012. One caveat is still in place : to portray these conflicts as conflicts between either “more or less protection” or “higher or lower levels of protection” is of no avail in cases of a collision of rights in horizontal settings, where a higher level of protection of one party leads to a lower protection for the other party. While we are well aware of this complication, we leave it aside for now. 56 To be sure, from the perspective of the EU and the ECHR it does not make a difference whether the source is constitutional or not. 57 Case C-112/00, Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-05659 and Case C-36/02, Omega [2004] ECR I-09609. 55

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law itself and with the approval of the European institutions and the CJEU, and not unilaterally by the member states or their courts.58 Now, does accession have an impact on the functioning of the national courts and their relationships with the European Courts ? Before we embark on a discussion of this question, we will briefly discuss the aspects of accession which are relevant to the national courts.

IV. Accession of the EU to the ECHR Accession of the EU to the ECHR constitutes a major step in the architecture human rights in Europe. It has been on the agenda for a very long time. Proponents of accession see it as a way to close gaps in legal protection59 and to give individuals the same protection vis-à-vis the EU (acting directly or indirectly via the member states) as they presently enjoy against member states. It would furthermore demonstrate the commitment of the EU to human rights, by submitting the EU’s legal system to independent external control exercised by Strasbourg. Also, it would avoid divergences between the respective bodies of case law of both European courts on the interpretation of human rights, by settling the question of final authority over the interpretation of the ECHR, and thus preventing the national courts from being caught in the middle. Finally, it would prevent the member states from being held liable for violations of the ECHR which are in fact attributable to the EU. Discussed for over thirty years, accession became a legal obligation under the Treaty of Lisbon.60 On the part of the ECHR, protocol No. 14 to the Convention amended article 59 ECHR providing the legal basis for accession, allowing the EU to become a party to the ECHR. At the moment, the 47 member states of the Council of Europe are parties to the Convention. The EU will be the first international organisation to become a party to the ECHR, without becoming a member of the Council of Europe. The first proposals regarding technical and legal issues of accession were made by the Council of Europe’s Steering Committee on Human Rights (CDDH) as early as 2002.61 Official negotiations commenced in July 2010.62 A committee of experts (Informal Group on Accession of the EU to the ECHR ; CDDH-UE) was entrusted with the task of drafting legal instruments setting out modalities of the acces-

On the role of article 4(2) TEU see M. Claes, “Negotiating constitutional identity or whose identity is it anyway ?”, in M. Claes et al. (eds), Constitutional Conversations in Europe, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2012, p. 205. These gaps could arise because applications could not be brought directly against the (see Eur. Ct. H.R. (5th sect.), Connolly v. 15 member States of the EU, dec. of 9 December 2008, Appl. No. 73274/01), and because under the Bosphorus doctrine, the standard of protection is lowered when member states act as agents for the EU : the presumption of equivalent protection could be rebutted only by proving that protection was “manifestly deficient”, thus effectively introducing double standards of protection in the ECHR system. 60 Article 6 (2) of the Treaty on European Union. 61 Technical and legal issues of a possible EC/EU accession to the European Convention on Human Rights, CDDH (2002) 010 Addendum 2. 62 Council of Europe, press release 545(2010), 7 July 2010. 59

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sion, working in close co-operation with the Commission. This resulted in the Draft Accession Treaty (hereinafter the draft).63 The two main procedural novelties are the co-respondent mechanism and the procedure of prior involvement. The co-respondent mechanism was considered necessary to accommodate the specific situation of the Union as a non-State entity with an autonomous legal system that is becoming a party to the Convention alongside its own member states.64 When an application is directed against one or more member state of the EU, the EU may become a co-respondent to the proceedings if it appears that alleged violation calls into question the compatibility of EU law with the Convention rights. Likewise, the mechanism would allow the EU member states to become co-respondents to cases in which the applicant has directed an application only against the EU.65 In cases where alleged violations against the EU and the EU member states are different the co-respondent mechanism would not apply. The draft states two conditions under which the co-respondent mechanism is triggered.66 First, in case one or more member state is indicated as a respondent and not the EU, the EU may become co-respondent if the alleged violation of the Convention concerns EU primary and/or secondary law and could only have been avoided by disregarding the obligation under EU law. With respect to primary EU law, this is striking, as it is up to the member states acting together to change EU primary law, while the EU itself is unable to remove such violations without the consent of the member states.67 Accordingly, if a violation were to be found, the EU would not be in a position to do what it takes to comply with the decision of the ECtHR. While this may seem an exceptional situation which is unlikely to occur, the explicit mention of primary law does raise questions. Second, if the EU is indicated as a respondent and not one of its member states, the member state may become co-respondent if the alleged violation of the Convention concerns EU primary law (i.e. the Treaties and other instruments having the same legal value) and notably, could only have been avoided by disregarding an obligation under those instruments. A Contracting Party will become a co-respondent only at its own request and by a decision of the ECtHR. The Court will seek the views of all parties to the proceedings before assessing whether the two conditions as stated in Article 3 (2) and (3) of the draft are met. The second procedural novelty concerns the mechanism of prior involvement. In proceedings in which the EU is co-respondent, the CJEU will have the opportunity to assess the compatibility of the relevant provision(s) of EU law with the

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Convention, if it had not done so, before the procedure continues in Strasbourg.68 This mechanism was proposed in order to remedy the situations where a member state implementing EU law has been accused of violating the Convention rights, and the CJEU has not pronounced itself on the alleged violation and remedy it, as the case has not come before it. Since references for preliminary rulings in EU law are not in the hands of the applicants but in those of the national courts, the condition of ‘exhaustion of domestic remedies’ for admissibility in Strasbourg will not include the condition that a reference has been made.69 Accordingly, applications may arrive in Strasbourg before Luxembourg has had a chance to look at the issue.70 It was considered appropriate that in cases in which the EU is co-respondent, the CJEU would not be circumvented, since EU law is at stake. Moreover, such a mechanism should be able to accommodate a specific situation of the EU as a non-State entity with an autonomous legal order. The draft does not deal with the procedure before the CJEU, since this is a matter of EU law. The decision of the Luxembourg Court will not be binding for the ECtHR. The procedure was suggested by the CJEU itself in a discussion document released shortly after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, on certain aspects on the accession of the EU to the ECHR. The Court pointed out that it alone had the task of ensuring proper interpretation and application of EU law, and jurisdiction to declare EU legislation void.71 Furthermore, the CJEU made reference to the subsidiary character of the ECHR system, and stated that a mechanism needed to be found to ensure that the question of validity of an EU act could be brought effectively before the CJEU before the ECtHR would have the opportunity to rule on the compatibility of that act with the Convention.72 Yet, ideally, this mechanism should never be used, as this would suggest that a national court has not made appropriate use of the preliminary reference procedure under article 267 TFEU. Accordingly, and somewhat paradoxically, the proposal seems to be aimed at comforting the CJEU’s distrust of the national courts, rather than of the ECtHR. This is striking, as it seems to place the burden of a ‘malfunctioning’ of the internal EU system at the doorstep of the ECHR system of enforcement and of the applicant seeking a decision in her case. In any case, the Strasbourg Court supported the CJEU’s point of view. A joint communication of the Presidents of the ECtHR and the CJEU, Costa and Skouris, 68

Draft Revised Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 47+1(2013)008rev2 (Strasbourg, 10 June 2013), Article 3 (6). Draft Explanatory Report to the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 47+1(2013)008rev2 (Strasbourg, 10 June 2013). 70 Note however, that these situations may also occur in cases brought against States and not involving EU law, namely that the constitutional court has not been able to pronounce itself, for instance because the reference was not been made by the national court. No exception has ever been made in this type of cases, and the condition of prior involvement of a constitutional court is alien to the ECHR system. When a decision of a constitutional court has been handed, this will be taken into account, but it does not ‘save’ the State from a possible finding of a breach. See e.g. Eur. Ct. H.R. (3rd sect.), Von Hannover v. Germany, judgment of 24 June 2004, Appl. No. 59320/00. 71 Discussion Document of the Court of Justice of the European Union on certain aspects of the accession of the European Union to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 5 May 2010, para. 8. 72 Ibidem, para. 7. 69

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basically restated the position of the CJEU : a flexible procedure should be put in place allowing the CJEU to carry out an internal review before the ECtHR carries out its external review.73 Nevertheless, the solution also contains a risk of direct conflict between the two European courts, as indicated by some delegations in the European Council.74 Indeed, matters of interpretation in Strasbourg and Luxembourg are similar but not identical and conflicts may arise.75 Accession should, in principle, rectify any possible inconsistencies, as the ECtHR will have the last say on the interpretation of the ECHR and the question whether it has been violated in a given case. Also, the proposed procedure does not sit comfortably with the principle of equality, which is one of the guiding principles in the negotiations : none of the national courts has a similar privilege of prior involvement, while there may be circumstances in which a case has not been seen by the constitutional court before it ends up in Strasbourg. In addition, as has been pointed out, prior involvement denies the fact that national courts are common courts of EU law. Finally, prior involvement does not give the CJEU the final say on whether or not there has been a violation, but it does grant it a first say, which in this complex constellation may be as important as having the last : the ECtHR is not likely to go against the interpretation by the Luxembourg Court, as conflicting outcomes may threaten the credibility and the legitimacy of both courts at the end of the day. It is very likely that the CJEU will be asked to give an opinion under Article 218 (11) TFEU on whether the agreement is compatible with the exigencies of the EU Treaties, and it remains to be seen whether the Court will accept it or whether amendments will be required. In any case, the CJEU’s track record concerning Opinions on treaties affecting its own jurisdiction, strongly impacts on the direction of the negotiations. The prior involvement mechanism may well be the price to pay for accession, a bitter pill the ECtHR may have to swallow in order to make accession acceptable for the CJEU. The future will tell whether it is a pill worth swallowing.

V. Accession and its impact on national courts So, what will be the impact of accession on national courts and on the triangular set of relationships, involving national courts, Luxembourg and Strasbourg ?

The ECHR as part of EU law Upon accession, the EU will be internationally bound by the ECHR, and will accordingly be subject to the Strasbourg system of supervision, making it possible for 73

Joint communication from Presidents Costa and Skouris, 17 January 2011, available on the website of the European Court of Human Rights. 74 Council document 10568/10 of 2 June 2010 authorising the Commission to negotiate the Accession Agreement of the European Union to the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), p. 5. 75 The traditional reference is to Joined Cases 46/87 and 247/87, Hoechst [1989] ECR I-2859 and the subsequent judgment in Eur. Ct. H.R., Niemietz v. Germany, 16 December 1992, Appl. No. 13710/88.

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individuals to bring complaints directly against the EU, and for the ECtHR to lift the preferential treatment of the EU which it has resorted to until now (Bosphorus). Moreover, upon the entry into force of the accession Treaty,76 the ECHR, just like other treaties concluded by the EU, will become part of EU law.77 It will acquire the same characteristics as EU law, including primacy. National courts will thus be under an obligation, within the scope of application of EU law, to enforce the ECHR, if necessary by setting aside conflicting provisions of national law. This implies, that within that scope, all national courts become human rights courts, and are under an EU obligation to review national law in the light of the ECHR. While this does not change anything for the judge in, say, the Netherlands, where all courts already review all national law in the light of the ECHR in all cases including those outside the scope of EU law, it does extend the powers and responsibilities of, say, the German, Italian and British courts, which under the domestic system and outside the scope of EU law, must leave the review of compliance of primary legislation with human rights to the constitutional court (Italy and Germany) or to Parliament (the UK). Human rights protection and review thus become more decentralized, and constitutional courts will also, in those systems where they have thus far retained a monopoly to review primary legislation, have to share their responsibility with the ordinary courts. The domestic application of the ECHR will thus become differentiated within the member states, whether or not a case comes within the scope of application of EU law. While in the latter situation the powers and competences of the ordinary courts are defined by the national constitutional set-up, in the former case, it is a matter of EU law and all courts have review powers. Now, while these shifts in the domestic balance between legislatures, constitutional and ordinary courts may seem revolutionary, on a closer look, it may all turn out to be less dramatic. Indeed, as has been recalled, the ECHR largely corresponds with the Charter, which already has the same legal force as primary EU law under article 6(1) TEU. Given the substantive equivalence between Charter and ECHR, the duties of consistent interpretation contained in article 52 (3) of the Charter and the repeated statements of intention for consistency on the part of both European Courts, a national act that allegedly infringes the ECHR will usually, for the same reasons, also allegedly infringe the Charter (and, for that matter, the national Constitution). And national courts must, already today, within the scope of EU law, ensure that Charter rights are duly respected.78 In fact, that same obligation to ensure compliance with EU fundamental rights in the domestic application of EU law also existed before the Charter was even adopted, through the general principles of EU law, and before that, through the

Accession requires ratification in accordance with article 218(8) TFEU and requires ratification by all member states in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements. Case 181/73, Haegeman v. Belgium [1974] ECR 449. 78 On the scope of the Charter, Case C-617/10, Åkerberg Fransson, decision of 26 February 2013, n.y.r. See also K. Lenaerts, “Exploring the Limits of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights”, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 8, no 3, 2012, p. 375. 77

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general principles of Community law.79 Moreover, as is stated in article 6(3) TEU, the EU already considers itself unilaterally bound by the rights protected under the ECHR, through general principles of EU law. The ECHR does not as such form part of EU law, but it is, so to speak, drawn into EU law by the EU itself. Accordingly, national courts are already under an obligation to enforce EU fundamental rights, and these are defined with reference to the ECHR.80 In this light, the recent Kamberaj decision of the CJEU is puzzling.81 The Italian referring court wanted to know whether in case of a conflict between a provision of domestic law and the ECHR, the reference to the ECHR in Article 6 TEU obliged the national court to apply Articles 14 ECHR and Article 1 of [Protocol No. 12] directly, disapplying the incompatible source of domestic law, without having first to raise the issue of constitutionality before the national constitutional court. If the CJEU would answer the question in the affirmative, this would have an important impact on the effect of the ECHR in certain domestic legal orders. The ECHR would then, through EU law, acquire the same qualities as EU law, including primacy. As a consequence, all national courts, including ordinary courts, would become ‘ordinary courts of human rights’, since they are ‘ordinary courts of EU law’. This would be especially significant for those countries where, until now, the constitutional court has the monopoly to review primary laws, as is the case in Italy and Germany, or where the courts do not have jurisdiction to set aside primary legislation for breach of the ECHR, such as in the UK. A clear answer affirming these implications of article 6(3) TEU would thus lay to bare the shifts in the national constitutional design. Yet, in its answer, the Court avoided the issue and narrowed down its answer to the effect of the ECHR qua ECHR, stating that article 6(3) TEU does not govern the relationship between the ECHR and the legal systems of the member states and does not lay down the consequences to be drawn by a national court in case of conflict between the rights guaranteed by ECHR and national law. While this decision may well be legally correct (yet highly ambiguous !), the decision at the same time neglects the fact that the same article 6(3) TEU does confirm that the fundamental rights as protected by ECHR are general principles of EU law, and must be complied with as general principles of EU law. In other cases, the Court has not hesitated to declare that national courts must guarantee the full effectiveness of the general principles, setting aside any provision of national law which may conflict with EU law.82 After accession the CJEU will no longer be able to duck this type of inquiries into the obligations which EU law imposes on national courts. It will have to give clear guidance to the national courts on their obligations as a matter of EU law. In fact, as a party to the ECHR, the EU and its Court will be under an ECHR obligation to ensure that within their jurisdiction, ECHR rights are protected. 79

The seminal case is Case C-260/89, ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. Case C-101/01, Lindqvist [2003] ECR I-12971 ; Case C-305/05, Ordre des barreaux francophones et germanophone and Others [2007] ECR I-5305 ; Case C-260/89, ERT [1991] ECR I-2925. 81 Case C-571/10, Kamberaj, decision of 24 April 2012, n.y.r. 82 Case C-144/04, Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981. 80

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If talk of a revolutionary change –accession transforms all national courts into human rights courts and extends the effect of the ECHR in domestic systemsis indeed appropriate, it has already taken place long time ago. The obligation imposed on national courts to enforce human rights in the scope of application of EU law already exists under EU law absent accession, and the ECHR is crucial also today in defining the contours of this obligation via the interpretation of the Charter and the general principles of EU law. Any further adaptations implicated by accession concern the form, rather than the substance of the duties imposed on national courts. While the fact that the ECHR will become effective in a more overt manner without first being transformed into general principles may matter a great deal psychologically, given the current political sensitivity of European human rights protection and the attacks on the legitimacy of the ECtHR. Yet, on substance, this rather seems like a case of old wine and new bottles.

Which relationships ? Accession will add to the overall landscape the external supervision of the EU by the Strasbourg machinery. It will allow individuals to bring complaints directly against the EU, rather than having to follow indirect routes via the member states who co-author or implement EU law. Accession thus makes a significant change to the overall architecture, and adds a new actor and new procedures to the EU system of fundamental rights protection. Politically and symbolically accession is highly significant : it completes the ECHR system of protection, and fills the gaps that had been created by the transfers of sovereignty to the EU. In substance, though, there is a lot of continuity, and accession confirms at the international level the commitment of the EU to the values and rights protected under the ECHR, which is already contained in article 6 TEU. Yet, bringing in new players and new procedural relationships may affect the dynamics of the system as a whole. Accession concerns first and foremost the relationship between the EU and the ECHR and between Luxembourg and Strasbourg. It does not seem to have a direct and immediate impact on the procedural relationship between national courts and the CJEU, even though once upon a time, accession may have been thought of as a way to convince the national constitutional courts to give up their Solange-position on primacy and fundamental rights. Also, in and of itself, accession does not impact on the relationships between national courts and the ECtHR. Nevertheless, after accession there seems to be no reason for the ECtHR to prolong the Bosphorus doctrine, which lowers the intensity of the review the Strasbourg Court applies when reviewing national measures obliged by EU law. The Bosphorus doctrine was developed in order to deal with the gap in legal protection caused by the fact that the EU was not a party to the ECHR and no complaints could be brought against it, while the member state implementing EU law did not have control over the measures which allegedly infringed ECHR rights of the applicant. After accession, there européen des droits de l’homme |2013/4 646|Journal European journal of Human Rights

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is no longer a need for the construction, and Strasbourg should return to the general rule, and forsake the preferential treatment of the EU.83

Simultaneous and consecutive application One of the main difficulties national judges are dealing with is when to apply which catalogue, and which test. In this vein, they are struggling a great deal with the application of the Charter,84 which states in its article 51(1) that it is binding on the member states ‘only in so far as they implement EU law’.85 This provision is central to the relation between EU fundamental rights and the member states’ legal systems. It is however not yet clear what exactly triggers the application of the Charter. Now, accession in itself does not change the constellation for national courts with respect to the Charter : the scope of the Charter is an issue for the EU and its member states. Another problem for national courts is how to combine the application of overlapping catalogues where two or more apply, and to decide whether infringements are justified in a particular case. This is not a new phenomenon : as has been explained, the simultaneous application of fundamental rights instruments is fairly common, and courts cope rather well. They usually take recourse to methods of consistent interpretation,86 and will apply the conditions for justified restrictions to fundamental rights cumulatively. So for instance the Belgian constitutional court seems to lump the different sources together, and ‘maximizes the protection of human rights by requiring that a limitation to a human right guaranteed both by [the Constitution] and by an [ECHR] provision meets both the formal standards laid down in the Constitution and the material standards laid down in the ECHR’.87 As long as the diverse sources allow for this and the maximization of the protection of one fundamental right does not affect the rights of others or justified general interests, this is not problematic. Yet, there will be instances in which the various sources strike different balances, and lead to different outcomes, or where different competing may (also) be at stake. In such cases, simply lumping together the various sources will no longer be possible. Adding yet another actor and procedural avenue into the equation further increases the already existing complexity, which can in itself be detrimental for the enjoyment of rights and for their judicial enforcement. There may be finan83

L. Besselink, “The European Union and the European Convention of Human Rights after the Lisbon Treaty : from Bosphorus sovereign immunity to full scrutiny ?”, paper available on ssrn. See for instance the 23rd colloquium organised by the Association of Council of State and Supreme Jurisdictions of the European Union, Madrid 25-26 June 2012. 85 Article 51 (1) of the EU Charter. 86 The examples mentioned above include the Spanish Constitutional provision and the practice of e.g. the Belgian constitutional court. 87 As explained in M. Bossuyt and W. Verrijdt, “The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment”, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 7, no 3, 2011, p. 362. 84

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cial as well as legitimacy costs to all of this, both for individual litigants and for society as a whole : procedure will become even more protracted, and it will take even more time to achieve closure.88 The human rights case law of both European Courts has to be absorbed into the domestic legal systems, where it is likely to give rise to an ever larger case load. This concern has recently been voiced by Lady Arden, who raised the question of how the (domestic) judiciary should react to the (European) case law on a collective basis : “if we are satisfactorily to meet the challenges which European law presents, we in the domestic courts need to think carefully about how to make the best of the system. I would like to start a debate at the level of national courts about how to achieve the most suitable form of supranational adjudication in Europe. I have no doubt that international courts discuss among themselves how to operate effectively. The supranational courts are not slow to say what they expect of national courts. But I would argue that the question of how to achieve the most suitable form of supranational adjudication must also be considered from the perspective of national systems. It is time to turn the tables and ask what the national courts are entitled to expect of supranational courts. So far as national courts are concerned, it is only natural that, where practical, national supreme courts should be asking this question and taking the lead in making any structural changes in the relationship”.89

Diverging standards Another consequence of the further development of a multi-level system of fundamental rights is that the risk of diverging interpretations of fundamental rights will substantially increase. Even if both the Charter and the draft accession Treaty seek to avoid cases of divergent interpretation, experience shows that it is difficult to avoid contradictions where two differently worded texts on the same subjectmatter are interpreted by two different courts.90 As explained before, legally, only in certain constellations does a divergence create a real conflict for the national court, namely when the respective standards are impossible to apply simultaneously, and complying with one would necessarily lead to a violation of the other. These cases have so far appeared to be rather rare. Yet, divergences in the level of protection of fundamental rights between national courts, the CJEU and ECHR will arise more and more often, with EU law expanding into more sensitive areas, with the Charter into force and litigants beginning to find their way to Luxembourg to have their fundamental rights protected. Also, such divergences will more and more often be the result merely of different ways to strike a balance between conflicting rights, or a clash of fundamental rights with other social values or general interests.

This has also been pointed out by NGO’s who have made their views known in the course of the negotiations. Rt Hon Lady Justice Arden DBE, “Peaceful or Problematic ? The Relationship between National Supreme Courts and Supranational Courts in Europe”, Yearbook of European Law, vol. 29, no 1, 2010, p. 5. 90 This concerns the ECHR and EU law but the same logic could be applied to national law as well. 89

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Most divergences can be solved by applying rules of construction (e.g. conform interpretation), avoidance of conflict (e.g. margin of appreciation) or conflict rules. Yet even if they can legally be solved in this way, diverging standards can be problematic in another respect. Following a decision adopted by one or both of the European court may force the national courts to hand decisions which may carry lower social legitimacy and societal acceptance at home. Now, this is not caused by accession of the EU to the ECHR in and of itself and is inherent in involving non-national charters and international courts.91 Think for instance of the commotion in the UK concerning voting rights for prisoners since Hirst, or the debate in many countries on the implications of Salduz. Legally, there is no question that these decisions are binding have to be complied with. Nevertheless, the increased involvement of both European Courts in sensitive matters which fundamental rights cases often entail, do call for sensitivity and caution on their part, since not only their own legitimacy but also that of national courts and human rights tout court may be at stake. These concerns would endorse a search for consistent interpretation and harmonious application of the various sources. More standards, less protection ? Yet there is also a downside to the search for coherence and coherence must not become an aim in itself. Though it may be confusing for citizens if different courts arrive at different conclusions on the basis of the same or similar provisions,92 the system is such that it allows for such divergences. This is obvious in the relationship national law – ECHR (subsidiary system, margin of appreciation and minimum standard), and not uncommon in the relationship national law-EU (justified restrictions, decision for national court, national identity). The search for coherence and harmony expressed in the various documents, in the case law of the respective courts and the extrajudicial comments of their members, should not have a chilling effect on the protection of rights. Minimum standards should not be mistaken for general standards. Examples of such ‘stiffening effects’ already exist. Thus in the UK and in the Netherlands, level of protection offered by the ECHR is adopted as the national standard, as was expressed by Lord Bingham in Ullah : “to keep pace with Strasbourg jurisprudence as it evolves over time : no more but certainly no less”.93 Not only is such position not called for under article 53 ECHR, it may also prevent further evolution and emulation, not only at the national, but also at the European level. As was recently recalled by the British judge in the ECHR, it is healthy that national courts should feel free to criticise Strasbourg judgments where those judgments have applied principles which are unclear or inconsistent or where they have misunderstood national law or practices.94 European human rights protection does 91

This is inherent in any form of review of compliance with fundamental rights by other actors, including also national courts. In that context this is known as the counter-majoritarian problem. As stated by President Costa, cited above. 93 R (Ullah) v. Special Adjudicator [2004] 2 AC 323 at [20]. The stance has since been relaxed, see B. Hale, “Argentoratum Locutum : Is Strasbourg or the Supreme Court Supreme ?”, Human Rights Law Review, vol. 12, no. 1 (2012), p. 65, and see R v. Horncastle and others (Appellants) (on appeal from the Court of Appeal Criminal Division) [2009] UKSC 14. 94 N. Bratza, “The relationship between the UK courts and Strasbourg”, E.H.R.L.R., vol. 5, 2011, p. 505. 92

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not and should not seek harmonisation of human rights protection as an aim in itself : it can only be a means to the end of better protection. Procedural strategies Further questions which national courts will be confronted with concern procedural issues, procedural economy and judicial strategy. We restrict our discussion here to the situation where national authorities implement EU law. When individuals make a serious claim before the national court that their fundamental rights have been infringed, the court will have to make a decision whether or not to make a reference for preliminary ruling to Luxembourg. This decision will have to be taken in a different context after accession. If no preliminary reference is made, this may trigger the prior involvement procedure at a later stage if the applicant brings her case to Strasbourg. Whether or not a reference is made at this stage, the procedure is likely to build in a very lengthy litigation involving three systems of courts, with ensuing financial implications, and at the cost of justice being delayed. National courts as well as the litigants before them will have to make their decisions taking account of a number of concerns, including time, need for closure, financial costs, etc. National courts may have an institutional interest in having the case off their docket as fast as possible, passing it on to a higher or non-national court (be it that in the case of Luxembourg it will return !). They will have to calculate the pros and cons of involving Luxembourg, and of opening up the State to applications in Strasbourg. This must also be seen in the context of the national settings in which these national courts are operating, and their relationship with political actors and the public at large. ‘Partnering’ with Luxembourg (or Strasbourg) may be part of a wider strategy to borrow legitimacy of these European Courts, or reversely, to outsource controversies which the domestic courts cannot settle at home.95 National judicial relationships In many member states both EU and ECHR law shift the relationships among national courts, more specifically between lower and highest courts, and, where relevant, between national ordinary and constitutional courts. Ordinary courts are always (EU law) or sometimes (depending on the national system) given review powers, which bring them in competition with the constitutional courts. Accession to the ECHR and the more overt incorporation of ECHR law into EU law described above, confirms this trend. Ordinary courts may be inclined to answer fundamental rights issues themselves, thus circumventing the constitutional court or even effectively cutting it off. They may also involve the Luxem95

The term is borrowed from W. Sadurski, “Partnering with Strasbourg : Constitutionalization of the European Court of Human Rights, the Accession of Central and East European States to the Council of Europe, and the Idea of Pilot Judgments”, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1295652. Examples of such cases in which domestic battles are outsourced to Luxembourg include the references of the Belgian constitutional court in Case C-212/06 Flemish Insurance [2008] ERC I-01683 and the Czech Supreme Administrative Court in C-399/09 Landtová [2011] ERC I-00000.

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bourg court instead, by making references on points of EU law, at times escaping domestic preliminary rulings procedures as well as disobeying constitutional judgments.96 In France and Belgium, the legislature has intervened in order to ensure that the constitutional courts can fulfil their role of guardian of the Constitution in the domestic system. This in turn may result in prioritising the constitutional courts at the cost of the CJEU. The CJEU has settled the issue by holding that as long as there is still the possibility for all courts at all times to make a reference to the CJEU, a prior involvement of the constitutional court does not infringe EU law.97 Now, while this may be complex as it is – is it affected by accession ? Perhaps not directly : national courts must still comply with EU law, prevent violations of the ECHR and naturally comply with the national law. Nevertheless, the new architecture of the inter-court relationships after accession does change the background against which national courts adopt their decisions and design their strategies. Conceptualising the relationship between courts and rights regimes Academics and increasingly also members of both European courts as well as constitutional courts have become accustomed to describe the relationships between the relevant systems and courts in terms of “Verfassungsgerichtsverbund” (Voßkuhle),98 “constitutional pluralism”, “multilevel constitutionalism” and in terms of networks. In the words of the president of the Belgian constitutional court, writing extra-judicially : The ECHR, primary EU law and national constitutions must be regarded as being part of one multilevel constitution, in which it is up to the three types of constitutional courts, i.e., the Strasbourg Court, the Luxembourg Court and the national constitutional courts, to find, through judicial dialogue, an equilibrium whenever parts of this compound European constitution come into conflict. In such a framework, there is no room for hierarchy between national and supranational constitutional law.99

Such spirit of cooperation, dialogue, equilibrium, and avoidance of conflict is certainly welcome, but it should not obscure the fact that after accession, there will be a formal relationship between the ECtHR and the CJEU, with the ECtHR more clearly than before supervising compliance with the ECHR by the EU and its member states acting as agents. Similarly, talk of pluralism, networks and absence of clear hierarchy should not detract from the fact that national courts are also bound by the EU fundamental rights and the case law of the CJEU and cannot let their constitutional rights prevail without infringing their obligations under EU law. Nevertheless, 96 M. Bossuyt and W. Verrijdt, “The Full Effect of EU Law and of Constitutional Review in Belgium and France after the Melki Judgment”, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 7, no 3, 2011, p. 384. 97 Joined Cases C‑188/10, Melki and Case C‑189/10, Abdeli [2010] ERC I-05667. 98 A. Vosskuhle, “Multilevel Cooperation of the European Constitutional Courts : Der Europäische Verfassungsgerichtsverbund”, European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 6, 2010, p. 175. 99 M. Bossuyt and W. Verrijdt, op. cit., pp. 365‑366.

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for the system to function well, courts should all be aware of the concerns and preoccupations of the other orders. Accession will provide the answer to the question of ultimate authority when it comes to ECHR rights and resolve the problem of coexistence of norms when the case law of the European courts diverges. For the national courts, things may therefore appear in a different light after accession.

Implementing ECtHR decisions A Strasbourg finding of a violation by the EU or the EU and one or more member states, will call for action by the EU and/or its member states to comply with the decision. This may involve legislative, administrative and judicial action at both the EU and the national level, depending on the facts of the case and the legal background. There may be cases in which a national court would then be confronted with EU law which has been found to violate the ECHR, but which has not yet been amended accordingly. Could in such a case, the national court set aside EU law ? Certainly, under EU law it could not, but one can imagine that national courts may be tempted in such case, to omit the reference to Luxembourg and draw their own conclusions following the decision of the ECtHR.

VI. Conclusion This article has sought to identify and discuss the position of national courts in the multi-sourced European legal space involving EU, ECHR and national law. Our expectation is that national courts are likely to face significant challenges in the fundamental rights area in the years to come. The implications of the binding character of the EU Charter as well as the accession of the EU to the ECHR will considerably affect relationship between the CJEU and the ECtHR but also their relationships with national courts. The position of national courts is the most difficult one since they are at the crossroads of three legal systems : as State organs, they ensure compliance of their State with the ECHR, they must at the same time uphold their national Constitution, and comply with EU law and EU fundamental rights. One of the concerns indicated here is that of competing and conflicting obligations for the protection of fundamental rights, since different catalogues of fundamental rights may not require the same level of protection and, are interpreted by different highest courts, while clear and generally accepted rules governing their mutual relationship are lacking. The challenges posed by overlapping protection systems are described in the Advocate General Maduro’s opinion in the Elfagaji case : [T]he protection of fundamental rights in the Community legal order exists alongside other European systems of protection of fundamental rights. These include both systems developed within the national legal systems and those stemming from the ECHR. Each of those protection mechanisms certainly européen des droits de l’homme |2013/4 652|Journal European journal of Human Rights

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pursues objectives which are specific to it and the mechanisms are certainly constructed from legal instruments particular to them, but sometimes they apply none the less to the same facts. In such a context, it is important, for each existing protection system, while maintaining its independence, to seek to understand how the other systems interpret and develop those same fundamental rights in order not only to minimise the risk of conflicts, but also to begin a process of informal construction of a European area of protection of fundamental rights. The European area thus created will, largely, be the product of the various individual contributions from the different protection systems existing at European level.100

Another and related problem for national judges is that they find themselves in an ever more complex institutional and procedural environment. As pointed out earlier, this complexity may become a threat in itself, for the individual applicant seeking to enforce his or her rights, for the judges operating it and for the system as a whole. Each existing protection system will have to find a way to understand how fundamental rights are interpreted and developed by other systems in order to minimise the risk of conflicts and ensure the optimal protection for the individual. But this is easier said than done. There is a mighty task ahead for national courts. Monica Claes Professor of European and Comparative Constitutional Law Maastricht University e‑mail : monica.claes@maastrichtuniversity.nl

Šejla Imamović Researcher at the University Maastricht e‑mail : sejla.imamovic@maastrichtuniveristy.nl

100

Case C-465/07, Elgafaji [2009] ERC I-00921, Opinion of AG Maduro, para. 22.

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Abstract

Résumé

his article examines the potential consequences of EU accession to the ECHR for the attribution of conduct to the Member States and/or international organisations under the law of international responsibility before the European Court of Human Rights. It first provides a critical assessment of the quest of the European Commission to exempt the EU from the general international law of responsibility before various international organs. It then discusses the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights concerning attribution of conduct in joint operations pursuant to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy, UNSC resolutions and NATO resolutions. It concludes that the analytical approach of the European Court of Human Rights on the attribution of conduct is doctrinally flawed, and that the policy of the European Commission seeking special treatment for the EU is misguided. It also explains why it is doubtful whether the accession of the EU to the Convention would substantially improve these problems.

et article examine les conséquences potentielles de l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme sur la question de l’attribution de comportements aux États membres et/ou à l’organisation internationale dont ils sont membres, au regard du droit de la responsabilité internationale. Il offre d’abord une lecture critique de la position de la Commission européenne, qui paraît revendiquer une exemption de l’Union européenne du droit général de la responsabilité internationale devant différents organes internationaux de règlement des différends. Il examine ensuite la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme concernant les questions d’attribution des comportements dans les opérations conduites dans le cadre de la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune de l’UE, pour la mise en œuvre de résolutions du Conseil de sécurité de l’ONU ou pour celle de résolutions de l’OTAN. En conclusion, l’on peut s’interroger sur la cohérence de l’approche suivie par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme sur les questions d’attribution, aussi bien que sur le bien-fondé de la revendication de la Commission européenne en faveur d’un traitement spécifique au bénéfice de l’Union européenne. Il y a lieu de douter que l’adhésion de l’UE à la Convention apporte des améliorations substantielles sur les problèmes ainsi identifiés.

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I. Introduction

he accession of the European Union (‘EU’ or ‘the Union’) to the European Convention on Human Rights 1950 (‘ECHR’ or ‘the Convention’) is now in medias res with negotiations concluded for a draft accession agreement and subsequent ratification.1 Although several stages lie ahead before the completion of this process, its consequences for the EU, the Member States, the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’ or ‘Strasbourg Court’) and third parties are potentially profound. Analysis of the ratification process and its implications for the adjudication of claims concerning the Union before the Strasbourg Court is therefore timely. With the increased international activity and inter-organisational cooperation of the post-Cold War period alongside the evolution and expansion of the EU and Council of Europe, these originally parallel regimes have increasingly interfaced with one another and with the United Nations (‘UN’) and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (‘NATO’) in practice. The Strasbourg Court has adjudicated several applications concerning the activities of Member States pursuant to UN Security Council (‘UNSC’), NATO and/or EU mandates. This is connected to the wider phenomena of ‘proliferation’ and ‘fragmentation’ of international law by which risk of conflict amongst legal regimes increases with their number and power.2 The demand for regularity in the field of international responsibility and its integral importance to general international law is exemplified in the United Nations International Law Commission (‘ILC’) Articles on State Responsibility for Internationally Wrongful Acts 20013 (‘ASR’) and the ILC Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations for Internationally Wrongful Acts (‘ARIO’).4 In 2002, the ILC commenced drafting of principles concerning the responsibility of international organisations – a matter that had been left open by Article 57 of the ASR. In 2011, the ILC adopted the ARIO on second reading. The conclusion of the ASR project by the ILC provided an impactful articulation of both orthodox and progressive principles of international responsibility. The ASR, in both draft and adopted form, have been widely applied in practice by States and by international courts and tribunals.5 Subsequently, the UN General Assembly has repeatedly delayed consideration of the adoption of the ASR as

Fifth Negotiation Meeting between the CDDH ad hoc Negotiation Group and the European Commission on the Accession of the European Union to the European Convention on Human Rights : Final Report to the CDDH, Council of Europe doc. 47+1(2013)008rev2 (10 June 2013). For the latest state of negotiations, see : http://www.coe.int/t/ dghl/standardsetting/hrpolicy/Acces-sion/default_en.asp [Accessed : 15 March 2013]. 2 See further : “Fragmentation of International Law : Difficulties Arising from the Diversification and Expansion of International Law : Report of the Study Group of the International Law Commission”, UN Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (3 April 2006), §§ 5-20. 3 GA Resn 56/83 (2001), Annex. 4 UN Doc. A/66/10, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2011, Vol. II, Part Two. 5 Crawford and Olleson, “The continuing debate on a UN convention on state responsibility”, 54(4) International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005), pp. 959‑971, 965-971.

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a treaty.6 As for the ASR, the General Assembly ‘took note’ of the ARIO on a ‘without prejudice’ basis and included it in its provisional agenda for its 2015 session.7 This article examines the potential consequences of EU accession to the ECHR for the attribution of conduct to the Member States and/or international organisations under the law of international responsibility before the Strasbourg Court. In section II, it critiques the policy of the European Commission concerning attribution of conduct before international courts and tribunals and the ILC. In section III, it assesses the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court concerning attribution of conduct in joint operations pursuant to the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (‘CFSP’), UNSC resolutions and NATO resolutions. The article focuses upon three areas of CFSP activity engaging human rights connected to the UN Security Council : 1) sanctions regimes, especially ‘targeted sanctions’ against individuals ;8 2) peacekeeping and international governance missions ; and 3) collective enforcement action.9 Whilst the jurisprudence examined in this article is also relevant to EU ‘autonomous sanctions’10 and other CFSP activity unconnected to the UNSC, the article focuses upon EU sanctions pursuant to Security Council resolutions. Moreover, the additional complexity of the UNSC context assists in elucidating doctrinal problems in the field of international responsibility.11 The article argues that the analytical approach of the Strasbourg Court has been confused on the attribution of conduct and that the policy of the European Commission seeking special treatment for the EU is misguided. An important terminological point should be noted here. Part One of both ILC texts are divided into separate chapters addressing ‘attribution of conduct’ (Chapter Two) and ‘responsibility of an international organization in connection with the act of a State or another international organization’ (Chapter Four). International responsibility is defined by Article 4 as comprising two components : 1) attribution of conduct ; and 2) breach of an international obligation. The arrangement of Part One appears to be inconsistent with this definition in 6

Most recently, the General Assembly in Resolution 65/19 (2011) provisionally included the ASR in its agenda for its sixty-eighth session to be held in 2014. International Law Commission, Report on the Work of its Sixty-Third Session (2011), UN Doc. A/66/10, §§ 80-84 ; International Law Commission, “Responsibility of International Organizations : Statement of the Chairman of the Drafting Committee” (3 June 2011), 1-2 ; UNGA Sixth Committee (Legal), ‘Report of the ILC : Report of the Sixth Committee’, UN Doc. A/66/473 (15 November 2011), ‘Draft Resolution III’ ; UNGA Resn 66/100 (2012), OP4. 8 See, e.g. Verdirame, The United Nations and Human Rights : Who Guards the Guardians ? (2011) ; Tzankopoulos, Disobeying the Security Council : Countermeasures against Wrongful Sanctions (2011) ; Ciampi, “Security Council Targeted Sanctions and Human Rights”, in Fassbender (ed.), Securing Human Rights ? Achievements and Challenges of the UN Security Council, 2011, pp. 98‑140. 9 For background on UNSC activity engaging human rights, see Fassbender, “The Role for Human Rights in the Decision-Making Process”, in Fassbender, supra note 8, pp. 74‑97, 88-92. 10 Namely, sanctions directed not towards Member States but rather towards third parties and prompted not by the UNSC or another body but emanating from the EU itself. 11 Current missions include : the Military Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo and the Naval Mission off Somalia – “Overview of the Missions and Operations of the European Union : September 2012”, online at : http://www.consilium.europa.eu/eeas/security-defence/eu-operations ? lang=en [Accessed ; 8 October 2012]. 7

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that Chapters Two and Four concern ‘attribution’ but are arranged under discrete headings and, sandwiched between the two Chapters, Chapter Three is entitled “breach of an international obligation”. The separation of the Articles contained within Chapters Two and Four is in one sense logical : whereas Chapter Two is concerned with the ‘primary’ attribution of conduct, with a conceptual predisposition towards exclusivity,12 Chapter Four addresses ‘secondary’ or ‘ancillary’ attribution. This is reflected in Article 19 within Chapter Four : “This Chapter is without prejudice to the international responsibility of the State or international organization which commits the act in question, or of any other State or international organization”. Notwithstanding the omission of ‘attribution’ from Chapter Four, since they essentially concern the problem of ‘attribution’ rather than ‘breach’, the term ‘attribution’13 is employed in this article when describing the operation of provisions under both Chapters.

II. The European Commission and the ARIO A. Legal Status of the ASR and ARIO A preliminary question is the status of the general international law of responsibility before the Strasbourg Court. Since the Court derives its authority from the Convention, to the extent that general international law (subject to ius cogens) conflicts with the Convention the Court is bound to apply the Convention. Paradoxically, this proposition derives from the general international law doctrine of lex specialis in the law of treaties.14 However, this proposition is complicated by interaction between the Convention system and other legal systems (notably, Article 103 of the UN Charter) with their own priority-of-norms provisions. Consequently, there is a tension between legal regimes that were not designed to interface with one another and each of which presupposing its own normative supremacy or speciality. In considering the status of the ASR and ARIO before the Court, the purpose of general international law to provide common rules for various legal persons was not anticipated by the fathers of the Convention. Implicit within that goal is the hierarchical supremacy of those general rules, without which their efficacy would be compromised.15 The subordination of Convention provisions to serve the need for commonality to regulate commerce between and amongst multiplying international legal persons is a counter-intuitive proposition from the perspective 12

ASR with Commentaries, Commentary to Chapter IV, §§ 1, 3, 5-8. The ILC refers in the Commentary to the ‘principle of independent responsibility’ with the situations covered in Chapter IV comprising ‘exceptions to [the principle]’ (§ 8). See further, e.g. – Dominicé, “Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States and the Implication of a State in the Act of Another State”, in Crawford et al., The Law of International Responsibility, 2010, pp. 281‑289, 282-285. 13 Stern, “Elements of an Internationally Wrongful Act”, in Crawford et al., supra note 12, pp. 193‑220, 202. 14 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969, Arts 31-33. See further the ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 2, §§ 46-122, 410-493 (esp. §§ 53-54, 56, 63-67, 119-122). See also McNair, The Law of Treaties, 1961, pp. 393‑399 as cited in the Report at § 56 (note 57). 15 ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 2, §§ 37-48, 85-87, 119-122.

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of the Court, which was tasked with applying and upholding the primacy of the Convention vis-à-vis the parties to the Convention. The lack of guidance within the Convention concerning the status of general international law within the Convention system complicates the resolution of applications engaging problems of responsibility on which the Convention is silent, vague or divergent from general international law. Article 1 (“obligation to respect human rights”) pertains to responsibility : “The High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention”.16 However, Article 1 concerns the discrete issue of “breach” rather than that of “attribution”17 in that it defines the scope of Convention rights and obligations but does not stipulate when parties have committed an act or omission. The Convention can also be said to indirectly address the issue of compliance with obligations in its provisions on execution with judgments (Art. 46). The scope of the key phrase ‘within their jurisdiction’ was considered by the Court in 2001 in Banković.18 Relatives of persons killed in bombings of television and radio facilities during the NATO bombardment of Serbia and Montenegro alleged that the sixteen respondents had breached the right to life of the deceased. This judgment did not address attribution of the airstrikes to NATO versus the respondents ; still less did it cite the then-draft ASR or general international law. Whilst the respondents had argued that the application was inadmissible ratione personae through the Monetary Gold principle (of general international law) and France had asserted that the impugned conduct was attributable to NATO rather than the respondents,19 the Court declined to address these arguments after a finding of inadmissibility ratione loci.20 Although the Court declined to address the question of attribution in Banković, the judgment indirectly bears upon the status of the general international law of responsibility. As the Court has done elsewhere in its jurisprudence, it purported to apply Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969

‘Les Hautes Parties contractantes reconnaissent à toute personne relevant de leur juridiction les droits et libertés définis au titre I de la présente Convention.’ Art. 2 ASR ; Art. 4 ARIO. 18 Vlastimir and Borka Banković and Others v. Belgium and Others, Appl. No. 52207/99, 2007 44 EHRR SE5, Judgment of 12 December 2001. 19 Ibidem, §§ 31-32. See also the argument of France that all of its actions were taken under the direction and control of NATO and attributable to it – Case Concerning Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. France) (Preliminary Objections), Oral Pleadings (22 April 2004), CR/2004/12, §§ 49-52. See also Case Concerning Legality of the Use of Force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Portugal) (Preliminary Objections), Oral Pleadings (19 April 2004), CR/2004/9, § 4.8 ; Oral Pleadings (20 April 2004), CR/2004/18, §§ 4.1-4.7. However, this argument was exceptional in that none of the other eight respondent States in the Legality of the Use of Force proceedings made the same argument – Klein, “The Attribution of Acts to International Organizations”, in Crawford supra note 12, pp. 299‑315, 302-303 (note 30). See also Stein, “Kosovo and the International Community. The Attribution of Possible Internationally Wrongful Acts : Responsibility of NATO or of its Member States ?” and Pellet, “L’imputabilité d’éventuels actes illicites. Responsabilité de l’OTAN ou des États membres”, in Tomuschat (ed.), Kosovo and the International Community : A Legal Assessment, 2002, pp. 181‑192, 193-202. 20 Ibidem, § 83. 17

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(‘VCLT’) to interpret the Convention.21 The lack of a textual basis in the Convention to refer to the law of treaties for its own interpretation destroys the concept of the ‘self-contained regime’ that is both comprehensive and exclusively self-referential. Indeed, Article 31(3)(c) of the VCLT provides that ‘[in interpreting a treaty] there shall be taken into account, together with the context…any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.’22 Thus, the general international law of responsibility may be invoked to interpret the Convention. However, the need to apply the law of responsibility through Article 31(3)(c) VCLT in the absence of Convention provisions does not necessarily imply that the ILC texts ought to be applied in toto. Even as they continue to be assessed and critiqued, they have already proved to be of considerable importance and utility in practice.23 Provisions reflecting progressive development or compromise during the drafting process rather than articulation or endorsement of longstanding principle may not necessarily be lex lata.24 Consequently, the authoritativeness of individual provisions should be carefully evaluated by international courts rather than applied as part of wider texts that are erroneously assumed to comprise definitive statements of the law of international responsibility at the present time. Even after their putative adoption as treaties, the ILC texts may undergo continual refinement through practice.

B. Lex Specialis Consequently, there is a tension concerning the degree to which the Convention system is integrated into general international law. In the absence of express provisions on responsibility within the Convention itself, according to the law of treaties the Strasbourg Court may even be bound to ‘take into account’ the general international law of responsibility in interpreting the Convention as ‘relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.’25 The ‘self-contained regime’ breaks down not only from the incompleteness of the Convention but also from encounters in practice with other sub-systems (e.g. – the EU and UN).26 To resolve normative conflicts, consistency demands a comprehensive generality that is not yet fully provided either in the jurisprudence of the Court or in the ARIO itself. Controversially, the ILC adopted a lex specialis rule in Article 64 :

Banković, supra note 18, §§ 16-18. For an assessment of the Court’s treatment of general international law, see Forowicz, The Reception of International Law in the European Court of Human Rights, 2010, pp. 352‑405. For analysis, see further the ILC Report on Fragmentation, supra note 2, §§ 410-480. 23 Crawford and Olleson, “The Continuing Debate on a UN Convention on State Responsibility”, 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly (2005), pp. 959‑971, 965-971. 24 Ibidem. 25 Art. 31(3)(c), Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969. 26 See further the ILC Report on Fragmentation of International Law, supra note 2, pp. 30‑34 (§§ 46-54), pp. 65‑101 (§§ 123-194) esp. pp. 74‑82 (§§ 138-152). 22

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“These articles do not apply where and to the extent that the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of an international organization, or a State in connection with the conduct of an international organizations, are governed by special rules of international law. Such special rules of international law may be contained in the rules of the organization applicable to the relations between an international organization and its members”.

The Commentary to Article 64 explains that this provision was specifically formulated with the EU in mind.27 In its comments to the ILC, the European Commission suggested that such a provision was necessary due to the ‘special nature’ of the EU and ‘other potentially similar organisations’. The Commission argued that the EU is not a ‘classic’ international organisation because it is not merely a forum for Member States but an international actor with its own legal order.28 However, Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja ‘saw no need to devise special rules on attribution in order to assert the organization’s responsibility in this type of case [where the authorities of the member States act as implementing authorities in areas of Community competence]’.29 Rather, he suggested that the responsibility of the organisation could be incurred without attribution of conduct – a proposal seemingly inconsistent with the definition of an internationally wrongful act under Article 4. Nevertheless, the ILC adopted Article 64 providing that EU law displaces the ARIO in determining attribution of conduct as between the EU and its members. Not only would this apply to ‘internal’ disputes within the EU legal order but also to ‘external’ disputes involving third parties (e.g. – WTO or ECtHR proceedings). The description of the EU as a ‘special’ organisation is defensible. It is undoubtedly a unique and unusually powerful international organisation ; its semi-supranationalism represents a hybrid between a State and an intergovernmental organisation. The implementation of EU legislation by the Member States is also an unusual feature. Nevertheless, these characteristics do not provide a rationale for its internal law to displace general international law. To the contrary, a double standard of ‘one rule for the EU, another for the rest’ undermines the purpose of the exercise to constitute consistent, clear and credible principles. Although the EU patently exercises at least some of the functions of a State, this does not justify the translocation of EU law to bind third parties.30 The danger of prejudice to third parties would arise were they compelled to respect EU norms despite the specific facts of the case and the principle of party equality under general international law.

ARIO with Commentaries, 100-102. Talmon, “Responsibility of International Organizations : Does the European Community Require Special Treatment ?”, in M. Ragazzi, International Responsibility Today : Essays in Memory of Oscar Schachter, 2005, pp. 405‑421, 406. 29 Ibidem, p. 409. 30 To the contrary, see Art. 32 ASR ; Art. 31 ARIO. 28

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Although Hoffmeister argues that the lex specialis provision is analytically justifiable through reference to the ‘bearer of the obligation’ or the ‘normative control’ rather than the ‘factual actor’ for the purposes of attribution,31 this approach does not operate in a nuanced and precise manner. As the ‘ultimate control and authority’ test developed by the EctHR in Behrami and Saramati discussed below illustrates, under a ‘normative’ approach the actions of multiple actors may be attributed to a remote legislator with scant involvement in the factual process that produced the outcome. It also ignores the possibility of ultra vires conduct32 and the difficulty of attribution pursuant to norms that are themselves ambiguous (e.g. – ‘mixed agreements’ with third parties).33 Complex cases involving multiple actors particularly require a fact-sensitive approach that separately attributes conduct according to control and causation. Moreover, the position of the European Commission erroneously assumes that EU law operates according to distinctive principles when attributing conduct (as opposed to powers) to the EU and the Member States. Article 340 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union34 (‘TFEU’) provides that ‘in the case of non-contractual liability, the Union shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States, make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their duties.’ This formulation is substantively similar to Article 5(1) ARIO.35 Thus, apart from causation and damage, the only TFEU provision concerning attribution is essentially identical to the ARIO. ECJ jurisprudence suggests that Member States generally exercise discretion when implementing EU law and are obliged to respect Convention standards when doing so.36 When Member States implement EU regulations that are binding in entirety and directly applicable, they may nevertheless exercise discretion in implementation.37 Consequently, there is no apparent inconsistency in the underlying principle of Article 340 TFEU such that would necessitate a divergence from general international law on attribution. However, the position of the European Commission is more readily explained by examining its policy of seeking to appear as sole respondent for alleged breaches arising from conduct pursuant to Union law in WTO, ECtHR and United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea

Hoffmeister, “Litigation against the European Union and its Member States – who responds under the ILC’s Draft Articles on international responsibility of international organizations ?”, 21(3) European Journal of International Law, 2010, pp. 723‑747, 746. 32 Talmon, supra note 28, p. 409. 33 Ibidem, pp. 416‑417. 34 O.J. C-83/47 (30 March 2010). In French : “En matière de responsabilité non contractuelle, l’Union doit réparer, conformément aux principes généraux communs aux droits des États membres, les dommages causés par ses institutions ou par ses agents dans l’exercice de leurs fonctions”. 35 “The conduct of an organ or agent of an international organization in the performance of functions of that organ or agent shall be considered as an act of that organization under international law whatever the position the organ or agent holds in respect of the organization”. 36 Costello, “The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights : Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, 6(1) Human Rights Law Review, 2006, pp. 87‑130, 108-109. 37 The implementing discretion may be scant or absent, so it will depend upon the particular regulation.

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(‘UNCLOS’) proceedings.38 Its rationale is to encourage respect for the supremacy of Union law by Member States even where compliance results in breaches of other legal regimes. The case of Chile v. European Communities39 before a Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (‘ITLOS’) is an apposite example. Chile brought proceedings against the EU40 for failure to ensure conservation of swordfish in the fishing activities of Spanish vessels on the high seas adjacent to its exclusive economic zone in breach of UNCLOS. Whilst the ITLOS did not have to address attribution of conduct due to the settlement of the case, it is unlikely that the imputability of the EU would have been challenged in light of the Commission’s aforementioned policy based upon the exclusive competence of the EC for the conservation of maritime resources under EC law.41 Notwithstanding the apparent neatness of this approach from the litigious standpoint, it is nevertheless problematic from a doctrinal perspective. The ostensible connection between the EU and the alleged breach was highly remote ; no Union organ was involved in the impugned conduct by the flag State and there was not even a normative link to Union law. According to both Union law and general international law, competence is not determinative of attribution. Pursuant to both Articles 4 ASR and 6 ARIO (as well as Article 340 TFEU, were Union law externally applicable), the correct outcome would be the exclusive attribution of the impugned conduct to Spain for want of a factual connection to the EU. Whilst the Commission’s acceptance of responsibility and the acceptance by all parties as well as the Tribunal can be viewed as an ‘acknowledgement of conduct’ under Article 9 ARIO, the underlying rationale of the Commission’s stance is suggested to be flawed and likely to convolute attribution in future litigation. The perceived need to encourage Member States to respect the supremacy of Union law was wholly absent, since implementation of Union law did not feature. The exclusivity of Union competence concerning conservation of maritime resources pertains to the power of prescription, not to the attribution of conduct. Reductio ad absurdum, the Commission’s approach would require the Union to assume responsibility for any conduct concerning maritime conservation committed by any Member State even in the absence of involvement in the impugned conduct at any level by the Union itself. The financial implications of such an approach are obvious. Although the EU may have been charged with breach of a discrete obligation to ensure maritime conservation by its Member 38

Hoffmeister, supra note 31, 732-739. Case No. 7 concerning the Conservation and Sustainable Exploitation of Swordfish Stocks in the South-Eastern Pacific (Chile v. European Community), Order 2009/1 (16 December 2009), online at : http://www.itlos.org [Accessed : 26 September 2012]. 40 Then called the European Community (‘EC’) prior to the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon. For simplicity, the EU is retroactively substituted for the EC throughout this article. 41 Art. 3(d), TFEU. 39

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States, omissions by Union organs rather than the actions of the fishing vessels would have comprised the impugned conduct. Before the Strasbourg Court, the Commission and respondent States have consistently asserted attribution to the Union of conduct by organs of Member State in performance of Union law. In Matthews,42 the United Kingdom (‘UK’) argued that the applicant’s complaint concerned EU legislation by which it was bound and over which it had no effective control. The Court rejected this argument, holding that the UK remained obliged to secure Convention rights within its jurisdiction : “The Court observes that acts of the E.C. as such cannot be challenged before the Court because the E.C. is not a Contracting Party. The Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be ‘secured’. Member States’ responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer”.43

Implicit in this approach was the attribution of conduct by UK organs to the UK notwithstanding its obligation to implement Union law. In Senator Lines,44 the applicant asserted that the respondents were “individually and collectively responsible for the acts of the [Union] institutions, and that… the [Union] courts were allowing a mere administrative body to force the applicant company into liquidation, in violation of the rights to a fair hearing”.45 The respondents’ “principal contention was that…the acts complained of did not represent an exercise by the individual States of their jurisdiction within the meaning of Art. 1 of the Convention”.46 In support, the Commission further asserted : “The Member States of the European Union are responsible for the procedure of the CFI and the ECJ, in the sense that they must ensure that provision is made for equivalent protection of fundamental rights in those courts. It added that, so long as such protection exists in general, the Member States are not responsible for the manner in which those courts assess and decide issues of fundamental rights in individual cases”.47

The Court did not decide upon this question of attribution, dismissing the application on other grounds.

(Appl. No. 24833/94) Matthews v. United Kingdom (1999) 28 EHRR 361, §§ 26-35. Ibidem, § 33. (Appl. No. 56672/00) Senator Lines GmbH v. 15 Member States (2004) 39 EHRR SE3. 45 Ibidem, 15. 46 Ibidem. 47 Ibidem, 18-19. 43 44

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In Bosphorus,48 the Commission argued that the impugned conduct was attributable to the EU as the implementing regulation and ECJ judgment left Ireland no discretion concerning the impounding of the aircraft. The Commission asserted : “The reason for initially adopting this ‘equivalent protection’ approach was equally, if not more, pertinent today. It was an approach which was especially important for the [EU] given its distinctive features of supranationality and the nature of [EU] law : to require a state to review for Convention compliance an act of the [EU] before implementing it would pose an incalculable threat to the very foundations of the [EU], a result not envisaged by the drafters of the Convention, supportive as they were of European co-operation and integration. Moreover, subjecting individual [EU] acts to Convention scrutiny would amount to making the [EU] a respondent in Convention proceedings without any of the procedural rights and safeguards of a Contracting State to the Convention”.49

The Court’s rejection of the preliminary objection based attribution of the impoundment to Ireland upon its factual commission by State organs.50 Whilst the Court placed greater emphasis upon the doctrine of equivalent protection rather than factual attribution,51 the attribution of the impoundment to Ireland is nevertheless justifiable on a “factual actor” basis pursuant to Article 4 ASR. However, it ignores the role of the ECJ judgment and the legislation of the Regulation 990/93 by Union organs (as well as the background UNSC Resolution 820) in causing the impugned breach of the Convention. In assessing this jurisprudence, it is difficult to see how the position of the European Commission in seeking to create a double standard for the EU as opposed to other international organisations would produce more rational results in practice. Not only is Article 340 TFEU broadly consistent with the general international law approach of attributing conduct to international legal persons based upon factual control but it also accords with the approach of the Strasbourg Court in Bosphorus. Following EU accession, attribution of conduct to the executor of the impugned act rather than the legislator would become even more logical with the availability of the Union to respond to impugned Union legislation.52 The Commission’s policy of seeking special treatment to attribute “responsibility” to the EU on the basis of legal powers rather than factual conduct is reflected in Article 3(2) of the Draft Accession Agreement of the EU to the ECHR : 48 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm Ve Ticaret Anonim Sirketi v. Ireland (App. No. 45036/98) (2006) 42 EHRR 1, Judgment of 30 June 2005, §§ 108-110, 122-125, 129-132. 49 Ibidem, § 124. 50 Ibidem, § 137. 51 Ibidem, §§ 149-158. 52 Indeed, the ECJ has rejected the attribution of targeted sanctions to the UN through implementation of Security Council resolutions and juxtaposed the contradictory Bosphorus and Behrami decisions of the Strasbourg Court – Joined Cases C-402/05 P and 415/05 P Kadi and Al Barakaat International Foundation v. Council and Commission [2008] ECR I-6351 (ECJ), §§ 312-314. See also Yassin Abdullah Kadi v. European Commission and Council of the European Union Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P and C-595/10 P Commission, Council and United Kingdom v. Kadi (European Court of Justice), Judgment of 18 July 2013, paras 60-69.

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‘‘The European Union or a member State of the European Union may become a co-respondent to proceedings by decision of the Court in the circumstances set out in the Agreement on the Accession of the European Union to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A co-respondent is a party to the case. The admissibility of an application shall be assessed without regard to the participation of a co-respondent in the proceedings’’.53

The power of the Court to decide upon co-respondent status is a crucial improvement over earlier proposals to vest High Contracting Parties with an effective veto over their own addition as co-respondent. This formulation does not resolve the inconsistencies in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court.54 In recent years, attribution of conduct has become an important and recurring issue in Strasbourg proceedings concerning multiple actors in operations pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions and misapplication of the law of responsibility in the jurisprudence. Whilst the Court’s analytical approach has purported to apply the ASR and ARIO in the absence of Convention provisions on attribution, it has not done so consistently or precisely.

III. Attribution of conduct in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights In recent years, attribution of conduct has become an important and recurring issue in Strasbourg proceedings concerning multiple actors in operations pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions. There is considerable inconsistency and misapplication of the law of responsibility in the jurisprudence. Whilst the Court’s analytical approach has purported to apply the ASR and ARIO in the absence of Convention provisions on attribution, it has not done so consistently or precisely. Although the aforementioned Bosphorus55 case is best-known for the “Bosphorus presumption”,56 it is also interesting from the perspective of attribution. The UNSC adopted Resolution 820 (1993) deciding, inter alia, that “all States shall impound all vessels, freight vehicles, rolling stock and aircraft in their territories in which a majority or controlling interest is held by a person or undertaking in or operating from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) and 53

CDDH Report, note 1, supra. 54 Den Heijer, “Issues of Shared Responsibility before the European Court of Human Rights”, ACIL Research Paper No. 2012-04 (SHARES Series), finalized 26 January 2012, available on SSRN, 40-43. 55 Supra note 48, §§ 1-60. 56 See, e.g. Costello, “The Bosphorus Ruling of the European Court of Human Rights : Fundamental Rights and Blurred Boundaries in Europe”, 6(1) Human Rights Law Review, 2006, pp. 87‑130 ; Lock, “Beyond Bosphorus : the European Court of Human Rights’ case law on the responsibility of member states of international organisations under the European Convention on Human Rights”, 10(3) Human Rights Law Review (2010), pp. 529‑545.

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that these…may be forfeit to the seizing State upon a determination that they have been in violation of resolutions 713 (1991), 757 (1992), 787 (1992) or the present resolution”.57 The EU adopted Regulation 990/93,58 Article 8 of which obliged Member States to impound aircraft in the same terms as Resolution 820. Irish organs subsequently impounded one of the applicant’s aircraft in Ireland. Upon judicial review of the ministerial decision to impound the aircraft, the Irish High Court held that Regulation 990/93 did not apply to the aircraft as a ‘majority or controlling interest’ was not held by a person operating from the FRY due to its lease to a person operating outside the FRY. On appeal by the Government, the Supreme Court requested a preliminary reference from the ECJ concerning the applicability of Regulation 990/93 to the aircraft in question. The applicant argued, inter alia, that its application would breach his fundamental right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. The ECJ ruled that Regulation 990/93 applied to the aircraft in question and that the interference with peaceful enjoyment of possessions was justified.59 Having noted the mandatory character of the ECJ judgment, the Irish Supreme Court allowed the appeal and the impoundment was reinstated. On appeal to the ECtHR, Ireland argued that “the Convention must be interpreted in such a manner as to allow State Parties to comply with international obligations so as not to thwart the current trend towards extending and strengthening international co-operation”.60 Ireland submitted that its impugned act of impoundment was implementation of an obligation emanating from Resolution 820 and Regulation 990/93 rather than an exercise of discretion and that it was obliged under EU law to implement the ECJ judgment.61 Italy, appearing as intervener, went further in asserting that the duty to comply with the Resolution, Regulation and ECJ judgment “warranted a conclusion of incompatibility ratione personae”.62 Whilst the applicant agreed that the Court lacked competence to examine acts pursuant to international obligations, it argued that the impoundment was an exercise of discretion.63 Following a brief analysis, in taking Article 1 of the Convention as its starting-point the Court implicitly held that the impugned act was attributable to Ireland : “In the present case it is not disputed that the act about which the applicant complained, the detention of the aircraft leased by it for a period of time, 57

UNSC Resn 820 (1993), OP24. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 990/93 of 26 April 1993 concerning trade between the European Economic Community and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) O.J. L 102, 28 April 1993 P. 0014-0016. 59 Case C-84/95 Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticaret AS v. Minister for Transport, Energy and Communications and others ECR [1996] p. I-03953, §§ 21-27. 60 Bosphorus, supra note 48, § 108. 61 Ibidem, §§ 109-111. 62 Ibidem, § 129. 63 Ibidem, §§ 115-119. 58

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was implemented by the authorities of the respondent State on its territory following a decision to impound of the Irish Minister of Transport. In such circumstances the applicant company, as the addressee of the impugned act, fell within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the Irish State, with the consequence that its complaint about the act is compatible ratione loci, personae and materiae with the provisions of the Convention”.64

Whilst the ARIO was not available to the Court at the time, it is nevertheless surprising that the Court did not refer to the ASR in its terse analysis and that the intricate issue of attribution was not canvassed more thoroughly. For the reasons set out above, it is suggested that the Court’s citation of Article 1 of the Convention was erroneous as Article 1 is concerned with breach rather than attribution. Interestingly, the Court’s decision exclusively emphasises the factual actor rather than the legislator of the obligation. Under Article 15 ARIO, the possibility is envisaged of secondary attribution of State conduct to an international organisation when pursuant to the latter’s ‘direction and control’. The Commentary explains : “In the relations between an international organization and its member States and international organizations the concept of ‘direction and control’ could conceivably be extended so as to encompass cases in which an international organization takes a decision binding its members…[i]f one interprets the provision in light of the passages [from the Commentary to Article 17 ASR] quoted above, the adoption of a binding decision on the part of an international organization could constitute, under certain circumstances, a form of direction or control in the commission of an internationally wrongful act. The assumption is that the State or international organization which is the addressee of the decision is not given discretion to carry out conduct that, while complying with the decision, would not constitute an internationally wrongful act”.65

Under this approach, it was arguable that the impoundment in Bosphorus was jointly attributable to the UN and EU that had both enacted binding legislation leaving Ireland no discretion concerning the performance of the impugned conduct. However, this approach raises a number of problems. First, it ignores the fact that the State has consented to be bound by potentially conflicting obligations, namely, the Article 25 Charter duty to implement Security Council resolutions and the Article 4 Treaty on European Union (‘TEU’)66 duty to implement EU regulations and ECJ judgments on the one hand and the Article 1 ECHR duty to secure Convention rights within its jurisdiction on the other. As the Court held : 64

Ibidem, § 137. ARIO with Commentaries, 38-39 (§ 4). ‘Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union’, O.J. C-83/13 (30 March 2010).

65 66

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“On the other hand, it has also been accepted that a Contracting Party is responsible under Art. 1 of the Convention for all acts and omissions of its organs regardless of whether the act or omission in question was a consequence of domestic law or of the necessity to comply with international legal obligations. Article 1 makes no distinction as to the type of rule or measure concerned and does not exclude any part of a Contracting Party’s ‘jurisdiction’ from scrutiny under the Convention”.67

It may be the case that States attempting to circumvent compliance with Convention duties may plead the duty to comply with a competing UNSC resolution to enable them to do so.68 To attribute conduct to the UN or EU for obliging Ireland to impound the aircraft would not reflect the practical reality of State discretion and may lead to States invoking UNSC resolutions to avoid compliance with Convention rights. This is compounded by the lack of a counterpart provision in the Convention to Article 103 of the Charter providing that compliance with the Convention is displaced by a superior Charter duty. Second, the application of the ‘direction and control’ concept to legislative acts is imprecise. It attributes to the legislator all actions or omissions causing the breach regardless of its involvement. Thus, the prescription of Resolution 820 by the UNSC and of Regulation 990/93 by the EU would render all of the prescriptive, interpretive and implementation stages of those instruments attributable to the UN and EU. This would unrealistically ignore the roles of the States Parties to the Convention not only in enacting those instruments but also in implementing them within their domestic legal orders. In complex cases involving multiple actors, a more nuanced analytical approach is necessary to precisely attribute responsibility. Third, the extension of the ‘direction and control’ concept to normative acts was not envisaged by the ILC in Article 17 ASR upon which Article 15 ARIO is based. Rather, the direction and control envisaged in the Commentary to Article 17 involves a relationship of dependency between a dominant State and a dependent State (e.g. – a protectorate or military occupation).69 The principle served is that the subservient State remains responsible for its own acts even if factually dependent upon another with respect to the specific acts. The principle of concurrent or separate responsibility is reflected, inter alia, in Articles 19 and 47 ASR (Articles 18 and 47 ARIO) concerning a plurality of responsible States. There is a 67

Ibidem, § 153. ARIO, Art. 61 : “A State member of an international organization incurs international responsibility if, by taking advantage of the fact that the organization has competence in relation to the subject-matter of one of the State’s international obligations, it circumvents that obligation by causing the organization to commit an act that, if committed by the State, would have constituted a breach of the obligation”. It is arguable that this language paradoxically makes it more difficult to attribute conduct to a State because it conflates attribution with breach (“incurs international responsibility”) and introduces an element of intention to the exercise (“taking advantage” and “circumvents’). By addressing the responsibility of a State within the paradigm of Article 61, it is already assumed (perhaps falsely) that the conduct in question is attributable to the organisation. 69 Dominicé, “Attribution of Conduct to Multiple States and the Implication of a State in the Act of Another State”, in Crawford et al., supra note 12, pp. 281‑289, 287-288. 68

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real distinction between a State that has freely chosen to be bound by conflicting obligations and a State that, as a result of occupation or other dependence, is incapable of controlling its conduct. Although this scenario might be expected to be relatively rare concerning international organisations, a practical example might include the role of the UN in administering territories (e.g. – Bosnia and Herzegovina or Kosovo). In Behrami and Behrami,70 the applicants complained on behalf of their sons who had suffered death and injury in Kosovo while playing with a cluster bomb that exploded. The bomb had been deployed during the NATO-sanctioned airstrikes upon the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (‘FRY’) in 1999. Following the withdrawal of the FRY from most of Kosovo, the NATO-led Kosovo Force (‘KFOR’) and the UN Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (‘UNMIK’) were deployed pursuant to UNSC Resolution 1244 (1999). In the joined case of Saramati, the applicant complained of his arrest and detention in Kosovo on the orders of the Commander of KFOR (‘COMKFOR’). Two admissibility issues arose in these cases : 1) the attribution of the infringements ratione personae to the respondents as opposed to KFOR, NATO and/or the UN ; and 2) if attributable to the respondents, the applicability of the Convention ratione loci to their conduct in Kosovo. Ruling that it was not competent to examine the cases ratione personae, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the admissibility objection ratione loci. In Behrami, the Court held that the impugned conduct was “in principle” attributable to the UN by virtue of the fact that NATO (through KFOR) was exercising delegated powers from the UN Security Council, which retained ‘ultimate authority and control’ over KFOR operations in Kosovo.71 The Court cited Article 5 ARIO : “The conduct of an organ of a State or an organ or agent of an international organisation that is placed at the disposal of another international organisation shall be considered under international law an act of the latter organisation if the organisation exercises effective control over that conduct”. Whilst the Court purported to apply this test of ‘effective control over conduct’ to the facts of the two cases before it,72 its reasoning has been much criticised as a misapplication.73 Sections of the Court subsequently affirmed this reasoning in the cases of Berić, Gajic and Kasumaj.74 Although evidentially sustainable, the Court’s attribution of operational conduct to NATO through KFOR was analytically imprecise. Under general international law, acts and omissions causing an internationally wrongful act are severally 70

Behrami and Behrami v. France, Saramati v. France, Germany and Norway (Appl. No. 71412/01) (2007) 45 EHRR SE10, Judgment of 2 May 2007 (Admissibility), §§ 2-17. Ibidem, §§ 132-153. 72 Ibidem, §§ 30-31, 138. 73 For an extensive list of critical scholarship on the reasoning of the Court, see the ILC ARIO Commentary, 23 (note 115). 74 Berić v. Bosnia and Herzegovina (Appl. No. 36357/04) (2008) 46 EHRR SE06, Judgment of 21 September 2004, §§ 26-30 ; Gajiv v. Germany, judgment of 5 July 2007, Appl. No. 31446/02 ; Kasumaj v. Greece, judgment of 5 July 2007, Appl. No. 6974/05. 71

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attributable.75 The several acts causing the breach should be attributed according to the control exercised by the respective actors. Not only was the Court’s attribution of whole of the conduct to the UN according to its novel ‘ultimate authority or control’ test (based upon the UNSC authorisation of KFOR and UNMIK activities rather than factual control) a misapplication of the ARIO but its attribution of the several acts and omissions comprising the infringement of the human rights of the applicants was incomplete and imprecise. In Saramati, the attribution exercise was relatively simple because the deprivation of liberty involved relatively few actors and factual control was clear. The orders for the applicant’s arrest and detention were issued by COMKFOR (initially a Norwegian and later a French officer) and implemented by UNMIK police officers. COMKFOR at all times operated within the unified command structure of NATO up to its political governing body, the North Atlantic Council.76 NATO is endowed by the North Atlantic Treaty with international legal personality and is thus capable of assuming responsibility for the impugned conduct. Effective control being a factual question concerning specified acts, the retention of national control over seconded units concerning disciplinary, financial or other administrative matters was not germane to the operational control exercised by NATO through its subsidiary organ COMKFOR over the specific act of detention. A comprehensive factual assessment would also acknowledge the role of UNMIK police officers in implementing the arrest and detention orders. This falls squarely within Article 7 ARIO in that the police officers had been placed at the disposal of KFOR and were under its effective control for the purpose of the detention. It is also arguable that the act of the UN in placing its agents at the disposal of NATO constitutes (for the purpose of attribution) ‘aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act’ pursuant to Article 14 ARIO.77 If UNMIK did so “with knowledge of the circumstances”, according to Article 14 it would bear secondary or ancillary responsibility for its assistance in the detention. Although UNMIK as a subsidiary organ of the UN was arguably bound to promote respect for human rights,78 there is no comparable obligation for NATO. In the Behrami cases, attribution was a more complex affair due to the several acts and omissions causing the death and injury. In chronological order, there was the initial deployment of the cluster bombs during the NATO-authorised bombardment of the FRY. Second, there was the omission by UNMIK to demine the area 75

Condorelli and Kress, “The Rules of Attribution : General Considerations”, in Crawford et al., supra note 13, pp. 221‑236, 228-231. Behrami, supra note 71, § 139. 77 “An international organization which aids or assists a State or another international organization in the commission of an internationally wrongful act by the State or the latter organization is internationally responsible for doing so if : (a) the organization does so with the knowledge of the circumstances of the internationally wrongful act ; and (b) the act would be internationally wrongful if committed by that organization”. 78 Charter, Art 55(c). See further Riedel and Arend, “Article 55(c)”, in Simma et al., The Charter of the United Nations : A Commentary 2012, Vol. II, pp. 1565‑1602, 1573 ; Marie and Questiaux, “Article 55, Alinéa c”, in Cot et al., La Charte des Nations Unies : Commentaire article par article, 2005, pp. 1481‑1503, 1485-1488. 76

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pursuant to the mine action programme for which it had assumed responsibility from KFOR prior to the incident in question.79 Third, there were the omissions by KFOR to have informed UNMIK of the existence of the unexploded ordinance and to have marked the particular area as dangerous for which it had had prior knowledge.80 As these actions and omissions arguably comprise inextricable causative elements of the breach, they could have been treated as a ‘composite act’ under Article 13 ARIO.81 Pursuant to Article 4 ASR and Article 7 ARIO, it would need to be determined whether the national military units that deployed those particular munitions had been acting under the effective control of NATO. Although the bombing campaign was ordered by the North Atlantic Council and formally conducted under NATO auspices, in practice it appears that operational control was retained by those Member States over the forces they contributed.82 Consequently, the deployment of the specific bomb would be attributable to the State rather than to NATO as the latter would not have exercised ‘effective control’ over that deployment for the purpose of Article 7. As in the Saramati case, KFOR conduct concerning demining would also be attributable to NATO due to its operational control.83 In the absence of contrary evidence, the omissions of marking the relevant area and informing UNMIK of the existence of unexploded ordinance for demining would be attributable to NATO through the local KFOR officer. Thus, the conduct in the Behrami cases was severally attributable : 1) to the unknown State for deployment ; 2) to NATO for failure to mark the site and inform UNMIK ; and 3) to the UN for the failure to demine. In Al-Jedda,84 the Court distinguished Behrami for the purpose of attribution. The UK was found to have violated the liberty of the applicant through longterm detention without trial in Iraq whilst acting pursuant to powers provided by UNSC Resolutions 1511 (2003) and 1546 (2004). The parties agreed that the governing principle for attribution was ‘effective control’ under Article 5 ARIO.85 After noting the agreement, the Court held : ‘[T]he Court considers that the UN Security Council had neither effective control nor ultimate authority and control over the acts and omissions of troops within the Multi-National Force and that the applicant’s detention was not, therefore, attributable to the United 79

Behrami, §§ 52-60. Ibidem, §§ 6, 54, 56, 58-59. “1. The breach of an international obligation by an international organization through a series of acts and omissions defined in aggregate as wrongful occurs when the action or omission occurs which, taken with the other actions or omissions, is sufficient to constitute the wrongful act. 2. In such a case, the breach extends over the entire period starting with the first of the actions or omissions of the series and lasts for as long as these actions or omissions are repeated and remain not in conformity with the international obligation”. 82 Klein, “Attribution of Acts to International Organizations”, in Crawford et al., supra note 12, pp. 299‑315, 302-303. 83 Behrami, § 56. 84 Al-Jedda v. United Kingdom, judgment of 7 July 2011, Appl. No. 27021/08 (2011) 53 EHRR 23, §§ 74-86. 85 Ibidem, § 18. 80 81

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Nations.’86 Whilst the Court seemingly edged away from its Behrami formula, it did not disavow it and found that Resolutions 1511 and 1546 did not oblige the UK to detain the applicant but empowered it to do so.87 In the recent judgment of Nada,88 the Court again considered the attribution of conduct to the UN. The Security Council in Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000), 1373 (2001) and 1390 (2002) created a sanctions regime targeting suspected al-Qaeda and Taliban operatives. Switzerland enacted enabling legislation and, following the listing of the applicant by the UN Sanctions Committee as a proscribed individual, denied the applicant entry into and transit through Switzerland. The applicant complained of violations to, inter alia, his liberty and privacy. Addressing the argument of France and others that the implementing measures taken by UN Member States were attributable to the UN, the Court held : “The Court cannot endorse that argument. It would point that it found in Behrami and Behrami that the impugned acts and omissions of KFOR, whose powers had been validly delegated to it by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter, and those of UNMIK, a subsidiary organ of the United Nations set up under the same Chapter, were directly attributable to the United Nations, an organisation of universal jurisdiction fulfilling its imperative collective security objective (ibid., § 151). In the present case, by contrast, the relevant Security Council resolutions, especially Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1333 (2000, 1373 (2001) and 1390 (2002), required States to act in their own names and to implement them at national level”.89

Unlike in Al-Jedda, where the parties had agreed on the applicability of Article 5 ARIO, the Court did not refer to or purport to apply the ARIO in its analysis of the attribution issue. Rather, it conceptualised the problem as falling within the scope of ‘jurisdiction’ under Article 1 of the Convention notwithstanding, as argued above, that that provision concerns breach rather than attribution. As in Behrami and Al-Jedda, the Court’s analysis focused upon the aims of the UNSC resolutions rather than factual control. Multiple actions caused the infringement of the applicant’s liberty. First, the legislation of an obligation upon all UN Member States to ‘prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of these [listed] individuals’90 was attributable to the UN as an act of the Security Council.91 However, it is arguable that the conduct of the European Member

Ibidem, § 84. Ibidem, §§ 83, 105. Nada v. Switzerland, judgment of 12 September 2012, Appl. No. 10593/08, §§ 117-123. 89 Ibidem, § 120. 90 UNSC Resn 1390 (2002), OP2(b). 91 ARIO, Art. 6. See also Nada, supra note 89, § 76. 87 88

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States – especially the veto-wielding Permanent Members – in voting in favour this resolution ‘knowing’ that there was a risk of incompatibility with Convention rights comprised discrete acts forming part of the chain of causation.92 Second, the proscription of the applicant was attributable to the UN through the Sanctions Committee as a subsidiary organ of the Security Council. In this respect, an important distinction between Nada and the UN Human Rights Committee case of Sayadi and Vinck93 is that whereas in the former the listing of the applicant by the Sanctions Committee was instigated by the USA, in the latter it was prompted by the respondent (Belgium). As noted by the Federal Court of Switzerland, Switzerland was not authorised to list or delist the applicant ex proprio motu.94 Third, the denial of entry into Switzerland to the applicant was attributable to Switzerland pursuant to Article 4 ASR. Whilst the Court arrived at the same conclusion, its reasoning placed greater emphasis upon the terms of the Security Council resolutions rather than the fact that Swiss organs had performed the impugned conduct of denial of entry.95 The provisions of Resolution 1390 were relevant context but the determinative fact was the status of the implementing authority as a State organ rather than a UN organ for that purpose. The argument of France that the effect of Article 103 of the UN Charter was to render the actions of Switzerland attributable to the UN was misconceived because Article 103 was relevant to mitigation rather than attribution. Whilst its effect was potentially to either displace the obligation or to mitigate the breach, it had no bearing upon whether it was Switzerland that factually denied entry and transit to the applicant. However, it was also arguable that the obligations prescribed by the Security Council rendered the denial of entry and transit attributable to the UN because Switzerland was in fact acting under its ‘direction and control’ pursuant to Article 15 ARIO. Whilst Article 17 ASR (upon which Article 15 is based) envisages a factual rather than normative approach towards ‘direction and control’, there is force in this proposition. An international organisation that expressly obliges a Member State to perform specified acts with scant implementing discretion presumably assumes responsibility for the consequences. Although the Commentary to Article 15 does not elaborate upon the phrase “under certain circumstances”, its threshold is likely to be a high one in line with

ASR, Art. 16. In particular : France, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, the Netherlands, Slovenia, the Ukraine, Norway and Ireland. See UNSC 4452nd Meeting (16 January 2002), UN Doc. S/PV.4452 ; UNSC 4385th Meeting (28 September 2001), UN Doc. S/PV.4385 ; UNSC 4251st Meeting (19 December 2000), UN Doc. S/PV.4251, 9 (Canada) ; UNSC 4051st Meeting (15 October 1999), UN Doc. S/PV.4051. 93 Nada, supra note 89, §§ 88-92. 94 Ibidem, §§ 50, 187-188. See also UNSC Resn 1390 (2002), OP2. 95 Ibidem, §§ 120-121.

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Article 17 ASR. If the abovementioned argument against ‘normative direction and control’ is wrong, the Nada case would fall within this threshold because operative paragraph 2(b) of UNSC Resolution 1390 was couched in imperative and specific terms, leaving Member States with no room for implementing discretion : “[The Security Council] decides that all States shall take the following measures with respect to [individuals listed by the Sanctions Committee] : (b) Prevent the entry into or the transit through their territories of these individuals, provided that nothing in this paragraph shall oblige any State to deny entry into or require the departure from its territories of its own nationals and this paragraph shall not apply where entry or transit is necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process or the Committee determines on a case by case basis only that entry or transit is justified”.

The provision of exhaustive exceptions emphasises the tightness of the control of the Sanctions Committee over the applicability of the prescribed measures to listed individuals. As none of the exceptions applied to the applicant, the domestic courts correctly found that Switzerland had no discretion to allow entry. However, the Court instead concluded that Switzerland had an ‘admittedly limited but nevertheless real’ discretion concerning implementation : “In the present case, the applicant mainly challenged the Swiss entry and transit ban imposed on him in particular through the implementation of Resolution 1390 (2002). Whilst paragraph 2(b) of that resolution required States to take such measures, it stated that the ban did “not apply where entry or transit [was] necessary for the fulfilment of a judicial process…” (see paragraph 74 above). In the Court’s view, the term “necessary” was to be construed on a case-by-case basis. In addition, in paragraph 8 of Resolution 1390 (2002), the Security Council “[urged] all States to take immediate steps to enforce and strengthen through legislative enactments or administrative measures, where appropriate, the measures imposed under domestic laws or regulations against their nationals and other individuals or entities operating on their territory …” (see paragraph 74 above). The wording “where appropriate” also had the effect of affording the national authorities a certain flexibility in the mode of implementation of the resolution. Lastly, the Court would refer to the motion by which the Foreign Policy Commission of the Swiss National Council requested the Federal Council to inform the UN Security Council that it would not longer unconditionally be applying the sanctions prescribed against individuals under the counter-terrorism resolutions (see paragraph 63 above). Even though that motion was drafted in rather general terms, it can nevertheless be said that the applicant’s case was one of the main reasons for its adoption. In any event, in the Court’s européen des droits de l’homme |2013/4 674|Journal European journal of Human Rights

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view, the Swiss Parliament, in adopting that motion, was expressing its intention to allow a certain discretion in the application of the Security Council’s counter-terrorism resolutions. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that Switzerland enjoyed some latitude, which was admittedly limited but nevertheless real, in implementing the relevant binding resolutions of the UN Security Council”.96

The critique of this reasoning in the Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudkivska is cogent and compelling.97 The Court’s finding of breach by Switzerland was grounded not in its implementation of Resolution 1390 but rather in its failure to take practicable steps to mitigate its effects, particularly by informing the Sanctions Committee of the findings of its investigation concerning the applicant and by lobbying Italy to apply to the Committee to delist the applicant.98 Neither the main judgment nor the Joint Concurring Opinion connected the discretion afforded to Switzerland to the question of attribution to the UN under the ARIO. This appraisal of the recent jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court concerning the attribution of conduct in cases involving international organisations and States acting pursuant to UN Security Council resolutions demonstrates that the Court has not applied the ASR and ARIO consistently or precisely. Rather, despite the lack of a Convention foundation, the Court has invented an ad hoc doctrinal approach to attribution or has often misapplied the ILC texts even when purporting to do so. This has resulted in a sporadic and confused jurisprudence that is not based upon any clear rationale and analytical method. The resulting detriment is the weakening of legal predictability and coherence, which is likely to spawn needlessly repetitive admissibility objections based upon unrealistic attempts by States to attribute to international organisations or by applicants to States regardless of the facts. A more rational approach would seek to apply (and, indeed, refine and develop) the ILC texts based upon factual control in a precise and fact-sensitive manner.

IV. Conclusions This article has assessed the potential consequences of EU accession to the ECHR for the attribution of conduct under the law of international responsibility before the Strasbourg Court. In its first section, it concluded that the policy of the European Commission in seeking to exempt the EU from the general international law of responsibility is misconceived both as a matter of pragmatism and EU law. In its second section, it argued that the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court 96

Nada, supra note 89, §§ 177-180. Ibidem, Joint Concurring Opinion of Judges Bratza, Nicolaou and Yudkivska, §§ 1-8. Ibidem, §§ 185-194.

97 98

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concerning attribution of conduct in cases involving the UN, EU and NATO is doctrinally flawed due to its analytical inconsistency and imprecision. It is questionable whether the accession of the EU to the Convention would substantially improve these problems. Although the availability of the EU as a respondent might be expected to prompt a more consistent and realistic approach in cases involving implementation of EU legislation or in CFSP operations, the Commission’s policy of seeking to arrogate responsibility to the EU in international litigation that even remotely engages EU law does not accord with the approach of general international law. The policy of the Commission that divisions of competence in the EU legal order be applied externally complicates an already-confused area before the Strasbourg Court, which the current formulation of the draft “co-respondent mechanism” is also likely to exacerbate. Moreover, the doctrinal problems in the jurisprudence of the Strasbourg Court are not principally caused by the absence of the EU as a party to the Convention. Rather, they arise from a tendency by the Court to adopt an ad hoc and factually imprecise approach in cases involving international organisations and joint operations. These include cases, such as Behrami and Saramati or Al-Jedda, that did not concern the EU. Whilst accession may prompt a rethink in cases involving implementation of EU law, particularly if the EU finds itself paying substantial sums in compensation for breaches in which it scarcely played a role, it is unlikely to provide a holistic cure. These problems could be rectified through the consistent and accurate application of the control-based approach of the ILC texts and more nuanced and detailed scrutiny of the facts. Although the ILC texts are inevitably imperfect, they have not only undergone careful and thorough scrutiny in their drafting by experts in the field but the ARIO have also been specifically designed to apply to all international organisations despite their architectural diversity. Flaws and gaps in the ILC texts (e.g. – “normative control” under Article 17 ARIO) can be rectified and refined through practical application, especially since neither text has yet been enacted as a treaty. In this respect, greater development and refinement of these carefully-drafted texts would produce better results than ad hoc invention of doctrine. In addition, a rigorous and nuanced examination of the facts is particularly necessary in cases involving multiple actors in joint operations and sanctions within a complex legal architecture. In such cases, simplicity can be achieved by carefully identifying and separating the actions and omissions that cause the alleged breach of the Convention. Instead of artificially attributing conduct to actors (e.g. – the UN) that had scant involvement in the commission of the impugned conduct, parsing out according to control of specific acts would create more realistic and consistent results. For this purpose, greater focus upon the enactment of legislation by Member States and causation would improve the rigour of the analysis in

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weighing the factors that contributed to the breach. On the one hand, this would enable respondents to justifiably claim mitigation for remedial purposes due to the involvement of third parties whilst ensuring that they are held responsible for their own contribution to the breach is properly acknowledged. Dr. Arman Sarvarian Lecturer in Law at the University of Surrey e‑mail : a.sarvarian@surrey.ac.uk

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Environnement et droits de l’homme Environment and Human Rights Christel Cournil et al.

Résumé

Abstract

e lien entre les droits de l’homme et l’environnement s’est renforcé, ces dernières années, tant au plan international qu’européen (I). Les initiatives relatives aux droits des « déplacés environnementaux » et certaines décisions récentes réaffirmant les droits des populations locales et peuples autochtones illustrent cette progression (II). La chronique évoque également les initiatives et responsabilités du secteur privé (III), les politiques européennes en matière de démocratie environnementale (IV), et les volets substantiel et procédural des droits de l’homme de l’environnement en Europe (V). Enfin, deux thèmes environnementaux – le climat et l’eau, respectivement – seront particulièrement étudiés afin d’illustrer les avancées en matière de droits de l’homme (VI).

he links between human rights and the environment have been strengthened in recent years, both at the international and at the European levels (I). New initiatives concerning the « environmentally displaced people » and some decisions reaffirming the rights of local communities or indigenous peoples provide illustrations of this progress (II). The column also presents the responsibilities, in this regard, of the private sector (III), the developments concerning environmental democracy in Europe (IV), and the substantive and procedural dimensions of the emerging right to a healthy environment in Europe (V). Finally, two environmental themes – climate and water, respectively – will be explored in greater depth in order to illustrate the implications for human rights of the rise of environmental concerns (VI).

I. Le renforcement récent du lien entre droits de l’homme et environnement aux plans international et européen A. Le Sommet de Rio+20 sur le développement durable

e Sommet de la Terre de juin 2012 demeurera un « rendez-vous manqué » pour la consécration d’un droit de l’homme à l’environnement dans la Déclaration Finale « L’avenir que nous voulons », texte programmatoire de portée internationale. Le lien entre droits de l’homme et environnement se retrouve très ponctuellement dans le texte adopté. Aux côtés d’un « maquis » de déclarations et d’engagements, on ne retrouve sur les 60 pages du texte guère qu’une petite dizaine de références explicites aux « droits de l’homme » ou aux « droits humains », aux « instruments internationaux relatifs aux droits de l’homme », ou aux « libertés fondamentales ». On relève également une série d’occurrences indirectes aux droits de l’homme, à

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la participation de certains groupes ou populations vulnérables (femmes, peuples autochtones, populations insulaires, etc.). La seule référence à la « conformité au droit international » et l’absence totale de références aux droits de l’homme dans le passage sur les objectifs du développement durable (O.D.D.) montrent que le lien n’est pas encore pleinement consacré et qu’il reste en émergence1. Ce quasi-silence laisse d’ailleurs sceptique quant aux opportunités ultérieures de prise en compte du lien dans un futur texte à vocation universelle de soft ou de hard law. Pourtant, la société civile et certaines organisations2 ont vivement défendu à Rio+20 « l’approche basée sur les droits de l’homme » dans les trois dimensions du développement durable (économie, sociale et environnementale). La richesse du Sommet s’est révélée « hors des murs » de la Conférence. En effet, d’importants événements3 ont été organisés par les départements juridiques des universités du monde entier, par des experts-conseils, des avocats sur les grandes questions juridiques liées aux défis environnementaux et aux droits de l’homme4. De surcroît, lors des événements parallèles du Sommet, on retiendra plus de 57 initiatives5 qui ont orienté directement ou indirectement leurs argumentaires sur les droits de l’homme et le lien avec le développement durable. Par exemple, un side-event « The need for a rights-based approach to sustainable development » organisé le 14 juin 2012 a réuni notamment Marcos Orellana du Centre de droit international de l’environnement qui a souligné l’importance d’intégrer les droits de l’homme dans le travail de Rio+20 et de ne plus les ignorer dans le suivi post Rio+20 sur les O.D.D. De même, le Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’homme6 et le P.N.U.E. ont tenu un événement parallèle commun intitulé Human Rights at the heart of Sustainable Development – Honouring Principle 17. À cette occasion, un panel de hauts experts s’est interrogé sur le lien entre les droits de l’homme et l’environnement, sur leurs influences réciproques, mutuellement bénéfiques. Les droits de l’homme jouent, selon eux, une partie intégrante dans la réalisation du développement durable. Ce panel a affirmé clairement la nécessité de renforcer l’engagement international et l’action commune en faveur du développement durable ainsi que son cadre institutionnel en y intégrant pleinement les droits de l’homme. En définitive, le texte de Rio+20 ne constitue qu’un point de départ pour le lancement des O.D.D. post-2015 ; un groupe de travail intergouvernemental négocie

Pour plus de détail : C. Cournil, « Le lien ‘‘droits de l’homme & développement durable’’ après Rio+20 : Influence, genèse et portée », Revue Droits fondamentaux, no 9, janv. 2011-déc. 2012, paru en mai 2013, 30 p. C.I.E.L., Human rights & Environment in the Rio+20 O.N.U. Conference on sustainable development. Issue Brief, février, 2012, 5 p. Cf. aussi Background Document for O.H.C.H.R.-U.N.E.P. Joint Side Event, Human Rights at the Center of Sustainable Development – Honoring Rio Principle 1, 19 June 2012. 3 Cf. la publication des actes dans le no 4 de la Revue Juridique de l’environnement de 2012. 4 Certains juristes ont organisé un événement d’envergure sur le droit international de l’environnement avec une session portant sur les enjeux de droits de l’homme, avec le soutien du Centre International de Droit Comparé de l’Environnement. 5 http://www.uncsd2012.org/. 6 Cf. son texte Rio+20 pour la Conférence et sa lettre ouverte à toutes les missions permanentes. 7 Human Rights at the heart of Sustainable Development – Honouring Principle 1, 19 juin 2012. 2

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d’ailleurs actuellement la définition de ces objectifs8. Il faut espérer que ce groupe de travail de 30 représentants choisis par les États membres au sein des cinq groupes régionaux de l’O.N.U. inclura, dans ses travaux, les enjeux des droits de l’homme liés au développement durable.

B. Le travail des Nations Unies Le Conseil des droits de l’homme et le Haut-Commissariat des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies ont joué un rôle important dans la mise en relation des droits de l’homme et de l’environnement. Le dernier rapport du Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’homme intitulé « Étude analytique sur les liens entre les droits de l’homme et l’environnement », présenté en décembre 20119, propose une triple approche de ce lien. La première approche postule « que l’environnement est un préalable à l’exercice des droits de l’homme. Elle met l’accent sur le fait que la vie et la dignité de l’homme ne sont possibles que lorsque les individus ont accès à un environnement offrant certaines qualités fondamentales. La dégradation de l’environnement, notamment la pollution de l’air, de l’eau et des sols, peut avoir une incidence sur la réalisation de droits particuliers, tels que le droit à la vie, à l’alimentation et à la santé »10. Selon la seconde approche, les droits de l’homme sont « des instruments pour s’attaquer aux questions environnementales à la fois sur le plan procédural et au fond. Cette approche souligne la possibilité d’utiliser les droits de l’homme pour parvenir à des niveaux adéquats de protection environnementale. Dans une perspective procédurale, des droits tels que l’accès à l’information, la participation aux affaires publiques et l’accès à la justice sont essentiels pour garantir des structures de gouvernance qui permettent à la société d’adopter des processus décisionnels justes s’agissant des questions environnementales »11. La troisième approche propose d’intégrer les droits de l’homme et l’environnement dans le concept de développement durable. Elle insiste donc sur « le fait que les objectifs sociétaux doivent être traités de manière intégrée et que les questions d’économie, d’environnement et de justice sociale doivent être prises en compte dans la perspective du développement durable »12. Lors d’un séminaire les 23 et 24 février 2012 organisé à Genève par le Conseil des droits de l’homme, trois objectifs de travail sur les changements climatiques et les droits de l’homme ont été dégagés : 1. Accroître l’information et améliorer la compréhension de la relation entre les changements climatiques et les droits humains en cherchant les effets néfastes des changements climatiques sur la jouissance des droits de l’homme et leurs interconnexions. 2. Améliorer la coopération 8

Le Groupe de Travail Ouvert sur les objectifs du développement durable a tenu sa première session le 14 mars 2013 pour commencer à définir le contenu des O.D.D. La question des droits de l’homme a été évoquée par plusieurs négociateurs. 9 Rapport du Haut-Commissaire des Nations Unies aux droits de l’homme, « Étude analytique sur les liens entre les droits de l’homme et l’environnement », présenté à la dix-neuvième session du Conseil des droits de l’homme, (16 décembre 2011), A/HRC/19/34, 18 p. 10 Ibid., p. 4. 11 Ibid., p. 4. 12 Ibid., p. 5.

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internationale et le respect des droits de l’homme dans toutes les situations liées aux changements climatiques en insistant sur les défis, les responsabilités et les engagements des États. 3. Renforcer la coopération entre deux communautés qui jusqu’à présent s’ignorent : les défenseurs des droits de l’homme et ceux travaillant sur les changements climatiques13. Dans cette dynamique de travail, le Conseil des droits de l’homme a nommé le 1er août 2012, John Knox comme premier expert indépendant chargé d’examiner la question des obligations relatives aux droits de l’homme se rapportant aux moyens de bénéficier d’un environnement sûr, propre, sain et durable. Son expertise devrait favoriser l’émergence du lien entre droits de l’homme et environnement. Dans son premier rapport14 du 24 décembre 2012, il confirme son intention d’intégrer les enjeux liés au développement durable, et notamment « c) de formuler des recommandations susceptibles d’aider à la réalisation des objectifs du Millénaire pour le développement, en particulier l’objectif 7 (assurer un environnement durable) » et « d) de tenir compte des résultats de la Conférence des Nations Unies sur le développement durable de 2012 et de contribuer à leur suivi sous l’angle des droits de l’homme »15. Enfin, dans le récent travail des Nations Unies, on relèvera l’initiative menée par Calin Georgescu (ancien Rapporteur spécial sur les incidences sur les droits de l’homme de la gestion et de l’élimination écologiquement rationnelle des produits et déchets dangereux, remplacé depuis novembre 2012 par Marc Pallemaerts), qui rappelle clairement dans son rapport16 de juillet 2012 le lien entre les droits de l’homme et les conséquences des produits chimiques.

C. Les récents travaux du Parlement européen Fin 2011, le Parlement européen a déjà mis l’accent sur le lien évident à construire entre développement durable et droits de l’homme dans une Résolution portant sur l’élaboration d’une position commune de l’Union européenne (UE) dans la perspective de la conférence des Nations Unies sur le développement durable (Rio+20)17. Le Parlement avait déjà adopté en juin 2011 une Résolution sur les femmes et les changements climatiques18 et il prépare actuellement une Résolution sur les droits de l’homme et les changements climatiques qu’il faudra suivre 13

Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the outcome of the Seminar Addressing the Adverse Impacts of Climate Change on the Full Enjoyment of Human Rights, twentieth Session, (10 April 2012), A/HRC/20/7. 14 Rapport préliminaire de l’Expert indépendant chargé d’examiner la question des obligations relatives aux droits de l’homme se rapportant aux moyens de bénéficier d’un environnement sûr, propre, sain et durable, M. John Knox, présenté à la vingt-deuxième session du Conseil des droits de l’homme, (24 décembre 2012), A/HRC/22/43. 15 Ibid., p. 3. 16 Rapport du Rapporteur spécial sur les incidences sur les droits de l’homme de la gestion et de l’élimination écologiquement rationnelles des produits et déchets dangereux, M. Calin Georgescu, présenté à la vingt-et-unième session du Conseil des droits de l’homme (2 juillet 2012), A/HRC/21/48. 17 Résolution du Parlement européen du 29 septembre 2011 sur l’élaboration d’une position commune de l’Union dans la perspective de la conférence des Nations Unies sur le développement durable (Rio+20), P7_TA(2011)0430. 18 Résolution du Parlement européen du 20 avril 2012 sur les femmes et le changement climatique (2011/2197(INI)).

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avec attention. Avec ce futur texte, le Parlement européen rejoindrait, ainsi, l’initiative régionale de l’Organisation des États américains qui a adopté une Résolution sur les droits de l’homme et les changements climatiques en juin 200819.

II. Les droits de l’homme des personnes déplacées et des populations autochtones dans un environnement menacé A. Les initiatives politiques et juridiques sur les droits des « déplacés environnementaux » Les droits des « déplacés environnementaux » ont fait l’objet d’initiatives internationales et régionales (européenne et africaine) visant à améliorer leur protection. Au plan international, l’initiative Nansen20 a été lancée par une grande conférence organisée à Oslo les 6 et 7 juin 2011. Cette conférence a abouti aux « Principes de Nansen sur les migrations environnementales », qui devraient former la base d’une réponse internationale au problème des migrations environnementales. Le 2 octobre 2012, en marge d’une réunion du Comité exécutif du Haut-Commissariat aux réfugiés à Genève, est lancée « l’Initiative Nansen » par la Norvège et la Suisse, et placée sous la direction de Walter Kälin, ancien Représentant Spécial du Secrétaire Général des Nations Unies pour les Déplacés Internes. Il s’agit de la première initiative intergouvernementale pour la protection des « déplacés environnementaux ». Un secrétariat a été ouvert à Genève. Un comité de pilotage mené par plusieurs États21 et un comité consultatif ont été constitués d’organisations internationales22 et d’organisations non gouvernementales23. L’initiative consiste en un processus consultatif intergouvernemental bottom-up, qui vise à déboucher sur un agenda de protection, possiblement à l’horizon 2014 ou 2015, sous la forme d’un document similaire aux Principes Directeurs pour les personnes déplacées à l’intérieur de leur pays adopté en 1998. Cet agenda de protection sera fondé sur trois piliers : la coopération et la solidarité internationales ; des normes opérationnelles pour les personnes affectées ; et des mécanismes de financement et de responsabilités de droit international humanitaire. Ensuite, c’est à la 16e Conférence des Parties à Cancún, le 11 décembre 2010, que les migrations environnementales ont fait leur entrée dans les négociations climatiques24. Cette « officialisation » de la thématique n’a toutefois pas apporté d’obligations contraignantes pour les États (voir ci-dessous, la section consacrée aux négociations sur les changements climatiques). Les récentes négociations de 19

OAS, Human Rights and Climate Change in the Americas, AG/RES. 2429, June, 2008. http://www.nanseninitiative.org/. 21 Norvège, Suisse, Costa Rica, Australie, Mexique, Kenya, Philippines. 22 UE, U.N.I.C.E.F., U.N.E.P., O.I.M., H.C.R., Banque Mondiale, Banque Asiatique de Développement, etc. 23 Croix Rouge, Conseil norvégien pour les réfugiés, l’Observatoire de Surveillance des déplacements internes, etc. 24 § 14 f) decision –/CP.16 Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA), p. 3. 20

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Doha de décembre 2012 n’ont pas permis de préciser davantage ce point, hormis de nouvelles réflexions relatives aux « pertes et préjudices » (loss and damage25) liés aux incidences des changements climatiques dans les pays en développement qui sont particulièrement exposés aux effets néfastes de ces changements, et ce, en vue de renforcer les capacités d’adaptation26. Puis, dans le cadre du système des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies, François Crépeau, le Rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies sur les droits de l’homme des migrants a inclus une section thématique intitulée « Changement climatique et migration » dans son premier rapport présenté en octobre 2012 à l’Assemblée Générale des Nations Unies. Le rapport relève que les droits de l’homme offrent un certain nombre de réponses générales qui s’appliquent aux migrants environnementaux. Les conclusions et recommandations du rapport mettent l’accent sur le besoin d’atténuer les changements climatiques, de financer davantage la recherche, mais aussi la nécessité pour les États de « reconnaître que la migration fait partie de la solution aux problèmes mondiaux de l’environnement »27. Il en appelle enfin à des politiques nationales et des coopérations à l’échelle régionale, afin de mettre en œuvre le droit international des droits de l’homme28. Au plan régional, dans le cadre de l’Union africaine, la Convention dite « de Kampala » sur la protection et l’assistance des personnes déplacées en Afrique, a été adoptée le 23 octobre 2009 et entrée en vigueur le 6 décembre 2012. Ce traité régional s’inspire largement des Principes Directeurs sur les personnes déplacées à l’intérieur de leur pays ; il constitue le seul outil international contraignant sur cette question. L’article 5, § 4 de la Convention énonce une obligation pour les États parties de prendre « les mesures nécessaires pour assurer protection et assistance aux personnes victimes de déplacement interne en raison de catastrophes naturelles ou humaines y compris du changement climatique », ce qui anticipe les déplacements résultant des catastrophes naturelles et des changements climatiques. Reste à voir si ce texte contraignant sera effectif sur le continent africain et comment il trouvera à s’appliquer aux déplacements environnementaux. Au sein de l’Union européenne, une étude intitulée « Réfugiés climatiques : réponses juridiques et politiques aux migrations causées par l’environnement » a été publiée en décembre 2011 par la Direction des droits des citoyens et des affaires constitutionnelles de la Direction Générale de la politique interne. Un premier document de travail de la Commission, remis dans le cadre de l’orientation stratégique de la politique de l’UE en matière d’adaptation aux changements climatiques, a été rendu public le 16 avril 2013, sur « les changements climatiques, les dégradations de l’environnement et les migrations »29. Ainsi, après s’être longtemps tenue à 25

Draft decision /CP.18, § 7. Voir également : Loss and damage in Vulnerable Countries Initiative : http://www. loss-and-damage.net. 26 Décision 1/CP.16, par. 26 à 29. 27 § 92. 28 § 93. 29 European Commission, Commission Staff Working Document, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation, and migration, 16 April 2013, SWD(2013) 138 final, Brussels, Belgium, 36 p.

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l’écart de ces débats, l’UE semble prendre en compte dans son action le besoin de protection des migrations environnementales et envisage la migration comme une stratégie possible d’adaptation30. Toutefois, ce document constitue davantage un bilan général de l’avancement des débats scientifiques et institutionnels sur le sujet qu’un véritable texte de propositions visant la reconnaissance d’une catégorie juridique de migrants.

B. Les grands procès relatifs aux droits des populations locales et peuples autochtones sur le continent américain et africain Le 25 juillet 2012, dans une autre affaire emblématique, la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme (C.I.D.H.)31 a jugé l’Equateur responsable de la violation des droits du peuple Kichwa de Sarayaku pour avoir autorisé la compagnie pétrolière argentine « Compagnie Générale de Combustibles » à exploiter les terres traditionnelles sans consultation préalable, libre et informée des populations locales. La décision fait suite à plus de dix ans de bataille menée par les populations indigènes, par l’avocat Mario Melo et par l’Instituto para el Ecodesarrollo Regional Amazónico : elle représente une condamnation historique. En 2003, le village de Sarayaku avait déposé une requête devant la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme ; cette dernière a saisi, en 2009, la C.I.D.H. face aux recommandations restées lettre morte de l’Equateur. Après avoir fait une visite exceptionnelle dans le village, la Cour a affirmé, dans sa décision, les atteintes aux droits des populations notamment sur le volet du droit à la consultation préalable, à la propriété collective, à l’identité culturelle, mais également au droit à la vie et à l’intégrité physique des populations. Cette affaire a le mérite d’inscrire les grandes lignes de la mise en œuvre des processus de consultation lors des grands projets de développement lorsqu’ils empiètent sur les droits des peuples indigènes. Elle réaffirme, par ailleurs, le respect des normes internationales et les principes qui se dégagent de sa jurisprudence, notamment de l’arrêt Saramaka c. Suriname de 2007. La consultation doit tenir compte d’un réel processus participatif, d’un dialogue de bonne foi, et viser à aboutir à un véritable consensus entre les parties prenantes dans le respect des pratiques culturelles. Cette jurisprudence a vocation à rayonner dans les autres États du continent américain concernés par l’exploitation de terres où vivent des populations autochtones. La célèbre affaire « Chevron/Texaco » a conduit à de nouveaux rebondissements en 2012. Cette compagnie nord-américaine a pratiqué pendant des années une déforestation illégale et déversé des millions de tonnes de déchets toxiques liés aux forages et à l’exploitation pétrolière en Amazonie équatorienne. Plus de 30

Voir aussi : Communication de la Commission au Parlement européen, au Conseil, au C.E.S.E. et au Comité des régions, Maximiser l’effet positif des migrations sur le développement, Contribution de l’U.E. au dialogue de haut niveau des Nations Unies et prochaines étapes, dans le renforcement du lien entre migrations et développement, COM(2013) 292 final, Bruxelles, le 21 mai 2013, p. 14. 31 C.I.D.H., Case of Kichwa Indigenous People of Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and reparations, Judgment of 27 June 2012. Series C No. 245.

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30.000 équatoriens ont poursuivi la multinationale dès 1993 devant la justice américaine. En 2002, celle-ci a renvoyé l’affaire devant les tribunaux équatoriens. Ce procès exemplaire d’une société transnationale devant la justice d’un pays du Sud s’est conclu par un jugement inédit en 2011 condamnant en première instance Chevron/Texaco à verser plus de 18 milliards de dollars pour les dégâts environnementaux et les atteintes graves à la santé des populations locales. En janvier 2012, la compagnie Chevron/Texaco a été condamnée en appel à payer 9,5 milliards et en juillet 2012, cette somme a été finalement portée à 19 milliards de dollars, faute d’excuses présentées aux populations touchées (excuses pourtant exigées par la justice équatorienne en appel). Sur le continent africain, saisie le 12 juillet 2012 par la Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, la Cour africaine a rendu en mars 2013 une décision importante relative à un avis d’expulsion pris par l’État Kenya qui souhaitait vendre les terres de la forêt de Mau (zone de captage important d’eau) sur lesquelles vit la Communauté Ogiek. La Cour a pris en urgence des mesures provisoires. Elle a rappelé fermement qu’il y avait ici une « situation d’une extrême gravité et d’urgence et un risque irréparable à la communauté Ogiek en raison de la violation des droits qui lui sont garantis par la Charte »32. C’est la toute première fois que la Cour statue en faveur des droits d’une Communauté indigène depuis sa création. Reste à attendre la décision de la Cour sur le fond de l’affaire.

III. Le secteur privé : l’entreprise face aux droits de l’homme de l’environnement A. Jurisprudence : affaire(s) Shell (delta du Niger) La « saga » judiciaire entourant l’exploitation pétrolière dans le delta du Niger a également connu des évolutions récentes. Le delta du Niger est une zone particulièrement polluée de la planète, où vivent près de trente millions de personnes. Plusieurs rapports ont dénoncé la faiblesse des droits sociaux, les dégâts environnementaux et les conséquences sur les conditions de vie des populations et leurs droits fondamentaux, résultant de l’exploitation par le gouvernement nigérian et des entreprises multinationales des gisements pétroliers de la région. En 2009, un rapport d’Amnesty International mettait déjà en évidence la pollution et la dégradation de l’environnement « qui ont privé la population du droit à un niveau de vie décent, qui passe notamment par un accès suffisant à la nourriture et à l’eau, mais aussi du droit de gagner sa vie en travaillant et du droit à la santé »33. Selon l’O.N.G., ces atteintes aux droits humains ont perduré en raison de « l’absence d’obligation de rendre des comptes » et de « l’incapacité pour les personnes touchées d’accéder à la justice ». Par la suite, un rapport du Programme 32

Ord. portant mesures provisoires de la Cour africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples, Commission africaine des droits de l’homme et des peuples c. Kenya, no 006/2012, 15 mars 2013. Rapport Nigéria, Pétrole, Pauvreté, http://www.amnesty.org/.

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des Nations Unies pour l’environnement de 2011 a examiné l’impact de l’exploitation pétrolière en pays Ogoni : résultat de plus d’un an d’étude sur site, le rapport concluait que le nettoyage de la région pourrait s’avérer l’exercice le plus long et le plus étendu pour ramener l’eau potable, ainsi que pour restaurer la terre et les écosystèmes contaminés34. Par ailleurs, le volet judiciaire s’est particulièrement animé sur le sujet ces derniers temps. En effet, la compagnie pétrolière Shell (c’est-à-dire la société-mère Royal Dutch Shell et sa filiale nigériane : Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria ou S.P.D.C.) ont été poursuivies en justice aux Pays-Bas pour des dommages commis au Nigeria. Quatre agriculteurs nigérians soutenus par l’O.N.G. Milieudefensie (affiliée aux Amis de la terre) ont ainsi déposé des plaintes concernant la pollution de trois villages (Goi, Oruma, Ikot Ada Udo) par des hydrocarbures. Les plaignants accusaient la multinationale d’avoir pollué les étangs de pêche mettant ainsi en péril leurs revenus, et leur capacité financière d’envoyer leurs enfants à l’école. Outre une compensation financière demandée pour les dommages subis, ils demandaient à Shell de dépolluer et de maintenir et sécuriser ses pipelines de manière à prévenir d’autres situations similaires. Shell a contesté la compétence d’un tribunal néerlandais sur sa filiale au Nigéria, affirmant que la société-mère ne pouvait être responsable des conséquences des actions de sa filiale dans ce pays. Ces affaires posaient dès lors la question de savoir dans quelle mesure une société-mère peut être tenue responsable des dommages environnementaux causés par une filiale à l’étranger. Par ailleurs, Shell avançait que les faits de pollution étaient consécutifs à des sabotages, événements sur lesquels la société n’avait aucune prise. Les plaignants considéraient, de leur côté, que la société n’entretenait pas correctement ses pipelines et n’avait pas pris de mesures suffisantes concernant le vol du pétrole et les sabotages consécutifs. Le Tribunal de la Haye a rendu sa décision le 30 janvier 2013. Dans une de ces affaires, Shell a été reconnue responsable, pour sa « négligence », de la pollution par hydrocarbures et des dommages subis dans le cadre de la plainte d’un agriculteur du village d’Ikot Ada Udo. Le Tribunal a ordonné le paiement de compensations aux victimes, dont le montant serait fixé ultérieurement. Dans les autres affaires, le tribunal a estimé que les fuites à l’origine des dommages subis étaient bien liées (comme le soutenait Shell) à des sabotages liés au vol du pétrole. La Royal Dutch Shell n’a en revanche pas été reconnue responsable des agissements de sa filiale au Nigéria qui assure pour sa part l’exploitation quotidienne de la société sur place. Un appel a été déposé par les agriculteurs nigérians et l’O.N.G. le 1er mai 2013 afin de permettre aux demandeurs déboutés d’obtenir gain de cause et la condamnation de la société-mère35. La conclusion de ce cas était très attendue en particulier en raison de l’arrêt sur un thème similaire de la Cour suprême des États-Unis qui, dans le cadre de l’Alien Tort Claims Act (A.T.C.A.), a conclu que les agissements survenus en dehors des ÉtatsUnis ne pourraient donner lieu à des actions en responsabilité. L’affaire Kiobel v. 34

Voir rapport : http://postconflict.unep.ch/publications/OEA/UNEP_OEA.pdf. L’ensemble des pièces du dossier, les jugements sont disponibles en intégralité et en anglais sur le site de l’O.N.G. Mileudefensie : http://www.milieudefensie.nl/.

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Royal Dutch Petroleum, qui a débouché sur cette conclusion, concernait une série de violations des droits de l’homme commises au Nigéria dans les années 1990, à une époque où Shell (par l’intermédiaire de sa filiale, la S.P.D.C.) procédait à des opérations d’exploration et d’exploitation pétrolière dans le delta du Niger. Des exactions impliquant tortures, viols et meurtres auraient été commises par les autorités nigérianes avec les moyens financiers de l’entreprise, envers les populations protestant contre les conséquences environnementales et humaines de ces nouvelles activités. Un groupe de ressortissants nigérians a alors déposé une plainte contre l’ensemble des parties prenantes, devant la District Court de New York, sur le fondement de l’Alien Tort Claims Act qui donne compétences aux juridictions fédérales des États-Unis pour connaître de toute action en responsabilité civile, engagée par un étranger, à raison d’une violation du droit des gens ou d’un traité conclu par les États-Unis36. Adopté dans le contexte du Judiciary Act de 1789, l’A.T.C.A. avait pour vocation initiale de permettre aux tribunaux américains de juger les violations du droit des gens (law of nations) ou d’un traité auquel les États-Unis sont parties, commises envers un étranger. Il se voulait en particulier être un remède aux crimes de piraterie. Le texte est resté lettre morte jusqu’en 1980, année au cours de laquelle il fut utilisé pour la première fois dans une affaire Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, lorsqu’une famille paraguayenne résidant aux États-Unis l’employa avec succès contre un ancien chef de la police paraguayenne pour actes de torture et meurtre d’un des leurs, considérant la torture comme une violation du « droit international moderne »37. Il s’agissait en somme de reconnaître aux juridictions fédérales des États-Unis la possibilité de sanctionner, à l’image de la compétence universelle, le droit international coutumier et en l’espèce l’interdiction universelle de la torture. La solution de 1980 a ouvert ensuite la voie à des actions judiciaires menées par des particuliers non seulement contre d’autres particuliers mais aussi contre des personnes morales38. Une affaire marquante fut celle opposant des années plus tard, des victimes du régime birman portant plainte contre la société UNOCAL pour complicité d’actes de travail forcé, viol, torture et meurtre, lors de la construction d’un pipeline. La Cour d’appel fédérale du 9e Circuit avait estimé, le 18 septembre 2002, avoir réuni suffisamment d’éléments lorsqu’est finalement intervenu un accord financier entre UNOCAL et les plaignants. Certains avaient néanmoins vu dans cette affaire une interprétation abusive du texte de 1789. La Cour suprême dans l’affaire Kiobel du 17 avril 2013 vient d’apporter une restriction importante à la possibilité de prendre appui sur l’Alien Tort Claims Act en excluant sa portée extraterritoriale : les requérants 36

28 U.S.C. § 1350 : US Code Section 1350, Alien’s actions for tort : « The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States ». Voir O. De Schutter, « Les affaires Total et Unocal : complicité et extraterritorialité en matière d’imposition aux entreprises d’obligations en matière de droits de l’homme », Annuaire français de droit international, vol. LII (2006), pp. 55‑101 ; ainsi que O. De Schutter, « Le contrôle du respect des droits de l’homme par les sociétés transnationales : le rôle de l’État d’origine », in M.‑A. Moreau, H. Muir Watt et P. Rodière (dir.), Justice et mondialisation en droit du travail, Paris, Dalloz, 2010, pp. 107‑168. 37 A.‑M. Burley, « The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789 : A Badge of Honor », AJIL, July 1989, 83, 461. 38 Pour des affaires rendues sur des questions environnementales : Amlon Metals, Inc. v. FMC Corp., 775 F.Supp. 668 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) ; Aguinda v. Texaco, Inc., 142 F. Supp. 2d 534 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) ; Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 366 (E.D. La. 1997) ; Bano v. Union Carbide Corp., 273 F.3d 120, 132 (C.A.2 (N.Y.) 2001) ; Sarei v. Rio Tinto plc, Civ No. C00-11695 (C.D. Cal. 2001).

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auraient dû être déboutés, selon la Cour suprême, car la loi ne pouvait pas s’appliquer à des faits survenus hors du territoire des États-Unis. La solution aurait été différente si la société avait des liens « étroits » avec les États-Unis et l’on peut imaginer à ce titre l’existence d’un siège social et pas simplement une « présence » ou des « activités » aux États-Unis. Nul doute que la décision de la Cour suprême, résultat d’une plainte déposée dix ans plus tôt par Esther Kiobel, aura des conséquences importantes pour les sociétés multinationales implantées dans des zones à risques et confrontées à des questions de droits de l’homme.

B. Entreprises multinationales minières ayant leur siège en Suisse Plusieurs plaintes récentes ont visé des filiales d’entreprises multinationales d’extraction minière ayant établi leur siège social en Suisse, pour des atteintes à l’environnement et à la santé des populations locales39. Estimant que l’accroissement de ce phénomène pouvait être de nature à nuire à la réputation de la Suisse, voire entrer en conflit avec les engagements internationaux du pays pris en faveur des droits de l’homme et de la protection de l’environnement, le Conseil fédéral a institué, le 23 mai 2012, une plateforme interdépartementale destinée à permettre l’échange d’informations entre les départements concernés et destinée à dresser, à l’intention du Conseil fédéral, un état des lieux de cette problématique des matières premières, sous ses différents aspects. Enfin, en mai 2012, un dialogue pluripartite a été lancé dans le cadre duquel la mise en œuvre des principes directeurs de l’O.N.U. relatifs aux entreprises et aux droits de l’homme sera discutée avec les acteurs intéressés des milieux économiques, scientifiques et syndicaux et des O.N.G.

C. Nouveau cercle de réflexion parlementaire en France sur la question du respect des droits de l’homme et de l’environnement par les entreprises multinationales En France, un cercle de réflexion parlementaire a été créé le 13 décembre 2012 afin d’élaborer des propositions concrètes pour le respect des droits de l’homme et de l’environnement par les entreprises multinationales. Cette initiative a pour but de donner un effet concret aux Principes directeurs des Nations Unies sur la responsabilité des entreprises multinationales en matière des droits de l’homme et aux Principes directeurs de l’O.C.D.E. à l’intention des multinationales. Cette prise de conscience répond à l’appel du Forum Citoyen pour la Responsabilité Sociale des Entreprises (F.C.R.S.E.) et du Collectif Éthique sur l’Étiquette (E.S.E.), lancé à l’issue du colloque « Devoir des États – Responsabilité des multinationales : Prévenir 39

Carlo Sommaruga relève par exemple les cas suivants : « En novembre 2011, les autorités de la province d’Espinar (Pérou) ont porté plainte contre la filiale d’une entreprise multinationale suisse d’extraction minière pour de graves atteintes à l’environnement et à la santé de la population locale. En mars 2012, le procureur général de Tucuman (Argentine) a déposé plainte auprès de la Cour Interaméricaine des droits de l’homme », http://www.parlament.ch/f/.

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et remédier aux violations des droits humains et de l’environnement » qui s’est tenu le même jour à l’Assemblée Nationale. Parmi les mesures principales que comporte l’appel figurent la responsabilisation des sociétés-mères pour les activités de leurs filiales ; l’élimination des obstacles à l’accès à la justice en intégrant l’action de groupe au droit français ; la garantie de l’exemplarité de l’État en conditionnant les investissements au respect des droits de l’homme et de l’environnement ; et l’amélioration de la transparence et de l’accès à l’information40.

IV. Démocratie environnementale et politique européenne : participation, information et accès au droit des citoyens Un an après son entrée en vigueur, un premier bilan de l’Initiative Citoyenne Européenne (I.C.E.) et de ses impacts en matière environnementale peut être tenté41. Ce développement s’inscrit dans une tendance plus vaste en faveur de mécanismes de participation et de l’amélioration de l’information en matière environnementale.

A. Bilan des Initiatives Citoyennes Européennes en matière d’environnement Introduite à l’article 11, § 4 du TUE par le Traité de Lisbonne du 13 décembre 2007, l’I.C.E. a été mise en œuvre par le Règlement du Parlement et du Conseil du 16 février 201142 qui définit sa procédure et ses conditions de mise en œuvre. Elle est conçue comme un instrument permettant de lancer des débats paneuropéens, d’acquérir une conscience politique européenne et d’influer sur l’agenda politique43. Un an après son lancement, le Comité économique et social européen (C.E.S.E.) a tiré le premier bilan de sa mise en œuvre et a réfléchi aux améliorations qu’il conviendra d’introduire dans le règlement de révision de l’I.C.E. en 2015. Les principaux enjeux relevés concernent prioritairement l’information et la conviction du citoyen quant au potentiel d’efficacité de ce nouvel outil de participation, la difficulté d’obtenir un financement et l’absorption des moyens disponibles dans la résolution des problèmes informatiques (ce qui ne permet pas d’investir dans les campagnes médiatiques), ou encore la simplification des règles en matière 40

Le texte est disponible ici : http://www.forumcitoyenpourlarse.org/. Mettant de côté l’aspect procédural de l’I.C.E. qui a déjà fait l’objet de nombreux commentaires : N. Levrat, « L’initiative citoyenne européenne : une réponse au déficit démocratique ? », C.D.E., 1er janvier 2011, pp. 53‑101 ; P. Ponzano, « L’initiative citoyenne européenne : la démocratie participative à l’épreuve », Revue du droit de l’Union européenne, 1er décembre 2012, pp. 615‑626. 42 Parlement européen et Conseil, Règlement relatif à l’initiative citoyenne, no 211/2011/UE, 16 février 2011, J.O.U.E., no L 65 du 11 mars 2011. 43 C.E.S.E., Avis sur « la mise en œuvre du traité de Lisbonne : démocratie participative et initiative citoyenne (art. 11) », 17 mars 2010, C.E.S.E. 465/2010. 41

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de collecte de signatures. D’autres interrogations concernent le problème de la traduction dans les vingt-sept langues officielles de l’UE lors de la conception des formulaires ou de la correspondance entre organisateurs d’une I.C.E., ou encore le délai des douze mois de collecte des signatures, délai jugé à la fois trop court pour solliciter l’ensemble des citoyens européens et trop long lorsqu’il s’agit d’impliquer des bénévoles sur toute sa durée. S’il a été reconnu que l’I.C.E. constitue une avancée sur le plan normatif, procédural et pratique, car c’est la première fois que les trois dimensions modernes de la démocratie directe, transnationale et numérique se retrouvent à l’intérieur d’un même outil, il est unanimement accepté que, pour l’heure, la communication est un échec et requiert une réforme. S’agissant de la participation citoyenne sur le plan environnemental, ce nouveau dispositif européen a porté ses fruits puisque parmi les quatorze I.C.E. enregistrées au 9 avril 2013, quatre concernent des questions environnementales. La première ayant recueilli le nombre requis de signatures est celle relative au droit à l’eau. Ses organisateurs demandent que l’UE s’inscrive dans la voie tracée par l’O.N.U. et érige le droit à l’eau et à l’assainissement au rang de droit de l’homme. Ils souhaitent notamment que les États membres soient contraints de garantir un approvisionnement en eau et une gestion des ressources hydriques qui ne soient pas soumis aux règles du marché intérieur et demandent que l’Union intensifie ses efforts pour concrétiser l’accès universel à l’eau et à l’assainissement. Deux autres I.C.E. concernent la gestion responsable des déchets et la suppression du paquet énergie-climat adopté en 2009. La première souhaite que la Commission élabore des principes-cadres pour garantir une gestion et un traitement responsables des déchets dans les États membres en se fondant notamment sur une série de mesures contraignantes : interdiction des suremballages, obligation d’utiliser des emballages recyclables, interdiction des incinérateurs. La seconde poursuit trois objectifs principaux : stopper la fuite carbone accentuée par la délocalisation des entreprises, réduire la précarité énergétique, augmenter la sécurité énergétique en autorisant les États à utiliser leurs propres ressources énergétiques. L’initiative la plus récente vise la prévention et la sanction de l’écocide. Elle demande que l’endommagement, la destruction et la perte d’écosystème engagent la responsabilité de leur auteur, qu’il soit personne physique ou morale. L’initiative vise les écocides perpétrés sur le territoire et dans l’espace maritime européens, ou réalisés par un ressortissant européen hors de l’UE. Impulsée sur la base des idées de Polly Hoggins, juriste internationaliste, cette initiative a pour ambition d’aboutir à une reconnaissance de l’écocide en tant que cinquième crime contre la Paix pouvant être jugé par la C.P.I.44. Ce premier bilan de l’I.C.E. a lancé une réflexion prospective sur les voies de recours possibles contre une I.C.E. admise par la Commission, ayant reçu le soutien d’un million de signataires, mais qui ferait l’objet d’une contestation de la part d’autres citoyens de l’U.E. Serait-il envisageable de mettre en place une contre-initiative ? Par ailleurs, on peut se demander si l’augmentation significative des infractions 44

http://www.endecocide.eu/.

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environnementales, représentant en 2011 17 % de l’ensemble des infractions45, et l’alerte donnée par la Commission et le Parlement sur l’insuffisance d’infrastructures de gestion des déchets et les manquements graves en résultant46, ne pourrait pas constituer une source d’inspiration pour des futures I.C.E. Si l’I.C.E. mobilise les citoyens européens, elle implique également le Comité économique et social européen, considéré comme l’interface clef de la relation entre la société civile et les institutions européennes. Souhaitant intervenir comme un facilitateur d’initiative citoyenne47, il s’est proposé de créer une structure de soutien indépendante, un helpdesk, qui verrait le jour en principe courant 201348. De son côté, le Comité des régions estime pouvoir jouer un rôle central dans le cadre d’une communication décentralisée et propose la création d’un guichet interinstitutionnel d’information49. Enfin, l’Agence européenne des droits fondamentaux a souligné les avantages de l’initiative citoyenne dans son rapport annuel de 2011 sur la mise en œuvre de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE50. Définissant la citoyenneté active comme l’implication des citoyens dans la vie des communautés locales sous forme d’idées, d’actions et de prise de décision, le Conseil de l’Europe s’inscrit également dans cet intérêt renouvelé pour la démocratie participative, ainsi qu’en attestent le rapport adopté le 9 avril 2012 par l’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe51 et sa résolution du 24 avril 201252. L’Assemblée parlementaire recommande de renforcer la coordination des systèmes de travail avec l’UE et de concevoir de nouveaux systèmes en relation avec son Programme unique. Partant, il déduit trois attributs essentiels à la citoyenneté européenne sur lesquels il convient de s’appuyer : le respect, la participation et la responsabilité.

B. Les autres politiques européennes participatives et informatives L’I.C.E. ne se développe pas de manière isolée. Elle rejoint une tendance plus ample au renforcement de la participation en Europe. Plusieurs indices permettent de l’attester. Tout d’abord, on remarque un retour en force en matière environnementale du droit de pétition prévu à l’article 227 du TFUE. Les pétitions adressées au Parlement européen en 2011 concernent plus spécifiquement les procédures de 45

Commission européenne, 29e rapport annuel sur le contrôle de l’application du droit de l’U.E., COM(2012)714final, 30 novembre 2012. 46 European Commission, « Screening of waste management performance of EU Member States », 2 juillet 2012 ; Parlement européen, Proposition de résolution sur les activités de la commission des pétitions relatives à l’année 2011. 47 C.E.S.E., Avis sur la Proposition de règlement du Parlement européen et du Conseil relatif à l’I.C.E., C.E.S.E. 993/2010, 14 juillet 2010. 48 S. Nilsson, « Discours d’ouverture », Journée de l’initiative citoyenne européenne : Engagez-vous !, 9 avril 2013, Bruxelles. 49 Comité des régions, Avis sur l’I.C.E, J.O.U.E., C 267/57, 1er octobre 2010. 50 Agence européenne des droits fondamentaux, Les droits fondamentaux : défis et réussites en 2011, Rapport annuel 2011, pp. 203 et s. 51 Assemblée Parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe, La promotion d’une citoyenneté active en Europe, Rapport, 9 avril 2012, Doc. 12989. 52 Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe, La promotion d’une citoyenneté active en Europe, Résolution 1874 (2012).

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consultation du public dans le cadre de la gestion de sites industriels, de centres de traitement des déchets et de parcs éoliens53, et sont motivées par le fait que, de manière générale, les citoyens n’accordent aux autorités nationales qu’un faible crédit pour gérer de manière adéquate les processus de consultation. Ensuite, l’année 2013 désignée « Année européenne des citoyens » constitue une opportunité pour le développement des droits fondamentaux des citoyens européens au premier rang desquels le droit d’initiative. Si la Commission européenne l’a envisagée dans une perspective limitée à la liberté de circulation dans l’UE54, le C.E.S.E. estime au contraire que cette année doit avoir pour objectif d’améliorer le dialogue et l’échange d’informations entre les institutions et les citoyens de l’Union et de renforcer la démocratie participative et la citoyenneté active55. En outre, dans sa communication du 7 mars 201256, la Commission européenne invite les États membres, institutions et agences de l’UE à travailler selon une logique de réseau d’informations, de remontée de l’information et de création de structures de traitement de l’information qui permettraient de rendre cette dernière compréhensible du plus grand nombre et largement diffusable57. Enfin, ces démarches vont de pair avec le renforcement du principe de participation au niveau national par la loi française du 27 décembre 201258 votée suite à la censure des articles L.120 et suivants du Code de l’environnement par le Conseil constitutionnel59.

V. Le droit de l’homme à l’environnement en Europe A. Devant la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme confirme sa tendance à intégrer une dimension environnementale à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme60. Tout d’abord, elle admet que la protection et la gestion de l’environnement peuvent constituer un but légitime lorsque ce but est invoqué pour justi53

M. Rambour, « Incidences environnementales, actions citoyennes et actualité jurisprudentielle, dans l’Union européenne », http://www.riseo.fr/. 54 Commission européenne, Proposition de décision du Parlement et du Conseil relative à l’Année européenne des citoyens (2013), 11 août 2011, COM(2011)489final, 2011/0217(COD) ; la Commission européenne propose de faire l’année 2013 « l’Année européenne des citoyens », 11 août 2011, IP/11/959 ; Parlement européen et Conseil, Décision no 1093/2012/UE relative à l’Année européenne des citoyens, 21 novembre 2012, J.O.U.E., L 325/1, 23 novembre 2012. 55 C.E.S.E., Année européenne des citoyens (2013), Avis, mars 2012, C.E.S.E. 822/2012. 56 Commission européenne, Tirer le meilleur parti des mesures environnementales de l’U.E. : instaurer la confiance par l’amélioration des connaissances et de la réactivité, COM(2012)95final, 7 mars 2012. 57 Évoquons la plateforme européenne d’adaptation au changement climatique appelée « CLIMATE-ADAPT » http:// climate-adapt.eea.europa.eu/, ou encore la consultation publique sur le climat : http://ec.europa.eu/clima/consultations/. 58 Loi no 2012-1460 du 27 décembre 2012 relative à la mise en œuvre du principe de participation du public défini à l’article 7 de la Charte de l’environnement, J.O., 28 décembre 2012. La loi vient renforcer les droits à l’information et à la participation en distinguant leur consécration au sein de l’article L. 110-1 du Code de l’environnement. En outre, par l’article L. 120-3 du même code, la loi étend le champ d’application de la participation du public aux décisions non individuelles prises par l’État, hors procédure de participation mise en place par un texte particulier. 59 Cons. constit., DC no 2012-282, 23 novembre 2012. L’article L. 120-1, alinéa 1er du Code de l’environnement a été jugé contraire à l’article 7 de la Charte de l’environnement. 60 Concernant l’approche environnementale des droits de l’homme devant la C.E.D.H., voir N. De Sadeleer, « Enforcing EUCHR Principles and Fundamental Rights in Environmental Cases », Nordic Journal of International Law, No. 81, 2012, pp. 39‑74, Conseil de l’Europe, Manuel sur les droits de l’homme et l’environnement, 2e éd., 2012, Éditions du Conseil de l’Europe, 206 p. ; L. Robert (éd.), L’environnement et la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme, Bruxelles, Bruylant, 2013, 244 p.

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fier que des restrictions soient apportées aux droits garantis par la Convention, s’agissant du moins des droits qui peuvent faire l’objet de telles restrictions (1). Ensuite, la Cour a identifié à plusieurs reprises des atteintes à l’environnement comme pouvant constituer des ingérences avec les droits garantis (2). Par ailleurs, elle a réaffirmé, à plusieurs reprises, que certains droits environnementaux procéduraux étaient garantis par la Convention (3). Enfin, la Cour a (semble-t-il) clos la question du droit autonome à un environnement sain et protégé en tant que droit autonome : elle exige que les requérants puissent démontrer que les dégradations de l’environnement portent atteinte à un droit protégé par la Convention afin que les affaires portées devant elle soient recevables (4).

1. La protection de l’environnement est un but légitime pour limiter la jouissance des droits relatifs La protection de l’environnement et l’aménagement du territoire sont des buts légitimes lorsqu’est en cause une mesure étatique qui résulte en une ingérence avec les droits relatifs de la Convention, et notamment le droit de propriété. C’est ce qui ressort de la décision d’irrecevabilité rendue dans l’affaire Marco Campanile et autres c. Italie61 du 15 janvier 2013. Dans l’arrêt de Grande Chambre Vistiņš et Perepjolkins c. Lettonie du 25 octobre 201262, il était question de terrains expropriés afin d’agrandir, rénover et reconstruire le port de Riga. Dans son contrôle de la conformité de l’expropriation avec les exigences du droit de propriété, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme rappelle qu’en matière d’urbanisme et d’aménagement du territoire, les États parties jouissent d’une large marge d’appréciation. La Cour a cependant conclu à la violation du droit de propriété en raison de la disproportion entre la valeur cadastrale des biens expropriés et les indemnités allouées. Dans sa décision du 3 avril 2012, Coriolan Gabriel Ioviţoni et autres c. Roumanie63, elle a conclu à la non-recevabilité rationae materiae des griefs présentés par les requérants qui mettaient en cause les taxes environnementales liées aux achats/immatriculations de voitures. Elle estime en l’espèce que les requérants ne tiraient pas du constat d’incompatibilité de ces taxes avec le droit de l’UE (constat fait par la Cour de Justice de l’Union européenne dans l’affaire C-402/09) des droits de créance issus d’une norme de l’UE parfaitement claire, précise et directement applicable.

2. La dégradation de l’environnement peut interférer avec les droits garantis par la Convention Dans l’arrêt Di Sarno et autres c. Italie du 10 janvier 201264, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a rappelé que les dégradations de l’environnement peuvent 61

Cour eur. D.H. (2e sect.), déc. (irrec.), Marco Campanile et autres c. Italie, 15 janvier 2003, req. no 32635/05. Cour eur. D.H. (GC), arrêt Vistiņš et Perepjolkins c. Lettonie, 25 octobre 2012, req. no 71243/01. Cour eur. D.H. (3e sect.), déc. (irrec.), Coriolan Gabriel Ioviţoni et autres c. Roumanie, 3 avril 2012, req. no 57583/10, 1245/11 et 4189/11. 64 Cour eur. D.H. (2e sect.), arrêt Di Sarno et autres c. Italie, 10 janvier 2012, req. no 30765/08 (définitif depuis le 10 mai 2012). 62

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aboutir à des ingérences dans les droits matériels garantis par la Convention, notamment le droit à la vie et le droit au respect de la vie privée et familiale, que garantissent respectivement les articles 2 et 8 de la Convention. Ainsi, « la Cour rappelle que des atteintes graves à l’environnement peuvent affecter le bienêtre des personnes et les priver de la jouissance de leur domicile de manière à nuire à leur vie privée et familiale (…) Les États ont avant tout l’obligation positive, en particulier dans le cas d’une activité dangereuse, de mettre en place une réglementation adaptée aux spécificités de ladite activité, notamment au niveau du risque qui pourrait en résulter. Cette obligation doit régir l’autorisation, la mise en fonctionnement, l’exploitation, la sécurité et le contrôle de l’activité en question, ainsi qu’imposer à toute personne concernée par celle-ci l’adoption de mesures d’ordre pratique propres à assurer la protection effective des citoyens dont la vie risque d’être exposée aux dangers inhérents au domaine en cause ». En l’espèce, les requérants se plaignaient des atteintes aux droits garantis par la Convention qui auraient résulté de la « crise des déchets » dans la commune de Naples. Il était reproché à l’Italie des défaillances en ce qui concerne la gestion, le traitement et l’élimination des déchets de 2000 à 2009. La Cour a conclu à la violation du volet matériel de l’article 8. De même, dans l’arrêt Apanasewicz c. Pologne du 3 mai 201165, elle rappelle que « des atteintes au droit au respect du domicile ne visent pas seulement les atteintes matérielles ou corporelles, telles que l’entrée dans le domicile d’une personne non autorisée, mais aussi les atteintes immatérielles ou incorporelles, telles que les bruits, les émissions, les odeurs et autres ingérences. Si les atteintes sont graves, elles peuvent priver une personne de son droit au respect du domicile parce qu’elles l’empêchent de jouir de son domicile ». En l’espèce, il s’agissait d’une usine de production de béton. La Cour conclut à la violation de l’article 8.

3. Le respect des droits environnementaux procéduraux : une exigence La Cour européenne des droits de l’homme a confirmé que les droits environnementaux procéduraux (droit à l’accès à l’information environnementale, à la participation du public au processus décisionnel et à l’accès à la justice) sont une garantie du respect des droits matériels (tels que, par exemple, le droit à une vie privée et familiale). Dans l’arrêt Grimkovskaya c. Ukraine66 du 21 juillet 2011 où il était question des effets de l’exploitation d’une autoroute, la Cour se réfère à la Convention d’Aarhus en considérant que la requérante n’a pas bénéficié d’une véritable possibilité de contester devant les juridictions nationales la politique du Gouvernement concernant l’autoroute : elle conclut à la violation de l’article 8. Dans l’arrêt Di Sarno et autres c. Italie du 10 janvier 2012, elle conclut à la non-violation de l’aspect procédural du droit à la vie privée et familiale car les requérants ont eu accès à l’information sur les risques liés à la crise des déchets dans la commune de Naples. En 65

Cour eur. D.H. (4e sect.), arrêt Apanasewicz c. Pologne, 3 mai 2011, req. no 6854/07 (définitif depuis le 3 août 2011). Cour eur. D.H. (5e sect.), arrêt Grimkovskaya c. Ukraine, 21 juillet 2011, req. no 38182/03 (définitif depuis le 21 novembre 2011). 66

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revanche, elle débouche sur un constat de violation de l’article 13 de la Convention (droit à un recours effectif) en raison de « l’absence, dans l’ordre juridique italien, de voies de recours effectives », ce qui aurait privé les requérants de la possibilité « d’obtenir réparation de leur préjudice ». Enfin, la Cour a conclu à la violation de la Convention dans des affaires relatives à des atteintes à l’environnement dans l’arrêt Apanasewicz c. Pologne du 3 mai 201167 et Tănăsoaica c. Roumanie du 19 juin 201268. Dans cette dernière affaire, le requérant avait dénoncé la pollution des eaux par l’aluminium dans un article, ce qui lui avait valu d’être condamnée par les tribunaux internes pour insulte. La Cour conclut à la violation de la liberté d’expression69, relevant que « le caractère d’intérêt public de la publication d’informations relatives au niveau de pollution des eaux » n’est pas contesté70 et que comme « il ressort d’une simple lecture de l’article litigieux, le requérant voulait tirer un signal d’alarme et informer la population du département de Dolj de la pollution des eaux par la société A. De l’avis de la Cour, cet épisode de pollution répondait à un intérêt public, important en l’occurrence »71. Il est intéressant de relever que la Cour fait également référence au droit du public de recevoir des informations environnementales : « dans le domaine de l’environnement (…) la Cour rappelle l’importance de l’accès du public aux conclusions des études environnementales ainsi qu’à des informations permettant d’évaluer le danger auquel il est exposé, qui fait partie des obligations positives sous l’angle de l’article 8 de la Convention »72.

4. Le refus de consacrer un droit autonome à un environnement sain, calme et protégé Dans son arrêt Tatar c. Roumanie du 27 janvier 200973, la Cour avait semblé reconnaître le droit à un environnement sain et protégé en tant que droit autonome. Plus récemment, elle semble s’être repliée sur sa jurisprudence traditionnelle, formulée très clairement dans sa décision Kyrtatos c. Grèce du 22 mai 200374 : « l’élément crucial qui permet de déterminer si, dans les circonstances d’une affaire, des atteintes à l’environnement ont emporté violation de l’un des droits sauvegardés par le paragraphe 1er de l’article 8 est l’existence d’un effet néfaste sur la sphère privée ou familiale d’une personne, et non simplement la dégradation générale de l’environnement. Ni l’article 8 ni aucune autre disposition de la Convention ne garantit spécifiquement une protection générale de l’environnement en tant que tel ; d’autres instruments internationaux et législations internes sont plus adaptés lorsqu’il s’agit de traiter cet aspect particulier ». En effet, les arrêts rendus de 2011 au premier trimestre de 2013 confirment ce retour à la jurisprudence « tradition-

Cour eur. D.H. (4e sect.), arrêt Apanasewicz c. Pologne, 3 mai 2011, req. no 6854/07 (définitif depuis le 3 août 2011). Cour eur. D.H. (3e sect.), arrêt Tănăsoaica c. Roumanie, 19 juin 2012, req. no 3490/03 (définitif depuis le 19 septembre 2012). 69 Article 10. 70 Ibid., § 43. 71 Ibid., § 48. 72 Ibid., § 44. 73 Cour eur. D.H. (3e sect.), arrêt Tatar c. Roumanie, 27 janvier 2009, req. no 67021/01 (définitif depuis le 6 juillet 2009). 74 Cour eur. D.H. (1re sect.), arrêt Kyrtatos c. Grèce du 22 mai 2003, req. no 41666/98 (définitif depuis le 22 août 2003). 68

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nelle ». Dans l’arrêt Apanasewicz c. Pologne du 3 mai 201175, la Cour relève que « la Convention ne reconnaît pas expressément le droit à un environnement sain et calme ». Dans le même sens, dans l’arrêt Di Sarno et autres c. Italie du 10 janvier 201276, elle relève que « ni l’article 8 ni aucune autre disposition de la Convention ne garantit spécifiquement une protection générale de l’environnement en tant que tel (…). Selon la jurisprudence de la Cour, l’élément crucial qui permet de déterminer si, dans les circonstances d’une affaire, des atteintes à l’environnement ont emporté violation de l’un des droits garantis par le paragraphe 1er de l’article 8 est l’existence d’un effet néfaste sur la sphère privée ou familiale d’une personne, et non simplement la dégradation générale de l’environnement ». Enfin, dans l’affaire Dubetska et autres c. Ukraine du 10 février 201177, la Cour a conclu à la violation de l’article 8 dans laquelle il était question de l’exploitation d’une mine de charbon. Dans le même sens, dans l’affaire Flamenbaum et autres c. France du 13 décembre 2012, elle débouche sur un constat de non-violation de l’article 8 et de l’article 1er du Premier Protocole additionnel à la Convention : dans cette affaire, les requérants entendaient dénoncer l’extension de l’aéroport de Deauville-Saint Gatien dont ils sont des riverains78. L’Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l’Europe réfléchit, depuis plusieurs années, à l’adoption d’un Protocole additionnel sur le droit à l’environnement sain annexé à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme.79 Ce projet n’a toujours pas abouti. Le Comité des Ministres du Conseil de l’Europe et le Comité d’Experts pour le développement des droits de l’homme s’y opposent toujours parce qu’un titulaire et un débiteur feraient défaut au droit à un environnement sain en tant que droit autonome des droits-relais garantis par la Convention.

B. Devant la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne Le droit à un environnement sain n’est reconnu en tant que tel, ni dans les traités européens, ni dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE80. Il a fait néanmoins son entrée dans l’ordre juridique de l’UE81, cela par le truchement de l’article 1er de la Convention d’Aarhus du 25 juin 199882. Approuvée le 17 février 2005 par l’UE83, cette Convention constitue un accord mixte qui, à ce titre, prime sur 75

Cour eur. D.H. (4e sect.), arrêt Apanasewicz c. Pologne, 3 mai 2011, req. no 6854/07 (définitif depuis le 3 août 2011). Cour eur. D.H. (2e sect.), arrêt Di Sarno et autres c. Italie, 10 janvier 2012, req. no 30765/08 (définitif depuis le 10 mai 2012). 77 Cour eur. D.H. (5e sect.), arrêt Dubetska et autres c. Ukraine, 10 février 2011, req. no 30499/03 (définitif depuis le 10 mai 2011). 78 Cour eur. D.H. (5e sect.), arrêt Flamenbaum et autres c. France, 13 décembre 2012, req. no 3675/04 et 23264/04 (définitif depuis le 13 mars 2013). 79 Voir la recommandation 1885 (2009) du 30 septembre 2009 portant sur l’élaboration d’un Protocole additionnel à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme sur le droit à un environnement sain. 80 M. Prieur, « Droit à l’environnement », Jcl. administratif, fasc. 360, 2013, no 16. 81 C.J., 20 avril 1974, Haegeman, 181/73, Rec., p. 449 ; C.J., 30 septembre 1987, Demirel, 12/86, Rec., p. 3719, § 9 ; C.J., 19 mars 2002, Commission c. Irlande, C-13/00, Rec., p. I-2943. 82 Cet article énonce qu’« afin de contribuer à protéger le droit de chacun, dans les générations présentes et futures, de vivre dans un environnement propre à assurer sa santé et son bien-être, chaque Partie garantit les droits d’accès à l’information sur l’environnement, de participation du public au processus décisionnel et d’accès à la justice en matière d’environnement conformément aux dispositions de la présente Convention ». 83 Décision no 2005/370/CE du 17 février 2005, J.O., L 124, 17 mai 2005, p. 1. 76

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le droit dérivé de l’Union. Pour autant, c’est surtout le volet procédural du droit à l’environnement qui est, par ce biais, intégré à l’ordre juridique de l’UE. En effet, les dispositions de la Convention d’Aarhus ne détaillent pas le volet substantiel du droit à l’environnement, ce qui explique probablement pourquoi la Cour de justice de l’UE (C.J.) n’a pas encore eu l’opportunité de se prononcer directement sur ce volet substantiel84. Le volet procédural du droit à l’environnement englobe les droits à l’information, à la participation et à l’accès à la justice du public. Ces garanties sont développées par les dispositions de la Convention d’Aarhus et mises en œuvre par plusieurs directives européennes85. Cette concordance des sources a ainsi permis à la Cour de justice de mettre en place une interprétation concomitante de ces dispositions, participant ainsi pleinement à l’effectivité du volet procédural du droit à l’environnement. Une décision de la Cour de justice rendue le 16 décembre 2010 sur renvoi préjudiciel86, retient particulièrement l’attention en ce qui concerne le droit à l’information. Après avoir rappelé que l’interprétation des restrictions à l’accès à l’information prévues par la directive 2003/4/CE doit rester stricte, la Cour livre un véritable modus operandi à l’attention des autorités nationales confrontées à une demande d’information environnementale fournie par le demandeur d’une autorisation de mise sur le marché de produits phytopharmaceutiques. Ainsi, même lorsqu’une éventuelle demande de protection de certaines informations, au titre du secret industriel ou commercial, leur paraît justifiée, « ces autorités sont néanmoins tenues de faire droit à la demande d’accès à ces informations si ces dernières sont relatives à des émissions dans l’environnement ou si, dans les autres cas, l’intérêt public servi par la divulgation apparaît supérieur à l’intérêt servi par le refus de divulguer ». Ensuite, sur le plan de la participation du public au processus décisionnel, la Cour de justice a eu l’occasion de considérer que l’article 9 de la directive 85/337/CEE n’exige pas que la décision contienne, sur le plan formel, en elle-même, les raisons pour lesquelles celle-ci a été prise87. Cependant, sur demande de l’intéressé, l’administration a l’obligation de lui communiquer les motifs pour lesquels cette décision 84

Néanmoins, plusieurs principes et obligations, issus du droit de l’environnement de l’U.E. et largement interprétés par la C.J., ont pour effet de concrétiser le volet substantiel du droit à l’environnement. Cela est notamment le cas des principes de précaution et d’action préventive (art. 191 TFUE). 85 Voir principalement la directive 2003/4/CE du 28 janvier 2003 concernant l’accès du public à l’information en matière d’environnement et abrogeant la directive 90/313/CEE (J.O., L 41, 14 février 2003, p. 26) ; la directive 85/337/CEE du 27 juin 1985 concernant l’évaluation des incidences de certains projets publics et privés sur l’environnement (J.O., L 175, 5 juillet 1985, p. 40), codifiée par la directive 2011/92/UE du 13 décembre 2011 concernant l’évaluation des incidences de certains projets publics et privés sur l’environnement (J.O., L 26/1, 28 janvier 2012, p. 1) ; et la directive 2001/42/CE du 27 juin 2001 relative à l’évaluation des incidences de certains plans et programmes sur l’environnement (J.O., L 197/30, 21 juillet 2001, p. 30). 86 C.J., 16 décembre 2010, Stichting Natuur en Milieu et a., C-266/09. 87 La nature de la motivation exigée par les dispositions de la directive 85/337/CEE et de la Convention d’Aarhus est particulière. Les motifs de la décision doivent être présentés au regard des résultats de la participation du public. Voir J. Bétaille, Les conditions juridiques de l’effectivité de la norme en droit public interne, illustrations en droit de l’urbanisme et en droit de l’environnement, thèse, droit, Limoges, 2012, no 686 et s.

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a été prise ou les informations et les documents pertinents. Elle précise en outre que les motifs communiqués au public doivent lui permettre « de juger de l’opportunité de former un recours »88. Par ailleurs, sur renvoi préjudiciel émanant d’une juridiction slovaque89, la Cour de justice a rendu le 15 janvier 2013 un arrêt qui vient préciser les conditions d’application de l’article 15 de la directive 96/61/CE et de l’article 6, paragraphe 6, de la Convention d’Aarhus. Ces dispositions prévoient que le public doit avoir accès à un certain nombre d’informations à un stade précoce de la procédure, ceci afin de pouvoir y prendre part effectivement. Dans ce cadre, les informations contenues dans le permis de construire d’une installation industrielle ne sont pas confidentielles, « compte tenu, notamment, de l’importance de la localisation de l’une ou de l’autre des activités visées par la directive 96/61 ». En outre, « le public concerné doit disposer de l’ensemble des renseignements pertinents dès le stade de la procédure administrative de première instance, avant qu’une décision n’ait été adoptée, pour autant que ces renseignements sont disponibles à la date où se déroule cette phase de la procédure ». Enfin, ce sont les dispositions du droit de l’UE et de la Convention d’Aarhus relatives à l’accès à la justice qui ont donné lieu au plus grand nombre de décisions intéressantes. En premier lieu, si la Cour de justice a constaté l’absence d’effet direct de l’article 9, paragraphe 3, de la Convention d’Aarhus, elle veille à en préserver l’objectif en affirmant qu’il ne saurait, en vertu du principe d’effectivité, « être envisageable, sans mettre en cause la protection effective du droit de l’Union de l’environnement, de donner une interprétation des stipulations de l’article 9, paragraphe 3, de la Convention d’Aarhus qui rendrait impossible en pratique ou excessivement difficile l’exercice des droits conférés par le droit de l’Union »90. En deuxième lieu, tout en considérant que l’article 9 de la Convention d’Aarhus et les dispositions européennes correspondantes laissent aux États membres le soin de déterminer les conditions de recevabilité des recours (que ce soit à propos de l’intérêt à agir ou de la condition d’atteinte à un droit), la Cour a pu souligner que les critères de recevabilité des recours déterminés par le droit interne ne sauraient « priver les associations de défense de l’environnement, qui répondent aux exigences visées à l’article 1er, paragraphe 2, de (la directive 85/337), de la possibilité de jouer le rôle qui leur est reconnu tant par la directive 85/337 que par la Convention d’Aarhus »91. Dès lors, « s’il est loisible au législateur national de limiter les droits dont la violation peut être invoquée par un particulier (…) aux seuls droits subjectifs publics, une telle limitation ne peut s’appliquer telle quelle aux associations de défense de l’environnement ». En troisième lieu, dans une décision du 15 janvier 201392, la Cour a précisé, confirmant en cela l’interprétation du Comité d’examen du respect des dispositions de la Convention

C.J., 16 février 2012, Marie-Noëlle Solvay e. a., C-182/10, para. 62 ; R.J.E., 2012, p. 584, chron. J. Bétaille. C.J., 15 janvier 2013, Jozef Krizan et a., C-416/10. C.J., 8 mars 2011, Lesoochranárske zoskupenie, C-240/09 ; R.J.E., 2011, p. 459, chron. J. Bétaille. 91 C.J., 12 mai 2011, Bund für Umwelt und Naturschutz Deutschland, C-115/09 ; R.J.E., 2011, p. 653, chron. J. Bétaille. 92 C.J., 15 janvier 2013, Jozef Krizan, C-416/10. 89 90

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d’Aarhus (C.E.R.D.C.A.)93, que l’article 9 de la Convention d’Aarhus impose que le juge national ait la possibilité d’imposer des mesures provisoires tendant à la suspension de l’autorisation. En effet, l’exercice d’un recours « ne permettrait pas de prévenir efficacement (les pollutions) s’il était impossible d’éviter qu’une installation susceptible d’avoir bénéficié d’une autorisation accordée en violation de cette directive continue à fonctionner dans l’attente d’une décision définitive sur la légalité de ladite autorisation ». Dans la même décision, la Cour de justice rappelle que le droit de propriété reconnu à l’article 17 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’UE n’est pas une prérogative absolue. Il doit au contraire être « pris en considération par rapport à sa fonction dans la société. Par conséquent, des restrictions peuvent être apportées à l’usage de ce droit, à condition que ces restrictions répondent effectivement à des objectifs d’intérêt général et qu’elles ne constituent pas, au regard du but poursuivi, une intervention démesurée et intolérable qui porterait atteinte à la substance même du droit ainsi garanti ». Appliquant ce raisonnement, elle affirme que la protection de l’environnement figure parmi les objectifs d’intérêt général et que par conséquent, elle est susceptible de justifier une restriction du droit de propriété. Dans l’affaire en cause, l’annulation d’une autorisation, parce que celle-ci viole les dispositions du droit de l’UE, ne semble donc pas de nature à porter une atteinte injustifiée au droit de propriété. En dernier lieu, la Cour a apporté des précisions sur la notion de « coût non prohibitif » de l’accès à la justice, notion utilisée tant dans la directive 85/337/CEE que dans la Convention d’Aarhus94. Outre que le coût d’une action en justice doit être apprécié in globo, l’exigence d’un coût non prohibitif implique que les requérants « ne soient pas empêchés de former ou de poursuivre un recours juridictionnel (…) à cause de la charge financière qui pourrait en résulter ». Le juge interne doit tenir compte « tant de l’intérêt de la personne qui souhaite défendre ses droits que de l’intérêt général lié à la protection de l’environnement ». De plus, l’appréciation du caractère non prohibitif du coût d’un recours ne peut pas uniquement être effectuée sur la base de la situation économique du requérant, mais « doit également reposer sur une analyse objective du montant des dépens, (…). Dans cette mesure, le coût d’une procédure ne doit pas apparaître, dans certains cas, comme étant objectivement déraisonnable. Ainsi, le coût d’une procédure ne doit ni dépasser les capacités financières de l’intéressé ni apparaître, en tout état de cause, comme objectivement déraisonnable »95. En outre, la Cour ajoute que « la circonstance que l’intéressé n’a pas été dissuadé, en pratique, d’exercer son action ne suffit pas à elle seule à considérer que le coût de la procédure n’a pas pour lui un tel caractère prohibitif ». En définitive, le rôle de la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne sur le plan de l’interprétation et de l’effectivité du volet procédural du droit à l’environnement 93

Voir la décision no ACCC/C/2008/33 du 24 septembre 2010 ; R.J.E., 2012, chron. J. Bétaille, p. 110. C.J., 11 avril 2013, David Edwards et Lilian Pallikaropoulos, C-260/11. Le C.E.R.D.C.A. a, contrairement à la C.J., considéré que tel ou tel montant représentait un coût prohibitif (voir les décisions no ACCC/C/2008/27 et no ACCC/C/2008/33 du 24 septembre 2010 ; R.J.E., 2012, p. 99, chron. J. Bétaille).

94 95

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apparaît déterminant. Un bémol doit néanmoins être mentionné. En effet, par le passé, la Cour n’a pas paru prompte à appliquer au recours en annulation les exigences de l’article 9 de la Convention d’Aarhus concernant l’accès à la justice, cela alors même que cet article s’applique à l’ensemble des institutions de l’UE. Cela a d’ailleurs été, à juste titre, relevé par le C.E.R.D.C.A.96.

VI. Climat, eau et droits de l’homme A. Les droits de l’homme au sein des négociations climatiques internationales Si les rapports successifs du Groupe intergouvernemental sur l’évolution du climat établissent progressivement les conséquences des changements climatiques sur les sociétés humaines, la question de la protection des populations affectées, et donc de leurs droits, n’a été soulevée que timidement et assez récemment au sein des négociations climatiques multilatérales. Depuis le Plan d’action adopté à Bali en 2007, plusieurs pays en développement, organisations internationales et organisations non gouvernementales ont impulsé une prise de conscience, certes encore embryonnaire, mais progressive du lien entre les droits de l’homme et les changements climatiques. Il aura, toutefois, fallu attendre la 16e Conférence des Parties (C.O.P.) de 2010 pour voir apparaître des références directes et indirectes aux droits de l’homme dans les accords de Cancún. Ainsi, tout d’abord, le préambule de la décision 1/CP.16 fait référence à la Résolution 10/4 sur les « droits de l’homme et changements climatiques », adoptée en 2009 par le Conseil des droits de l’homme. Ce texte évoque, ensuite, les dispositions pertinentes de la Déclaration des Nations Unies sur les droits des peuples autochtones97. Il fait également mention de la participation effective des femmes98, des peuples autochtones et des communautés locales99, notamment pour estimer et tenir compte des conséquences économiques et sociales des mesures de riposte, particulièrement en matière de Réduction des émissions résultant de la déforestation et de la dégradation des forêts (mécanisme R.E.D.D.+). La décision 1/CP.16 consacre aussi la thématique des « déplacés climatiques » en prévoyant la mise en place de « mesures propres à favoriser la compréhension, la coordination et la coopération concernant les déplacements, les migrations et la réinstallation planifiée par suite des changements climatiques, selon les besoins, aux niveaux national, régional et international »100. Toutefois, c’est surtout l’affirmation selon laquelle « les Parties devraient pleinement respecter les droits de

Voir aussi T.P.I.U.E., 14 juin 2012, Stichting Natuur en Milieu et Pesticide Action Network Europe c. Commission, T-338/08 ; R.J.E., 2012, chron. J. Bétaille, p. 735. 97 Décision 1/CP.16, Les accords de Cancún : Résultats des travaux du Groupe de travail spécial de l’action concertée à long terme au titre de la Convention, FCCC/CP/2010/7/Add.1, 10-11 décembre 2010, Appendice I, point 2(c). 98 Ibid., point 7. 99 Ibid., point 72. 100 Ibid., point 14(f).

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l’homme dans toutes les mesures ayant trait aux changements climatiques »101 qui inscrit explicitement le respect des droits de l’homme au sein du régime climat. La C.O.P. de Durban, l’année suivante, a réitéré cette idée, bien qu’en des termes plus généraux, engageant simplement « les Parties à prendre dûment en considération les incidences positives et négatives de la mise en œuvre de mesures de riposte destinées à atténuer les effets des changements climatiques sur la société et sur tous les groupes vulnérables, en particulier les femmes et les enfants »102. S’il est possible de se réjouir de ces nouvelles références aux droits de l’homme dans le droit dérivé de la Convention-cadre des Nations Unies sur les changements climatiques, leur portée reste limitée. Certes, elles témoignent d’une reconnaissance formelle de la thématique mais elles n’apportent pas (encore) d’obligations contraignantes pour les États. Pour qu’elles produisent des effets, il reste indispensable de déterminer les modalités d’application de ces dispositions. Or, dans une certaine mesure, c’est bien dans cette voie que se sont engagées les décisions adoptées lors des C.O.P. suivantes. Le débat concernant le lien entre les droits de l’homme et les changements climatiques s’est ainsi déplacé sur le terrain institutionnel et procédural autour de deux thématiques qui pourraient contribuer à rendre opérationnelles ces références aux droits de l’homme. Tout d’abord, la décision, adoptée à Durban en 2011, établissant le Fonds vert pour le climat (F.V.C.) comporte une disposition mandatant le Conseil du F.V.C. pour adopter « des garanties environnementales et sociales tirées des meilleures pratiques »103 qui seront « appliquées à tous les programmes et projets financés à l’aide des ressources du Fonds »104. En outre, il a été convenu que le Conseil du F.V.C. mettra en place « un mécanisme de recours indépendant qui (…) reçoit les plaintes se rapportant au fonctionnement du Fonds, procède à une évaluation et formule des recommandations »105. Pour l’heure, le Conseil du F.V.C. ne s’est pas encore penché sur ces points qu’il devrait, toutefois, aborder d’ici la fin de l’année 2013. S’il n’est donc pas encore acquis que ces garanties environnementales et sociales feront expressément référence aux droits de l’homme, la perspective d’un tel mécanisme de recours indépendant pourrait contribuer à ce que leur violation soit évitée ou réparée. Par ailleurs, faisant suite aux propositions sur l’octroi d’une indemnisation financière aux victimes du climat et aux « déplacés climatiques » et l’utilisation de dispositifs de micro-assurance106, la Conférence des Parties de 2012 à Doha a ouvert le débat concernant la mise en place d’un mécanisme permettant de remédier 101

Ibid., point 8. Décision 2/CP.17, Résultats des travaux du Groupe de travail spécial de l’action concertée à long terme au titre de la Convention, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 11 décembre 2011, point 90. 103 Décision 3/CP.17, Mise en place du Fonds vert pour le climat, FCCC/CP/2011/9/Add.1, 11 décembre 2011, Annexe, point 65. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid., point 69. 106 AWG-LCA, Summary of views expressed during the second session of the AWG-LCA, FCCC/AWGLCA/2008/11, 11 août 2008, points 44(iv) et (v). 102

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aux pertes et préjudices liés aux changements climatiques. Le sujet est, toutefois, apparu particulièrement controversé, et peu de chemin a été parcouru. Les Parties ont simplement convenu d’établir un tel mécanisme lors de la 19e C.O.P., qui se tiendra à Varsovie en décembre 2013107, étant noté que les travaux à engager dans cette perspective devront tenir compte « des pertes et préjudices autres qu’économiques »108, ce qui peut être interprété comme une référence implicite aux violations des droits de l’homme. En outre, ces travaux devront analyser les « effets des changements climatiques sur l’évolution des migrations, des déplacements et de la mobilité des êtres humains »109. La prochaine C.O.P. sera aussi l’occasion de réviser les procédures et modalités de fonctionnement du mécanisme de développement propre (M.D.P.)110. Celles-ci doivent encore être discutées, mais il résulte de la compilation des propositions reçues par le Conseil exécutif du M.D.P.111 que les droits de l’homme pourraient être pris davantage en compte, que ce soit lors de la validation d’un projet ou lors de la vérification de sa réalisation par les entités nationales désignées. En outre, certaines propositions tendent à conférer au Conseil exécutif du M.D.P. le pouvoir de retirer l’enregistrement d’un projet lorsqu’il est établi que celui-ci viole les droits de l’homme. Au regard des allégations de violation massive des droits de l’homme résultant de certains projets par le passé, l’aboutissement de ces propositions conditionnera la crédibilité future du M.D.P.

B. Eau et les droits de l’homme L’eau en tant que ressource naturelle constitue actuellement un enjeu transversal majeur pour le droit international ayant des implications directes sur la situation et l’objectif des droits de l’homme. L’accès à l’eau potable et à l’assainissement fait notamment l’objet d’une revendication croissante visant à sa reconnaissance comme droit garanti sur le plan international et européen. L’évolution du « droit de l’eau » au « droit à l’eau », confirmant le lien entre l’eau et les droits de l’homme, peut être observée à la fois sur le plan normatif et institutionnel (1), mais surtout dans le cadre de la jurisprudence d’organes juridictionnels et quasi juridictionnels (2) ainsi que dans la pratique d’acteurs tiers ou non institutionnalisés, issus de la société civile internationale (3).

107

Décision 3/CP.18, Démarches permettant de remédier aux pertes et préjudices liés aux incidences des changements climatiques dans les pays en développement qui sont particulièrement exposés aux effets néfastes de ces changements en vue de renforcer les capacités d’adaptation, FCCC/CP/2012/8/Add.1, 8 décembre 2012, point 9. 108 Ibid., point 7(a)(ii). 109 Ibid., point 7(a)(vi). 110 Décision 5/CMP.8, Guidance relating to the clean development mechanism, FCCC/KP/CMP/2012/13/Add.2, 8 décembre 2012, point 9. 111 Conseil exécutif du M.D.P., Compilation of inputs considered by the Board in its review of the CDM modalities and procedures, Version 01.0, CDM-EB72-A01, 8 mars 2013, propositions 107 à 109.

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1. La dynamique normative et institutionnelle du droit à l’eau Les premières tentatives de définition normative d’un droit à l’eau au niveau international sont l’œuvre des organes et institutions des Nations Unies. Elles restent toutefois imparfaites, compte tenu du faible degré de contrainte qu’elles imposent aux États et à la communauté internationale. Depuis le statut minimum préconisé pour le droit à l’eau dans l’Observation générale nº 15 (2002) du Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels des Nations Unies112, la reconnaissance formelle d’un droit à l’eau et à l’assainissement en tant que droit de l’homme par la récente Résolution de l’Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, de juillet 2010, a le mérite de mettre en lumière, pour la première fois dans un texte de portée universelle – quoique non obligatoire – la volonté des États d’assumer leurs obligations dans ce sens113. En septembre 2008, le Conseil des droits de l’homme des Nations Unies avait déjà choisi de nommer une Rapporteuse spéciale (initialement Experte indépendante), en la personne de Catarina de Albuquerque, chargée d’examiner la question des obligations en rapport avec les droits de l’homme qui concernent l’accès à l’eau potable et à l’assainissement. Dans le cadre de son mandat, la Rapporteuse spéciale a publié depuis 2009, outre des rapports géographiques faisant état de ses missions dans différents pays et régions du monde, des rapports annuels thématiques114, ainsi que des recueils de bonnes pratiques115. Sur le plan européen, la reconnaissance formelle d’un droit à l’eau n’est pas encore acquise et demeure, tout au plus, implicite ; elle progresse cependant au niveau politique et au niveau des « outils » juridiques de la soft law. L’article 3, § 3, al. 2 du TUE dispose que « [l’Union] œuvre pour le développement durable de l’Europe, (…) qui tend (…)[à] un niveau élevé de protection et d’amélioration de la qualité de l’environnement ». Par ailleurs, l’article 35 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne affirme qu’« un niveau élevé de protection de la santé humaine est assuré dans la définition et la mise en œuvre de toutes les politiques et actions de l’Union ». Une étape considérable semble avoir été franchie récemment vers une reconnaissance formelle du droit à l’eau au niveau politique, à travers des déclarations officielles successives prononcées depuis 2010 par la Haute Représentante de l’UE pour les affaires étrangères et la politique de sécurité, Catherine Ashton, à l’occasion de la célébration de la Journée mondiale et européenne de l’eau, le 22 mars. Ces déclarations rappellent les « obligations des États en matière de droits de l’homme relatives à l’accès à l’eau potable, qui doit être disponible, physiquement accessible, d’un coût abordable et d’une qualité acceptable » ; pour 112

Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, obs. générale nº 15 sur le droit à l’eau, E/C.12/2002/11, adoptée le 20 janvier 2003. Elle a été suivie par la décision 2/104 du Comité D.H., intitulée Les droits de l’homme et l’accès à l’eau, du 27 novembre 2006, ainsi que par la résolution 7/22 du Conseil des droits de l’homme, intitulée Les droits de l’homme et l’accès à l’eau potable et à l’assainissement, du 28 mars 2008. 113 Assemblée générale des Nations Unies, 64e session, Résolution 64/292, Le droit à l’eau et à l’assainissement : droit de l’homme, 28 juillet 2010, A/RES/64/292. 114 Ainsi, en 2010 : Les Objectifs du millénaire pour le développement et le droit à l’eau et à l’assainissement, A/65/254, 6 août 2010 ; en 2011 : Financement pour la réalisation du droit à l’eau et à l’assainissement, A/66/255, 3 août 2011 ; en 2012 : Prise en compte des principes de non-discrimination et d’égalité dans le programme de développement pour l’après2015 concernant l’eau, l’assainissement et l’hygiène, A/67/270, 8 août 2012. 115 A/HRC/15/31/Add.1, 1er juillet 2010 et A/HRC/18/33/Add.1, 29 juin 2011.

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Christel Cournil et al.

l’Union, « non seulement, l’accès à l’eau potable est lié aux droits de l’homme, mais qui plus est, il fait partie intégrante du droit à un niveau de vie suffisant et il est étroitement lié à la dignité humaine »116. Il est par ailleurs fait état non seulement de la responsabilité des États membres à garantir, par des mesures positives, la jouissance de ce droit117, mais aussi de la volonté de l’UE elle-même de « promouvoir une action internationale concertée en faveur de l’eau »118. Enfin, en 2013, la déclaration met en exergue l’importance de la coopération internationale, en associant à son adoption des pays en voie d’adhésion, des pays candidats, ainsi que de pays partenaires de l’Union119.

2. La justiciabilité du droit à l’eau Si le droit à l’eau peine à acquérir un statut uniforme sur le plan institutionnel et normatif international et européen, c’est dans le cadre de la pratique des instances juridictionnelles et quasi juridictionnelles du Conseil de l’Europe qu’il réussit à trouver une relative consécration, et ce depuis plusieurs années120. À l’occasion d’arrêts récents, la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme aboutit à envisager le droit d’accès à l’eau sous l’angle des droits individuels, lié à la dignité de la personne humaine et à la sphère privée. Ainsi, à l’occasion de l’examen de l’affaire Kashavelov c. Bulgarie, la Cour a qualifié le manque d’accès à l’eau potable et à l’assainissement dans le contexte d’une situation de privation de liberté comme équivalent à des mauvais traitements au sens de l’article 3 de la Convention – bien que, par manque de preuves, il absolve l’État partie sur ce point concret121. L’argumentaire de la Cour est similaire dans l’arrêt M.S.S. c. Belgique et Grèce, relatif aux mauvaises conditions subies en centre de rétention par un demandeur d’asile122. La Cour considère, enfin, comme un traitement susceptible d’atteindre le seuil de gravité de l’article 3 de la Convention l’expulsion d’individus vers un pays comme la Somalie, pour des raisons, entre autres, relatives aux conditions matérielles de vie dans ses camps de réfugiés et déplacés : c’est la portée de l’arrêt Sufi et Elmi c. Royaume Uni rendu le 28 juin 2011123. Toujours dans le cadre du Conseil de l’Europe, le Comité européen des droits sociaux s’est également penché sur la question de la privation d’accès à l’eau et à 116

Déclaration du 22 mars 2010. Déclaration du 22 mars 2011. 118 Déclaration du 22 mars 2012. 119 Déclaration du 22 mars 2013. 120 On notera comme point de départ l’arrêt Zander de 1993, dans lequel la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme avait reconnu le droit de « jouir de l’eau » d’un puits privatif, comme dérivé du droit de propriété consacré dans l’article 1er du 1er Protocole additionnel : Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Zander c. Suède, 25 novembre 1993, req. no 14282/88. 121 Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Kashavelov c. Bulgarie, 20 janvier 2011, req. no 891/05. 122 Cour eur. D.H. (GC), arrêt M.S.S. c. Belgique et Grèce, 21 janvier 2011, req. no 30696/09. 123 « In light of the above, the Court considers that the conditions both in the Afgooye Corridor and in the Dadaab camps are sufficiently dire to amount to treatment reaching the threshold of Article 3 of the Convention. IDPs in the Afgooye Corridor have very limited access to food and water, and shelter appears to be an emerging problem as landlords seek to exploit their predicament for profit. Although humanitarian assistance is available in the Dadaab camps, due to extreme overcrowding access to shelter, water and sanitation facilities is extremely limited » : Cour eur. D.H., arrêt Sufi et Elmi c. Royaume Uni, 28 juin 2011, § 291, req. no 8319/07 et no 11449/07. 117

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Chroniques / Columns

l’assainissement, à l’occasion de l’examen de réclamations collectives, notamment en déplorant une telle pratique de certains États à l’égard des Roms124.

3. L’action de la société civile en faveur de la reconnaissance d’un droit à l’eau Des acteurs non institutionnalisés et la société civile ont augmenté la pression exercée sur les décideurs politiques au cours des dernières années, en vue de renforcer la prise en compte de la problématique de l’accès à l’eau. Parmi une multitude d’initiatives et événements récents, on retiendra le 6e Forum mondial de l’Eau, organisé par le Conseil mondial de l’Eau à Marseille, du 12 au 17 mars 2012125. La préparation de cet événement majeur avait donné lieu à des travaux de réflexion et d’analyse, dont notamment un rapport du Conseil d’État français intitulé L’eau et son droit publié en juin 2010, ainsi qu’une publication de l’Académie de l’Eau, sur Le droit à l’eau potable et à l’assainissement : sa mise en œuvre en Europe126. La récente I.C.E. évoquée plus haut sur « L’Eau et l’assainissement sont un droit humain » (Water Campaign) invite la Commission européenne à proposer une législation qui fasse du droit à l’eau « un droit humain au sens de l’ONU et à promouvoir la fourniture d’eau et l’assainissement en tant que services publics essentiels pour tous »127. Forte de presque 1,5 million de signatures en juin 2013, cette initiative pourrait être la première de ce genre à devoir être examinée par la Commission européenne. La chronique a été établie sous la direction de Christel Cournil, Maître de conférences en droit public, Université Paris 13 – P.R.E.S. Sorbonne Paris Cité, membre de l’I.R.I.S. et associée au C.E.R.A.P. (christelcournil@yahoo.fr). Elle a bénéficié du soutien de l’A.N.R. CIRCULEX (A.N.R.-12-GLOB-0001-03 CIRCULEX). Elle a rédigé la section I, II, et VI, A. La section III a été rédigée par Catherine Colard-Fabregoule, Maître de conférences en droit public, Université Paris 13 – P.R.E.S. Sorbonne Paris Cité, membre du C.E.R.A.P. (catherine@Fabregoule.com). La section IV a été rédigée par Adélie Pomade, Docteur en droit, Post-doctorante à l’I.D.E., Université Jean-Moulin Lyon 3, chercheur associé au C.E.R.I.C. (U.M.R. 7318) (adeliepomade@orange.fr). La section V, A, a été rédigée par Armelle Gouritin, Maître de conférences, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Chercheuse Institute for European Studies (Vrije Universiteit Brussel) (armelle.gouritin@vub.ac.be). La section V, B, a été rédigée par Julien Bétaille, Maître de conférences à l’Université de Toulouse 1 Capitole. (julienbetaille@gmail.com). La section VI, A, a été rédigée par Anne-Sophie Tabau, Maître de conférences en droit public, Université Paris 13 – P.R.E.S. Sorbonne Paris Cité, membre du C.E.R.A.P. (anne-sophie.tabau@wanadoo.fr) et Christel Cournil. La section VI, B a été rédigée par Despina Sinou, Docteur en droit, chargée de cours à l’Université Paris 13, membre du C.E.R.A.P. (sinoud@yahoo.com). 124 Deux de ces décisions rendues en 2012 concernent la France : C.E.D.S., Forum européen des Roms et des Gens du Voyage c. France, no 64/2011, déc. du 24 janvier 2012 ; C.E.D.S., Médecins du Monde – International c. France, o n 67/2011, déc. du 11 septembre 2012. 125 http://www.worldwaterforum6.org/. 126 http://www.water-tariff-for-vulnerable.org/. 127 http://www.right2water.eu/.

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Actualités / News

Aide humanitaire / Humanitarian aid Nouveau centre de réaction d’urgence au sein de la Commission européenne Le 15 mai 2013, la Commission européenne a inauguré dans ses locaux à Bruxelles l’ouverture d’un nouveau centre de réaction d’urgence destiné à remplacer au sein de la direction générale de l’aide humanitaire et de la protection civile (ECHO) l’ancien centre de suivi et d’information (MIC). La mise en place de ce nouveau « cœur opérationnel » du mécanisme d’aide humanitaire et de protection civile de l’Union européenne doit permettre d’améliorer la coordination, la rapidité et l’efficacité des réactions de l’Union européenne en cas de catastrophe naturelle ou d’origine humaine.

Nouvelle stratégie de l’Union européenne pour améliorer la nutrition dans le monde Lors de la seconde réunion du mouvement pour le renforcement de la nutrition (Scaling Up Nutrition ou SUN) qui s’est tenue les 14 et 15 mars 2013 à Bruxelles, la Commission européenne a présenté la nouvelle stratégie de lutte contre la faim dans le monde qu’elle vient d’adopter. La communication intitulée « Améliorer la nutrition maternelle et infantile dans le cadre de l’aide extérieure : un cadre stratégique de l’UE », prévoit à cet égard que des fonds supplémentaires au titre des budgets de l’Union européenne dans les domaines de l’aide humanitaire et du développement seront consacrés à la nutrition et à l’aide alimentaire. Afin de parvenir à l’élaboration de solutions durables dans le domaine, les aides ainsi mises en place seront destinées à lutter non seulement contre les conséquences de la malnutrition mais également contre leurs causes profondes ; le ciblage sera amélioré de sorte à garantir leur efficacité.

Action extérieure de l’Union européenne / External action of the European Union Sanctions économiques à l’égard de la Corée du Nord Le 22 avril 2013, le Conseil de l’Union européenne a décidé d’alourdir les sanctions économiques à l’égard de la Corée du Nord. Cette décision, qui abroge la décision 2010/800/PESC, intervient après l’essai nucléaire effectué par les autorités nord coréennes en février 2013 et leur condamnation par la résolution 2094 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations Unies, adoptée le 7 mars 2013 et renforçant les sanctions à l’égard de la Corée du Nord. Le Conseil précise que cette décision est conforme à la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne, notamment quant au droit au recours effectif, l’accès à un tribunal impartial, le droit de propriété et le droit à la protection des données à caractère personnel.

Conseil de l’Europe / Council of Europe Protocol No. 15 to the ECHR adopted On 16 May 2013, the Committee of Ministers adopted Protocol No. 15 to the ECHR. The Protocol opened for signature by Member States on 24 June 2013. Some notable changes provided for by Protocol No. 15 include the addition of a reference to the principle of subsidiarity and the doctrine of the margin of appreciation in the preamble of the ECHR ; a reduction of the time limit to lodge a complaint from six to four months after a final decision has been taken at the domestic level ; and the removal of the right of the parties to the case to object to the relinquishment of jurisdiction by a Chamber in favour of the Grand Chamber.

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Actualités / News Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR adopted On 10 July 2013, the Ministers’ Deputies of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted Protocol No. 16 to the ECHR and agreed to open it for signature in Strasbourg on 2 October 2013. Protocol No. 16 extends the jurisdiction of the European Court of Human Rights to deliver advisory opinions upon request on the interpretation of the ECHR or the Protocols thereto in the context of a specific case at the domestic level.

PACE urges a total ban on coerced sterilisation or castration ‘in any way for any reason’ During its Summer Session (24-28 June 2013) the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe approved a resolution (1945/2013) to stop coerced sterilisation or castration. It was based on a report by Liliane Maury Pasquier (Switzerland, SOC). These coerced sterilisations and castrations are mainly directed against transgender persons, Roma women and convicted sex offenders. The Assembly urged Council of Europe member states to revise their laws and policies to ensure that “no one can be coerced into sterilisation or castration in any way for any reason”. The Assembly urged “adequate redress for victims of recent (and future) coerced sterilisation or castration, including the protection and rehabilitation of victims, the prosecution of offenders, and financial compensation. Neither forced nor coerced sterilisations or castrations can be legitimated in any way in the 21st century – they must stop.”

Václav Havel Human Rights Prize launched in Prague The Václav Havel Human Rights Prize, which aims to reward outstanding civil society action in the defence of human rights in Europe and beyond, was launched on

25 March at a ceremony in Prague (Czech Republic). To be awarded each year by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), in partnership with the Václav Havel Library and the Charta 77 Foundation, the Prize is open to nominations from any individual, non-governmental organisation or institution working to defend human rights. The Prize will be awarded at a ceremony during the autumn PACE plenary session in October in Strasbourg. The Václav Havel Human Rights Prize replaces the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Human Rights Prize, which was created in 2009 and awarded every two years.

Adhésion de l’Union européenne à la CEDH / Accession of the European Union to the ECHR Le 5 avril 2013, la cinquième réunion de négociation sur l’adhésion de l’Union européenne à la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme s’est clôturée par la finalisation d’un projet d’accord d’adhésion, projet sur lequel la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne est appelée à se prononcer par voie d’avis. La conclusion de ces négociations met en œuvre l’article 6, § 2 du Traité sur l’Union européenne, qui prévoit que « l’Union adhère à la Convention européenne de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales ».

Amnistie / Amnesty Amnistie pour violations graves des droits de l’homme Le 20 mars 2013, la Cour interaméricaine de droits de l’homme a émis la première résolution dans le cadre du processus d’exécution de l’arrêt Gelman c. Uruguay du 24 février 2011 qui avait déclaré contraire à la Convention américaine des droits de l’homme la loi d’amnistie uruguayenne adoptée par référendum (arrêt sur les ex2013/4

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ceptions préliminaires, le fond et les réparations, Série C no 211). La Cour a constaté que l’État avait exécuté certains aspects de l’arrêt sur le fond, par la présentation d’excuses publiques du Président de la République, de la publication de l’arrêt, le paiement des indemnités aux victimes et la promulgation du décret no 323/2011 et de la loi 18-831/2011 déclarant imprescriptible l’action punitive de l’État dans les cas de graves violations de droits de l’homme. Toutefois, la Cour a indiqué que la décision de la Cour Suprême de justice de l’Uruguay du 22 février 2013 faisait obstacle à l’exécution complète de l’arrêt dans la mesure où elle a entièrement dénaturé les fondements de l’arrêt Gelman qui reposaient sur les évolutions actuelles, à l’échelle interaméricaine comme universelle, en matière de sanctions des graves violations des droits de l’homme. La Cour saisit l’occasion pour rappeler que ses arrêts étaient dotés de l’autorité de chose jugée qui vaut pour l’ensemble des pouvoirs publics des États parties, dimension sur laquelle s’attarde le juge mexicain Eduardo Ferrer Mc Greggor dans son opinion concordante.

Asile / Asylum Judgments on deportation of failed asylum seekers to Iraq On 27 June 2013, the European Court of Human Rights delivered eight judgments concerning deportation of failed asylum seekers from Sweden to Iraq (S.A. v. Sweden, D.N.M. v. Sweden, A.G.A.M. v. Sweden, M.K.N. v. Sweden, M.Y.H. and Others v. Sweden, N.A.N.S. v. Sweden, N.M.B. v. Sweden and N.M.Y. and Others v. Sweden). The applicants in the first two cases were Sunni Muslims. They alleged that they would run a real and immediate risk of being killed for having engaged in a relationship with a woman whose family disapproved. The applicants in the other six cases were Christians who alleged that they and their family members were being persecuted on account of their reli-

gious beliefs. The Court found, in all eight cases, that Articles 2 and/or 3 would not be violated if the applicants would be deported to Iraq. The Court ruled that, since the applicants were the target of violence and threats by private individuals, as opposed to government agents, they could safely relocate to other regions of the country.

Judgment on lawfulness detention of asylum seeker On 23 July 2013, the European Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the case of Suso Musa v. Malta. The case concerned the detention of a Sierra Leonean asylum seeker. According to the Court, detaining the applicant in inappropriate conditions was in violation of Article 5 § 1. Also in violation of Article 5 § 1, it had taken the authorities an unreasonable amount of time (one year) to determine whether he was allowed to remain in Malta, and his detention pending deportation, once his asylum request had been rejected, had been excessively long (almost one year), despite the fact that there was no prospect of deporting him. The Court also found a violation of Article 5 § 4 because of the lack of a remedy that allowed for the speedy review of the lawfulness of the applicant’s detention. Under Article 46, the Court ordered Malta to provide a judicial mechanism to allow for such speedy review, but which still maintains the relevant procedural safeguards. The Court also recommended Malta to improve detention conditions and to limit periods of immigration detention.

Judgment on conditions for asylum seekers in Hungary The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Mohammed v. Austria on 6 June 2013. The case concerned the transfer from Austria to Hungary of a Sudanese asylum seeker. His asylum application was rejected in Austria, because

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Actualités / News Hungary was considered to be the designated country to examine his application under the Dublin Regulation. The Court found no violation of Article 3. The Court distinguished the case from M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, relying specifically on the most recent report of UNHCR. The report indicated planned changes to the law by the Hungarian Government and referenced the intention of the Hungarian authorities to introduce additional legal guarantees concerning detention and to ensure asylum seekers unhindered access to basic facilities.

Procédure d’octroi et de retrait du statut de réfugié dans l’Union européenne La directive 2013/32/UE relative à des procédures communes pour l’octroi et le retrait de la protection internationale adoptée le 26 juin 2013 par le Parlement et le Conseil abroge la directive 2005/85/CE du 1er décembre 2005 relative à des normes minimales concernant la procédure d’octroi et de retrait du statut de réfugié. Dans le pacte européen sur l’immigration et l’asile adopté le 16 octobre 2008, le Conseil européen a constaté que malgré l’adoption de normes minimales, de grandes disparités subsistaient entre les différents États membres quant à la procédure d’octroi du statut de réfugié. La nouvelle directive veut encourager la mise en place d’un régime d’asile européen commun, l’objectif étant que des cas similaires soient traités de la même manière et aboutissent au même résultat quel que soit l’État saisi.

Normes minimales pour l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile dans les États membres de l’UE La directive 2013/33/UE abroge la directive 2003/9/CE du Conseil du 27 janvier 2003 relatives à des normes minimales pour l’accueil des demandeurs d’asile dans les États membres. Les conditions d’accueil

des réfugiés ont notamment été mises en cause par la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme et la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne. La nouvelle directive précise que les États qui supportent une charge disproportionnée en raison de leur situation géographique devraient faire l’objet d’une aide financière particulière. Les garanties prévues par la directive devront être assurées à tous les stades de la procédure et aussi longtemps que le demandeur d’asile est autorisé à rester sur le territoire d’un État membre.

Nouveau règlement « Dublin II » Le règlement no 604/2013 – troisième texte visant à refondre la politique d’asile de l’Union européenne – vient abroger le règlement 343/2003 du Conseil adopté le 18 février 2003 établissant les critères et mécanismes de détermination de l’État membre responsable de l’examen d’une demande d’asile introduite dans l’un des États membres par un ressortissant d’un pays tiers. Le nouveau règlement a été adopté après un examen des effets sur les droits fondamentaux du règlement 343/2003, tel que mis en lumière notamment par l’arrêt N.S. de la Cour de justice (aff. jointes C-411/10 et C-493/10). Le nouveau texte prévoit ainsi que les demandeurs d’asile bénéficient de garanties juridiques et d’un recours effectif à l’égard de la décision de transfert vers l’État membre responsable afin de respecter les dispositions de la Charte des droits fondamentaux, notamment son article 47.

Conditions d’octroi de la protection internationale L’affaire C-285/12 concerne un demandeur d’asile d’origine guinéenne, qui demande l’asile et la protection subsidiaire en Belgique après avoir subi des violences pour sa participation à des manifestations dans son pays d’origine. Les autorités belges re2013/4

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jettent sa demande au motif qu’il n’existait pas à l’époque en Guinée de conflit armé au sens du droit international humanitaire. Le Conseil d’État belge sursoit à statuer pour demander à la Cour si la notion de conflit armé au sens de l’article 15, sous 3, de la directive 2004/83/CE doit être interprété de la même manière qu’en droit international humanitaire ou si l’article doit être interprété de façon autonome. Dans les conclusions qu’il a récemment rendues dans cette affaire, l’avocat général estime que « l’existence de menaces graves et individuelles contre la vie ou la personne du demandeur de la protection subsidiaire n’est pas subordonnée à la condition que la situation dans son pays d’origine, ou, dans le cas d’un apatride, dans le pays dans lequel il avait sa résidence habituelle, soit qualifiable de conflit armé interne au sens du droit international humanitaire (…) L’existence de telles menaces doit être appréciée en fonction du degré de violence aveugle qui caractérise la situation dans le pays d’origine du demandeur, ou, dans le cas d’un apatride, dans le pays dans lequel il avait sa résidence habituelle, au moment de statuer sur la demande de protection subsidiaire ».

Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne / Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union Utilisation de la Charte La Cour de justice a rendu le 27 juin 2013 l’arrêt Agrokonsulting-04 (C-93/12). Agrokonsulting, entreprise agricole, s’étant vu refuser une aide au titre de la politique agricole commune par le seul organisme compétent en la matière, saisit le tribunal administratif régional de son ressort. Or, la législation bulgare stipule que le tribunal administratif compétent pour statuer

sur cette catégorie de recours est celui du siège de l’organisme ayant rendu la décision attaquée. Cet organisme – unique – ayant son siège dans la capitale bulgare, seul le tribunal administratif de Sofia peut connaître de l’ensemble du contentieux. La juridiction bulgare se demande si une telle situation est compatible avec les exigences découlant du droit de l’Union, et plus précisément au regard des principes d’équivalence et d’effectivité, ainsi que du droit à un recours effectif contenu à l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux de l’Union européenne. La Cour de justice considère – après de multiples rappels tenant à l’autonomie procédurale des États membres – qu’une situation telle que celle présentée par la juridiction a quo n’est pas, en principe et sous réserve de certaines vérifications que devra mener la juridiction de renvoi, contraire aux exigences du droit de l’Union européenne. L’intérêt de cette affaire réside dans l’utilisation que fait la Cour de l’article 47 de la Charte, qui vient en complément de l’examen du principe d’effectivité (voir point 60 de l’arrêt). Dans ses conclusions, l’avocat général Y. Bot situe l’article 47 de la Charte au centre de son analyse, donnant de ce texte une interprétation large qui y inclut la notion de protection juridictionnelle effective aussi bien les principes d’équivalence et d’effectivité que le droit au recours effectif.

Champ d’application La Cour de justice a rendu le 6 juin 2013 une ordonnance dans l’affaire Cholakova (C-14/13). En l’espèce, M. Cholakov et Mme Cholakova – citoyens bulgares – refusent de se soumettre à un contrôle d’identité sollicité par des agents de police de la ville de Sofia. Suite à l’émission d’un mandat d’arrêt national à leur encontre, ils sont placés en détention afin d’établir leur identité conformément à la législa-

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Actualités / News tion bulgare. Mme Cholakova saisit le tribunal administratif de Sofia pour demander l’annulation de ce mandat d’arrêt national en invoquant des principes du droit de l’Union, notamment ceux relatifs à la libre circulation. La juridiction administrative considère l’argument comme recevable et décide de solliciter la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne à titre préjudiciel. La Cour se déclare cependant incompétente, dès lors que la situation ne présente aucun lien avec le droit de l’Union. Telle est également son attitude dans l’ordonnance du 30 mai 2013 Fierro et Marmorale (C-106/13), qui concerne l’applicabilité éventuelle de l’article 17 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux (droit de propriété). L’affaire concerne un compromis de vente d’immeuble, le contrat définitif de vente d’une partie d’un immeuble étant subordonné à l’octroi par un organisme de crédit d’un prêt hypothécaire. Ce dernier a été refusé aux potentiels acquéreurs au motif que, selon la loi italienne, l’immeuble en question ne pouvait être divisé. Les requérants saisissent alors un tribunal ordinaire italien d’une demande de nullité du compromis de vente. Suite au renvoi préjudiciel opéré vers la Cour de justice, celle-ci confirme que la Charte ne trouve pas à s’appliquer, la situation ne présentant aucun lien de rattachement avec le droit de l’Union.

Conseil des droits de l’homme / Human Rights Council 22e session du Conseil des droits de l’homme Le Conseil des droits de l’homme a tenu sa 22e session du 25 février au 22 mars. Durant cette session, dix-sept titulaires de mandats des procédures spéciales ont présenté leur rapport annuel sur des sujets thématiques ou sur la situation des droits

de l’homme dans certains pays (droit à l’alimentation, logement convenable, torture, défenseurs des droits de l’homme, détention arbitraire, droits de l’homme et lutte contre le terrorisme, disparitions forcées, liberté de religion et de conviction, dette extérieure, environnement, minorités, vente d’enfants, Cote d’Ivoire, Corée du Nord, Haïti, République islamique d’Iran et Myanmar). En plus de leurs rapports thématiques, les titulaires de mandat ont également présenté les rapports de leurs visites dans les pays suivants : Bosnie et Herzégovine, Cameroun, Canada, Chili, Chypre, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Irlande, Israël et les Territoires Palestiniens Occupés, Maroc, Pakistan, Rwanda, Tadjikistan, Tunisie, la FAO et la Banque mondiale. Les rapports sont disponibles au lien suivant : http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session22/ Pages/22RegularSession.aspx. 34 résolutions, 3 décisions et 2 déclarations présidentielles ont été adoptées lors de cette session. Ces résolutions traitent notamment de la jouissance des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels, du droit à l’alimentation, des minorités, des droits de l’enfant, de l’enregistrement des naissances, des défenseurs des droits de l’homme, des manifestations pacifiques, du respect des droits de l’homme dans la lutte contre le terrorisme, de la liberté de religion, de torture, de la prévention du génocide, et de racisme et d’incitation à la haine. Plusieurs résolutions traitent de la situation des droits de l’homme dans des pays spécifiques : Corée du Nord, Haïti, Iran, Israël et les Territoires Palestiniens Occupés, Libye, Mali, Myanmar, République arabe syrienne, Sri Lanka (voir la liste des résolutions sur http://www.ohchr. org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/ Session22). Le Conseil a également adopté les résultats de l’Examen périodique universel de l’Argentine, du Bénin, du Gabon, du Ghana, 2013/4

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du Guatemala, du Japon, du Pakistan, du Pérou, de la République de Corée, de la République tchèque, du Sri Lanka, de la Suisse, de l’Ukraine et de la Zambie.

La 23e session du Conseil des droits de l’homme

femmes, personnes déplacées, droits culturels, discrimination contre les personnes avec albinisme, accès au médicament, les institutions nationales, migrants, violence contre les femmes, y compris violences sexuelles. Plusieurs résolutions traitent de la situation des droits de l’homme dans des pays spécifiques : Belarus, Cote d’Ivoire, Érythrée, Guinée, Myanmar, République d’Afrique centrale, République arabe syrienne, Soudan du Sud (voir la liste des résolutions sur http://www.ohchr.org/ EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session23).

Le Conseil des droits de l’homme a tenu sa 23e session du 27 mai au 14 juin. Durant cette session, vingt-et-un titulaires de mandats des procédures spéciales ont présenté leur rapport annuel sur des sujets thématiques ou sur la situation des droits de l’homme dans certains pays (droit à la santé, migrants, traite des êtres humains, extrême pauvreté, dette extérieure, indépendance des juges et des avocats, exécutions sommaires, personnes déplacées, sociétés transnationales, liberté d’association et de réunion pacifique, droit à l’éducation, solidarité internationale, droits culturels, discrimination envers les femmes, liberté d’expression, violence contre les femmes, racisme, Belarus, Cote d’Ivoire, Érythrée et Territoires Palestiniens Occupés). En plus de leurs rapports thématiques, les titulaires de mandat ont également présenté les rapports de leurs visites dans les pays suivants : Azerbaïdjan, Brésil, Bolivie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatie, El Salvador, Emirats Arabes Unis, Equateur, Espagne, Fédération de Russie, Gabon, Grèce, Honduras, Inde, Italie, Japon, Lettonie, Maldives, Mexique, Mongolie, Namibie, Pakistan, Papua New Guinée, Philippines, Moldavie, Saint Vincent et Grenadines, Iles Salomon, Soudan, Tadjikistan, Tunisie, Turquie et Royaume Uni. Ses rapports sont disponibles au lien suivant : http://www.ohchr. org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/ Session23/Pages/ListReports.aspx.

Lors de sa 22e session, le Conseil des droits de l’homme a créé un nouveau mandat, celui d’Expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Mali (voir résolution A/HRC/RES/22/18). L’Expert indépendant présentera son premier rapport au Conseil en mars 2014, lors de la 25e session du Conseil. Lors de sa 23e session, le Conseil des droits de l’homme a nommé Suliman Baldo comme Expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’homme au Mali et Gustavo Gallón comme Expert indépendant sur la situation des droits de l’homme en Haïti.

26 résolutions et une déclaration présidentielle ont été adoptées lors de cette session. Ces résolutions traitent notamment de liberté d’expression, éducation, traite des êtres humains, indépendance des juges et des avocats, discrimination contre les

Toujours à la 22e session, suite à une recommandation de la Haut-Commissaire aux droits de l’homme et du Rapporteur spécial sur la situation des droits de l’homme en Corée du Nord, Marzuki Darusman, le Conseil des droits de l’homme a créé une

Le Conseil a également adopté les résultats de l’Examen périodique universel des Bahamas, de la Barbade, du Botswana, du Burundi, des Emirats Arabes Unis, de la France, du Liechtenstein, du Luxembourg, du Mali, du Monténégro, de la Roumanie, de la Serbie et de Tonga.

Le Conseil des droits de l’homme crée de nouveaux mandats et nomme de nouveaux titulaires

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Actualités / News Commission d’enquête sur la Corée du Nord. Son Président est Michael Donald Kirby et ses autres membres sont Marzuki Darusman et Sonja Biserko. La Commission d’enquête sur la Syrie a quant à elle été prorogée pour un an.

Défenseurs des droits de l’homme / Human rights defenders

indépendant, les institutions nationales des droits de l’homme bénéficient d’une position unique pour tenir les Gouvernements responsables en matière de droits de l’homme. Elles représentent donc un acteur vital dans la lutte contre l’impunité. Margaret Sekaggya formule plusieurs recommandations à cet égard.

Détention / Detention

Le Conseil des droits de l’homme adopte une résolution clé sur la protection des défenseurs des droits de l’homme

Le Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire traite de la définition de la privation arbitraire de liberté en droit international coutumier

La résolution du Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/RES/22/6) appelle vivement les États à instaurer un climat sûr et porteur qui permette aux défenseurs des droits de l’homme d’agir sans entrave et en toute sécurité. Elle enjoint les États à reconnaître publiquement le rôle légitime des défenseurs des droits de l’homme. Elle aborde également en détails les différentes formes de restriction, menaces et représailles rencontrées par les défenseurs des droits de l’homme, notamment l’utilisation des législations nationales pour restreindre, délégitimer voire pénaliser les activités des défenseurs, y compris le financement de leurs activités. La résolution expose en détail les obligations des États en la matière.

Le Groupe de travail sur la détention arbitraire a adopté sa Délibération no 9 sur la définition et le champ d’application de la privation arbitraire de liberté dans le droit international coutumier (voir A/ HRC/22/44). Le Groupe de travail a conclu que l’interdiction de toutes les formes de privation arbitraire de liberté fait partie intégrante du droit international coutumier. Il constitue une norme impérative (jus cogens). En 2012, le Groupe de travail a adopté 69 avis relatifs à la détention de 198 personnes dans 37 pays (voir A/ HRC/22/44/Add.1). Il a également envoyé 104 appels urgents à 44 États au sujet de 606 personnes.

Le rôle des institutions nationales des droits de l’homme Dans son dernier rapport (A/HRC/22/47), la Rapporteuse spéciale sur la situation des défenseurs des droits de l’homme, Margaret Sekaggya, souligne que les institutions nationales des droits de l’homme peuvent être considérées à la fois comme des défenseurs des droits de l’homme et ont également un rôle à jouer dans la protection des défenseurs des droits de l’homme. Dans ses conclusions, la Rapporteuse met l’accent sur le fait qu’en tant qu’organe public

Judgment on discrimination of detainees on remand On 5 March 2013, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Gülay Çetin v. Turkey. The case concerned a detainee who during her detention on remand was diagnosed with gastric cancer. All her requests for provisional release were rejected. The Court found that Turkey had breached Article 3, since keeping her in detention despite her state of health amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment. The second complaint concerned the fact that, had she been de2013/4

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tained after conviction, she would have been entitled to provisional release under Turkish law. The Court recognized that ‘detainees on remand’ fall under the discrimination ground ‘any other status’. The Court further recalled the European prison rules, which hold that no distinction is allowed between detainees on remand and convicted detainees. Since there was no legitimate reason to exclude detainees on remand from provisional release on health grounds, the Court found a violation of Article 14.

Élargissement des mesures conservatoires concernant la fermeture de la base navale de la baie de Guantánamo Le 23 juillet 2013, la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme a élargi, de sa propre initiative, la portée des mesures conservatoires en faveur des personnes détenues par les États-Unis sur la base navale de la baie de Guantánamo (MC 259/02), avec comme but d’exiger la fermeture du centre de détention. Cet élargissement est basé sur l’absence de mise en œuvre, par les États-Unis, des mesures conservatoires en vigueur depuis 2002 en faveur des détenus, la persistance des détentions prolongées et indéfinies, les plaintes d’abus et de mauvais traitements y compris l’exécution de perquisitions non nécessaires et humiliantes, l’alimentation forcée lors de grève de la faim ainsi que l’augmentation de la ségrégation et de la mise à l’isolement des détenus. Dans ce contexte, la Commission interaméricaine a exigé la fermeture immédiate du centre de détention ; le transfert des détenus vers leur pays d’origine ou vers un pays tiers ; l’accélération de la libération des détenus dont le transfert a déjà été approuvé ; enfin, l’amélioration des conditions de logement des détenus poursuivis, et l’octroi de garanties de procédure.

Préoccupation relative à l’usage excessif de l’isolement des détenus aux ÉtatsUnis Le 18 juillet 2013, la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme a exprimé sa préoccupation concernant les causes du déclenchement d’une grève de la faim massive dans un grand nombre de centres pénitenciers publics et privés dans l’État de Californie, aux États-Unis. Les prisonniers entendaient protester contre l’usage excessif de l’isolement, y compris à l’encontre de personnes handicapées mentales, de condamnés à mort ou à perpétuité et de mineurs. La Commission a exhorté les autorités fédérales comme fédérées à adopter les mesures de nature à résoudre la situation, en ne recourant à des mesures d’isolement des détenus que conformément aux normes du droit international des droits de l’homme, c’est-à-dire en n’en faisant usage que sur une base exceptionnelle, comme ultime recours, sous un strict contrôle judiciaire et médical, pour une durée de temps aussi brève que possible afin d’éviter des situations contraires à l’interdiction de la torture et des traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants.

Discrimination Adoption de deux conventions interaméricaines contre la discrimination et le racisme Le 5 juin 2013, l’Assemblée générale de l’Organisation d’États Américains (OEA) a approuvé deux conventions contre la discrimination et le racisme. Il s’agit de la Convention interaméricaine contre le racisme, la discrimination raciale et les formes connexes d’intolérance (A 68) et de la Convention interaméricaine contre toute forme de discrimination et d’intolérance (A 69). Ces conventions prévoient la création d’un Comité commun aux deux Conventions, le « Comité interaméricain pour la prévention et l’élimination du ra-

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Actualités / News cisme, la discrimination raciale et toutes les formes de discrimination et d’intolérance », qui aura pour fonction d’établir des recommandations sur les rapports fournis par les États tous les quatre ans. Elles prévoient aussi une procédure de pétition individuelle tant devant la Commission que devant la Cour interaméricaines des droits de l’homme.

Préoccupation concernant les discriminations à l’encontre des personnes vulnérables La Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme – lors de sa 147e session ordinaire (17-22 mars 2013) – s’est montrée particulièrement consternée par la double discrimination subie par les personnes et peuples en situation de vulnérabilité, notamment dans l’exercice de leurs droits au travail, à la santé et à la propriété de leurs terres. La Commission rappelle le lien étroit entre le droit de vivre libre de toute discrimination et l’exercice des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels de groupes différents, incluant les femmes, les communautés indigènes et les afro-descendants.

Droit à une bonne administration / Right to good administration Disclosure of documents related to a dismissal In an inquiry opened before the European Ombudsman (complaint 1013/2012/(AR) MHZ against the European Commission), a Polish doctor of veterinary science who had worked as an expert on an EU funded project, complained about the Commission’s refusal to disclose documents related to his dismissal. The Ombudsman invoked Article 41(2)(b) of the Charter (right to good administration), which includes the right of every person to have access to his or her file, while respecting the legitimate

interests of confidentiality and of professional and business secrecy. The Ombudsman emphasized that the Court of justice has clearly held that when processing an application for access to documents under Regulation No. 1049/2001, the institutions must carry out a specific examination of each document concerned. In the present case, the Commission did not make the effort to identify the relevant documents in its file, it considerably delayed its replies to the Ombudsman and failed to comply with its commitments to give explicit answers to the complainant’s requests. The Ombudsman considered that these failures constitute instances of maladministration. The Commission has accepted and has properly dealt with the Ombudsman’s draft recommendation.

Droit au logement / Right to housing La Rapporteuse spéciale sur le droit à un logement convenable se penche sur la notion de sécurité d’occupation et demande des orientations spécifiques en la matière. Dans son rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/22/46), la Rapporteuse spéciale sur le droit à un logement convenable, Raquel Rolnik, traite de la notion de sécurité d’occupation en tant qu’élément du droit à un logement convenable. Raquel Rolnik souligne que la reconnaissance et la protection de la sécurité d’occupation constituent un des défis majeurs de notre époque et sont essentielles à la prévention des formes les plus choquantes d’expulsion, de déplacement et de sans-abrisme. Tout en reconnaissant la complexité et la nature multiforme de la sécurité d’occupation, la Rapporteuse précise que ses consultations ont confirmé le besoin d’orientations plus spécifiques et détaillées sur ce sujet car les normes existantes sont rares et souvent incomplètes. Dans ce contexte, elle rappelle que les individus ont déjà droit à la sécurité 2013/4

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d’occupation, au titre du droit fondamental à un logement convenable. La façon dont ce droit peut être reconnu, protégé et exercé est ce qui doit être précisé.

Droits de l’enfant / Rights of the child Recommandations sur le droit de l’enfant à jouir du meilleur état de santé possible Dans son rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/22/31), la Haut-Commissaire aux droits de l’homme des Nations Unies conclut que malgré les progrès réalisés, la santé des enfants reste un sujet de préoccupation dans le monde entier. Pour faire face à ces préoccupations, des efforts sont nécessaires de la part d’un large éventail d’acteurs : États, communauté internationale, société civile, communautés, familles et secteur privé. Le rapport souligne que la survie, la protection, la croissance et le développement des enfants en bonne santé physique et mentale sont les fondements de la dignité humaine et des droits de l’homme.

Protection des enfants contre l’exploitation sexuelle dans le cadre des voyages et du tourisme Dans son rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/22/54), la Rapporteuse spéciale sur la vente d’enfants, la prostitution des enfants et la pornographie mettant en scène des enfants, Najat Maalla M’jid, relève que même si de nombreux efforts ont été faits aux niveaux mondial et national pour prévenir et combattre l’exploitation sexuelle des enfants dans le cadre des voyages et du tourisme, plusieurs difficultés demeurent, notamment le peu de données disponibles, les lacunes juridiques existantes dans de nombreux pays, la faiblesse des mécanismes de plaintes inadaptés aux enfants ou les lacunes de la coopération transnationale. Elle formule

plusieurs recommandations visant à protéger les enfants contre ce phénomène.

Protection de l’identité des mineurs dans le cadre du procès international À travers sa résolution du 14 mai 2013 dans l’affaire Mendoza et autres c. l’Argentine, la Cour interaméricaine a rejeté la demande des représentants des victimes présumées visant à ce que soit maintenue secrète l’identité de l’une d’entre elles dans le jugement à venir de la Cour afin de prévenir les risques de possibles représailles. La Cour a fondé son rejet sur le fait que l’identité de la victime présumée avait été largement diffusée ; elle avait notamment été enregistrée dans les rapports, résolutions et vidéos publics du processus devant la Commission et la Cour. La juge Margarette May Macaulay a pour sa part rédigé une opinion dissidente considérant la décision de la majorité comme « autoritaire » et « préoccupante » car, inter alia, le jugement de la Cour aurait une diffusion plus large que celle des autres pièces du dossier, et parce que les parties, la Commission et la Cour elle-même – ainsi qu’elle-même, en tant que juge – ont involontairement omis de considérer si l’identité de l’un ou de tous les mineurs, victimes présumées en l’espèce, devait ou non être tenue secrète depuis le début du processus judiciaire.

Responsabilité internationale de l’État pour la privation perpétuelle de liberté de mineurs Dans l’affaire Mendoza et autres c. Argentine du 14 mai 2013 (arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires, le fond et les réparations, Série C no 260), la Cour interaméricaine a dû se prononcer sur la compatibilité avec la Convention américaine relative aux droits de l’homme de la condamnation à des peines de prison à perpétuité de cinq personnes pour des délits commis durant leur enfance. Prenant en compte l’intérêt supé-

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Actualités / News rieur de l’enfant, la Cour a considéré que l’Argentine avait violé le droit à la liberté personnelle des victimes dans la mesure où les peines devaient : 1) être exceptionnelles ; 2) impliquer une privation de liberté durant le moins de temps possible et pour une durée déterminée à partir de son imposition ; 3) permettre la révision périodique de la nécessité de son maintien. La Cour a ordonné, entre autres, des mesures de réparation tendant à ce que ces faits ne se répètent pas, ainsi que des mesures relatives à la réforme de l’ordonnancement juridique et des politiques publiques relatives à la justice pénale et à la délinquance juvénile.

Droit à la vie / Right to life Robots létaux autonomes Le Rapporteur spécial sur les exécutions extrajudiciaires, sommaires ou arbitraires, Christof Heyns, a consacré son rapport annuel à la question des robots létaux autonomes et la protection de la vie (A/ HRC/23/47). Les robots létaux autonomes (RLA) sont des systèmes d’armes qui, une fois activés, peuvent sélectionner et attaquer des cibles sans intervention humaine. Le Rapporteur estime que bien qu’aucun État n’utilise actuellement des armes complètement autonomes de ce type, la technologie pour ce faire existe. Pour lui, cette possibilité suscite de sérieuses préoccupations, liées notamment à l’absence de système de responsabilité juridique adapté et au fait que des robots ne devraient pas avoir un pouvoir de vie et de mort sur des êtres humains. Il recommande la mise en place d’un moratoire sur ces robots létaux autonomes tant qu’un cadre international n’est pas mis en place. Il appelle à la mise en place d’un groupe d’étude de haut niveau sur ces armes chargé d’élaborer une politique sur la question à l’intention de la communauté internationale.

Droits des femmes / Women’s rights Situation des femmes déplacées Le Rapporteur spécial sur les droits de l’homme des personnes déplacées dans leur propre pays, Chaloka Beyani, a dédié son rapport sur la situation particulière des femmes déplacées, notamment les difficultés qu’elles rencontrent comme les discriminations croisées (A/HRC/23/44). Le Rapporteur conclut que des mesures importantes ont été prises pour améliorer les réponses aux problèmes rencontrés par les femmes déplacées. Mais souvent ces réponses ne tiennent pas compte du rôle que les femmes déplacées peuvent jouer et ne font pas appel à leur active participation, ce qui les rend souvent inadéquates.

Le Conseil des droits de l’homme cherche à renforcer les synergies entre les différents mécanismes traitant de la violence à l’égard des femmes Dans son rapport sur le renforcement des synergies entre les mécanismes du Conseil et les autres mécanismes intergouvernementaux sur la question de la violence à l’égard des femmes et des filles (A/HRC/23/25), le Haut-Commissariat aux droits de l’homme souligne que le Conseil des droits de l’homme a accordé une attention croissante à la question de la violence contre les femmes et les filles. Grâce aux différentes initiatives du Conseil et des mécanismes des droits de l’homme, comme la Rapporteuse spéciale contre la violence contre les femmes, les autres titulaires de mandat ou encore les différentes résolutions adoptées, le Conseil a examiné en profondeur les différentes dimensions de la violence contre les femmes et les réponses qui y ont été apportées. Dans ce contexte, le rapport présente plusieurs recommandations pour renforcer les synergies entre les différents acteurs impliqués et ainsi promouvoir le respect intégral des obligations 2013/4

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des États en matière de lutte contre les violences à l’égard des femmes.

Le Rapporteur spécial sur le droit à l’alimentation aborde la question du droit des femmes à l’alimentation Dans son rapport présenté au Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/22/50), le Rapporteur spécial sur le droit à l’alimentation, Olivier De Schutter, traite du droit des femmes à l’alimentation et notamment des menaces qui pèsent sur ce droit. Il souligne que garantir l’égalité des sexes et l’autonomisation des femmes est fondamental au regard du droit des femmes à l’alimentation. Cela contribue également à la réalisation de ce droit pour d’autres membres de la société, comme les enfants. Cela a également des retombées positives sur le ménage en entier. Dans ce contexte, il recommande aux États de répondre aux besoins et priorités des femmes et des filles dans leurs stratégies visant à assurer la sécurité alimentaire. Il recommande également de réduire le fardeau du travail non rémunéré qui pèse sur les femmes et de s’attaquer aux contraintes que subissent les femmes en veillant à transformer la répartition des rôles fondée sur le sexe.

Interruption de grossesse et mise en danger de la vie de la mère Dans une résolution du 29 mai 2013, la Cour interaméricaine des droits de l’homme a accordé des mesures provisoires en faveur de Mme « B » contre l’État du Salvador. Mme « B » – une jeune femme de 22 ans, enceinte de son deuxième enfant – est porteuse d’une maladie nommée LED (lupus érythémateux disséminé), aggravée par de l’arthrite rhumatoïde et une « néphrite lupique ». Selon les avis médicaux émis par le Comité Médical de l’Hôpital National Spécialisé de la Maternité (« Comité Médical »), la poursuite de la grossesse aurait entraîné

des risques élevés pour sa santé et son intégrité physique et mentale, et pouvait mettre sa vie en danger. Ces diagnostics sont aggravés par le fait que l’embryon est porteur d’une grave malformation congénitale du système nerveux central qui empêche la possibilité d’une vie extra-utérine et qui provoque d’importantes complications obstétriques. Au vu de ces circonstances, le Comité Médical a recommandé l’interruption de la grossesse mais n’a pas été suivi par l’État qui s’est retranché derrière la législation salvadorienne qui interdit, de façon absolue, l’avortement et, par voie de conséquence, tous les traitements médicaux correspondants. La Cour réaffirme d’abord qu’elle peut octroyer des mesures provisoires en dépit du fait qu’aucune pétition n’ait été présentée devant la Commission interaméricaine et alors même qu’aucune procédure n’est en cours devant elle (ce qui était le cas en l’espèce). Elle rappelle aussi sa jurisprudence reconnaissant la double fonction de protection et de prévention des mesures provisoires prévues par l’article 63, § 2 de la Convention américaine des droits de l’homme et de l’article 27 de son règlement intérieur. Elle exige que le Salvador adopte et garantisse, de toute urgence, toutes les mesures pour que l’équipe médicale responsable du traitement en faveur de Mme « B » puisse réaliser, sans aucune espèce d’interférence, les mesures nécessaires à la garantie de ses droits assurés par les articles 4 et 5 de la Convention. De plus, elle exige que l’État présente un rapport spécifique sur les mesures adoptées et ce dans les délais fixés dans sa résolution.

Droits des travailleurs / Workers’ rights Transfert d’entreprises et maintien des droits des travailleurs Le 18 juillet 2013, la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne a rendu son arrêt Mark

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Actualités / News Alemo-Herron e.a. (C-426/11). La question préjudicielle posée par la Supreme Court of the United Kingdom visait à savoir si, en cas de transfert d’entreprise ou d’activité, le cessionnaire pouvait se voir opposer les obligations contenues dans les conventions collectives auxquelles était lié le cédant, lorsque postérieurement au transfert, de nouvelles conventions d’application rétroactive étaient conclues. Était en jeu une augmentation de salaires décidée par la nouvelle convention collective et que l’entreprise cessionnaire refusait d’accorder aux travailleurs, au motif qu’elle ne se considérait pas liée par la nouvelle convention collective. Par ailleurs, contrairement au cédant, le cessionnaire ne participait pas à l’administration chargée de la négociation des conventions collectives, en raison de son statut d’entreprise privée. Rappelant sa jurisprudence antérieure (9 mars 2006, Werhof, C-499/04), la Cour de justice a d’abord affirmé que le cessionnaire n’était pas lié par les conventions collectives postérieures à celle qui était en vigueur au moment du transfert d’entreprise, sauf si ces conventions collectives accordent des droits plus favorables aux travailleurs. Entendant toutefois garantir un équilibre entre les intérêts des travailleurs et ceux de l’entreprise cessionnaire, la Cour a également examiné si l’application de la nouvelle convention collective permettait au cessionnaire de procéder aux ajustements et adaptations nécessaires à la continuation de son activité. En l’espèce, le transfert d’entreprise étant intervenu entre une personne morale de droit public et une personne morale de droit privé, la Cour relève que de telles conventions, destinées à régler l’évolution des conditions de travail dans le secteur public, sont susceptibles de limiter considérablement la marge de manœuvre nécessaire à la prise des mesures d’ajustement et d’adaptation du cessionnaire privé. La Cour considère également qu’il est porté atteinte à la liberté contractuelle découlant de la liberté d’entreprise garantie à l’article 16 de la Charte des droits fonda-

mentaux, dès lors que le cessionnaire n’a pas la possibilité de participer à l’organisme de négociation collective.

Éducation / Education Judgment on numerus clausus at university The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Tarantino and Others v. Italy on 2 April 2013. The case concerns the numerus clausus system in Italy, that restricts access to certain university studies. The applicants all failed to pass the entrance examination for either medicine or dentistry. According to the Court, an entrance examination to identify the most meritorious students is a proportionate measure to ensure a minimum and adequate education level at university. The Court further found that the numerus clausus achieved a balance between the interests of the applicants and those of society at large. In particular, the Court accepted that the numerus clausus served the capacity and resource potential of universities, as well as the society’s need for a particular profession. Furthermore, the applicants had neither been denied the right to apply to any other courses nor to pursue their studies abroad, and they could have sat the test as often as necessary to be successful. Therefore the Court did not find a violation of Article 2 Protocol 1.

Environnement / Environment L’Expert indépendant chargé d’examiner la question des obligations relatives aux droits de l’homme se rapportant aux moyens de bénéficier d’un environnement sûr, propre, sain et durable a présenté son premier rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme Dans son rapport (AHRC/22/43), John Knox place son mandat dans un contexte 2013/4

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historique. Il présente également les questions qui de son point de vue restent ouvertes en ce qui concerne les relations entre les droits de l’homme et l’environnement. L’Expert indépendant souligne notamment que la question de ces liens a suscité de l’intérêt récemment. Selon lui, certains liens fondamentaux entre droits de l’homme et environnement sont bien établis. Il estime toutefois que de nombreux aspects restent à examiner en ce qui concerne les obligations que le droit des droits de l’homme impose en matière de protection de l’environnement. C’est sur ce sujet que l’Expert indépendant compte se pencher en priorité.

Gel des fonds / Freezing of funds Laurent Gbagbo and others case On April 23th, the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice the European Union handed down its judgment in the case Laurent Gbagbo and others concerning restrictive measures taken in the aftermath of the election of President Ouattara in Ivory Coast (joined Cases C‑478/11 P to C‑482/11 P). Interestingly, the Court departs from Advocate General Cruz Villalon’s opinion and dismisses the appeals alleging that the General Court’s finding of manifest inadmissibility disregarded the right to effective judicial protection. The Grand Chamber considers that the General Court was right to examine whether the two-months time limit for bringing action had been complied with, as this is a matter of public policy, which can be examined ex officio and without hearing the parties. Even though the General Court erred in law when considering that the time limit started to run from the date of publication of the contested measures, the inadmissibilty finding was valid since the public notice of the measures was a sufficient notification and the time limit arising from that notice had not been respected.

Furthermore, there was no evidence proving that the appellants’ presence in Ivory Coast during the armed conflict amounted to a force majeure preventing them from bringing their actions in good time before the EU courts.

Simone Gbagbo case Whereas the Grand Chamber’s judgment Laurent Gbagbo and others mainly raises procedural questions, the General Court’s judgment in the case Simone Gbagbo (T119/11), delivered on April 25th, addresses the merits of the restrictive measures taken as a reaction to the political crisis in Ivory Coast after President Ouattara’s election. Mrs. Gbagbo especially criticised what she considered to be a manifest error in the Council’s assessment of the political situation in Ivory Coast, estimating that her husband was the legitimate President. The General Court stresses the Council’s large discretionary power in that matter, judicial review being limited to procedural issues, material accurateness of the facts and the absence of a manifest error of assessment of the facts or misuse of power. The recognition of President Ouattara’s election by regional and international bodies confirms the absence of any manifest error of assessment, while the General Court declines its competence to examine the regularity of the electoral process in Ivory Coast. The claim of a misuse of power is also rejected, the General Court noting that smart sanctions are in full compliance with the goal set by Article 21 TUE, i.e. the promotion of peace, the rule of law and human rights. Mohamed Trabelsi and Others case On May 28th, the General Court delivered its judgment in the case Mohamed Trabelsi and Others v. Council of the European Union (T-187/11) concerning restrictive measures taken against individuals suspected of economic offences in Tunisia. Notwith-

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Actualités / News standing the poor quality of Trabelsi’s claims, the General Court considered that the reference to provisions laid down in French administrative law should instead be understood as a claim that the obligation to state reasons for judicial measures guaranteed by Articles 296 TFEU and 41 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights had been violated. The General Court defines a stereotypical decision as one that is “modelled on the wording of a general description”, which is not the case for references to the situation of Tunisia and to the subjection of the individual to judicial investigation by the Tunisian authorities in respect of money-laundering. However, the General Court notes that the scope of the decision was limited to the specific crime of misappropriation of State funds, not including money-laundering charges. Thus, the sanction has no legal basis and has to be annulled as an infringement of the right to property.

Kadi II case The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice handed down its judgment in the so-called Kadi II case on 18th July (joined cases C-584/10 P, C‑593/10 P and C‑595/10 P). The Court confirmed its refusal, initiated in its Kadi I judgment, to grant regulations implementing resolutions of the Security Council any judicial immunity. The main issues at stake were effective judicial protection and the standard of review, more precisely the definition of the terms of an “in principle […] full review” used in Kadi I. The ECJ chooses a rather strict standard of review due to the necessary balance between the respect of human rights and the maintenance of international peace, as well as the deficiencies of the procedures at the UN level. Thus, the Court considers that its role is not only to scrutinise the procedural aspects of the imposed smart sanctions – that is, the obligation to give reasons for the listing and allow the individual to be heard – but also the substantial aspects,

i.e. whether or not at least one of those reasons has sufficient factual basis and is generally substantiated. Whereas there is no obligation to provide all the information underlying the sanctions, the Court will in absence of said evidence base its substantial review solely on the indications that have been disclosed. The Grand Chamber considers that although the absence of full disclosure did not suffice to violate Kadi’s right to effective judicial protection, the reasons indicated were too vague to justify the sanction ; it thus upheld the General Court’s judgment.

Handicap / Disability European Committee of Social Rights’ decision on the provision of social services to highly dependent persons with disabilities On 18 March 2013, the European Committee of Social Rights decided International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) v. Belgium. The case concerned the shortage of care and accommodation solutions for highly dependent adults with disabilities. The Committee found significant obstacles to equal and effective access for highly dependent adults with disabilities to social welfare services appropriate to their needs. Moreover, the Committee found that the shortage of care solutions and social services suited to the needs of persons with severe disabilities obliges them to live with their families and, as a result, many of these families are in a precarious and vulnerable situation. It also held that this lack of protection exposes these persons to poverty and exclusion. The Committee found several violations of the European Social Charter, including Article 14 § 1 (the right to benefit from social welfare services), Article 16 (the right of the family to social, legal and economic protection) and Article 30 (the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion).

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Les « aménagements raisonnables » Dans l’affaire Commission européenne c. République italienne (C‑312/11), jugée le 4 juillet 2013, la Cour a considéré que l’Italie avait manqué à son obligation de transposer correctement et pleinement l’article 5 de la directive 2000/78/CE du Conseil, portant création d’un cadre général en faveur de l’égalité de traitement en matière d’emploi et de travail. Cet article dispose sur l’obligation pour tous les employeurs de mettre en place, en fonction des besoins dans des situations concrètes, des « aménagements raisonnables » pour toutes les personnes handicapées – une notion également présente à l’article 2, § 4 de la Convention des Nations Unies relative aux droits des personnes handicapées. Contrairement aux arguments de l’Italie, il ne suffit pas, pour transposer correctement et pleinement l’article 5 de ladite directive, d’édicter des mesures publiques d’incitation et d’aide, mais il incombe aux États membres d’imposer à tous les employeurs l’obligation de prendre des mesures efficaces et pratiques en faveur de toutes les personnes handicapées, portant sur les différents aspects de l’emploi et du travail et permettant à ces personnes d’accéder à un emploi, de l’exercer ou d’y progresser, ou pour qu’une formation leur soit dispensée. La Cour de justice conclut que la législation italienne, même évaluée dans son ensemble, n’impose pas à l’ensemble des employeurs cette obligation.

Liberté d’expression / Freedom of expression Surveillance des communications par les États Dans son rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/23/40), le Rapporteur spécial sur la liberté d’opinion et d’expression, Frank La Rue, explique que les techniques de communication ont évolué de manière significative, ce qui a également

un impact sur la façon dont ces communications sont surveillées par les États. Le Rapporteur insiste sur le fait que le droit à la vie privée et la liberté d’opinion sont intrinsèquement liés ; les États ne peuvent assurer que les personnes puissent chercher et recevoir des informations et s’exprimer librement sans protéger leur droit à la vie privée. Par exemple, sans législation qui assure le caractère privé, la sécurité et l’anonymat des communications, les journalistes ou les défenseurs des droits de l’homme ne peuvent être certains que leurs communications ne font pas l’objet d’une surveillance de l’État. Il souligne le besoin urgent d’étudier davantage les nouvelles modalités de surveillance et de réviser les lois qui régissent ces pratiques pour assurer que les droits de l’homme sont respectés.

Droit à la liberté d’expression artistique et à la création Dans son dernier rapport (A/HRC/23/34), la Rapporteuse spéciale sur les droits culturels, Farida Shaheed, explique que toutes les personnes jouissent du droit à la liberté d’expression artistique et de création. Ce droit recouvre le droit d’assister et de contribuer librement aux expressions et créations artistiques, par une pratique individuelle ou collective, le droit d’avoir accès aux arts et le droit de diffuser leurs expressions et créations. Selon elle, les effets de la censure et des restrictions non justifiées à la liberté d’expression artistique sont dévastateurs. Elle examine les différentes manières dont le droit à la liberté à l’expression artistique et à la création peut être restreint. Elle constate que différents moyens sont utilisés pour réduire les voix artistiques au silence. Il s’agit notamment des lois qui restreignent les libertés artistiques ou encore des questions économiques qui ont une incidence considérable sur ces libertés. Le plus souvent les motivations de ces restrictions sont politiques, religieuses, culturelles ou morales, ou reposent sur des intérêts économiques,

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Actualités / News ou sont une combinaison de ces éléments. La Rapporteuse spéciale formule plusieurs recommandations. Elle appelle notamment à un examen critique des législations et pratiques qui imposent des restrictions au droit à la liberté d’expression artistique et de création.

The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights comments on press freedom in the digital age : new threats, new challenges On May 3rd the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Nils Muižnieks, published a human rights comment on press freedom in the digital age : “As growing portions of journalistic activity take place on the Internet, people reporting can reach out faster and to a broader audience than before. But old and new threats await them when they decide to do so : violence, intimidation, prosecution for lawful speech, judicial harassment and surveillance of those reporting continue unabated in the digital era, including in Europe.” The Commissioner urges to strengthen work to ensure the protection and safety of journalists. Protection must be as inclusive as possible, including not only journalists (in the formal sense), but all those reporting in the public interest. According to the caselaw of the Strasbourg Court, the justification for enhanced protection of freedom of expression is the nature of the information imparted, rather than the position of the person imparting this information.

Communiqué conjoint du Rapporteur spécial des Nations Unies et du Rapporteur spécial de la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme Suite aux informations concernant l’existence de programmes de surveillance secrète créés par les États dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et la défense de la sécurité nationale, le Rapporteur spécial des Nations

Unies sur la promotion et la protection du droit à la liberté d’opinion et d’expression et le Rapporteur spécial de la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme sur la liberté d’expression ont émis, le 21 juin 2013, un communiqué conjoint rappelant les principes du droit international qui servent à orienter la formulation et la mise en œuvre des programmes de surveillance dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme et la défense de la sécurité nationale. Les États doivent assurer la publicité et la transparence de la réglementation des mécanismes d’interception d’informations personnelles afin notamment que les droits à l’intimité et à la liberté d’expression soient préservés.

Clôture définitive de l’affaire Kimel c. Argentine Par la résolution d’exécution du 5 mars 2013, la Cour interaméricaine de droits de l’homme a déclaré close l’affaire Kimel c. Argentine du 2 mai 2008. L’affaire concernait la condamnation pénale d’un journaliste pour avoir publié un ouvrage où il mettait en cause l’attitude d’un juge lors du traitement d’un massacre pendant la dictature. La Cour s’est félicitée du fait que les autorités argentines ont adopté l’ensemble des mesures d’exécution qu’appelait l’arrêt de la Cour, y compris le changement du droit interne en matière de délit de diffamation.

EU-sponsored photographic exhibition relating to same-sex couples In an inquiry procedure before the Ombudsman (complaint 1640/2011/MMN against the European Commission), a complainant alleged that the Commission exceeded its powers and misused EU funds by giving its patronage to, hosting and financing a photographic exhibition relating to same-sex couples prepared by the organisation ILGA-Europe. She added that the Commission insulted and discriminated 2013/4

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against those EU citizens that do not share the views promoted by the said exhibition, given that : (i) the relevant photographs were accompanied by text containing offensive language ; and (ii) the views expressed through this photographic exhibition were not shared by or were unacceptable to a considerable number of EU citizens. The Ombudsman found that the Commission did not commit an instance of maladministration, but “understands” the complainant’s view that a statement suggesting that anyone who does not agree with allowing lesbian couples to benefit from artificial insemination is “solely motivated by lesbophobia” was likely to offend at least some EU citizens (and thus violate article 11 of the Charter). Although the Commission has clarified later that the patronage did not imply the Commission’s endorsement of the entire contents of the exhibition, the Ombudsman remarks that it would clearly have been advisable to make this clear at an earlier stage, for instance, by displaying an appropriate disclaimer.

Préoccupation concernant l’approbation en Equateur de la loi organique sur les communications Le 28 juin 2013, le Rapporteur spécial pour la liberté d’expression de la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme a exprimé sa préoccupation suite à l’approbation de la loi organique sur les communications par l’Equateur. Dans une lettre envoyée au gouvernement équatorien, le Rapporteur explique les raisons pour lesquelles la loi en cause irait à l’encontre des standards internationaux sur la liberté d’expression et les droits à une protection juridictionnelle effective. Le Rapporteur spécial a appelé l’État équatorien à revoir la loi pour respecter ses engagements internationaux en la matière.

caine des droits de l’homme a également manifesté sa préoccupation concernant la demande adressée par le ministère de la Justice des États-Unis aux sociétés de téléphonie de lui fournir les enregistrements de tous les appels téléphoniques réalisés par des journalistes liés à l’agence The Associated Press (AP). Ces enregistrements ont été obtenus sans que l’agence en ait été avertie et sous le prétexte de la réalisation d’une enquête sur une supposée fuite d’informations considérées comme néfastes aux États-Unis. Selon le Rapporteur, des telles mesures affectent le droit à la liberté d’expression en portant atteinte au secret des sources journalistiques, consacré, parmi d’autres, par le Principe 8 de la Déclaration de Principes sur la liberté d’expression de la Commission interaméricaine.

Liberté d’association / Freedom of association Accès des associations aux ressources financières Le Rapporteur spécial sur le droit de réunion et d’association pacifiques Maina Kiai consacre son rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/23/39) au financement des associations et à l’organisation de réunions pacifiques. Il est préoccupé par les obstacles excessifs à l’aide financière rencontrés par les acteurs de la société civile. Il est d’avis que les États doivent faciliter l’accès des associations à des financements, y compris de sources étrangères. Il souligne également que la tenue de réunions pacifiques est un moyen légitime d’en appeler au changement démocratique et à un respect accru des droits de l’homme. Ce droit est particulièrement important pour les groupes les plus exposés au risque de violations et de discriminations.

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Actualités / News Liberté de réunion / Freedom of assembly Voir également Racisme et intolérance / Racism and intolerance Recommandations sur la protection des droits de l’homme dans le contexte des manifestations pacifiques Suite au panel sur le même sujet et à la résolution 19/35 adoptée par le Conseil en mars 2012, la Haut-Commissaire aux droits de l’homme des Nations Unies a présenté un rapport sur les mesures effectives et les meilleures pratiques pour assurer la promotion et la protection des droits de l’homme dans le contexte des manifestations pacifiques (A/HRC/22/28). La HautCommissaire conclut que les manifestations pacifiques sont un aspect fondamental de la démocratie et les États devraient reconnaître leur rôle positif. Dans le contexte des manifestations pacifiques, la promotion et la protection des droits de l’homme demandent non seulement un cadre juridique adéquat, mais également des efforts constants pour assurer leur mise en œuvre. Cela passe notamment par le dialogue entre les différents protagonistes (organisateurs de manifestations, autorités administratives, police, etc.) et la formation en droits de l’homme des forces de police.

Judgment on police brutality during demonstration On 23 July 2013, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of İzci v. Turkey. The case concerns a woman who was beaten and subjected to teargas when police attacked a peaceful demonstration to celebrate Women’s Day. The Court found both a substantive and procedural violation of Article 3, on account of the excessive use of violence and the lack of investigation of the incident. The Court also found a violation of Article 10, because the violence used was

not necessary for preventing disorder or crime. Furthermore, the Court made a ruling under Article 46, in which it held that a clearer set of rules must be adopted concerning the use of tear gas. A system must also be put in place that guarantees adequate training of law enforcement personnel, as well as control and supervision of that personnel during demonstrations. There is also need for an effective ex post facto review of the necessity, proportionality and reasonableness of any use of force, especially against people who do not put up violent resistance.

Mariage et vie familiale / Marriage and family life European Committee of Social Rights’ decision on suspension of family allowances for truancy On 19 March 2013, the European Committee of Social Rights decided European Committee for Home-Based Priority Action for the Child and the Family (EUROCEF) v. France. The case concerned a measure suspending and possibly suppressing family allowances in the event of truancy. The Committee considered that the measure makes parents exclusively responsible for pursuing the aim of reducing truancy and increases the economic and social vulnerability of the families concerned. Moreover, there was no evidence that the measure helped achieve the aim of returning the child to school. However, since the Committee rules on the legal situation that applies on the date of its decision on the merits, there was no violation of Article 16 of the European Social Charter (the right of the family to social, legal and economic protection) as a result of the abrogation of the contested measures. No violation of Article 30 of the Charter (the right to protection against poverty and social exclusion) was found either.

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Judgment on disappeared Serbian babies On 26 March 3013, the European Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the case of Zorica Jovanović v. Serbia. The case was brought by the mother of one of the hundreds of newborn babies who had gone missing from Serbian hospitals following their supposed deaths, mostly from the 1970s to the 1990s. Three days after giving birth to a healthy baby, she was informed that her son had died. She was not allowed to see her son, his body was never handed over to her or her family, nor was she provided with an autopsy report or informed of where and when he was allegedly buried. By analogy with forced disappearance cases, the Court found a continuing violation of Article 8 on account of Serbia’s continuing failure to provide her with reliable information as to the fate of her son. Under Article 46, the Court ordered Serbia to within a year establish a mechanism aimed at providing individual redress to all parents in a situation (sufficiently) similar to the applicant’s.

Judgment on the refusal to return bodies to relatives On 6 June 2013, the European Court of Human Rights issued its judgments in the cases of Maskhadova and Others v. Russia and Sabanchiyeva and Others v. Russia. Both cases concern the refusal of the Russian authorities to return the bodies of Chechen insurgents who had been killed in battle to their families. According to the Court, the refusal to return a body falls within the ambit of both ‘private’ and ‘family life’ within the meaning of Article 8. The Court accepted that the refusals could serve the legitimate aim of protecting public safety and preventing disorder, since the Russian authorities considered that burial and remembrance rites could serve as means of terrorist propaganda and cause offence to the relatives of terrorism victims. According to the Court, however, these goals could not justify denying the applicants any par-

ticipation in the funeral ceremonies or at least some kind of opportunity for paying last respects to the deceased. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 8.

Media Judgment on ban on political advertising On 22 April 2013, the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom. The case concerned the refusal to broadcast a television advertisement by an animal rights NGO, because of its political nature. In the UK paid political advertising is banned from radio and television. The Court stressed that, since the case concerned a general measure, the question was not whether less restrictive rules should have been adopted, but rather whether, in adopting that measure and striking the balance it did, the legislature acted within its margin of appreciation. According to the Court, the prohibition was specifically circumscribed to address the risk of distortion of broadcasting on public interest matters, with minimum impairment of freedom of expression. Since the applicant organisation had access to alternative media, and in the absence of a European consensus on how to regulate paid political advertising in broadcasting, the Court did not find a violation of Article 10.

Judgment on unlawful search at newspaper publisher The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in the case of Saint-Paul Luxembourg S.A. v. Luxemburg on 18 April 2013. The case concerned a search and seizure warrant at the office of a newspaper publisher, in order to identify the author of an article, who allegedly did not appear on the official list of recognized journalists, in the context of defamation proceedings. A longer version of the author’s name, work-

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Actualités / News ing for the journal in question, however did appear on that list. According to the Court, the authorities could thus have applied a less intrusive measure than a search and seizure to confirm the identity of the author. The Court therefore found a violation of Article 8. Furthermore, the Court also found a violation of Article 10, stressing in particular the fact that the warrant had been formulated too broadly, conferring extensive powers to the investigating officers, and thereby making it possible to identify the journalist’s sources.

Migrants Le Rapporteur spécial sur les droits de l’homme des migrants se penche sur les frontières extérieures de l’UE François Crépeau a présenté un rapport sur la gestion des frontières extérieures de l’Union européenne et son impact sur les droits de l’homme des migrants. Il a consacré la première année de son mandat à cette étude. Pour ce faire, il a tenu des consultations avec les représentants de l’Union européenne et a effectué des visites en Grèce, Italie, Tunisie et Turquie. Il se félicite que les droits des migrants aient été intégrés dans la politique migratoire de l’UE. Toutefois il estime que la protection des droits fondamentaux des migrants, en particulier ceux en situation irrégulière, n’est pas souvent assurée sur le terrain. Dans ce contexte, il soulève un certain nombre de problèmes liés à la gestion sécuritaire des migrations, au recours à la détention comme outil de contrôle des frontières et à l’externalisation des opérations de contrôle des frontières, ainsi qu’à l’insuffisance du partage des responsabilités avec les États situés aux frontières de l’Union européenne.

Situations d’apatridie en République dominicaine Dans le cadre de son rapport concernant la République dominicaine, présenté lors

de sa 147e session ordinaire (17-22 mars 2013), la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme a dénoncé le manque d’avancées concernant la situation des personnes dominicaines d’origine haïtienne. Les violations des droits de l’homme qu’elles subissent liées notamment au droit à la nationalité produisent en effet de nombreuses situations d’apatridie. La Commission rappelle à l’État sa responsabilité d’adopter des mesures efficaces pour résoudre cette situation.

Surveillance des frontières maritimes extérieures de l’Union européenne Suite à l’annulation par la Cour de justice de la décision du Conseil 2010/252/UE, la Commission a émis une nouvelle proposition de règlement établissant des règles pour la surveillance des frontières maritimes extérieures dans le cadre de la coopération opérationnelle coordonnée par l’Agence européenne pour la gestion de la coopération opérationnelle aux frontières extérieures des États membres de l’Union européenne (FRONTEX) (COM/2013/0197 final). La proposition de règlement, qui s’inscrit dans le cadre opérationnel de Frontex, fait application du principe de non-refoulement. En cas de débarquement dans un pays tiers, les gardes-frontières ont l’obligation d’identifier les personnes interceptées ou secourues, et d’évaluer leur situation personnelle dans la mesure du possible. Ces personnes doivent être aussi informées, de manière appropriée, du lieu de débarquement et se voir offrir la possibilité d’expliquer les raisons pour lesquelles un débarquement dans le lieu proposé serait, selon elles, contraire au principe de non-refoulement (article 4). Une distinction est établie entre détection, interception et sauvetage et les mesures pouvant être prises dans ces différents cadres. La proposition traite également du débarquement des navires interceptés. Si le navire est intercepté dans la mer territoriale ou dans la zone contiguë, le débarquement a lieu sur le territoire de l’État membre côtier. Si l’intercep2013/4

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tion se déroule en haute mer, sous réserve du respect de la protection des droits fondamentaux et du principe de non-refoulement, le débarquement peut avoir lieu dans le pays tiers que le navire a quitté (article 10). Quant au débarquement consécutif à une opération de sauvetage, la proposition retient la notion de « lieu sûr » (article 2, § 11).

Minorités nationales / National minorities Judgment on segregation of Roma children in primary schools in Greece The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Lavida and Others v. Greece on 30 May 2013. The case concerned segregation in primary schools, more particularly the fact that one of the four primary school in the applicants’ village was exclusively reserved for pupils of Roma origin. The Court found a violation of Article 14 combined with Article 2 of Protocol 1. The Court referenced multiple international instruments that prohibit discrimination of Roma children in schools. The Court ruled that the failure of the State to implement effective anti-segregationist measures, for reasons to do with the manifest hostility of parents of non-Roma children, could not be considered to be objectively justified by a legitimate aim.

Adoption of Opinions on Ireland and Ukraine by the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities On 19 April 2013, the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities published its Third Opinion on Ireland. The Opinion sets several issues for immediate action, including : establish the new Irish Human Rights and Equality Commission ; take urgent measures to address the de facto exclusion of Travellers from the labour market ; and

continue to involve Travellers and Roma in the work of all relevant consultative mechanisms. On 28 March 2013, the Advisory Committee published its Third Opinion on Ukraine. Issues for immediate action include : adopt a comprehensive legislative framework pertaining to national minority protection and the status and restoration of rights of formerly deported persons ; take measures to promote the full and effective equality of persons belonging to disadvantaged minorities, such as the Roma and Crimean Tatars ; and re-establish a specialised governmental body to coordinate all issues relating to the protection of persons belonging to national minorities.

Organes de surveillance des traités des Nations Unies relatifs aux droits de l’homme / UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies Sessions récentes des comités d’experts Le Comité des droits de l’homme a tenu sa 107e session du 11 au 28 mars. Le Comité a examiné les rapports des États suivants : Angola, Hong Kong (Chine), Macao (Chine), Paraguay, Pérou. Le Comité a également examiné la situation à Belize en l’absence de rapport de l’État Partie. La 108e session du Comité a eu lieu du 8 au 26 juillet durant laquelle il a examiné les rapports de l’Albanie, de la Finlande, de l’Indonésie, de la République tchèque, du Tadjikistan et de l’Ukraine. Le Comité des disparitions forcées s’est réuni pour la quatrième fois du 8 au 19 avril. Il a examiné le rapport de l’Uruguay et de la France. Le Comité des droits des personnes handicapées a examiné le rapport du Paraguay lors de sa 9e session, qui s’est tenue du 15 au 19 avril. Il a tenu une demi-journée de

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Actualités / News discussion générale sur les femmes et les filles avec un handicap. Le Comité des travailleurs migrants a examiné la mise en œuvre de la Convention en Azerbaïdjan, Bolivie et Colombie lors de sa 18e session, tenue du 15 au 26 avril. Le Comité a eu une journée de discussion générale sur le rôle des statistiques migratoires dans le rapportage relatif aux traités et les politiques migratoires. Le Comité des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels s’est réuni pour sa 50e session du 29 avril au 17 mai. Il a examiné la mise en œuvre du Pacte au Japon, en Iran, en Jamaïque, en Azerbaïdjan, au Togo, au Rwanda et au Danemark. Le Protocole facultatif au Pacte international sur les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels est entré en vigueur le 5 mai. Le Comité contre la torture a tenu sa 50e session du 6 au 31 mai. Il a examiné les rapports concernant la Bolivie, l’Estonie, le Guatemala, le Japon, le Kenya, la Mauritanie, les Pays-Bas, et le Royaume-Uni. Le Comité des droits de l’enfant s’est réuni pour sa 63e session du 21 mai au 14 juin. Il a examiné la mise en œuvre de la Convention et des deux protocoles en Arménie, au Rwanda, en Israël, en Ouzbékistan, en Slovénie et en Guinée Bissau. Le 3 juin 2013, les États Parties à la Convention internationale sur l’élimination de toutes les formes de discrimination raciale a élu 9 nouveaux membres pour le Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination raciale : M. Noureddine Amir, M. Marc Bossuyt, Mme Anastasia Crickley, Mme Afiwa-Kindena Hohoueto, M. Anwar Kemal, M. Gün Kut, M. José Augusto Lindgren Alves, M. Yeung Kam John Yeung Sik Yuen et M. Melhem Khalaf. Le Sous-Comité pour la prévention de la torture s’est réuni du 17 au 21 juin. Il a

par ailleurs visité la Nouvelle Zélande du 28 avril au 8 mai et l’Allemagne du 8 au 12 avril. Le Comité pour l’élimination de la discrimination à l’égard des femmes s’est réuni du 8 au 26 juillet. Il a examiné la mise en œuvre de la Convention en Afghanistan, en Bosnie-Herzégovine, au Cap Vert, à Cuba, en République démocratique du Congo, en République dominicaine, en Serbie, et au Royaume-Uni.

Orientation sexuelle / Sexual orientation Condamnation d’une vague de violence contre les personnes LGTBI À travers le communiqué de presse no 54/13 du 30 juillet 2013, la Commission interaméricaine a condamné la récente vague de violence contre les personnes lesbiennes, gay, trans, bisexuelles et intersex (LGTBI) en Haïti, qui serait liée à la protestation contre l’homosexualité émise par la Coalition Haïtienne des organisations religieuses et morales le 19 juillet 2013. La Commission a rappelé que l’État était dans l’obligation d’adopter des mesures pour répondre à ces violations de droits de l’homme, et de s’assurer que les personnes LGTBI puissent exercer de manière effective leur droit à une vie sans aucune discrimination ni violence, et que ces obligations incluaient l’adoption de politiques et de campagnes publiques pour éviter que ce type d’actes puissent se répéter.

Interdiction des discriminations fondées sur l’orientation sexuelle Le 25 avril dernier, la Cour de justice a rendu l’arrêt Asociaţia Accept (C‑81/12) précisant l’interprétation à donner aux dispositions de la directive 2000/78/CE portant création d’un cadre général en faveur de l’égalité de traitement en ma2013/4

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tière d’emploi et de travail. En vertu de l’article 10 de cette directive, dès lors que sont établis « des faits qui permettent de présumer l’existence d’une discrimination directe ou indirecte, il incombe à la partie défenderesse de prouver qu’il n’y a pas eu violation du principe de l’égalité de traitement ». La Cour était interrogée par une juridiction roumaine dans le cadre d’une affaire où étaient en cause « les déclarations publiques, émises par une personne se présentant et étant perçue par l’opinion publique comme le dirigeant d’un club de football professionnel, excluant le recrutement par ce club d’un footballeur présenté comme étant homosexuel ». La Cour de justice a considéré que, pour que soit établie l’existence de « faits qui permettent de présumer l’existence d’une discrimination », il n’était pas nécessaire que « l’auteur des déclarations portant sur la politique d’embauche d’une entité déterminée [jouisse de] la capacité juridique de définir directement cette politique ou encore de lier ou de représenter cette entité en matière d’embauche ». Elle a également précisé que l’absence de violation du principe d’égalité de traitement « pourrait être réfutée à partir d’un faisceau d’indices concordants » (par exemple une « prise de distance claire par rapport aux déclarations publiques à l’origine de l’apparence de discrimination ») sans qu’il ne soit nécessaire de prouver que des personnes d’une orientation sexuelle déterminée ont été recrutées dans le passé, ce qui déboucherait sur une violation du droit au respect de la vie privée. La Cour a par ailleurs précisé que les sanctions prévues par les législations nationales en application de l’article 17 de ladite directive devaient revêtir « un caractère effectif, proportionné et dissuasif » et ne sauraient être « purement symboliques ».

Rapport de la Commission interaméricaine sur la diversité sexuelle Le Rapport spécial sur la diversité sexuelle (LGTBI), adopté lors de la 147e session ordinaire de la Commission interaméricaine (17-22 mars 2013), exprime sa préoccupation pour la persistance de « centres de guérison de l’homosexualité » dans la région. De la même façon, le rapport se montre préoccupé par des interventions chirurgicales pratiquées sur des enfants intersexuels afin de les adapter à un standard masculin ou féminin sans avoir égard ni à leur âge, ni à leur capacité de décider de la maîtrise de leurs corps. La Commission appelle les États Parties à revoir ces mesures à la lumière des droits de l’homme, car de telles interventions n’étant pas médicalement nécessaires, ont des conséquences irréversibles, incluant l’insensibilité génitale, la stérilisation et ainsi que des douleurs chroniques. La Commission s’est montrée également préoccupée par la double discrimination des personnes indigènes LGTBI vivant avec le virus VIH.

Organisation des États américains / Organization of American States Fonds d’assistance légale aux victimes de violations de droits humains La Cour interaméricaine, dans l’exercice de sa compétence de surveillance de l’exécution de ses décisions (articles 67 et 68 de la Convention américaine de droits de l’homme ; articles 25.1 et 25.2 du Statut de la Cour ; et article 69 de son règlement) a émis le 14 mai 2013 une Résolution par laquelle elle reconnaît l’accomplissement intégral par l’État du Salvador de l’obligation de verser la somme de 6.034,36 US$ en faveur du Fonds d’assistance légale aux victimes. Ce faisant, le Salvador se plie à ce que la Cour lui avait imposé dans l’arrêt du 25 octobre 2012, Masacres de El Mozote y

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Actualités / News des Places Aledaños. La somme correspond aux frais et dépenses engagés durant la procédure devant la Cour, notamment à l’occasion de la comparution de témoins lors de l’audience publique. La Cour interaméricaine rappelle à cette occasion qu’un tel versement contribue à maintenir le développement durable du Fonds, destiné à accorder l’assistance économique pour les victimes de violations de droits humains qui ne disposent pas des moyens permettant de faire face aux dépenses relatives au litige devant la Cour. Le fonds garantit l’égalité dans l’accès à la justice.

Réforme du règlement de la Commission interaméricaine des droits de l’homme (CIDH) Par une résolution 1/2013 du 19 mars 2013 (n° 1/2013), la Commission interaméricaine a approuvé la réforme de son règlement. Le processus de réforme avait commencé en 2011 et a été enrichi des recommandations des États Parties ainsi que de celles de la société civile, des victimes et du monde académique notamment. Les articles 25, 28, 29, 30, 36, 37, 42, 44, 46, 59, 72, 76 à 79 du règlement sont amendés, en mettant notamment l’accent sur la transparence des choix de la Commission, les procédures en matière de mesures provisoires et de pétitions individuelles, l’accès des victimes au système et au contentieux interaméricain des droits de l’homme et le renforcement des capacités des États Parties à partir de la promotion de bonnes pratiques. La réforme est en vigueur depuis le 1er août 2013.

Procès équitable / Due process Judgment on retroactive application criminal law against war criminals On 18 July 2013, the European Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the case of Maktouf and Damjanović v. Bosnia

and Hercegovina. The applicants had both been retroactively convicted and sentenced for war crimes on the basis of the new Bosnian Criminal Code. While these war crimes were already criminal offences under the old Code, different sentencing frameworks applied. According to the Court, the fact that an act was criminal under ‘the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations’ within the meaning of Article 7 § 2, does not mean that the rule of non-retroactivity of crimes and punishments does not apply. The Court rejected the argument that the duty to punish war crimes required that the rule of non-retroactivity be set aside, by noting that this rule also appears in the Geneva Convention. The Court went on to find a violation of Article 7, since the applicants could have received lower sentences had the old Code been applied.

Judgment on immunity of the United Nations in context of Srebrenica massacre The European Court of Human Rights delivered its admissibility decision in Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica and Others v. the Netherlands on 11 June 2013. The case concerned complaints instituted by relatives of victims of the 1995 Srebrenica massacre against the United Nations in front of the Dutch courts. The Dutch courts rejected the complaints for reasons to do with the UN’s immunity. The Court declared the application inadmissible. The Court ruled that international law did not support the position that a civil claim should override immunity from suit for the sole reason that it was based on an allegation of a particularly grave violation of a norm of international law. The Court recognised that no alternative jurisdiction existed that would be competent to entertain the applicants’ claim against the UN, but ruled that it did not follow that the recognition of immunity in itself constituted a violation of the right of access to court under Article 6.

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La notion de « délai raisonnable » L’arrêt rendu par la Cour de justice le 28 février 2013 dans l’affaire Arango Jaramillo e.a. c. BEI (C-334/12) a pour objet le réexamen d’un arrêt du Tribunal de l’Union européenne (T-234/11). Afin de déterminer si l’interprétation de la notion de « délai raisonnable » retenue par le Tribunal porte atteinte à l’unité ou à la cohérence du droit de l’Union, la Cour de justice ne se contente pas de constater le caractère erroné de cette interprétation au regard de sa jurisprudence ; elle examine également l’atteinte qu’elle est susceptible de porter au droit à un recours effectif. Or, pour analyser les exigences inhérentes au respect du principe d’une protection juridictionnelle effective, la Cour de justice se réfère non seulement à l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux, mais également à la jurisprudence de la Cour européenne des droits de l’homme relative à l’article 6, § 1er de la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme. Elle relève à cet égard que si le droit à un tribunal n’est pas absolu, des limitations quant aux conditions de recevabilité d’un recours pouvant notamment y être apportées, celles-ci ne doivent toutefois pas empêcher les justiciables de se prévaloir d’une voie de recours disponible. Or, considérant en l’espèce que l’interprétation erronée par le Tribunal de la notion de « délai raisonnable » a placé les requérants dans l’impossibilité de défendre leurs droits au moyen d’un recours effectif devant un tribunal, la Cour de justice constate une atteinte au principe de protection juridictionnelle effective. C’est à partir de ce double constat, à la fois de dénaturation par le Tribunal de la substance même de la notion de « délai raisonnable », et de méconnaissance du droit à un recours juridictionnel effectif qui en résulte, que la Cour de justice retient l’existence d’une atteinte à l’unité ou à la cohérence du droit de l’Union.

L’exigence de « coût non prohibitif » Suivant la même logique, on peut relever la décision préjudicielle rendue par la Cour

de justice le 11 avril 2013 dans l’affaire Edwards (aff. C-260/11) et portant sur l’interprétation des articles 10bis de la directive 85/337/CEE et 15bis de la directive 96/61/ CE qui prévoient en matière d’environnement que les procédures juridictionnelles visées ne doivent pas avoir un coût prohibitif (voir à cet égard, dans cette même livraison de la revue, la chronique portant sur les droits de l’homme et l’environnement). Pour interpréter cette exigence de « coût non prohibitif », la Cour de justice précise en effet que celle-ci participe, dans le domaine de l’environnement, du respect du droit à un recours effectif consacré à l’article 47 de la Charte des droits fondamentaux. Elle indique à cet égard que l’exigence de « coût non prohibitif » implique que les personnes visées par les directives précitées ne soient pas empêchées de former ou de poursuivre un recours juridictionnel entrant dans le champ d’application des articles soumis à son interprétation en raison de la charge financière qui pourrait en résulter. S’agissant de l’affaire qui lui est soumise, elle ajoute que la seule circonstance que le requérant au principal n’ait pas été dissuadé en pratique d’exercer son action ne saurait suffire à considérer que le coût de la procédure n’a pas pour lui un caractère prohibitif.

Projet de directive portant sur l’accès à un avocat dans l’Union européenne Le 19 juin 2013, un projet de directive du Parlement et du Conseil fixant des règles européennes minimales concernant le droit d’accès à un avocat pour les personnes soupçonnées ou poursuivies ainsi que le droit des individus en détention de communiquer avec une personne de leur choix a été approuvé par la Commission des libertés civiles du Parlement européen. Ce projet vise à renforcer les droits procéduraux des personnes soupçonnées ou poursuivies dans les procédures pénales et à améliorer la coopération judiciaire dans l’Union européenne. En effet, alors que les droits de la défense constituent un élément fondamen-

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Actualités / News tal du droit à un procès équitable, les conditions dans lesquelles les suspects peuvent consulter un avocat diffèrent encore d’un État membre à l’autre. La directive, si elle est adoptée, participera donc du renforcement de la confiance mutuelle entre les États membres tout en assurant un niveau élevé de protection des droits fondamentaux au sein de l’Union européenne.

Recours juridictionnel suspensif relatif au mandat d’arrêt européen L’arrêt Jeremy F. c. Premier Ministre (C168/13) a été rendu le 30 mai 2013 à l’occasion de la première demande de décision préjudicielle adressée par le Conseil constitutionnel français à la Cour de justice. Celle-ci portait en substance sur la question de savoir si la décision-cadre relative au mandat d’arrêt européen impose aux États membres de prévoir la possibilité de former un recours suspensif contre une décision d’extension des effets d’un mandat d’arrêt européen ou bien au contraire s’y oppose. Le Code de procédure pénale français n’admettant pas un tel recours, le Conseil constitutionnel, saisi d’une question prioritaire de constitutionnalité dans le cadre de la procédure au principal, devait en effet pour sa part déterminer si cette absence de recours ne violait pas le droit à un recours juridictionnel effectif. Dans ce contexte, la Cour de justice considère que si la décision-cadre n’empêche ni n’impose aux États de prévoir un recours juridictionnel suspensif à l’encontre des décisions relatives au mandat d’arrêt européen, ses modalités de mise en œuvre doivent en revanche respecter les droits fondamentaux consacrés dans la Charte des droits fondamentaux : les droits fondamentaux garantis par la Charte faisant partie intégrante du droit de l’Union, il appartient non seulement au législateur européen de les prendre en compte, mais les États membres doivent également en assurer le respect dans la mise en œuvre du droit de l’Union européenne. La Cour de justice ajoute que même en dehors du droit de l’Union, le

droit interne des États membres, en l’occurrence leur procédure pénale, est lui aussi soumis à l’obligation de respecter les droits fondamentaux, notamment ceux consacrés par la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme ou par le droit national. Elle justifie cette solution en considérant qu’en consolidant le degré de confiance mutuelle entre les États membres, une telle obligation participe du renforcement du principe de reconnaissance mutuelle, sur lequel repose précisément le mécanisme du mandat d’arrêt européen visé par la décision-cadre.

Propriété / Property Judgments concerning 98% tax rate on severance pay The European Court of Human Rights delivered judgments in N.K.M. v. Hungary and R.Sz. v. Hungary on 14 May 2013 and 2 July 2013, respectively. Both cases concerned the imposition of a 98 % tax rate on the upper part of the severance pay due to dismissed civil servants and employees of State-owned companies. Given the lack of a European consensus on taxation, the Court granted a wide margin of appreciation to the national authorities, which meant that the applicable tax rate could not be decisive in itself. However, the Court found the measure targeted only a certain group of individuals, who were apparently singled out by the public administration in its capacity as employer. As a result, the applicants were made to bear an excessive and disproportionate burden, in violation of Article 1 of Protocol 1.

Racisme et intolérance / Racism and intolerance Plan d’action de Rabat sur l’interdiction de l’appel à la haine nationale, raciale ou religieuse Lors de la 22e session du Conseil, la HautCommissaire aux droits de l’homme des 2013/4

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Nations Unies a présenté les résultats d’une série d’ateliers d’experts sur l’interdiction de l’incitation à la haine nationale, raciale ou religieuse, durant lesquels les modèles législatifs, les pratiques judiciaires et les politiques en la matière ont été examinés (A/HRC/22/17/Add.4). Initiée en 2011, cette initiative s’est clôturée par une réunion finale d’experts à Rabat en octobre 2012 qui a permis de rassembler les conclusions et recommandations des différents ateliers d’experts. Sur cette base, les experts ont adopté le Plan d’action de Rabat sur l’interdiction de l’appel à la haine nationale, raciale ou religieuse qui constitue une incitation à la discrimination, à l’hostilité ou à la violence.

Judgment on dissolution of anti-Roma association The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Vona v. Hungary on 9 July 2013. The case concerned the dissolution of an association involved in anti-Roma rallies and paramilitary marches. The Court found no violation of Article 11. The Court held that the paramilitary demonstrations, through which the association expressed racial division and implicitly called for race-based action, had an intimidating effect on members of a racial minority. The Court ruled that, if the right to freedom of assembly is repeatedly exercised by way of intimidating marches involving large groups, the State is entitled to take measures restricting the related freedom of association in so far as it is necessary to avert the danger which such large-scale intimidation represents for the functioning of democracy. The Court concluded that the authorities had chosen the least intrusive – according to the Court, the only reasonable – course of action to deal with the issue.

Religion Des experts indépendants abordent différents aspects des droits des personnes appartenant à des minorités Le Rapporteur spécial sur la liberté de religion et de conviction, Heiner Bielefeldt, s’est penché sur la situation des minorités religieuses dans son dernier rapport au Conseil des droits de l’homme (A/HRC/22/51), notamment sur la nécessité de respecter et de protéger la liberté de religion et de conviction pour les personnes appartenant aux minorités religieuses. L’Experte indépendante sur les questions relatives aux minorités, Rita Izsàk, s’est quant à elle concentrée sur la question des minorités linguistiques, plus particulièrement sur les défis qu’elles rencontrent (A/HRC/22/49).

Judgment on religious autonomy and trade union freedom for priests The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Sindicatul “Pãstorul cel Bun” v. Romania on 9 July 2013. The case concerned the authorities’ refusal to register a trade union for priests of the Romanian Orthodox Church, for reasons to do with religious autonomy (the applicants had failed to obtain the archbishop’s permission). The Court found no violation of Article 11, by eleven votes to six. The Court ruled that, taking into account the wide margin of appreciation granted to the national authorities in this area, the refusal to register the union was not unreasonable, particularly in view of the State’s role in preserving religious autonomy. The Court specifically ruled that, in refusing to register the applicant union, the State was simply applying the principle of the autonomy of religious communities and declining to become involved in the organisation and operation of the Romanian Orthodox Church, thereby

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Actualités / News observing its duty of neutrality under Article 9 of the Convention.

Santé / Health Voir également Droits des femmes / Women’s rights Le Rapporteur spécial contre la torture examine les établissements de soins de santé Le rapport du Rapporteur spécial sur la torture et autres peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants, Juan Mendez, se concentre sur certaines formes d’abus dans les établissements de soins de santé qui franchissent parfois un seuil de gravité les rendant constitutifs de torture ou de peines ou traitements cruels, inhumains ou dégradants (A/HRC/22/53). Le Rapporteur a étudié certaines pratiques abusives souvent signalées dans les établissements de soins et a mis à jour les politiques qui favorisent de telles pratiques ainsi que les lacunes existantes en matière de protection. En appliquant le cadre de protection contre la torture à ces abus, le Rapporteur cherche à mieux comprendre les violations commises et à clarifier les obligations positives des États de les prévenir, poursuivre et réparer. Il formule plusieurs recommandations à cet égard.

Judgment on denial of healthcare on financial grounds The European Court of Human Rights issued its judgment in the case of Mehmet Şentürk and Bekir Şentürk v. Turkey on 9 April 2013. The case concerned a pregnant woman who had died after being denied emergency treatment because she was unable to pay a deposit to cover the costs of her hospital admission and surgery. The Court found that Turkey had failed to discharge its positive obligation to protect the applicant’s physical integrity, in violation of Article 2. In particular, the

Court stressed that domestic law had failed to protect her life, since it had allowed the hospital to refuse her access to adequate emergency care. The Court further found a procedural violation of Article 2. The Court particularly held that, since the actions of the medical staff could not be considered as simple fault or medical negligence, but amounted to knowingly denying emergency treatment in violation of their professional obligations, criminal prosecution should have been brought against them.

Mauvais traitements dans le contexte médical Dans l’arrêt Suárez Peralta c. Equateur du 21 mai 2013 (arrêt sur les exceptions préliminaires, le fond et les réparations, Série C no 261), la Cour interaméricaine a condamné l’Equateur pour les mauvais traitements médicaux subis par les requérantes. La Cour a constaté la violation non seulement des articles 8, § 1er (garanties judiciaires) et 25 (protection judiciaire) du fait des nombreuses carences de l’enquête pénale, mais aussi de l’article 5, § 1er du fait de l’atteinte à l’intégrité personnelle des deux victimes. La Cour relie directement le droit à l’intégrité personnelle à la santé humaine. La protection de ce droit implique, selon la Cour, la réglementation des services de santé dans les ordres internes. L’obligation de contrôle étatique sur les services de santé s’étend aux services publics comme aux services privés.

Torture et mauvais traitements / Torture and ill-treatment Judgment on life imprisonment without possibility of review or release The Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Vinter and Others v. the United Kingdom on 9 July 2013. The case concerned sentences 2013/4

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of life imprisonment without the possibility of review or release. The Court found a violation of Article 3. The Court noted that the imposition of a life sentence is not in itself incompatible with Article 3, but ruled that, for it to remain compatible with Article 3, there must be both a prospect of release and a possibility of review. The Court held that it was for the national authorities to decide on the form and timing of the review, but observed that the comparative and international law materials showed clear support for a mechanism guaranteeing review no later than 25 years after the imposition of a life sentence. In passing, the Court also indicated that a grossly disproportionate sentence would violate Article 3 of the Convention, but added that this test will only be met on rare and unique occasions.

European anti-torture watchdog elects its new Bureau The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has elected its new Bureau. The Bureau now consists of L tif Hüseynov, Marzena Mykola and Gnatovskyy Ksel. L tif Hüseynov from Azerbaijan has been re-elected as the CPT’s President. Mr Hüseynov is Professor of Public International Law at Baku State University. Marzena Ksel from Poland has been elected as the CPT’s 1st Vice-President. She is a medical doctor and former Head of the Health-Care Department in the Polish Prison Service. Mykola Gnatovskyy from Ukraine has been elected as the CPT’s 2nd Vice-President. He is Associate Professor of International Law at Taras Shevchenko National University, Kyiv. The CPT has unlimited access to all places of detention in the 47 member States of the Council of Europe, to examine how persons deprived of their liberty are treated.

Council of Europe anti-torture Committee publishes report on Georgia The Council of Europe’s Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) has published on the 31 July the report on its November 2012 ad hoc visit to Georgia, together with the Georgian authorities’ response. In its report, the CPT welcomes the wide-scale prison amnesty, while stressing that the problems of prison overcrowding and prison population inflation cannot be addressed in a comprehensive and lasting way through the use of such exceptional measures ; a strategy for the sustainable reduction of the prison population should include a variety of steps to ensure that imprisonment really is the measure of last resort. The CPT has also made several recommendations concerning the two prisons visited by the delegation (in Gldani and Kutaisi) and on other issues related with the prison system, especially the prison health-care services.

Vie privée / Private life Judgment on disclosure of medical information on Jehovah’s Witnesses The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Avilkina and Others v. Russia on 6 June 2013. The case concerned the disclosure by public hospitals of Jehovah’s Witnesses’ medical files to a prosecutor, in compliance with his request to inform him of any refusal by Jehovah’s Witnesses to have blood transfusions. The Court found a violation of Article 8. The Court held that the applicants were not suspects in any criminal investigation. Moreover, the doctors had other means than disclosure at their disposal, if they considered that they were faced with a life-threatening situation. The Court ruled that the means employed by the prosecutor need not have been so oppressive for the applicants. Other options than ordering

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Actualités / News the disclosure of confidential medical information were available, such as trying to obtain the applicants’ consent for the disclosure and/or questioning them.

Judgment on assisted suicide The European Court of Human Rights delivered its judgment in Gross v. Switzerland on 14 May 2013. The case concerned an elderly woman who wished to end her life. Because she did not suffer from a clinical illness, she was unable to obtain the authorities’ permission to be provided with a lethal drug to commit suicide. The Court found a violation of Article 8, by four votes to three. The Court stated that the Swiss guidelines on assisted suicide were issued by a non-governmental organisation. Moreover, since the guidelines only applied in cases of terminal illness, they did not cover the applicant’s case. The Court ruled that the lack of clear legal guidelines on the issue was likely to have a chilling effect on doctors and that the resulting uncertainty must have caused the applicant a considerable degree of anguish, which would not have occurred if there had been clear, State-approved guidelines.

Harcèlement moral Le 19 juin 2013, le Tribunal de la fonction publique a rendu sa décision Agence européenne de la sécurité aérienne (AESA) (F-40/12). CF, ancien agent temporaire de l’Agence, a saisi le Tribunal, suite à la résiliation de son contrat d’agent temporaire qui résulte, selon elle, du harcèlement moral dont elle a fait l’objet tout au long de sa période de travail. Si le Tribunal rappelle qu’une décision faisant grief à un agent ne serait pas pour autant illégale dans un contexte de harcèlement moral, il y a lieu d’examiner s’il existe un lien entre le harcèlement en cause et les motifs de la décision de licenciement (Tribunal de la fonction publique, 24 février 2010, Menghi/ENISA,

F-2/09). Après avoir examiné les différents moyens, le Tribunal conclut que les indices de harcèlement moral présentés ne sont pas suffisants. Le Tribunal fait cependant droit à la demande de CF d’annuler la décision de l’Agence et de la condamner à une indemnisation, mais sur un autre fondement que celui du harcèlement moral : l’Agence aurait causé un préjudice matériel à la requérante en ne prenant pas en compte des services que celle-ci aurait accomplis en tant qu’agent contractuel pour calculer la durée de son congé de maladie rémunéré. The Recent Developments concerning the Council of Europe were compiled by Yaiza Janssens, Laurens Lavrysen, Lourdes Peroni and Stijn Smet, working under the supervision of prof. Eva Brems (Ghent University, Belgium). The Recent Developments concerning the European Union (EU) were compiled by Pierre-Vincent Astresses, Pauline Béchieau, Antal Berkes, Véronique Bruck, Aurore Dupin-Jarry, Sarah Laalaj, Chervine Oftadeh, Quy Hanh Pham and Aline Veloso, working under the supervision of prof. L. Burgorgue-Larsen (Sorbonne Law School, Paris I, France). The Recent Developments concerning the Organization of American States (OAS) were compiled by Rosmerlin Estupiñan Silva, Juana María Ibanez Rivas, Nicolás Montoya Cespedes et Ruitemberg Pereira, working under supervision of prof. L. Burgorgue-Larsen (Sorbonne Law School, Paris I, France). The Recent Developments concerning the United Nations were compiled by Nathalie Rondeux, from the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (Geneva) ; the views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.

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2013 | 4

Journal européen des droits de l’homme

Journal européen des droits de l’homme European Journal of Human Rights

European Journal of Human Rights

JEDH | EJHR

n° 4 | novembre 2013 Rédacteur en chef | Editor in chief Olivier De Schutter

561 Dossier

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678 Chroniques

678 Columns

706 Actualités

706 news

ISSN : 2294-9313

561 Dossier

- Environnement et droits de l’homme . . . . 678

- Environment and Human Rights . . . . . . . 678

D/2013/0031/490 JEDH-N.13/4 ISBN : 978-2-8044-6749-4

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